Q Saco 6

Tip: Search for English results only.
You can specify your search language in Preferences
Search Results
Web results
Metafísica del bien y del mal - Ediciones Universidad ... - Eunsa

www.eunsa.es › libro › metafisica-de...
1.
Translate this page
Dec 1, 1987 - Cursó los estudios de Filosofía en la Universidad de Barcelona. Se doctoró
en la Universidad de Navarra y en la Universidad de Letrán de ...
METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA):

9788431309985 ...
www.amazon.ca › METAFISICA-DEL-BIEN-MAL-EUN...
METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA): 9788431309985: Books - Amazon.ca.
Metafísica del bien y del mal (Colección teológica) - Amazon.es

www.amazon.es › Metafísica-del-bie...
1.
Translate this page
Peso del producto : 358 g; Tapa blanda : 236 páginas; ISBN-10 : 8431309989; ISBN-13 :
978-8431309985; Editorial : EUNSA. EDICIONES UNIVERSIDAD DE ...
Vista de Carlos CARDONA, Metafísica del bien y del mal ...

revistas.unav.edu › article › view
1.
Translate this page
Volver a los detalles del artículo Carlos CARDONA, Metafísica del bien y del mal, EUN
Tip: Search for English results only. You can specify your search language in Preferences
Search Results
Web results

1.
Translate this page

9788431309985 ...

1.
Translate this page

1.
Translate this page
Search Results
Web results

1.
Translate this page

9788431309985 ...

1.
Translate this page

1.
Translate this page
Search Results
Web results

1.
Translate this page

9788431309985 ...

1.
Translate this page
1.
Translate this page
Search Results
Web results

1.
Translate this page

9788431309985 ...

1.
Translate this page

1.
Translate this page
Search Results
Web results

1.
Translate this page

9788431309985 ...

1.
Translate this page

1.
Translate this page
is numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make no sense at all.
He recognized, too, that there has surely to be some escape from the
paradox that he took to arise if 'exists' were a first-level predicate.
Hence his Frege-like suggestion that 'Lord Hailsham exists' says
nothing at all about Lord Hailsham himself but merely about the
name 'Lord Hailsham,' namely, that it has been used to designate a

real individual rather than a fictional one: the proposition is about
a name, not a person. 14 On this understanding, the paradox that was
based on the supposition that the propositions were about indi-
viduals would simply not arise.
Geach, however, has countered the suggestion that 'Lord Hail-
sham exists' is merely about the name 'Lord Hailsham' by offering
biblical examples in which this is clearly false. IS One such is Jacob's
bewailing the loss of his sons in 'Joseph is not and Simeon is not.'16
He makes the reasonable comment that 'it would be quite absurd to
say that Jacob in uttering those words was not talking about Joseph
and Simeon but about the use of their names.'l? Similar examples are
the report of God saying to Moses 'I am who am'18 {i.e., 'I am he who
is} and Christ's claim 'Before Abraham was, I am.' 19
Williams, however, interprets Jacob's cry as elliptical for 'Joseph
no longer is and Simeon no longer is.'20 He then treats these propo-
sitions as embedding both 'Joseph is' and 'Simeon is,' and deals with
them in a way to which I shall return shortly. As for the others, he
suggests that the biblical authors were no less mistaken in their un-
derstanding of their own language than they were about the origins
14. C. J. F. Williams, Being, Identity, and Truth, 34.

15. P. T. Geach, 'Form and Existence,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 55 (1954-55), reprinted in his God and the Soul (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1969), 42-64.
16. Genesis 42:36. King James version.
17. P. T. Geach, God and the Soul, 58.
18. Exodus 3:14. King James version.
19. John 8:58. King James version. Recall from earlier in the chapter
that the value of this and the earlier example lies not in their accuracy as
translations, but in the quality of the English in which the translations are
expressed.
20. C. J. F. Williams, What Is Existence? 146.
THE FULLNESS OF BEING
of the universe. He argues that, 'if God's revelation can be made in
words which presuppose historical misconceptions [about the ori-
gin of the universe], it can presumably be made through words
whose correct use has equally been misconceived.'2l Well, hardly.
It really is drawing the longbow exceeding taut to equate the bib-
lical authors' knowledge of their own language with their igno-
rance of competing versions of the Big Bang theory, and to imply
that they were no less likely to be ignorant of the former than they
were of the latter. No one could expect them to know anything

about the Big Bang theory, nor even about philosophical logic. It de-
fies credulity, however, to suggest that they were equally ignorant of
so rudimentary a difference as that between saying something about
the individuals Simeon and Joseph and saying something about their
names. Had they been so afflicted they could hardly have written the
Old Testament.
In leaving this dispute unresolved for the moment, it is worth
noting that even someone sympathetic to the view that stand-alone
uses of 'Lord Hailsham exists' are not about Lord Hailsham might
well hesitate to say the same about the so-called embedded occur-
rences of that proposition. I refer to those that occur in propositions
like 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never
have existed,' to mention but a couple. The former might be under-
stood as 'It is no longer the case that (Lord Hailsham exists)' and the
latter as 'It might never have been the case that (Lord Hailsham ex-
ists)'; and, as thus understood, 'Lord Hailsham exists' would seem
to be a genuine logical component of both propositions. What also
seems quite clear, however, is that the propositions as a whole are
about Lord Hailsham: neither of them is about his name. But surely
their being about Lord Hailsham can stem only from the presence of
'Lord Hailsham exists' within them. Here, then, are some apparently
incontestable examples of 'Lord Hailsham exists' being about a per-
son rather than a name.
Williams agrees: he concedes that 'Lord Hailsham no longer ex-
ists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are 'propositions
which genuinely say something about a real man': they are 'not propo-
'Exists' as Predicable of Concrete Individuals 29
sitions about names nor are the properties they ascribe properties
of classes or concepts.'22 What he denies, however, is that the some-
thing said of Lord Hailsham is 'exists'; for to say otherwise would,
he thinks, be tantamount to embracing the very paradox he has been
striving to avoid. To justify his denial he has therefore to reconcile
the following two claims:
• 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might
never have existed' are admittedly about Lord Hailsham. At first
sight, what they predicate of him would seem to be 'exists.'
• It is impossible, under pain of paradox, that 'Lord Hailsham no
longer exists' and 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed'
predicate 'exists' of Lord Hailsham, since there would be no
Lord Hailsham for it to be predicated of.

Obviously, all will be well if the apparent first-level use of 'exists'
can be eliminated: there will then be no paradox. Williams there-
fore moves to dispense with the first-level existential predicate and
replace it with a non-existential one.23 The strategy in regard to 'Lord
Hailsham no longer exists' is to remind us that 'when we are at-
tempting to discover whether something is the same as something
which possessed some property at an earlier time, we need predica-
bles of reidentification.' As he explains, this means that we need two
predicables, one being true of Lord Hailsham before he died and the
other true of him after his death. Hence his claim that 'Lord Hail-
sham no longer exists' is to be understood simply as the denial that
there is any such pair of predicables. The proposition has therefore
to be understood as 'There is no pair of predicables of reidentifica-
tion such that one of them can be truly predicated of Lord Hailsham
and the other truly predicated of someone at the present moment.'24
Notice that this still contains an existential predicate, albeit not a
first-level one but merely the second-level one 'there is.'

22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.
The virtue of this interpretation, says Williams, is that it says
something without, however, implying either that there is nothing for
it to be about or that there is a fact of which a nonexistent Lord Hail-
sham would have to be a constituent. Hence, although 'Lord Hail-
sham no longer exists' would be nonsense if 'exists' were to be used
in a first-level sense, it would make perfectly good sense if a second-
level sense were employed in the proposed reparsing.
A similar strategy is followed with 'Lord Hailsham might never
have existed.' Williams begins by denying that this can be understood
as 'It might have been the case that it was not always the case that
(Lord Hailsham exists).' He maintains, rather, that the 'not' has to
occur within the brackets, as in 'It might have been the case that it
was always the case that (Lord Hailsham does not exist).' As in the
earlier case, this move, too, relies precariously on denying any dis-
tinction between internal and external negation. By allowing only in-
ternal negation, Williams feels able to charge the proposition with

attempting not only to say something about a person but to imply
that there is no such person to say anything about. It would be an at-
tempt to present a fact about Lord Hailsham without his being a con-
stituent of that fact.
As in the case of 'Lord Hailsham no longer exists,' the problem
with 'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' is to find an interpre-
tation in which 'exists' would not even seem to be predicated of Lord
Hailsham. The suggested candidate is, 'There is a property which
was an essential property of Lord Hailsham, and it might have been
the case that nothing at all ever possessed this property.'25 Obviously,
this does not imply that there is any fact having a nonexistent Lord
Hailsham as one of its constituents. Consequently, propositions like
'Lord Hailsham might never have existed' are said to be acceptable,
but only if they are understood as being about one of Lord Hail-
sham's properties rather than about Lord Hailsham himself. In that
case 'exists' would occur merely as a second-level predicate, which is
innocuous, rather than as a first-level level one, which is not.
25. Ibid., 30. An example of what he means by an essential property is
being a daughter of Rosa and Manoah Bottrill, which is attributable to his
mother. About it he notes that 'there may be other things which are in this
way essential to my mother's existence.'

'Exists' as Predicable of Concrete Individuals
If Williams is right, the two propositions which seemed for all
the world to say something about Lord Hailsham are, mira bile dictu,
saying nothing at all about him, but only about the instantiation of
one or other of his properties. 'Lord Hailsham might never have
existed' is saying that there is an essential property which belonged
to Lord Hailsham and which might have belonged to no one. 'Lord
Hailsham no longer exists' is saying that there is no pair of proper-
ties of reidentification one of which belongs to someone now, the
other of which did belong to Lord Hailsham during his lifetime.
To sum up. Williams makes basically the same point about gen-
eral and singular existential propositions alike. It is, first, that the
negative ones do seem to generate a paradox and, second, that the
appearance of paradox stems from the misconception that 'exists'
functions as a first-level predicate. The challenge for him, therefore,
has been to show that it need never be used as a first-level predicate
at all. In attempting to meet that challenge, he argues that 'exists' is
in fact being used in the following ways:
• In general existential propositions like 'Blue buttercups do not
exist' the use of 'exists' is as a second-level predicate, which en-
tails that the propositions are not about individuals at all, but
only about properties or kinds.
• In free-standing singular existential propositions like 'Lord Hail-
sham exists' there can be no first-level use of 'exists' since 'Lord
Hailsham' does not refer to any individual, but merely to itself-
a name.
• In embedded singular existential propositions 'Lord Hailsham'
does indeed refer to an individual, but 'exists' is not predicated
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effectis numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make
no sense at all.

expressed.
Old Testament.



22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.

no sense at all.
expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.


expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.




a name.
no sense at all.
expressed.

Old Testament.

22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.


expressed.
Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.




a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.

22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.
expressed.
Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.
Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.

a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.
Old Testament.

22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.

24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.


expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.
expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.

a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.



22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.
Old Testament.

22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.



22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.
no sense at all.


expressed.

Old Testament.

22. Ibid., 28.

23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.
expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.



a name.

no sense at all.
expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.


expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.
expressed.

Old Testament.

22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.



22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.
Old Testament.

22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.




a name.
no sense at all.

expressed.

Old Testament.


22. Ibid., 28.
23. Ibid., 28-33.
24· Ibid., 33.


a name.
of him. On the contrary, 'exists' is in effect

Q Saco 6

Cargado por

Información del documento

Título original

Derechos de autor

Formatos disponibles

Compartir este documento

Compartir o incrustar documentos

Opciones para compartir

¿Le pareció útil este documento?

¿Este contenido es inapropiado?

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

Q Saco 6

Cargado por

Copyright:

Formatos disponibles

Tip: Search for English results only.

You can specify your search language in Preferences

Metafísica del bien y del mal - Ediciones Universidad ... - Eunsa

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA):

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA): 9788431309985: Books - Amazon.ca.

Metafísica del bien y del mal (Colección teológica) - Amazon.es

Vista de Carlos CARDONA, Metafísica del bien y del mal ...

Metafísica del bien y del mal - Ediciones Universidad ... - Eunsa

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA):

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA): 9788431309985: Books - Amazon.ca.

Metafísica del bien y del mal (Colección teológica) - Amazon.es

Vista de Carlos CARDONA, Metafísica del bien y del mal ...

Metafísica del bien y del mal - Ediciones Universidad ... - Eunsa

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA):

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA): 9788431309985: Books - Amazon.ca.

Vista de Carlos CARDONA, Metafísica del bien y del mal ...

Metafísica del bien y del mal - Ediciones Universidad ... - Eunsa

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA):

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA): 9788431309985: Books - Amazon.ca.

Metafísica del bien y del mal (Colección teológica) - Amazon.es

Metafísica del bien y del mal - Ediciones Universidad ... - Eunsa

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA):

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA): 9788431309985: Books - Amazon.ca.

Metafísica del bien y del mal (Colección teológica) - Amazon.es

Vista de Carlos CARDONA, Metafísica del bien y del mal ...

Metafísica del bien y del mal - Ediciones Universidad ... - Eunsa

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA):

METAFISICA DEL BIEN Y DEL MAL (EUNSA): 9788431309985: Books - Amazon.ca.

Metafísica del bien y del mal (Colección teológica) - Amazon.es

Vista de Carlos CARDONA, Metafísica del bien y del mal ...

is numerous' and 'Lord Hailsham is not none' make no sense at all.

paradox that he took to arise if 'exists' were a first-level predicate.

Hence his Frege-like suggestion that 'Lord Hailsham exists' says

name 'Lord Hailsham,' namely, that it has been used to designate a

a name, not a person. 14 On this understanding, the paradox that was

based on the supposition that the propositions were about indi-

viduals would simply not arise.

Geach, however, has countered the suggestion that 'Lord Hail-

sham exists' is merely about the name 'Lord Hailsham' by offering

biblical examples in which this is clearly false. IS One such is Jacob's

He makes the reasonable comment that 'it would be quite absurd to

is} and Christ's claim 'Before Abraham was, I am.' 19

Williams, however, interprets Jacob's cry as elliptical for 'Joseph

no longer is and Simeon no longer is.'20 He then treats these propo-

them in a way to which I shall return shortly. As for the others, he

14. C. J. F. Williams, Being, Identity, and Truth, 34.

and Kegan Paul, 1969), 42-64.

16. Genesis 42:36. King James version.

17. P. T. Geach, God and the Soul, 58.

18. Exodus 3:14. King James version.

20. C. J. F. Williams, What Is Existence? 146.

THE FULLNESS OF BEING

of the universe. He argues that, 'if God's revelation can be made in

words which presuppose historical misconceptions [about the ori-

gin of the universe], it can presumably be made through words

whose correct use has equally been misconceived.'2l Well, hardly.

It really is drawing the longbow exceeding taut to equate the bib-

lical authors' knowledge of their own language with their igno-

rance of competing versions of the Big Bang theory, and to imply

were of the latter. No one could expect them to know anything

fies credulity, however, to suggest that they were equally ignorant of

so rudimentary a difference as that between saying something about

In leaving this dispute unresolved for the moment, it is worth