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Literature Review

Focusing on the European Union and the externalization of borders in countries

throughout North Africa, the role of civil society organizations is important to examine as they

become nonstate actors that contribute to the in transit and migratory experiences of migrants

attempting to cross international borders. To understand the role of nonstate actors in migration

between African countries and the EU it is first important to highlight the complex power

dynamics and governmental structures that operate and exist at the border. Literature

surrounding migration and the study of borders as it relates to movement and mobility, define the

term ‘border’ as “a dynamic process of power relations rather than a fixed and material entity”

(Fontanari and Ambrosini 2018, 588). Fontanari and Ambrosini expand on this concept arguing

that a ‘European Border Regime’ has been established as an active system within which a

“complex set of actors, laws, policies, devices and discourses that govern migration towards and

within Europe” (2018, 588).

Within this regime there are private and public actors that have varying interests and

objectives that create an even more complex space that migrants must interact with and navigate.

The various power structures and the tensions that they create, establish what Fontanari and

Ambrosini refer to as a ‘battleground’ (2018, 589). This conceptualization of migration in the

article highlights how the “migration process is not only managed by political authorities and

legislation, but it is an outcome of power relations between other actors such as migrants

themselves and several parts of the civil society” (2018, 589). Fontanari and Ambrosini focus

their research on a case of refugees in Italy and Germany and their participation in the

Oranienplatz protest in Berlin. While the active involvement of civil society supporters are

examined in their research, they ultimately show the agency of migrants arguing that “refugees

are not passive victims in need of help and welfare relief; rather, they are autonomous beings
who try to build their lives by negotiating with or challenging structural constraints” (Fontanari

and Ambrosini 2018, 599). This article serves to establish the complexities of power at the

European Border and identify civil society as a distinct actor within the ‘European Border

regime.’ From this, the externalization of the European border can be examined, and the exact

role of civil society can be defined. Further, the article highlights the active agency and

autonomy of migrants which introduces the ways in which migrant resistance and support at the

borders are enacted, and how these actions interact with civil society.

Before discussing the role of civil society actors in the externalization of the border in

Northern Africa, it is important to define what civil society is and more broadly what it does.

Civil society is defined by the World Health Organization as “collective action around shared

interests, purposes and values, generally distinct from government and commercial for-profit

actors” (“Civil Society” 2017). Civil society can include charities, religious institutions,

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), community groups, professional associations, social

movements, trade unions, coalitions and advocacy groups (“Civil Society” 2017). According to

researchers Maurizio Ambrosini and Joanne Van Der Leun, civil society is in essence the

“activities and organizations that are not created by the state, or by its articulations, and are not

directly controlled by it” (2015, 104).

For the purpose of this research, I will be examining one case of a community-based

organization as a facet of civil society that is used to resist the border regime and support

migrants in their journeys. This does not detract however from the important role that multiple

organizations such as local or international NGOs, faith-based organizations, and social

movements play as contributors to the space of civil society and resistance at the border. In the

context of migration, Ambrosini and Van Der Leun find that civil society organizations are
forms of support that often work with the most vulnerable members of the migrant population

such as asylum seekers, irregular migrants, and victims of abuse or exploitation (2015, 104).

These categories, as argued by the authors of the article, are to a large extent the same population

of migrants who are often targets of restrictive control policies at the border (Ambrosini and Van

Der Leun 2015, 104). In spaces of increasing control and hardening immigration policies, civil

society organizations are situated and established to meet the needs of migrants that the “state

cannot or is not willing to meet” (Ambrosini and Van Der Leun 2015, 107). While other scholars

criticize the role of NGOs and civil society actors in their compliance and reinforcement of state

mandated policies, this article examines the ways in which civil society can soften the various

aspects of harsh and restrictive migration controls.

Civil society actions confront leaders and state actors with the limitations and failings of

such restrictive policy and further facilitate spaces of resistance that in some instances bring

about change (Ambrosini and Van Der Leun 2015, 111). Another article written by Ambrosini

uses a case of civil society health services in Italy to address how nonstate actors come into

tension and formulate resistance to state laws and policies. Drawing on his earlier conception of

migration as a battleground, Ambrosini argues that civil society actors are engaged in this

‘battle’ where the tightening of immigration regimes necessitates the encounter of “opponents

and competing narratives” (2015, 130). His research in this article focuses on two case studies of

NGOs based in Milan that provide nonurgent medical care to irregular migrants. He focuses on

the role of volunteers, cooperation networks, and the political activities that organizations

undertake in addition to their health care services. His study showed that “NGOs do not only

provide alternative services, they also act in the political arena to assert the rights of migrants, to

oppose stricter regulations, and to make public opinion aware of the issues at stake” (Ambrosini
2015, 130). This particular case study of NGOs in Milan highlights the active role that civil

organizations play in resisting borders polices and supporting migrants in various stages of their

journey. It is of course important to note that not every civil society organization has the same

impact and indeed do not utilize their resources to support migrants and resist the policies that

unjustly target them. Yet, Ambrosini’s work ultimately illustrates the capacity that nonstate

actors have to do so and further underscores the complexities and tensions inherent between

resisting migrants and their supporting organizations, and the securitization policies put in place

by state actors.

From this distinction of civil society organizations, literature provides deeper insight into

the existing dynamics between state actors and civil society especially as it pertains to the

externalization of the border in North Africa. In his research Paolo Cuttitta writes that NGOs and

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are “both objects and subjects of governments; their

positions vis-à-vis externalised migration management are diversified, and the outcomes of their

activities in this field unpredictable” (2019, 2). He posits that literature on externalization has

often lacked an examination of the role that NGOs/CSOs play in countries of transit and origin.

In his research he focuses specifically on organizations in Egypt and Tunisia. He finds that the

motivations of NGOs and CSOs are complex and varied at times supporting migrants and at

others acting as extensions of the state.

Generally speaking, the EU approach to migration cooperation with third countries like

Tunisia have been heavily Eurocentric that serve to further EU interests. Through partnerships

like the European Neighborhood Policy, foreign development aid is made conditional on the

increased securitization and control of their borders. As such aid and in effect the actions taken

by state actors to meet these conditions are distanced from the European state controlling and
creating them. In the same way the EU attempts to outsource “activities they would not be

allowed to carry out directly in foreign territories for sovereignty reasons…to neutral, nonstate

actors” (Cuttitta 2019, 6). In his examination of organizations in Tunisia and Egypt, specifically

focusing on the UNHCR, he finds that migrants are “able to turn externalised initiatives aimed at

their immobilisation into instruments facilitating their mobility towards Europe” (Cuttitta 2019,

9). This again highlights the distinct agency and autonomy of migrants as they navigate border

spaces and systems of support and restriction. Cuttitta concludes his study quoting another

scholar who writes that “some civil society actors work to erode borders, while others work to

reinforce them or to create new ones” (Rumford 2008, 8 in Cuttitta 2015, 9). This summarizes

the diverse role of NGOs/CSOs along the border of North African countries and emphasizes the

divergent motivations and impacts different organizations can have.

The influence and power of civil society does not go unnoticed by state actors on local or

international levels. In fact, international conventions and partnerships centered around migration

control and initiatives attempt to incorporate the voices of civil society actors and organizations.

The grassroots and typically nonstate affiliation of CSOs facilitate spaces where migrant needs

and issues can be represented and addressed. Despite the willingness to include these

organizations, literature on the subject has found that “the presence and input of refugees in

UNHCR settings has been criticised as insufficient and largely tokenistic (Rother and Steinhilper

2019, 247).

In this context, CSOs have little true impact to shape international initiatives or policies

ways that reflect their bottom-up practices. The types of organizations that deal directly with

migrants and refugees themselves are those that must have representation in conversations

considering policies that will most directly impact them. In their research Rother and Steinhilper
find that in response to this ‘tokenization’ inside U.N. deliberations where CSO presence was

less participatory and more observatory, civil society created their own space within which to

address international migration (2019, 246). This resulted in the foundation of the Peoples’

Global Action on Migration Development and Human Rights (PGA) a gathering that existed

parallel to the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). Rother and Steinhilper

credit these forums and other outside events like Civil Society Days and the Migration and

Development Civil Society Network (MADE) for helping “solidify and expand the spaces for

civil society voices, including migrant self-organizations and diaspora groups inside global

processes” (2019, 246).

This increasing presence and establishment of civil society organizations leads to the

question of Civil society actions for and against local government policy. In other words, how do

local civil society organizations resist and navigate spaces of restrictive migration policy and

what is the state response? Two articles examine a case of this in Tunisia and Greece. In their

research Pastore and Roman examine the discord between the EU’s dominant discourse and the

civil society stakeholders’ narratives concerning migration policy (2020, 16). Under the Ben Ali

regime, civil society in Tunisia was severely restricted and under heavy state control. As such

there were no CSOs focused on migration and asylum and the subject was absent from any major

media discourse and public discussion. Pastore and Roman find that after the revolution, civil

society activism began to rise, and the subject of migration and asylum was finally addressed.

Amidst this change, Tunisian civil society stakeholders criticized the security driven agenda of

the EU-Tunisia cooperation agreements and instead advocated for a more human-rights based

approach to migration and border policy (Pastore and roman 2020, 9).
Out of the oppressive scope of state suppression, Pastore and Roman found that civil

society actors were “were relatively successful in promoting a change in how Tunisian

institutional actors frame migration” (2020, 9). In their study they further found that CSOs were

willing to work within existing EU frameworks of migration policy to advocate for change, so

long as it addressed the human rights needs and concerns being presented by the organizations.

Though they disliked the heavy securitization, they were focused more on their ability to address

the ongoing issues in EU-Tunisian negotiations and as such were cooperative as opposed to

antagonistic (Pastore and Roman 2020, 15). These findings were in contrast to those found in

Morocco where the researchers noted that “Moroccan CSOs have a more radically critical stance

towards the EU’s and European countries’ cooperation policies…which are considered as a

continuation of the European colonialist policies in the African continent” (Pastore and Roman

2020, 16). This article illustrates the power dynamic between local governments and civil society

and further highlight the different attitudes civil society have in regard to government policy and

cooperation. This is important to note because it can influence the ways in which civil society

actors are able to engage the subject of migration and to what extent their activism is willing to

go. This can vary between states and even between different civil society organizations.

In the case of Greece, civil society organizations defied traditional governance when

regional and national mechanisms failed. In response to a humanitarian crisis that arose when

large numbers of migrants arrived at the Aegean islands, civil society actors mobilized and

utilized what researcher Nicholas Micinski calls “everyday coordination mechanisms” (2019,

129). Volunteers and CSO actors used everyday modes of communication like WhatsApp,

Facebook Groups, maps of service, peer-to-peer coordination, and site working groups to address

migrant needs. Micinski argues that “these coordination mechanisms challenged state led
processes because they established parallel systems and sometimes encourage[d] divergent

policies (2019, 130). Instead of the usual top-down approach to addressing migration at the

Grecian shores, these word of mouth and grassroots coordination techniques did not rely on any

formal approval by government authorities.

In response to this lack of governmental approval and the resulting actions that

undermined the goals of the European Union and the Greek government, the Greek government

cracked down on civil society actors, restricting the aid and support being given to migrants by

non-state actors. The article examines why this occurred and further the ways in which civil

society actors worked actively against government policy to provide social support for arriving

migrants. Micinski’s research ultimately highlights three trends that are relevant to understanding

the role and relationship of civil society actors and local governments. The first trend Micinski

notes is that “states and international organizations are hesitant to respond to large movements of

refugees or migrants because they are afraid that robust humanitarian responses will create an

incentive or a pull factor for migration” (2019, 145). This trend is seen across Europe and

especially at sites of border externalization in North African third countries. This trend leads to

the second which is the response of civil society actors to fill the void governments create by

providing crucial humanitarian aid. These actions lead to a third trend which is the crackdown

and even criminalization of groups providing migrant assistance because they work against state

led goals (Micinski 2019, 145). These trends are important to understand in the context of

resistance and support for migrants in complex border spaces.


References

Ambrosini, Maurizio, and Joanne Van der Leun. “Introduction to the Special Issue:
Implementing Human Rights: Civil Society and Migration Policies.” Journal of immigrant
& refugee studies 13, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 103–115

Ambrosini, Maurizio. “NGOs and Health Services for Irregular Immigrants in Italy: When the
Protection of Human Rights Challenges the Laws.” Journal of immigrant & refugee studies
13, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 116–134.

“Civil Society.” World Health Organization. World Health Organization, September 25, 2017.
https://www.who.int/social_determinants/themes/civilsociety/en/. fwho

Cuttitta, Paolo. “Non-Governmental/civil Society Organisations and the European Union-


Externalisation of Migration Management in Tunisia and Egypt.” Population space and
place (March 11, 2020).

Fontanari, Elena, and Maurizio Ambrosini. “Into the Interstices: Everyday Practices of Refugees
and Their Supporters in Europe’s Migration ‘Crisis.’” Sociology 52, no. 3 (2018): 587–
603. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038518759458.

Micinski, Nicholas R. “Everyday Coordination in EU Migration Management: Civil Society


Responses in Greece.” International studies perspectives 20, no. 2 (May 2019): 129–

Pastore, F., Roman, E. Framing migration in the southern Mediterranean: how do civil society
actors evaluate EU migration policies? The case of Tunisia. CMS 8, 2 (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0160-4

Rother, Stefan, and Elias Steinhilper. “Tokens or Stakeholders in Global Migration Governance?
The Role of Affected Communities and Civil Society in the Global Compacts on Migration
and Refugees.” International migration 57, no. 6 (October 24, 2019): 243–257.

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