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Kierkegaard:The Self and
EthicalExistence
GeorgeJ. Stack
StateUniversityof New York,Brockport
the ethical."4 The choice which is the condition for the possibility of
other authentic choices is the "absolute" choice of oneself which, in
Either/Or, is equated with Socratic self-knowledge.
The act of choosing is an expression or signification of an ethical
"movement." A "baptism of the will" brings a choice into the realm of
the ethical insofar as the will to choose is itself already an ethically rele-
vant act. For, volitional choice individuates and is the act by which an
individual may become a person. As is the case for Aristotle, the choice
of good or evil is the overriding choice with which one is confronted.
But even this choice presupposes that one has already chosen oneself. For,
an authentic choice can only originate out of some degree of self-knowl-
edge. Choice is an expression of a being who has the potentiality for per-
sonality and involves a return to possibilities which had been implicitly
present insofar as an individual had attained consciousness. For self-con-
sciousness is described by Kierkegaard as the relating process by which
the relata of ideality (conceptualization of an ideal possibility) and actu-
ality (concrete immediacy) are related, and which entails an awareness of
opposition affected by concern.5 A subjective concern for the actualiza-
tion of a possibility through choice already has ethical significance, since
this concern for the self-being of one's own actuality is central to an ethi-
cal existence. An ethical existence is a concernful or an "interested" exis-
tence. This is not egotism (Egoisme), but I-ness or subjectivity (Ego-
itet). To exist in subjective inwardness as a self is not a narcissistic ego
inflation, but an ethical task which requires self-control, self-mastery, self-
discipline, a kind of spiritual asceticism. Needless to say, such a state of
being (which entails a repetitious commitment to resolute moral decisive-
ness) is difficult to sustain throughout a lifetime. Nevertheless, the means
of realizing the ethical possibility, of moving toward selfhood, is available
for anyone who is self-reflective, who has the potentiality for self-trans-
formation.
as voluntary, then ... it would have in its turn to be the result of a prior
choice to choose, and that from a choice to choose to choose,"7 suggests
the logical absurdity of an analysis of absolute choice such as that of
Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard would probably say that there must at some
time in the life history of an individual be an occasion when he is faced
with the choice to choose or not to choose since choice is a self-reflec-
tive, self-conscious, intentional mental act. Like Aristotle, he agrees that
children or animals are not capable of choice. In addition, he assumes
that there is a hypothetical moment in an individual's life when he is
faced with the option to choose to choose. This is most dramatically
presented in his account of one's original choice: the choice to choose
oneself. Aristotle and Kierkegaard hold that choice is a voluntary act;
that is, an act which is within the power of an individual, one which is
done neither in ignorance nor out of compulsion. Thus, if Ryle's criti-
cism is valid in regard to Kierkegaard's account of choice it is equally
valid against Aristotle's view that choice is voluntary.
It would seem that Kierkegaard (in his analysis of the choice to
choose) fills in a gap in Aristotle's account of choice. For, Aristotle's
account of choice presupposes that there is an original choice which a
rational individual makes. The question is whether there must not be a
prior choice to choose since it is possible for an individual to attempt
to avoid making morally relevant choices. What is being sought is some-
thing like Sartre's conception of an original project. It is maintained that
rational, purposive moral choice is not possible unless one has already
"chosen oneself" insofar as this involves an attempt to know oneself and
one's motivations. Kierkegaard's conception of a choice to choose does
make sense if (a) we assume that at least some individuals can avoid
attaining ethical self-consciousness and hence put off ethically relevant
choice and (b) if we assume that prior to a rational, self-conscious
choice an individual did not, strictly speaking, make choices at all. In
order to choose to make a choice, deliberation and not a prior choice is
necessary. Furthermore, if a choice is not construed as voluntary, it is
difficult to know how we can ascribe responsibility for a choice to a moral
agent. Such a view seriously obscures the relationship between choice
and voluntary action. As Aristotle remarks in his Ethics, we cease to trace
the process of decision or action any further when we have traced the
origin of an action to the rational "part" of the self, since it is this which
brings about deliberate choice.8 If one denies that there is an apparent
mental process of intentional volition determining choice, it is difficult
to know how one would be able to distinguish a voluntary from an
involuntary action. Merely by observing the overt behavior of an in-
dividual we cannot know with certainty whether his action is voluntary
7. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London, 1949), p. 68.
8. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rackham (London, 1962), 3.3.17.
115 Kierkegaard: The Self and Ethical Existence
or involuntary. Ryle's answer that it is "a man" who does this or that
act does not answer this question unless we ask the individual whether
he intended to do this or that. If an action is, in fact, voluntary, we must
assume that the choice to do that act was also voluntary. Finally, if it
is admitted that one can refuse to make an important, decisive choice,
then the conception of a choice to choose does make sense. The avoidance
of making an absolute choice is not regarded as a choice since it sig-
nifies an incapacity for resoluteness. To be sure, it is not "a volition"
or a "will" which chooses on any given occasion, but a complex, psycho-
physical individual who makes a decision by virtue of a conative process
which we designate as a "volition" or an "act of will." We need not
convert "will" or volition" into ontological entities in order to use these
terms meaningfully in a description of the act of choice as it is con-
cretely experienced by an individual.
Kierkegaard appears to have narrowed the range of meaning of
choice and to have distinguished it from what ordinarily passes for choice
in daily life. He conceives of choices having direct relevance to the
development of character as far more significant than the adiaphoric
choices which comprise most of our ordinary decisions. Authentic
choice situations having to do with decisions which will affect future
choices and which are related to life projects are relatively rare. Most
of what in ordinary language is called a "choice" is trivial and of little
relevance for the development of the self. From a purely logical point
of view it may be plausible to argue that it is paradoxical to trace a
choice to choose to a prior choice insofar as this process appears to go
on ad infinitum; but from an existential point of view, from the point
of view of a finite being's existence between birth and death, it does
make sense insofar as it is conceivable that one may never choose to
make an authentic choice. Surely, certain choices are momentous for the
pattern or direction of one's life and are difficult to make. And there are
many who postpone such choices-who do not choose to choose-in-
definitely. That, as a matter of fact, individuals are unaware of the sig-
nificance of their "choices" or that they make decisions carelessly or
casually is not testimony to the insignificance of such choices, but it
may be testimony to the trivialization of human life against which
Kierkegaard rebelled, to the loss of what he described as the dialectical
tension of existence. Socrates held that it is by no means necessary that
everyone become a man, and Kierkegaard held that it is by no means
necessary or inevitable that one become a person or an integral self.
The act of choosing is not only individuating, but is an act whereby
the individual both expresses and attains freedom. The primitive free-
dom an individual has is a freedom for possibility. Before William James,
Kierkegaard insisted that only in a world in which there is possibility
is freedom itself possible. The choice of oneself means the realization
116 Ethics
this general notion does make sense insofar as one ought (ideally) to
know as much as one can about oneself in order to be free for rational
choice. This view may be compared with the assumption of psycho-
analysis that a recognition of the causal factors which have influenced
one's psychosexual development can enable one to change one's pattern
of behavior or overcome neurotic tendencies. At any rate, it is by means
of choice that an individual is liberated for his own possibilities. Only a
person who has a potentiality for rational choice can attempt to realize
the ethical possibility. As Heidegger will later express it, "Because Dasein
is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can. . . 'choose' itself and win
itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself . . . only insofar as it is essen-
tially something which can be authentic-that is, something of its own-
can it have lost itself and not yet won itself.""
One has made the ethical "movement" if one has taken responsibil-
ity for one's life no matter what the moral condition of that life may
be at present. An individual accepts himself as "guilty" in the sense
that he accepts guilt as a "debt" he owes to what is best in himself. To
know, in Kantian language, that one can be (from a moral point of view)
what one ought to be seems to entail that one also knows that one ought
to be what one can be. What Kierkegaard was sensitive to was that the
individual is, in a sense, a synthesis of necessity and possibility. The
necessary aspects of the individual are all of those factors which affect
what one is but which were acquired beyond one's control. The full
recognition of the necessities determining one's self is required in order
that an individual appropriate himself in his specificity and not be entirely
dominated by "unconscious" tendencies or dispositions.
What may be called "original" choice originates in relation to the
psychic processes of the psychophysical individual who posits this choice
(as possibility) and apprehends his own potentiality for making this
choice. The freedom of the individual is a freedom of self-determination
or self-realization and not, as some interpreters of Kierkegaard have sug-
gested, an absolute freedom. The self which determines itself and strives
to realize itself manifests its freedom in its choice of itself. Thus, the ethi-
cist, by choosing himself as "guilty" (in the sense of owing a debt to what
he ought to be) has done so freely and has, by virtue of this, brought to
actualization a freedom for possibility which he previously had a potential-
ity for (kunnen).
The most elementary form of freedom is a freedom for possibility,
a freedom which can be brought to fruition by virtue of a self-integrat-
ing act of choice. By freely accepting his imperfect, actual self the
individual is free to attempt to realize his projected ideal self. The first
movement in this subjective, teleological transformation is isolating and,
for that reason, individuating. For, as Kierkegaard expresses it, "The
11. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tiibingen, 1963), p. 43.
118 Ethics
first form which the choice takes is complete isolation. For in choosing
myself I detach myself from the whole world.... The individual having
chosen himself in terms of his freedom, is eo ipso active. This action,
however, has no relation to any surrounding world, for the individual
has reduced this to naught and exists only for himself."'12 This subjec-
tive, ethical epoche' contributes to the consolidation of personality insofar
as the individual is engaged in a concernful self-reflection and is involved
in a search for concernful knowledge in which the self is at issue.
THE SELF