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CANON 17
Bagonoc, Hazel Claire M.
Case Num. 132- Canon 17
Lorenzana Food Corporation V. Diaz
A.C. No. 2736

132 Facts:
Respondent: Atty. Francisco L. Daria
Complainant: Lorenzana Food Corporation (LFC)

Brief background:

● Atty. Daria was hired by LFC as its legal counsel and was designated as its personnel manager six months later. LFC’s
employee, Violeta Hanopol, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against LFC before (MOLE- now
DOLE)
● Summons was then served on the parties with the requirement that position papers be submitted
● No agreement was met during the initial hearing, so it was then reset to June 1983
● In the meantime, on June 20, 1983, respondent received an Order in another labor case, setting the hearing therein also on June 28,
1983
● The respondent then faced a conflicting schedule, when he also received an Order in another labor case setting the hearing on the
same date, so he then decided to postpone the hearing in the Hanopol case.
● However, instead of filing a written motion for postponement, he opted to call, through his secretary, the Office of the Labor Arbiter to
move for postponement, but such message failed to reach the labor arbiter because at the hearing on June 28, 1983, he considered
the case submitted for decision on the basis of Hanopol's complaint and affidavit. R had not submitted a position paper.
● R filed for an appeal to NLRC, the case was then remanded to the labor arbiter for further proceedings and hearings were then set on
July 27, 1984 and August 8, 1984
● Atty. Udabe then took his place and made the pleadings for the Hanapol case after R decided to resign, however, the Labor Arbiter
had already revived his earlier Decision.

In connection with the other charge of betrayal by respondent of his former client's confidences, the following
facts appear on record:

While the respondent was still connected with complainant, its general manager, Sebastian Cortes, issued a
memorandum to its employee, San Juan requiring him to submit a written explanation for his alleged double
liquidation and unliquidated cash advances. He was then issued with another memorandum after further
investigation, On account of the gravity of the charge, respondent placed San Juan under preventive
suspension.

San Juan thereafter resigned and s​ought the assistance of the respondent in the preparation of his
counter affidavit.

Complaint against the Lawyer:

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
IBP Decision:
Guilty, in violation with Canon 18
Canons Allegedly violated:
CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST
AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Issue​: WON the respondent was guilty of negligence and betrayal of his former client's confidences.

Ruling​: Yes. The Supreme court held that the respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a clear violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE
Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Furthermore, the appropriate Canon applicable in this case with regards to the violation of the then Canon 37 of the old Canons of
Professional Ethics is now:

CANON 17 — A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

The Supreme Court decided that the respondent had betrayed the confidences of the complainant, his former client and reiterated that:

. . . An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client
has terminated, and it is not a good practice to permit him afterwards to defend in another case other persons against his former client under
the pretext that the case is distinct from and independent of the former case.

Punishment: SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
 Synthesis​:

Respondent was faulted for negligence because of his failure to appear in two consecutive hearings and submit a position paper in a
case that he handled for his client. The Supreme Court also ruled that he betrayed the confidences of his former client when he assisted San
Juan, in the preparation of the counter-affidavit submitted in defense of the latter in the accusation of estafa filed against San Juan by LFC.

Reyes, Farrah Stephanie

Case No 133:

Susan De Leon v Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo

AC No. 10441

Facts

Brief Background

De Leon engaged in the services of Atty. Geronimo to represent her in a labor case where the employee of the former filed complaints against
her for illegal dismissal and violations of the labor standards. The Labor Arbiter’s (LA) dismissed the complaints on illegal dismissal and
ordered De Leon to pay the employees 5,000 each as financial assistance.

The employees field an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without De Leon being informed by her lawyer. The
LA’s decision was reversed by the NLRC, ordering De Leon to re-instate the employees and pay them more than 7 million. When De Leon
received a copy of the Motion for Reconsideration which Atty. Geronimo prepared, she was disappointed since the motion was composed of
only three (3) pages and the arguments did not address all the issues in the assailed decision. Thus, De Leon filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC. Atty. Geronimo provided her copies of the records of the case, after which, she never heard from the lawyer
again.

After several months, De Leon finally decided to call Atty. Geronimo to follow up on the status of the two motions. To her surprise, Atty.
Geronimo informed her that said motions had already been denied by the NLRC. When De Leon asked him if he elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA), Atty. Geronimo said that he did not. Atty. Geronimo said he did not pursue the case to higher courts because De Leon
has no money and no properties to avail – no money in the bank and no house and lot, since De Leon lives in the house owned by her
husband’s family. De Leon terminated the service of Atty. Geronimo as counsel and at the same time Atty. Geronimo filed withdrawal of
appearance as counsel.

Atty Geronimo claims that De Leon filed the complaint against him for his perceived negligence even when he exerted his best defending her
before the LA by filing the mandatory pleadings and supporting documents – by explaining the LA’s ruling favorable to her but De Leon was
said to have decided not to appeal, Atty. Geronimo also explained to her remedies if the NLRC reversed the LA ruling; that she might be forced
to bring the case to the CA and the Supreme Court. But De Leon said that she had no more money to defray the expenses of the suit.

133 Complaint against Lawyer

A disbarment complaint which De Leon filed against Atty. Geronimo, for purportedly committing acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), on presumed negligence in handling the case of the former.

​IBP Decision

The IBP recommended that Atty. Geronimo’s suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.

​Canon Allegedly Violated

A disbarment complaint De Leon filed against Atty. Geronimo, for purportedly committing acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04​ of the CPR provide:
● CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF
THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
● CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client's request for information.
Issue
Whether Atty. Geronimo was negligent in dealing with the needs of his client, in turn violating the CPR on the lawyer’s duty to his client?
Ruling
Yes. The Court finds no reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

The Court held that Atty. Geronimo's failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the NLRC, thereby precluding her from
further pursuing an appeal, is a clear breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the CPR. Atty. Geronimo was unjustifiably remiss in his bounden duties
as De Leon's counsel. The lack of proper communication and coordination between De Leon and Atty. Geronimo is palpable but cannot
possibly be attributed to the client's lack of diligence. The negligence of Atty. Geronimo cost De Leon the entire case and left her with no
remedies. Atty. Geronimo failed to exhaust all possible means to protect the interest of his client, failing to do what he had sworn to do as a
member of the legal profession.

“Clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention,
skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. … xxx Therefore, a lawyer's
 negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action.”

“Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that
has the better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does
so mostly on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the level of diligence, competence, and
accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. Between the lawyer and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full cost
of indifference or negligence.”

Punishment

The Court ​SUSPENDS Atty. Antonio A. Geronimo from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and ​WARNS him that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Summary

A disbarment complaint filed by De Leon against Atty. Geronimo, for purportedly committing acts in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), when latter was said to be negligent in discharging his duties as counsel of former – there was
no communication and coordination, and such lawyer failed to exhaust all remedies available to further protect the interest of his client. Thus,
the IBP and the Court ruled to suspend for six months Atty. Geronimo.

Capuyan, Thea
CASE NO. 134 : Morales vs Borres Jr. A.C. No. 12476 - CANON: Canon 17- Duty of Fidelity to the Cause of the Client

Facts:
Brief Background​: Respondent assisted complainant in filing complaints for trespass to property and malicious mischief. Respondent
prepared three complaints and filed them before the Office of the Prosecutor’s Office in Tabaco City. In the Investigation data Form,
complainant Morales, indicated the residence of his brother in law instead of his actual residence in Quezon City. Respondent then informed
complainant that the case had been dismissed but the former did not provide for a resolution of the dismissal. They were later informed that the
notices sent to his brother-in-law's residence in Tabaco City were returned unserved.

The office of the prosecutor nonetheless directed the complainant to submit the necessary information of the parties to be charged.
Complainant, for his motion for reconsideration gave a copy of the title of his property to respondent lawyer but the latter did not attach the said
title to the motion.

Complaint against the lawyer​: Complainant Morales now contends that respondent lawyer has failed to do his part as counsel in following
up the case of his client and for failing to attach the title of the property thereby resulting in the dismissal of the client’s motion for
reconsideration.

Defense of Respondent Lawyer: According to the respondent lawyer, he still managed to follow-up the status of the cases with the
OCP-Tabaco City whenever he had a hearing in the area. It was unfortunate, however, that the personnel assigned to the cases were always
not around each time he went there to inquire.

He did not know that complainant indicated as the latter's postal address the Tabaco City residence of his brother-in-law in the records of the
OCP-Tabaco City. He never suppressed any information from complainant regarding the status of the cases. In fact, as soon as he learned
that the cases got dismissed, he wasted no time and called complainant.

As for the police and barangay blotters pertaining to the acts of malicious mischief complained of, he was unable to submit them to the
OCP-Tabaco City as the same got destroyed when Albay was hit by typhoons.
134
Regarding the complainant's title to the property, there was no need to attach the same to the motion for reconsideration since the parties
themselves had already acknowledged in their Kasunduan executed before the barangay. In fact, the respondent lawyer promptly advised the
complainant to file for a petition for review after their motion for reconsideration was denied.

IBP Decision:​ IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violations of Canons 17. IBP Board of Governors reversed the earlier decision.

Canons allegedly violated​: Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Issue: ​ Whether or not respondent violated Canon 17 of the CPR?

Ruling: NO. First, the respondent does not appear to have been engaged as complainant's counsel of record in subject cases. This precisely
was the reason why the respondent himself did not receive copies of the orders or resolutions issued in said cases. Complainant himself even
admitted to the fact that the copies of orders were unserved because he did not indicate his correct address. Moreover, respondent has
followed up with the cases however the personnel assigned to the cases were not around. As for the complaint, there was no need to attach
the complainant's title to the motion for reconsideration since the parties themselves in their "Kasunduan" before the barangay had already
agreed. The court also considered that the police and barangay blotters pertaining to the incidents complained of could no longer be produced
as the same got destroyed during the typhoons

Respondent here was not shown to have neglected his duty to complainant in the cases for which he was engaged as counsel. He may not
have won the case, but to reiterate, this fact alone does not equate to neglect of duty as counsel.

Penalty​: Complaint against respondent Atty. Ramiro Borres is hereby DISMISSED

Summary: ​Complainant, Morales contends that respondent lawyer had been negligent in dealing with his case for trespassing. Respondent
allegedly failed to follow up the cases and failed to attach the title of the property for the motion for reconsideration which was later denied. The
Court dismissed the complaint as it was shown that respondent had not neglected his duty to the complainant

CANON 18
SPOUSES ADECER v AKUT
135
Complainant​: Spouses William and Teresita Adecer
Respondent​: Atty. Emmanuel Akut
 Facts​:

1. The instant petition is an offshoot of Criminal Case in which complainants were charged with committing a crime punishable under Article
318 of the Revised Penal Code

2. Respondent received a copy of the MTCC's Decision ​1 ​dated 12 March 1997 convicting complainants of Other Deceits and had fifteen (15)
days to file either an appeal or a petition for probation ​ ​in behalf of the complainants. It was only a month after that the respondent lawyer filed
the petition for probation.

3. Complainant spouses filed a petition for disbarment.

Argument of the Respondent:

1. He was out of town during the period for filing an appeal however this explanation somewhat evolved eventually.

2. He stated that complainants deliberately failed to meet with him seasonably for the signing of the verification of the Petition for Probation.

3. He explained that he was out of his office most of the time because he and his wife were always out of town looking for faith healers to cure
the malignant brain tumor of his wife. Allegedly, after attending the "important" hearings, he immediately went out of town seeking faith healers.

Recommendation of IBP Commissioner:​ Admonished and suspend from the practice of law for 1 month

Recommendation of IBP Board:​ Suspended instead to 6 months.

Held​:

1. ​Respondent is bound by the representations he made that a timely petition for probation was not filed due to the fact that he was
out of town​ and that complainants were laboring under the misapprehension that the civil liability must be paid in full before probation could be
availed of

2. Since he is primarily responsible for filing the vital pleading that would have made possible for his clients to avail of probation, ​we find that
respondent's omission is a culpable act of negligence for which he must be held liable.

3. Respondent had attempted to deceive the court by initially stating without qualification that he was out of town, he later on uttered words
which reveal his notion that some of his cases were more important, and therefore, given more immediate attention than others.

Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of his impression that one case or
hearing is more important than the other

4. ​We have held that the failure of an attorney to file a timely motion for reconsideration or an appeal renders him liable for
negligence under the Code of Professional Responsibility​. What compounds respondent's negligence is his indifference to the
complainants' plight.

5. ​The lawyer should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent and efficient manner​ and he ​should provide a quality of services at
least equal to that which lawyers generally would expect of a competent lawyer in the like situation.

Violation​:

Lawyer is admonished and suspended from the practice of law for 6 months for violation of Canon 18 of the CPR.

Synthesis​:

Complainants were incarcerated for committing a crime under Art 318 of RPC which became final and executory because their lawyer filed the
Petition for Probation after the reglementary period. His excuse was that he was out of town to look for faith healers for his wife suffering
cancer and that he only took care of his important cases. The Court held that his failure to file a timely appeal renders him liable for negligence
under Canon 18 of the CPR. He was suspended for 6 months.

CASE NO.: 136

CASE TITLE: A.C. No. 801 (June 27, 1987)
CESARIO ADARNE, complainant
vs.
ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA, respondent
CANON: 18

Facts:

Ø ​Brief Background:
136
In 1958, Raymunda Cumpio and her husband, Rufo Cumpio, filed an action for forcible entry against herein complainant Cesario
Adarne. Complainant was first represented by Atty. Isauro Marmita (1st lawyer) who raised the issue of ownership of the land in
question which was dismissed by the Justice of the Peace for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
First Instance (CFI) Leyte, it was remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits. It was again dismissed.

The plaintiffs again appealed to CFI Leyte. This time, complainant was represented by Attys. Arturo Mirales and Generoso
Casimpan (2nd and 3rd lawyer). At the hearing of the case on Aug 7, 1961, the said lawyers were absent so complainant asked his
3rd degree cousin, Atty. Damian Aldaba who was then present in court to attend the trial of an electoral case, to appear as counsel for
them and ask for the Postponement of the trial. Respondent agreed and entered a special appearance. Upon noticing that the
plaintiffs and their counsel were not also present in court, the respondent, instead of asking for a postponement, moved for the
 dismissal of the case. Motion was granted and the case was dismissed. The plaintiff filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order,
to which the respondent filed an opposition on behalf of the defendants, and the motion was denied.

Plaintiffs appealed to CA where the said court remanded the case to CFI Leyte. Again, the complainant asked Atty. Aldaba
to enter a “special appearance”. They asked if they could be allowed to file action for quieting of title. However, during the hearing on
June 17, 1965, complainant failed to appear and plaintiffs presented evidence. CFI Leyte rendered decision in favor of the plaintiffs.
Because of this, Cesario Adarne filed the present complaint against the respondent Atty. Damian V. Aldaba.

Ø ​Complaint against the Lawyer:

Administrative action against the respondent attorney for gross negligence and misconduct, for failure to give his entire devotion to the interest
of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and exertion of his utmost learning and ability in the prosecution and
defense of his client, and for not taking steps to protect the interests of his client in the face of an adverse decision.

Ø ​IBP decision:

The judgment by default rendered against the complainant cannot be attributed to the respondent attorney. The blame lies with the
complainant for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given to
them to appear on his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. To add to the confusion, the complainant had also requested
the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Leyte that he (complainant) be furnished with summons and subpoena accorded to him. He
also filed a motion by himself, thus implying that he was handling his case personally.

Ø ​Canons allegedly violated:

o CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

§ Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Issue:​ ​Whether or not Atty. Adalba should be disbarred or gross negligence and misconduct?

Ruling:

No. An attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the
character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and
will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.

It appears that there have been three changes made of the attorneys for the complainant in the forcible entry case. The complainant was
originally represented by Atty. Isauro Marmita who, upon his appointment to the Department of Labor, engaged Atty. de Veyra to take his
place. Then came Atty. Arturo Mirales and later, Atty. Generoso Casimpan. However, no formalities whatsoever were observed in those
changes such that the respondent entered a "special appearance" for the complainant in order that he could ask for the dismissal of the case
for the failure of the adverse party to prosecute. The rule followed on matters of substitution of attorneys as laid down by this Court is that no
substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there be filed:

(1) a written application for such substitution;

(2) the written consent of the client;

(3) the written consent of the attorney substituted; and

(4) in case such written consent can not be secured, there must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon the
attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules.

Unless the foregoing formalities are complied with, substitution will not be permitted, and the attorney who properly appeared last in the cause,
before such application for substitution, will be regarded as the attorney of record and will be held responsible for the proper conduct of the
cause.

It is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent attorney must be established by convincing proof. In the instant case, there is no sufficient proof to
warrant the disbarment of the respondent attorney. Neither is there culpable malpractice to justify his suspension.Finding no convincing proof
to warrant the disbarment of respondent attorney, the administrative complaint filed against him was dismissed.

Punishment:

None – Case Dismissed – Petitioner was in default.

Synthesis:

In Adarne vs. Aldaba, ​an administrative action against the respondent attorney was filed by petitioner for gross negligence and misconduct for
failure to appeal for the set hearing on June 17, 1965, such acts of respondent led him to lose in the civil case. Atty. Aldaba denied they have
an agreement with the complainant to handle the case except for “special appearance”. SC ruled in favor of respondent, stating that an
attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill. Prone to err like any other human
being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith. Petitioner, in this
case was clearly in default, for having engaged the services of several lawyers to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he
had given to them to appear on his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. To add to the confusion, the complainant had
also requested the clerk of court that he be furnished with summons and subpoena, thus implying that he was handling his case personally.
 Finding no convincing proof to warrant the disbarment of respondent, the administrative complaint was dismissed.

Bareja, Vincent
Case #137 ​REYES ​vs​. VITAN​, A.C. No. 5835
Topic: ​Canon 18-​Duty to serve with competence and due diligence

FACTS:
Brief Background:
● It was alleged that complainant, Carlos Reyes, hired the services of respondent Atty. Jeremias Vitan for filing a complaint or charge
against his sister-in-law, Estelita Reyes, and the latter's niece, Julieta P. Alegonza; that both women refused to abide with the
Decision of RTC Manila ordering the partition of the properties left by complainant's brother and that Atty Vitan, after receiving the
amount of P17,000.00, did not take any action on complainant's case.

Complaint:

● An administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Carlos Reyes against Atty. Jeremias Vitan for gross negligence

IBP Decision:
● The complaint was referred to IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. IBP Commissioner issued several orders directing
Atty Vitan to file an answer, but he failed to do so. He only sent his secretary to represent him during the proceedings.
● IBP Commissioner Report and Recommendation as adopted and approved by IBP board of Governors:
○ No pleadings was submitted despite respondent's allegations that he was collating evidence to prove his side of the case.
○ The complaint submitted by the complainant was only a format in the sense that it was not signed by the respondent; the
RTC Branch No. was left blank; there was no Civil Case No. and there was no proof that said pleading was filed, which
amounts only to a mere scrap of paper and not a pleading or authenticated document in the legal parlance.
○ Nothing had been done by the respondent for the complainant as his client for the legal fees he collected which was paid by
the complainant as reflected in the receipts issued by the respondent in handwritten forms and signed by him.
○ The respondent be suspended from the practice of his profession for a period of two (2) years from receipt hereof; and
refund the amount of P17,000.00 paid, within six (6) months from receipt hereof
137
Canons Allegedly Violated:
● Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the CPR

ISSUE​:​ WON the respondent violated Rule 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of CPR.

RULING:
● YES. When he accepted the P17,000.00, it was understood that he agreed to take up the case and that an attorney-client
relationship between them was established. It was expected of him to serve his client with competence and attend to his cause with
fidelity, care and devotion. Subsequently failure to render services after receiving the acceptance fee is a clear violation of Canon 18
of the ​CPR. ​Rule 18.03 states:

"Rule 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable."

● He also violated his oath as a lawyer, which declares in part, that he will not delay any man for money or malice and will conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client.
● The recommended penalty by the IBP is too harsh. Jurisprudence shows that lighter sanctions have been imposed for
violations of this nature, taking into consideration the gravity of the offense and the necessity of preserving the integrity of the legal
profession.

PUNISHMENT:
● Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months . He is ordered to return to
complainant within five (5) days from notice the sum of P17,000.00 with interest of 12% ​per annum.

SYNTHESIS:
● A complaint against a lawyer who failed to file a case despite acceptance litigation fees from the client. Court ordered a 6 months
suspension and the return of money to the complainant.
Reyes, Ry Jordane
Case No. 138 - Canon 18
Santiago v. Fojas, Adm. Case No. 4103, 7 September 1995

Facts​:

Brief Background

Complainants provided an Affidavit of Merit stating that Atty. Fojas had not informed them the reason why he abandoned,
138 and failed to act accordingly or seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against their case; that he under false pretenses
assured that everything was in order and that he had already answered the complaint in spite of demand to provide a copy; and that
because of this they lost the case under the sala of Judge Capulong and the appeal in the CA.

DEFENSE: He stated that his “mistake” in failing to file but he alleges that it was ‘cured’ by his motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the court. He also stated that the case was a “losing cause” because it was based on the expulsion of
the plaintiff from the Far Eastern University Faculty (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful.
 Complainants allegedly expelled from the union Mr. Paulino Salvador, which filed a complaint at DOLE. Med-Arbiter
Tomas Falcontin declared that his expulsion was unlawful and was affirmed by the Sec. of Labor and Employment.
Mr. Salvador filed a case at the RTC for moral and exemplary damages. Respondents assailed res judicata and
motion to dismiss. Judge Capulong granted the dismissal but upon Salvador’s MOR, it was reinstated and required
an answer from the respondent. TC then rendered that they pay Salvador P200K as moral damages, P50K for
exemplary and P65K for attorney’s fees plus cost.

Complaint against the Lawyer​:​ Pray for disbarment for “malpractice, neglect and other offenses that may be discovered during the actual
investigation of the complaint”

IBP decision​: none

Canons allegedly violated:

CANON 15

Rule 15.05 – A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of
the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.

CANON 18

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Issue: ​WON Respondent committed culpable negligence as would warrant disciplinary action in failing to file for the complainants an
answer for their Civil Case

Ruling: ​GUILTY

Defendant alleges that it was because of his “overzealosuness” and “volume and pressure of legal work”. The first
presupposes that his full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which he subordinated to his conviction that the TC
had committed reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order, there is no showing that he assailed it. Secondly, on
the pressure and volume does not excuse the due diligence required in his duty.

Every case a lawyer accepts deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

Punishment​:​ REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be more careful in the performance of his duty

SYNTHESIS

Atty. Fojas failed to file a reply in regards to the civil case of the complainants which caused the loss of the case and made the
complainants liable for thousands of damages to Mr. Salvador (the illegally dismissed employee) from Far Eastern University Faculty.
He is liable for negligence under Canon 18 and Canon 15

Case No. 139

Ma. Elena Carlos Nebreja v. Atty. Benjamin Reonal
A.C. No. 9896 March 19, 2014
Canon 18

FACTS

Complaint: Disbarment complaint against Atty. Reonal for his failure to file the contracted petition for annulment of marriage in her behalf; for
his misrepresentation on its status; and for his use of a fictitious office address.

Allegations of the Complainant:

1. Complainant engaged the services of respondent to file her petition for annulment, and paid the latter for the service but complainant
did not receive any updates only to be told that her petition was dismissed for lack of evidence.
139 2. Then respondent demanded again sum of money for psychological test and other fees which complainant paid. However, no updates
still.
3. On March 14, 2006, complainant demanded the case files however respondent merely handed to her photocopies of her marriage
contract and her children’s birth certificates.
4. When complainant tried to look for the respondent’s office, she discovered that there was no such building. She also found
respondent’s calling card bearing the address was respondent’s residential address.
5. When she asked him to write a letter to explain to the University of Perpetual Help-Rizal the discrepancy between the surnames
appearing in her children’s NSO-issued birth certificates and the school records, respondent did not mention any pending annulment
case in the letter, which he filed in complainant’s behalf.

Defense of the Respondent:

1. Respondent denied having been engaged by complainant to handle her petition for annulment and having been paid therefor.
2. Respondent averred that complainant did not engage him to be her lawyer because she was unemployed and could not afford his
legal services;
3. that in the preparation of the affidavit for the University of Perpetual Help, he did not mention her intention to pursue an annulment
proceeding against her husband upon her request;
4. and that no psychological test was conducted because she refused to allocate time to accommodate the schedule of the clinical
 psychologist.

Decision of the IBP:

1. CBD found that respondent was liable for inexcusable negligence for failing to file her petition for annulment.
2. CBD found that indeed, respondent used a fictitious office address to deceive complainant.

Canon violated:​ Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING

Yes, respondent violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his inexcusable negligence by failure to file the
annulment petition and for misrepresentation.

1. This was found to be contrary to the mandate prescribed in Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
enjoined a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
2. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.
3. In this case, respondent clearly received his acceptance fee, among others, and then completely neglected his client’s cause.
Moreover, he failed to inform complainant of the true status of the petition. His act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal
services in handling the complainant's case and, subsequently, failing to render the services, was a clear violation of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

PUNISHMENT

Suspension from the practice of law for 1 year.

SYNTHESIS

Complainant engaged and paid for the services of the respondent for her petition for annulment. However, respondent did not file any case or
petition and refused to inform complainant of the status. The Court held that respondent violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 for his inexcusable
negligence in failing to file the annulment petition.

Vargas, Michelle Anne C.

Case No.: ​140 Case Title: ​Tan v. Diamante Canon: ​18

Facts:

Brief Background​: Complainant claimed to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order
to pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan. The complaint was dismissed
by the RTC. While respondent was notied of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007, complainant learned of the same only on August 24,
2007 when he visited the former's office. On September 12, 2007, complainant handed the amount of PhP10,000.00 to respondent, who on
even date, led a notice of appeal before the RTC which was dismissed for having been led beyond the reglementary period. Respondent,
however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC
directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his liation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice.
Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension of the
deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certied by the RTC's Clerk of
Court. Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed. Aggrieved, he led
140
an administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent. Respondent Diamante’s defense is that he informed complainant of the lapse
of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same.

Complaint against the Lawyer​: Complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging
him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for
failing to keep his client informed of the status of the case.

IBP Decision: ​The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable and
recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year.

Canons allegedly violated​: Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR

Issue:

Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR
 Ruling:

Yes.

Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer's duty to keep his client constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is
crucial in maintaining the latter's condence, to wit:

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client's
request for information.

As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his
client's case. He should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and condence in the attorney.
The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the lawyer is defending the client's interests. The lawyer must constantly keep in
mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. The lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments
of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client's cause.

In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the dismissal of complainant's partition case before
the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007
when he visited the former's office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in ling complainant's appeal only on
September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to
exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of professional
employment.

Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant's appeal by fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly
required a DNA testing to make it appear that complainant's appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied.
In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on
the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal prociency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and
fair dealing, failing in which whether in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law. A lawyer's
inexcusable neglect to serve his client's interests with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned. Respondent's conduct
of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case's true status through the use of a falsied
court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct. His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral aw that makes him unt to practice law. In cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them.

Punishment:

Respondent Diamante is disbarred for Gross Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys.

Summary: ​Complainant Tan filed a disbarment case against respondent Diamante for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for
failing to keep his client (Tan) informed of the status of the case. Respondent Diamante’s defense is that he informed complainant of the lapse
of the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) found respondent
administratively liable and recommended the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year. However, the Supreme Court held that
respondent's conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case's true status through
the use of a falsied court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct. Respondent Diamante is disbarred for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered stricken off
from the roll of attorneys.

Golosino, Abbie

Case # 141

A.C. No. 10244: ​Segovia, et al. v. Javier –​ CANON 18 (Duty to serve with competence and due diligence)
Facts:
Brief background:
The petitioners alleged that they engaged the services of respondent as their counsel in a case involving falsification of
documents and recovery of property. During the existence of attorney-client relationship, respondent asked the petitioner the amount
of P30,000.00 as filing fee, which they have dutifully paid. Petitioners discovered that the respondent also demanded from one Riza
141 Rizabal Tesalona the amount of P27,000.00 in connection with the case. Whenever they followed-up on the case, they always
received a response from respondent to not worry as he would file the case within the week, and an assurance that the case will be
resolved in their favor. However, the respondent never filed the case.
.
Complaint against the lawyer:
The respondent lawyer, Atty. Rolando S. Javier, has allegedly abandoned his client (petitioner herein) by failing to file the
case on their behalf after collecting the amount of P57,000.00 for litigation fees.

IBP Decision:
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that Atty. Rolando S. Javier is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.
 Canons allegedly violated:
CANON 18: RULE 18.03. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rolando S. Javier should be disbarred?

Ruling:
No. The SC held that the appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer requires sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.
In the instant case, Respondent had clearly breached the trust reposed in him by his client after accepting the case and
collecting the filing fees and yet failed in his duty to file the case for his clients despite demands from the latter. These practices by
lawyers degrade the legal profession and the administration of justice and breed delinquent lawyers. Such practices should not be
tolerated since it could easily be done especially against indigent and marginalized clients.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the
client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Conversely, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended
purpose, he must immediately return the money to the client.
Respondent's failure to return the money to complainants despite failure to use the same for the intended purpose is conduct
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety and a violation of the trust reposed on him. His unjustified withholding of money belonging
to the complainants warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.

Punishment:
The Court finds a one-year suspension from the practice of law appropriate as penalty for respondent's misconduct.

He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is
ORDERED to RETURN to complainants the amount of P30,000.00 with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
September 10, 2007 until June 30, 2013, then six percent (6%) interest per annum from July 1, 2013 until fully paid. Respondent shall
submit to the Court proof of restitution within ten (10) days from payment.

SUMMARY:

A petition against a lawyer who failed to file a case despite collecting litigation fees from the client. Court ordered a 1-year suspension
and returned the money to the petitioner.

TALABOC, VANESSA

EDMUND BALMACEDA v. ATTY. ROMEO Z. USON

A.C. No. 12025, June 20, 2018

Facts:

Brief background:
Complainant sought legal advice from herein respondent Atty. Uson concerning the filing of an ejectment case against the
complainant’s brother who illegally occupied complainant’s property.
Complainant engaged the services of the respondent as counsel for a fee of P75,000.00 which the complainant paid in full. However,
two years had lapsed but no ejectment case was ever filed by the respondent against Antonio, complainant’s brother. Thus,
prompting complainant to demand the return of the attorney's fees of P75,000.00 but respondent refused to return, hence the filing of
the instant disbarment complaint against him.

​Defenses of the Respondent: ​He alleged that he immediately sent a demand letter to Antonio, asking him to vacate the subject
property. Antonio threatened him to take matters to court. He then offered to return the amount of P75,000.00 but the complainant refused to
accept the amount and insisted on the filing of the ejectment case.

Complaint against the lawyer​: ​An administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Romeo Z. Uson (respondent) for
violating Rules 16 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IBP Decision​: ​Initially dismissed disbarment complaint due to lack of ​substantial evidence but was reversed, imposing a penalty of 6
142 months suspension against Atty. Romeo Z. Uson.
​Canons allegedly violated:​ ​CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03- A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

​Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Uson should be suspended from service.

​Ruling:
YES. It is needless to emphasize that at the very moment a lawyer agrees to be engaged as a counsel, he is obliged to handle the
same with utmost diligence and competence until the conclusion of the case. Neglecting a legal cause renders him accountable under the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, under Rule 18.03 thereof.
In the instant case, the respondent reneged on his duty when he failed to file the ejectment case on behalf of the complainant despite
full payment of his attorney's fees. His negligence caused his client to lose his cause of action since the prescriptive period of one year to file
the ejectment case had already lapsed without him filing the necessary complaint in court.

Reyes vs. Vitan:​ "the act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's case and subsequently failing to
render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of ​Professional Responsibility.​ "

Punishment: ​GUILTY of violating Rules 18.03 and 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ​SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS
from the practice of law.

SUMMARY: Complainant engaged the services of the respondent as counsel for a fee of P75,000.00 for the filing of ejectment case against
complainant’s brother but Atty. Uson failed to file the same. Complainant demanded restitution of the attorney's fees but respondent refused to
 return. Atty. Uson was suspended from the practice of law for 6 months for violation of Rules 18.03 and 16.01 of the CPR.
Ngo, Patrick Samuel
JAIME S. DE BORJA v. ATTY. RAMON R. MENDEZ
[ AC. No. 11185, Jul 04, 2018 ]

Facts:
Brief background:
Jaime, as representative of the Heirs of Deceased Augusto De Borja, engaged the services of R.R.Mendez & Associates Law Offices where
Atty. Mendez is a lawyer, for the reconveyance of a parcel of land. Along with the prosecution of the case, Atty. Mendez demanded Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) for the titling of a property situated in Pateros. Jaime submitted a copy of the receipt of said amount
of money. The Court of Appeals ordered the Heirs of De Borja to file their Appellant's Brief. Jaime inquired with Atty. Mendez concerning the
order, to which Atty. Mendez committed that he will file the Appellant's Brief.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the appealed case for failure to file Appellant's Brief. Jaime asked Atty. Mendez the reason why they weren't
able to file the brief, and he was told that the firm did not receive a copy of the notice which ordered them to file the appellant's brief. Atty.
Mendez assured him that he will file the motion for reconsideration based on non-receipt of the notice, and will subsequently file the appellant's
brief. Unsatisfied, Jaime went to the Court of Appeals and the Postal Office of Caloocan. He discovered that the notice to file appellant's brief
was in fact received by one Jennifer Lastimosa, a secretary of the firm R.R. Mendez & Associates Law Offices.

Citing loss of trust and confidence due to the dismissal, Jaime terminated the services of Atty. Mendez, and demanded the return of the Three
Hundred Thousand (Php300,000.00). Unable to get a reply from Atty. Mendez even after six months, Jaime wrote to Atty. Mendez, demanding
the return of the money. Thus, the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Mendez for incompetence and malpractice.

Atty. Mendez insisted that his law office did not receive a copy of the court order to file the appellant's brief. He claimed that even their
secretary, Jennifer Lastimosa, cannot recall having received said order or mail. He claimed that when Jaime informed him about the dismissal
order, he lost no time in preparing the motion for reconsideration and the appellant's brief. Atty. Mendez maintained that he has been in the
practice of law for more than three (3) decades already and that he was never remiss in his duty to his clients. He claimed that it was
unfortunate that his secretary's signature was forged to make it appear that she has received the mail.

Atty. Mendez acknowledged the receipt of P300,000.00 as retainer's fees from Jaime. He averred that considering that he had actually
rendered professional services to Jaime, he may refund a reasonable portion thereof. Atty. Mendez asserted that due to the fact that his office
actually failed to receive the notice from the court, there is no basis to show that he was unprofessional, thus, does not deserve to be meted
any harsh punishment from the Court. However, After more than one (1) year Atty. Mendez made a partial return of Jaime's money in the
amount of P140,000.00 which was received by Atty. Marie Diane Bolong, Jaime's new counsel.

143 Complaint against the lawyer:

An instant administrative complaint against Atty. Mendez for incompetence and malpractice.

IBP Decision:
It recommended that Atty. Mendez was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a
repetition of the same infraction will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty. It further recommended that Atty. Mendez be ordered to
return to Jaime the remaining amount of One Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P160,000.00).

Canons allegedly violated:

Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states that "A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." Rule 18.03: A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Issue:
Whether or not, Atty. Mendez is liable for incompetence and malpractice.

Ruling:
Atty. Mendez received money from Jaime for the titling of property covered by Tax Declaration No. D-006-01404. However, despite several
oral and written demands to Atty. Mendez, he failed to use the money for its intended purpose, and returned the money after demand.
Considering it took more than a year before Atty. Mendez' made an initiative to return the money albeit partial only, the same cannot be said to
be prompt or immediate return of the money, rather, he was already in delay for a considerable period of time in returning his client's money.
Notably, it must be pointed out that Atty. Mendez not only failed to return the money immediately, but he also failed to return the whole amount
of P300,000.00. He was able to return the amount of P140,000.00 only, thus, there is still a remaining balance of P160,000.00.

Clearly, these acts constitute violations of Atty. Mendez' professional obligations under Canon 16 of the CPR which mandates lawyers to hold
in trust and account all money’s and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Time and again, We have reminded lawyers
that the practice of law is a privilege bestowed only to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession.
As such, lawyers are duty-bound to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. If the
lawyer falls short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to discipline the lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise
of sound judicial discretion.

The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers
because of their fiduciary relationship. Any lawyer who does not live up to this duty must be prepared to take the consequences of his
waywardness.
 Punishment:
ATTY. RAMON R. MENDEZ, JR. is found GUILTY of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon receipt of this Decision,
with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Mendez is, likewise, ORDERED to RETURN to complainant Jaime S. De Borja the remaining balance of P160,000.00 with legal interest,
if it is still unpaid, within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with this directive will merit the imposition of the
more severe penalty, which this Court shall impose based on the complainant's motion with notice duly furnished to Atty. Mendez.

SUMMARY:
Atty. Ramon R. Mendez, Jr. is guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for incompetence and malpractice. Unable to do his duties as a lawyer, he is suspended for 1 year and must return the fees his
client has given him.
CANON 19
Oblianda, Johanna Daisyre
CASE NO. 144:
GONZALES VS. ATTY. MIGUEL SABACAJAN

Facts:
Ø ​Brief Background:​ T​ he complainants were informed by the Registry of Deeds of Cagayan De Oro City that the duplicate title of
their lands were entrusted to respondent Sabacajan. He confirmed that the titles were in his custody but when later demanded to
deliver, he refused to give without any justification. When confronted, he challenged complainants to file any case in court.
Ø ​Atty. Sabacajan’s defense:​ he never challenged anyone to file the case and he was only holding the titles in behalf his client Mr.
Samto Uy, to whom the complainants allegedly have a monetary debt and are notorious for having many civil and criminal
complaints against them .

Ø ​Complaint against the Lawyer:​ The complainants sent a letter to the Supreme Court saying: That in spite of repeated demands,
requests and pleas towards respondent, he still failed and stubbornly refused without justification to surrender the said titles to
the rightful owners, the complainants here(in), which act is tantamount to wilful and malicious defiance of legal and moral
obligations emanating from his professional capacity as a lawyer who had sworn to uphold law and justice, to the prejudice and
damage of the complainants.

Ø ​Canons allegedly violated​: Canon 15 Duty of Candor, Fairness and Loyalty to the Client, Rule 15.07 Duty to impress compliance
with the law and ​Canon 19 Duty to serve only within the bounds of the law and Rule 19.01 Duty to employ only honest
and fair means.

Issue: ​Whether or not Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

144 Ruling:
1.Respondent has disregarded Canon 15, Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall impress
upon his client the need for compliance with the laws and principles of fairness. Instead, he unjustly refused to give to complainants their
certificates of titles supposedly to enforce payment of their alleged financial obligations to his client and presumably to impress the latter of his
power to do so. ​Canon 19, Rule 19.01 ordains that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present unfounded charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.

2. As a lawyer, ​respondent should know that there are lawful remedies provided by law to protect the interests of his client​. The Court
finds that respondent has not exercised the good faith and diligence required of lawyers in handling the legal affairs of their clients. If
complainants did have the alleged monetary obligations to his client, that does not warrant his summarily confiscating their certificates of title
since there is no showing in the records that the same were given as collaterals to secure the payment of a debt. Neither is there any
intimation that there is a court order authorizing him to take and retain custody of said certificates of title.

Penalty: SUSPENDED from the practice of law until he can duly show to this Court that the disputed certificates of title have been returned to
and the receipt thereof duly acknowledged by complainants, or can present a judicial order or appropriate legal authority justifying the
possession by him or his client of said certificates. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar or any other administrative
misconduct will be punished more severely.

SYNTHESIS
Respondent unlawfully refused to give the title to the landowners which had been entrusted to him. He did this without any justification and
instead challenged them to a case in court. The Supreme Court ruled that he violated Canon 19 (and Canon 15) for not taking lawful remedies
to protect his client which resorted to violations against the legal rights of the complainants.

Desiree Clemence B. Panelo

145. Pena v Aparicio. AC No. 7298, June 25 2007

Facts:

Brief Background
145
Atty. Lolito G. Aparicio appeared as legal counsel for Gracee C. Hufana in an illegal dismissal case before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) against complainant Fernando Martin Pena. Hufana is praying for claim for separation pay, but Pena rejected the claim
as baseless.

Thereafter, Aparicio sent Pena a letter reiterating his client’s claim for separation pay. Through his letter, he threatened complainant that
should Pena fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as
 multiple charges such as tax, evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violation of laws.

Complaint against Lawyer

Charged with violation of Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for writing a demand letter the contents of which
threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents.

Issue: ​WON Apricio violated Canon 19 (and 19.01) of the CPR, enjoining every lawyer to represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the
law?

Held: YES.

Under Canon 19, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his
client designed to secure leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer's client.

In the case at bar, the threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail. Blackmail is "the extortion of
money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition
of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice."

The letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against the
complainant which have nothing to do with his client's claim for separation pay. Indeed, letters of this nature are definitely proscribed by the
CPR.

It was not the respondent's intention to point out complainant's violations of the law as he so gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even
contains an implied promise to "keep silent" about the said violations if payment of the claim is made on the date indicated.

Punishment: ​P​enalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Summary:​ Respondent Aparicio was charged with violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the CPR for writing a demand letter the contents of
which threatened complainant with the filing of criminal cases for tax evasion and falsification of documents. The SC held that the

Adolfo, Tricia
CASE 146
Malvar v. Feir, A.C. No. 11871, 2018 - CANON 19
[formerly CBD Case No 154520]

Facts:
● In February 2015, petitioner Potenciano R. Malvar filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent ​Atty. Freddie B. Feir ​(counsel
of Amurao) alleging that on December 2014 and January 2015, he ​received threatening letters from Feir ​stating that should he fail
to pay the sum of ₱18M to his client, Amurao, a criminal complaint for Falsification of Public Documents and Estafa, a civil complaint
for Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title, and an administrative complaint for the revocation of his license as a physician would be
filed against him.
● According to Malvar, ​Feir's demands were tantamount to blackmail or extortion due to the fact that Feir tried to obtain something
of value by means of threats of filing complaints.
○ Feir countered that the said letters merely demanded Malvar to explain how certain parcels of land Malvar was purchasing
from his client, Amurao, were already registered in Malvar's name when Amurao had never executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale transferring the same.
● Atty. Feir said that in 2008, Amurao was tasked by his co-owners, spouses Toribio, to sell their properties consisting of 3 parcels of
land in Antipolo City.
○ The buyer of said properties was Malvar, who initially paid the sum of ₱3.2M with ​a promise to pay the remainder of the
purchase price after verification of the authenticity of the owner's title to the properties.
● For this purpose, Malvar borrowed the original copies of said titles from Amurao & failed to return it.
○ Malvar ​transferred properties to his name despite the fact that he never executed the necessary Deed of Absolute Sale
nor received the balance of the purchase price.
○ Apparently, ​there already exists a Deed of Absolute Sale ​covering the sale of the subject properties in favor of Malvar
146
exhibiting not only the signatures of all owners (of Amurao and Teodorico but also the signature of Fatima, who had long
been dead). Malvar could not explain the existence of such Deed of Sale
● It is for this reason that ​Amurao consulted Feir on his legal remedies It was pointed out that the purported Affidavit executed by
Amurao must be a forgery in view of the fact that he never executed any such document and that his supposed Senior Citizen
Identification Number indicated in the Acknowledgment thereof was left blank.
● IBP decision​: Investigating Commissioner and IBP dismissed complaint for lack of merit
Canon allegedly violated:​
(a) CANON 19 – ​a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law
(b) RULE 19.01​- a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

Issue: ​WON respondent should be disbarred for violating Rule 19.01 of CPR?​ NO

Ruling: ​ Court finds no merit in Malvar’s contention.​ Atty. Feir did not blackmail Malvar.

● What is blackmail? “the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints,
obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret
calculated to operate to his prejudice.”
○ There is no blackmail here. Malvar is the buyer of the properties subject herein and that Amurao, Feir’s client, is one of the
owners of the same.
● It is also undisputed that said subject properties are already registered under Malvar’s name even if he has not paid.
 ● ​These demand letters were based on a legitimate cause or issue (not blackmail)​, which is the alleged failure of Malvar to pay
the full amount of the consideration in the sale transaction as well as the alleged falsified Deed of Sale used to transfer ownership
over the lots subject of the instant case
● Feir was simply ​acting in compliance with his lawyer's oath to protect and preserve the rights of his client.
● Feir’s demand for the ₱18M is not an exaction of money for the exercise of an influence but is actually a ​legitimate claim for the
remaining balance subject of a legitimate sale transaction.
● Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to
the principal-agent relationship that he has with his client, the principal.
○ Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his client's claim and to take all the steps
necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified period.
● In absence of preponderant evidence, Malvar’s claim must fail.

Penalty: ​Petition for Disbarment against Atty. Feir is ​DISMISSED ​for utter lack of merit.

SUMMARY​: Atty. Feir, representing Amurao allegedly “blackmailed” petitioner Malvar when he demanded Malvar to pay P18M for acquiring a
Deed of Absolute Sale when he failed to pay full amount. Courts ruled that there was no blackmail since the demand letter had legitimate
cause to claim a remaining balance. Rule 19.01 was observed here since Atty. Feir was simply complying with the lawyer's oath to protect &
preserve client’s rights.

CANON 20
Ferolino, Nicole Danisse
CASE 147: Leviste v. CA
G.R. No. L-29184, 30 January 1989

FACTS:
● Benedicto Leviste, a practicing attorney, entered into an agreement with Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for
probate of the holographic will of the late Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was
agreed that Leviste's contigent fee would be 35% of the property that Rosa may receive.

● On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his services as her counsel
due to "conflicting interest."

● On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a "Motion To Withdraw Petition for
Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and sisters
who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent.

● on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two
witnesses testified that the will and the testatrix's signature were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva.

● Leviste filed an appeal however, Del Rosario filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Leviste was not a party in
interest.

● RTC and CA dismissed Leviste's appeal for being insufficient in form and substance as Leviste did not appear to be a proper party to
appeal the decision.

ISSUE:
WON an attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis may, in order to collect his fees, prosecute an appeal despite his client's refusal
to appeal the decision of the trial court.

DEFENSE:
147 Leviste argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the Civil
Code which provides:

ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize
them to accept it in the name of the heir.

The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should there be
any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules
established in this Code, it may belong.

HELD:
Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a
creditor of Rosa del Rosario.​ The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic
will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled
to his fee.

Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the
dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the
petitioner to accept in her name.

This Court had ruled in the case of Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 1427, that "the contract (for contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor
purports to give, to the appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (Mrs. Harden's) aforesaid share in the conjugal
partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees."

SUMMARY:
It was agreed that Leviste's contigent fee would be 35% of the property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will. However, Del
Rosario withdrew the petition for probate which was granted by the court. Leviste, in order to claim his attorney’s fee, filed an appeal but was
dismissed by the court.With respect to the attorney’s fee, the court held that the payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the
successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur.
Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.
 Mapalo, Ella Gabrielle
CASE 148: WILFREDO LICUDAN v CA
[G.R. No. 91958, 24 January 1991]

FACTS:
Brief Background:
● Atty Domalanta is the uncle and lawyer of petitioner Spouses Licudan for civil cases pertaining to partition of land and redemption of
property. He filed a Petition for Attorney’s Lien which alleged that his clients executed two written contracts for professional services in
his favour which provide that:
1. He is entitled to 97.5 sq.m of the plaintiff’s share of the lot in question;
2. He shall have usufructuary right for a period of 10 years of the plaintiff’s share of the lot in question
● The trial court ordered the annotation at the back of the TCT of said lot pursuant to the said Contract for Professional Services which
was signed by petitioner Spouses. The court also noted that petitioners have freely and voluntarily entered into the contract.

Complaint against lawyer:

● The Contract for Professional Services differs from the earlier contractual provisions in that it entitled Atty Domalanta to 1/3 of the
subject property (instead of only 97.5 sq.m. of petitioner’s share) and provided for usufructuary rights over Atty’s son.
● They further contend that under the award for professional services, they may have won the case but would lose the entire property
won in litigation to their uncle-lawyer.

Defense of respondent lawyer:

● Atty Domalanta contended that he has additional attorney’s fees for handling the redemption case which was but a mere offshoot of
the partition case. He further manifested that the additional 31 sq.m as compensation for the redemption case must be merged with
the 90.5 sq.m of subject property for the partition case.

TRIAL COURT RULING: ​Trial court granted that Atty Domalanta’s lien be added 31 sq.m along with the original 90.5 sq.m.

COURT OF APPEALS RULING: C ​ A ruled in favour of Atty Domalanta and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. When the reasonableness
of the appellee's lien as attorney's fees over the properties of his clients awarded to him by the trial court had not been questioned by the
client, and the said orders had already become final and executory, the same could no longer be disturbed, not even by the court which
rendered them.

Canons allegedly violated​: ​Canon 13 of CPE, Canon 20 of CPR

ISSUE:​ ​W/N the award of attorney’s fees is reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees

SC RULING:
● NO. It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned under Canon 13 of
CPE and Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of CPR.
148 ● When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by
any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party.
● The order by the CA cannot become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent fee which is always subject to the supervision
of the Court with regard to its reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics​, which
provides: “A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case
including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness.”
● There is no dispute in the instant case that the attorney's fees claimed by the respondent lawyer are in the nature of a contingent fee.
There is nothing irregular about the execution of a written contract for professional services even after the termination of a case as
long as it is based on a previous agreement on contingent fees by the parties concerned and as long as the said contract does not
contain stipulations which are contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.
● Said contract cannot be allowed to stand as the law between the parties considering that the rule in the presence of a contract for
professional services duly executed by the parties, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an
exception – that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, etc.
● Under ​Canon 20 of CPR​, a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyer's fees are fair
and reasonable, ​Rule 20.01 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be considered in resolving the said issue. They are as
follows:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proferred case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
● All that Atty handled was a simple case of partition which necessitated no special skill nor any unusual effort in its preparation. The
subsequent case for redemption was admittedly but an offshoot of the partition case. There should never be an instance where a
lawyer gets as attorney’s fees the entire property involved in the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in litigation to lose
everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.

PUNISHMENT: ​The Court of Appeals' decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorney's fees in
the amount of P20,000.00.

SUMMARY​: Atty Domalante was petitioners’ lawyer for civil cases of partition and redemption of property. As his lien, he and petitioners
entered into a Contract for Professional Services giving him 97.5 sq.m of petitioners’ share in the lot as well as usufructuary rights. However,
when Atty annotated said title of the lot, he was given 1/3 share of the subject lot and usufructuary rights were given to his son. He contended
that this was an addition to his attorney’s fees as the redemption case was an offshoot of the partition case he handled. SC ruled that such
contingent fees are subject to the Court’s supervision as to its reasonableness. In this case, such fees were indeed unconscionable because
although he won the case for petitioners, they would lose their property in favour of their lawyer. Atty violated Canon 13 of CPE and Canon 20
 of CPR.

149
Javier, Clysil Sweet
CASE #150
RAUL SESBREŃO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 117438, 8 June 1995

CANON 20- Duty to charge only fair and reasonable fees.

​FACTS:

● Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of the 52 employees who sued the Province of Cebu and then Governor Espina for reinstatement and
backwages.
● 32 of the 52 employees signed 2 documents whereby they agreed to pay petitioner ​30% as attorney’s fees 20% as expenses ​to be
taken from their back salaries.
● The trial court rendered a decision ordering the Province of Cebu to reinstate the petitioning employees and pay them back salaries.
● A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties below in April 1979 whereby the former employees waived their right to
reinstatement. The Province of Cebu released 2,300,000 to the petitioning employees through the petitioner as “Partial Satisfaction of
Judgment.” The amount represented back salaries, terminal leave pay and gratuity pay due to employee.
● Ten employees filed manifestations before the trial court asserting that they agreed to pay petitioner 40% to be taken only from their
back salaries.
● The trial court fixed petitioner's attorney's fees at 40% of back salaries, terminal leave, gratuity pay and retirement benefits and 20%
as expenses, or a total of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. The trial court modified the award after noting that petitioner's
attorney's lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it should have been only 50%.
● Petitioner appealed to the CA. The appellate court noted that attorney's fees are always subject to judicial control and deemed the
award of 20% of the back salaries awarded to private respondents as a fair, equitable and reasonable amount of attorney's fee.

​ ​PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT
He claims that attorney's fees amounting to 50% of all monies awarded to his clients as contingent fees should be upheld for being
consistent with prevailing case law and the contract of professional services between the parties.

CANON ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED:

150
CANON 20- Duty to charge only fair and reasonable fees
Rule 20.01- Guide in determining attorney’s fees

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Atty. Sesbreno, notwithstanding the contract for
professional services signed by the client.

RULING:

● Yes. It is a settled rule that what a lawyer may charge and receive as attorney's fees is always subject to judicial control. When he
takes his oath, he submits himself to the authority of the court and subjects his professional fees to judicial control.
● A stipulation on a lawyer's compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount of fees that the
contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable or unconscionable.
● Contingent fee contracts are under the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order that clients may be protected from unjust
charges.
● Courts may always ascertain, if the attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the circumstances. ​Quantum
meruit​, meaning "​as much as he deserves​," is used as the basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a
contract.
● a fee of 20% of back salaries would be a fair settlement in this case. This award pertains only to the ten private respondents herein.
Petitioner has already been compensated in the amount of 50% of all monies received, by the rest of his clients.

PUNISHMENT:
No punishment. Petition is DENIED

SUMMARY:
Atty. Sesbreno is the counsel of 52 employees who sued the Province of Cebu. The trial court rendered a decision in favor the employees and
fixed Atty. Sesbreno’s attorney’s fees at 40% of back salaries, and 20% as expenses or a total of 60% of all monies paid. The court later
modified the atty’s fees at 50%. Hence the petition.

Urot, Marcelyn A.
Nenita D. Sanchez vs. Atty. Romeo Aguilos
Facts:
● Sought the legal services of the respondent to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio
151 C. Sanchez.
● Respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000. Complainant then paid the initial amount of P90,000
● When the complainant inquired about the developments of her case, respondent told her that he would only start working on her case
upon her full payment. He further informed the complainant that what he contemplated to file is a legal separation and that annulment
would entail her a higher acceptance fee.
 ● So the complainant withdrew the case from the respondent and demanded that respondent refund her of the amount she had already
paid. But the latter refused contending that he had already started working on the case.
● The constant refusal of the respondent to return the amount prompted the complainant to bring an administrative case in the IBP
Complaint against the Lawyer:​ Complainant charged respondent with misconduct for the latter’s refusal to return the amount of P70,000 she
had paid for his professional services despite not having performed the contemplated professional services.
Respondent’s reply to the allegations:
● Respondent alleges that based on his evaluation of the complainant’ s situation, would be a legal separation of marriage rather than
annulment.
● That he has communicated to her to submit pertinent requirements for purposes of the petition for legal separation but the latter did
not promptly respond to his communication.
● He alleges that complainant had spent the money that was supposed to be paid for tha balance of his professional fees.
● Respondent admits he received the demand letter, but states that he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of paper because the
demand lacked basis in law, and that it should have been addressed​ *​“to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve its rightful
purpose”.
IBP Decisions​:
1. By virtue of the principle on​ quantum meruit​ (“as much as he deserves”), respondent is entitled to receive P40K out of the P70K paid
to him, and that, accordingly, he should be made to return the amount of P30,000.
2. For failure to distinguish between the grounds for legal separation and annulment of marriage, respondent should be sanctioned.
3. Lastly, for failure to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness towards his colleagues and for using offensive or improper language in his
pleading​*​, which was filed right before the Commission on Bar Discipline, he must also be sanctioned and disciplined for the violation
of Rule 8.01 of the CPR.
Issues:
A. Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct;
B. Whether or not he should be ordered to return the attorney’s fees paid.
C. Whether or not respondent violated Canon 8 of the CPR.
Ruling:
A. Respondent was liable for misconduct.
CANON 18 of the CPR states that “A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence”. Clearly, the respondent
misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal, he did not know the distinction
between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage. Such knowledge would have been basic and expected of him as a
lawyer accepting a professional engagement for either causes of action. His explanation that the client initially intended to pursue the action for
legal separation should be disbelieved. The case unquestionably contemplated by the parties and for which his services was engaged, was no
other than an action for annulment of the complainant's marriage with her husband with the intention of marrying her British fiancée. They did
not contemplate legal separation at all, for legal separation would still render her incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was insisting
in his answer that he had prepared a petition for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as attorney's fees if she desired to have the
action for annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify his claim for services
rendered.
B. Respondent should be ordered to return the entire amount received from the client.
The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it was way above his ability and
competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis to accept any amount as attorney's fees from
the complainant. He did not even begin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was improbable that the
agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition for legal separation instead of the
petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either way did
not entitle him to retain the amount he had already received.
The decision of the IBP in favor of respondent was too generous. We cannot see how the respondent deserved any compensation
because he did not really begin to perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his version, he would prepare the petition for legal
separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage. The attorney who fails to accomplish the tasks he should naturally and expectedly
perform during his professional engagement does not discharge his professional responsibility and ethical duty toward his client. The
respondent was thus guilty of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he may be
ordered to restitute to the client the amount received from the latter in consideration of the professional engagement, subject to the rule on
quantum meruit, if warranted.
C. Respondent did not conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleague.
Canon 8 of the CPR, provides: “A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues,
and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel”. While Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 specifically demands that: “A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.”
The respondent's statement in his answer that the demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a mere scrap of paper or should
have been addressed by her counsel . . . to the urinal project of the MMDA where it may service its rightful purpose" constituted simple
misconduct that this Court cannot tolerate.
Canons Violated:
● RULES 18.01, 18.02, 18.03 OF CANON 18
● RULE 8.01 OF CANON 8
Punishment:
● Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby​ FINED P10,000.00​ for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and
REPRIMANDS​ him for his use of offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition
of the offense shall be severely punished.
● The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to ​RETURN ​to the complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00,
plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.
Loro, Clarisse

Cortez vs. Cortes, A.C. No. 9119. March 12, 2018

Facts:
· Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Cortes as his counsel in an illegal dismissal case against Philippine
152 Explosives Corporation (PEC). He further alleged that he and Atty. Cortes had a handshake agreement on a 12% contingency fee as and
by way of attorney's fees.
· Upon winning the case, complaint was entitled for P1,100,000. As the complainant was about to withdraw the initial check deposited,
Atty Cortes halted the transaction and said that he is entitled to the 50% of the total awarded claims for his service.
· Atty. Cortes became hysterical and inorder to pacify him the complaint offered the former the amount of P200k and then P275K but
rejected and insisted on the 50% of the total award.
· Thus, the complainant filed against Atty. Cortes for grave misconduct, and violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code for Professional
Responsibility.
 Defense:

Atty. Cortes posited that the check forms part and parcel of the judgment award to which he had a lien corresponding to his attorney's fees and
denied that they agreed on 12% contingency fee by way of attorney's fees. Further, 50-50 sharing arrangement is not unconscionably high
because the complainant was given the option to hire other lawyers, but still he engaged his services.

IBP: ​recommended the six-month suspension of Atty. Cortes. It ruled that a contingent fee arrangement should generally be in writing, and that
contingent fees depend upon an express contract without which the lawyer can only recover on the basis of quantum meruit.

Canon violation: ​Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees." Rule
20.01 of the same canon enumerates the following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:

a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer

Issue: ​Whether or not Atty. Cortes guilty of violation of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

Yes. The court believed that the contingent fee here claimed by Atty. Cortes was, under the facts obtained in this case, grossly excessive and
unconscionable. The issues involved could hardly be said to be novel and Atty. Cortes in fact already knew that the complainant was already
hard up. We have held that lawyering is not a money making venture and lawyers are not merchants. ​ ​Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is
not capital that yields profits. ​ ​The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile
pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to
State regulation.

Punishment: ​Suspension for three (3) months in the practice of law and to return to the complainant the amount he received in excess of the
12% allowable attorney's fees.

Case summary: ​Lawyer represented the client in a labor case in which the latter was awarded a P1.1million claim. Lawyer insisted that he is
entitled to 50% of the total award but the client denied as they only agreed on 12% as a lawyer’s fee. Court held that the fee was grossly
excessive and unconscionable. The suspension is lowered to only three months instead of the 6 months recommendation of the IBP.

CANON 21

CASE NO. 153

Suntay vs. Suntay, A.C. No. 1890, 7 August 2002 – CANON 21
Complainant: ​Federico C. Suntay
Respondent: ​Atty. Rafael G. Suntay

Facts:

Brief Background​:

● Complainant alleged that Respondent, his nephew, was his legal counsel, adviser and confidant who was privy to all his legal,
financial and political affairs
● After parting ways, respondent had been filing complaints and cases against complainant, making use of confidential information
gained while their attorney-client relationship existed.
● Required to answer the charges respondent led a " Motion to Order Complainant to Specify His Charges" alleging that complainant
failed to specify the alleged "confidential information or intelligence" gained by him
● After almost four (4) years the OSG submitted its Report and Recommendation with regard to the cases led by respondent against
complainant:
○ I.S. No. 77-1523, "Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for false testimony and grave oral defamation and Civil Case No.
112764, “Magno Dinglasan v. Federico Suntay," for damages where respondent appeared as counsel for the plaintiff
■ Complainant stated that he once declined the demand of Dinglasan, a former official of the BIR for P150,000.00 as
consideration for the destruction of complainant's record. Dinglasan charged complainant on with the crime of false
testimony and grave oral defamation. During the preliminary investigation of the case, respondent acted as counsel
for Dinglasan. Complainant testified in this disbarment proceeding that he consulted respondent, who was then his
counsel, about the demand. Respondent's advice was for complainant to disregard the demand as it was improper.
■ Respondent committed malpractice when he represented Magno Dinglasan
○ Civil Case No. 4306-M for injunction and damages, " Carlos Panganiban v. Dr. Federico Suntay," and Civil Case No.
4726M, " Narciso Lopez v. Federico Suntay,"
■ Complainant alleged that respondent relentlessly pursued a case for the alleged disappearance of two (2) creeks
traversing complainant's fishpond. Complainant alleged that respondent's possession and examination of the TCT
and the blueprint plan of the property while he was still counsel for complainant provided him with the information
that there used to be two (2) creeks traversing the fishpond
■ Respondent violated the confidentiality of information obtained out of a client-lawyer relationship
153 ○ Other cases where respondent served as lawyer of Panganiban and Lopez and for himself filing criminal charges against
 complainant which were later dismissed.
■ While there may be validity to respondent's contention that it is not improper for a lawyer to file a case against a
former client, under the over-all circumstances of the case at bar it cannot be said that respondent acted ethically.
Complainant was not only his client but also his uncle and a political benefactor. The parties for whom respondent
led cases against complainant were former friends or associates whom respondent met serving as counsel of
complainant. The cases led by respondent were about properties which respondent had something to do with as
counsel and administrator of complainant.

Complaint against the Lawyer:

● Malpractice for violating the confidentiality of client-lawyer relationship and engaging in unethical conduct

​IBP decision:

● Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for two years.
● IBP Investigating Commissioner and IBP Commission on Bar Discipline finds respondent guilty of violating:

Canons allegedly violated:

● Canon 21, Rule 21.01 — A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
A. When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
B. When required by law;
C. When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial action.
● Canon 21, Rule 21.02 — A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment,
nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances
consents thereto.

Issue: ​WON respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR?

Ruling:

● Yes, administratively liable

● Respondent acted as counsel for clients in cases involving subject matters regarding which he had either been previously consulted
by complainant or which he had previously helped complainant to administer as the latter's counsel and confidant
● A lawyer shall preserve the confidences and secrets of his clients even after termination of the attorney-client relation. As his defense
to the charges, respondent averred that complainant failed to specify the alleged confidential information used against him. Such a
defense is unavailing.
● It behooves attorneys not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice.

Punishment: ​Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS.

Summary:

Complainant alleged that Respondent was his legal counsel but after parting ways, respondent had been filing complaints and cases against
complainant, making use of confidential information gained while their attorney-client relationship existed. The court held that it is a lawyer’s
duty to keep inviolate the client's confidence. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of
paramount importance in the administration of justice.

Bagonoc, Hazel Claire M.

Case Num. 154- Canon 21
Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda

Facts:

Brief Background:

● Complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP), she
further claimed that she asked legal advice from R, and in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept
confidential, she disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a baptismal certificate.
● However, after the confidential information was given, Atty. Madianda referred her to another lawyer, so this complaint was field
against R
● In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public documents and
154 immorality – using the disclosures as basis for the charges.

Complaint against the Lawyer:

● Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latter's act of disclosing personal secrets and confidential
information she revealed in the course of seeking respondent's legal advice.

IBP Decision:

The Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when she "[revealed] information given to her during a legal
consultation," and accordingly recommended that respondent be reprimanded.
 Canons Allegedly violated:

Canon 21-Duty to preserve the client’s confidence and secrets

Issue: WON Atty. Madianda violated Canon 21.

Ruling:

YES. R indeed breached his duty of preserving the confidence of a client. the documents shown and the information revealed in confidence to
the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged
against the complainant. The Supreme Court further held that the purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from
possible breach of confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.

Punishment: Atty. Mandianda was to be REPRIMANDED and admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a
result of a lawyer-client relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act complained of.

Synthesis:

A client seeked for a lawyer’s advice and upon disclosing all the information, the lawyer referred her to another lawyer, which resulted in the
client’s filing for a complaint, however, the lawyer filed for a counter complaint by using the disclosures as basis for the charges. The lawyer
was then reprimanded Reprimanded.The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable
lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda should have kept the information secret and confidential, under the
attorney-client privilege rule.

Reyes, Farrah Stephanie

William Ong Genato v Atty. Silapan
AC No. 4078

Facts
Brief Background

Atty. Silapan (respondent-lawyer) was renting an office in the building of Genato (complainant). At the same time, respondent-lawyer
handled some cases of the complainant. The conflict started when the respondent-lawyer borrowed money from the complainant to
which he intends to use as down payment for his purchase of a new car. Respondent-lawyer issued a post-dated check to the
complainant and mortgaged his house and lot in favor of the complainant.

Respondent-lawyer was able to purchase the car. However, he failed to pay the amortization on the car and demand letters were sent
to the complainant. Complainant now tried to encash the post-date check but it was dishonored because the account was said to
have already closed.

Complainant filed a case against respondent-lawyer. Which respondent-lawyer then made allegations that complainant is a
businessman who is engaged in the real estate business, trading and buy and sell of deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and
other shady deals and has many cases pending in court. Complainant holds that the foregoing allegations are false, immaterial to the
foreclosure case and maliciously designed to defame him. He charged that in making such allegations, respondent is guilty of
breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship and should be held administratively liable therefor.

Respondent-lawyer insisted that there was nothing libelous in his imputations of dishonest business practices to complainant and his
155 revelation of complainant's desire to bribe government officials in relation to his pending criminal case. He claimed to have made
these statements in the course of judicial proceedings to defend his case and discredit complainant's credibility by establishing his
criminal propensity to commit fraud, tell lies and violate laws. He argued that he is not guilty of breaking his confidential lawyer-client
relationship with the complainant as he made the disclosure in defense of his honor and reputation.

Complaint against Lawyer

Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22 and claimed that said lawyer was guilty of breaking their confidential
lawyer-client relationship.

IBP Decision

The IBP finds respondent-lawyer guilty and recommends the suspension from the practice of law for a period of 1 year.

Canon allegedly Violated

Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.

● The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in
his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents.
● This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their
relationship.
● The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor
 is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of
relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
● IMPORTANT​: It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and properly within
the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer.

Issue

Whether respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to complainant illegal practices and disclosing
complainant's alleged intention to bribe government officials in connection with a pending case.

Ruling
Yes, respondent's allegations and disclosures in the foreclosure case amount to a breach of fidelity sufficient to warrant the imposition
of disciplinary sanction against him. According to the Court, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were
not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the foreclosure case as it
was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondent's professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in
said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

Punishment
Suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.

Summary
A lawyer borrowed money from his client to purchase a new car. He issued post-dated checks which later bounced. Client filed a case
for violation of BP 22, where lawyer responded by alleging the [unlawful] business of client. Client further filed for breach of trust and
confidence by imputing and disclosing information which was said to be between them. Lawyer was then found guilty by the IBP and
the Court and subject to six months suspension.

Capuyan, Thea
CASE NO. 156 : Mercado vs. Vitriolo A.C No. 12476- CANON: Canon 21- Duty to preserve the client’s confidence and secrets

Facts:
Brief Background​: Respondent represented petitioner for her annulment proceedings, after the latter’s previous counsel died. Years
later, respondent filed a criminal case against complainant for allegedly falsifying the Certificates of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and
Katelyn Anne. She allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, when in truth, she
is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado. Complainant denied the accusation and instead cited other charges against the respondent.

Complaint against the lawyer: Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document disclosed confidential
facts and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This prompted complainant to
bring this action. She claims that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential
lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.

Defense of Respondent Lawyer

Respondent alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled against
him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies.

Respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule
on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are
public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to
respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case.

IBP Decision​: IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the
156
rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

Canons allegedly violated:​ Canon 21

Issue​: Whether or not respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for
falsification of public document against his former client.

Ruling​: NO. In order to establish the existence of attorney client privilege, the court cites three essential factors: First, is that there exists an
attorney- client relationship, second, the client made the communication in confidence and lastly, the legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity.

In this case, the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations. Complainant did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that
respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents
because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell
out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint.

Penalty:​ Complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Summary: ​Complainant, Mercado ​contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action
against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then
handled by respondent. The Court dismissed the complaint as the complainant did not spell out the facts which will determine the merit of her
complaint.

157 157 ADELFA PROPERTIES v MENDOZA

Complainants​: Adelfa Properties (now Fine Properties Inc)
Respondents​: Atty. Restituto Mendoza

Facts​:

1. Adelfa Properties is a corporation primarily engaged in real estate development. It maintains a pool of lawyers assigned as in-house counsel
to its affiliate companies. As in-house counsel, they provide legal advice and opinion not only to the company they are assigned to but also to
other affiliate companies of Adelfa as need arises.

2. Brittany Corporation, an affiliate company of Adelfa, hired Atty. Mendoza as one of its in-house counsel. much to the dismay and
disappointment of Adelfa and its affiliates, ​Atty. Mendoza failed to blend effectively​. Complainant added that ​Atty. Mendoza's performance
evaluation, particularly his ability to adapt to his work environment had been consistently low that he had to be transferred from one
company to another​, from one supervisor to another, in order to find him a suitable place in the company

3. Adelfa Properties filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent lawyer.

4. Argument of Complainant:

a. Cynthia J. Javarez, Senior Officer of MB Villar Group of Companies, stated that after she informed Atty. Mendoza of the
unfavorable assessment made by the senior officers, ​he threatened them and retorted, "I will bring down the Company with me,"
and even brazenly claimed that he has information and documents against the company boss.

b. Atty. Mendoza told another senior officer that he took part in the preparation of documents in one of the illegal and irregular
transactions of Adelfa, and that he had information and documents that are damaging to the political career of Senator Villar.

c. Thus, due to breach of trust and confidence, complainant sent a notice of termination dated May 22, 2009 to Atty. Mendoza. In the
said termination letter, complainant manifested they found substantial evidence that Atty. Mendoza has violated the company's core
values and the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code.

5. Argument of Respondent:

a. He claimed that his employment was terminated because he stood up for his principles to which he was branded as abrasive and
not a team player.

b. Averred that he filed the labor complaint in order to seek justice for his illegal termination, and that he never wanted the media
attention he got from filing his labor complaint against complainant.

6. ​Mendoza had himself interviewed by ABS-CBN TV Patrol​ where he maliciously claimed that he was dismissed from employment
because he does not want to participate in the corrupt practices of the company. He also said therein that Senator Villar uses his influence and
power to obtain favorable decisions in land disputes,

Recommendation of IBP Commissioner​:​ Violation Canon 17 and Canon 21. Suspended for 1 year from the practice of law.

Recommendation of IBP Board:​ ​Suspend instead to 6 months from the practice of law.

Held​:

1. Court finds that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant's allegations.

a. Complainant merely claimed that the privilege was broken ​without averring any categorical and concrete allegations and
evidence​ to support their claim.

b. The filing of the illegal dismissal case against complainant, and the disclosure of information in support thereof is not per se a
violation of the rule on privileged communication because it was necessary in order to establish his cause of action against
complainant

c. Court finds that the complaint, as well as the submitted affidavits, ​failed to discharge the necessary burden of proof as no other
evidence was presented to substantiate their claims of extortion.​ The affidavits ​merely provided general statements and
lacked evidence in support of their allegation of extortion.

2. Atty. Mendoza's actuation of allowing himself to be interviewed by the media, thus, utilizing that forum to accuse his former employer of
committing several illegal activities and divulging information which he secured in the course of his employment while he was the complainant's
in-house counsel, no matter how general the allegations are, ​is an act which is tantamount to a clear breach of the trust and confidence
of his employer.

a. The most decent and ethical thing which ​Atty. Mendoza should have done was instead lodge a proper complaint against
complainant if he finds it necessary and allowed the judicial system to take its course.

b. He ​should have exercised prudence and refrained from holding press conferences, issuing press statements, or giving
interviews to the media​ on any matter or incident related to the issues subject of the controversy.

3. The acts of Atty. Mendoza, in allowing himself to be interviewed by the media constitute gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which
a suspension from the practice of law is warranted.

4. Suspended from the practice of law for 6 months for violating Rule 13.02, Canon 21, 21.01, and 21.02.
 Synthesis​:

Complaint for disbarment was filed against lawyer for (1) demanding P25,000,000.00 otherwise he would surrender all the documents he had
against Senator Villar, the major stockholder respondent was working for (2) respondent’s threats to expose incriminating information against
Senator Villar which constitute serious misconduct, and (3) for having himself interviewed by ABSCBN TV Patrol where he discussed the illegal
dismissal complaint he filed. Court found that the evidence did not substantiate on the first two allegations. However, the Court found the
lawyer’s actuation of allowing himself to be interviewed is tantamount to a clear breach of trust and confidence of his employer. Therefore,
suspended for 6 months.

CASE NO.: 158

CASE TITLE: A.C. No. 11504 (August 01, 2017)
ARIEL G. PALACIOS, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF THE AFP RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM
(AFP-RSBS), complainant
vs.
ATTY. BIENVENIDO BRAULIO M. AMORA, respondent
CANON: 21

Facts:

Ø ​Brief Background:

Complainant is the owner-developer of more or less 312 hectares of land estate property located in the Province of Cavite. Said property was
being developed into a residential subdivision, community club house and two (2) eighteen-hole, world-class championship golf course known
as the "Riviera project". In 1996, complainant entered into purchase agreements with several investors in order to finance its Riviera project.
One of these investors was Philippine Golf Development and Equipment, Inc. ("Phil Golf"). On 07 March 1996, Phil Golf paid the amount of
Php 54 Million for the purchase of 2% interest on the Riviera project.

Complainant retained the services of respondent of the Amora and Associates Law Offices to represent and act as its legal counsel on all
contracts related to the Riviera project. Consequently, respondent kept receiving payments for the services it rendered as a counsel.

As complainant's legal counsel, respondent was privy to highly confidential information regarding the Riviera project which included but was
not limited to the corporate set-up, actual breakdown of the shares of stock, financial records, purchase agreements and swapping agreements
with its investors. Respondent was also very familiar with the Riviera project, having been hired to secure Certificate of Registration and
License to Sell with the HLURB and the registration of the shares of stock and license to sell of the Riviera Golf Club, Inc. and Riviera Sports
and Country Club, Inc. Respondent further knew that complainant had valid titles to the properties of the Riviera project and was also
knowledgeable about complainant's transactions with Phil Golf.

After complainant terminated respondent's services as its legal counsel, respondent became Phil Golfs representative and assignee.
Respondent began pushing for the swapping of Phil Golfs properties with that of complainant. Respondent sent swapping proposals to his
former client, herein complainant, this time in his capacity as Phil Golfs representative and assignee. These proposals were rejected by
complainant for being grossly disadvantageous to the latter. After complainant's rejection of the said proposals, respondent filed a case against
its former client, herein complainant on behalf of a subsequent client (Phil Golf) before the HLURB for alleged breach of contract. In this
HLURB case, respondent misrepresented that Phil Golf is a duly organized and existing corporation under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines because it appears that Phil Golfs registration had been revoked as early as 03 November 2003. Despite Phil Golfs revoked
158 Certificate of Registration, respondent further certified under oath that he is the duly authorized representative and assignee of Phil Golf.
Respondent, however, was not authorized to act for and on behalf of said corporation because Phil Golfs corporate personality has ceased.
The Director's Certificate signed by Mr. Benito Santiago of Phil Golf dated 10 May 2007 allegedly authorizing respondent as Phil Golfs
representative and assignee was null and void since the board had no authority to transact business with the public because of the SEC's
revocation of Phil Golfs Certificate of Registration.

Due to the above actuations of respondent, complainant filed the instant action for disbarment.

Ø ​Complaint against the Lawyer:

The instant administrative case seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr. for alleged violation of:
(1) Canon 1, Rules 1.01 to 1.03; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 to 10.03; Canon 15, Rule 15.03; Canon 17; Canon 21, Rule 21.01 and 21.02
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); (2) Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Lawyer's Oath; and (4) Article
1491 of the Civil Code.

Ø ​IBP decision:

After hearing, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) issued a Report and Recommendation dated
June 21, 2010, penned by Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, recommending the dismissal of the complaint.

On review, the IBP-BOG reversed the recommendation of the IBP-CBD and recommended the suspension from the practice of law of
respondent for a period of three (3) years and ordering the return of the amount of PhP1.8 Million to the complainant within six (6)
months.

The IBP-BOG found that respondent violated Rules 15.01, 15.03, 21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR, as well as Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

Ø ​Canons allegedly violated:

o ​CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

§ ​Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as practicable
whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith
 inform the prospective client.

§ ​Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.

o ​CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

§ ​Rule 21.01​ - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;

(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

(b) When required by law;

(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial
action.

§ ​Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course
of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client
with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Issue:​ ​Whether Atty. Amora should be held administratively liable based on the allegations on the Complaint.

Ruling:

Yes. However, the Court modified the findings of IBP-BOG and ruled that Atty. Amora violated only the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 15.01, 15.03,
21.01 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent used confidential information against his former client, herein complainant. By causing the filing of the complaint before the
HLURB, the IBP-BOG correctly points out that respondent must have necessarily divulged to Phil Golf and used information that he gathered
while he was complainant's counsel in violation of Rules 21.01 and 21.02 of the CPR.

Using confidential information which he secured from complainant while he was the latter's counsel, respondent accused his former client of
several violations. In the process, respondent disclosed confidential information that he secured from complainant thereby jeopardizing the
latter's interest.

In the instant case, despite the obvious conflict of interest between complainant and Phil Golf, respondent nevertheless agreed to represent
the latter in business negotiations and worse, even caused the filing of a lawsuit against his former client, herein complainant, using
information the respondent acquired from his former professional employment.

It is undeniable that, in causing the filing of a complaint against his former client, respondent used confidential knowledge that he acquired
while he was still employed by his former client to further the cause of his new client. And, as earlier stated, considering that respondent failed
to obtain any written consent to his representation of Phil Golfs interests, he plainly violated the said rules. Clearly, respondent must be
disciplined for his actuations.

While the Court cannot allow a lawyer to represent conflicting interests, the Court deems disbarment a much too harsh penalty under the
circumstances.

In Quiambao v. Bamba, the Court pointed out that jurisprudence ​regarding the penalty solely for a lawyer's representation of conflicting
interests is suspension from the practice of law for one (1) to three (3) years. While the IBP-BOG recommends the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for three (3) years be imposed on respondent, the Court finds that under the circumstances, a penalty of two (2) years
suspension from the practice of law would suffice. Atty. Amora, however, is warned that a repetition of this and other similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.

Punishment:

Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr. is hereby ​SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years. Atty. Amora is warned that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Synthesis:

In Palacios vs. Amora, ​an administrative case was filed seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Bienvenido Braulio M. Amora, Jr. for
alleged violation of: (1) Canon 1, Rules 1.01 to 1.03; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 to 10.03; Canon 15, Rule 15.03; Canon 17; Canon 21, Rule 21.01
and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR); (2) Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Lawyer's Oath; and (4) Article
1491 of the Civil Code. Respondent was found guilty of violating the rules on conflict of interest as he undertook to take up the causes of his
new client against the interest of his former client and in doing so, divulged confidential information that he gathered while he was
complainant’s counsel. Atty. Amora is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

CANON 22
Case # 159 - ​Montano v. IBP and Atty. Dealca​, AM # 4215
Topic: ​Canon 22-​ Duty to withdraw services only for good cause and upon notice
159
FACTS:

Complaint:
 ● Felicisimo M. Montano filed a complaint against Atty. Juan Dealca charging the latter with misconduct and prays that he be "sternly
dealt with administratively
● Complainant filed an Administrative Case against the IBP and Atty. Dealca averring that the IBP Board of Governors committed grave
abuse of discretion when it overturned its earlier resolution and granted respondent counsel's motion for reconsideration. He claimed
that the earlier resolution denying the motion for reconsideration issued on October 25, 1997 had already become final and
executory; hence, any further action or motion subsequent to such final and executory judgment shall be null and void.

Brief Background:

● Montano hired the services of Atty. Dealca as his counsel in collaboration with Atty. Gerona in a civil case wherein the complainant
was the plaintiff-appellant.
● The agreed attorney's fees is P15,000.00. Fifty percent (50%) of which was payable upon acceptance of the case and the
remaining balance upon the termination of the case​. Accordingly, the complainant paid the respondent the amount of
P7,500.00 representing 50% of the attorney's fee.
● Atty. Dealca demanded an additional payment from the complainant even before he had prepared the appellant's brief and contrary
to their agreement that the remaining balance be payable after the termination of the case. Complainant obliged by paying the
amount of P4,000.00. Atty Dealca again demanded payment of the remaining balance of P3,500.00. When the complainant was
unable to do so, ​respondent lawyer withdrew his appearance as complainant's counsel without the complainants prior
knowledge and/or conformity​. Returning the case folder to the complainant, respondent counsel attached a note ​stating that for
breaking their promise on ​their alleged failure to fulfill their end of the bargain, they instead shall lawyer for themselves. Such
conduct by respondent exceeded the ethical standards of the law profession and prays that the latter be sternly dealt with
administratively. Complainant later on filed motions praying for the imposition of the maximum penalty of disbarment.
● Respondent’s Contention: Complainant is being represented by Atty. Ronando L. Gerona in his case on appeal; whose daughter
has an ailment, hindering him to prepare and submit the appellant’s on time. Complainant went to the respondent to do just that, i.e.,
prepare and submit his appellant's brief on time at the agreed fee of P15,000.00, 50% down and ​50% upon its completion​; After
completion of the appellant's brief, he requested for remaining balance of P7,500.00 be paid. Complainant paid P4,000.00
only, promising to pay the balance on a later date. Such P3,500.00 remains unpaid. Even without being paid completely,
respondent, of his own free will and accord, filed complainant's brief on time; Sensing that something was amiss, respondent
sent the note and case folder to the complainant. Complainant's refusal to pay the agreed lawyer's fees was deliberate and in bad
faith; hence, his withdrawal as counsel was "just, ethical and proper." The penalty of suspension harsh for his act of merely trying to
collect payment for his services rendered, but it indirectly would punish his family since he was the sole breadwinner with children in
school and his wife terminally ill with cancer.

IBP Decision:

● The Investigating Commissioner found respondent counsel guilty of unprofessional conduct and recommended that he be "severely
reprimanded." The penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was amended to "three (3) months suspension from
the practice of law for having been found guilty of misconduct, which eroded the public confidence regarding his duty as a lawyer."
The Commissioner,after case referral from IBP in view of the Motion for Reconsideration of Atty. Dealca, granted by the SC,
recommended that the originally recommended penalty be imposed.
● IBP Board of Governors, ADOPTED and APPROVED, the original Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner imposing a penalty of Reprimand.

Canons Violated:
● Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

ISSUE​:​ WON Atty. Dealca violated Canon 22.01.

RULING:

● Yes. Atty. Dealca's conduct was found unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the
circumstances. In the present case, Atty. Dealca's withdrawal was unjustified as the complainant did not deliberately fail to pay the
attorney's fees. Complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondent's contemptuous conduct does not speak well
of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. There is sufficient evidence which indicates
the complainant's willingness to pay the attorney's fees. Atty. Dealca withdrew his appearance simply because of the complainant's
failure to pay the remaining balance of P3,500.00, which does not appear to be deliberate.
● Rule 20.4 of Canon 20, mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. The situation was aggravated by respondent counsel's note to
complainant withdrawing as counsel which was couched in impolite and insulting language. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to
him by the complainant, respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.
● The court affirmed the findings made by the IBP that complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer only for the
preparation and submission of the appellant's brief and the ​attorney's fees ​was payable upon th​e ​completion and submission
of the appellant's brief and not upon the termination of the case​.
● The Court does not agree with the complainant that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on the respondent
lawyer. Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court
and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.​ ​In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.

PUNISHMENT:
● Atty. Juan S. Dealca was REPRIMANDED with a warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.

SYNTHESIS:
Montano filed a complaint against Atty. Dealca who withdrew his services due to the complainants failure to pay the remaining balance of
attorney’s fees. Atty. Dealca’s withdrawal is unjustified as the complainant did not deliberately fail to pay the attorney’s fees. Atty. Dealca was
REPRIMANDED and warned that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.
 Reyes, Ry Jordane
Case No. 160 - Canon 22
Canoy vs. Ortiz, A.C. No. 5485, 16 March 2005

Facts:

Brief Background

A complaint was filed against Atty. Ortiz. Canoy filed a complaint at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Region VI (Bacolod City) for illegal dismissal against his former employer, Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. In 1998, the labor arbiter hearing
ordered to submit position papers, Canoy provided Atty. Ortiz all the needed documents but he did not show progress in the case.
After his last visit in 2000 at the law office wherein he was told to come back again, he followed up in the NLRC office, he found out it
was dismissed in 1998 for failure to prosecute.

Atty. Ortiz claims he has catered mostly indigent and low-income clients and with considerable financial sacrifice to himself. He
claims that his office is a virtual adjunct of the PAO with its steady stream of non-paying clients. He also hosted a legal assistance
show on the radio and pursued this until his election as ‘COUNCILOR’ of Bacolod City.

DEFENSE:​ He was confident that it would be resolved in a compromise; before he could submit, the Labor Arbiter had
already issued a dismissal of the case that his period had lapsed. The reason was because he was “Frankly preoccupied
with both his functions as a LGU official and a practicing lawyer.

He states that it was his policy “to inform clients that they should be the ones to follow-up their cases with his office, as it
would be too difficult and a financial burden to attend making follow-ups with 100s of clients…”

Complaint against the Lawyer​: Misconduct and malpractice

IBP decision​:

Canoy withdrew the complaint but IBP did not allow this to interrupt the case; recommended REPRIMAND – IBP Commission
modified with warning.

Canons allegedly violated:

160
CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND H SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to
the client’s request for information.

CANON 22 – A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES

Rule 22.02- A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including
all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.

Issue:​ ​WON Atty. Ortiz is liable for misconduct and malpractice?

Ruling:​ GUILTY

It took nearly 2 years before Canoy had learned that the paper had not been filed and had been dismissed. It was highly
irresponsible of Atty. Ortiz considering Canoy was an indigent client whom he proudly says are his favored clientele. He cannot shift
the balme to the complainant for not inquiring the status of his case.

The mantle of public service will not deliver the lawyer, no matter how well-meaning, from the consequence of negligent acts.
It is not enough to say that all pauper litigants should be assured of legal representation, it must also be quality representation.

Punishment: ​SUSPENSION for one (1) month from notice

SYNTHESIS
Atty. Ortiz failed to notify his indigent client Mr. Canoy of the dismissal of his case (illegal dismissal from Coca-Cola) due to his failure
to file a comment at the NLRC office; he stated that the reason he was not able to inform them was because he was overwhelmed
with work and he ran for Councilor at Bacolod City - Guilty
Catubag, Clemn Lawrence Lopez
Case No. 161
Francisco v. Atty. Portugal
161 A.C. No. 6155 March 14, 2006

​FACTS
 Complaint:​ Affidavit-complaint against Atty. Portugal for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, gross misconduct, and gross negligence

Allegations of the Complainant:

1. Complainants engaged the services of respondent for their criminal case.

2. After filing several motions, complainants never heard from the respondent.

3. Later on, complainants were shocked to discover that the Court had already issued a Resolution denying their petition.

4. Complainants also learned that the said Resolution had attained finality and warrants of arrest5 had already been issued against the
accused because respondent, whose whereabouts remained unknown, did nothing to prevent the reglementary period for seeking
reconsideration from lapsing.

Defense of the Respondent:

1. Respondent states that it is of vital significance that the Court notes that he was not the original counsel of the accused.

2. He only met the accused during the promulgation of the Sandiganbayan decision convicting the accused of two counts of homicide and
one count of attempted homicide.

3. He was merely requested by the original counsel to be on hand, assist the accused, and be present at the promulgation of the
Sandiganbayan decision.

4. Respondent claims that there was no formal engagement undertaken by the parties. But only because of his sincere effort and in true
spirit of the Lawyer’s Oath did he file the Motion for Reconsideration.

Decision of the IBP:

§ The Board of Directors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve Commissioner Villadolid’s recommendation to find respondent guilty and
specifically to recommend his suspension for six (6) months as penalty.

Canon violated:​ Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct.

RULING

Yes, respondent committed gross negligence or misconduct in handling complainants’ criminal case which eventually led to the ad cautelam
petition’s dismissal with finality.

1. In a criminal case like that handled by respondent in behalf of the accused, respondent has a higher duty to be circumspect in defending
the accused for it is not only the property of the accused which stands to be lost but more importantly, their right to their life and liberty.

2. He definitely fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights of his clients. As aptly
observed by Commissioner Villadolid, respondent had not been quite candid in his dealings with the accused or complainants.

3. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause.
The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final
adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.

PUNISHMENT

Suspension from the practice of law for 3 months

SYNTHESIS

Complainants engaged the services of the respondent their criminal case. However, respondent denied that he was the counsel of the
complainants but was only requested by the original counsel to assist the case. Respondent even sent letter to complainants of his intention to
withdraw as their counsel. The Court held that respondent committed gross negligence and misconduct for failure to fulfil his duty especially
that it was a criminal case and that respondent cannot withdraw as counsel without just cause.

Vargas, Michelle Anne C.

Case No.: ​162 Case Title: ​Spouses Warriner v. Dublin Canon: ​22
162
Facts:

Brief Background: C ​ omplainant ​secured the services of respondent in the filing of a Complaint for damages against E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd. before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. During the proceedings of the case, respondent requested the RTC for a period
 of 10 days within which to submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. Despite the lapse of the requested period, respondent did not
submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence nor filed any comment which declared complainants to have waived their right. Respondent
requested for another extension of 30 days which was granted. However, after a lapse of almost two years, respondent still did not file his
Comment. Respondent again ignored the Court's directive amidst fines sanctioned to him. Thereafter, the court ordered respondent's arrest
and detention until he complies with the Resolutions. This time, respondent heeded the court’s directives by submitting his Compliance and
Comment. Respondent claimed that he failed to file his Comment to the instant administrative case because he lost the records of the said
Civil Case and that he tried to get a copy from the RTC to no avail. In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period,
respondent averred that complainant Warriner is an Australian national who married his Filipino spouse as a convenient scheme to stay in the
country; that he rendered his services free of charge; that he accepted the case because he was challenged by Warriner's criticism of the
Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of Warriner's claim that the construction being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil towards his property; that Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of
other witnesses to testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion of the veracity of Warriner's claim; that upon inquiries, he discovered that the
bits of evidence presented by Warriner were fabricated; that the barangay officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme of
Warriner; that he visited Warriner's property and saw that Warriner authored the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion prevention
ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.; that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with
a disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that
complainants no longer saw him or inquired about the status of the case; that he did not withdraw from the case because complainants no
longer visited him at his law office; that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to perpetrate his fraudulent scheme; and that
he could not be held administratively liable for filing a belated Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence as he only did the same to protect the
legal profession and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.

Complaint against the Lawyer: ​Administrative Complaint filed by complainant-spouses George Arthur Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R.
Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin for gross negligence and dereliction of duty.

IBP Decision: ​The IBP Board of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants, respondent also showed his
propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year.

Canons allegedly violated: ​Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Canon 22

Issue: ​Whether respondent is guilty in mishandling the civil case of complainants.

Ruling:​Yes. Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling the said civil case.

Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and Rule 18.03 which provide:

Canon 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him
liable.

The Court held that respondent ​deliberately mishandled said civil case to the prejudice of the complainants. Respondent admitted that he
deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits because he believed that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same
would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If respondent truly believes that the exhibits to be presented in evidence by his
clients were fabricated, then he has the option to withdraw from the case.

Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such as "when the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of
conduct with the matter he is handling" or "when the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules."

The Court also agreed with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect court orders and processes. Note that the
Court required respondent to submit his Comment to the administrative Complaint as early as year 2000. However, he was only able to file his
Comment eight years later, or in 2008 and only after the Court ordered his arrest. "As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know
that a resolution of the Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely.

Punishment: ​Atty. Reni M. Dublin is suspended from the practice of law for six months, with a warning that a similar violation will be dealt with
more severely.

Summary: ​Complainant ​secured the services of respondent in the filing of a Complaint for damages against E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of exhibits
because he believed that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same would be refused admission by the RTC. The IBP Board
of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants, respondent also showed his propensity to defy the orders of the
court, thus it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year. The Court held that Atty. Reni M. Dublin violated
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 and Canon 22 ​and ​was suspended from the practice of law for six months, with a warning that a similar violation will be
dealt with more severely.

Golosino, Abbie
Case # 163
A.C. No. 12146: ​Lopez v. Cristobal –​ CANON 22 (Duty to withdraw services only for good cause and upon notice)

Facts:
Brief background:
Petitioner alleged that sometime in May 2011, he engaged the services of respondent Atty. Cristobal as his counsel in a
case pending before the Regional Trial Court Branch 148 in Makati. Atty. Cristobal required the payment of an acceptance fee of
163 Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00). Lopez deposited the said amount to Atty. Cristobal's bank account.
The RTC Branch 148 issued an Order requiring the parties to file their respective position papers in connection with the
subject case. Lopez averred that despite knowledge of the lower court's directive, Atty. Cristobal failed to file the position paper
required by the lower court. Lopez stated in his Complaint that Atty. Cristobal also did not attend the hearings on the subject case and
that she also deliberately refused to communicate with Lopez.
In a letter dated March 5, 2012, Lopez informed Atty. Cristobal of his decision to stop her engagement as his counsel in the
subject case and demanded that Atty. Cristobal:
(1) prepare and file her withdrawal of appearance in the subject case and provide Lopez with a copy thereof;
(2) return the acceptance fee of Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00)
 Despite the written demand made by Lopez, Atty. Cristobal did not file her withdrawal as counsel of Lopez.

Complaint against the lawyer:

The petitioner alleges that the defendant lawyer has not filed necessary position papers in court despite already complying
with the litigation fees. The defendant lawyer also failed to withdraw as counsel of the petitioner.

IBP Decision:
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended imposing the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of
law.

Canons allegedly violated:

CANON 22 — A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rule 22.01 — A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment
effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR, on the other hand, provides that an attorney may only retire from a case either by written
consent of his client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the
name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent lawyer should be disbarred?
Ruling:
No. The SC held that a lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a petition
for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three (3) days before the
date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of paper."
The circumstances of the case show that Atty. Cristobal made no such move. The Court agrees with the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Cristobal's defense of discharge as self-serving. Atty. Cristobal claimed that her return of the
case records to Lopez as well as the latter's acceptance of P10,000.00 effectively discharged her from her obligations as counsel for
the complainant. The Court does not agree.
Atty. Cristobal clearly disregarded the mandate of Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR. Atty. Cristobal never sought the written
consent of Lopez, his client or the permission of the court. Atty. Cristobal also did not file a petition for withdrawal in court.
Here, the circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P35,000.00 as acceptance fee,
Atty. Cristobal failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of Lopez.

Punishment:
The Court finds a six-month suspension from the practice of law appropriate as penalty for Atty. Cristobal's misconduct. She
is also ORDERED to RETURN to complainant Carlos V. Lopez the remaining balance of P25,000.00 from the P35,000.00 she
received from the latter within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision. Respondent shall submit to the Court proof of restitution
within ten (10) days from payment.

SUMMARY:
The petitioner alleges that the defendant lawyer has not filed necessary position papers in court despite already complying
with the litigation fees. The defendant lawyer also failed to withdraw as counsel of the petitioner. The Supreme Court suspended the
lawyer for 6 months and ordered him to return the money.

OTHER TOPICS
A.C. No. 6368 June 13, 2012

FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO ​vs. ​ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO

Facts:

Brief background: The respondent – with the connivance of Andres Magat – willfully and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent
to defraud against the complainants by using false pretenses and deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of land
belonging to the Miranda Family of Tagaytay City, who are the acquaintance of the complainants.

It started when the respondent convinced the complainants to finance and deliver to him PhP 495,000.00 as advanced money to
164 expedite the titling of the subject land. He further committed misrepresentation by presenting himself as the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the
prospective buyer of the land. He also led complaints to believe that he has contracts at NAMRIA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds
which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and were only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver the said amount.
Upon receipt of the money, he did not comply with his obligation to expedite the titling of the land but instead used the money for personal use.
The complainants demanded the return of the money to no avail. Respondent were charged with the crime of Estafa.

Complaint against the lawyer: ​C​omplaint ​for disbarment against respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit,
malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation of his duties and oath as a lawyer.

IBP Decision: ​SUSPENDED for a period of TWO YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his profession as a lawyer and as a
member of the Bar.

​Canons allegedly violated: ​Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
 Rule 2.03.​ – A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. – A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bengco should be suspended from the practice of law.

Ruling:
YES. It is first worth mentioning that the respondent’s defense of prescription is untenable. The Court has held that administrative
cases against lawyers do not prescribe.
The accused used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the
subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of ₱495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is
not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

Punishment: Respondent Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is found ​GUILTY of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility. ​SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for ​ONE (1) YEAR​ effective upon notice hereof.

SUMMARY: Respondent defrauded the complainants by using false pretenses misrepresenting himself to convince the complainants that he
can expedite the titling of land of the latter if they will pay him PhP 495,000.00. He failed to comply with his obligation and the complainant
demanded for the return of the money. He was charged with the crime of Estafa and suspended for one year from practice. The practice of law
is not a business and is not meant to be a money making-venture.

Ngo, Patrick Samuel

In Re: Suspension from the practice of law in the territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera
July 2004, B.M. 793

Brief Background​:
The District Court of Guam informed the SC of the 2-year suspension of Atty. Maquera from the practice of law in Guam. The IBP sent
Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline but the notice was returned unserved
because Maquera’s current address was unknown.

The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to practice law in the Philippines in 1958 and in Guam in 1974. He was suspended in Guam for
misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an
unreasonably high fee for handling his client's case.

Based on the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct,
"there is no evidence to establish that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines. However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him
indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977,

Complaint against the Lawyer:

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign
jurisdiction, where he has also been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension in this realm, provided the
foreign court's action is by reason of an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or
a violation of the lawyer's oath.

165
The IBP also still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is,
in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised
Rules of Court.

IBP decision:
The IBP only resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is, in
turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules
of Court.

Canons allegedly violated:

● Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court
● Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Issue
W/N member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction may likewise be disbarred
or suspended in this country for the same infraction?

Ruling:
Yes. As Maquera has not yet been able to adduce evidence on his behalf, the SC required him to show cause why he should not be
suspended or disbarred for said acts. In the meantime, Atty. Maquera was SUSPENDED for 1 YEAR or until he shall have paid his
membership dues, whichever comes later.
 The Superior Court of Guam found that Maquera acquired his client's property by exercising the right of redemption previously assigned to him
by the client in payment of his legal services. Such a transaction falls squarely under Article 1492 in relation to Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the
Civil Code, which prohibits the lawyer's acquisition by assignment of the client's property which is the subject of the litigation handled by the
lawyer. Under Article 1492 the prohibition extends to sales in legal redemption. This is also a valid ground for his suspension from the practice
of law here as it is violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him;" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

However, it bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam does
not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines

Under Section 27,Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in
this jurisdiction ( i.e. an act or omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or a violation of the
lawyer's oath) Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a
lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present evidence

Punishment:
Atty. Maquera was SUSPENDED for 1 YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.

Summary:
Atty. Maquera is liable for misconduct. Being suspended in another country’s practice of law does not automatically result in his suspension or
disbarment in the Philippines. He must answer to the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline notice of hearing. Until then he was suspended for 1
year or until he pays his memberships dues due.

Oblianda, Johanna Daisyre L.

CASE NO. 166
VALENCIA VS. ANTINIW ​(30 June 2008 Case)​ – Suspension, Disbarment and Discipline of Lawyers

Facts:
Ø ​Brief Background:​ T ​ his is an ​appeal for reinstatement to the bar of the respondent who was disbarred on 26 April 1991 for
falsifying a notarized deed of sale and introduction the same as evidence for his client.
Ø From 1993 to 2002, the respondent filed several motions and appeals for reinstatement to the bar. Respondent proffered his
apologies to the Court for his shortcomings as a legal practitioner asserting that if there was an offense or oversight committed
against the legal profession, it was due to his sincere belief that he was doing it honestly to protect the interest of his client. His
motions and appeals were accompanied by endorsements of his good moral character by various organizations such as
IBP-Pangasinan Chapter; Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Courts of Lingayen and Urdaneta, Pangasinan; Provincial
Prosecutors’ Association of Pangasinan; Provincial Board of Pangasinan; Rotary Club of Urdaneta; and past National President
of the IBP.
Ø ​IBP decision​: IBP resolved to approve respondent's Plea for Reinstatement and recommend the reinstatement of Atty. Dionisio C.
Antiniw as member of the bar immediately. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended his reinstatement.

Issue:​ Whether or not Atty. Antiniw should be reinstated to the bar

Ruling: ​Yes.
1. Disbarment is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather ​intended to protect the
166 administration of justice ​by requiring that those who exercise this function should be ​competent, honorable and reliable ​in order
that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them.​Restorative justice, not retribution, is our goal in disciplinary
proceedings​.
2. Guided by this doctrine and considering the evidence submitted by respondent satisfactorily showing his contrition and his being again
worthy of membership in the legal profession, the Court finds that it is now time to lift herein respondent’s disbarment and reinstate
him to the august halls of the legal profession, but with the following reminder that practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance
with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying
the privilege to practice law.
3. During respondent’s disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in
reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that he has regained
his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary.
Moreover, it is well-settled that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to protect the
dispensation of justice by sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.

SUMMARY
Atty. Antiniw appeals for reinstatement to the Bar after having been disbarred for 15 years after being found guilty of falsifying a notarial deed
of sale and using it as evidence. The SC ruled that after the numerous pleas and after showing remorse and engaging in civic and
humanitarian affairs, Anitiniw showed that he is fitting to be reinstated to the bar. Restorative justice, not retribution (vengeance), is the goal of
disciplinary proceedings.

Panelo, Des
Case 167
Bernardo v. Mejia, Adm. Case No. 2984, Aug. 31 2007
167
FACTS:
● Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia of several administrative offenses such as misappropriating
and converting to his personal use the money entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on Bernardo’s property; falsification of
 documents such as the Special Power of Attorney, Deed of Sale and Deed of Assignment and lastly, issuing a check knowing that he
was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from the former in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing
said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded. The Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam which
found the respondent Atty. Mejia guilty of all the charges against him and imposed on him the penalty of Disbarment. Respondent
files a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law however, the Supreme Court En Banc denied his petition
for reinstatement. The respondent filed again this present petition for review of his Administrative case with a plea for reinstatement in
the practice of law. In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. At the age of seventy-one, he is
begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through
his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.

ISSUE: ​WON the respondent shall be reinstated.

RILING:
● The Court granted the respondent’s petition. Fifteen years has passed since he was punished with the severe penalty of
disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the
fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to
him, and he has shown remorse. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also
knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. However, the petitioner is reminded that practice of law is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree
of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the
privilege to practice law.
● WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby
GRANTED.

SUMMARY:

Adolfo, Tricia
CASE 168
Re: 2003 Bar Examination, B.M. 1222, 2009 - DISBARMENT

Facts:
● In September 2003, the day following the examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar Examinations
Committee, was apprised of a ​rumored leakage in the examination on the subject.
○ He reported to Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and to the other members of the Court, recommending that the examination
on the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted.
○ Following Vitug’s recommendation, the Court moved to nullify and spread out the weight of the Mercantile Law among the
remaining seven bar subjects.
● An investigation was then made and it was found that the leaked test questions were the ones which the examiner, ​Atty. Balgos (of
Balgos & Perez Law firm) had prepared and submitted
● His questions ​constituted 82% of the in the exam, ​some with slight changes which were not substantial and in other cases exactly
as he proposed. As such, it was conclusively proved that the leakage originated from his office.
● Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were prepared by him on his computer. His computer was interconnected wit 9
assistant attorneys.
● The next day, Attorney Balgos questioned Attorney Danilo De Guzman (assistant attorney in Balgos & Perez Law firm), also a
member of the ​Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, ​FEU chapter.
● De Guzman was the source of the leakage of his test questions​ in Mercantile Law
○ De Guzman admitted to him that he downloaded the test questions from Attorney Balgos computer and faxed a copy to a
fraternity brother.
○ De Guzman alleged that he did not know that they were the bar questions and thought that they were quizzers for Atty.
Balgos’ book.
● Committee and IBP Recommendation: for De Guzman to be ​disbarred​.

Canon allegedly violated:​

168 (a) ​Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
(b) ​Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
integrated bar.

Issue: ​WON Atty. De Guzman must be disbarred? YES

Ruling: ​De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law instead of promoting respect for it
and ​degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. ​His actuations impaired public respect for the
Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a law graduates academic preparedness to embark upon the
practice of law

● De Guzman did not do it alone. He had help:

○ Cheryl Palma → Atty. Balgos private secretary & the only person who knew the password to Balgos’ computer
○ Silvestre Atienza → also a fraternity brod of De Guzman, who was responsible for interconnecting Atty. Balgos computer
with the other computers outside.
○ Other conspirators → those who received & distributed the leaked questions
● Atty. Balgos could have avoided the leak if he​ exercised due diligence​ in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions which he
prepared.
● Penalty: ​De Guzman is ​DISBARRED & Atty. Balgos is ​REPRIMANDED and DISENTITLED from receiving any honorarium as an
 Examiner in Mercantile Law.

SUMMARY​: IN the 2003 Bar Exams, Atty. Balgos was an examiner for Mercantile Law. His questions were leaked by his assistant attorney De
Guzman who interconnected the computer of Atty. Balgos. The questions were leaked to an FEU fraternity (brothers of De Guzman), which
caused the cancellation of the Mercantile Law exam. Atty. Balgos is reprimanded and Atty. De Guzman is disbarred.

Ferolino, Nicole Danisse A.

CASE 169: ELPIDIO P. TIONG, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO, RESPONDENT.
A.C. No. 4428 : December 12, 2011

FACTS:
Brief Background:
Atty. George Florendo has been serving as the legal counsel and administrator of Elpidio’s business.. Elpidio, a US citizen, is often times
away. For 2 years, he suspected that his wife and Atty. Florendo were having an affair. Finally in 1995, he was able to listen to a telephone
conversation where he ehar Atty. Florendo mentions amorous words to Ma. Elena. He confronted the two and both eventually admitted to their
illicit relationship. Atty. Florendo and Ma. Elena then executed and signed an affidavit, which wa later notarized stating that they admit of their
illicit relationship; that they are seeking the forgiveness of their respective spouses

Complaint against lawyer:

Elpidio forgave Florendo and Ma. Elena but nevertheless, Elpidio filed a disbarment case against Florendo.

Defense of respondent lawyer:

Florendo contended that he can no longer be sanctioned because he was already pardoned.

IBP Ruling:
Suspension from the practice of law for 1 year

Canons allegedly violated:

"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
169
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Florendo should be disbarred despite being pardoned by Elpidio

SC RULING:
Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital
vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he violated the trust and
confidence reposed on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17. of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Undeniably, therefore, his illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action
from the Court.

With respect to Florendo’s contention that he can not be sanctioned because he has been pardoned:
The court held that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is
intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an
investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of
the Bar Hence, the Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating the instant
proceedings

PUNISHMENT:
However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months,
instead of one (1) year as recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.

SUMMARY:
Atty Florendo had an illicit affair with his client’s wife and later both admitted their relationship. They then executed an affidavit attesting their
relationship and asked forgiveness. Elpidio pardoned Florendo and his wife but filed a disbarment case against Florendo. Florendo contented
that he should not be sanctioned bec he is already pardoned. SC held that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to
grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to
protect the public and the courts.
Mapalo, Ella Gabrielle
CASE 170: Eduardo Maglente v Atty Delfin Agcaoili
[A.C. No.10672, 18 March 2015]

FACTS:
Brief Background: ​Maglente alleged that he engaged the services of Atty Agcaoili for the purpose of filing a case to determine the true owner
of the land being occupied by the members of their organization. He gave Atty Agcaoili P48,000 intended to cover the filing fees for the action
170 to be instituted.

Complaint against lawyer: ​Despite the payment, Atty failed to file an action in court. When confronted, Atty explained that the money given to
him was not enough to fully pay for the filing fees in court. Thus, Maglente asked for the return of the money, but Atty claimed that he spent it
and demanded more money. Complainant further alleged that when he persisted in seeking restitution of the aforesaid sum, respondent told
him to shut up because it was not his money in the first place.
 Defense of respondent lawyer: ​Atty denied spending complainant's money, explaining that he had already prepared the initiatory pleading
and was poised to file the same, when he discovered through the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City that the filing fee
was quite costly. This prompted him to immediately relay such information to complainant who undertook to raise the amount needed. While
waiting, however, the instant administrative case was filed against him.

IBP Ruling:
● IBP found Atty guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of CPR and that he must be meted with the penalty of Censure, with a warning that a
repetition of the same will be met with a stiffer penalty, and that Atty is also directed to account for or return P48,000 to complainant.
● The Investigating Commissioner observed that had respondent prepared the complaint and performed research works, as he claimed,
then he could have kept a reasonable amount for his effort under the doctrine of quantum meruit, but unfortunately, he could not
present any proof in this respect.
● IBP Board of Governors ordered to increase the penalty from Censure to the suspension from the practice of law for 3 months.

Canons allegedly violated:​ Rule 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 and Rule 18.3, Canon 18 of CPR

ISSUE:​ ​W/N respondent should be held administratively liable for the acts complained of

SC RULING:
● It must be stressed that once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to
attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion, whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable for violating:
o ​ Canon 18​: A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence; and
o ​ Rule 18.03​: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection [therewith] shall
render him liable.
● In this case, despite complainant giving P48,000 to answer for the filing fees, Atty failed to comply with his undertaking and offered
the flimsy excuse that the money was not enough to fully pay the filing fees.
● Atty Agcaoili also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of CPR when he failed to refund the amount of P48,000 that complainant
gave him despite repeated demands.
o ​Canon 16​: A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
o ​Rule 16.01​: A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
o ​Rule 16.03​: A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
● When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the money was not used accordingly, the same must be
immediately returned to the client. A lawyer's failure to return the money to his client despite numerous demands is a violation of the
trust reposed on him and is indicative of his lack of integrity, as in this case.

PUNISHMENT: ​Atty is suspended from the practice of law for 1 year, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more
severely. He is also ordered to return to complainant the amount of P48,000 he received from the latter.

SUMMARY: ​Atty Agcaoili was the lawyer of Maglente for the determination of the true owner of the subject land. Maglente gave P48,000 to
Atty for the filing fee. However, Atty failed to file the case and alleged that said amount was not enough to file. Maglente asked for the return of
the amount but Atty refused and contended that he had already prepared an initiatory pleading but realized that the cost for filing was costly.
Still, he refused to pay the amount. SC ruled that Atty violated Canons 16 and 18 of the CPR for failure to attend his client’s cause with
diligence, and for failing to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for its intended purpose.

171
JAVIER, CLYSIL SWEET
CASE 172
PACAO vs. LIMOS, A.C. No. 11246, 14 June 2016

FACTS:

● Complainant’s wife, Mariadel Pacao, was charged with qualified theft by BHF Pawnshop Mandaluyong branch. Atty Limos appeared
as counsel for the BHF.
● To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for possible settlement. After a series of
negotiations, Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of 530,000.00 to be paid in full or by instalments. It led to an
172 agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount of 200,000 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to
who will then deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint motion to approve
compromise agreement for filing with the court.
● Later on, Atty Limos received the initial payment of 200,000 but failed to meet the terms of their agreement. Thereafter, the
complainant met BHF’s representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer their counsel and was not
authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF.
● This prompted the complainant to send demand letter to Atty. Limos to return the money but failed and refused to do so.

COMPLAINT AGAINST THE LAWYER:

Complainant filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the IBP – CBD. The IBP- CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she
did not file any responsive pleading.
 Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Limos. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record
to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose
the material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to
receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant.

IBP DECISION
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation and transmitted the notice of the
resolution and the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

CANONS ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED

Lawyer’s oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics

ISSUE
WON the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from the practice of law

RULING

● Atty. Limos was previously suspended twice by the Supreme Court and was warned that repetition of the same or similar acts will
merit a more severe penalty.

Brief background of the two previous offense:

In Villa Gores v. Atty. Limos, she received attorney's fees of 20,000 plus miscellaneous expenses of 2,000, but she failed to perform
her undertaking with her client; thus she was found guilty of gross negligence and dereliction of duty. Likewise, in Wilkie v. Atty.
Limos, Atty. Limos was held administratively liable for her deceitful and dishonest conduct when she obtained a loan of 250,000 from
her client and issued two postdated checks in the latter's favor to pay the said loan despite knowledge of insufficiency of funds to
cover the same.

● Despite her two prior suspensions, still, Atty. Limos is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is she unfit to stay in the
legal profession for her deceitful conduct but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has supervision over her. Atty.
Limos' unwarranted obstinacy is a great insolence to the Court which cannot be tolerated.
● The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor​.— A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

● Atty. Limos' recalcitrant attitude and unwillingness to heed with the Court's warning, which is deemed to be an affront to the Court's
authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. Her repeated desecration of her ethical
commitments proved herself to be un.t to remain in the legal profession. Worse, she remains apathetic to the need to reform herself.
● "The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions."
● Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure to
live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a member of the bar.

PUNISHMENT
Atty. Sinamar Limos is disbarred and her name ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

SUMMARY
Atty Limos was the counsel of BHF Pawnshop who filed a case against the wife of the complainant. Atty. Limos committed fraud and deceit by
concealing or omitting to disclose the material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on
behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant.

Urot, Marcelyn A.
LILY FLORES-SALADO, et. al v. ATTY. ROMAN A. VILLANUEVA
The Case: ​This is a disbarment complaint against Att. Roman Villanueva for allegedly falsifying a public document and for allegedly concealing
his true age.
Brief Background:
● This involves a parcel of land in which herein petitioner presented an adverse claim. This claim was annotated by the register of
deeds on the TCT covering the questioned land.However, an affidavit of withdrawal/waiver was also annotated on said title thereafter,
173 which appeared to be signed by them.
Complaint against Lawyer:
● Petitioners lodged their complaints with the IBP charging the respondent with gross dishonesty on the basis of their assertion that
they had not signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal.
● They further charged him with dishonesty for concealing his true age in order to secure his appointment in 2006 as a state prosecutor.
Petitioners averred that he is already disqualified from the said position since he has already been 70 years old. Their proof:
● the residence certificate issued in the name of "Isabelo Villanueva, Jr.," whom they claimed was the respondent
himself, stating June 26, 1936 as his birthdate;
 ● the deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of Roman Villanueva, Sr. showing that the respondent was 14 years
old when he signed the document as "Isabelo Villanueva";
● the certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Tupi, South Cotabato showing that he was 26 years old
when he got married on December 24, 1961; and
● the affidavits respectively executed by his siblings, Francisca V. Flores and Tarcela V. Sajulan.
Respondent-Lawyer’s Contention:
● He contended that the complainants did not present sufficient proof showing that he had falsified the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal;
● that the basis for the partition of the contested property had been the compromise agreement entered into by him and his siblings
● that he had been born on November 29, 1943, as indicated in his birth certificate.
IBP Decisions:
● The IBP-CBD finds the respondent liable for gross misconduct in relation to the forged affidavit and recommended his 2-year
suspension from the practice of law.
● But, they dismissed the charge of dishonesty in relation to the respondent’s age because the birth certificate prevailed over the
documents presented by the petitioners.
Issue​: Should the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for gross misconduct and gross dishonesty?
Ruling​: The court reversed the decisions of the IBP, considering that the charges were not competently substantiated.
● Falsification must be proved in the appropriate criminal or civil proceeding, not in the disbarment proceeding. A disbarment
proceeding is not the occasion to determine the issue of falsification or forgery simply because the sole issue to be addressed and
determined therein is whether or not the respondent attorney is still fit to continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of
justice. Accordingly, we decline to rule herein whether or not the respondent had committed the supposed falsification of the affidavit
of waiver/withdrawal in the absence of the prior determination thereof in the appropriate proceeding.
● Moreover, the complainants' mere denial of having signed the affidavit of waiver/withdrawal did not suffice to overcome the positive
value of it as a notarized document.
● Regarding the concealment of age, the court held that the birth certificate is the best evidence of the respondents’s date of birth. Also,
the fact of late registration of the respondent's birth should not adversely affect the validity of the entries made in his birth certificate.
● Lastly, ​the court finds that disbarment or suspension complaints against lawyers in the public service involving their qualifications
should be initially investigated by the agencies or offices having administrative supervision over them.
Punishment​: No punishment. The court ​Dismisses​ t​ he Disbarment Complaint against respondent for lack of factual and legal merit.
Loro, Clarisse
Paras vs. Paras, A.C. No. 5333. March 13, 2017

Facts:
· an administrative case stemmed from the disbarment complaint filed by Rosa Yap Paras (complainant) against her husband Justo de
Jesus Paras (respondent) for which he was suspended from the practice of law for a year.
· The Court suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and
other related loan instruments, and for one (1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family.
· Atty. Paras continued to practice law such as preparing pleadings which then were signed by his associate. After filing the Motion to Lift
Suspension, he started to accept new clients and cases.
· The complainant filed the administrative case against petitioner for violating such suspension

IBP: ​there is no IBP's factual findings and recommendation. IBP failed to investigate the alleged violation of the suspension order and to lift
the same. it took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant matters before it. Thus, this leaves the Court with no factual findings to
serve as its basis in resolving the issues raised.

Violation: ​Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and willfully appearing as an
attorney without authority to do so

Issue:
174 whether or not the respondent should be administratively held liable for practicing law while he was suspended.
Whether or not the Court should lift his suspension.

Ruling:
Moot and academic.
As a rule, during the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law. It must be stressed,
however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required
documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law.

However, the Court ruled that the penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be imposed on a lawyer who had been previously
disbarred. Furthermore, for recording purposes, the Court imposed suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

Note:​ the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for valid and compelling reasons, as
it is essential to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues raised. ​ ​Absent a valid
fact-finding investigation, the Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP for further proceedings.

Punishment​: Suspension for 6 months but cannot be imposed due to previous disbarment.

Case summary: ​Lawyer violated the suspension to practice law. Preparing pleadings and accepting new clients and cases upon filing the
Motion to Lift Suspension. Court can no longer impose the suspension because of previous disbarment.

CASE NO. 175

Tan vs. Gumba, A.C. No. 9000, 10 January 2018 - CANON 22
Complainant: ​Tomas P. Tan, Jr.
Respondent: ​Atty. Haide V. Gumba

Facts:

Brief Background:

● Respondent asked to be lent P350,000.00. Respondent assured Complainant that she would pay the principal plus 12% interest per
175 annum after one year.
 ● She likewise offered security a parcel of land located in Naga City, covered by TCT No. 2055 and registered in her father's name.
Respondent showed a SPA executed by respondent's parents, and verbally assured complainant that she was authorized to sell or
encumber the entire property.
● Complainant consulted one Atty. Raquel Payte and was assured that the documents provided by respondent were valid. Thus,
complainant agreed to lend money.
● Respondent executed in complainant's favor an "open" Deed of Absolute Sale over the said parcel of land, attaching thereto the SPA.
Complainant was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the loan with interest on due date, the deed of sale
may be registered.
● Respondent, however, defaulted despite repeated demands.
● Complainant went to the Register of Deeds to register the sale, only to find out that respondent deceived him since the SPA did not
give respondent the power to sell the property but only empowered respondent to mortgage the property solely to banks.
● Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading but no answer or comment was ever filed before the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD).
● IBP-CBD allowed respondent to answer the Amended Complaint subsequently led by complainant but she did not file any answer
thereto.
● Respondent also chose not to attend the mandatory conference hearings despite due notice.

Complaint against the Lawyer:

● Administrative complaint for disbarment led by complainant against respondent for gross unethical conduct.

IBP decision:

● Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for one year.
● IBP Commissioner and IBP-BOG finds respondent guilty of violating:

Canons allegedly violated:

● Canon 1, Rule 1.01 – Duty not to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
● Canon 7 – Duty to uphold the dignity of the profession and to support the activities of the integrated bar.

Issue: ​WON respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR?

Ruling:

● Yes, administratively liable

● Respondent's actions clearly show that she deceived complainant into lending money to her through the use of documents and false
representations and taking advantage of her education and complainant's ignorance in legal matters (Canon 1, Rule 1.01)
● By her misdeed, respondent has eroded not only complainant's perception of the legal profession but the public's perception as well
(Canon 7)
● Furthermore, after filing a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Responsive Pleading, respondent disregarded the lawful orders of
the IBP-CBD to file her answer and to appear for the mandatory conferences despite due notice. Respondent should bear in mind that
she must acknowledge the orders of the IBP-CBD in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP
● Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed. We find, however, that suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months is sufficient to discipline respondent

Punishment: ​Respondent is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS.

Summary:

Respondent obtained a loan, secured by land, from complainant who was made to believe that if respondent fails to pay the full amount of the
loan with interest on due date, the deed of sale may be registered. The Court held that the use of documents and false representations and
taking advantage of her education and complainant's ignorance in legal matters was deceitful conduct. Thus, respondent has eroded not only
complainant's perception of the legal profession but the public's perception as well.

Bagonoc, Hazel Claire M.

Case Num. 176- Readmission to the Bar (Conditions)
C. No. 5473
GENE M. DOMINGO V. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR

Facts:

Respondent: Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla Jr

Complainant: Gene Domingo

Brief Background:

An American citizen of a Filipino descent sought the service of Atty. Revilla Jr. to handle the cases to be filed against his cousin and to work on
the settlement of the estate of his late mother. The respondent assured that he will represent him on behalf of the law firm where he worked as
an associate. Trusting the representations of respondent, the complainant agreed to engage respondent and his law firm, and paid the initial
amount of ₱80,000.00.

Being based in the United States of America, the complainant maintained constant communication with respondent often through electronic
mail (e-mail) and sometimes by telephone to get updates on the cases. The complainant alleged that based on his correspondences with
respondent, the latter made several misrepresentations.

The complainant would repeatedly request the original or at the very least copies of the decisions and the titles by e-mail, fax or courier
service, but the respondent repeatedly failed to comply with the requests, giving various reasons or excuses.
He did not turn over the requested documents to the latter.
The respondent ultimately tried to avoid the complainant by cutting off communications between them.
176
 Given the respondent's evasion, the complainant decided to write to the law firm to inform them of the fraudulent actions of the respondent.
The complainant was surprised to be informed by the law firm that he had never been its client, and also told him that the respondent had been
forced to resign from the law office because of numerous complaints about his performance as a lawyer. Hence, the complainant terminated
the services of the respondent for refusal to respond and to surrender the alleged documents in his possession.

Complaint against the Lawyer:

The complainant filed his complaint for disbarment in this the Court accusing the respondent of committing acts in violation of Canons 1, 2, 13,
15 & 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Issue: ​Whether the respondent is guilty of violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

YES
Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 15.06- A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07 -A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of
fairness.

Firstly, the respondent misled the complainant into thinking that it would be his law firm that
was to take on the case.
Secondly, despite the fact that he had intimated to the complainant that it would be highly unlikely to still have the adoption decree nullified due
to the decree having long become final and executory, he nonetheless accepted the case.
Thirdly, he told the complainant that he had already instituted the action for the annulment of the adoption despite not having yet done so.
Fourthly, he kept on demanding more money from the complainant although the case
was not actually even moving forward.
Fifthly, he continued to make up excuses in order to avoid having to furnish to the complainant the requested copies of court documents
that, in the first place, he could not produce.
Lastly, he claimed that he intended to return the money to the complainant but instead sent the latter a stale check.

He is therefore, GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Punishment: ​FINE of ₱l00,000.00

Note, however that Atty. Revilla’s motion to reduce his penalty to 50,000 pesos was granted by the SC on July 03, 2018 because the Court
found and considered the justifications of the respondent sufficient to warrant the reduction of the fine imposed upon him.

Synthesis:

A complaint for disbarment instituted against Atty. Revilla, Jr. Who was alleged to have deliberately and feloniously induced and persuaded his
client into releasing almost half a million pesos on the false pretense of having performed and accomplished legal services for him. The court
found him guilty of violating the CPR, however, he was not disbarred, and a fine of 100,000 pesos instead served as his penalty.

Reyes, Farrah Stephanie

Edgar M. Rico v Atty. Reynaldo G. Salutan
A.C. No. 9257 (March 5, 2018)

Facts

Brief Background

A previous case of forcible entry was filed against Milagros Abrille to which Atty. Salutan was the counsel. Abrille was ordered by the
Court to restore plaintiffs possession of property in subject and pay for the occupation of the properties. The plalintiffs in the case were said to
be relatives of Rico.

Another case was filed by Abrille against Rico for unlawful detainer in which the former won the case. Rico was ordered to vacate the
premises by the MTCC and affirmed the RTC issuing a Writ of Execution.

The Court Sheriff executed a Return Service stating that the writ could not be served on Rico since the property subject of the case
was different from the lot which Rico was occupying. Abille, through Atty. Salutan filed for a motion for the issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution. It was repeatedly denied for the same reason above.

For the fourth time, Villa Abrille filed another motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution. This time, the MTCC granted it.
Consequently, the court sheriff issued a Final Notice to Vacate to Rico on June 10, 2010. On June 15, 2010, the same sheriff led the
demolition of the house and other improvements on the property. Thus, Rico filed the administrative complaint against Atty. Salutan.

Atty. Salutan denied the charges and argued that he merely advocated for the cause of his client and were done within the bounds of
the law and of the rules. He merely did what a zealous lawyer would naturally do in representation of his client.

Complaint Against Lawyer

The complaint against Atty. Sambulan filed by Rico for purportedly misleading the court through misinformation.
177
 IBP Decision

The IBP recommended the dismissal of the administrative case for insufficient cause and evidence to merit the case. In administrative
proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent
must be established by convincing and satisfactory proof.

Burden of Proof (Administrative Cases)

Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of
the Rules of Court, is not determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying to a given fact. It depends on its
practical effect in inducing belief for the party on the judge trying the case.

[Canon 10 Rule10.01: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.]

Issue: Whether the administrative case against Atty. Salutan was sufficiently proved to reverse the decision of IBP?

Ruling: No. The Court found no cogent reason to depart from the findings and recommendations of the IBP.

Rico failed to show any proof of deception on the lawyer's part. There was no court decision declaring that Villa Abrille's title was fake or that it
had encroached on Rico's property. ​All that Atty. Salutan did was to zealously advocate for the cause of his client. He was not shown to have
misled or unduly influenced the court through misinformation. ​He merely persistently pursued said cause and he did so within the bounds of
the law and the existing rules.

The Court has consistently held that an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the contrary
is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have performed his duties in accordance with his oath.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, which is that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the burden of proving by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. ​The basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.
Likewise, charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.

Rico failed to discharge said burden of proof and failed to establish his claims through relevant evidences to support the conclusion that indeed
Atty Salutan misled the court, directly or indirectly, in the course of defending his client’s cause.

Members of the Bar must be reminded that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it
must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government. While
zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is desirable, unprofessional conduct stemming from such zeal or enthusiasm is always
disfavored.

Punishment: None. Case dismissed.

Summary:

A complaint was filed against Atty. Salutan for purportedly misleading the court and for contempt of court. The case was dismissed for
lack of sufficient evidence that would prove the acts of Atty. Salutan misled the court and affected its decision. He was merely supporting the
cause of his client and acted within the bounds of the law and the rules.

Capuyan, Thea
CASE NO. 178 : A.C. No. 5580, July 31, 2018 - SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. v. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS
Facts
Brief Background:
For the first disbarment case, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) in a case against Durano and Corp.,
Inc. (DCI). While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAI's conformity to
construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano. Complainant then terminated respondent's services as counsel.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for the Civil Case 18014 entitled "​San Jose Homeowners, Inc.
v. Durano and Corp., Inc."​

Complaint against the lawyer:

​SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting interest. Respondent knew fully well that the Montealegre case
was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been not only an active board member but his corporate secretary had access to
all its documents confidential and related to the case. He also acted as counsel for Durano and Co.[,] Inc., Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict
of interest between the latter and the Complainant became so revealing and yet he proceeded to represent the former.

For the second disbarment case, respondent used the title "​Judge"​ in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected
in several areas within the San Jose Subdivision. Respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez despite the
Resolution because it was still pending when the second disbarment case was file

IBP Decision: ​The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report of the investigating commissioner which recommended the
dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent should observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession

Court found merit in the complaint, and thus, held respondent guilty of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, 3.01 and 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment from the practice of law.

After almost nine years from his disbarment, respondent filed the instant Letter once more praying for the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of
Attorneys. In compliance with the Court's Resolution dated January 10, 2017, respondent submitted forty (40) letters from people, all vouching
for his good moral character

Canons allegedly violated:

178 Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
 written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure.

Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any
misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be reinstated to the practice of law.

Ruling:
No. Respondent has failed to prove that he has complied with the guidelines for reinstatement to the practice of law.

The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in
conduct and character. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. A review of the jurisprudences lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.​74 These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the IBP, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty​75​ to ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by
giving him a chance to redeem himself.​76
4. There must be a showing of promise​77 (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and
the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.​78
5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

Although more than ten years had already passed since his disbarment, respondent's present appeal has failed to show substantial proof of his
reformation as required in the first guideline. He expressly asks for forgiveness for his transgressions in his letters to the Court, yet respondent
continues to insist on his honest belief that there was no conflict of interest notwithstanding the Court's finding to the contrary.
Furthermore, the testimonials submitted by respondent all claim that respondent is a person of good moral character without explaining why or
submitting proof in support thereof.

For the 3​rd and 4​th guidelines, no other evidence was presented in his appeal to demonstrate his potential for public service, or that he - now
being 71 years of age - still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

Penalty: ​Appeal is DENIED

Summary: Respondent was administratively charged by complainant San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. for representing conflicting
interests and for using the title "​Judge"​ 2​ despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct. After 9 years, respondent now
pleads the court for reinstatement to the practice of law, he submitted 40 letters from people all vouching for his reformed character. The Court
denied the petition as respondent has failed to present substantial proof of his remorse and reformation.

Villagonzalo, Courtney Psalm

Case Title: Buntag vs. Toledo, A.C. No. 12125, 11 February 2019

Facts
Celiana Bongo-Buntag (Buntag), Flora Arbilera, Vetaliano Bongo, Sebastian Bongo, Petronilo Bongo, Leo Bongo, and Raul Iman (Buntag, et
al.) filed a Disbarment Complaint against Atty. Wilfredo S. Toledo (Atty. Toledo), their former counsel in several criminal and civil cases

1. Buntag, et al., claimed that despite knowing that they were indigents, Atty. Toledo demanded money from them several times. To
produce the money he asked for, they had to borrow money from their neighbors and Toledo brought companions to their house
without prior notice. He introduced them as "dignitaries" and demanded that they serve them lechon, sugpo, and white "nokus."

Defense​: Toledo denied this. He maintained that he only went to their house when he was invited during a fiesta celebration or family
occasions.
2. Toledo forced them to lie during their hearings and cross-examinations, and to sign documents without understanding their contents.
He even supposedly refused to conduct any inspection of the property to help them prove their ownership over the property.

Defense​: He pointed out a case of forcible entry and damages, where it was revealed in a hearing that Buntag had already signed
three (3) deeds of sale in favor of the defendant. Upon this discovery, Buntag engaged the services of another lawyer. Yet, despite
having been discharged as their lawyer, he still continued to fulfill his duties as their counsel
3. Toledo did not take any action against the judge assigned on their cases, even if the judge was clearly biased against them. He also
failed to update them on the status of their cases. They would later be surprised to ;nd out that they had already been convicted of the
charge against them.

Defense​: when he represented Schaap, there was no conflict of interest since Buntag, et al., were not parties to the case. Besides,
he added, Schaap's case was executed by the sheriff even before they became his clients.
4. Toledo handled a civil case despite a conflict of interest: he served as counsel for Ma. Teresa Edar Schaap (Schaap) in a case where
Buntag, et al., were the plaintiffs.

Defense​: claimed that he represented Buntag, et al., to the best of his abilities. Case in point, even if they discharged him as their
counsel, he still filed a Motion for Reconsideration for one (1) of their cases, as the court had not yet acted upon their Notice of
Withdrawal as Counsel
5. Toledo became indifferent when he noticed that they could no longer afford to pay him, so they asked him to withdraw as their
counsel.

Atty. Toledo denied all the allegations thrown against him. He also attached the Affidavits of Arturo Arboladura and Vitaliano Dumangcas
(Toledo’s messenger) to support his claims that he did not neglect his duties as complainants' counsel, and that he did not demand huge sums
of money from them.
179 ● Arboladura​: Toledo helped him create the Panglao Peace Multi-Purpose Cooperative and register it with the Cooperative
 Development Authority. He also attested that Atty. Toledo recruited his clients, the members of the Bongo family (or Buntag, et al., in
this case), to be part of the cooperative. Arboladura stated that on two (2) occasions, Buntag, accompanied by Atty. Toledo, asked for
his help in paying the bail bond of her family members who had been charged with estafa and illegal possession of unlicensed
firearms. He lent her a total of P50,000.00, stating that he would not have lent her any money had it not been for Atty. Toledo's
intercession. He testified that Atty. Toledo solely handled all Bongo family’s cases pro bono. Arboladura would sometimes get invited
by Buntag to a thanksgiving party for Atty. Toledo when a case against them was dismissed, or when a family member was acquitted.
● Dumangcas​: attested that the lawyer had many poor clients in Panglao and Dauis in Bohol whose cases he had accepted without
pay. He claimed that Atty. Toledo sometimes even used his own money to pay his clients' bail bond.

Recommendation​: It is respectfully recommended that for failing to overcome the burden of proof required in disbarment cases, the
administrative complaint against Respondent Atty. Wilfredo S. Toledo be DISMISSED and he be ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not
be sanctioned for encroaching upon the business of another lawyer.

Issue​: whether or not respondent Atty. Wilfredo S. Toledo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling​: The Complaint must be dismissed.

● complainants failed to present any evidence to adequately support their allegations against respondent.
○ They failed to state how much he supposedly demanded from them. They also did not attach receipts of the payment they
had sent him to support their claim of unreasonable demand of money. Receipts from financial institutions could have
supported their allegations that the unreasonable demand of money caused them to borrow money with high interest rates
○ Complainants alleged that they were forced to sign documents without understanding their contents. These documents
should have been annexed to their Complaint to show this Court what these were. If they were forced to lie during hearings
and cross-examinations, the stenographic notes would have shown the statements they wanted to dispute
○ they failed to attach records or other pieces of evidence to substantiate their Complaint. The little evidence that they did
proffer failed to support their accusations or bolster their case against him
● This Court will not penalize lawyers unless it is unmistakably shown that they are unfit to continue being a member of the Bar
● Nonetheless, it has not escaped this Court's attention that respondent's lackadaisical attitude toward his professional dealings with
complainants led in part to the controversy pending before this Court.
○ It is indeed laudable that respondent does not limit his legal assistance only to those who can afford his services and that he
generously provides legal services to everyone who asks for help. Yet, his failure to put in writing his contractual agreements
with his clients, paying or not, added to the confusion on the obligations and expectations of each party in their
attorney-client relationship.
○ Without a written agreement, it would be difficult to ascertain what the parties committed to; hence, a party may be
emboldened to make baseless demands from the other party, presenting his or her own interpretation of the verbal
agreement into which they entered.
○ If the parties had executed a written agreement, issues on lawyer's fees and other expenses incurred during a trial would not
have arisen, as each party would know his or her obligations under the retainer agreement. As it was, complainants seemed
unaware of what was expected of them as clients, leading them to make blanket accusations of impropriety against
respondent.
○ To prevent a similar predicament from happening in the future, respondent is directed to henceforth execute written
agreements with all of his clients, even those whose cases he is handling pro bono.

Dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Administrative Complaint against respondent Atty. Wilfredo S. Toledo is ​DISMISSED ​for lack of merit. However, he is
DIRECTED ​to henceforth reduce into writing all of his agreements for legal services with his clients, and is given a ​STERN WARNING that a
similar infraction in the future will merit a more severe response from this Court.

CASE TITLE: A.C. No. 6963 (February 9, 2006)

VICTORINA BAUTISTA, complainant

vs.

ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE, respondent

CANON:NOTARIAL PRACTICE

Facts:

Ø Brief Background:

Complainant alleged that respondent prepared and notarized a Magkasanib na Salaysay purportedly executed by Donato Salonga and
complainant’s mother, Basilia de la Cruz. Both affiants declared that a certain parcel of land was being occupied by Rodolfo Lucas for more
than 30 years. Complainant claimed that her mother could not have executed the joint affidavit on January 1998 because she has been dead
since January 1961.

Respondent denied that he falsified the Magkasanib na Salaysay. He disclaimed any knowledge about Basilia's death. He alleged that before
he notarized the document, he requested for Basilia's presence and in her absence, he allowed a certain Pronebo, allegedly a son-in-law of
Basilia, to sign above the name of the latter as shown by the word "by" on top of the name of Basilia. Respondent maintained that there was no
forgery since the signature appearing on top of Basilia's name was the signature of Pronebo.

Ø Complaint against the Lawyer:

Complainant Victorina Bautista prays for the suspension or disbarment of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical
conduct in the performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer.

Ø IBP decision:

Ø The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:

1.Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be suspended from the practice of the legal profession for one (1) month;
2.Any existing commission of Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe as notary public, be revoked; and
180 3.Atty. Sergio Esquibel Bernabe be barred from being granted a notarial commission for a period of one (1) year.
 IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for one year and his notarial commission be revoked and that he be disqualified for reappointment as notary public for two
years.

Ø Canons allegedly violated:

IN VIOLATION OF RULE 1.01, CANON 1 OF THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NOTARIAL LAW.

Respondent's act of notarizing the Magkasanib na Salaysay in the absence of one of the affiants is in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law. By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he led
us to believe that Basilia personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in
fact it was a certain Pronebo who signed the document. Respondent's conduct is fraught with dangerous possibilities considering the
conclusiveness on the due execution of a document that our courts and the public accord on notarized documents. Respondent has
clearly failed to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of his function as a notary public and to comply with the mandates of the
law.

Issue:​ Whether or not Atty. Bernabe should be disbarred for malpractice and unethical conduct in the performance of his duties as a notary
public and a lawyer.

Ruling:

Yes. A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed will
enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the affiant. The acts of the affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for
what are stated therein are facts of which they have personal knowledge. They should swear to the document personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their representative's name should appear in the said documents as the one who executed the same. That is the
only time the representative can affix his signature and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of the said document.

Respondent's alleged lack of knowledge of Basilia's death does not excuse him. It was his duty to require the personal appearance of the
affiant before affixing his notarial seal and signature on the instrument.

Complainant's desistance or withdrawal of the complaint does not exonerate respondent or put an end to the administrative proceedings. A
case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.

We find the penalty recommended by the IBP to be in full accord with recent jurisprudence. In Gonzales v. Ramos, respondent lawyer was
found guilty of notarizing the document despite the non-appearance of one of the signatories. As a result, his notarial commission was revoked
and he was disqualified from reappointment for a period of two years. In addition, he was suspended from the practice of law for one year.

Punishment:

· Notarial Commission – Revoked

· Reappointment as Notary Public – Disqualified for 2 years

· Practice of Law – Suspended for 1 year

· He is further warned that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Synthesis:

In Bautista vs. Bernabe, ​complainant prays for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Bernabe for malpractice and unethical conduct in the
performance of his duties as a notary public and a lawyer, and was alleged to have violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Notarial Law. By affixing his signature and notarial seal on the instrument, he made everyone believe that Basilia
personally appeared before him and attested to the truth and veracity of the contents of the affidavit when in fact it was a certain Pronebo who
signed the document. The court ruled in favor of the complainant, thus, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe, is
REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or of similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.

Bareja, Vincent James

Case # 181- Notarial Services
Topic:​NOTARIAL SERVICES
JUDGE LAQUINDANUM ​vs​. ATTY. QUINTANA, A.C. No. 7036 June 29, 2009

FACTS:
Complainant: Judge Lily Lydia Laquindanum
Respondent: Atty. Nestor Quintana

Brief Background:
● Certain documents notarized by Atty. Quintana, a commissioned notary public for Cotabato City and Province of Maguindanao, had
reached the office of Executive Judge Lily Lydia Laguindanum of RTC Midsayap, Province of Cotabato.
● The same prompted Judge Laguindanum to write a letter to Atty. Quintana directing him to stop notarizing documents within the
181 territorial jurisdiction of the RTC Midsayap, Cotabato (which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued
 his notarial commission for Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao). Midsayap, Cotabato is not part of Cotabato City or the
Province of Maguindanao. Midsayap is part of the Province of Cotabato. The City within the province of Cotabato is Kidapawan City,
and not Cotabato City.
● Judge Laquindanum also alleged that, upon further investigation of the matter, it was discovered that it was Atty. Quintana's wife who
performed notarial acts whenever he was out of the office.
● Despite such directive, respondent continuously performed notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato. Atty. Quintana continued to
notarize documents in the years 2006 to 2007 despite the fact that his commission as notary public for and in the Province of
Maguindanao and Cotabato City had already expired on December 31, 2005, and he had not renewed the same.
● Atty. Quintana argued that he subscribed documents in his office at Midsayap, Cotabato; and Midsayap is part of the Province of
Cotabato. He contended that he did not violate any provision of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, because he was
equipped with a notarial commission. He maintained that he did not act outside the province of Cotabato since Midsayap,
Cotabato, where he practices his legal profession and subscribes documents, is part of the province of Cotabato. He claimed that
as a lawyer of good moral standing, he could practice his legal profession in the entire Philippines.
● Atty. Quintana further argued that Judge Laquindanum had no authority to issue such directive, because only Executive Judge Reno
E. Concha, who issued his notarial commission, and the Supreme Court could prohibit him from notarizing in the Province of
Cotabato.
● Atty. Quintana admitted that all the signatures appearing in the documents marked as exhibits of Judge Laquindanum were his except
for the following: (1) Afidavit of Loss of ATM Card ​executed by Kristine C. Guro; and (2) Affidavit of Loss of Driver's License
executed by Elenita D. Ballentes; and (3) Affidavit of Loss ​executed by Santos V. Magbanua. He explained that those documents
were signed by his wife.
● The reason why Judge Laquindanum did not act on his petition was that he had not paid his IBP dues, ​which is a requirement before
a notarial commission may be granted. Judge Laquindanum submitted a Certification ​and its entries showing that Atty. Quintana
paid his IBP dues for the year 2005 only on January 9, 2006. Likewise, the arrears of his IBP dues for the years 1993, 1995, 1996,
and 1998 to 2003 were also paid only on January 9, 2006. Hence, when he filed his petition for notarial commission in 2004, he had
not yet completely paid his IBP dues.

Complaint:

Administrative case against Atty. Quintana filed by Judge Laquindanum of RTC Midsayap, Cotabato for proper disciplinary action
be imposed on him for performing notarial functions in Midsayap, Cotabato, which is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court that issued his notarial commission, and for allowing his wife to do notarial acts in his absence.

IBP Decision:
The OBC recommended that Atty. Quintana be disqualified from being appointed as a notary public for two (2) years; and that if
his notarial commission still exists, the same should be revoked for two (2) years. The OBC found the defenses and arguments
raised by Atty. Quintana to be without merit.

Canon Allegedly Violated: ​Sec. 11, Rule III ​6 ​of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
"Jurisdiction and Term — A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first
day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless earlier revoked or the notary
public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Quintana, equipped with a notarial commission, can perform notarial functions anywhere in the Philippines outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission.

RULING:

No. Atty. Quintana may perform his notarial acts within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning Executive Judge Concha, which is in
Cotabato City and the Province of Maguindanao only. But definitely he cannot extend his commission as notary public in Midsayap or
Kabacan and in any place of the province of Cotabato as he is not commissioned thereat to do such an act. Midsayap and Kabacan are not
part of either Cotabato City or Province of Maguindanao but part of the province of North Cotabato. Thus, the claim of the respondent
that he can exercise his notarial commission in Midsayap, Cotabato because Cotabato City is part of the province of Cotabato is absolutely
devoid of merit.
There is no doubt that Atty. Quintana violated the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
committed the following acts: (1) he notarized documents outside the area of his commission as a notary public; (2) he performed notarial
acts with an expired commission; (3) he let his wife notarize documents in his absence; and(4) he notarized a document where one of the
signatories therein was already dead at that time.
The act of notarizing documents outside one's area of commission is not to be taken lightly. Aside from being a violation of ​Sec. 11 of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice​, it also partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. ​Notarizing documents with an expired
commission is a violation of the lawyer's oat​h to obey the laws, more specifically, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Since the
public is deceived into believing that he has been duly commissioned, it also amounts to indulging in deliberate falsehood, which
the lawyer's oath proscribes. ​Notarizing documents without the presence of the signatory to the document is a ​violation of Sec. 2(b)(1),
Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, ​Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility​, and the lawyer's oath
which unconditionally requires lawyers not to do or declare any falsehood. Finally, Atty. Quintana is personally accountable for the
documents that he admitted were signed by his wife. He cannot relieve himself of liability by passing the blame to his wife. He is, thus,
guilty of violating ​Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibilit​y, which requires lawyers not to directly or indirectly assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Quintana fell miserably short of his obligation under ​Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility​, which directs every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
Atty. Quintana relies on his notarial commission as the sole source of income for his family will not serve to lessen the penalty that should
be imposed on him. On the contrary, he was reminded that a notarial commission should not be treated as a money-making venture. It is a
privilege granted only to those who are qualified to perform duties imbued with public interest. As declared on several occasions,
notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized
to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in
 evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof.

Punishment:
The notarial commission of Atty. Quintana, if still existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as notary
public for a period of two (2) years. He is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a WARNING
that the repetition of a similar violation will be dealt with even more severely.

Synthesis:
Atty. Quintana performed notarial services outside the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court that issued his notarial commission.
Judge Laguindanum, filed an administrative case against Atty. Quintana due to his inaction despite being directed to stop doing further notarial
functions outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court that issued his notarial commission. The SC ruled that Sec. 11, Rule III ​of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice sets a limit of notarial functions within the ​territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court.
Reyes, Ry Jordane V.

Case 182.
Tenoso v. Echanez, A.C. No. 8384, 11 April 2013

Brief Background:

Efigenio ​M. Tenoso filed a complaint against Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez – for allegedly engaging in practice as a notary public in Cordon,
Isabela without having been properly commissioned by the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela.

Violates Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. 8-13-SC)

She attached the ff. as evidence:

a. 2 documents signed and issued by RTC Santiago City Executive Jduge Efren M. Cacatian – names of the commission notaries
public – respondent’s name does not appear on neither list
b. copies of 10 documents that appear to have been notarized by respondent in the years 2006, 2007, and 2008
c. a copy of a certification issued by Judge Cacatian stating that a joint-affidavit notarized by respondent in 2008 could not be
“authenticated as to respondent’s seal and signature as no notarial commission was issued upon him at the time of the
document’s notarization”

DEFENSE ANSWER
- denied the allegations “I have never been notarizing any document or peladings” – “never committed any malpractice nor deceit,
nor violated the lawyers oath”.

Investigating Commissioner Atty. Hababag – recommended SUSPENSION for six (6) months and DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2) years for violating Rules 1.01, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

IBP Board of Governors ​– affirmed the findings – increased the penalty of Suspension from 6months TO 1 year

VIOLATIONS:
Rule 3 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
Rule 1.01
Rule 10.01 of the CPR
Complaint against the Lawyer​: Illegal Notarial Practice

Ruling:
GUILTY. In misrepresenting himself as a notary public, respondent exposed party-litigants courts, other lawyers and the general
public to the perils of ordinary documents posing as public instruments. - He failed to rebut the evidence provided by the complainant.

Punishment:
GUILTY of engaging in notarial practice without a notarial commission –
SUSPENDED FOR TWO (2) YEARS and DISQUALIFY from being commission as a Notary Public for TWO (2) YEARS
Warned that a repetition in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.

SUMMARY:
Atty. Echanez has been charged for allegedly violating the notarial practice without a notarial commission, complainanatrpesented
documentary evidence howeever, respondent failed to rebut such evidence - the court found him guilty and suspended him for 2 years and
182 disqualified him from commission as a notary public for two years as well.
183
Vargas, Michelle Anne C.

Case No.: ​184 Case Title: ​Caalim-Verzonilla v. Pascua Canon: ​Notarial

Practice

Facts:

Brief Background​: Respondent prepared and notarized two Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Lope Caalim with
Sale. The first deed was for a consideration of P250,000 and appears to have been executed and signed by Lope's surviving spouse, Caridad
Tabarrejos, and her children (complainant, Virginia Caalim-Inong and Marivinia Caalim) in favor of spouses Madki and Shirley Mipanga. The
second deed was for a consideration of P1,000,000 and appears to have been executed by and for the benefit of the same parties as the first
deed. The two deeds have identical registration numbers, page numbers and book numbers in the notarial portion. Complainant avers that
both deeds are spurious because all the heirs' signatures were falsified. Respondent admits having prepared and notarized the two disputed
Deeds of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Sale but denies any irregularity in their execution. Respondent denies complainant's
assertions that the two deeds are simulated and falsied, averring that all the parties acknowledged the same before him. Respondent argues
that the complainants pleaded with him to prepare the second deed with the reduced selling price to avoid paying high taxes. Moved by his
humane and compassionate disposition, respondent gave in to the complainant’s plea.

Complaint against the Lawyer​: The complainant Caalim-Verzonilla seeking the disbarment of respondent Atty. Pascua for allegedly falsifying
a public document and evading the payment of correct taxes through the use of falsified documents
184
 IBP Decision​: Atty. Pascua is suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and suspension of his Notarial Commission for two (2)
years with warning that a similar violation in the future will be dealt with severely.

Canons allegedly violated​: Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice, Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice

Issue:

Whether Atty. Pascua is liable for falsifying a public document and evading the payment of correct taxes through the use of falsified document.

Ruling:

Yes. With his admission that he drafted and notarized another instrument that did not state the true consideration of the sale so as to reduce
the capital gains and other taxes due on the transaction, respondent cannot escape liability for making an untruthful statement in a public
document for an unlawful purpose. As the second deed indicated an amount much lower than the actual price paid for the property sold,
respondent abetted in depriving the Government of the right to collect the correct taxes due. His act clearly violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

CANON 1 — A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.02.​ — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

Moreover, while respondent's duty as a notary public is principally to ascertain the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the
declaration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement or at least refrain from being a party to
its consummation. Rule IV, Section 4 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice in fact proscribes notaries public from performing any notarial act
for transactions similar to the herein document of sale, to wit:

SEC. 4​. ​Refusal to Notarize. — A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules for any person requesting
such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if: (a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that
the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral.

Respondent also failed to comply with Section 2, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice when he gave the second document the same
document number, page number and book number as the first:

SEC. 2. ​Entries in the Notarial Register. — (e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or document executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the instrument or document the page/s of
his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

Punishment: ​Atty. Pascua is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, his present notarial commission is revoked, and
he is disqualified from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

Summary: ​Atty. Pascua notarized two deed of sale with different stated price despite knowledge of its illegal purpose due to his desire to
accommodate the request of his client in avoiding a higher tax fee. IBP recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years. The Supreme Court affirmed IBP’s recommendation.

Golosino, Abbie Claire

Case # 185
A.C. No. 9514: ​Jandoquile vs. Revilla Jr. –​ Notarial Practice
Facts:
Brief background:
Atty. Revilla Jr. notarized a complaint-affidavit signed by Heneraline Brosas, Herizalyn Brosas-Pedrosa and Elmer Alvarado.
Heneraline and Hezeraline are sisters of Atty. Revilla Jr.’s wife, while Elmer is a houseboy of the Brosas’ family.
Complaint against the lawyer:
Petitioner complains that respondent lawyer is disqualifies to perform the notarial act per Sec 3c, Rule IV of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, viz: “​Notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.”
Petitioner also complains that respondent lawyer did not require the three affiants in the complaint-affidavit to show their
valid identification cards.
Respondent lawyer’s defense:
Respondent lawyer did not deny but admitted the petitioner's material allegations. He submits that his act is not a ground for
disbarment. He also says that he acts as counsel of the three affiants; thus, he should be considered more as counsel than as a
notary public when he notarized their complaint-affidavit. He did not require the affiants to present valid identification cards since he
knows them personally.
IBP Decision:
Since the facts are not contested, the Court deems it more prudent to resolve the case instead of referring it to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation.
Canons allegedly violated:
Section 3 (c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly disqualifies him from notarizing the complaint-affidavit,
from performing the notarial act, since two of the a:ants or principals are his relatives within the fourth civil degree of affinity
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent lawyer should be disbarred?
Ruling:
No. The SC held that his violation is not a sufficient ground for disbarment.

Atty. Revilla, Jr. readily admitted that he notarized the complaint-affidavit signed by his relatives within the fourth civil degree
185 of affinity. Given the clear provision of the disqualification rule, it behooved upon Atty. Revilla, Jr. to act with prudence and refuse
 notarizing the document. We cannot agree with his proposition that we consider him to have acted more as counsel of the affiants, not
as notary public, when he notarized the complaint-affidavit. The notarial certificate 6 at the bottom of the complaint-affidavit shows his
signature as a notary public, with a notarial commission valid until December 31, 2012. He cannot therefore claim that he signed it as
counsel of the three affiants.
On the second charge, we agree with Atty. Revilla, Jr. that he cannot be held liable. If the notary public knows the affiants
personally, he need not require them to show their valid identification cards. This rule is supported by the definition of a "jurat" under
Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a)
appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document; (b) ​is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. Hence, he was justified in no
longer requiring them to show valid identification cards. But Atty. Revilla, Jr. is not without fault for failing to indicate such fact in the
"jurat" of the complaint-affidavit. No statement was included therein that he knows the three affiants personally.
While he has a valid defense as to the second charge, it does not exempt him from liability for violating the disqualification
rule.
Punishment:
Respondent Atty. Quirino P. Revilla, Jr., is REPRIMANDED and DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary
public, or from performing any notarial act if he is presently commissioned as a notary public, for a period of three (3) months. Atty.
Revilla, Jr. is further DIRECTED to INFORM the Court, through an affidavit, once the period of his disqualification has lapsed.

SUMMARY:
Lawyer notarized a document of his 2 sister-in-laws and 1 houseboy. He also did not ask for identification cards for the affiants. He is guilty of
violating Section 3(c), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. As a result, he is disqualified from performing any notarial act for three
months.
TALABOC, VANESSA
A.C. No. 10185 March 12, 2014
DIZON v. CABUCANA, JR.

Facts:
Brief background:

Complainant, Licerio Dizon, alleged that he was one of the “would be” buyers of a parcel of land owned by Callangan in a Civil Case
filed before the MTCC. On that case, a compromise agreement was executed by the parties before respondent, Atty. Mercelino Cabucana, Jr.
At the hearing, the signatories signed the instrument in the court room of MTCC but not in the presence of Atty. Cabucana as Notary
Public; hence, there was delay in the decision of the case which caused damage and injury to the complainant. They also alleged that Atty.
Cabucana violated the Notarial Law by notarizing in the absence of most of the signatories and uttered grave threats against him after the
hearing of the said case.
Hence, he filed a petition against Atty. Cabucana, before the IBP, praying for the disbarment of the latter for falsification of public
document. In his answer, he averred that the complaint was intended to harass him for he was the private prosecutor on a criminal case
against Dizon and lack of cause of action for he was only a “would be” buyer.

Complaint against the lawyer:​ Whether or not he violated a rule in the CPR through his conduct.

IBP Decision:​ Suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month and disqualified as notary public for one (1) year.

Canons allegedly violated:

Section 1, Public Act No. 2103, ​otherwise known as the Notarial Law states:

The acknowledgment shall be before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under the official seal, if he is required by law to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.

The requirement of affiant's personal appearance was further emphasized in Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice
of 2004 which provides that:

A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Violated the Notarial Law.

Ruling:
Yes. As a notary public, Atty. Cabucana should not notarize a document unless the person who signs it is the same person executing
it and personally appearing before him to attest to the truth of its contents. This is to enable him to verify the genuineness of the signature of
the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's free and voluntary act and deed.

Punishment: ​Respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon l of the CPR and suspends him from the practice
of law for three (3) months, and prohibits him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

SUMMARY:​ A complaint was filed against Atty. Cabucana Jr. for falsification of document when he notarized a compromise agreement in a
Civil case in the absence of most of the signatories and without his presence upon the signing of the signatories. He was found to have
186 violated the Notarial Law and was suspended from the practice of law for 3 months and 2 years as a Notarial Public.
 Ngo,, Patrick Samuel
Case # 187
ROBERTO P. MABINI v. ATTY. VITTO A. KINTANAR
Facts:
Brief background:
In his Position Paper, the complainant stated that in November 2003, Regina Alamares approached him and his wife, Mercedes M.
Mabini, to sell her a parcel of land. It was covered by a title. Regina made known to the complainant and Mercedes that the title was lost but its
duplicate certificate may be secured from the Register of Deeds. Complaint and Mercedes nonetheless bought the property. Later, the
complainant filed a petition for issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy which was granted. The RD of Albay issued TCT covering the
property in the names of complainant and Mercedes over the property.
Complaint against the lawyer:
Complainant averred that, in March 2012, however, respondent's wife, Evangeline, filed a complaint against him, among other
persons, for reconveyance, annulment of title, damages with prayer for preliminary injunction or restraining order. Attached to said complaint
was an Affidavit of Lost Owner's Duplicate Copy of Title executed by Evangeline and notarized by respondent on April 25, 2002, and registered
in his notarial book.
According to the complainant, respondent knew that he was not authorized to notarize a document of his wife, or any of his relatives
within the fourth civil degree, whether by affinity or consanguinity; thus, for having done so, respondent committed misconduct as a
lawyer/Notary Public.
Respondent lawyer’s defense​:
Respondent countered that the subject Affidavit purportedly executed by his wife appeared to have been notarized on April 25, 2002;
as such, it was governed by Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which did not prohibit a Notary Public from notarizing a document executed
by one's spouse. He likewise stated that, granting for argument's sake that he indeed notarized said Affidavit, he did not violate the law as the
document involved was a mere affidavit, not a bilateral document or contract.
IBP Decision:
On August 25, 2015, Commissioner Almira A. Abella-Orfanel (Investigating Commissioner) found the respondent guilty of misconduct and
recommended his suspension. from the practice of law for six months.
Canons allegedly violated:
Revised Administrative Code of 1917
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent committed misconduct by notarizing his wife's affidavit of loss in 2002.
Ruling:
No, A lawyer cannot be held liable for a violation of his duties as Notary Public when the law in effect at the time of his complained act
does not provide any prohibition to the same, as in the case at bench. There is indeed no basis to hold respondent liable for misconduct for
notarizing his wife's Affidavit in 2002.

The 1917 Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law. In turn, the provisions of anent notarial practice embodied in the
Revised Administrative Code were superseded by the passage of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. This only means that any prohibition
enumerated in the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice does not cover the acts made by a Notary Public earlier, including those executed in 2002.

SUMMARY:
All told, the Court holds that respondent did not violate any of his duties as Notary Public when he notarized the affidavit of his wife on
April 25, 2002. WHEREFORE, the Complaint against Atty. Vitto A. Kintanar is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
187
Oblianda, Johanna Daisyre
CASE 188:
ZARCILLA VS. QUESADA – NOTARIAL PRACTICE

Brief Background: ​complainant Zarcilla executed an Affidavit-Complaint against respondent Atty. Quesada and complainant Marita
Bumanglag for falsification of public documents. Zarcilla alleged that Bumanglag conspired with certain Spouses Quezada and Atty. Quesada
to falsify a Deed of Sale by making it appear that his parents, Spouses Zarcilla, sold a parcel of land in favor of the Spouses Quezada despite
knowledge that his parents were already deceased. The documents of such sale was notarized by Atty. Quesada despite his knowledge of
their death. All other respondents in the said falsification case, except for Atty. Quesada, filed their respective counter-affidavits where they
reiterated Bumanglag's admission (that she thought that the land was sold to her mother so she sold with no fraudulent intent).

The SC then required Quesada to file a comment on the complaint on June 26, 2006. It even granted Quesada’s request for
extension of time on November 20, 2006. But Quesada still failed to submit his comment, prompting the SC to issue a show cause order. In
2008, SC imposed a P1,000 fine; two more orders were issued that escalated the fine to P3,000 but still, Atty. Quesada did not pay nor issue
anything. This prompted the Court to order the arrest of Atty. Quesada, and directed the NBI to arrest and detain him until he shall have
complied with the Court's order. It was only after five years that Atty. Quesada filed his Comment dated October 10, 2011, in compliance with
Resolution dated June 26, 2006.

Complaint against the lawyer: ​gross misconduct for notarizing a document (Deed of Sale) when in fact the “vendors” of the land are already
dead, thereby constituting fraud

Lawyer’s defense: ​He claimed that he is a victim of political harassment, vengeance and retribution, and that the instant case against him was
filed solely for the purpose of maligning his person.

IBP Decision: disbarment from the practice of law

Violation: ​Section 2 (b) of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the ​necessity of the affiant's personal appearance
before the notary public: ​(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
188 defined by these Rules.
 Issue: Whether or not Atty. Quesada’s infractions in notarial practice warrant disbarment

Held: ​The SC found Quesada guilty of gross misconduct. He was found to have notarized the April 12, 2002 document purportedly executed
by Zarcilla’s parents despite them having died long before the execution. Quesada even certified that he knew the sellers of the land and that
they executed the document even as they turned out to have been dead already. ​A notary public should not notarize a document unless
the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and the truth of what are stated therein. Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in question, the notary
public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the party's
free act or deed “Atty. Quesada’s act of notarizing the deed of sale appeared to have been done to perpetuate a fraud,” the decision read.
“Atty. Quesada deliberately made false representations, and was not merely negligent.”

The SC said Quesada was guilty of willful disobedience of its lawful orders and his actions showed “utter disrespect” and a “high degree of
irresponsibility.” Quesada did not even offer any apology or justification for his long delay in complying with the SC’s directives. “While the
Court has been tolerant of his obstinate refusal to comply with its directives, he shamelessly ignored the same and wasted the Court’s time and
resources.

Penalty: Disbarment

Synthesis
Atty. Quesada notarized a Deed of Sale despite knowledge that the persons who was made to appear to have executed the document have
died already. He also failed to follow the orders of the Court with regards to the investigation. The Court ordered for his disbarment for gross
misconduct and violation of the rules of Notarial Practice (re: the need for the affiant to personally appear before the notary public) and for utter
disrespect of the Court.

Panelo, Des
CASE 189
In Re: Decision dated September 26, 2012 in OMB-M-A-10-023-A, etc. against Atty. Diuyan, AC No. 9676, 2 April 2018- NOTARIAL
PRACTICE

FACTS: ​The Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao) decided in OMB-M-A-10-023-A, dated September 23, 2012, that it finds unsettling that the
Deed of Partition notarized by Respondent Atty. Robelito B. Diuyan on July 23, 2003, when one of the signatories earlier died on August 2001.
This decision was submitted to the Supreme Court, which treated it, along with the Deed of Partition, as an Administrative Case against the
Respondent.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and recommendation. For his failure to attend the
mandatory conference, Respondent was required to submit a position paper. He explained in the said position paper that as a public officer at
the time of signing the Deed of Partition, the presumption of good faith and regularity in the discharge of his duty applied to him and that there
was no showing that irregularity was present in the execution of the document.

The IBP-Commision on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Respondent guilty of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. It recommended
for the revocation of Respondent’s notarial commission for one (1) year. Thereafter, the IBP-Board of Governors (BOG), in its resolution,
increased the recommended penalty to immediate revocation of notarial practice, disqualification from being commissioned for two (2) years,
and suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months.

ISSUE: Whether Respondent is administratively liable?

HELD: ​The Supreme Court found nothing irregular in the notarization of the Deed of Partition because the law applicable at the time of its
execution (July 23, 2003) required only the presentation of CTCs.

It also found the Respondent not liable for notarizing the Deed of Partition upon affiants’ presentation of their CTCs only because it was not
prohibited by the law in effect at that time.

The laws applicable at that time (July 23, 2003) was: 1. Title IV, Chapter II, Art. VII of the Revised Administrative Code, which required the
presentation of proper residence certificates or cedula, and 2. Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 465, which reiterated that a residence certificate
should be presented when acknowledging documents before a notary public. The IBP was wrong in applying the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice because it was not yet in effect at the time when the Respondent notarized the Deed of Partition.
PENALTY:
189 SUMMARY:
Adolfo,Tricia
CASE 190
Muntuerto v. Alberto​ -​ NOTARIAL PRACTICE
A.C. No. 12289, 2019
Facts:
I.​ Brief Background:
● The complainants aver that the Respondent Atty. Alberto was the counsel of record of Cristeto E. Dinopol, Jr., who had instituted an
action for reconveyance and recovery of possession and damages against Singfil Hydro Builders
● Atty. Alberto had attached to the complaint a supplemental agreement and an amended joint venture agreement separately
acknowledged before him as a notary public in Cavite City
● First, Atty. Alberto did not have notarial commission → RTC in Cavite City certified that it had "no record of any Commission/Order
appointing a certain Atty. Gerardo Wilfredo L. Alberto as Notary Public for the City of Cavite”
● Secondly, Atty. Alberto had his client sign and file the so-called Motion for Prior Leave of Court to Admit the Herein Attached
Amended Complaint;
● Thirdly, Atty. Alberto did not indicate his MCLE certificate of compliance number and the date of issue
● Additional: Atty. Alberto falsified the secretary's certificate to make it appear that he had been duly appointed as the acting corporate
secretary of Singtrader JV Corporation, and that a resolution had been adopted by said corporation authorizing Dinopol, Jr. as its
representative relative to the filing of the necessary and proper actions.

II.​ ​Lawyer’s defense:​ ​Atty. provided no defense. Upon receipt of the administrative complaint, Atty. Alberto did not reply and was declared in
default. He did not respond to IBP’s mandatory conference (despite the notice). Furthermore, Atty. did not file his position paper.
190
 III​. ​IBP decision:​ Atty. Alberto to be SUSPENDED FOR 5 YEARS from receipt hereof as a lawyer and member of the Bar

Issue​: WON Atty. Alberto violated Lawyer’s Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) by:

(a) notarizing documents without having been issued a notarial commission;

(b) allowing a non-lawyer to sign a motion filed in court; and
(c) failing to indicate his MCLE compliance number in the complaint filed in connection with a pending case?

Ruling​: YES, Atty. violated Lawyer’s Oath & CPR!

(​A) Unauthorized Notarizing of Documents

● The significance of the office of the notary public cannot be taken for granted. The notarial act is invested with public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act and serve as notaries public
● Without a notarial commission, Atty. is guilty of dishonesty and deliberate falsehood in trial court. He made it appear that he had been
duly commissioned to act as notary public, thereby vested the documents with evidentiary value.
● The respondent should be subjected to strong disciplinary action for notarizing the documents without authorization or commission to
do so.
● A lawyer who notarizes documents without a notarial commission, and assists and abets the unauthorized practice of law by a
non-lawyer, deliberately violates the Lawyer's Oath and transgresses the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

(B) Allowing a Non-lawyer to Sign a Motion

● Violated Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
● The preparation and signing of any pleading, motion or other paper to be submitted in court in connection with any pending matter
constitute legal work within the context of the practice of law

(C) Failing to Indicate MCLE Compliance # in Pending Case

● Atty. did not disclose his MCLE certificate of compliance number and the date of issue of the certificate in the complaint he filed in
Civil Case
● It is good to mention that the Atty. Alberto seemed to be a repeat violator of the requirement for disclosure under the resolution
issued in Bar Matter No. 1922.

PUNISHMENT​: Court ​SUSPENDS​ respondent ATTY. ALBERTO from the practice of law for​ five (5) years. Court PERMANENTLY BARS
him from being commissioned as Notary Public in ​the Philippines effective upon his receipt of this decision; and​ STERNLY WARNS ​him
that a stiffer penalty will be imposed should he commit a similar offense hereafter.

SUMMARY​: Atty. Alberto is accused of 1) notarizing documents without having notarial commission from Cavite City, 2) allowing his client (not
a lawyer) to sign a motion filed in court, and 3) failing to indicate his MCLE Compliance No. in his case. IBP and the Courts ruled to SUSPEND
him for 5 YEARS from receipt hereof. He is also permanently barred from being commissioned as Notary Public.

PART II - JUDICIAL ETHICS

Ferolino, Nicole
Marces, Sr vs. Arcangel
[A.M. No. RTJ-91-712, 9 July1996]

FACTS:

Brief Background:

Respondent judge intervened in the feud between the complainant’s family and the Cañas family

A family feud between the Cañas and Marces arose. On September 27, 1990, Mrs. Flordeliza Cañas had an exchange of words with Mrs. Ruth
Marces and the latter’s daughter, Lydia, during which they hurled invectives at each other. The incident was triggered by a relatively minor
matter involving a fight between the turkeys owned by the two families but which, because of the bad blood between them, became a major
issue.

As a result of the shouting incident, Mrs. Cañas also filed a complaint with the Barangay Captain against complainant’s wife and daughter,
Lydia. Mediation conferences between the two families were conducted on October 27, 1990 and on November 3, 1990. Although he had not
been asked to, respondent Judge Arcangel attended the conferences. It is alleged that respondent judge:

1. disturbed the proceedings by walking in and out of the Barangay Hall where the conferences were being held;
2. introduced himself as the Executive Judge of the RTC of Davao City in an obvious attempt to influence the Barangay Officials; and
3. accompanied Mrs. Cañas and acted as the baby-sitter of the latter’s daughter.

Respondent judge caused the issuance of alias warrants of arrest by requesting another judge, before whom the case against the
complainant was pending, to issue the warrants
191
 On Sep 28, Mrs. Cañas had the complainant Ben D. Marces arrested. The arrest was made on the basis of alias warrants of arrest handed to
the policeman by Mrs. Cañas. The warrants had been issued by MTCC Judge Edipolo Sarabia in three criminal cases against the herein
complainant for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

The following day, complainant saw Judge Sarabia and explained that the criminal cases against him, in connection with which the alias
warrants were issued, had long been amicably settled. Judge Sarabia told the complainant that he really did not know anything about the
cases and that he had only been requested by respondent Judge Paul Arcangel to issue the warrants.

Complaint against JUDGE:

Respondent judge intervened in the feud between the complainant’s family and the Cañas family and such interference was not limited to the
barangay mediation proceedings but extended as well to the various stages of the conflict.

Defense of respondent JUDGE:

Respondent judge denies he acted as escort and baby-sitter and claims that he could not have disturbed the proceedings because none were
held on November 3, 1990. He claims that he went to the barangay hall because he filed his own complaint against Ruth Marces and her
daughter Lydia. Apparently, respondent judge is referring to the incident on September 27, 1990 during which Mrs. Marces and daughter Lydia
allegedly called Mrs. Cañas "KABIT, KABIT, KABIT SA ABOGADO"n of the cases which the respondent intends to file against the complainant
for slander and threats.

With respect to the warrants, the respondent judge alleged that he only requested Judge Sarabia of the MTCC of Davao City to issue them. 2
Respondent judge claims the warrants were valid, having been issued in connection with pending cases and that there were other warrants
against complainant which could not be served because of complainant’s close connections with the officers of the warrant section.

LOWER COURT Ruling:

Associate Justice Purisima recommends dismissal of the charges against respondent judge for insufficiency of evidence, except the charge
that respondent judge attended mediation conferences between the feuding families and tried to intervene. As to this charge the Investigating
Justice finds that the evidence establishes the same. Justice Purisima recommends that respondent judge be admonished and sternly warned
that repetition of the acts of impropriety by respondent will be dealt with more severely.

Canons allegedly violated​:

Canon 2, Rule 2.04

ISSUE​:

WON respondent judge is guilty of improper conduct

SC RULING:

Yes, respondent judge allowed himself to be dragged into what was a purely private matter between feuding families. In attending, at the
request of Mrs. Cañas, the barangay conciliation proceedings and introducing himself there as the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
in an obvious demonstration of support for Mrs. Cañas, respondent lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case.

Respondent’s request to the judge of a lower court to issue warrants of arrest against the complainant is no less censurable. As the Court had
occasion to state in Sabitsana, Jr. v. Villamor: 15

Cardinal is the rule that a Judge should avoid impropriety in all activities. The Canons mince no words in mandating that a Judge shall
refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another Court (Canon 2, Rule 2.04).
Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or the result of litigation does not
only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the people’s faith in its integrity and impartiality.

PUNISHMENT:

Respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on his part in the future will be dealt with
more severely. All other charges are hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.

SUMMARY​:
​A family feud between the Cañas and Marces arose. Respondent judge intervened in the feud between the complainant’s family and the
Cañas family and such interference was not limited to the barangay mediation proceedings but extended as well to the various stages of the
conflict. The court held that the judge is guilty of improper conduct.
​Mapalo, Ella Gabrielle M.
Office of the Court Administrator v Judge Salvador De Guzman
[A.M. No RTJ-93-1021. 31 January 1997]

FACTS:

Brief Background:

● Norvic Incorporated owns a parcel of land which was subject to a contract to sell. Such land was conveyed to St. Michael International
Realty and Management Corporation (SMIRM). Two years later, Norvic filed a case on the ground that the transfer was fraudulent.
Norvic caused the annotation of lis pendens.
● SMIRM filed a motion to cancel the notice of lis pendens, but it was denied with Judge Cosico as Presiding Judge . As a result of
Judge Cosico’s resignation, the case was re-raffled to respondent Judge De Guzman who ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens.

Complaint against JUDGE:

192
 ● An administrative suit was filed by former Judge Cosico against respondent Judge De Guzman. He contended that respondent
approached him at least twice while he was still the Presiding Judge. Respondent asked him to grant the motion to lift the notice of lis
pendens. When he denied the motion, respondent came back asking him to reconsider. When it was respondent Judge presiding, he
cancelled said notice, showing keen personal interest on the said case to the prejudice of the administration of justice.

Defense of respondent JUDGE:

● Respondent denies having approached Judge Cosico. He asserts that Judge Cosico was motivated by vindictiveness when he
testified falsely against respondent. During their several meetings, respondent and Judge Cosico only talked to each other mostly on
matters of law but he never asked Judge Cosico any favor nor to act in a certain way in any case except in the pending case involving
the respondent himself who requested Judge Cosico to rule on his motion for execution.

LOWER COURT Ruling:

● Justice Salas found that respondent, in reconsidering the order of denial issued by Judge Cosico and consequently lifting the notice
of lis pendens, was not dictated by pecuniary consideration, but nevertheless held him liable for influencing the outcome of the subject
case when it asked Judge Cosico to cancel the notice of lis pendens.
● He recommended as a penalty, reprimand, with a warning of a more severe penalty in case of repetition.

Canons allegedly violated​:​ Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

ISSUE​: ​W/N respondent Judge must be held administratively liable for the acts complained of

SC RULING:

● There is no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the allegation that respondent was moved by personal or financial interest in
cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The explanation offered by respondent and the circumstances prevailing in the subject case are
sufficient to warrant a conclusion that he in utmost good faith merely discharged his public duty when he lifted the notice of lis
pendens.
● In the absence therefore of fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith in issuing the order lifting the notice of lis pendens, this act of
respondent which pertains to his judicial capacity is not subject to disciplinary action.
● HOWEVER, ​the Court was convinced that respondent approached Judge Cosico at least twice asking him to cancel the notice of lis
pendens​, thereby trying to influence the course of the litigation in the subject case in violated of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, to wit: “A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court or judge."
● The Court gave credence to the testimony of Judge Cosico who narrated the event in a clear and straightforward manner. It is
improbable for Judge Cosico to cause damnation to respondent who brought no harm to the former. Well settled is the rule that in the
absence of any evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses should have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no
improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
● Judges are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that would enhance the respect and confidence of our people in the judicial
system. Being the dispensers of justice, judges should not act in a way that would cast suspicion in order to preserve faith in the
administration of justice.
● In the case at bar, the act of interference by respondent De Guzman with the subject case pending in the sala of Judge Cosico
clearly tarnishes the integrity and independence of the judiciary and subverts the people's faith in our judicial process. His evident
misconduct collides with the established ethical standards mandated upon those who sit in the bench. It is significant to stress that
judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the public trust.
They should inspire trust and confidence, and should bring honor to the judiciary.

PUNISHMENT:

● WHEREFORE, this COURT finds sufficient evidence to hold respondent GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT for influencing the
course of litigation in Civil Case No. 91-1123 in evident violation of Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Accordingly, a
fine of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) is hereby imposed upon respondent with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more SEVERELY.

SUMMARY​:​ Judge Cosico presided a case regarding the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens. However, due to his resignation, said case
was re-raffled to the sala of respondent Judge De Guzman, who ordered the cancellation. An administrative complaint was filed against
respondent by Judge Cosico alleging that the former approached him to cancel the notice of lis pendens, which showed a personal interest on
the said case to the prejudice of the administration of justice. The Court ruled that while respondent Judge is not guilty of showing personal
interest to the case, he violated Rule 2.04, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct for influencing the course of litigation during a pending
case.
CASE NO. 193: Garcia v. Valdez A.M. No. MTJ-98-1156, 13 July 1998
(JUDICIAL ETHICS -CANON I. Independence)
FACTS:
Brief Background:

​ A joint affidavit-complaint filed against respondent Judge Panfilo V. Valdez by the complainants. Judge Valdez of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac allegedly duly interfered in DARAB Cases, a land involving herein complainants as plaintiffs against a certain Raul
Valdez and other heirs of the late Dr. Cosme T. Valdez, Sr., brother of respondent Judge.

The records show that Dr. Cosme owned a 59-hectares of farmland which he sold to the Land Bank of the Philippines during his
lifetime. The LBP, in turn, distributed said farmland to herein complainants but Raul and the other heirs of Dr. Cosme refused to recognize
these transfers and proceeded to take possession of the land.

Complaint against the Judge:

In their joint affidavit, the complainant alleged that, even though not a party therein, Judge Valdez appeared during office hours in the
three DARAB cases and in the conference before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Cases (PARO). They are apprehensive that they might lose
these cases and consequently their land with the tremendous influence wielded by Judge Valdez and his alleged promises to those who
helped his relatives.

193 Office of the Court Administrator:

 Submitted a memorandum recommending that Judge Valdez be reprimanded for misconduct. The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates
that the court of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. One who occupies a position of such grave responsibility in the
administration of justice must conduct himself in a manner befitting the dignity of such exalted office. A judge’s private as well as official
conduct must at all times be free from all appearances of impropriety and be beyond reproach. In the case at hand, the respondent judge has
failed to conduct himself in the manner prescribed by the provisions of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which Canon 2 directs the
avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.

Canon allegedly violated:

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which directs the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Valdez violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
RULING​:
The Supreme Court agrees to the recommendation. As a member of the bench, respondent Judge should realize that his presence,
opinion and participation could slant the evaluation and resolution of the case in favor of the party he identifies himself with. In this case, the
respondent judge’s presence and participation in the said proceedings were to the advantage of his relatives, the heirs of Dr. Valdez, Sr.
Clearly, the respondent has failed to conduct himself in the manner prescribed by the provisions of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
which directs the avoidance of impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. In view thereof, the Court reprimands herein
respondent for the commission of acts constituting misconduct.
PUNISHMENT:
The court RESOLVED and REPRIMAND respondent Judge Panfilo V. Valdez for the commission of acts constituting misconduct with
the WARNING that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SYNTHESIS:
A joint affidavit-complaint filed against respondent Judge Panfilo V. Valdez because he allegedly duly interfered in DARAB Cases, a
land involving herein complainants as plaintiffs against a certain Raul Valdez and other heirs of the late Dr. Cosme T. Valdez, Sr., brother of
respondent Judge. As a member of the bench, respondent Judge should realize that his presence, opinion and participation could slant the
evaluation and resolution of the case in favor of the party he identifies himself with. He violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Clysil Sweet B. Javier

CASE 194
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR(OCA) vs. NECESSARIO, et. al.,
A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, 2 APRIL 2013

TOPIC: CANON II- INTEGRITY

​FACTS:

The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. Certain package fees were offered to interested parties by
“fixers” or “facilitators” for instant marriages.

A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice
and were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain “Meloy”. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached
and assisted the female lawyer. Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate
would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three
thousand pesos only.

In its Resolution, the Court treated the Memorandum of the judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed
Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective
comments. The Court also suspended the judges pending resolution of the cases against them

643 marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. Out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages
were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages
than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There is also an unusual number of marriage licenses obtained from the local
civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the
same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is more than 60 km away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost 2 hours. Liloan, Cebu, on the
other hand, is more than 10 km away from Cebu City​.

DEFENSE OF THE RESPONDENTS

•​ Judge Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to him by contracting parties. He also denies
knowledge of the payment of solemnization fees in batches. In addition, he argues that it was a process server who was in-charge of recording
marriages on the logbook, keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages monthly.

• Judge Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and that he is not required to inquire whether the license was obtained
from a location where one of the parties is an actual resident. He believes that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license
to determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity of public documents.

194 • Judge Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls the actions of the judicial audit team during the investigation an
"entrapment". She aims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and with the
fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the parties resided. The judge also attributes the irregularity in
the number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks.

• Judge Rosales denies violating the law on marriage. He maintains that it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by
the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license issued. The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial duty.

​REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA

OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court employees, and the suspension or admonition of others.

Judge Necessario is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents. Gross ignorance of
the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors during the
cohabitation.

Judge Acosta is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid. He is also
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting
parties were minors during the cohabitation.

Judge Rosales is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents. Gross ignorance of the
law for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license.

Judge Tormis is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents.

​CANON ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED

Canons 2- Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
Canon 6- Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

ISSUE:
WON the judges are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct

RULING:

· ​The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of swift marriages. The respondent judges and court
personnel disregarded laws and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of justice.

· The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of
gross inefficiency or neglect of duty when they solemnized marriages without following the proper procedure laid down by law, particularly
the Family Code of the Philippines and existing jurisprudence.

​To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:

First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the requirements submitted by the couples were
incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or
superimpositions of entries related to the parties' place of residence. These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font size, and
ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of the respondent judges constitute gross
inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in
Rodrigo-Ebron v. Adolfo, defined neglect of duty as the failure to give one's attention to a task expected of him and it is gross when, from the
gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare. The
marriage documents examined by the audit team show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were missing or payment
by batches was made for marriages performed on different dates. The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization fee starts off
the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp of regularity" on the process.

Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not
submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity
to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of
duty of the judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities
would have been prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage.

Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code
111199 with respect to the marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority status of one
party. The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22)
years old who were married by their submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. These affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing
judge himself or herself.

Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of some couples where no marriage license
was previously issued. The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on the same day the marriage was solemnized.
 The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is
beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary.

Wherefore, the court finds respondents: Judge Necessario, Judge Acosta, Judge Tormis, and Judge Rosales GUILTY of gross
inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of the law and that be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of their retirement
benefits except leave credits, if any, and that he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation.

​Liability of Other Court Personnel

Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, GUILTYof violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be
DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

Rhona Rodriguez , Administrative Officer I, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel and for inducing Maricel Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits.

Desiderio Aranas Process Server, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and that he be SUSPENDED
without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely

Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of violating Section 2 (b),
Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a warning
that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, and Emma Valencia Stenographer III, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
of violating Section 2 (b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely;

The complaints against JUDGE ECONG, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon Retuya , Court
Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou Cabanez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be
REFERRED to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings against the judge.

PUNISHMENT
Judge Necessario, Judge Acosta, Judge Tormis, and Judge Rosales GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross ignorance of
the law and that be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of their retirement benefits except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation.

​ UMMARY
S
The judicial audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City. Certain package fees were offered to interested parties by
"Fixers" or "facilitators" for instant marriages. The SC imposed the penalty on MTCC Judges who were found guilty of gross inefficiency and
neglect of duty and were ordered dismissed from the judicial service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification from
holding any government post.

Urot, Marcelyn
Tobias v. Limsiaco A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734
Facts:
● Florenda Tobias, herein petitioner filed a verified complaint against the respondent, Judge Manuel Limsiaco for allegedly offering
package deals to litigants who plan to file their cases in court.
● According to her complaint, she requested her sister to inquire from the court in which the respondent presides, about the
requirements needed for ejectment.
● She further alleged that her sister was offered by the court stenographer of such a package deal for the amount of P30,000. And that
they made clear that if they don’t accept, they will not be granted any relief from the squatter problem.
● Respondent’s Alibi​: ​respondent, together denounced the allegation that he offers "package deals" to prospective litigants as
malicious, baseless and a lie. He denied that he demanded from complainant the additional payment of P10,000.00. He alleged that
he does not know complainant and she is a total stranger to him. On the other hand, stenographer Salvacion Fegidero and counsel
Atty. Robert Juanillo denied the accusations of complainant that they had a package deal with Lorna Vollmer.
● Due to the conflicting allegations of the parties, the OCA opined that a formal investigation was necessary to afford the parties
opportunity to substantiate their respective claims and to determine the alleged participation of court employee Salvacion Fegidero.
Upon recommendation of the OCA, the Court referred the complaint to Executive Judge Frances V. Guanzon.
● Investigating Judge Guanzon found that the complainant did not have personal knowledge of the alleged "package deals" to litigants
who file cases in the court of respondent. The allegations in the Complaint were all based on the information relayed to complainant
though telephone by her sister, Lorna Vollmer. Hence, ​the complaint of corruption was unsubstantiated.
● Nevertheless, Investigating Judge Guanzon stated that although the alleged offer of package deals by respondent to litigants was
195 unsubstantiated, it was improper for respondent to talk to prospective litigants in his court and to recommend lawyers to
 handle cases. ​Likewise, Judge Guanzon found respondent's act of preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert
Juanillo to be improper and unethical.
● The Court agrees with the findings of Investigating Judge Guanzon that complainant failed to prove by substantial evidence her
allegation that respondent offers "package deals" to prospective litigants in his court.
Canons violated:
● However, the investigation revealed that respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in particular, talking to a prospective
litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo,
which pleading was filed in his court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and reflective of
the integrity of his office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA, the said acts of respondent violate Section 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Section 2
of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
CANON 2

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer.

CANON 3

SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

CANON 4

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in
a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

PUNISHMENT:

Respondent Judge Manuel Q. Limsiaco, Jr., former Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Valladolid-San Enrique-Pulupandan, Negros Occidental, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct for which he is
FINED in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00). The Office of the Court Administrator is
DIRECTED to deduct the fine of P25,000.00 from the retirement benefits due to Judge Limsiaco, Jr.​|||

Loro, Clarisse
Case no. 196
Dawa vs. De Asa
A.M. No. MJT-98-114, 22 July 1998

Facts:

Floride Dawa, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto and Noraliz L. Jorgensen filed charges of sexual harassment under RA No. 7877/acts of
lasciviousness, grave or serious misconduct and violation of the high standard of morals demanded by judicial ethic to Armando C. de Asa,
presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting executive judge of MTC, Caloocan, City.

First, Floride Y . Dawa a stenographic reporter in MeTC of Caloocan City, reported that on August 8, 1997, while on her way to the
ladies' toilet, she had seen and nodded out of respect to respondent before entering the ladies comfort room. Upon seeing Dawa emerged
from the same, respondent casually asked her whether the toilet was clean. She answered that it was dirty. Respondent called her and she
approached him. When she neared the respondent, the latter put his arm on her shoulder and led her into his chamber. Once inside and while
she was standing near the edge of respondent's office table, he placed his arm around her shoulder and suddenly held her jaw and kissed her
on the lips. Before she could recover herself, respondent once again held her shoulder and chin and kissed her on the lips. She forcibly
pushed the respondent away. Respondent asked her where she lived and with whom but she hurriedly left respondent's office.

Second, Noraliz L. Jorgensen, assigned in the Office of the Clerk of Court, had gone to the office of respondent Judge for the purpose
of securing his signature on the payroll for the judges' allowances, approached her and suddenly kissed her on the cheek. In another incident,
Respondent Judge held her two arms, and suddenly kissed her and licked her left ear, saying "I love you". Jorgensen was surprised and afraid.
She asked respondent, "Judge, what is this", at the same time endeavoring to free herself from his hold but she could not because his grip was
strong. Respondent then said, "Don't make noise lest we be heard outside". At the same time, respondent held her jaw and kissed her on the
lips. He said, "Open your mouth" as her continued to hug and kiss her while she tried to free herself. He did not heed her pleas although she
was then trembling with fear.

Third, Femenina Lazaro-Barreto, a court Stenographer, temporarily assigned to respondent’s Branch approach him for the purpose of
his signature, held her chin and kissed her. Barreto asked, "What are you doing?" Respondent kissed her again and tapped her shoulder
saying, "Sigue na, Nina. Okay na," dismissing her. Barreto went out of the office and wiped her lips with her hand.

Consequently, respondent's victims file an administrative charge against respondent Judge.

Defendant defense:

Respondent claimed that all these charges "were obviously instigated and altogether orchestrated". He accused the Clerk of Court,
Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino, as the "prime mover of this cabal" and that aside from her there were "other people behind the conspiracy who
ha[d] yet to be uncovered. He further claimed that "the complaints were set up, hatched and designed, to destabilize and destroy the good
image of the undersigned created in the minds of party litigants, government, local as well as private concerns, in Caloocan City. respondent
believed that "Ms. Mona Lisa Buencamino, took all my actions, with disdain, suspicion, more so, with resistance. On her face, she regretted the
fact of my designation as Acting Executive Judge. She is not used to being controlled. She would want to maintain her 'madrina' and
'godmother' (i.e. influential, wealthy, etc.) image not only among the employees but also among the judges as well.

196
 Canon violated:

Canon 1 Rule 1.01 and Canon 2 Rule 2.02 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics

Recommendation:

​The investigating​ ​justice recommended that respondent judge be found guilty as charged with the recommendation that he be dismissed from
the service for gross misconduct and immorality, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch of
the government, including government owned or controlled corporations.

Issue:

​Whether or not respondent Judge violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics?

Ruling:

Yes. ​The Court found the findings, conclusion and recommendation of the investigating justice to be adequately, substantiated by the evidence
presented by the parties and anchored on applicable law and jurisprudence. Further, the Court found totally unacceptable the temerity of the
respondent judge in subjecting herein complainants, his subordinates all, to his unwelcome sexual advances and acts of lasciviousness. Not
only do the actions of respondent judge fall short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary; they stand no chance of satisfying the
standards of decency even of society at large. His severely abusive and outrageous acts, which are an affront to women, unmistakably
constitute sexual harassment because they necessarily ". . . result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee[s]." Let
it be remembered that respondent has moral ascendancy and authority over complainants, who are mere employees of the court of which he is
an officer. The bench is not a place for persons like him. His gross misconduct warrants his removal from office.

Case summary: ​Respondent Judge found guilty of Act of Lasciviousness of 3 Court employees of the MeTC. He was dismissed and deprived
of his retirement benefits.

CASE NO. 197

In re: complaint against Judge Martonino Marcos and clerk of court Shirley Visaya, municipal trial court, Gerona, Tarlac, A.M. No.
MTJ-04-1520, January 27, 2004
Administrative Case
Complainant:​ Romeo T. Zacarias
Respondent: ​Judge Martonino R. Marcos

​Facts:
Brief Background
● Arose from a complaint led by Romeo T. Zacarias and an undated Anonymous Complaint of a concerned citizen of Gerona, Tarlac.
Complaints identically charged judge Martonino R. Marcos and Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya with immoral conduct and illegal
solicitation from litigants.
● The complaints were referred by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for discreet
investigation and subsequently for formal investigation, report and recommendation.
● After conducting the investigation, a court insider had confirmed the illicit relationship of respondents. He then recommended the filing
of formal charges against them.
● In view, however, of the promotion of respondent, the Court, thereafter referred the matter to Associate Justice Josefina
Guevara-Salonga of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation
Complainant’s Allegations
● According to the complainant, the respondent clerk summoned him to the chambers of the respondent Judge. While inside the judge's
chambers, respondents allegedly tried to extort money from him so that there will be some changes in the decision before it will be
promulgated.
● At the hearing, he was surprised when the respondent clerk asked him to post a cash bond in the amount of P1,000.00 for his
provisional liberty despite the fact that he was arrested specifically to serve his sentence. The complainant further aired his confusion
since regardless of the cash bond that he posted, he still served his sentence for fifteen (15) days
● Complainant further alleged that, he was informed that the respondent Judge does not approve bailbonds without bribe money and
that the respondents are engaged in an illicit love affair which is common knowledge to municipal and court personnel and as well as
to the people of Gerona
Respondent Judge’s Defense
● Respondent judge averred that the allegations of complainant lacked factual and legal basis. He claimed that the Complaint had been
led merely to harass him. He denied having ever demanded money. And that complainant might have misinterpreted as bribe the
amounts he had paid for his cash bond and for the damages adjudged against him.
● As to the charge of immorality, respondent judge averred that his hectic schedule hardly allowed him to indulge in illicit relations. He
emphasized that on top of his duties as judge, he was also a lay minister and president of the Parish Pastoral Council of Ramos,
Tarlac, as well as an active member of the freemasonry and the cursillo movements
● Respondent, to prove his innocence, he submitted copies of the Warrant of Arrest against complainant, the Release Order, the Legal
Fees Form showing the posting of the cash bond and the Undertaking attendant thereto, the Order ordering the release of the cash
bond to complainant, and the Receipt for payment of damages.
Respondent Clerk’s Defense
● Respondent clerk denied having demanded money from complainant. She vehemently denied having illicit relations with respondent
judge, whom she described as kind, considerate and morally upright. She also submitted a Sworn Statement executed by her
co-employees, who vouched therein for her integrity and uprightness. Finally, she presented a certified true copy of the Official
Receipt that she had issued to complainant for the cash bond.
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice:
● Investigating justice held that the inconsistencies in the statements of respondents in their Comments and testimonies during the
clarificatory hearing belied their claim that complainant had voluntarily posted the bond
● Investigating justice observed that nowhere in the records was it shown that complainant had applied for probation and withdrawn it.
197 She held that the failure of respondent judge to issue a commitment order further militated against his claim that complainant had
 been released after posting bond
● ​Respondent clerk's classification of the cash bond as part of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) instead of the Fiduciary Fund
was surprising; having been in service for 27 years, respondent clerk ought to have been aware of the latter's duty to check the forms
and to collect the cash bond for the court.
● Concluded​: that the acts of respondents had been irregular, unlawful, anomalous and totally inconsistent with any claim of good faith
in the performance of their judicial functions. As to the charge of immorality, she recommended that it be dismissed, as it was based
only on vicious rumors and unverified reports.
● ​Recommended​: that respondents be penalized with severe reprimand and suspension from office for a period of one (1) month for
grave misconduct
Canons violated:
● Canons 1 and 2

Issue​: WON respondents should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR?

Ruling:
● Yes, the court affirms the findings of the investigating justice with some modifications, by increasing the penalty of respondents
consistent with Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court and Civil Service Rules
● As the epitome of integrity and justice, respondent judge should comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official
or otherwise, can bear searching public scrutiny
● ​Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a magistrate "should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities";
and "should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence
● ​His conduct lacked the meticulous care expected of one ever mindful of the image of the judiciary that one portrays. It is the kind of
behavior for which he must be administratively dealt with, as it erodes public confidence in the judicial system
● It has been stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed by the trust
and confidence reposed in a public office
● While the investigating justice merely recommended that respondents be suspended for one (1) month, we believe that the nature of
their infraction calls for a heavier sanction. Although the charge of undue solicitation against respondent judge was not sufficiently
proven, he had unquestionably ​violated Canons 1 and 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct​.
● This violation carries with it a penalty of dismissal from service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.

● As to respondent clerk, we find that she was equally remiss in the performance of her duties. The laxity of respondent clerk in the
supervision of court personnel was repugnant to her role as an adjudicative and administrative officer of the court. Hence, her action
constituted simple misconduct. 55 55 Under Section 52 (B) (2) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, 56
56 simple misconduct is punishable with suspension from one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months.
● She is also found guilty of ineciency and incompetence in the performance of her ocial duties a grave offense that is punishable with
suspension from six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. 57 57 This being the more serious infraction, we deem it proper to
impose the minimum penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, after considering her 27 years of service in the
government.

● Judge Martonino R. Marcos is hereby found ​GUILTY of violating the Code of Judicial Conduct and is SUSPENDED without pay for
four months​.
● Clerk of Court Shirley M. Visaya, on the other hand, is found ​GUILTY of simple misconduct as well as inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of ocial duties, for which she is ​SUSPENDED without pay for six (6) months and one (1) day.
● Both are ​sternly warned​ that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Bagonoc, Hazel Claire M.

Case Num. 198- Impartiality

A.M. No. CA-09-48-J

The Law Firm of Chavez Miranda Aseoche v. Justice Dicdican

Respondent:Justice Dicdican

Complainant: Chavez

Facts​:

Brief Background:

The special civil action for certiorari stemmed from a complaint filed by Asparen with the RTC of Bacolod City for nullification of disciplinary
sanctions, damages with prayer for temporary restraining order/injunction.

The school involved in the case had imposed disciplinary sanctions on its student, Asparen, but it was lifted upon the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction by Hon. Elumba, the presiding judge of the trial court. The matter was then elevated to the Court of Appeals which issued
a TRO, penned by respondent Justice, which prevented the enforcement of the order and writ of the trial court.

Complainant and Asparen, then sought the inhibition of respondent from the case, on the ground that the latter had​ previously represented
various religious organizations and institutions during his practice of law and the petitioner school in the case is run by a religious
organization while petitioner Sr. Bandalan is a nun belonging to said organization.

Respondent Justice admitted on record that he once served as counsel of religious organizations but denied that such circumstance affected
his impartiality in the case. Respondent Justice, however, found it proper to​ voluntarily inhibit himself​ to disabuse the mind of the student and
complainant of any suspicion as to his impartiality.

Despite his inhibition, respondent Justice allegedly participated again in the case when his name appeared as one of the signatories of a
Resolution. As such, complainant filed a Manifestation and Motion for respondent Justice to maintain his earlier inhibition. Then, the
complainant again filed a Reiterative Motion for Justice Dicdican to Maintain His Earlier Inhibition from the Present Case.
198
 Respondent Justice maintained that he never participated again in the case after his inhibition. Records were shown that the case was already
reraffled to another justice and was reassigned to another Judge thereafter.

Complaint against the Lawyer:

Complainant alleged that respondent Justice’s actions showed his manifest bias and prejudice against his client in the case—a blatant
disregard of ​Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

Issue​: WON the respondent is guilty of the violation of the Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Ruling​:

NO.

In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the respondent committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant, in this case,
the complainant failed to show sufficient basis and evidence.

The presumption that respondent regularly performed his duties prevails due to the fact that the complainant failed to substantiate his
imputations of impropriety and partiality against respondent Justice.

On the other hand, respondent Justice adequately explained that since his voluntary inhibition from the case, he no longer participated in the
case and his perceived participation in the issuance of the assailed Resolution was a result of a typographical mistake.

​Punishment​:

The administrative complaint against Justice Isaias P. Dicdican is DISMISSED for lack of merit

Synthesis​:

An administrative complaint against Judge Dicdican was filed for violation of Canon 21 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in the resolution of the
incidents in the special civil action for certiorari. He was alleged of being impartial, because in that resolution, the petitioner was a nun who
belonged in a religious organization, now the complainant alleged that during his practice of law, he represented various religious
organizations, thus making him impartial in deciding for the case. However, the SC dismissed the complaint due to lack of merit.

Reyes, Farrah Stephanie

Doreto Salazar v Judge Antonio Marigomen
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2004 (October 19, 2007)

Facts

Brief Background

Zenaida Salazar, wife of the complainant, a mayoralty candidate in Madridejos, Cebu filed an election protest against the proclaimed
winner Lety Mancio before the RTC of Bogo. The election case was first heard by then Acting Presiding Judge Jesus S. dela Peña who issued
an order directing the revision of the contested ballots in the premises of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) where the
ballot boxes were being kept. Respondent took over and started presiding over the election case.

Judge Marigomen dismissed the election protest and declared Mancio as the duly elected municipal mayor. On appeal, COMELEC
reversed and set aside respondent’s decision and declared Zenaida Salazar as the duly elected mayor. Thus, spawned the filing of the
complaint at bar.

The claims of the complainant:

1. Complainant claimed that respondent admitted in evidence uncertified photocopies of the contested ballots, of which the
original copies were in the custody of the HRET. The charge for ignorance of the law is in violation of Section 7, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court where respondent considered the uncertified photocopies in deciding the case.

2. The partiality of the respondent was shown in several instances as claimed by the complainant. When protestant Zenaida
Salazar objected to the presentation of the plain photocopies of the contested ballots, respondent ordered his Clerk of Court to
coordinate with counsel for protestee and to testify for her; allowed Atty. the co-counsel for the protestee, to testify despite the
protestant's objection on the ground that his testifying would be a violation of professional ethics and despite respondent's citation
of authorities on the matter; and acted as if he was counsel of protestee when he explained the nature of the testimony and laid
down the basis of such, because the counsel for the protestee incurred difficulty to do so.

3. The respondent was “too liberal and tolerant of the maneuverings and manipulations of the protestee”, dragging the
proceedings, which is in violation of the period provide for in the Omnibus Election Code.

4. Respondent violated the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as well as the Constitution for not clearly and distinctly stating the
facts and the law on which his decision was based

Respondent’s claim:

1. The complainant is not the real party in interest and the complaint is moot and academic as the election protest had been
decided on appeal by the COMELEC; and if errors were committed, "they pertain to the exercise of his adjudicative functions
[which] cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings."

2. As to the charge of gross ignorance of the law, respondent cites Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as his legal basis
for the admission of the uncertified photocopies.
199
 3. On the charge of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service, respondent disclaims any intentional delay of the
proceedings on his part.

4. He maintains that his decision clearly stated the facts and the law on which it was based, and if there are errors therein, they
are correctible by judicial remedies and not by administrative proceedings.

Complaint Against Lawyer

Doreto Salazar claims that Judge Marigomen was partial and bias, grossly ignorant of the law and exhibited conduct prejudicial to the
interest of the service and rendering a decision violative of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the Constitution.

IBP Decision

Recommended that respondent be found guilty of ignorance of the law, and fined P20,000, and bias and dishonesty, amounting to
grave misconduct and suspended for six months without pay

Canon Allegedly Violated

Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court 8​ which provides:

SEC. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. — When the original of a document is in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility: The Rule prohibits a lawyer from testifying in behalf of his client, except on
formal matters such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, or on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is
essential to the ends of justice.

Issue: Whether Judge Marigomen is guilty of the charges filed against him by the complainant.

Ruling: The Court affirmed the recommendation of the OCA but with modification.

Administrative matter involves the exercise of the Court's power to discipline judges. It is undertaken and prosecuted solely for the
public welfare, that is, to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government. Thus, unlike in ordinary cases, there is no private
offended party in administrative proceedings who may be entitled to judicial relief. ​The complainant need not be a real party in interest, as
anyone may file an administrative complaint against a judge, the only requirement being that the complaint be verified and it "be in writing and
shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules
of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct."

The admission of the uncertified or plain photocopies of the contested ballots by respondent Judge in favor of Mancio betrays his
ignorance of Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

His invocation of Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to justify his admission of the plain copies of the contested ballots is
misplaced. Verily, as the original copies of the contested ballots are in the custody of the HRET, which fact was known to respondent judge,
there was no occasion to apply Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent took special interest to the presentation of the counsel of Mancio. Respondent judge's bias for Mancio was further shown
by respondent judge when he allowed one of the counsels for Mancio, Atty. Reinerio Roiles, to testify despite the vigorous objection of Salazar
through his counsel, as the testimony was in violation of Rule 12.08, Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility. . The Rule
prohibits a lawyer from testifying in behalf of his client, except on formal matters such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument, or on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice. In this case, Atty. Roeles was allowed to
testify on matters not contemplated by the exceptions.

The respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law, manifest bias and deliberate falsehood or dishonesty.​ Under Section 8,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious charge. Similarly, bias and deliberate falsehood, which are
tantamount to grave misconduct, are considered serious charges under the same Rule. The penalty imposable for serious charges ranges
from fine to dismissal.

Punishment: Guilty of ignorance of the law and fined the amount of P25,000 and manifested bias and dishonesty amounting to grave
misconduct and fined P25,000.

Summary:

A complaint was filed against Judge Marigomen for gross ignorance of law, bias, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and
rendering a decision violative of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure and the Constitution. He was found guilty of the
charges and was fined.

Capuyan, Thea
CASE NO. 200: SUSAN O. REYES, v. JUDGE MANUEL N. DUQUE, September 2010

Facts
Brief Background:
Complainant Susan Reyes filed a petition claiming for the ownership of a property which was owned by Spouses Carolyn and Nak Choi. She
claimed that she was in actual possession of the said property with full knowledge of Philippine Savings Bank. Respondent Judge, Manuel
Duque ordered complainant to settle the matter with the bank within 30 days.

200 Reyes allegedly received a call from the respondent Judge who instructed her to “go to his house and bring some money in order that he can
 deny the pending motion against her case. Since complainant did not have enough money, she told him instead that she would see him in the
following days once she receives her allotment. After receiving her allotment, complainant Reyes went to respondent’s house to pay 20,000,
however respondent demanded that she should pay 100,000. Complainant asked for some extension from respondent to pay the balance.
After a week, complainant was informed by her counsel that respondent judge had been asking for the balance. Complainant Reyes then went
to the house of respondent with only 18,000. Respondent allegedly scolded her for not bringing the whole amount, he then locked the main
door of his house and asked complainant to enter his office. Inside, respondent set a deadline for complainant to complete the payment. All of
a sudden, respondent judge allegedly held the waist of complainant Reyes and kissed her. He tried to raise her skirt and attempted to have
sexual intercourse with her. Complainant tried to struggle and free herself and as a desperate move, she appealed to the judge that they do it
in a hotel instead. The respondent stopped his sexual and advance and ordered Reyes to fix her hair.

Complaint against the lawyer:​ Complainant Susan Reyes charged Respondent with Impropriety and corruption.

Defense of Respondent Lawyer:

Respondent Judge Duque, averred that he was no longer under the jurisdiction of the Office of Court Administrator as the complaint of Reyes
was filed after he had retired. Furthermore, he denied the charges against him and claimed that such allegations were fabricated and
malicious.

Recommendation of Investigating Justice: As to the charge of graft and corruption, Reyes only presented photocopies of the bills to prove
that Duque had demanded money from her. The investigating justice found no compelling evidence to corroborate the accusation.

For the charge of impropriety and gross misconduct, the investigating justice opined that the act of Judge Duque in kissing and touching Reyes
were certainly acts of lewdness. Such acts were established by substantial evidence. The investigating justice found Duque guilty of
impropriety and gross misconduct.

Canons allegedly violated​: Canon IV- Propriety

Issue:​ Whether or not respondent is guilty of impropriety and gross misconduct?

Ruling​: Respondent is guilty of impropriety and gross misconduct. First, as to the defense of respondent regarding the Office of the court
Administrator’s jurisdiction, it was clarified that complainant Reyes had filed four similar complaints against the respondent. Reyes had
intended to file the complaint before respondent had retired.

Second on the charge of corruption, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice and OCA that found insufficient
evidence to sustain Reyes' allegation that Judge Duque demanded and received money from her in consideration of a favorable ruling.

Third, the court after a thorough investigation it was established that Reyes went to respondent’s house. Substantial evidence also pointed to
Judge Duque's liability for impropriety and gross misconduct when he sexually assaulted Reyes. There is no need to detail again the lewd acts
of Judge Duque. The Investigating Justice's narration was sufficient and thorough.

Judges should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities. Judges should conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office. The conduct of Judge Duque fell short of the exacting standards for members of the judiciary.
He failed to behave in a manner that would promote confidence in the judiciary. Considering that a judge is a visible representation of the law
and of justice, he is naturally expected to be the epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach. Judge Duque's conduct indubitably bore
the marks of impropriety and immorality. He failed to live up to the high moral standards of the judiciary and even transgressed the ordinary
norms of decency of society.

Penalty​: Respondent is fined 40,000 to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Summary: ​Complainant Susan Reyes charged Respondent Judge with Impropriety and corruption after the respondent demanded 100,000
from her in consideration of a favorable ruling. She also alleges that respondent sexually harassed her inside his office when she made the
partial payment. Court found respondent judge guilty of impropriety and misconduct, however as to the charge of graft and corruption, the court
found insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation.

Villagonzalo, Courtney Psalm R.

Case Title: Umali vs. Villarante, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2124, 27 August 2009

Facts​:

● By Complaint-Affidavit of April 25, 2007 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali (Judge
Capco-Umali) charged Judge Paulita Acosta-Villarante (Judge Acosta-Villarante) with violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary 3 (New Code of Judicial Conduct), Canon 2, Section 2 and Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2.
● Umali alleged that Judge Acosta-Villarante wrote a Memorandum addressed to Executive Judge Maria Cancino-Erum of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City:
■ “Judge Rizalina Capco-Umali marred the event by conduct very unbecoming of a judge by uttering unsavory
remarks and epithets or words of the same import designed to humiliate the undersigned in the presence of fellow
judges and assistant clerk of court Atty. Leynard Dumlao, coupled with her attempt to inflict physical harm to the
undersigned which you, as the newly appointed executive Judge, miserably failed to control and dominate and
opted to take a passive stance. The conduct of the newly appointed vice executive judge does not speak well of her
being a judge who is expected to conduct herself in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.”
○ Defense​: Judge Acosta-Villarante denied that she wrote the Memorandum to maliciously impute a crime, vice or defect on
Judge Capco-Umali as she merely requested for the suspension of the holding of the monthly meeting of judges to avoid a
repetition of the incident and to afford the parties an opportunity to "cool off”. She explained that she had an "obligation to
bring to the attention of concerned officials the personal demeanor of another member that would put the Judiciary in
constant public scrutiny and disrespect".
● Because of Villarante’s memorandum, Umali filed a complaint for libel against her.
○ The complaint said that they had a meeting with the Mayor. The topic shifted to the topic of local allowance.
○ “Mayor Gonzales noticed the disparity in figures (amount) as to the allowance received by each Judge. He noticed that
respondent Villarante was receiving additional P3,000 on top of her regular allowance as Executive Judge; and additional
Php5,000 on top of her allowance as Acting Judge of Br. 209.”
○ “when the matter of giving to the new executive judge the increased allowances of Executive Judge Paulita B.
Acosta-Villarante and that the latter would revert back [sic] to the authorized amount for Executive Judges was discussed,
201 respondent ​Villarante was angered and blurted out addressing the new Executive Judge​, thus:
 ● "Kayo, simula ng maupo sa pwesto, wala ng ginawa kundi kutkutin at maghanap ng evidencia para ako
masira, nagsusumbong, nagmamanman. Wala naman pakialaman sa allowance kanya kanya yan
dapat.["]”
○ “the respondent kept talking too and even shouting at the top [of] her voice towards complainant visibly irked by
complainant's revelation on the matter. Respondent even called complainant a liar “
○ “Respondent continued verbally attacking complainant with words connoting malicious imputations of being an incorrigible
liar and of being in cahoots with Judge Maria A. Cancino-Erum in peddling lies [that] the complainant got upset by the verbal
aggression made by Judge Villarante that she told the latter, thus: "Matanda ka na, halos malapit ka na sa kamatayan
gumagawa ka pa ng ganyan, madadamay pa kami". Judge Villarante fought back: "Bog, sana mangyari sa iyo, bog!".
● Villarante countered by filing and Administrative Complaint charging Umali with violation of Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, and a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation and Grave Threats
● Judge Capco-Umali, ​admitted ​having uttered the remarks "matanda ka na, halos malapit ka na sa kamatayan gumagawa ka pa ng
ganyan, madadamay pa kami" due to exasperation" as Judge Acosta-Villarante called her "an incorrigible liar"
● Judge Acosta-Villarante, ​admitted ​calling Judge Capco-Umali "sinungaling", explained that she was only "constrained" by the
situation, adding that Judge Capco-Umali is a "pathological liar"
●
OCA Report and Recommendation:
● “The admissions made by the concerned Judges anent the allegations they hurled against each other provide for the strongest
evidence to establish their individual liability”
● Judges that as magistrates of the law, they must comport themselves at all times in such a manner that their conduct, official or
otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as epitome of integrity and justice. They must be
the first to abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow. They must studiously avoid even the slightest infraction of the
law (Alumbres vs. Caoibes, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1431, January 23, 2002) . The actions of the respondent Judges fell short of this
exacting ethical standard demanded from the members of the Judiciary.
● Judge Capco-Umali failed to live up to the standard of propriety entrenched in the aforequoted code of conduct. While she might have
been provoked by Judge Acosta-Villarante's referral to her as a liar, she should have maintained her composure instead of shouting
back at a fellow judge.
● Judge Acosta-Villarante should also be required to answer for her failure to observe the basic norm of propriety demanded from a
judge. She should have been more cautious in choosing the words to address the already volatile situation with Judge Capco-Umali.
● The memorandum by Villarante was thus written as a medium for retaliation against Judge Capco-Umali. If indeed the memorandum
was produced strictly to allow the parties to cool off and avoid a repetition of the incident, on this ground alone, there was no need to
mention the alleged misbehavior of Judge Capco-Umali during the meeting
● An act complained of anchored on a violation of Code of Judicial Conduct, may only constitute a serious charge under Section 8 of
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court if the same amounts to gross misconduct
● Respondents, therefore, may be sanctioned with: [1] suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than (1) nor
more than three (3) months; or [2] a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
● In the case of Judge Capco-Umali, however, the imposable penalty should be tempered because it is clear from the record that she
was dragged into the tiff by an act of provocation.
●
Issue​:
1. Did the two judges commit gross misconduct? NO
2. Are they GUILTY of violation of Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary? YES

Ruling​:
● Any fighting or misunderstanding is a disgraceful occurrence reflecting adversely on the good image of the Judiciary. By fighting
within the court premises, respondent judges failed to observe the proper decorum expected of members of the Judiciary. More
detestable is the fact that their squabble arose out of a mere allowance coming from the local government. (reason for #2)
● They made a violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars, which is classified as a less serious charge, in which case,
any of the following sanctions may be imposed: (1) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor
more than three months; or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. (Reason for #1)
● The Court finds, however, that Judges Capco-Umali and Acosta-Villarante should each be fined P11,000.

Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the Court 9nds Judges Rizalina T. Capco-Umali and Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante GUILTY of violation of Section 1, Canon 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary​, for which they are each FINED in the amount of Eleven Thousand
(P11,000) Pesos.

In view of the retirement of Judge Paulita B. ​Acosta-Villarante​, the Fiscal Management and Budget Office, Office of the Court Administrator is
ordered to ​DEDUCT ​the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos (P11,000) from her retirement benefits.

Judge Rizalina T. ​Capco-Umali​, who is still in the service, is ​STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more
severely. The same stern warning applies to retired Judge Paulita B. Acosta-Villarante in her capacity as a member of the Bar.

CASE TITLE: A.C. No. RTJ-99-1448 (April 6, 2000)

SAPHIA M. MAGARANG, complainant
vs.
JUDGE GALDINO B. JARDIN, SR., respondent
CANON:CANON IV - PROPRIETY

Facts:

Ø Brief Background:

Nuruddin-Ali M. Magarang, the complainant’s husband, was appointed as Director III for Caraga of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) vice Alexander Mama-O. Mama-O filed a quo warranto with injunction questioning the appointment of Magarang.
Respondent judge then issued a TRO enjoining Nuruddin Magarang from assuming the office.

After the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction complainant went to the house of respondent judge to request the latter to fairly
decide the application for injunction. Respondent judge expressed his willingness to help complainant, but said that he had to return the
202 P200,000.00 he received from petitioner Mama-O. The complainant committed herself to pay the said amount to respondent judge at a later
date, to which respondent judge replied "O sige, tingnan natin bukas."

The next day, respondent judge granted the writ of preliminary injuction in which the accused’s counsel filed a motion for consideration. During
the pendency, complainant went to respondent judge’s office and handed him P80,000.00 and committed to give P200,000.00 later, in
exchange for a favorable action on her husband’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent asked the complainant when she could give the
money then instructing her to return the following day.

Complainant returned the next day but respondent judge told her he might not be able to finish the "decision" as no one was willing to report on
a Saturday to type it. Complainant then offered to pay for the overtime work of his staff. Respondent judge acceded and told complainant to
make the request directly to the employee concerned. Complainant then asked a lady staff member who expressed willingness to work, but
respondent judge did not want her to do the job.

The following day, complainant returned to the Hall of Justice but was told by the respondent judge’s secretary that the copy of the resolution
of the motion for reconsideration had been delivered to her counsel. Complainant proceeded to the house of her lawyer, only to find out that
the resolution denied the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant went to respondent judge’s office to recover the P80,000.00 she gave him. A heated argument ensued between complainant and
respondent judge, with the latter uttering unsavory words tending to malign complainant’s marital fidelity. Angered, complainant poked her
index finger at respondent judge’s mouth to stop him from further hurling invectives at her. Respondent judge bit complainant’s finger, causing
her to forcibly pull it off, which caused respondent judge’s tooth to fall off.

The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration however, respondent judge denied the motion.

The Solicitor General thereafter filed with CA a petition to annul orders of respondent, which CA granted.

Thus, the administrative case against Judge Jardin.

Ø Complaint against the Judge:

The case is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Saphia M. Magarang charging respondent Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., Regional
Trial Court, with corruption, incompetence, and ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion.

Ø Canons allegedly violated:

CANON IV – PROPRIETY

The career of a judge, as required in the Code of Judicial Conduct, entails the highest degree of competence, integrity and independence,
because a judge ought to be the embodiment of all that is good, efficient, competent, honest and reliable. Woe unto the magistrate who is
wanting in any of these virtues. In view of the adversarial nature of our system of administering justice, a judge is almost always the object of
hate, venom, and contempt — and of administrative or criminal charges — feigned or illusory. It is thus the policy of this court that
administrative charges against a judge must be heard with utmost care and circumspection.

In Vedana v. Valencia, 29 the Court held:

"The code of judicial ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance
of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is
also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated
from his personal existence. Thus:

"Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

"A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of
official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.”

Issue:​ Whether or not Judge Jardin was guilty of corruption in office.

Ruling:

Yes. After careful scrutiny of the records, the court finds respondent judge guilty of corruption in office.

While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of
an individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with
existing administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of justice.

Respondent judge miserably failed to measure up to stringent judicial standards. Complainant has sufficiently established the corrupt acts of
respondent judge in connection with Spl. Civil Case No. 887. He received a bribe from both sides, "lagaring hapon." He has no place in the
judiciary. He dishonored the judicial robe he wore. His acts could even be criminal in nature. We have unhesitatingly removed from office
judges and court employees for less serious transgressions. We removed a deputy sheriff from office for asking a bribe of only P1,500.00. We
have no reason to depart from this ruling. Respondent judge’s acts of corruption clearly show his unfitness to remain any minute longer in his
judicial robe.

We are disappointed with the recommendation of the investigating justice to impose on respondent judge only suspension from office for one
(1) year despite her finding that respondent judge committed acts of corruption in office by receiving a bribe of P80,000.00 from complainant
and P200,000.00 from the other party to the case before him. Surely, she could not be unaware of extant jurisprudence that such corrupt acts,
no matter how minimal the amount involved, deserve no less than outright removal from office. "Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges." red
 Punishment:

· DISMISSED from service

· Forfeiture of all retirement benefits and leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reinstatement or reemployment in any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government including government owned or controlled corporations.

· Judge Jardin shall immediately vacate his position as Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 05, Butuan City as well as any position in
the judiciary to which he may be presently assigned, and desist from deciding or resolving any case or incidents therein upon
receipt of notice hereof.

Synthesis:

In Magarang vs. Jardin​, an administrative complaint was filed by complainant charging respondent Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., with
corruption, incompetence, and ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion. Respondent judge was alleged to have received the amount
of P200, 000.00 from petitioner Mama-O and P80, 000.00 from complainant Magarang in consideration of favorable action on complainant’s
request for "justice" for her husband in the same case. After careful scrutiny of the records, the court find respondent judge guilty of corruption.
It was held that the code of judicial ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to
his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality.
Therefore, Judge Jardin was immediately dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits with prejudice to reinstatement or
reemployment in any branch, instrumentality or agency of the government including government owned or controlled corporations.

J.King and Sons Company V. Hontanosas

Case No. A.M. No. RTJ-03-1815
October 25, 2004

Brief Background:

Complainant alleges that it is the plaintiff in a case pending before the RTC
presided over by respondent.
Respondent then issued an Order granting the application for writ of preliminary attachment.
An urgent motion to discharge and lift writ of preliminary attachment was filed by defendants before the respondent and on the same day,
respondent issued an Order lifting the writ of preliminary attachment.
Said order was issued sans proper notice and hearing as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent approved defendants’
counter-bond despite knowledge that the bonding company’s Supreme Court Clearance was not valid and the maximum net retention of the
bonding company had a deficiency. At a meeting in his house, respondent asked Rafael King to match defendants’ offer to pay P250,000.00
so that the Order of July 5, 2002 will be reconsidered formally if a motion for reconsideration is filed by complainant.
Respondent’s favorite hang-out is the karaoke music lounge of Metropolis Hotel owned by herein complainant, and he uses said facilities
"gratis et amore."

Complaint against the lawyer:​ The complainant alleged that the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment and/or interlocutory orders, bias and partiality, when he issued four patently irregular interlocutory orders

IBP Decision:

He was not actually "ignorant of the law." Rather, he ignored the law, deliberately and in bad faith, when he rendered [the questioned orders]
after the court had already lost jurisdiction over the case.
Agrees with the complainant that respondent is administratively guilty of gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct, and manifest bias and
partiality when he issued four (4) patently irregular interlocutory orders

Canons Allegedly Violated:

Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is expected to be "the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence" to
maintain public confidence in the legal system. He should so behave at all times as to promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary

Rule 2.01, Canon 2, of the Code of Judicial Conduct for demanding ₱250,000.00 from the complainant therein and using the latter’s karaoke
bar and entertaining litigants at his home

Issue: ​WON Respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law resulting to impropriety for using the facilities of the complainant free of charge

Held:

There is no basis for Justice Victor to inhibit himself from deciding the case.
To be sure, as trial court judge, he presided
partly over the case below, heard part of plaintiff’s evidence and ruled on motions.
The decision itself, however, was penned by another judge, the Honorable Lucas
Bersamin, who took over as presiding judge when then Judge Luis Victor was
promoted. Upon elevation to the Court of Appeals, the case was assigned to Justice
Victor as ponente.

The principle that approximates the situation obtaining herein is the

disqualification of a judge from deciding a case where his “ruling in a lower court is
the subject of review” or “in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling
or decision is the subject of review.” Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over
the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision
therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a position where he had to
review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally
bound to inhibit himself from the case.

Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and

circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the
203 case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be
 perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is
intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for
the judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it
is our considered view that his active participation in the case below constitutes a
“just or valid reason,” under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself
from the case.

Punishment​: FINED in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (₱40,000.00),

which shall be deducted from his accrued leave credits; and, in case such leave credits be found insufficient to answer for the said fine, the
respondent shall pay the balance thereof to the Court.
Reyes, Ry Jordane V.

CASE 204
Antonio M. Lorenzana v. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014

Brief Background:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (RTC, Branch 2 – Batangas City)

It arose from the case “In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed Under Corporate Rehabilitation with
Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed Rehabilitation Plan”. Mr. Lorenzana (Executive VP and Chief Operating Offer of Steel Corporation of
the Philippines (SCP)

Complaint against the Lawyer: Dated Jan. 21, 2008 – he alleged that in the course of the proceedings, the Judge committed:
· Gross Ignorance of the Law
· Grave Abuse of Authority
· Gross Misconduct
· Grave Incompetence
· Irregularity in the Performance of Duty
· Grave Bias and Partiality
· Lack of Circumspection
· Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge
· Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period and
· Violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

INSTANCES
a. She appointed Atty. Gabionza, Jr. as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s objections and despite serious conflict of interest;
external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors, he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as​ ​a legal adviser
b. She conducted informal meetings (‘consultative meetings) in places outside her official jurisdiction (1​st class golf club, hotel,
sports club facilities) where she arbitrarily dictated the terms, parameters, and features of the rehabilitation plan she wanted
to approve.
c. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent dictated to him. She
exceeded her limits of authority and effectively usurped and pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of functions
d. Respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal meetings be ‘off-record’ sot that there would be no record that she
had favored ‘Equitable-PCI Bank(EPCIB).
e. She had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB to discuss the case without the presence and knowledge of SCP
and its creditors.
f. She appointed Mr. Anonas as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and at the same time, her financial adviser to guide her in
the formulation and development of the rehabilitation plan, for a fee of (3.5M) at SCP’s expense. Anonas is also
(cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.
g. She encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations against SCP – leading to the filing of a motion to ‘create a
management committee’
h. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a subpoena (SCP could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to
prove the allegation) the respondent denied the requests and delayed the issuance of the order until the last minute
i. Hearing on Sept. 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty. Topacio, blocked his every attempt to speak;
refused to recognize his appearance in court; and made snide remarks.
j. She failed to observe the reglementary period prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
(Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission
for extension from the Supreme Court
k. She erroneously interpreted and applied Sec. 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (Court’s power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to
include the power to amend, modify, and alter it.
l. She took a personal interest and commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor and made comments and rulings in the
proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.
m. She adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed special interest and personal involvement in the case.

DEFENSE RESPONSE (COMMENT):

· Allegations
She denied the allegations; she admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible, rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that
she did so only to render fairness and equity to all parties to the rehab proceedings. She admitted that if she did err in modifying the
rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action. She claimed that the
administrative complaints were premature because judicial remedies were still available.
She argues that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings and conferences. She argues that they are even encouraged in view of
the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehab proceedings. Sec.21, Rule 4 of the Rules – give the rehabilitation receiver the power to met
with the creditors, then all the more the judge who has the authority to approve the plan to call and hold meetings with the parties.She pointed
out that SCP was the one who suggested the informal meetings and she agreed under the condition that all parties will attend.

· Alleged Failure to Observe the Reglementary Period

- she contented that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the matter of
granting extension of time under Sec. 11, Rule 4 of the Rules pertains not to the SC but to the rehabilitation Court.

· Allegations of Bias and Partiality

1. she claimed that her denial of the complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to
204 lack of basis.
 2. She argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB as evidenced by the fact that EPCIB itself (as some other
creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the Court of Appeals (CA)
3. she did not remove Atty. Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the grounds the complainant
raised warranted his removal; she found no merit to the allegations of conflict of interest
4. Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the complainants allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

· Abuse of Authority
- she did not abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Sec.1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the
Rules specifically states that the Court may decide matters on the basis of Affidavits and other documentary evidence.

· Conflict of Interest
- she maintained that the allegations were not proven and substantiated by evidence. She also believed that there was nothing
improper in expressing her ideas during the informal meetings.

Supplemental Complaint: ​April 14, 2008 – he alleged that respondent committed an act of impropriety when she displayed her
photographs in a social networking website called “Friendster” and posted her personal details for the purpose of finding a compatible
partner. (and posted a photo with just a shawl, and underneath a brassiere)

DEFENSE COMMENT:
She holds that it could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an ‘off-shouldered’ attire is an acceptable social outfit
under contemporary standards and is not forbidden. There is no prohibition against attractive ladies being judges, lastly, she admitted that the
ruling of the Curt in the case of ‘Impao v. Judge Makilala’ should not be applied to her case, since the facts are different.

CANONS VIOLATED:
Complainant alleges violation of:
· Rules 2.01, 2.02, and 2.03, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Court Held: Sec. 6 – CANON 4
Ø recommended to the CA

CA’s Recommendation
Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She found the issues judicial in nature since this
involved the appreciation of evidence.
- CA resolved to SET ASIDE the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation proceedings, it was not because of her ignorance of
law or abuse of authority but because the plan could no longer be implemented in view of SCP’s financial predicament.
- GRAVE BIAS AND PARTIALITY – ruled that the complainant failed to rpesent any clear and convincing proof she intentionally
and deliberately acted against SCP’s interest; it relied on opinions and surmises.
- INHIBITION – she noted that in cases not covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within the
discretion of the sitting judge (matter of conscience)
- INFORMAL MEETINGS – found nothing irregular despite the out-of-court emetings as these were agreed upon by all the parties,
including SCP’s creditors. She found the respondent’s explanation satisfactory regarding the approval of the plan beyond the 180
day period prescribed by the rules.
- EXCHANGES AND UTTERANCES – between the Judge and the SCP’s legal counsel – were found to be reflective of arrogance
and superiority.
- FRIENDSTER ACCOUNT – even during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the trend –
constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct; the propriety
and the appearance of propriety are ESSENTIAL to the performance of all the activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct
themselves in a manner consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
- GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION – she ruled that such professional incompetence was tantamount to gross ignorance of the
law and procedure, and recommended a FINE OF P20K + admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial decorum
required by her office.

OCA Recommendation
1. to consider Justice Gonzales-Sison’s report
2. respondent Judge be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and for violation of Sec. 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct
3. respondent Judge be FINED in the amount of 20K and
4. be ADONISHED to refrain from further acts of impropriety
5. OCA found her not guilty of gross ifnorance of the law
6. found that the charges of bias and partiality were not supported by evidence
7. accepted the respondent’s explanation on failure to observe reglementary period
8. maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence are judicial in nature (not subject to
disciplinary action)
9. conduct unbecoming of a judge – Friendster account – OCA shares the view of Justice Sison regarding the conduct online of
respondent Judge

COURT’S RULING
· VIOLATIONS
Ø On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority ; Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave Bias and Partiality and Lack
of Circumspection – DEVOID OF MERIT
- complainant failed to establish bad faith, malice, or ill will. “Unless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption,
malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly
in the adjudication of cases.

NOTE: “An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued
by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an appeal…”

Ø On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality – BASELESS

Ø On the Charges of Grave Incompetence and Gross Ignorance of the Law
- ​we agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error/mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable. “IN
the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though
such acts are erroneous”

· Rehabilitation Plan –​ in failing to show that the respondent was motivated by bad faith, the charge should be DISMISSED.
 · In the Creation of Management Committee – ​without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, we find the error
to be so egregious to amount to BAD FAITH, conclusion of GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW – as charged
· SCP rehabilitation proceedings – ​SCP was not given an opportunity to present its evidence

Ø On the Charges of Reglementary period – DISMISSED

Ø On the Ground of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge

Sec. 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the Court and be patient, dignified, and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar
conduct of legal representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control. - Her unnecessary
bickering with SCP’s legal counsel

Ø Friendster Account
Sec. 6, CANON 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct: in the exercise of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities
Sec. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.

NOTE: Judges are held to a higher standard of conduct and thus must accordingly comport themselves.

Punishment:
GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW
- fined (P21,000.00)
- ADMONISHED to refrain from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE with a
Stern Warning.

SUMMARY :
Judge Austria of Batangas City is charged by complainant for grave abuse of authority and several other violations for showing favor towards
EBCPB, and for conduct unbecoming of a judge for a judge for posting seductive photos on a public platform(Friendster)which the court held
as in violation of Sec. 6, CANON 4. All allegations have been dismissed due to lack of merit except the allegation on making a team before any
evidentiary proceeding has been held which would amount to gross ignorance of the law. She is fined 21K and admonished.
205
Vargas, Michelle Anne C.

Case No.: ​206 Case Title: ​Valdez v. Torres Canon: ​VI – Competence and Diligence

Facts:

Brief Background: ​Civil Case No. 20191 was an action for damages and attorney's fees instituted on October 25, 2005 by complainant
against Prudential Guarantee & Assurance, Inc. (PGAI) and Charlie Tan (Tan), which was raffled to the Mandaluyong MeTC-Branch 60,
presided over by respondent. ​Complainant had already filed eight motions to resolve the said civil case but there was still no resolution made
by the respondent Judge. Frustrated by the long wait for the resolution, complainant filed the administrative complaint on June 4, 2010 against
respondent, alleging unreasonable delay by the latter in the disposition of said case to the damage and prejudice of the former. The Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) informed respondent of the administrative complaint against her and required her to submit her comment
thereon within 10 days from receipt of said indorsement but respondent did not comply. On November 23, 2010, the Court promulgated its
Decision in three other consolidated administrative cases against respondent, dismissing her from service.

Complaint against the Judge: ​Administrative complaint filed by complainant Valdez against respondent Judge Gutierrez-Torres of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, for delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 20191.

Canons allegedly violated: ​Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Issue:

Whether respondent Judge Gutierrez-Torres is guilty of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191.

Ruling:

Yes. At the outset, the Court notes that the respondent had been given ample opportunity to address the complaint against her. However, up
until the resolution of the present case, respondent has not complied with the OCA directives. Moreover, the respondent had also failed to
comply, despite due notice, with the Resolution of the Court itself requiring the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
present administrative matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed.

It is true that respondent's failure to submit her comment and manifestation as required by the OCA and this Court, respectively, may be
tantamount to insubordination, gross inefficiency, and neglect of duty. It is the respondent's duty, not only to obey the lawful orders of her
superiors, but also to defend herself against complainant's charges and prove her fitness to remain on the Bench. As a result of her
non-compliance with the directives of the OCA and the resolution of this Court, respondent had completely lost the opportunity to defend
herself against complainant's charges. As for the merits of the instant administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence on record
satisfactorily establish respondent's guilt for the undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191.

Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to promptly act upon cases and matters pending before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, directs judges to "dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and resolution of cases and matters pending
before their courts, to wit:

6. PROMPTNESS
206
 He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.

7. PUNCTUALITY

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of
value and that if the judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction with the
administration of justice.

Punishment: ​Given that respondent had been previously dismissed from the service, the penalty of suspension is already inapplicable herein.
Instead, the Court imposes upon respondent, for her undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20191, a fine in the maximum amount of
P20,000.00, to be deducted from her accrued leave credits.

Summary: ​An administrative case was filed by complainant Valdez against respondent Judge Gutierrez-Torres of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, for delay in the disposition of Civil Case No. 20191. 5 years had already passed by and the respondent
Judge still had no resolution of the case. Frustrated by the long wait for the resolution, complainant filed the administrative complaint on June
4, 2010 against respondent, alleging unreasonable delay by the latter in the disposition of said case to the damage and prejudice of the former.
The Court promulgated its Decision in three other consolidated administrative cases against respondent, dismissing her from service.

Golosino, Abbie
Case # 207
A.M. No. MTJ-06-2014: ​Nilda Verginesa-Suarez vs. Judge Renato J. Dilag, March 4, 2009 –​ Notarial Practice

FACTS:
Brief Background: ​This case stemmed from the Complaint-Affidavit dated November 25, 2005 and Letter dated January 11, 2006 filed
before the OCA by Suarez against Judge Dilag and Pascua allegedly for collecting P30,000.000 from litigants in consideration of
favorable judgments in cases for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Suarez supported her accusation with a sworn
statement of a certain Belen Trapane who allegedly paid the amount of P30,000.00 to Pascua to obtain a favorable judgment in an
action for declaration of nullity of marriage lodged before the court presided by Judge Dilag. She also attached an anonymous letter
addressed to former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which stated that Judge Dilag charged the amount of P30,000.00 for a
favorable judgment in every annulment case. Suarez further pointed out the existence of conflicting decisions rendered by Judge
Dilag on several cases. The OCA observed that the controversies between the parties were replete with substantial factual issues,
and so it recommended a formal administrative inquiry.
Complaint Against the Judge​: As a result of inquiry, they found that Judge Dilag is liable for: (1) "gross misconduct constituting
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct" for signing conflicting decisions in the Pancho, Tomboc, and Del Rosario cases; (2) "gross
ignorance of the law and procedure" in handling Joyce Moreno v. Alvin Moreno and Eliodoro Perez v. Adelita Perez; and (3) "gross
negligence and inefficiency" for failing to administer proper supervision over his staff when a fake registry return receipt was effected
in Cayabyab v. Cayabyab and entries of judgment were effected in Joyce Moreno v. Alvin Moreno, Angelito and Yolanda Roldan, and
Dinoso v. Corpuz.
Judge’s Defense:​ Respondent judge argued that the insinuations of the OCA that malice and fraud attended the dispositions of these
cases have not been sufficiently proven. The argument fails. In the case of Ora vs. Judge Almajar [A.M. No. MTJ-05-1599, October
14, 2005], the Supreme Court, while finding that there was no allegation that respondent judge therein was motivated by bad faith,
malice or corruption, nevertheless, held him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law. The pertinent portions of the
decision read: Respondent judge is charged with gross ignorance of the law. However, to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the
law, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith. The acts complained of must not only be contrary
to existing law and jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, and corruption. For to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders would be intolerable.
OCA Decision:​ TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the following observations noted by the Audit Team; EXPLAIN within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof why the number of cases submitted for decision/resolutions are not accurately reflected in their Monthly
Report of Cases in gross violations of existing circulars; and SUBMIT a REPORT on the action taken on, and the present status of,
the foregoing cases in CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER as listed above, attaching thereto copies of the order/decision/resolution for
reference, as well as the action taken together with the corresponding required explanation as directed.
Canons allegedly violated:​ Canon 6: Competence and Diligence

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent lawyer is guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Code of Judicial Ethics? YES.

RULING:
A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence to uphold and maintain public confidence in the legal system.
Thus, while he is expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than a cursory
knowledge of the rules of procedure. Not every error is indicative of ignorance, for if committed in good faith, no administrative
sanction is imposed. Good faith, however, is only within the parameters of tolerable judgment. It does not apply where the issues are
so simple and the applicable legal procedures evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. In the case at the bench,
the respondent Judge failed to follow basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders him liable to administrative sanction
for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
Furthermore, there was no allegation whatsoever that the respondent judge was motivated by bad faith, malice or corruption when he
issued the premature warrant of arrest. Be that as it may, however, we hold him administratively liable for his unfamiliarity with the
rules on the conduct of preliminary investigations. We have always exhorted judges to be conversant with basic legal norms and
precepts as well as with statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to follow developments in the law and to apply them.
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, whereby he judges his fellowmen, the judge owes it to the public who depend on
him, and to the dignity of the court he sits in, to be proficient in the law. Thus, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to be
faithful to the law and be the embodiment of professional competence.
Punishment: Considering that Judge Dilag had already been administratively sanctioned in Ma. Teresa De Jesus v. Judge Renato J.
Dilag wherein he was fined in the amount of P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, Judge Dilag’s already grave offenses are
further aggravated. Therefore, this Court imposes upon Judge Dilag the extreme administrative penalty of ​dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

SUMMARY:
The high tribunal ordered the dismissal of Renato J. Dilag, presiding judge of the Olongapo City, Zambales Regional Trial Court
branch 73. Concepcion Pascua, a court stenographer assigned in the same sala, was also ordered dismissed for graft and
corruption.The charges against Dilag and Pascua stemmed from the complaint-affidavit of Court Stenographer Nilda
207 Verginesa-Suarez, also assigned in the same court, who accused of them receiving money from litigants in exchange for favorable
 judgments in cases for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage.
TALABOC, VANESSA

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2026

ATTY. ANTONIO G. CAÑEDA vs. JUDGE ERIC F. MENCHAVEZ

Facts:
Brief background: ​The complainant is the counsel of one of the defendants in a in Civil Case pending with the respondent’s RTC
Branch 21. The complainant advanced the idea that the parties talk to each other through mediation on how to go about with the partition of the
property. The respondent thereupon blurted out "never mind mediation, walay hinundan na (it's useless)." When the respondent checked on
the progress of the case, the complainant remarked that it was being delayed. The respondent reacted by angrily banging his gavel. He
banged the gavel so hard that it broke, its head flying into the air and almost hitting complainant. The respondent then slammed the table with
his hand and then went inside his chambers. After a while, he came back with a holstered handgun and smashed it on the table, as he angrily
shouted at complainant, "Unsay gusto nimo? Yawa! Gahig ulo!" (What do you want? Devil! Hardheaded!)
The complainant regarded the respondent's act as improper under Section 6(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, in relation with the Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canons 2.01, 3.01 and 3.03. He also perceived the respondent to be biased in favor of the plaintiffs inasmuch as the
respondent had been convincing him to agree to the plaintiffs’ position.

Complaint against the lawye​r: Complaint against Presiding Judge Eric F. Menchavez (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 21, Cebu City, for violation of Section 6(3), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court in relation with Canons 2.01, 3.01 and 3.03 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

OCA Decision: ​ Respondent be made liable for conduct unbecoming a judge and fined in the amount of ₱5,000.00

Canons allegedly violated:

New Code of Judicial Conduct requires:
"`(Judges) shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer," and their "behavior and conduct x x x must reaffirm the peoples' faith in the integrity of the judiciary,".
Section 6, Canon 6 of the Code provides:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Judge is liable under the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Ruling:​ YES. the respondent overreacted in his handling of the situation before his court. Bringing out a gun for everyone present in
the court to see, even for purposes of maintaining order and decorum in the court, is inexcusable in the absence of overt acts of physical
aggression by a party before the court.
New Code of Judicial Conduct requires:
"`(Judges) shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer," and their "behavior and conduct x x x must reaffirm the peoples' faith in the integrity of the judiciary,".
The respondent violated this rule when, after a show of anger, he brought and openly displayed his gun on his courtroom table while
hurling a confrontational question at the offending counsel.
Section 6, Canon 6 of the Code provides:
Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal
representatives, court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

Punishment: ​Respondent Judge was found LIABLE for vulgar and unbecoming conduct as a judge. Accordingly, a fine of ₱10,000.00 is
imposed upon him with a WARNING.

SUMMARY:​ The respondent Judge lost his cool and uttered vulgar words against the defendant while hearing a partition case. The Judge
even banged the gavel so hard the head flew in the air and almost hit the defendant. He then brought a gun and smashed it in his table while
making a threatening stance. The Judge was found liable for vulgar and unbecoming conduct of a judge and is imposed with the penalty not to
exceed P10, 000.
208
Case # 209
OLGA M. SAMSON vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO
Facts:
Brief background:
This is an administrative complaint for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge Virgilio G.
Caballero. Complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero should not have been appointed to the judiciary
for lack of the constitutional qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence, and for violating the Rules of the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.
Complaint against the lawyer:
According to the complainant, respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending
administrative charges against him. She disclosed that, on behalf of Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc she had filed criminal
and administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the
Revised Penal Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 23, 2003. At that time a public prosecutor, respondent
allegedly committed certain improprieties and exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation he conducted.
Respondent lawyer’s defense:
Respondent admitted that the complainant had lodged criminal and administrative cases against him in the Ombudsman. He,
however, insisted that these were already dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and executory March 24, 2004 decision of the
209 Ombudsman. Thus, there were actually no more pending cases against him during his interviews in the JBC from February to August 2005.
Accordingly, there was no impediment to his nomination to an assumption of the position of judge. However, he insisted that he informed the
JBC of the said cases.
To further support her charge of dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) filed by
respondent on March 21, 2006 in the Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator (OAS-OCA) RTC Personnel Division.
According to her, respondent categorically denied ever having been charged formally with any infraction.
IBP Decision:
On the basis of the pleadings and documents presented by both parties, the OCA found respondent administratively liable for dishonesty and
falsification of an official document for his false statement in his PDS. It recommended respondent’s dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government service. The Court agrees with the
findings of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official document.
Canons allegedly violated:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION…
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled
by any artifice.
CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Judicial Ethics.
Ruling:
Yes. Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects his moral
fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer. In this particular case,
respondent’s dishonest act was against the lawyer’s oath to “do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.” It cannot be denied
that respondent’s dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his moral character in serious doubt and rendered him
unfit to continue in the practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a
continuing requirement to the practice of law.

If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as
far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. The first step towards the successful implementation of the
Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set of rules
of conduct on judges.

The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good example to the
bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for
it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge. Respondent was DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

SUMMARY:
Judge Caballero deliberately concealed the fact that he had pending administrative charges against him. The Court is extraordinarily strict with
judges and the standard of integrity imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for it is their integrity that
gives them the right to judge. Respondent was DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Oblianda, Johanna
CASE 210 - DELA PAZ V. JUDGE ADIONG (Liabilities of Justices and Judges)

Brief Background:
Pacasum College, Inc. filed with the RTC, a petition for mandamus with application for a preliminary mandatory injunction, against FAPE.
FAPE, through counsel, filed an omnibus motion set aside orders of March 4 and 5, 2002 and to dismiss the case. FAPE claimed that it was
not served with summons; that the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which was intended to be enforced in Makati is outside the
jurisdiction of the Twelfth Judicial Region of RTC Marawi City that Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the
RTC has jurisdiction to issue writ of injunction which may be enforced in any part of its respective regions; that the writ was granted without
hearing and notice; neither was there a showing of an affidavit that would establish that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant
before the matter can be heard nor was there a showing that a bond had been filed.

Complaint: ​Respondent’s (Judge Adiong) issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was in glaring disregard and defiance of
Section 21 of B.O. Blg. 29 which limits the authority of RTCs to issue writs of mandamus within their respective regions. The issuance of the
writ was in disregard of the notice and hearing requirements under Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

Defense of Judge: Respondent explains in his second indorsement dated July 29, 2002 that he had ordered the dismissal of Special Civil
Action No. 813-02 per his resolution dated June 21, 2002 and that he had recalled and set aside his questioned orders dated March 4 and 5,
2002. He submits that with the dismissal of the said case, the herein complaint has become moot and academic and should no longer be given
due course.

Office of the Court Administrator Decision: The Court Administrator submitted his Report finding respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance
of law and grave abuse of authority and recommending that he be meted with the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six (6)
months without pay with a warning that the commission of a similar act in the future will warrant his dismissal from the service.

Alleged Violation: ​defiance of Section 21 of B.O. Blg. 29 for issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction intended to be enforced in
Makati and is outside respondent’s court jurisdiction (RTC of Marawi City); practically no jurisdiction over the case
Issue: ​Whether or not Judge Adiong is guilty of gross ignorance of law and grave abuse of authority

Held:
· Respondent's court is in Marawi City which falls within the twelfth judicial region. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued
by respondent requiring FAPE, which is holding office in Makati City, and its officials who have their residences in Metro Manila, to
issue a check in the amount of P4,000,000.00, is outside the territorial jurisdiction of respondent's court. Thus, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the respondent is void considering that his authority to issue an injunction is limited only to and
operative only within his respective provinces or districts. Consequently, the Order dated March 5, 2002 directing the sheriff of Makati
and Mandaluyong to serve the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to FAPE, et al. is a jurisdictional faux pas as the respondent
can only enforce his orders within the territorial jurisdiction of his court.

· It has been held that in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, erroneous acts of a judge in his juridical capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, for no magistrate is infallible. The lack of malicious intent however, cannot completely free the
respondent from liability especially so when the law is so elementary, thus not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We
reiterate what we said in a case which also involved the herein respondent, thus:

A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence. ​When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with
the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. ​A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be
proficient in the law and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence​. Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice.

Penalty: suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay with a warning that the commission of a similar act in the future will warrant his
dismissal from the service.

Summary
Judge Adiong issued an order for writ of mandatory injunction which is to be enforced in Makati and outside of his jurisdiction being the judge
of RTC in Marawi City. The court ruled that although erroneous acts of judges (without malicious intent) are generally not subject to disciplinary
action, liability for mistakes in laws that are so elementary should be strongly warned. that He was found guilty of gross ignorance of law and
abuse of authority and was sentenced to suspension for 6 months.