FEMINIST 3 STEMI2 / FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGILES Feminism made its first incursions into philosophy in a movement from the margins to the center. Applied fields, most notably applied ethics, were the first areas in which feminist work was published. Not coincidentally, these areas were and are viewed by most professional philosophers as “on the periphery” of central philosophical work, where the virtue of centrality isaccorded to work with a greater degree of abstraction from concrete material reality and with pretensions to universality. Feminist philosophers began work in the applied areas because feminism is, first and last, a political movement concerned with practical issues, and feminist philosophers understood their in- tellectual work to be a contribution to the public debate on crucial practical issues. At first, the more abstract areas of philosophy seemed distant from these concrete concerns. But from the applied areas we moved into more central ones as we began to see the problems pro- duced by androcentrism in aesthetics, ethics, philosophy of science, and, finally and fairly recently, in the “core”’ areas of epistemology and metaphysics.! Feminist work in epistemology, as in all other arcas, began as a critique of the tradition (including a critique of the dominant narra- tives about just what that tradition is) Although this critique conlin- ues, constructive and reconstructive work in the theory of knowledpe When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology / 3 is emerging today. The essays in this yolume reveal the contours of a new research program in epistemology, a research program moving beyond critique to reframe the problematic of knowledge. Our title, Feminist Epistemologies, should alert readers that this new research program is internally heterogeneous and irreducible to any uniform set of theses. The feminisms that make up this new problematic are diverse, often having in common only their commitment to unearth the politics of epistemology. But this recognition of the political com- mitments and effects implicit in every philosophical position has sparked a determination to reconstruct epistemology on newer, more self-conscious ground. This reconstruction also promises to reconfig- ure the borders between epistemology, political philosophy, ethics, and other areas of philosophy as we come to see the interrelationships and inseparability of heretofore disparate issues. Moreover, the dis- (inetions between margin and center or periphery and core within the domain of philosophy itself give way. Once we recognize that values, politics, and knowledge are intrinsically connected, the hier- archies and divisions within philosophy will be replaced by more hol- istic and coherentist models. This volume demonstrates that the work of feminist philosophers is in the process of producing a new config- uration of the scope, contours, and problematics of philosophy in izs entirety. Readers may be tempted to assume that because this anthology hears the word “feminist” in its title, the issues treated in it are limited or reduced to gender issues. Not so. Growing awareness of the many ways in which political relationships (that is, disparate power rela- lions) are implicated in theories of knowledge has led to the conclu- sion that gender hierarchies are not the only ones that influence the production of knowledge. Cognitive authority is usually associated with a cluster of markings that involve not only gender but also race, class, sexuality, culture, and age. Moreover, developments in feminist theory have demonstrated that gender as a category of analysis cannot stracted from a particular context while other factors are held ible; gender can never be observed as a “pure” or solitary influence. Geuder identity cannot be adequately understood—or even per- «vived—except as a component of complex interrelationships with other systems of identification and hierarchy. Thus, because gender as un abstract universal is not a useful analytical category and because sescarch has revealed a plethora of oppressions at work in productions ol knowledge, feminist epistemology is emerging as a research pro- yn wiih multiple dimensions. And feminist epistemology should not Ie be taken as invelving a commitment to gender as the primary axis of oppression, in-any sense of “primary,” or positing that gender is a40 / PEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIS theoretical variable separable from other axes of oppression and sus- ceptible to a unique analysis. Why, then, retain the adjective “leminisi"? We decided to retain Feminist Epistemologies as the title of this collection because it serves to identify work about which there is considerable curiosity; thus, its title distinguishes this book as an appropriate resource for anyone who seeks acquaintance with that body of work. As well, the term “ferninist” correctly identifies the history of this work. The articles collected here under the rubric “feminist epistemologies” represent ihe latest development of a goad fifteen years of work that did in fact Begin (among those who identified with mainstream academic fem- inism) as work on gender issues in the theory of knowledg: The term allows us to identily the historical trajectory of current work and to see where we are coming from We find a strong consensus among feminists today that both the term and the project of feminism itself must be more inclusive than a focus on gender alone permits. If feminism is to liberate women, it must address virtually all forms of domination because women fill the ranks of every category of oppressed people. Indeed, the ontological status of woman and even of women has shifted for academic feminists in light of influential arguments showing that women, per e, do not exist. There exist upper-caste Indian Mitle girls; older, heterosexual Tatinas; and white, working-class lesbians. Each lives at a different node in the web of oppressions. Thus, to refer to a liberatory project as “feminist” cannot mean that it is only for or about “women,” but that it is informed by or consistent with feminism. It seeks, in current feminist parlance, \o unmake the web of oppressions and reweave the web of life. If the concept “woman” has lost its analytical credibility, the con- cept of a universal human nature is even less credible, Yet it is the latter concept that allows mainstream epistemologists to ignore the specificity of the knowing subject. Lorraine Code, in "Taking Subjec- tivity into Account,” argues that this inattention to the subjective ele- ments involved in knowing and the illusion that knowing is universal and perspectiveless are easy to maintain when the paradigm of knowl- edge is taken to be the observation of everyday simple objects, such as sticks, apples, and patches of colors. In this type of knowing— “perception at a distance’’—the particular person who fills the role of the knowing subject will make no difference. Any person would be likely to see the object in the same way, and epi lemologisis_haye ncluded-therefore that there is_no point in “laking subjectivity into Account," The key epistemic attributes of knowers are then argued to be “universal.” When Feminisms Intersect Episiemology / 5 Code suggests that there is no justifiable reason to take ‘perception al a distance” as the paradigm case of knowing and the model for analyzing epistemic practices. Knowing others, which is arguably a more_crucial practice in human knowledge acquisition given that most of our knowledge is interactive and dependent on others, would yield a very different “geography of the epistemic terrain” iT taken as ihe paradigm case. However, Code does not want simply to replace one hegemonic paradigm of knowing with another but to show why ihe strategics for identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for 5 knows that p” in the mainstream literature can m be successful until they pay a8 much attention toSas they pay top. ~————— BY) eiNerEMeremonens When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology /” 9 individuals “to organize our sensory experiences into coherent and recoverable accounts.” Nelson uses the dispute between man-the-hunter theories of human development and feminist critiques of those theories as well as \wanan-the-gatherer theories to illustrate her contentions that the Iwoper agents of knowledge are communities and that evidence is canimunal. Nelson's discussion of the dispute also reveals that al- though she rejects abjectivism, she does not embrace the view that ‘anything goes.” The epistemological community of feminist scholars sviliquing man-the-hunter theery and producing the woman-the-gath- «rer alternative shares enough standards with proponents of man-the- Iuinicr to allow sensible debate over what we know about human_| ihevelopment. ~ The discovery of a bit of scientific knowledge, for example, is only possible within a system of theories and practices including meta- physical commitments, methods, and standards of evidence that emerged concomitantly with the process of coming to know that bit of knowledge—when that system is adopted by a community. That is, Nelson argues that this adoption is itself only possible “within a con- text of social arrangements and practices, puzzles, pressures, conflicts, and undertakings.” We find, then, that what counts as evidence depends in turn on the same communal system; on the metaphysical commitments and meth- ods incorporated in current scientific practices; on theories and prac- tices in other, related fields; and ultimately on “common-sense” knowledge and experience of macroscopic objects and events—all adopted by a community with certain social arrangements, practices, and so on. We should note that Nelson also holds experience to be fundamentally social, not something fundamentally ascribed to indi- viduals, Thus, the sensory experiences that provide partial evidence for scientific claims depend on public theories and practices that allow12 “| / FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES lo many philosophe: says, then, ask qu lions and pose problems that are new they also reframe old questions and shill the When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology / 13 cmphases and purposes of epistemology. Who is the subject of knowl vage? How does the social position of the subject affect the production of knowledge? What is the impact upon knowledge and reason of the subject’s sexed body? Is all knowledge expressible in propositional torm? How can objectivity be maximized if we recognize that per- tive cannot be eliminated? Are the perspectives of the oppressed cpistemically privileged? How do social categories such as gender iMlect scientists’ theoretical decisions? What is the role of the social sciences in the naturalization of epistemology? What is the connection heiween knowledge and politics? Readers of this volume are likely to have varied responses to these uestions; some questions will seem old hat to feminists but bizarre \) Iraditiona! philosophers. And the answers offered by authors in this value will also elicit varied responses. Some answers will appear \uniliar to philosophers but alien to readers of feminist theory; other will seem obvious to feminists but disconcerting to traditional »jistcmologists. The variation is inevitable given the contradictory iclitionship of feminism to philosophy. lor mainstream philosophers, feminist work in philosophy is scan- tulous primarily because it is unashamedly a political intervention. \he philosophical myth, like the myth of natural science, is that pol: Wis may motivate a philosopher to undertake philosophical work and Nint work may be put to better or worse political and social uses, but Nita philosopher’s work is good te the extent that its substantive, iwc lnical content is free of political influence. Holding to this myth, tiuliiional philosophers conclude that one need not even read fem- ‘int philosophy to know, a priori, that it is bad philosophy. 'lwe work presented here supports the hypothesis that politics in- (elect traditional epistemology. Yet it would be a serious misreading le interpret these essays as arguing for or resulting in a reduction of H(bstemology to politics. Instead, they raise a question about the ad- ‘4/140 y of any account of knowledge that ignores the politics involved spe his Ii Knowledge: These essays show, even when they do not say, that to Ie snderuale, an epistemology must attend to the complex ways in which social values influence knowledge, including the discernible “ial aud political implications of its own analysis. This new criterion iM inlequacy, of course, makes it much harder to do good episte- tehogey Atel i| ts just as difficult for feminist epistemologies as it is for old- lachivucd epistemologies. For feminists, the purpose of epistemology fetal only to satisly intellectual curiosity, but also to contribute to 4ieennaneipatory goal the expansion of demecracy in the production nL bdeavledge. This goal requires thal onr epistentologies niake it pos:14 / FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES sible to see how knowledge is authorized and who is empowered by it. 1t follows that ferninist epistemologies should be self-reflexive, able to reveal their own social grounds, a revelation made all the more urgent because academic feminists are in a contradictory social po- sition, seeking fundamental changes in the very institutions that em- power us to speak and work. The worry for academic feminists is that we will commit the metonymic fallacy once again by assuming that what is liberatory for us is liberatory for all women. Ultimately, as Addleson points out in this volume, feminist epistemologies must be tested by their effects on the practical political struggles occurring in a wider frame of reference than the academy. Note 1. See the bibliography of feminist philosophy compiled by Susan Bernick in the “Newsletter on Ferninism and Philosophy,” Issue no. 90:1, Fall 1990, 116-121.