SECOND DIVISION

February 3, 2016

G.R. No. 190846

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.
JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari  challenging the August 28, 2009 decision  and
1 2

November 17, 2009 resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645.
3

The Facts

The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on January 14,

1979.  During their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga
4

City, which lot was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21229. 5

On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property,
as evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by
virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor.  The Deed of Sale stated
6

that the purchase price for the lot was P200,000.00.  After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled
7

and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the name of Tomas. 8

On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of

Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga
City.  The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the
9

complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and
knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose’s signature making it appear
that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to Tomas. 10

In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value.  Before he paid
11

the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told
him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in order.  Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA
12

authorizing Milagros to sell the property was annotated at the back of the title. 13
Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and moral damages,
attorney’s fees, and expenses for litigation, in the event that judgment be rendered in favor of Jose. 14

The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to Jose’s complaint and
Tomas’ cross-claim. On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas’ complaint against the Register of
15

Deeds since it was only a nominal party. 16

After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. 17

Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio testified that he
learned of the sale of the subject property from Milagros’ son.  When Bonifacio confronted Milagros
18

that Jose would get angry because of the sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property because
she needed the money. Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the sale. 19

Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio
verified with the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title covering the disputed property had
been transferred to Tomas. 20

Bonifacio further testified that Jose’s signature in the SPA was forged.  Bonifacio presented
21

documents containing the signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit,
duplicate original of SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate,
voter’s affidavit, specimen signatures, and a handwritten letter. 22

On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by Rosana Robles
(Rosana), his goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to the
house of Milagros to confirm if Jose knew about the sale transaction. Through a phone call by
Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose who confirmed that he was aware of the sale and
had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale. Rosana informed Tomas of Jose’s
confirmation.23

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of
P350,000.00 and another P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of
Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only
P200,000.00; he inquired why the written consideration was lower than the actual consideration
paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that
she needed money badly and had to sell the house because Jose had stopped sending her money. 24

The RTC Ruling

In its decision dated December 27, 2006,  the RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of
25

the subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose
supposedly appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.

Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00
as temperate damages. 26

The CA Ruling

Tomas appealed the RTC’s ruling to the CA.

In a decision dated August 28, 2009,  the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the
27

SPA were void. However, the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of
temperate damages; and second, by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase
price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas’
allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing
evidence that established this claim. 28

Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground that the amount of
P200,000.00 as reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient and not
supported by the evidence formally offered before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that
the actual amount he paid as consideration for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his
testimony before the RTC. 29

The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit" in a resolution dated November 17,
2009.30

The Petition

Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which ordered the
reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price he paid in the amount of
P700,000.00. 31

Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration stated,
cannot be used as evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not
specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale;  third, his testimony establishing the
32

actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted;  and, fourth, Jose must return the
33

full amount actually paid under the principle of solutio indebiti.

34

Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the purchase price
indicated in the deed of dale for failing to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms of
an agreement reduced into writing are deemed to include all the terms agreed upon and no other
evidence can be admitted other than the terms of the agreement itself. 35

The Issues

The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of
consideration paid; and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual
purchase price of the sale.

OUR RULING

We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.

Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact not proper in a petition
for review on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the correctness of the appellate
court's factual findings are not the functions of this Court, as we are not a trier of facts.
36

This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on "the truth or falsehood of
alleged facts," except in the following cases:
37
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 38

The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.

Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject property is a factual
question that the CA had already resolved in the negative.  The CA found Tomas’ claim of paying
39

P700,000.00 for the subject property to be unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing
evidence to establish his claim.

We uphold the CA’s finding.

In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence.  Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence,
40

not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. 41

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or
"greater weight of the credible evidence."  Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last
42

analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
43

We agree with the CA that Tomas’ bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00
cannot be considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this
claim. Tomas’ bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given
weight and credence.

It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it;  the burden
44

rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.  A mere
45

allegation is not evidence, and the person who alleges has the burden of proving his or her
46

allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.

The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as evidence.

The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the reimbursement of
P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale, based on the principle of unjust
enrichment.

The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the deed of sale as
basis for the reimbursable amount because a null and void document cannot be used as evidence.

We find no merit in the petitioner’s argument.

A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning.  This rule applies to
47

contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal
property without the other spouse’s written consent.  A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is
48

absolutely wanting in civil effects.  It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.  When,
49 50

however, any of the terms of a void contract have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. 51

It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what has been given
is in order." This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that "every
52

person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same." Hence, the restitution of what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent
contract.

While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it
does not preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the
course of executing the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the execution of the contract.

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact,

sanctioned by the Rules of Court.  The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain
53

the truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in
the document.

The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of
the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as
evidence is not to enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of
a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in
the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void
contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.

Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these
rules.  There is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void
54

document. The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its
admissibility. 55

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as

evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the
document itself.

It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be

of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject
them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent; for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out
later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or
ignoring them. 56

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law
prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s consent.  It does not, however,
1âwphi1

preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed
of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence which
appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the court to determine
the presence of the essential elements of the sale, including the consideration paid.

Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of
the sale and, hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.

The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as evidence.  Tomas, in
57

fact, formally offered it for the purpose of proving its execution and the regularity of the sale. 58

The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the lower courts to consider
the terms written therein to determine whether all the essential elements  for a valid contract of sale
59

are present, including the consideration of the sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void
does not prevent the court from relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the
actual amount paid by the petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.

Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the sale is not
necessary since it is necessarily included in determining the regular execution of the sale.

The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima facie evidence of the amount
paid by the petitioner.

The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated therein.
60

Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting
the party’s claim or defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.
61

In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie evidence of
the amount paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce
satisfactory evidence to rebut or contradict the consideration stated as the actual consideration and
amount paid to Milagros and Jose.

The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the consent of
both spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the presence of
the consideration of the sale, except with respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale
has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration
paid.

As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of
P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or
testimonial evidence to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas’ sole
testimony. Tomas’ sole testimony of payment is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove
that Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property.

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount
the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned under the principle of unjust
enrichment.

Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a
person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity,
and good conscience."  The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the
62

State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil Code.  63

The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received under the
void contract which presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P,200,000.00 since this the
consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose
expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled to recover the money paid by him in the
amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August 28,
2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 530            April 16, 1902

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, 

vs.
BERNABE SANTOS, defendant-appellant.

Vicente G. Azaola, for appellant.

Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for appellee.

LADD, J.:

The defendant was convicted of murder in the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced to
death. The case is before this court on appeal and in consultation.

On the night of the 15th of August, 1900, the defendant and three other men, all armed with
revolvers and daggers, broke into the house of Lorenzo Laopoco, in Tondo, tied Laopoco and his
son-in-law, Norberto Anacleto, and after committing various acts of violence upon Anacleto's wife
and the other persons in the house, and taking some jewelry and money, left the house, carrying
with them Laopoco. These facts were satisfactorily established by the evidence of Anacleto and his
wife. There was no direct evidence as to what occurred after the robbers left the house, but
immediately thereafter Anacleto and his wife heard Laopoco cry out for help, saying that the robbers
were going to kill him, and upon opening the window and looking out they saw him lying on the
ground and around him or in the act of leaving the spot the defendant and his companions, including
several who had not entered the house. Laopoco was taken into the house, and was found to be
covered with wounds inflicted with daggers, in consequence of which he died in about three weeks.

Upon these facts the defendant is clearly guilty either of homicide or, if the constitutive circumstance
of alevosia is present, of murder. The prosecuting attorney is of the opinion that this circumstance
has not been shown, and that the crime is therefore to be regarded as simple homicide, and asks
that the judgment of the court below be modified in accordance with that view.

The ground upon which the prosecuting attorney bases this opinion is that "it has been impossible to
show clearly the means, methods, and manner which the criminals availed themselves of for the
purpose of perpetrating the crime. No one was present when the deceased was attacked by them,
nor does it even appear from the record whether he was or was not bound when the wounds from
which he died were inflicted upon him. These are data which must of necessity be proved in order to
legally determine whether the circumstance of alevosia is present."

The facts showing alevosia as a generic or qualificative circumstance may, under the Spanish
system of evidence in criminal cases, be established by the same kind and degree of proof as the
main facts upon which the guilt of the accused is predicated. (Judgment of the supreme court of
Spain of January 22, 1878, fifth conclusion of law; the provisional law for the application of the
provisions of the Penal Code in the Philippine Islands, par. 52.) In neither case are "mere
presumptions" or "arbitrary deductions from hypothetical or presumable facts" admissible. (Judgment
of the supreme court of Spain of October 7, 1871.) In both cases, if the inference of guilt rests solely
upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must be "grave and conclusive," and "the conviction
which the combination of such evidence produces must be such as to leave no room for reasonable
doubt as to the criminality of the accused in the ordinary and natural order of things." (Provisional
law above cited.) If there were anything in these rules inconsistent with the new law of criminal
procedure fixing the degree of certainty with which the guilt of the accused — that it to say, every
element constituting his guilt — is to be proved, and prescribing the nature of the evidence which
must be employed for this purpose, the principles of the latter law would prevail. It is clear that under
that law no discrimination is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in any case, and that
the only requirement is that the guilt of the accused be proved by relevant evidence, the best of
which the case is susceptible, and beyond a reasonable doubt. (General Orders, No. 58, secs. 57
and 59.)

It is true that in the present case there was no ocular evidence that the deceased was bound at the
moment when the fatal wounds were inflicted. And it is also true that the two witnesses for the
prosecution who saw him while he was lying in the ground after the stabbing have omitted to state
whether he was at that time bound or not. But it has been proved that he was bound in the house,
and while it is of course barely possible that his captors may have released him before putting him to
death, the only reasonable conclusion, "according to the ordinary and natural order of things," is that
he remained bound until their purpose was accomplished. It is not easy — indeed, it is almost
impossible — to conceive any reason why he should have been liberated in the short interval that
elapsed between the time he was taken from the house and the time he was killed. We are of the
opinion, therefore, that the evidence is entirely sufficient to show that the crime was committed
with alevosia as defined in article 10, No. 2, of the Penal Code.

The aggravating circumstance of article 10, No. 15, is clearly present, the crime having been
committed in a band. We are of opinion that no generic extenuating circumstances are present, and
that, in view of the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the accused, the circumstance of
article 11 can not properly be considered in his favor.
The result is that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed with costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, and Willard, JJ., concur.

Mapa, J., dissents.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

March 5, 2018

G.R. No. 202206

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee 

vs.
TENG MONER y ADAM, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal of the Decision  dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
1

No. 04399 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Teng Manery Adam, which affirmed the Joint
Decision  dated August 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 95 in
2

Criminal Case Nos. Q-05-133982 and Q-05-133983. Anent Criminal Case No. Q-05-133982, the trial
court found appellant Teng Moner y Adam (Moner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 5, Article II (sale of dangerous drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In the same judgment, Moner and his co-accused
were acquitted of the charge of violating Section 11, Article II (possession of dangerous drugs) of the
same statute which was the subject of Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983.

The crime of which Moner was convicted is described in the Information dated April 25, 2005, as
follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of April, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being
authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did then and
there, willfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said
transaction, three point ninety-one (3.91) grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.3
Subsequently, on May 16, 2005, Moner pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the aforementioned charge of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs upon his arraignment. 4

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals presented the factual milieu of this case in this manner:

To establish the guilt of accused-appellant, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses namely:
P02 Joachim Panopio, P03 Junnifer Tuldanes and PO3 Edwin Lirio.

The prosecution's evidence tends to establish the following facts:

On April 23, 2005, the police operatives of Las Piñas Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operation Task Force (SAIDSOTF) had arrested a certain Joel Taudil for possession of illegal drugs.
Upon investigation, they gathered from Taudil that the source of the illegal drugs was Teng Moner
(herein accused-appellant) who hails from Tandang Sora, Quezon City.

As per this information, Police Chief Inspector Jonathan Cabal formed a team that would conduct a
buy-bust operation for the apprehension of accused-appellant. The team was composed of himself,
SP04 Arnold Alabastro, SPO1 Warlie Hermo, PO3 Junnifer Tuldanes, PO3 Edwin Lirio, PO2 Rodel
Ordinaryo, PO1 Erwin Sabbun and PO2 Joachim Panopio. The marked and boodle money were
given to PO2 Panopio who acted as the poseur-buyer.

Before proceeding with the buy-bust operation, the team prepared the pre-operation report
addressed to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the authority to operate outside their
jurisdiction and the coordination paper. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Central Police District
Office (CPDO), Camp Karingal, Quezon City for proper coordination. Thereafter, the team together
with Taudil and a CPD-DIID personnel proceeded [to] No. 26 Varsity Lane, Barangay Culiat,
Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Upon reaching the place they made a surveillance and assumed their
respective positions.

At the target area, P02 Panopio and Taudil went to accusedappellant's house. While outside the
gate, Taudil summoned accusedappellant and the latter came out after a few minutes. The two men
talked with each other in the Muslim dialect. Taudil introduced PO2 Panopio as his friend to
accused-appellant and told him that PO2 Panopio was interested to buy shabu. PO2 Panopio asked
for the price of five (5) grams of shabu. Accused-appellant replied that the same would cost him
₱8,000.00 and asked him if he has the money. When PO2 Panopio confirmed that he has the
money with him, accused-appellant asked them to wait and he went inside the house. When he
returned after a few minutes, he handed a plastic sachet containing a substance suspected
as shabu to PO2 Panopio who in turn gave him the marked and boodle money. Accused-appellant
was about to count the money when PO2 Panopio gave the pre-arranged signal to his team and
introduced himself as [a] police officer.

Accused-appellant resisted arrest and ran inside the house but PO2 Panopio was able to catch up
with him. The other members of the team proceeded inside the house and they saw the other
accused gather[ed] around a table re-packing shabu. PO3 Lirio confiscated the items from them and
placed the same inside a plastic bag.

After accused-appellant and his co-accused were arrested, the team proceeded to the Las Piñas
City Police Station. The items confiscated from them were turned over by PO2 Panopio to PO3
Dalagdagan who marked them in the presence of the police operatives, accused-appellant and his
co-accused. PO3 Dalagdagan prepared the corresponding inventory of the confiscated items. The
specimens were then brought to the police crime laboratory for testing. The specimens yielded
positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Consequently, a case for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 was filed against accused-
appellant and another for Violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 against him and his co-
accused.

In refutation of the prosecution's version, the defense presented four (4) witnesses, to wit: Judie
Durado, Fatima Macabangen, accused-appellant and Richard Pascual.

It is the contention of the defense that on April 23, 2005, accused-appellant and his co-accused in
Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983 were at the house located along No. 26 Varsity Lane, Philam,
Tan.dang Sora, Quezon City to prepare for the wedding of Fatima Macabangen and Abubakar
Usman to be held the following day. While they were inside the house, several armed persons
wearing civilian clothes entered and announced that they were police officers. They searched the
whole house and gathered all of them in the living room.

The police officer who was positioned behind accused-appellant and Abubakar dropped a plastic
sachet. The former asked accused-appellant and Abubakar who owns the plastic sachet. When
accused-appellant .denied its ownership, the police officer slapped him and accused him of being a
liar. Thereafter, they were all frisked and handcuffed and were brought outside the house. Their
personal effects and belongings were confiscated by the police officers. Then they boarded a
jeepney and were brought to [the] Las Piñas Police Station.

Upon their arrival, they were investigated. A police officer asked them to call up anybody who can
help them because they only needed money for their release. Judie Dorado called up [his] mother.
They saw the other items allegedly confiscated from them only at the police station. At around 10:00
o'clock in the evening, they were brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City. From there, they went to
Makati for drug testing and were returned to Las Piñas Police Station.

Subsequently, cases for Violation of R.A. No. 9165 were filed against them. 5

After receiving the evidence for both sides, the trial court convicted Moner on the charge of
selling shabu while, at the same time, acquitting him and his co-accused of the charge of possession
of illegal drugs. The dispositive portion of the August 4, 2009 Joint Decision of the trial court reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders its Joint Decision as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133982:

The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt for violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 or illegal selling of three point ninety-one (3.91) grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a FINE of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(Php500,000.00).

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983:

The Court finds accused TENG MONER Y ADAM, JUDIE DURADO Y MACABANGEN, FATIMA
MACABANGEN Y NUÑEZ, ABUBAKAR USMAN Y MASTORA, GUIAMIL ABU Y JUANITEZ,
NORODIN USMAN Y MASTORA, RICHARD PASCUAL Y TANGALIN and AMINA USMAN-MONER
"NOT GUILTY" for violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. 9165 considering that the prosecution failed
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The pieces of evidence subject matter of Crim. Case No. Q-05- 133983 are hereby ordered to be
safely delivered to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for proper disposition. 6

As can be expected, Moner elevated his case to the Court of Appeals which, unfortunately for him,
ruled to affirm the findings of the trial court and dispositively held:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated August 4, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 95,
Quezon City in Criminal Case No. Q-05- 133982 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt is hereby AFFIRMED. 7

Hence, Moner interposes this appeal wherein he reiterates the same errors on the part of the trial
court contained in his Brief filed with the Court of Appeals, to wit:

A. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED ITS DECISION DATED
AUGUST 4, 2009 FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT MONER GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATING SECTION 5, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165, WHEN
THE TESTIMONIES OF THE THREE (3) PROSECUTION WITNESSES (P02 JOACHIM P
ANOPIO, P03 JUNNIFER TULDANES, AND P03 EDWIN LIRIO) ARE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE AND UNBELIEVABLE TO PROVE THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST.

B. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEN IT RELIED SOLELY
ON THE PERJURED TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES POLICE
OFFICERS WHICH ARE FULL OF INCONSISTENCIES.

C. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION

WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE DEFENSE
WITNESSES WHO CLEARLY TESTIFIED THAT THERE WAS REALLY NO BUY-BUST
AND THAT APPELLANT MONER WAS NOT SELLING ANY PROHIBITED DRUGS.

D. THE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED DECISION

DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES FAILED TO COMPLY
WITH THE MANDATORY PROVISION OF SEC. 19 OF R.A. NO. 9165, ON THE MATTER
OF PHYSICAL INVENTORY, AND PICTURE TAKING OF THE EVIDENCE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED FROM THE ACCUSED, AS WELL AS THE PROVISION OF SECTION 86
THEREOF. 8

In sum, Moner maintains that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof to sustain his
conviction for the charge of sale of dangerous drugs. He highlights the fact that the prosecution
failed to present in court the informant who pointed to him as a supplier of shabu. He also stresses
that the buy-bust operation was conducted without proper coordination with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Likewise, he derides the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as
inconsistent, incredible and unworthy of belief. Most importantly, he underscores the failure of the
arresting officers to comply with the statutorily mandated procedure for the handling and custody of
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from him.

The appeal is without merit.

For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential
elements must be proven: (1) that the transaction or ·sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or
the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified.
9
A perusal of the records of this case would reveal that the aforementioned elements were
established by the prosecution. The illegal drugs and the marked money were presented and
identified in court. More importantly, Police Officer (PO) 2 Joachim Panopio (PO2 Panopio ), who
acted as poseur-buyer, positively identified Moner as the seller of the shabu to him for a
consideration of ₱8,000.00.

With regard to Moner's contention that the prosecution's failure to present the informant in court
diminishes the case against him, we reiterate our pronouncement on this matter in the recent case
of People v. Lafaran  :
10

It has oft been held that the presentation of an informant as witness is not regarded as indispensable
to the success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented
in court for security reasons, in view of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation of the
culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant's identity is protected
in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the testimony of the informant
is considered absolutely essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit should the need to protect
his security be disregarded. In the present case, as the buy-bust operation was duly witnessed by
SPO2 Aro and PO3 Pera, their testimonies can take the place of that of the poseur-buyer.

Thus, we concur with the appellate court's finding that there is no need to present the informant
because PO2 Panopio, who acted as the poseur-buyer, had testified in court. Furthermore, the other
members of the buy-bust team, namely PO3 Junnifer Tuldanes (PO3 Tuldanes) and PO3 Edwin
Lirio (PO3 Lirio ), gave clear and credible testimonies with regard to the criminal transaction that was
consummated by appellant and PO2 Panopio.

In addition, we rule that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that were
pointed out by Moner consist merely of minor variances that do not deviate from the main narrative
which is the fact that Moner sold illegal drugs to a poseur-buyer. It has been held, time and again,
that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the declarations of witnesses do not destroy the
witnesses' credibility but even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.  It bears stressing, too, that the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
11

witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great
respect, if not conclusive effect.
12

Lastly, we can give no credence to Moner's contention that the prosecution failed to prove an
unbroken chain of custody in consonance with the requirements of law.

To ensure that the drug specimen presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same
material seized from him or that, at the very least, a dangerous drug was actually taken from his
possession, we have adopted the chain of custody rule. The Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) has
expressly defined chain of custody involving dangerous drugs and other substances in the following
terms in Section 1 (b) of DDB Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002:

b. "Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,
from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]

In relation to this, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently provides the following:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof[.]

Furthermore, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No.
9165 relevantly states:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided,
further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

We have consistently ruled that noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act
No. 9165 will not necessarily render the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation
inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs have been preserved, i.e., the
illegal drugs being offered in court as evidence is, without a specter of doubt, the very same item
recovered in the buy-bust operation. 13

With regard to the foregoing, Moner asserts that he should be acquitted of the criminal charges
levelled against him specifically because of the following serious lapses in procedure committed by
the apprehending officers: (a) the physical inventory was not conducted at the place where the
seizure was made; (b) the seized item was not photographed at the place of seizure; and (c) there
was no physical inventory and photograph of the seized item in the presence of the accused, or his
representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
The aforementioned concerns can be squarely addressed by a careful and assiduous review of the
records of this case accompanied by a liberal application and understanding of relevant
jurisprudence in support thereof. Both object and testimonial evidence demonstrate that the
apprehending officers were able to mark the dangerous drugs seized and to prepare a physical
inventory of the same at the Las Piñas Police Station which was the place where Moner and his co-
accused were brought for processing. The following excerpts lifted from the transcript of the
testimony of PO2 Panopio during trial confirm this fact:

Q Now, Mr. Witness, after your team recovered [the] evidence on top of the table inside the house,
arrested those persons whom you identified a while ago and also arrested Teng Moner recovered
from him the buy-bust money, what happened next?

A We brought them to the police headquarters.

Q In what headquarters did you bring the persons arrested?

A We brought them to Special Action ... SAID-SOTF Las Piñas Police Station.

xxxx

Q Now, I would like to inform you that under Section 21 of the Republic Act 9165, the arresting
officer immediately after the arrest of the accused or the person buy-bust for possession must
prepare the inventory of seized evidence.

A Yes, sir.

Q What do you mean by "yes"?

A We did prepare an inventory, sir.

Q So, you are aware of that provision?

A I just forgot the Section 21, sir.

COURT: (to the witness)

Q You do not know that doing an inventory is a requirement under Section 21?

A Yes, your Honor.

PROS.: (to the witness)

Q Now, you said that you are aware of Section 21 an inventory must be made. Do you know whether
your team complied with that provision of the law upon reaching the station?

A Yes, sir,

Q What do you mean by "yes"?

A We made an Inventory Report, sir.

Q Where is now that Inventory Report?

A It's with the documents I submitted earlier in court, sir.

xxxx

PROS: (to the Court)

This piece of document handed by the witness your Honor, the Inventory of Property Seized be
marked as Exhibit "OOO".

COURT: (to the witness)

Q That is the original, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, your Honor.

xxxx

PROS.: (to the Court)

Q The signature of PO3 Rufino G. Dalagdagan under the heading "Received By:" be bracketed and
be marked as Exhibit "OOO-1"; the list of the articles appearing [in] the body of Exhibit "OOO" be
bracketed and be marked as Exhibit "OOO-2". This Receipt of Property Turned-Over, your
Honor, which states: "I, P03 RUFINO G. DALAGDAGAN OF SAID-SOTF, LAS PINAS CITY
POLICE STATION, SPD hereby acknowledge received (sic) the items/articles listed hereunder
[from] PO2 JOACHIM P. PANOPIO" and may we request, your honor that letters appearing on the
top of the name TENG MONER ADAM, ET AL. (RTS) be marked as Exhibit "OOO-3"

PROS.: (to the witness)

Q Who prepared this Exhibit "OOO"?

A PO3 Rufino Dalagdagan, sir.

Q These items listed [in] the body of marked as Exhibit "OOO", who made these items?

A I, myself, sir.

Q Now, showing to you this Exhibit marked as "OOO-3" particularly on [the] letters RPS appearing
inside the parenthesis, who placed that entry (RPS)?

A Police Officer Dalagdagan, sir.

Q Where were you at the time when this (RPS) marked as Exhibit "OOO-3" was made?

A I was inside the office, sir.

Q Where were those persons whom your team arrested when this evidence marked as Exhibit
"OOO" was made?
A They were also inside the office, sir.

xxxx

Q You said a while ago that in consideration with the buy-bust money, you received from the
accused, Teng Moner, that plastic sachet containing shabu. Upon reaching the station, what
happened to the plastic sachet, subject matter of the buy-bust operation?

A I turned it over, sir.

Q To whom?

A PO3 Dalagdagan, sir.

Q And before you turned it over to the investigator, PO3 Dalagdagan, that shabu subject
matter of the buy-bust operation, what did you do with it?

A He placed [the] markings on it, sir.

Q Showing to you several pieces of evidence placed inside the brown envelope. Kindly look at the
same and pick from these several items that plastic sachet, subject matter of the buy-bust
operation?

A (Witness picked from the bunch of evidence the plastic sachet which already marked as Exhibit
"P" and he read [the] markings "TMAU1-23APR05".)

Q Now, you also stated a while ago that you were the one who personally recovered the buy-bust
money used in the operation from the possession of the accused, Teng Moner. If the same would be
shown to you, would you be able to identify it?

A Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q Now, you also stated that the Request for Laboratory Examination was made by the
investigator, Now, who delivered the plastic sachet subject matter of the buy-bust operation
for laboratory examination?

A We did, sir.  (Emphases supplied.)

14

Judging from the cited testimony, it is apparent that the apprehending officers were able to
substantially comply with the requirements of the law regarding the custody of confiscated or seized
dangerous drugs. When cross-examined by the defense counsel during trial about the reason
behind the buy-bust team's noncompliance with standard procedure, PO3 Tuldanes, one of the
apprehending officers, gave the following response:

ATTY. PALAD: (to witness)

Q Meaning you had no time to make the inventory right at the scene of the alleged buy-bust?
A Yes, sir, because we were immediately instructed to pull out from the area.

Q Was there any threat on your lives that you immediately pulled out from the said area?

A It was not our area - Area of Responsibility - so we just wanted to make sure, for security and
immediately left, sir.

Q So this fear for security, you did not follow this photographing/inventory?

A We did not do that anymore, sir, because our security was at risk. 15

Verily, the circumstances that the buy-bust team proceeded first to the Central Police District (CPD)
Station, Camp Karingal in Quezon City and, from there, they were accompanied by a police officer
from the CPD to the target location, aside from proving that it was a legitimate police operation,
supported the existence of a security risk to the buy-bust team. These additional precautions taken
by the buy-bust team underscored their unfamiliarity with the location of the operation and, in fact,
corroborated the above-quoted testimony that the buy-bust team believed there was a threat to their
security.

With regard to the accused’s allegation that the buy-bust team failed to coordinate with the PDEA
before proceeding with the operation that nabbed Moner, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals declare in unison that the requisite prior coordination with PDEA did happen. Likewise, our
own review did not provide any reason for us to disbelieve said established fact.

To reiterate, noncompliance with the chain of custody rule is excusable as long as there exist
justifiable grounds which prevented those tasked to follow the same from strictly conforming to the
said directive. The preceding discussion clearly show that the apprehending officers in this case did
not totally disregard prescribed procedure but, instead, demonstrated substantial compliance with
what was required. It was likewise explained that the divergence in procedure was not arbitrary or
whimsical but because the buy-bust team decided that they could not linger at the crime scene as it
would unduly expose them to security risks since they were outside their area of responsibility.

Notably, in the recent case of Palo v. People,   we affirmed a conviction for illegal possession of
16

dangerous drugs despite the fact that the seized illegal substance was only marked at the police
station and that there was no physical inventory or photograph of the same:

The fact that the apprehending officer marked the plastic sachet at the police station, and not at the
place of seizure, did not compromise the integrity of the seized item. Jurisprudence has declared
that "marking upon immediate confiscation" contemplates even marking done at the nearest police
station or office of the apprehending team. Neither does the absence of a physical inventory nor the
lack of photograph of the confiscated item renders the same inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items as these
would be used in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. 17

With regard to the third breach of procedure highlighted by Moner, this Court
cites People v. Usman  wherein we declared that the chain of custody is not established solely by
18

compliance with the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the
presence of the enumerated persons by law. In that case, the police officers who arrested and
processed the accused did not perform the prescribed taking of photographs under the law but,
nevertheless, the assailed conviction was upheld. The Court reasoned thus:
[T]his Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in
reality it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important
factor is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be
used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. x x x. 19

In the case at bar, the records indicate that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
had been preserved despite the procedural infirmities that accompanied the process. On this score,
we quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of Appeals:

The record shows that upon the arrest of accused-appellant, the shabu and marked money were
confiscated from him by P02 Panopio. Accused-appellant was immediately brought to the Las Piñas
Police Station where the items confiscated from him were turned-over by P02 Panopio to P03
Dalagdagan, the investigator-on-case. The latter received the confiscated items and marked
them in the presence of P02 Panopio and accused-appellant. An inventory of the confiscated
items was also made.

Thereafter, the request for laboratory examination was prepared by P03 Dalagdagan and signed by
P/C Insp. Jonathan A. Cabal. The specimen together with the request was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City by P02 Panopio and the other police officers. There, it was
received by PSI Michael S: Holada, who delivered the specimen and request for laboratory test to
the forensic chemist PIS Maridel C. Rodis. After examination, the specimen submitted for testing
proved positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The result of the test was
reduced to writing and signed by the forensic chemist. It was duly noted by P/Sr. Supt. Ricardo
Cacholaver. It is worth stressing that the prosecution and defense had agreed to dispense with the
testimony of the forensic chemist and stipulated among others that she could identify the documents
and the specimens she examined.  (Emphases supplied and citations omitted.)
20

Anent Moner' s allegation that the buy-bust team asked money from him and his former co-accused
in exchange for their liberty, it must be emphasized that the said allegation only came to light when
defense counsel asked appellant what happened when he and his former co-accused were brought
to the Las Piñas Police Station.  Curiously, however, defense counsel did not confront any of the
21

prosecution witnesses regarding the said accusation. More importantly, based on the record, no
criminal or administrative· case relating thereto was ever filed by Moner or any of his former co-
accused against their alleged extortionists. Nevertheless, on this particular issue, we would like to
reiterate our ruling that the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been invariably viewed by
the courts with disfavor for it can just easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in most prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 22

At this juncture, it bears repeating that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.  Admittedly, the
23

buy-bust team did not follow certain aspects of procedure to the letter but this was excusable under
the saving clause of the chain of custody rule and prevailing jurisprudence. As a consequence
thereof, their arrest of Moner in the performance of their duty cannot be described as having been
done so irregularly as to convince this Court to invalidate the credibility and belief bestowed by the
trial court on the prosecution evidence. Accordingly, Moner must provide clear and convincing
evidence to overturn the aforesaid presumption that the police officers regularly performed their
duties but the records show that he has failed to do so. Absent any proof of mishandling, tampering
or switching of evidence presented against him by the arresting officers and other authorities
involved in the chain of custody, the presumption remains.
This is not the first time that this Court has been confronted with the question of whether or not to
uphold the conviction of a person arrested for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs who had been
positively identified by credible witnesses as the perpetrator of said crime but the manner by which
the evidence of illegal drugs was handled did not strictly comply with the chain of custody rule. To
reiterate past pronouncements, while ideally the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect
and unbroken, in reality, it is not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken
chain.  Unfortunately; rigid obedience to procedure creates a scenario wherein the safeguards that
24

we set to shield the innocent are likewise exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment.
Realizing the inconvenient truth that no perfect chain of custody can ever be achieved, this Court
has consistently held that the most important factor in the chain of custody rule is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.25

We find it apropos to highlight this Court's discussion in Zalameda v. People,   which was restated in
26

the recent case of Saraum v. People 27

We would like to add that noncompliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the
inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs
inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be
inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule,
the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the court
x x x.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-
admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to noncompliance with Section 21 of
Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is noncompliance with said section, is not of
admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The
weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each
case.

Stated differently, if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed
by the chain of custody rule, the consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically
destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence presented for each particular
case. In the case at bar, the trial court judge convicted Moner on the strength of the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses despite an imperfect chain of custody concerning the corpus delicti.

It should be noted that Section 21(a) of the IRR of Republic Act No. 9165 provides that:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items. (Emphases supplied.)

The above-quoted provision recognizes that the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and the
admissibility of other evidence are well within the power of trial court judges to decide. Paragraph
(5), Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Supreme Court the following
power, among others:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Jurisprudence explains the above-quoted constitutional provision m the following manner:

Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing
scheme between the legislature and this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the
1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the "power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."
However, these constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to "repeal, alter or
supplement" such rules.

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous
charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII Congress' subsidiary and corrective power.
This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice that this Court's power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court
with Congress." 28

The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a
traditional power of this Court.  This includes the power to promulgate the rules of evidence.
29

On the other hand, the Rules of Evidence are provided in the Rules of Court issued by the Supreme
Court. However, the chain of custody rule is not found in the Rules of Court. Section 21 of Republic
Act No. 9165 was passed by the legislative department and its implementing rules were promulgated
by PDEA, in consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies under and within
the executive department.

In the United States, the chain of custody rule is followed by the federal courts using the provisions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Court of Appeals applied this rule in United States v.
Ricco  and held as follows:
30

The "chain of custody" rule is found in Fed. R. Evid. 901, which requires that the admission
of an exhibit must be preceded by "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims." x x x.
x x x As we have pointed out, the "chain of custody' is not an iron-clad requirement, and the fact of a
‘missing link' does not prevent the admission of real evidence, so long as there is sufficient proof that
the evidence is what it purports to be and has not been altered in any material respect." x x x.

According to Cornell University's online legal encyclopedia, "[r]ules of evidence are, as the name
indicates, the rules by which a court determines what evidence is admissible at trial. In the U.S.,
federal courts follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, while state courts generally follow their own
rules."  In the U.S. State of Alaska, for example, the "chain of custody" rule is found in Alaska
31

Evidence Rule 901(a). 32

Evidence is defined in Section 1 of Rule 12833 as "the means, sanctioned by these rules,
of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact." Section 2 of the
same Rule provides that "[t]he rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules."

Furthermore, the said Rule provides for the admissibility of evidence, and states that "[ e ]vidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules." The Rules
of Admissibility provide that "[ o ]bjects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court.
When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the
court. "
34

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is important to distinguish if a matter is a proper

subject of the rules of evidence, which as shown above are promulgated by the Court, or it is a
subject of substantive law, and should be passed by an act of Congress. The Court discussed this
distinction in the early case of Bustos v. Lucero :
35

Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the
legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C. J., 980.) Substantive law is that part
of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates ·the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer;
as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains
redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S., 1026.)

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law
which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be
punished. (22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the
first step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence - which is "the mode and
manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party relies to establish the
fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" - is identified with and forms part of the method by which, in
private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in criminal law, a law transgressor is
punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So.,
419; 179 La., 462.) The entire rules of evidence have been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We
can not tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole
code of evidence embodied in these Rules.

In Beazell vs. Ohio, 269 U. S., 167, 70 Law. ed., 216, the United States Supreme Court said:
"Expressions are to be found in earlier judicial opinions to the effect that the constitutional limitation
may be transgressed by alterations in the rules of evidence or procedure. See Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall.
386, 390, 1 L. ed., 648, 650; Cummings vs. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 326, 18 L. ed., 356, 364;
Kring vs.Missouri, 107 U. S. 221, 228, 232, 27 L. ed., 507, 508, 510, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443. And there
may be procedural changes which operate to deny to the accused a defense available under the
laws in force at the time of the commission of his offense, or which otherwise affect him in such a
harsh and arbitrary manner as to fall within the constitutional prohibition. Kring vs. Missouri, 107 U.
S., 221, 27 L. ed., 507, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep., 443; Thompson vs. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 42 L. ed., 1061, 18
Sup. Ct. Rep., 620. But it is now well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of
evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and
unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. A statute which, after indictment,
enlarges the class of persons who may be witnesses at the trial, by removing the disqualification of
persons convicted of felony, is not an ex post facto law. Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U. S., 575, 28 L. ed.,
263, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep., 202, 4 Am. Crim. Rep. 417. Nor is a statute which changes the rules of
evidence after the indictment so as to render admissible against the accused evidence previously
held inadmissible, Thompson vs. Missouri, 171 U. S., 380, 43 L. ed., 204, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep., 922; or
which changes the place of trial, Gut vs. Minnesota, 9 Wall. 35, 19 L. ed., 573; or which abolishes a
court for hearing criminal appeals, creating a new one in its stead. See Duncan vs. Missouri, 152 U.
S., 377, 382, 38 L. ed., 485, 487, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep., 570."

xxxx

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition. The
difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467;
Beazell vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative
power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of parties
affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. (State vs. Pavelick, 279 P.,
1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules should step on
substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to expect such incursion
as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or deprive him of a defense, but
operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his disadvantage. For the Court's power is not
merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's
approval. This power is "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts," which is a power to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure,
adding new and different rules without regard to their source and discarding old ones.

To emphasize, the distinction in criminal law is this: substantive law is that which declares what acts
are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural
law which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished. 36

Based on the above, it may be gleaned that the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a
rule of procedure.  It is therefore the Court who has the last say regarding the appreciation of
1âwphi1

evidence. Relevant portions of decisions elucidating on the chain of custody rule are quoted below:

Saraum v. People : 37

The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of the illegal
drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the accused until the
time they are presented in court.x x x. (Citation omitted.)

Mallillin v. People  :
38
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that
the same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these
cases is that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt. Be that as it may, the
mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of
guilt. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
same. (Citations omitted.)

These are matters well within the powers of courts to appreciate and rule upon, and so, when the
courts find appropriate, substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved may warrant the conviction of the
accused. This is the rationale, grounded on the constitutional power of the Court, to pass upon the
credibility and admissibility of evidence that underlies the proviso in Section 21(a) of the IRR of
Republic Act No. 9165.

To conclude, this Court has consistently espoused the time-honored doctrine that where the issue is
one of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed unless the
consideration of certain facts of substance and value, which have been plainly overlooked, might
affect the result of the case.  We do not believe that the explainable deviations to the chain of
39

custody rule demonstrated by the police officers involved in this case are reason enough to overturn
the findings of the trial court judge, who personally observed and weighed the testimony of the
witnesses during trial and examined the evidence submitted by both parties.

In light of the foregoing, we are compelled to dismiss the present appeal and affirm the conviction of
Moner for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The

assailed Decision dated July 27, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04399
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170583             September 12, 2007

ERNESTO M. FULLERO, petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,1 petitioner
Ernesto M. Fullero seeks to set aside the Decision2 dated 19 October 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, affirming in toto the Decision3 dated 9 October 2003 of the Legazpi City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 7712, finding petitioner guilty of
falsification of public document as defined and penalized in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code.

In an Amended Information4 dated 14 October 1997, petitioner was charged with falsification of

public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as
follows:

That sometime in 1988, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud, being then
the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga City Telecommunication’s Office, while acting in said
capacity and taking advantage of his official function, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify and/or caused to be falsified a genuine public document, that is when
he prepared his CSC 212 (Personal Data Sheet) for submission to Bureau of
Telecommunication Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, he made it appear that he passed
the Civil Engineering Board Examinations given by Professional Regulation Commission on
May 30 and 31, 1985 with a rating of 75.8%; however, upon verification issued by PRC, said
accused took the examination in May 1984 and another one [in] May, 1985 with general
ratings of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively.

When arraigned on 5 January 1998, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the charge.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

In 1977, petitioner was employed as a telegraph operator at the Bureau of Telecommunications

Office in Iriga City (BTO, Iriga City). In 1982, he became the Acting Chief Operator of the same office
until 1994.6

A Personal Data Sheet (PDS) [Civil Service Form 212] dated 8 January 1988, purportedly
accomplished and signed by petitioner, states that he passed the Civil Engineering Board
Examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%.7 It appears that he submitted
the PDS to the Bureau of Telecommunications Regional Office, Legazpi City (BTO, Legazpi City).8

A letter dated 7 March 1988 and signed by petitioner shows that he applied for the position of either
a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor with the Regional
Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region 5, Legazpi City.9

Upon inquiry made by Florenda B. Magistrado (Magistrado), a subordinate of petitioner in the BTO,
Iriga City, with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), it was verified that petitioner never
passed the board examination for civil engineering and that petitioner’s name does not appear in the
book of registration for civil engineers.10

Petitioner denied executing and submitting the subject PDS containing the statement that he passed
the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and
thumbmark appearing therein. He claimed that the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS
differs from the stroke of his genuine signature.11He added that the letters contained in the PDS he
accomplished and submitted were typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have
small letters. As such, the subject PDS could not be his because it had both small and capital
typewritten letters.

Moreover, petitioner claimed that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case against him
because he issued a memorandum against her for misbehavior in the BTO, Iriga City.12 He further
argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try him there being no evidence that the alleged
falsification took place in Legazpi City.13

After trial, the Legazpi City RTC rendered a Decision dated 9 October 2003 finding petitioner guilty
of the crime of falsification. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Ernesto M. Fullero is hereby

found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification defined and penalized
under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccionalmaximum to ten (10) years
of prision mayor medium as the maximum and to pay a fine of three thousand P3,000.00
Pesos. Costs against the accused.14

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 19 October 2005, the appellate court promulgated
its Decision affirming in toto the assailed Legazpi City RTC Decision. The appellate court decreed:

In sum, the Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established all the elements of
the offense of falsification of a public document and that the trial court correctly rendered a
judgment of conviction against appellant.

WHEREFORE, the appeal at bench is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the appealed 09
October 2003 decision is affirmed.15

On 21 November 2005, petitioner lodged the instant petition before us citing as errors the following:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING

THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID
 LOWER COURT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED IN THE ABSENCE OF SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE I.E., PROOF TO SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED ACTUALLY PERFORMED THE
ACT OF FALSIFICATION HE IS ACCUSED OF;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING

THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT, EVEN
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED FILLED UP THE PERSONAL DATA SHEET
(PDS) INCLUDING THE STATEMENT THAT HE IS A LICENSED ENGINEER, ACCUSED
WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO STATE SAID DATA AND NO CRIMINAL INTENT WAS
SHOWN.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING

THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID
RTC ADMITTED EVIDENCES NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED AND THEREAFTER
CONSIDERED THE SAME IN DETERMINING THE ALLEGED GUILT OF THE ACCUSED;

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING

THE JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF IRIGA CITY, WHERE THE ALLEGED PERSONAL
DATA SHEET WAS ACCOMPLISHED NOT IN THE RTC OF LEGAZPI CITY.

Apropos the first issue, petitioner maintained that none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw
him accomplish and sign the PDS; that the prosecution failed to establish that he took advantage of
his position in falsifying the PDS; that a person need not be an Acting Chief Operator to be able to
falsify a PDS; that he never became the custodian of the PDS nor did he have any special access to
it by reason of his office; and that the identity of the person who falsified the PDS has not been
established by the prosecution.16

In establishing its charge of falsification against petitioner, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses, namely: Magistrado, Joaquin C. Atayza (Atayza), Romeo Brizo (Brizo), Emma Francisco
(Francisco) and Edith C. Avenir (Avenir).

Magistrado, a subordinate of petitioner at the BTO, Iriga City, testified that prior to the filing of the
instant case against petitioner, she sued the petitioner for unjust vexation as the latter kissed her on
one occasion. While the case for unjust vexation was pending, her lawyer, Atty. Mariano Baranda,
Jr. (Atty. Baranda), asked her if petitioner was indeed a licensed civil engineer since some persons
simply referred to petitioner as "Mr. Fullero" whereas in the BTO, Iriga City, petitioner was known as
"Engineer Fullero." Suspicious of the true status of petitioner, she went to the Records Office of the
BTO, Legazpi City, and requested therein if she can see petitioner’s PDS. Upon being shown
petitioner’s PDS, she observed that, under Item No. 18 thereof, petitioner appears to be a licensed
civil engineer having passed the board examination for civil engineering given on 30-31 May 1985.
Unconvinced of the veracity of petitioner’s statement in the PDS that he is a licensed civil engineer,
she sought the advice of Atty. Baranda. Atty. Baranda then proceeded to the main office of the PRC
in Manila to check the records of petitioner. Subsequently, Atty. Baranda obtained a certification
from the PRC attesting that petitioner never passed the board examination for civil engineering. Atty.
Baranda showed the said certification to her. Thereafter, she instituted the instant case against
petitioner.17

Atayza, Regional Director of the PRC in Legazpi City, testified that petitioner is not registered as a
board passer for the civil engineering examination given on 30-31 May 1985.18

Brizo, Human Resource Management Officer and Acting Records Officer of the BTO, Legazpi City,
testified that his duty as acting records officer was to safeguard the records and files of the BTO,
Iriga City, and BTO, Legazpi City. He said he personally knows the petitioner and is familiar with the
latter’s signature because he regularly received petitioner’s daily time records and other documents
bearing petitioner’s signature. He confirmed that the signature appearing in petitioner’s PDS was the
signature of petitioner.19

Francisco was the Officer-In-Charge of the Records Section of the PRC, Manila. She declared that
petitioner’s name was included in the master list of examinees in the May 1984 civil engineering
licensure examination where petitioner obtained a failing grade of 56.75%. She affirmed that
petitioner’s name also appears in the list of examinees for the 30-31 May 1985 and May 1990 civil
engineering licensure examinations where he got failing marks.20

Avenir was the Special Investigator III in the Legal Affairs Division of the CSC, Regional Office No.
5, Legazpi City. As the duly authorized representative of the Regional Director of the said office,
Avenir brought to the court the letter of petitioner applying for the position of either Junior
Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor, and a certification
submitted by the petitioner stating that the latter is a licensed civil engineer. Avenir stated that the
letter and the certification were taken from the records of their office and that these documents were
being kept as part of the records of an administrative case of petitioner with the said office.21

The prosecution also presented documentary evidence to bolster the foregoing testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) a certification issued by Jose A. Arriola, Director II, PRC, Manila,
attesting that petitioner’s name is not registered in the book of registry for licensed civil engineers;
(2) certifications issued by Francisco affirming that petitioner failed in the 30-31 May 1985 board
examination for civil engineering;22 (3) the PDS where petitioner stated that he passed the 30-31
May 1985 board examination for civil engineering with a rating of 75.8% and which was signed by
him;23 (4) certifications issued by Francisco attesting that petitioner failed the May 1990board
examination for civil engineering;24 (5) transcript of stenographic notes in the perjury case filed by
petitioner against Magistrado which states that, during the trial thereof, petitioner affirmed before the
court hearing the case that he is a licensed civil engineer;25 (6) a letter signed and submitted by
petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, claiming to be a
licensed civil engineer and applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer
or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor;26 (7) an Order dated 20 December 2001 of the CSC,
Regional Office No. 5, finding petitioner administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and imposing upon him a penalty of six months suspension for falsifying his
PDS which is also the subject matter of the instant case;27 (8) a certification submitted by the
petitioner to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, showing that he is a licensed civil
engineer;28 (9) the daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner as the former’s
superior;29 and (10) other documents bearing the signature of petitioner in blue ballpen.30

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as its sole witness. No documentary evidence
was proffered.

Petitioner interposed denials and alibi to support his contentions. Petitioner denied that he executed
and submitted the subject PDS containing the statement that he passed the board examinations for
civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He averred
that the PDS he accomplished and submitted was typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter
does not have small letters; thus, the subject PDS could not be his since the letters were typewritten
in small and capital letters; that the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the
stroke of his genuine signature; that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case against
him since he issued a memorandum against her for the latter’s misbehavior in the BTO, Iriga City;
that he is not a licensed civil engineer; and that he accomplished a different PDS in the BTO, Iriga
City.

Petitioner testified that he cannot recall the exact date when he issued the alleged memorandum
against Magistrado31 and when during the trial of his perjury case against Magistrado, he claimed
that he is a licensed civil engineer.32 He cannot also remember if he submitted a letter to the CSC,
Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications
Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor33and the fact that he submitted therein a
certification that he is a licensed civil engineer.34

The initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between the prosecution and defense is credible.

Case law dictates that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence had been presented by the prosecution.35 Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.36

Although none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the petitioner falsifying the PDS, they,
nonetheless, testified that that they are very familiar with the petitioner’s handwriting and signature.
Magistrado testified that, being a subordinate of petitioner, she is very familiar with petitioner’s
signature and actually witnessed petitioner affixing his signature on her daily time records for
September 1987 to May 1988.37 Brizo testified that he is also familiar with petitioner’s signature
because he personally knows petitioner and that he regularly received petitioner’s daily time records
and other documents bearing petitioner’s signature.38 Both Magistrado and Brizo opined that the
signature in the PDS belongs to petitioner.

The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution. The RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Magistrado and Brizo as
trustworthy and believable.

More significant are the documentary evidence consisting of petitioner’s signature in certain
authentic instruments which are apparently similar to the signature in the PDS. The RTC and the
Court of Appeals have compared petitioner’s signatures in Magistrado’s daily time records and
petitioner’s signature in his application letter to the CSC, Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, with
that of petitioner’s alleged signature in the PDS. They observed that the slant position of the writing,
as well as the stroke and the last rounding loop of the signature in the PDS, does not differ from
petitioner’s signatures in Magistrado’s daily time records and in petitioner’s application letter.39 They
noted that petitioner’s signatures in the said documents are "strikingly similar, such that through the
naked eye alone, it is patent that the signatures therein were written by one and the same person."
The observation of the Court of Appeals is worth noting, viz:
 Appellant’s allegation that he did not execute the subject PDS is unavailing. First, the
informations entered in the PDS, such as his accurate personal data and precise
employment history, are matters which only the accused could have known. Second, a visual
analysis of appellant’s signatures in the Certificate of Arraignment and Notice of
Hearing, vis-a-vis his signature in the PDS would show no significant disparity, leading to the
conclusion that appellant himself prepared the PDS and affixed his signature therein. Third,
the signature of appellant in the PDS and in the Daily Time Records (Exhibits "J" to "Q") of
prosecution witness Florenda Magistrado, were glaringly identical. x x x.40

The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said
findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.41 This is more true if such findings were
affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate
court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court.42

In absolute disparity, the evidence for the defense is comprised of denials. Petitioner denied having
accomplished and signed the PDS. He tried to impart that someone else had filled it up. However,
aside from this self-serving and negative claim, he did not adduce any convincing proof to effectively
refute the evidence for the prosecution.

It is a hornbook doctrine that as between bare denials and positive testimony on affirmative matters,
the latter is accorded greater evidentiary weight.43

The subsequent matter to be determined is whether the elements of falsification for which petitioner
is charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Article 171, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code, provides:

ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. –

The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon
any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and

c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.44

In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had
taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document,
the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty
to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the
official custody of the document which he falsifies.45
All of the foregoing elements of falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code, have been sufficiently established.

First, petitioner was a public officer, being then the Acting Chief Operator of the BTO, Iriga City,
when he accomplished and submitted his PDS on 4 January 1988 at the BTO, Legazpi City. It is
settled that a PDS is a public document.46 He stated under Item No. 18 of his PDS that he passed
the civil engineering board examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8%.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted his PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City.

Second, in Inting v. Tanodbayan,47 we ruled that the accomplishment of the PDS being a
requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the
government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with
such employment. Hence, the filing of a PDS is required in connection with promotion to a higher
position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth.
Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified
aspirants to the same position.48

Petitioner was legally obliged to disclose in the PDS that he is not a licensed civil engineer since, as
evidenced by his application letter, he was applying for positions to be occupied only by licensed civil
engineers. Further, petitioner was also legally obliged to make truthful statements in his PDS since
he affirmed therein "under the penalty of perjury" that his answers to the queries are "true and
correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief."49

Third, petitioner’s statement in the PDS that he passed the civil engineering board examination
given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8% is absolutely false. As Officer-in-Charge of
the Records Section of the PRC, Manila, Francisco declared that petitioner was included in the
master list of examinees in the May 1984 civil engineering licensure examination wherein petitioner
obtained a failing grade. She affirmed that petitioner’s name also appears in the list of examinees for
the May 1985 and May 1990 civil engineering licensure examinations where petitioner also got
failing marks. She also submitted certifications and authentic documents in support of her
statements. Further, petitioner admitted that he never passed the board examination for civil
engineering.50

Finally, as a public officer, petitioner is duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS
pursuant to the Civil Service Rules and Regulations.51 Were it not for his position and employment in
the government, he could not have accomplished the PDS. In People v. Uy,52 Santiago Uy, a field
agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, was charged with falsification of public document
under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for making false statements in his
Personal Information Sheet. We ruled therein: "[T]hat the defendant (Santiago Uy) took
advantage of his position may be gathered from the fact that he himself filled the information
sheet which obviously was to be submitted by each and every officer or employee of the
NBI." In the same vein, petitioner also had the responsibility to prepare, accomplish and submit his
PDS at the time he made a false statement therein that he is a licensed civil engineer. Hence, it is
clear that petitioner took advantage of his position as Acting Chief Operator of BTO, Iriga City when
he falsified his PDS.

Anent the second issue, petitioner posited that being a licensed civil engineer is not a qualification
for him to hold office and such is not a requirement for his promotion; that the false statement
caused no prejudice to any private person as he did not have any competitor in his position nor was
the government damaged by such false statement; that the false statement would not in any way
redound to his benefit and, as such, no criminal intent could have impelled him to make such false
claim; and that no evidence was produced showing that he had intent to cause injury.
The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an
essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.53 It is jurisprudentially settled that in
the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason
that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.54 In falsification of public
documents, therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the
existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage
becomes immaterial.55

The fact that the petitioner’s false statement in the PDS did not redound to his benefit, and that the
government or any private individual was not thereby prejudiced, is inconsequential. What is clear
and decisive in this case is that petitioner made an entry in his PDS that he passed the 30-31 May
1985 board examination for civil engineering despite his full awareness that such is not true.

Regarding the third issue, petitioner contended that the prosecution’s documentary evidence,
consisting of Exhibits A, C, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R and their sub-markings, are
inadmissible in evidence based on the following reasons:

(1) Exhibit A, which is the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, confirming that
petitioner’s name does not appear in the registry books of licensed civil engineers, was not properly
identified during the trial. The proper person to identify the certification should have been the
signatory therein which was PRC Director II Jose A. Arriola, or in his absence, a person who actually
witnessed the execution of the certification. Prosecution witness Atayza, who was not present when
the certification was executed, had identified the certification during the trial. Thus, the contents of
the certification are mere hearsay; (2) Exhibit C, which is, according to petitioner, a machine copy of
the PDS, does not show that it was the petitioner who prepared and submitted the PDS to BTO,
Legazpi City. There was nothing in the PDS which requires a periodic submission of an updated
PDS. Prosecution witness Brizo does not know whether petitioner’s PDS was personally delivered or
mailed. Hence, the identification and subsequent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the
PDS are mere hearsay; (3) Exhibit F, which is the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17 March
1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner against Magistrado where petitioner allegedly admitted
that he is a civil engineer, lacks proper identification as the stenographer or records officer was not
presented in court; (4) Exhibit G, which is the alleged letter of petitioner to the Regional Director of
the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, applying for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications
Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor; and Exhibit I, which is a machine copy of a
certification allegedly issued by the PRC attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and
which was allegedly submitted by petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi
City, as his credential in applying for the aforesaid positions, are merely machine copies and the loss
and unavailability of their original were not proven; and (5) Exhibits J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q and R,
which are the daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner and which were offered to
compare petitioner’s alleged signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are devoid of factual basis.
Petitioner’s signatures in the said exhibits are, "with the use of naked eye," not the same as his
signature in the PDS. The Legazpi City RTC should have submitted these documents to a
handwriting expert for examination instead of relying on the testimony of Magistrado.56

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, states that a witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived
from his perception. A witness, therefore, may not testify as to what he merely learned from others
either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay
and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.57 This is known as the hearsay
rule.
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One of the exceptions is the
entries in official records made in the performance of duty by a public officer.58 In other words, official
entries are admissible in evidence regardless of whether the officer or person who made them was
presented and testified in court, since these entries are considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. Other recognized reasons for this exception are necessity and trustworthiness. The
necessity consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a
witness to testify to innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. This will also unduly hamper
public business. The trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of
official duty by a public officer.59

Exhibit A, or the Certification of the PRC dated 17 January 1998, was signed by Arriola, Director II
of the PRC, Manila.60 Although Arriola was not presented in court or did not testify during the trial to
verify the said certification, such certification is considered as prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein and is therefore presumed to be truthful, because petitioner did not present any
plausible proof to rebut its truthfulness. Exhibit A is therefore admissible in evidence.

Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides that an evidence is admissible
when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or rules. Exhibit C, which according to
petitioner is the machine copy of the PDS, is very relevant to the charge of falsification and is not
excluded by the law or rules. It was offered precisely to prove that petitioner committed the crime of
falsification by making false statements in the PDS. Further, the information specifically accuses
petitioner of falsifying such PDS. A scrutiny of Exhibit C would show that it is the very PDS which
petitioner falsified and not a mere machine copy as alleged by petitioner. Being the original falsified
document, it is the best evidence of its contents and is therefore not excluded by the law or rules.61

Section 2, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, explicitly provides that a transcript of the
record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as
correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings.

Petitioner failed to introduce proof that Exhibit F, or the Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated 17
March 1998 of the perjury case filed by petitioner against Magistrado in which petitioner allegedly
admitted that he is a civil engineer, is not what it purports to be. Thus, it is prima facie correct.
Moreover, as earlier elucidated, one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule is the entries in official
records made in the performance of duty by a public officer. Exhibit F, being an official entry in the
court’s records, is admissible in evidence and there is no necessity to produce the concerned
stenographer as a witness.62

Section 7, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides that when the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Exhibit G, which is the
alleged letter of petitioner to the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, applying for
the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic
Supervisor; and Exhibit I, which is the machine copy of a certification allegedly issued by the PRC
attesting that petitioner is a licensed civil engineer and which was allegedly submitted by petitioner to
the Regional Director of the CSC, Region 5, Legazpi City, as his credential in applying for the
aforesaid positions, are certified true copies of their original documents recorded or kept in the CSC,
Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City63 and, thus, admissible to prove the contents of their originals.

Exhibits J to R, which are the daily time records of Magistrado signed by petitioner and which were
offered to compare petitioner’s alleged signature in the PDS with the said exhibits, are admissible in
evidence since they are relevant and material to the charge of falsification against petitioner. The
signatures of petitioner in the said exhibits, the authenticity of which were not denied by petitioner,
were presented to prove that these signatures were similar to petitioner’s signature in the PDS
where he made the alleged falsification.

Well-entrenched is the rule that resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory. Handwriting experts,
while probably useful, are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwritings or
signatures.64 This is so since under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person, because he has seen the person write; or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or has been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person. Moreover, the opinion of a non-expert witness, for which proper basis is given, may be
received in evidence regarding the handwriting or signature of a person with which he has sufficient
familiarity.65

The Legazpi City RTC was, therefore, not obliged to put a handwriting expert on the witness stand
and direct the latter to examine petitioner’s signatures in the foregoing exhibits before ruling on their
admissibility. It can, as it did, rely on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who are familiar
with petitioner’s handwriting/signature in determining the admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. It
can, by itself, also compare petitioner’s signature in the PDS with the petitioner’s signatures in the
subject exhibits with or without the aid of an expert witness and thereafter rule on the admissibility of
such exhibits based on its own observation. In short, it can exercise independent judgment as
regards the admissibility of said exhibits.

As to the fourth issue, petitioner argued that since none of the prosecution witnesses testified that
they actually saw him fill up the PDS, then there is no evidence showing that the alleged falsification
took place in Legazpi City; that when the PDS was allegedly falsified, he was stationed at BTO, Iriga
City, and was a resident of Iriga City; that, even assuming without admitting that he filled up the
PDS, the same was, "in all probability," filled up in Iriga City and, as such, the crime of falsification
was consummated therein; that, consequently, the instant case should have been tried in the Iriga
City RTC and not in the Legazpi City RTC.66

There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire jurisdiction
over criminal cases. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the offense or the subject
matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed.
And third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.67 There is no dispute that
the Legazpi City RTC has jurisdiction over the offense and over the person of petitioner. It is the
territorial jurisdiction of the Legazpi City RTC which the petitioner impugns.

The territorial jurisdiction of a court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information
as regards the place where the offense charged was committed.68 It should also be emphasized that
where some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one
province or city and some in another, the court of either province or city has jurisdiction to try the
case, it being understood that the court first taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others.69

In the case at bar, the information specifically and positively alleges that the falsification was
committed in Legazpi City. Moreover, as heretofore discussed, the testimonies and documentary
evidence for the prosecution have sufficiently established that petitioner accomplished and thereafter
submitted the PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City. The foregoing circumstances clearly placed the locus
criminis in Legazpi City and not in Iriga City.

We find no reason to disturb the prison term and fine imposed on petitioner by the Legazpi City RTC
and the Court of Appeals, as they are in accord with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 19
October 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 221732, August 23, 2017

FERNANDO U. JUAN, Petitioner, v. ROBERTO U. JUAN (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS SON JEFFREY C.

JUAN) AND LAUNDROMATIC CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's resolution is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated
January 25, 2016, of petitioner Fernando U. Juan that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision1dated May
7, 2015 and Resolution2 dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing his appeal for
failure to comply with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 and Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

The facts follow.

Respondent Roberto U. Juan claimed that he began using the name and mark "Lavandera Ko" in his laundry
business on July 4, 1994. He then opened his laundry store at No. 119 Alfaro St., Salcedo St., Makati City in
1995. Thereafter, on March 17, 1997, the National Library issued to him a certificate of copyright over said
name and mark. Over the years, the laundry business expanded with numerous franchise outlets in Metro
Manila and other provinces. Respondent Roberto then formed a corporation to handle the said business,
hence, Laundromatic Corporation (Laundromatic) was incorporated in 1997, while "Lavandera Ko" was
registered as a business name on November 13, 1998 with the Department of Trade and Industry  (DTI).
Thereafter, respondent Roberto discovered that his brother, petitioner Fernando was able to register the
name and mark "Lavandera Ko" with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) on October 18, 2001, the
registration of which was filed on June 5, 1995. Respondent Roberto also alleged that a certain Juliano
Nacino (Juliano) had been writing the franchisees of the former threatening them with criminal and civil
cases if they did not stop using the mark and name "Lavandera Ko." It was found out by respondent Roberto
that petitioner Fernando had been selling his own franchises.

Thus, respondent Roberto filed a petition for injunction, unfair competition, infringement of copyright,
cancellation of trademark and name with/and prayer for TRO and Preliminary Injunction with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) and the case was raffled off at Branch 149, Makati City. The RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioner Fernando in Order dated June 10, 2004. On July 21, 2008, due to
the death of respondent Roberto, the latter was substituted by his son, Christian Juan  (Christian). Pre-trial
conference was concluded on July 13, 2010 and after the presentation of evidence of both parties, the RTC
rendered a Resolution dated September 23, 2013, dismissing the petition and ruling that neither of the
parties had a right to the exclusive use or appropriation of the mark "Lavandera Ko" because the same was
the original mark and work of a certain Santiago S. Suarez  (Santiago). According to the RTC, the mark in
question was created by Suarez in 1942 in his musical composition called, "Lavandera Ko" and both parties
of the present case failed to prove that they were the originators of the same mark. The dispositive portion
of the RTC's resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds both the plaintiff-Roberto and defendant-Fernando guilty
of making misrepresentations before this court, done under oath, hence, the Amended Petition and the
Answer with their money claims prayed for therein are hereby DISMISSED.

Therefore, the Amended Petition and the Answer are hereby DISMISSED for no cause of action, hence, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction is hereby DENIED for utter lack of merit; and the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction issued on June 10, 2004 is hereby LIFTED AND SET ASIDE.

Finally, the National Library is hereby ordered to cancel the Certificate of Registration issued to Roberto U.
Juan on March 17, 1997 over the word "Lavandera Ko," under certificate no. 97-362. Moreover, the
Intellectual Property Office is also ordered to cancel Certificate of Registration No. 4-1995-102749, Serial
No. 100556, issued on October 18, 2001, covering the work LAVANDERA KO AND DESIGN, in favor of
Fernando U. Juan.

The two aforesaid government agencies are hereby requested to furnish this Court of the copy of their
cancellation.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.3

Herein petitioner elevated the case to the CA through a notice of appeal. In his appeal, petitioner contended
that a mark is different from a copyright and not interchangeable. Petitioner Fernando insisted that he is the
owner of the service mark in question as he was able to register the same with the IPO pursuant to Section
122 of R.A. No. 8293. Furthermore, petitioner Fernando argued that the RTC erred in giving credence to the
article of information it obtained from the internet stating that the Filipino folk song "Lavandera Ko" was a
composition of Suarez in 1942 rather than the actual pieces of evidence presented by the parties. As such,
according to petitioner, such information acquired by the RTC is hearsay because no one was presented to
testify on the veracity of such article.

Respondent Roberto, on the other hand, contended that the appeal should be dismissed outright for raising
purely questions of law. He further raised as a ground for the dismissal of the appeal, the failure of the
petitioner to cite the page references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d) and (f)
of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court and petitioner's failure to provide a statement of facts. Respondent also
argued that assuming that the Appellant's Brief complied with the formal requirements of the Rules of Court,
the RTC still did not err in dismissing the petitioner's answer with counterclaim because he cannot be
declared as the owner of "Lavandera Ko," since there is prior use of said mark by another person.

The CA, in its Decision dated May 7, 2015, dismissed the petitioner's appeal based on technical grounds,
thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for failure to comply with the
requirements of Section 13, Rule 44 and Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED.4

Hence, the present petition after the denial of petitioner Fernando's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
Fernando raises the following issues:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL BY THE COURT OF APPEALS ON PURELY TECHNICAL
GROUNDS WAS PROPER CONSIDERING THAT THE CASE BEFORE IT CAN BE RESOLVED BASED ON THE
BRIEF ITSELF.
 B.

WHETHER OR NOT A MARK IS THE SAME AS A COPYRIGHT.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT FERNANDO U. JUAN IS THE OWNER OF THE MARK "LAVANDERA KO."

D.

WHETHER OR NOT AN INTERNET ARTICLE IS SUPERIOR THAN ACTUAL EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE
PARTIES.5

According to petitioner Fernando, the CA should have considered that the rules are there to promote and not
to defeat justice, hence, it should have decided the case based on the merits and not dismiss the same
based on a mere technicality. The rest of the issues are similar to those that were raised in petitioner's
appeal with the CA.

In his Comment6 dated April 22, 2016, respondent Roberto insists that the CA did not commit an error in
dismissing the appeal considering that the formal requirements violated by the petitioner in the Appellant's
Brief are basic, thus, inexcusable and that petitioner did not proffer any valid or substantive reason for his
non-compliance with the rules. He further argues that there was prior use of the mark "Lavandera Ko" by
another, hence, petitioner cannot be declared the owner of the said mark despite his subsequent registration
with the IPO.

The petition is meritorious.

Rules of procedure must be used to achieve speedy and efficient administration of justice and not derail
it.7 Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights
and obligations of the parties.8 It is, [thus] settled that liberal construction of the rules may be invoked in
situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the
same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least connotes a reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rules.9 In Aguam v. CA,10 this Court ruled that:

x x x Technicalities, however, must be avoided. The law abhors technicalities that impede the cause of
justice. The court's primary duty is to render or dispense justice. "A litigation is not a game of
technicalities." "Law suits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. Technicality, when it deserts
its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant
consideration from courts." Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on technicality. Every party
litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the unacceptable plea of technicalities. Thus, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules
of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to
help secure, not override substantial justice. It is a far better and more prudent course of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on appeal to attain the ends of
justice rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties, giving a
false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of
justice.

In this case, this Court finds that a liberal construction of the rules is needed due to the novelty of the issues
presented. Besides, petitioner had a reasonable attempt at complying with the rules. After all, the ends of
justice are better served when cases are determined on the merits, not on mere technicality.11

The RTC, in dismissing the petition, ruled that neither of the parties are entitled to use the trade name
"Lavandera Ko" because the copyright of "Lavandera Ko", a song composed in 1942 by Santiago S. Suarez
belongs to the latter. The following are the RTC's reasons for such ruling:
The resolution of this Court - NO ONE OF THE HEREIN PARTIES HAS THE RIGHT TO USE AND ENJOY
"LAVANDERA KO"!

Based on the date taken from the internet - References: CCP encyclopedia of Philippine art, vol. 6
http://www.himig.coin.ph (http://kahimyang.info / kauswagan/articles/1420/today - in - philippine -history
this information was gathered: "In 1948, Cecil Lloyd established the first Filipino owned record company, the
Philippine Recording System, which featured his rendition of Filipino folk songs among them the "Lavandera
ko" (1942) which is a composition of Santiago S. Suarez". Thus, the herein parties had made
misrepresentation before this court, to say the least, when they declared that they had coined and created
the subject mark and name. How can the herein parties have coined and created the subject mark and work
when these parties were not yet born; when the subject mark and work had been created and used in 1942.

The heirs of Mr. Santiago S. Suarez are the rightful owners of subject mark and work - "Lavandera ko".

Therefore, the writ of injunction issued in the instant case was quite not proper, hence the same shall be
lifted and revoked. This is in consonance with the finding of this court of the origin of the subject mark and
work, e.g., a music composition of one Santiago S. Suarez in 1942.

Moreover, Section 171.1 of R.A. 8293 states: "Author" is the natural person who has created the work."
And, Section 172.1 of R.A. No. 8293 provides: Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as "works",
are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their
creation and shall include in particular:

(d) Letters;

(f) Musical compositions, with or without words;”

Thus, the subject mark and work was created by Mr. Santiago S. Suarez, hence, the subject mark and work
belong to him, alone.

The herein parties are just false claimants, done under oath before this court (paragraph 4 of Roberto's
affidavit, Exhibit A TRO, page 241, Vol. I and paragraph 2 of Fernando's affidavit, Exhibit 26 TRO, page 354,
Vol. I), of the original work of Mr. Santiago S. Suarez created in 1942.

Furthermore, Section 21 of R.A. 8293 declares: "Patentable Inventions - any technical solution of a problem
in any field of human activity which is new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable shall be
patentable. It may be, or may relate to, a product, or process, or an improvement of any of the foregoing."
Thus, the herein subject mark and work can never be patented for the simple reason that it is not an
invention. It is a title of a music composition originated from the mind of Mr. Santiago S. Suarez in 1942.

Thus, the proper and appropriate jurisprudence applicable to this instant case is the wisdom of the High
Court in the case of Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporation v. Shoemart, Incorporated (G.R. No. 148222, August
15, 2003), the Supreme Court ruled: "The scope of a copyright is confined to literary and artistic works
which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of
their creation." The Supreme Court concluded: "The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the
benefit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the one is
explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be
secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters patent." (Pearl & Dean v. Shoemart, supra., citing the case of
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99; 1879 U.S. Lexis 1888; 25 L. Ed. 841; 11 Otto 99, October, 1879 Term).

It is noted that the subject matter of Exhibit "5" (Annex 5) Of Fernando (IPO certificate of registration) and
Exhibit B of Roberto (Certificate of Copyright Registration) could not be considered as a literary and artistic
work emanating from the creative mind and/or hand of the herein parties for the simple reason that the
subject work was a creation of the mind of Mr. Santiago S. Suarez in 1942. Thus, neither of the herein
parties has an exclusive right over the subject work "Lavandera Ko" for the simple reason that herein parties
were not the maker, creator or the original one who conceptualized it. Section 171.1 defines the author as
the natural person who has created the work. (R.A. No. 8293). Therefore, it can be said here, then and now,
that said registrations of the word "Lavandera Ko" by the herein parties cannot be protected by the law,
Republic Act No. 8293. Section 172.2 (R.A. No. 8293) is quite crystal clear on this point, it declares: "Works
are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expressions, as well as
of their content, quality and purpose." Herein parties were not the creators of the subject word. It was a
creation of Santiago S. Suarez in 1942.

Finally, in the case of Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chuan v. Court of Appeals and Lorenzo Tan (G.R. No. 130360,
August 15, 2001), the Supreme Court ruled: "A person to be entitled to a copyright must be the original
creator of the work. He must have created it by his own skill, labor and judgment without directly copying or
evasively imitating the work of another." Again, herein parties, both, miserably failed to prove and establish
on how they have created this alleged work before registering it with the National Library and the
Intellectual Property Office, hence their claim of ownership of the word "Lavandera Ko" is not conclusive or
herein parties are both great pretenders and imitators. Therefore, it is hereby declared that registration with
the IPO by Fernando is hereby cancelled, for one and many others stated herein, because of the admission
of Fernando that he coined the name from the lyrics of a song popularized in the 1950's by singer Ruben
Tagalog. Admission is admissible without need of evidence. (Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Court).

Considering that herein parties had made misrepresentations before this court, hence, both the herein
parties came to this court with unclean hands. Thus, no damage could be awarded to anyone of the herein
parties.12

The above ruling is erroneous as it confused trade or business name with copyright.

The law on trademarks, service marks and trade names are found under Part III of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8293, or the Intellectual Code of the Philippines, while Part IV of the same law governs copyrights.

"Lavandera Ko," the mark in question in this case is being used as a trade name or specifically, a service
name since the business in which it pertains involves the rendering of laundry services. Under Section 121.1
of R.A. No. 8293, "mark" is defined as any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods (trademark) or
services (service mark) of an enterprise and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. As such,
the basic contention of the parties is, who has the better right to use "Lavandera Ko" as a service name
because Section 165.213 of the said law, guarantees the protection of trade names and business names even
prior to or without registration, against any unlawful act committed by third parties. A cause of action arises
when the subsequent use of any third party of such trade name or business name would likely mislead the
public as such act is considered unlawful. Hence, the RTC erred in denying the parties the proper
determination as to who has the ultimate right to use the said trade name by ruling that neither of them has
the right or a cause of action since "Lavandera Ko" is protected by a copyright.

By their very definitions, copyright and trade or service name are different. Copyright is the right of literary
property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law.14 An intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute
to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited
period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling
them.15 Trade name, on the other hand, is any designation which (a) is adopted and used by person to
denominate goods which he markets, or services which he renders, or business which he conducts, or has
come to be so used by other, and (b) through its association with such goods, services or business, has
acquired a special significance as the name thereof, and (c) the use of which for the purpose stated in (a) is
prohibited neither by legislative enactment nor by otherwise defined public policy.16

Section 172.1 of R.A. 8293 enumerates the following original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic
domain that are protected from the moment of their creation, thus:

172.1 Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred to as "works", are original intellectual creations in the
literary and artistic domain protected from the moment of their creation and shall include in particular:

(a) Books, pamphlets, articles and other writings;

(b) Periodicals and newspapers;
(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, dissertations prepared for oral delivery, whether or not reduced in writing
or other material form; 
(d) Letters; 
(e) Dramatic or dramatico-musical compositions; choreographic works or entertainment in dumb shows; 
(f) Musical compositions, with or without words; 
(g) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithography or other works of art; models
or designs for works of art; 
(h) Original ornamental designs or models for articles of manufacture, whether or not registrable as an
industrial design, and other works of applied art;
(i) Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches, charts and three-dimensional works relative to geography,
topography, architecture or science;
(j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific or technical character;
(k) Photographic works including works produced by a process analogous to photography; lantern slides; 
(l) Audiovisual works and cinematographic works and works produced by a process analogous to
cinematography or any process for making audio-visual recordings;
(m) Pictorial illustrations and advertisements;
(n) Computer programs; and 
(o) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and artistic works.

As such, "Lavandera Ko," being a musical composition with words is protected under the copyright law (Part
IV, R.A. No. 8293) and not under the trademarks, service marks and trade names law (Part III, R.A. No.
8293).

In connection therewith, the RTC's basis or source, an article appearing in a website,17 in ruling that the
song entitled "Lavandera Ko" is protected by a copyright, cannot be considered a subject of judicial notice
that does not need further authentication or verification. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts
that judges may properly take and act on without proof because these facts are already known to
them.18 Put differently, it is the assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional
evidentiary support. The principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing
evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.19 In Spouses
Latip v. Chua,20 this Court expounded on the nature of judicial notice, thus:

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or
discretionary on the courts, thus:

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and
symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court
assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is
not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of
his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.

We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case ofExpertravel &
Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, which cited State Prosecutors:

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be
said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1)
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which
are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus,
facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the
common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially
noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in
part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive
knowledge.

The article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks a requisite for it to be of judicial notice to the court
because such article is not well and authoritatively settled and is doubtful or uncertain. It must be
remembered that some articles appearing in the internet or on websites are easily edited and their sources
are unverifiable, thus, sole reliance on those articles is greatly discouraged.

Considering, therefore, the above premise, this Court deems it proper to remand the case to the RTC for its
proper disposition since this Court cannot, based on the records and some of the issues raised by both
parties such as the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of registration issued by the Intellectual Property
Office, make a factual determination as to who has the better right to use the trade/business/service name,
"Lavandera Ko."

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated January 25,
2016, of petitioner Fernando U. Juan is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated May 7, 2015 and
Resolution dated December 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED andSET ASIDE. This Court,
however, ORDERS the REMAND of this case to the RTC for its prompt disposition.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 138874-75             January 31, 2006

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

vs.
FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias "PACO;" JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias
"WESLEY;" ALBERT CAÑO alias "ALLAN PAHAK;" ARIEL BALANSAG; DAVIDSON
VALIENTE RUSIA alias ‘TISOY TAGALOG;" JAMES ANTHONY UY alias "WANGWANG;" and
JAMES ANDREW UY alias "MM," Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over one’s action.1 Our legal
system, for instance, does not punish a youth as it would an adult, and it sees youthful misconduct
as evidence of unreasoned or impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad of cases, we have applied the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority embodied in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code --
the rationale of which is to show mercy and some extent of leniency in favor of an accused who, by
reason of his age, is presumed to have acted with less discernment. The case at bar is another
instance when the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.

For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration2 filed by brothers James Anthony and James
Andrew, both surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of the penalties we imposed upon the latter on
the ground that he was a minor at the time the crimes were committed.

A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.

On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision3 convicting the Uy brothers, together with Francisco

Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag of the crimes
of (a) special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape;
and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos.
CBU 45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias

‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias
‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
 illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty
of DEATH by lethal injection;

(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias

‘PACO’; JOSMAN AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias
‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;

(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY who was a minor at
the time the crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case
No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention and
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
asMAXIMUM;

(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in
each case, the amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages; (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages; and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No.
7659, upon the finality of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
Office of the President for the possible exercise of Her Excellency’s pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration anchored on the following
grounds:

ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S.
UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16,
1997;

II

THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU
LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS
EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING.4

The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by Larrañaga, Aznar,
Adlawan, Caño and Balansag in their separate motions for reconsideration, we deemed it
appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a painstaking evaluation of every piece and specie of
evidence presented before the trial court in response to the movants’ plea for the reversal of their
conviction, still we are convinced that the movants’ guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we denied all the motions. However, left unresolved is
the issue of James Andrew’s minority.

Hence, this disquisition.

In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and two
hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time the crimes were committed. To substantiate such claim,
he begs leave and pleads that we admit at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live
Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. In the ultimate, he prays
that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.

Considering that the entry of James Andrew’s birth in the proffered Certificate of Live Birth is not
legible, we required the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato, as
well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James’ Certificate of Live Birth, and
thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the Uy brothers’ motion, solely on the issue of James
Andrew’s minority.

On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his comment. Attached therewith are clear
and legible copies of James’ Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the Office of the City Civil
Registrar of Cotobato and the National Statistics Office. Both documents bear the entry October 27,
1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he was indeed only 17 years and 262 days old when
the crimes were committed on July 16, 1997.

Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed on James Andrew be
modified as follows:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be reduced to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period,
as maximum, similar to the penalty imposed on his brother James Anthony in Criminal Case No.
CBU-45303.

The motion is meritorious.

Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the offender
is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph
next to the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:

xxx

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower than
the statutory penalty. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape, being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion
perpetua.5 On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion temporal.6 There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.7

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed
upon James Andrew; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the imposable penalty upon him is
twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our Decision dated February 3,
2004 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, James Andrew
Uy is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304,
the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen
(17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103911 October 13, 1995

EDGARDO E. LOPEZ, petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION), OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR and
ARNULFO M. AGLERON, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge
in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case,
except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the
judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to
establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely.

Section 1, Rule 129, of the Revised Rules of Court, however, provides that certain facts need not be
proved because they are judicially noticed by the Courts. Judicial notice takes the place of proof and
is equally as persuasive as actual evidence presented, whether testimonial or documentary.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether judicial notice can be taken of the fact that Petitioner
Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez took his oath as Municipal Mayor of Mati, Davao Oriental, and assumed
the position of Municipal Mayor only on February 2, 1988, in the face of the allegation in the
Information that the accused was already the Mayor of Mati on December 10, 1987, and, as such
Mayor, he connived with Gov. Leopoldo N. Lopez in accepting, receiving and using the ambulance in
question.

Mainly sought to be annulled in the herein Petition for Certiorari, upon the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, is the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division), denying Petitioner's motion to quash the Information, as amended, in Criminal Case No.
16987, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo E. Lopez.

Established, as may be gathered from the pleadings of the parties and the prosecutors' reports as to
law and the facts on their several preliminary investigations, are the following facts:

The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), represented by its General Manager, Fernando
O. Carrascoso, executed on December 10, 1987, a Deed of Donation  of one (1) cream-white
1

Mitsubishi L-300 van, for use as an ambulance, in favor of the Municipality of Mati, Province of
Davao Oriental. The municipality was represented by Provincial Governor Leopoldo N. Lopes, now
deceased. The donation was accepted by the said Governor Lopes in the very Deed of Donation
itself.

Immediately after the acceptance of the donation, the ambulance was shipped through the Solid
Shipping Lines from the North Harbor, Manila, to Davao Oriental via Davao City, a clearance for
shipment having been obtained from the Headquarters Constabulary Highway Patrol Group. Freight
charges were paid for by Governor Lopez. The Delivery Cargo Receipt, issued by the Terminal
Facilities & Services Corporation of Ilang, Davao City, indicated that the consignee of the ambulance
was Governor Lopez.

Hon. Salvador R Gutierrez was then acting as Officer-In-Charge of the Office of the Mayor of the
Municipality of Mati. When turning over the Office of the Mayor to Petitioner Edgardo E. Lopez, who
was elected as Mayor in the 1988 elections, Acting Mayor Gutierrez "forgot all about the
ambulance"  and in effect failed to inform Petitioner Lopez that an ambulance was donated to the
2

Municipality of Mati.

Days after the donation was effected, Governor Leopoldo N. Lopez was purged and Atty. Teodoro
Palma Gil was installed as OIC of the Office of the Provincial Governor of Davao Oriental. Mayoralty
OIC Gutierrez was made to understand by Acting Governor Palma Gil that the Mitsubishi van, to be
converted to an ambulance, was for the use of the Davao Provincial Hospital, but, since the hospital
is located in Mati, the Acting Governor asked that the municipality shoulder the expenses for: (1)
shipping the ambulance to Mati and (2) its conversion from a simple L-300 van into an ambulance.

The vehicle was insured  and registered  in the name of the Province of Davao Oriental by the late
3 4

Governor Lopez. Consequently, it was never turned over to the Municipality of Mati. 5

On September 17, 1988, while on its way to Davao City, the ambulance was stopped in Barangay
Barol, Municipality of Lupon, and set on fire and completely burned by unidentified armed men.

Whereupon, the political adversaries of Governor Lopez, making an issue of it, filed a complaint with
the Ombudsman, charging Gov. Leopoldo N. Lopez, the newly-elected Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez,
Isedronio G. Espadero, and Agustin F. Montefalcon with the offense of Violation of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act.
Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, a regularly deputized Ombudsman prosecutor, was made to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case. He issued a Resolution  ordering the dismissal of
6

the complaint for lack of merit.

The Ombudsman for some reason reopened the preliminary investigation and designated Graft
Investigating Officer Gay Maggie Balajadia as investigator. In a Resolution,  dated June 21, 1991,
7

Graft Investigator Balajadia recommended the filing of an Information for the Violation of R. A. 3019
against Gov. Leopoldo N. Lopez and Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez. The recommended Information was
filed on August 3, 1991 before the Sandiganbayan and was docketed as Criminal Case No. 16987.
The case was reinvestigated upon motion of both accused, but the prosecution, ironically through
another Lopez, Prosecutor Mario Lopez, reinstituted the case by filing the following Amended
Information  against Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez alone, because, by then, Gov. Leopoldo N. Lopez had
8

already passed away: 9

That on or about the 10th day of December, 1987, in the Province of Davao Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Mati, Davao Oriental,
while in the performance of his official functions, conspiring and confederating
with deceased Leopoldo N. Lopez, who was then the Provincial Governor of Davao
Oriental, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to
the Municipality of Mati through the following acts: deceased Leopoldo N. Lopez, with
evident bad faith and after having received without authority an "Ambulance Van"
described as a Cream White Mitsubishi L300 with Engine No. 4G62-DJ2407 donated
by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to the Municipality of Mati, failed to
deliver the same to the said municipality and instead registered it in the name of the
Province of Davao Oriental and used it as a service vehicle of the Province of Davao
Oriental, and accused Edgardo E. Lopez, being fully aware that the aforesaid
ambulance van was donated to his municipality for the use of his constituents,
through evident bad faith and manifest partiality failed to recover the same from
deceased Leopoldo Lopez, and instead acknowledged the Province of Davao
Oriental as the actual donee and allowed the latter appropriate the said ambulance
van, thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Mati and its residents who
were unjustifiably deprived of the ownership, possession and use of the aforesaid
vehicle as well as a health service extended to them by the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner Mayor Edgardo E. Lopez, as sole defendant in the case, moved to quash the Amended
Information upon the following grounds: (1) The Honorable Court (Sandiganbayan) has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) The criminal liability for the offense charged has been
extinguished, the Petitioner contending that, at the time the donation of the ambulance was effected,
he was only a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mati. The Municipality of Mati then had an
Acting Mayor in the person of Hon. Salvador R. Gutierrez. The donated vehicle was accepted and
received and used by and in the name of Provincial Governor Leopoldo N. Lopez. Consequently,
Petitioner Mayor Lopez had no participation in the acquisition, registration, and use of the vehicle in
question.

Accused petitioner, however, was elected as Municipal Mayor of Mati in the 1988 local elections.
Thus, on February 2, 1988, Petitioner Edgardo E. Lopez then took his oath of office   as Municipal
10

Mayor and assumed the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Mati, Davao Oriental. He took his
oath before Davao Regional Trial Court Judge Roque A. Agton.
Alleging that the Motion to Quash "reveals lack of legal or factual basis to justify the grant thereof",
and that the nature, scope and legal consequences of the inculpatory allegations in the Amended
Information remain to be ascertained during the trial, the Court a quo gave no merit to the motion
and, thus, denied it.

Pertinent portions of the questioned Resolution read:

A careful and meticulous analysis of the arguments advanced by accused-movant to

support the grounds relied upon in his "Motion to Quash", taken in the light of the
prosecution's opposition thereto, as well as the reply of the accused, clearly reveals
the lack of legal or factual basis to justify the grant thereof. Running pervasively
throughout accused-movant's pleadings are evidentiary matters which are more
appropriate for presentation during the trial. There appears to be an apparent
tendency on the part of accused-movant to confuse the existence of a prima
facie case, as determined after due preliminary investigation, with proof beyond
reasonable doubt, which can only be ascertained after trial on the merits.

xxx xxx xxx

Accused-movant contends that this Court has no jurisdiction over him for the offense
charge, citing the date alleged in the Amended Information, which reads, "that on or
about the 10th day of December, 1987", and the fact that he became the Mayor of
Mati, Davao Oriental, only on February 2, 1988 when he took his oath of office as the
duly-elected mayor after the 1988 elections. However, as found by Prosecutor Mario
V. Lopez, who conducted the reinvestigation of this case and who filed the Amended
Information, accused-movant's participation is subsequent to December 10, 1987
and continued up to July 15, 1988 and October 5, 1990, during which period,
accused-movant had committed the following acts, to wit:

. . . accused Edgardo E. Lopez, being fully aware that the aforesaid

ambulance van was donated to his municipality for the use of his
constituents, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality failed to
recover the same from deceased Leopoldo Lopez and instead
acknowledged the Province of Davao Oriental as the actual donee
and allowed the latter to appropriate the said ambulance van, thereby
causing undue injury to the Municipality of Mati and its residents who
were unjustifiably deprived of the ownership, possession and use of
the aforesaid vehicle as well as a health service extended to them by
the Government.

The nature, scope and legal consequences of the inculpatory allegations in the
Amended Information, with respect to the accused-movant, remains to be
ascertained during the trial. Furthermore, We are of the considered opinion that
inasmuch as conspiracy has been alleged between the two (2) accused herein, then
there can be no question that this Court has jurisdiction over both or either of them.
And inasmuch as it is clearly alleged in the Amended Information, supported by
Prosecutor Lopez' Order of December 4, 1991, (Pp. 108-109, ibid), accused-movant
not only failed but likewise allowed his co-accused (Leopoldo Lopez) to appropriate
the ambulance van but also allegedly sent two (2) letters to Gov. Lopez waiving the
right of the municipality of Mati to receive said van, which are dated July 15, 1988
and October 5, 1990, without any authorization from the Sangguniang Bayan, during
which period of time, the accused-movant was already the municipal mayor, then it is
 crystal clear that this Court has jurisdiction not only over the offense charged but also
over the persons of the accused, including accused-movant. Moreover, there being a
charge of conspiracy, the death of any of the alleged co-conspirators does not
extinguish the alleged criminal liability of the surviving co-conspirator, which is quite
clear and evident from the provisions of Articles 89 and 90 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Now comes the herein petition praying for the issuance of a writ of certiorari to annul this resolution
of denial of the said Motion to Quash upon the following grounds:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY IN RULING THAT IT HAS

JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY IN RULING THAT THE

DEFENSES RAISED BY PETITIONER ARE PROPERLY INVOCABLE ONLY
DURING TRIAL ON THE MERITS.

III. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED ARBITRARILY IN REFUSING TO PASS

UPON THE VALIDITY OF THE DONATION.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a comment thereto, in an effort to refute the foregoing
grounds. We note the reply thereto, the rejoinder, the sur-rejoinder and the Memoranda of the
parties.

We find the petition to be impressed with merit.

We uphold the submission that the factual defenses of petitioner are matters within the concept of
mandatory judicial notice. While it is true that, as pontificated by the Court a quo, factual defenses
on the part of the accused are evidentiary matters which may be presented only during trial on the
merits, the facts alleged by the accused are facts admitted, whether directly or impliedly, in
pleadings of the prosecution and in the reports of the Provincial Prosecutor of Davao Oriental and
Graft Investigator Gay Maggie Balajadia. Consequently, the disposition of the matter in the
questioned Resolution which states that "The nature, scope and legal consequences of the
inculpatory allegations in the Amended Information, with respect to accused-movant, remains (sic) to
be ascertained during the trial," is not at all correct.

Judicial notice may be taken of petitioner's oath taking before the Regional Trial Court Judge of Mati,
Davao Oriental, the Hon. Roque A. Agton, as evidenced by a certification from the Records Officer
of the office of the Provincial Governor. The oath taking partakes of an official act, while the
certification is an official act of an official of the Executive Department of the government.

We had the occasion to make rulings on a similar issue. In People vs. Navarro & Atienza, 75 Phil.
516, for example, the accused, the Acting Provincial Governor and the Provincial Warden were
charged with Arbitrary Detention for having allegedly committed the private complainant to prison
without legal grounds. At pre-trial, it was conceded by the Fiscal that the offended parties were
detained by order of the Commanding General, Western Visayas Task Force, United States Army.
The accused thereupon filed a Motion to Quash upon the ground that the facts charged in the
Information did not constitute an offense. The trial court granted the motion, from which the Solicitor
General appealed, alleging that if the Information must be quashed on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, elementary logic dictates that the signed facts must be
examined to determine the sufficiency of the allegations.

In turning down the appeal, We ruled that:

It must be noted that the section of the rule (sec. 2 [a], Rule 113) permitting a motion
to quash on the ground that "the facts do not constitute an offense" omits reference
to the facts "detailed in the information". Other sections of the same rule would imply
that the issue is restricted to those alleged in the information (see secs. 9 and 10,
Rule 113). Prima facie, the "facts charged" are those described in the complaint, but
they may be amplified or qualified by others appearing to be additional
circumstances, upon admissions could anyway be submitted by him as amendments
to the information. It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the
consideration of the motion the parties and the judge were precluded from
considering the facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were
not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions
the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the
information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of
his evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor,
admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently
reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not that all accused
are convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to
prohibit the court from considering those admission, and deciding accordingly, in the
interest of a speedy administration of justice. (People v. Navarro, 75 Phil. 516, 518-
519).

Reiterating Navarro, this Court ruled in People vs. De la Rosa, 98 SCRA 191, that:

As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the
information do not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter
should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity
are hypothetically admitted. However, as held in the case of People v. Navarro, 75
Phil. 516, additional facts not alleged in the information, admitted or not denied by
the prosecution may be invoked in support of the motion to quash. (People v. De la
Rosa, supra. at 196-197).

And in Milo vs. Salanga, 152 SCRA 113, We likewise ruled that:

This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in

the information. Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such a
motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal
liability, prescription and former jeopardy. In the case of U.S. v. Perez, this Court held
that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those
alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when the
facts are admitted by the prosecution. (Milo v. Salanga, supra, at 121).

Since the prosecution has admitted the fact that petitioner was not yet the Municipal Mayor on or
about December 10, 1987 and that Petitioner Mayor Lopez became the Municipal Mayor only after
the date of the commission of the offense charged, such an admission constitutes as a judicial
admission which is binding upon the prosecution. It is pointed out by the petitioner that public
respondents, in their Comment, dated April 13, 1992, stated that:
 Bur perhaps, Respondent Court, aside from denying the Motion to Quash should
have likewise ordered a further amendment of the Amended Information to reflect the
correct date of the commission of the crime considering that (1) the prosecution itself
admitted that "December 10, 1987" was the date the late Governor Lopez accepted
the ambulance van donated by the PCSO to municipality of Mati, Davao Oriental . . .
(Comment, p. 14).

II

The accusation indeed avers that the accused Edgardo E. Lopez was the Municipal Mayor of Mati,
Davao Oriental, on December 10, 1987; that, on said date, he connived with Provincial Governor
Leopoldo N. Lopez: (1) in receiving without authority an "Ambulance Van" donated by the PCSO to
the Municipality of Mati, (2) in failing to deliver the vehicle to Mati, and (3) in registering the vehicle in
the name of the Province of Davao Oriental.

Considering the admitted fact that, on December 10, 1987, the accused Edgardo E. Lopez was not
yet the Municipal Mayor of Mati; that the acceptance of the donation and the receipt of the vehicle in
question were acts perpetrated by Governor Leopoldo N. Lopez alone, the accusation of Edgardo E.
Lopez has been falsely made. This was the very reason for the dismissal of the case by Provincial
Prosecutor Salvador M. Bijis. That the case should be assigned to another prosecutor so that the
case can be filed in court smacks of manifest partiality in favor of complainants. The accused claims
that the hand of dirty politics and politicians entered the picture.

The facts as stated even in the Amended Information, in the face of the verity that accused Edgardo
E. Lopez was not yet the Mayor on December 10, 1987, are such hollow and false allegations that
they cannot be proven as against accused Edgardo E. Lopez.

III

We do not see any anomaly in the situation where a motor vehicle, while on paper donated to the
Municipality of Mati, is in fact accepted by the Province of Davao Oriental, of which Mati is the
capital, through its Provincial Governor; is outfitted by the province into a hospital ambulance; and is
used by the Davao Oriental Provincial Hospital located in and serving the people of the Municipality
of Mati.

The Provincial Prosecutor of Davao Oriental, after conducting the preliminary investigation of this
case, dismissed it for lack of merit, and took occasion to state:

Looking deeper on some matters not clearly shown by the records, it should be
noticed that the Donee, the Municipality of Mati, does not run or have a hospital or
medical clinic of its own. The Government Hospital existing in the Municipality of Mati
is the Davao Oriental Provincial Hospital. The Deed of Donation speaks of One (1)
Ambulance and said Donation was "pursuant to President Corazon C. Aquino's
campaign for better health and medical facilities" Undoubtedly, the One (1)
Ambulance should be for the use of either a Government Hospital or clinic for which
the Donee, the Municipality of Mati, has none. The donation of that One (1)
Ambulance for the Municipality of Mati is, therefore, for no purpose at all. Inevitably,
the Donation was intended for the Davao Oriental Provincial Hospital situated within
the territorial area of the Municipality of Mati.

The donation should have rightfully been made in favor of the Province of Davao
Oriental and not of the Municipality of Mati.  11
It is a strange and convoluted idea to prosecute the public officials involved herein when there was
no prejudice to people or country. The ambulance was utilized for public health purposes by the
Davao Oriental Provincial Hospital, a public health center located in the very municipality alleged to
have been prejudiced by the accused Governor's failure to deliver the ambulance to Mati.

It is obvious that, while the Mitsubishi L-300 van was on paper donated to the Municipality of Mati,
the vehicle was in spirit and in actuality intended for the use of the Davao Oriental Provincial
Hospital. President Corazon C. Aquino's Health Services Program called on the PCSO to provide
ambulances to municipalities. State government hospitals, it is true, are supposed to be assigned
vehicles for use as ambulances to be paid for from their respective budget appropriations, but
Governor Lopez was resourceful enough to appropriate a Mitsubishi L-300 van, which, while placed
in the name of the Municipality of Mati, was intended for the use of the Davao Oriental Provincial
Hospital. Mati has no use for an ambulance because it has no hospital or health clinic of its own.
Had the vehicle in question been delivered to the Municipality of Mati, the vehicle was sure to wind
up as a service vehicle for the Municipal Mayor because the municipal government could not have
used it as an ambulance. Deprived of the use of the vehicle would have been the accused Mayor
himself. Thus, it is incongruous to accuse Mayor Lopez for depriving himself of the use of the
vehicle.

Consequently, it is our holding that Criminal Case No. 16987 which was filed against the petitioner
alone ought to be dismissed for lack of probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the herein Petition for Certiorari is granted. Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No.
16987, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo E. Lopez, is hereby ordered dismissed, with
costs de officio.

The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

SECOND DIVISION

G. R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005

CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA, Petitioners, 

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of
1 

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which affirmed, with modification, the trial court’s decision finding
2 

petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal Case No. 9107.

Culled from the records are the following facts:

Petitioner Torralba was the host of a radio program called "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" which was aired
over the radio station DYFX in Cebu City. On 12 September 1994, an information for libel was filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagbilaran City against petitioner Torralba. The information
states:

The undersigned, City Prosecutor II, City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, hereby accuses CIRSE
FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA for the crime of Libel, committed as follows:

That, on or about the 11th day of April, 1994, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate and malicious intent of maligning, impeaching and
discrediting the honesty, integrity, reputation, prestige and honor of late CFI Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas, who was during his [lifetime] a CFI Judge of Cebu and a man of good reputation and
social standing in the community and for the purpose of exposing him to public hatred, contempt,
disrespect and ridicule, in his radio program "TUG-ANI AND LUNGSOD" (TELL THE PEOPLE) over
radio station DYFX, openly, publicly and repeatedly announce[d] the following: "KINING MGA
HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS UG CASTOR HONTANOSAS, MGA COLLABORATOR
SA PANAHON SA GUERRA. SA ATO PA, TRAYDOR SA YUTANG NATAWHAN." X X X. "DUNAY
DUGO NGA PAGKATRAYDOR ANG AMAHAN NI MANOLING HONTANOSAS," which in English
means: "THESE HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR HONTANOSAS, ARE
COLLABORATORS DURING THE WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE TRAITORS TO THE
LAND OF THEIR BIRTH." X X X. "THE FATHER OF MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD
TREACHEROUS BLOOD," and other words of similar import, thereby maliciously exposing the
family of the late Judge Agapito Hontanosas including Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas, one of the
3 

legitimate children of [the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor,
discredit, contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer social humiliation, embarrassment,
wounded feelings and mental anguish, to the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L.
Hontanosas in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Article 355 of the same Code.

City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, September 8, 1994.

(SGD.) ADRIANO P. MONTES

City Prosecutor II

APPROVED:

(SGD) MARIANO CAPAYAS

City Prosecutor 4
Upon arraignment on 12 March 1996, petitioner Torralba pleaded not guilty to the crime he was
charged with.5

On 14 May 1998, petitioner Torralba filed before the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City, where Crim.
Case No. 9107 was raffled off, a motion for consolidation alleging therein that private complainant
6 

Atty. Manuel Hontanosas (Atty. Hontanosas) filed a total of four (4) criminal cases for libel against
petitioner Torralba, three of which – Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 – were then
pending with the RTC, Branch III, Tagbilaran City. As the evidence for the prosecution as well as the
defense were substantially the same, petitioner Torralba moved that Crim. Case No. 9107 be
consolidated with the three other cases so as to save time, effort, and to facilitate the early
disposition of these cases.

In its order dated 25 May 1998, the motion for consolidation filed by petitioner Torralba was granted
7 

by the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.

During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution presented as witnesses
Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and Gabriel Sarmiento.

Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI)
and was at that time the assigned manager of the port in Tagbilaran City. According to him,
sometime during the Marcos administration, petitioner Torralba sought TMSI’s sponsorship of his
radio program. This request was approved by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then
the president of TMSI. During the existence of said sponsorship agreement, the management of
TMSI noticed that petitioner Torralba was persistently attacking former Bureau of Internal Revenue
Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector. Fearing
that the Toledos would think that TMSI was behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the
management of TMSI decided to cease sponsoring petitioner Torralba’s radio show. In effect, the
TMSI sponsored "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" for only a month at the cost of ₱500.00.

Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim testified that petitioner
Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum wage law and that said corporation was
charging higher handling rates than what it was supposed to collect.

On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in petitioner Torralba’s
radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after said incident, however, petitioner Torralba
resumed his assault on TMSI and its management. It was petitioner Torralba’s relentless badgering
of TMSI which allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralba’s radio broadcasts. Three of
the tape recordings were introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to wit:

Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 1994 8

Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 1994 9

Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 1994 10

During his testimony, Lim admitted that he did not know how to operate a tape recorder and that he
asked either his adopted daughter, Shirly Lim, or his housemaid to record petitioner Torralba’s radio
program. He maintained, however, that he was near the radio whenever the recording took place
and had actually heard petitioner Torralba’s radio program while it was being taped. This prompted
petitioner Torralba to pose a continuing objection to the admission of the said tape recordings for
lack of proper authentication by the person who actually made the recordings. In the case of the
subject tape recordings, Lim admitted that they were recorded by Shirly Lim. The trial court
provisionally admitted the tape recordings subject to the presentation by the prosecution of Shirly
Lim for the proper authentication of said pieces of evidence. Despite petitioner Torralba’s objection
to the formal offer of these pieces of evidence, the court a quo eventually admitted the three tape
recordings into evidence. 11

It was revealed during Lim’s cross-examination that petitioner Torralba previously instituted a
12 

criminal action for libel against the former arising from an article published in the Sunday Post, a
13 

newspaper of general circulation in the provinces of Cebu and Bohol. In said case, Lim was found
guilty as charged by the trial court and this decision was subsequently affirmed, with modification,
14 

by the Court of Appeals in its decision promulgated on 29 July 1996 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16413
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Segundo Lim and Boy Guingguing." In our resolution of 04
15 

December 1996, we denied Lim’s petition for review on certiorari. 16

For his part, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas testified that he was at that time the chairman and
manager of TMSI; that on 20 January 1994, Lim presented to him a tape recording of petitioner
Torralba’s radio program aired on 18 January 1994 during which petitioner Torralba allegedly
criticized him and stated that he was a person who could not be trusted; that in his radio show on 25
January 1994, petitioner Torralba mentioned that "he was now [wary] to interview any one because
he had a sad experience with someone who betrayed him and this ‘someone’ was like his father who
was a collaborator"; that on 12 April 1994, Lim brought to his office a tape recording of petitioner
Torralba’s radio program of 11 April 1994 during which petitioner Torralba averred that the
Hontanosas were traitors to the land of their birth; that Judge Agapito Hontanosas and Castor
Hontanosas were collaborators during the Japanese occupation; and that after he informed his
siblings regarding this, they asked him to institute a case against petitioner Torralba.
17

When he was cross-examined by petitioner Torralba’s counsel, private complainant Atty.

Hontanosas disclosed that he did not actually hear petitioner Torralba’s radio broadcasts and he
merely relied on the tape recordings presented to him by Lim as he believed them to be genuine. 18

Sarmiento testified that he was the former court stenographer and interpreter of RTC, Branch 3,
Tagbilaran City, and that he translated the contents of the tape recordings in 1994 upon the request
of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas.

The defense presented, as its sole witness, petitioner Torralba himself. Petitioner Torralba
maintained that he was a member of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas and other civic
organizations in Cebu. In the course of his profession as a radio broadcaster, he allegedly received
complaints regarding the services of TMSI particularly with respect to the laborers’ low pay and
exhorbitant rates being charged for the arrastre services. As he was in favor of balanced
programming, petitioner Torralba requested TMSI to send a representative to his radio show in order
to give the corporation an opportunity to address the issues leveled against it; thus, the radio
interview of private complainant Atty. Hontanosas on 
17 December 1993.

When petitioner Torralba was cross-examined by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, he denied
19 

having called former CFI Judge Hontanosas a traitor during his 11 April 1994 radio broadcast.
Petitioner Torralba admitted, though, that during the 17 December 1993 appearance of private
complainant Atty. Hontanosas in his radio program, he did ask the latter if he was in any way related
to the late CFI Judge Hontanosas. Petitioner Torralba averred that he posed said question as mere
backgrounder on his interviewee.
On 24 August 2000, the trial court rendered an omnibus decision acquitting petitioner Torralba in
20 

Crim. Cases No. 8956, No. 8957, and No. 8958 but holding him guilty of the crime of libel in Crim.
Case No. 9107. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby ACQUITS from criminal liability herein
accused Cirse Francisco Choy Torralba of the charges alluded in Criminal Cases Nos. 8956, 8957,
and 8958 being an exercise of legitimate self-defense, as afore-discussed. Consequently, the
corresponding cash bonds of the accused in said cases as shown by OR No. 5301156, No.
5301157, and No. 5301158, all dated February 23, 2000, issued by the Clerk of Court of Multiple
Salas in the amount of P4,200.00 each representing cash deposits therefore are hereby cancelled
and released.

However, the Court finds the same accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No.
9107 for his unwarranted blackening of the memory of the late Hon. CFI Judge Agapito Y.
Hontanosas through the air lanes in his radio program resulting to the dishonor and wounded
feelings of his children, grandchildren, relatives, friends, and close associates. For this, the Court
hereby sentences the accused to imprisonment for an indeterminate period of FOUR MONTHS of
Arresto Mayor to THREE YEARS of Prision Correccional medium period pursuant to Art. 353 in
relation to Art. 354 and Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code under which the instant case falls.
Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas for moral
damages suffered in the amount of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as prayed for,
considering their good reputation and high social standing in the community and the gravity of the
dishonor and public humiliation caused. 21

Petitioner Torralba seasonably filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which, in the challenged
decision before us, affirmed, with modification, the findings of the court a quo, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the modification that

accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor to
two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional and to pay moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00. 22

Hence, the present recourse where petitioner Torralba raises the following issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKING THROUGH ITS SPECIAL FIFTEENTH

DIVISION GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT A
QUO (WITH MODIFICATION), CONVICTING PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] FOR THE
CRIME OF LIBEL AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLES 353 AND 355 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE BASED SOLELY ON THE ALLEGED TESTIMONY OF SEGUNDO
LIM . . . AS BORNE OUT BY THE STENOGRAPHIC NOTES WOULD NOT SUPPORT THE
FINDING THAT HE TESTIFIED ON THE MALICIOUS IMPUTATIONS PURPORTEDLY MADE BY
PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9107.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY COMMITTED AN ERROR IN ADMITTING

IN EVIDENCE AN UNAUTHENTICATED AND SPURIOUS TAPE RECORD OF A RADIO
BROADCAST (EXHIBIT "D") ALLEGEDLY BY HEREIN PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA]
ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE LATTER WAS CONVICTED FOR THE CRIME OF LIBEL.
 III

ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] MADE

UTTERANCES CONTAINED IN THE TAPE RECORD MARKED AS EXHIBIT "D," THE
HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE PRIVILEGE[D] NATURE
OF HIS ALLEGED STATEMENTS IN FEALTY ADHERRENCE TO THE LANDMARK DECISION OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN BORJAL VS. CA, 301 SCRA 01 (JAN. 14, 1999).

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN AWARDING DAMAGES

AGAINST THE PETITIONER ABSENT ANY SHOWING OF EVIDENT BAD FAITH ON THE PART
OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT [TORRALBA] WHO ACTED WITH UBERIMA
FIDES (OVERWHELMING GOOD FAITH) IN EXERCISING THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
ENSHRINED FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (ARTICLE 2220, NEW CIVIL CODE). 23

This Court deems it proper to first resolve the issue of the propriety of the lower court’s admission in
evidence of the 11 April 1994 tape recording. 
Oddly, this matter was not addressed head-on by the Office of the Solicitor General in its comment.

Petitioner Torralba vigorously argues that the court a quo should not have given considerable weight
on the tape recording in question as it was not duly authenticated by Lim’s adopted daughter, Shirly
Lim. Without said authentication, petitioner Torralba continues, the tape recording is incompetent
and inadmissible evidence. We agree.

It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of its form where a proper
24 

foundation has been laid to guarantee the genuineness of the recording. In our jurisdiction, it is a
25 

rudimentary rule of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and given
probative value, the following requisites must first be established, to wit:

(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;

(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;

(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording;

(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made;

(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;

(6) identification of the speakers; and

(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement. 26

In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the recording device as regards its
operation, his method of operating it, the accuracy of the recordings, and the identities of the
persons speaking laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the recordings. Likewise, a
27 

witness’ declaration that the sound recording represents a true portrayal of the voices contained
therein satisfies the requirement of authentication. The party seeking the introduction in evidence of
28 

a tape recording bears the burden of going forth with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is
an accurate reproduction of the conversation recorded. 29
These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of susceptibility to tampering of
tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of
a recording provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for the preservation
of the recording and for its protection against tampering.30

In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for the admissibility of the tape
recording was not adhered to. It bears stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand
that he was not familiar at all with the process of tape recording and that he had to instruct his
31 

adopted daughter to record petitioner Torralba’s radio broadcasts, thus:

ATTY. HONTANOSAS:

q Was this radio program of the accused recorded on April 11, 1994?

a Yes, sir.

q Who recorded the same radio program of April 11, 1994?

a It was my adopted daughter whom I ordered to tape recorded the radio program of Choy
Torralba.32

Clearly, Shirly Lim, the person who actually recorded petitioner Torralba’s radio show on 11 April
1994, should have been presented by the prosecution in order to lay the proper foundation for the
admission of the purported tape recording for said date. Without the requisite authentication, there
was no basis for the trial court to admit the tape recording – Exhibit "D" – in evidence.

In view of our disallowance of the 11 April 1994 tape recording, we are constrained to examine the
records of this case in order to determine the sufficiency of evidence stacked against petitioner
Torralba, bearing in mind that in criminal cases, the guilt of the accused can only be sustained upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In his comprehensive book on evidence, our former colleague, Justice Ricardo Francisco, wrote that
"[e]vidence of a message or a speech by means of radio broadcast is admissible as evidence when
the identity of the speaker is established either by the testimony of a witness who saw him broadcast
his message or speech, or by the witness’ recognition of the voice of the speaker." 33

The records of this case are bereft of any proof that a witness saw petitioner Torralba broadcast the
alleged libelous remarks on 11 April 1994. Lim, however, stated that while petitioner Torralba’s radio
program on that date was being tape recorded by his adopted daughter, he was so near the radio
that he could even touch the same. In effect, Lim was implying that he was listening to "Tug-Ani ang
34 

Lungsod" at that time. In our view, such bare assertion on the part of Lim, uncorroborated as it was
by any other evidence, fails to meet the standard that a witness must be able to "recognize the voice
of the speaker." Being near the radio is one thing; actually listening to the radio broadcast and
recognizing the voice of the speaker is another. Indeed, a person may be in close proximity to said
device without necessarily listening to the contents of a radio broadcast or to what a radio
commentator is saying over the airwaves.

What further undermines the credibility of Lim’s testimony is the fact that he had an ax to grind
against petitioner Torralba as he was previously accused by the latter with the crime of libel and for
which he was found guilty as charged by the court. Surely then, Lim could not present himself as an
"uninterested witness" whose testimony merits significance from this Court.
Nor is this Court inclined to confer probative value on the testimony of private complainant Atty.
Hontanosas particularly in the light of his declaration that he did not listen to petitioner Torralba’s
radio show subject of this petition. He simply relied on the tape recording handed over to him by Lim.

Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional presumption
of innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt -- one which
requires moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those
who are to act upon it. As we have so stated in the past –
35 

… Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this
standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below
and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely
by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against
him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. 36

Confronted with what the State was able to present as evidence against petitioner Torralba, this
Court is compelled to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals due to insufficiency of evidence
meriting a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision promulgated on 22 May 2002 of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the omnibus decision dated 24 August 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Tagbilaran City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, a new one is
entered ACQUITTING petitioner Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba of the crime of libel. The cash
bond posted by said petitioner is ordered released to him subject to the usual auditing and
accounting procedures. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

January 8, 2018

G.R. No. 210766

MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON, Petitioner 
vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari  are the August 29, 2013 Decision  of the Court of
1 2

Appeals (CA) and its January 6, 2014 Resolution  in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662, which reversed and set
3

aside the November 12, 2010 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch
4

260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.

Factual Antecedents

On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a. Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed
a Petition  for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code of the
5

Philippines  (Family Code). This was docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
6

It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were
married before the Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church, Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said
marriage produced four children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they started living
together, petitioner noticed that respondent was "dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the
expense of the family's welfare, extremely vain physically and spiritually,"  and a compulsive
7

gambler; that respondent was immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties; that
respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man, and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's
abnormal behavior made him completely unable to render any help, support, or assistance to her;
and that because she could expect no help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled
to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole breadwinner.

Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition, respondent was confined at Metro
Psych Facility,  a rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's attending psychiatrist,
8

Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:

Based on history, mental status examination and observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering from
Pathological Gambling as manifested by:

a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen
in his stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances[;]

b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired
effect[;]

c. lies to family members or others to conceal the extent of [his] involvement with gambling[;]

d. committed illegal acts such as forging the signature of his wife, issuing bouncing checks in
order to finance his gambling[;]

e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife, lost the respect of his children, lost a good
career in banking because of gambling[;]
 f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to provide money to relieve a desperate
fmancial situation caused by gambling[;]

While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in] behavioral changes as a young boy, it would
be difficult to say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and 2006 [are] etiologically
related to the general medical condition that occurred in his childhood.

Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of behavior that deviates markedly from
the expectations of our culture as manifested in the following areas:

a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own] self, other people, and events[;]

b. his emotional response[;]

c. his poor impulse control[;]

Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to significant impairment in social, occupational
and interpersonal relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has persisted for several years, and can
be traced back [to] his adolescence since he started gambling while in high school. He is therefore
diagnosed to be suffering from Personality Disorder.

All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing his marital obligations. 9

Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a "distraught" family and had a
"dysfunctional" childhood; that respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his parents as the
10

youngest child for some time; but that these parental love, care and protection were, however,
transferred to his youngest brother who was born when respondent was almost five years old; and
that these factors caused respondent emotional devastation from which he never recovered.

Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a high school student, was already
betting on jai alai. She also claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality disorders, but
that she did not attain her goal.

Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to
govern their prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no conjugal assets or debts.

On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer. 11

Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that "psychological incapacity" must be

characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present in the instant
case because petitioner's allegations are not supported by facts.

Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed to render any help, support or
assistance to petitioner and their family; that the family home where petitioner and their children are
living was in fact his own capital property; that his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not
pertain to the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders that would satisfy the standards
required to obtain a decree of nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing more than a
complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage who wants to get out of it; that contrary to
petitioner's claim that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree in business
administration, and is a bank employee, and, that it was money problem, and not his alleged
personality disorder, that is the wall that divided him and petitioner.
Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the basis for the conclusions of the psychiatrist
to the effect that he is suffering from pathological gambling and personality disorder; that petitioner's
allegation that he came from a distraught family and that he suffered emotional devastation is vague,
and bereft of particular details, and even slanderous; and that assuming that he had not acted the
way petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions and behavior are not psychological
illnesses or personality disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin to hypertension and
allied sicknesses, and that these physical illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders that
were present at the time of his marriage with petitioner.

Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had conjugal assets and debts; that the land
where their family home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home is their conjugal
property; that he and petitioner also have a house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts
that are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have investments in shares of stocks,
cars, household appliances, furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets because they
came from petitioner's salaries and his (respondent's) own inheritance money.

Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the present Petition, petitioner had caused him
to be admitted into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of his confinement and
treatment in this psychiatric facility, he has incurred medical expenses and professional medical
fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all their finances and conjugal assets it stands to
reason that he should be awarded '"spousal support."

On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order. 12

Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson
(Jose), and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio.

On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence which included a photocopy of
the marriage contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son Jose’s Judicial Affidavit
dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008;
Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical
Summary); her (petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751 registered in the names of the parties' four children:, and a
notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses of Funds for tJ1e period November
1999 to March 31, 2008" executed by petitioner and described as a detailed summary of expenses
paid for with the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes
Village.
13

Respondent filed his Comment thereon. 14

On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits. 15

On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss  "on the ground that the totality of evidence
16

presented by petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x to comply with the
essential martial obligations x x x".  Petitioner filed her Opposition  thereto, and respondent
17 18

tendered his Comment thereon. 19

On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and stood pat on its March 29,
2010 Order. 20
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s counsel manifested that his client was waiving
the right to present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also moved that the Petition at
bar be submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on the record. The RTC thus
declared the case submitted for decision. 21

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the Petition and declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s psychological
incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is GRANTED. Judgment is

hereby rendered[:]

1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage between MARIA CONCEPCION v. SINGSON

a.k.a. CONCEPCION N. SINGSON and BENJAMIN L SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in
Mandaluyong City or any other marriage between them on the ground of psychological' incapacity of
the respondent.

2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City and the National Statistics Office to
cancel the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in the Registry of
Marriage.

There are no other issues in this case.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrars ofMandaluyong City and
Parañaque City, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register General (National
Statistics Office) and the Office of the City Prosecutor, Parañaque City.

SO ORDERED. 22

The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the family Code are present in the instant case because the totality of evidence showed that
respondent is suffering from a psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has juridical
antecedence.

The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio convincingly
showed that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations;
that respondent's inability to perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71 of the
Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological abnormality arising from a pathological and
utterly irresistible urge to gamble.

The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal that respondent is suffering
from Personality Disorder known as Pathological Gambling."  It ruled that it has been shown
23

that this personality disorder was present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest
only later; that because of this personality disorder respondent had already jeopardized his
relationship with his family; and that respondent's psychological disorder hinders the performance of
his obligations as a husband and as a father.

Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in common by spouses was donated in favor of
the parties' children as evidenced by TCT No.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.

But in its older dated January 6, 2011,  the RTC denied respondent's motion for reconsideration. It
24

reiterated that the expert witness had adequately established that respondent is suffering from
"Pathological Gambling Personality Disorder'' which is grave, permanent, and has juridical
antecedence. On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal  which was given due
25

course by the RTC in its order  dated February 28, 2011.

26

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the RTC, and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 November 2010 issued by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070, declaring the marriage
between Maria Concepcion N. Singson and Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. 27

The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations, which in this case, was
not at all proven to be grave or serious, much less incurable, and furthermore was not existing at the
time of the marriage. What is more, the CA declared that any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage, and against its dissolution and nullity, in obedience
to the mandate of the Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case, petitioner failed to
discharge the burden of proving that respondent is suffering from a serious or grave psychological
disorder that completely disables or incapacitates him from understanding and discharging the
essential obligations of the marital union.

According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the downright or utter incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did not go along with the RTC,
which placed heavy reliance on Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations due to a personality disorder known as
pathological gambling. The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that respondent's pathological
gambling was grave or serious, the evidence in fact showed that the latter was truly capable of
carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because he had a job, had provided money for the
family from the sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the land on which the family home
was built, and he also lives in the family home with petitioner and their children.

On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from incapacity
rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that
respondent's alleged pathological gambling arose after the marriage; that in fact petitioner admitted
that she was not aware of any gambling by respondent before they got married; that petitioner
moreover acknowledged that respondent was a kind and a caring person when he was courting her;
that petitioner likewise admitted that respondent also brought petitioner to the hospital during all four
instances when she gave birth to their four children.

In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported pathological gambling was not proven to
be incurable or permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment since 2003 and has
been responding to the treatment.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration  of the CA's Decision. But her motion was denied by the CA in
28

its Resolution of January 6, 2014. 29

Issue

Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the following question –

[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE [RTC]. 30

Petitioner's Arguments

In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution, and in asking for the
reinstatement of the RTC Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition,  Reply,  and
31 32

Memorandum  that respondent's psychological incapacity had been duly proved in court, including
33

its juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity.

First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform the marital duties of mutual love, respect,
and support; that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by the testimonies of
petitioner end her son Jose both of whom demonstrated that respondent’s psychological incapacity
is grave or serious rendering him incapable to perform the essential marital obligations; that for his
pan, respondent had adduced no proof that he (respondent) is capable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage for the reason that everything that the family had saved and built had
been squandered by respondent; and that respondent's confinement at the rehabilitation facility is
itself proof of the gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity.

Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, as
shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such psychological
incapacity, which included pathological gambling, can be traced back when respondents was
already betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was not known to his family; that the Clinical
Summary was based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by respondent’s sister, and
by respondent himself; that such juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor overthrown by
countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be traced back to respondent’s flawed
relationship with his parents which developed into a psychological disorder that existed before the
marriage.

Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that personality disorders
are generally incurable and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically; that in this case
the Clinical Summary; had pointed out that respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is
only at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio had affirmed that personality
disorders are incurable.

Respondent’s Arguments

In his Comment  and Memorandum,  respondent counters that the assailed CA Decision should be
34 35

affirmed. He argues that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same grounds raised by
petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly
that he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations,
hence there is no basis to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.

Our Ruling
The Petition will not succeed.

It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our
Constitution and statutory laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of
the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same
rests at all times upon the petitioner.  "The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the
36

family as the basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of this,
the Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties."
37

Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life" and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution."

In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this social institution by suing out pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code, which provides that:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order
227)

Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-entrenched case law rulings interpreting
and construing the quoted Article, to wit:

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
should refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
In Santos v. CA (Santos), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved). The Court laid down more
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic
of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the Molina guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate the
basic requirements that the Court established in Santos. 38

In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held that petitioner failed to prove that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the
time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.

At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting findings
between the trial court and the appellate court.  We thus did peruse and review the records, and we
39

are satisfied that the CA correctly found that respondent has the capability and ability to perform his
duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather general statement that respondent's
psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic obligations as a husband
and a father.

We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's
psychological incapacity was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since
"[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family from the sale of his property; provided the
land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home with petitioner-appellee and
their children."
40

Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was working
at a certain point."  This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary
41

and testimony, which were both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the
parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent met at the bank where petitioner was
applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit investigator prior to their
courtship and their marriage.42

It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized
summary dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of
respondent's share in the sale of his parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to
around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this amount was insufficient to cover the
family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the items for their
family budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association dues, and for electric
bills came from this money.

And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which the
family home was built, thus -

[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?

A: No.

Q: He does not [own] any real property?

A: No.

Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal which
has been transferred with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-numbered as S-25470,
which is in the name of [respondent], Filipino, of legal age, single.

xxxx

[COURT to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Who owned this property?

A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson.

Q: Where is this property located?

A: It is located in United Paranaque.

Q: Where in United Paranaque?

A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.

Q: Are you staying in that property?

A: We are staying in that property.

xxxx

[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner]

Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque [property], who owns it?

A: It was donated to the children.

xxxx

[COURT to the witness, petitioner]

Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner?

A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.

Q: Who owns it now?

A: The children because it was donated [to them]. 43

What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since their
marriage on July 6,1974 (and in the company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the
time that respondent was under treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any
instance when respondent failed to live with them.

To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent likewise
brought her to the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their children. 44

By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at
the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and
is unable to keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It is settled that
"[p]sychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will."  "[I]t is not enough to
45

prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that
he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not physical,
illness."
46
Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for gospel
truth in regard to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his marital
obligations. That much is clear from the following testimony –

[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]

Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this case, Benjamin Singson?

A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003, during his first admission and again [in]
2006, [S]ir.

Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam witness?

A: Yes, [S]ir.

Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?

A: He was initially confined because of problems with gambling and subsequently because of
[behavioral] problem, [S]ir.

xxxx

Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam [W]itness?

A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However, [in] September of 2006, he knocked on
the doors of the maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got his car in the garage
and drove out bumping the car parked right across the garage and he [also kept] takfr1g things out
from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he [would] immediately take them out again.
So, he was brought to the facility in October because of his uncontrolled behavior, [S]ir.

xxxx

Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the respondent, Benjamin Singson, Madam
witness?

A: Based on history, mental status examination and observations during his stay, I found that
[respondent] is suffering from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of typhoid fever when he
was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006.
Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is suffering from a personality disorder, [S]ir.

Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality disorder with [regard] to [respondent's
dealings] with other people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?

A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my memory.

COURT: Go ahead.

A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees [sic] his problems which [makes] his
personal[,] family[,] and social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was pre-occupied
with gambling, thinking of ways to get money with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and
pawning jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with increasing amounts of money in
order achieve his desired effects into gambling, [S]ir.

COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s counsel]

Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam witness?

A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist did the psychological testing, [S]ir.

Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam witness, which we would like to request [from]
this Honorable Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert witness, you concluded
that the respondent is suffering from personality disorder?

A: Yes,[S]ir.

Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam witness?

A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior that has distracted his ability to perform
his functions as a married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a person who is
supposed to be employed productively, [S]ir. 47

Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, [while undoubtedly negative
traits are nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the absence of
[incontrovertible] proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness."
48

We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the contrasting findings of the trial court and
appellate court,  we take recourse to the records to assist us in evaluating the perspective postures
49

taken by the parties.

Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the basic marital
obligations x x x."  "A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological
50

incapacity."51

Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or correctly lay down the bases or premises
for this particular finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity, thus:

Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent's inabilities to perform his
marital obligations was a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are caused by
psychological abnormality. Such psychological incapacity of the respondent has been shown as
already present at the time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only after the
solemnization. x x x. 52
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence adverted to by the RTC did not specifically
identify the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
did not point to a definite or a definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when he was
younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and
2006."  Besides, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but another psychologist
53

who conducted the tests.  And this psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than that, Dr.
54

Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's alleged admission that he was allegedly
betting on jai alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as no witness having
personal knowledge of that fact was called to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in connection therewith, the latter did testify in court.
And we are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court assesses the sufficiency of psychological
evaluation reports is necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution that marriage is an
inviolable institution protected by the State." 55

Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's alleged psychological incapacity could
be attributed to the latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to the parties'
marriage; no evidence has been adduced to substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding
petitioner's contention that respondent's family was "distraught" and that respondent's conduct was
"dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this. These are very serious charges which
must be substantiated by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at all adduce.
Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's
alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.

Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's testimony that his father's psychological
incapacity existed before or at the time of marriage.  It has been held that the parties' child is not a
1âwphi1

very reliable witness in an Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the spouses were
married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until
long after his birth."
56

To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have adduced convincing, competent and
trustworthy evidence to establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity and
that the same antedated their marriage.  If anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's
57

finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by respondent before they got married and that
respondent was a kind and caring person when he was courting her. 58

Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration that petitioner failed to prove that
respondents alleged psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is incurable or
permanent.

To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders
are generally incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to take judicial notice under
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. 59

"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties or one of them, by
reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing at the time the marriage was
celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have
validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital
tie."  This is the situation here.
60

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013 Decision and January 6, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 128122             March 18, 2005

PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK, Petitioner, 

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LIBERATO G. YAMBAO, JESUS B. RODRIGUEZ and JESUS D.
MORALES,Respondents.

x--------------------x

G.R. No. 128184            March 18, 2005

LILIAN M. TOUNDJIS, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LIBERATO G.YAMBAO, et al., and JOSELITO GARAYGAY, ET
AL., Respondents.

x--------------------x

G.R. No. 128229            March 18, 2005

JOSELITO P. GARAYGAY, CENTURY REALTY and DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, LIBERATO G. YAMBAO, JESUS B. RODRIGUEZ and JESUS D.
MORALES, respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court are these three (3) separate petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the Decision1 dated November 29, 1995 and
Resolution2 dated February 6, 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 42121.
The first assailed issuance affirmed an earlier decision3 dated January 28, 1993 of the Regional Trial
Court at Quezon City, Branch 88 in its Civil Case No. Q-92-8455, declaring, inter alia, herein private
respondents, as plaintiffs therein, Liberato G. Yambao, Jesus B. Rodriquez and Jesus D.
Morales ("Yambao", "Rodriquez" and "Morales", respectively), as rightful owners of the land
subject of this case. The second assailed issuance, on the other hand, denied reconsideration of the
first.

At the core of the controversy is a 2,660-square meter parcel of land, denominated as Lot 23 of the
subdivision plan Fls-2804-D of SWO-17514, registered under TCT No. 9780 of the Manila Registry,
located as it were in Matandang Balara, which used to be a part of the then district of Caloocan, City
of Manila. The creation of Quezon City which found Lot 23 within its borders saw the transfer of the
corresponding property records to the new political unit and the generation of new certificates of title
to reflect territorial changes. As thus transferred, TCT No. 9780 was assigned title number TCT No.
9780 (693).

The evidence on record disclose the following factual antecedents:

Two (2) different persons with exactly the same name, i.e., Vicente T. Garaygay, each claimed
exclusive ownership of Lot 23 by virtue of an owner’s duplicate certificate each had possession of
during the period material covering said lot. One held TCT No. 9780, supra, and the other, TCT No.
9780 (693), supra. The technical description of the land appearing in one copy corresponds exactly
with that in the other. The date "June 14, 1944" appears on the face of both copies as a common
date of entry. One, however, contained certain features, markings, and/or entries not found in the
other and vice versa.

On April 17, 1979, one of the two Vicente T. Garaygays, a resident of Cebu City (hereinafter referred
to as Garaygay of Cebu), executed a deed of sale4 over the lot described in and covered by
his TCT No. 9780 (693) in favor of his nephew, Joselito P. Garaygay ("Joselito", hereinafter). The
sale notwithstanding, the owner’s duplicate certificate remained for some time in the seller’s
possession.

In another transaction, the other Vicente T. Garaygay, a resident of Rizal (hereinafter referred to
as Garaygay of Rizal), sold to Liberto G. Yambao and Jesus B. Rodriguez the same property
described in TCT 9780. "YCM Compound, Angono, Rizal" is set out in the February 11, 1986
conveying deed5 as the seller’s residence. Buyers Yambao and Rodriquez would later sell a portion
of their undivided interests on the land to Jesus D. Morales.6

Then came the June 11, 1988 fire that gutted a portion of the Quezon City hall and destroyed in the
process the original copy of TCT No. 9780 (693) on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
Barely a month later, a certain Engr. Hobre filed an application, signed by Garaygay of Cebu, for
the reconstitution of the burned original on the basis of the latter’s owner’s duplicate certificate. One
Engr. Felino Cortez of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) did the follow-up on the application.
After due proceedings, the LRA issued an order of reconstitution,7 by virtue of
which Garaygay of Cebu acquired reconstituted TCT No. RT-1764 (9780) (693).8

Meanwhile, or on May 26, 1989, the deed of sale executed by Garaygay of Cebu in favor of his
nephew Joselitowas registered, paving the issuance in the latter’s name of TCT No.
12183.9 Thereafter, thru the efforts of same Engr. Cortez,10 Lot 23 was subdivided into three (3) lots,
namely: Lot 23-A, Lot 23-B and Lot 23-C for which TCT Nos. 14414, 14415 and 14416,
respectively,11 were issued. Joselito posthaste sold Lot 23-A to Lilian Toundjiswho, pursuant to a
Contract to Sell executed on March 23, 1990,12 undertook to pay Joselito the P.5 Million balance of
the P2.5 Million purchase price once she is placed in possession of a fenced-off property. And, for
shares of stock, Joselito assigned on February 26, 1991, the other two (2) lots, i.e., Lot 23-
B and Lot 23-C to Century Realty and Development Corporation ("Century Realty") which, after
securing TCT Nos. 34390 and 34391 therefor, mortgaged13 the same to Premiere Development
Bank, Inc. ("Premiere Bank") to secure a P2.5 Million loan.

Clashing claims of ownership first came to a head when, sometime in May 1990, Liberato G.
Yambao and his agents forcibly prevented Joselito’s hired hands from concrete-fencing the subject
property. The police and eventually the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) entered into the
picture.

In the meantime, Yambao, Rodriquez and Morales as pro indiviso buyers of Lot No. 23, caused

the annotation on December 17, 1990, January 16, 1991 and February 15, 1991 of their respective
adverse claims on Joselito’s TCT Nos. 14414, 14415 and 14416. They then filed with the Regional
Trial Court at Quezon City suit against Joselito, Century Realty and Premiere Bank for quieting of
title and annulment of said defendants’ fake titles with prayer for damages.

In their amended complaint,14 docketed as Civil Case No. Q-92-8455 and raffled to Branch 88 of the
court, Yambao, Rodriguez and Morales alleged, inter alia, the following:

1. That Joselito, taking advantage of the 1988 burning of the Quezon City Hall, and "using
an impostor, who pretended to be Vicente Garaygay, by means of fraud, deceit, and
unlawful manipulation succeeded in administratively reconstituting the aforesaid property
(sic) in 1990 on the basis of an alleged owner’s copy, which on its face is patently fake and
spurious and fake title bearing [TCT] No. 9780 (693)".

2. That a reconstituted title secured by means of fraud, deceit, or other machinations is

void ab initio under Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) 6732;

3. That after causing the reconstitution of the title, Joselito "acted fast to consummate his
scheme of depriving the plaintiffs of their ownership . . . of the [disputed] land by the
following successive acts", referring to Joselito’s act of securing title in his name, subdividing
Lot No. 23 and securing titles to and disposing of the subdivided lots;

4. That they (Yambao, Rodriguez and Morales) filed their separate adverse claims and
caused the same to be annotated at the back of Joselito’s TCT Nos. 14414, 14415 and
14416; that while the adverse claim of Rodriquez was still valid, Joselito executed on
February 26, 1991 a Deed of Assignment in favor of Century Realty, which thus made the
latter a "transferee in bad faith"; that on March 26, 1991, Century Realty executed a
mortgage contract in favor of Premiere Bank, "a mortgagee in bad faith"; and

5. That at the time the mortgage was executed, the houses of plaintiffs’ caretaker and a
chapel belonging to them were standing on the two lots in question.

Answering, principal defendants Joselito and Century Realty denied plaintiffs’ material allegations

and asserted, by way of affirmative defense, the validity of (a) the reconstitution of TCT No. 9780
(693); (b) the assignment of real property in favor of Century Realty; and (c) the mortgage made by
Century Realty in favor of Premiere Bank.

In their separate answers, also with crossclaim and counterclaim, Lilian Toundjis, who was allowed
to intervene to oppose the action thus filed, and Premiere Bank virtually adopted Joselito’s position
and pleaded, in addition, their right as bona fide purchaser or mortgagee for value, as the case may
be, of the subject property.

Issues having been joined, trial ensued with plaintiffs Yambao, Rodriguez and Morales offering in
evidence several documents. Foremost of these was Exhibit "B"15 which is the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 9780 of the Registry of Manila once in the possession of Garaygay of Rizal. On
the other hand, the principal defendants presented no less than 38 pieces of marked and sub-
marked documentary evidence, among which was Exhibit. "1",16 identical to Exhibit "D", which is
the duplicate copy of TCT No. 9780 (693) that pertained to Garaygay of Cebu and used in the
reconstitution of the burned original thereof.

In his testimony, Yambao stated having noticed, when Garaygay of Rizal offered to sell Lot 23, that
the corners and the portion of Exhibit "B" containing the owner’s personal circumstances were torn
and related the owner’s explanation as to how these oddities came about. Yambao related that
owing to the physical appearance of Exhibit "B", the recording of the Garaygay of
Rizal - Yambao/Rodriguez deed of sale (Exh. "A") was refused since the more crucial
document, i.e., the torn owner’s copy was itself not registrable unless it is first reconstituted. He also
testified that, to assure himself of the genuineness of the seller’s owner’s duplicate certificate, he
and Garaygay of Rizal repaired to the Quezon City Registry to compare his (Garaygay of Rizal’s)
copy with the original copy on file with the registry, and discovered that the only difference was that
the owner’s duplicate bears the title number "9780", while the original had "9780 (693)" typewritten
on a straight line.17 As told by Yambao, Garaygay of Rizal’sexplanation for the figure difference is
that "693" was not affixed on his (Garaygay of Rizal’s) title because he never, in first place,
presented the same to the Quezon City Registry for correction or affixture.

Yambao also testified that Garaygay of Rizal, when asked to show proof of his identity, presented a
voter’s ID with his picture,18 a Commission of Elections (COMELEC) certification attesting to his
being a registered voter in Precinct No. 21 in Angono, Rizal19 and a certification of residence issued
by the barangay captain of the place.20Yambao added that before concluding the sale, he, together
with the prospective seller, proceeded to the land site where the residents and/or caretakers thereat
assured him that his companion, Garaygay of Rizal, was actually the landowner.

For their part, defendants presented Garaygay of Cebu who alleged, among other things, having
acquired Lot 23 from one Macaria Lim vda. Arambulo sometime in 1944, having paid taxes thereon
for the period 1949-199021 and mortgaging in 1949 the titled property with Meralco Employees
Savings & Loan Association, with the mortgage deed and later the discharge of mortgage being
annotated on his title.22 Joselito also took the witness stand in defense of his ownership of Lot 23 and
the transactions he entered into involving the lot.

Eventually, the trial court rendered judgment finding for the plaintiffs and against the defendants,
declaring Joselito’s TCT No. 9780 (693) and all subsequent titles traceable to it and transactions
involving its derivatives as null and void. To the trial court, plaintiffs’ evidence preponderated over
those of the defendants’ whose main witness, Garaygay of Cebu, gave inconsistent testimony,
while Joselito hedged on his answer regarding a cousin connected with LRA. Going against the
defendants’ cause, the trial court further observed dubious circumstances surrounding the
reconstitution of TCT 9780 (693), the more disturbing of which is the admitted participation of LRA
personnel in the reconstitution process.

Dated January 28, 1993, the trial court’s decision23 dispositively reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court renders the following judgment to wit:
 1. Plaintiffs Liberato G.Yambao, Jesus B. Rodriguez and Jesus D. Morales are
hereby declared the rightful owners and possessors of the land described in TCT No.
9780 marked as Exh. ‘B’;

2. Defendants’ title, TCT No. 9780 (693), marked as Exh. ‘1’ (p. 349, Rollo, identical
to Exh. ‘D’, p. 493 Rollo); the LRA Order of Reconstitution . . .; defendants’
reconstituted title No. RT-1764 (9780) (693) marked as Exh. "4" . . .; the cancelled
title TCT No. 12183 and its derivative titles, TCT Nos. 14414, 14415, and 14416, all
in the name of defendant Joselito P. Garaygay and intervenor Lilian M. Toundjis
involving TCT 14414; the Deed of Assignment and Transfer between Joselito P.
Garaygay and Century Realty involving TCT Nos. 14415 and 14416; [the derivative]
titles of defendant Century Realty . . . namely TCT Nos. 34390 . . . and 34391 . . .;
and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Century Realty . . . in favor of
defendant Premiere Bank, Inc. are all declared null and void and without force and
effect;

3. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City to strike out the reconstituted title [but
already cancelled] No. 1764 (9780) (693) and TCT No. 12183, . . . ; to cancel TCT
14414 . . .; to cancel the Deed of Assignment and Transfer between Joselito P.
Garaygay and Century Realty . . . covered by TCT Nos. 14415 and 14416, and
necessarily cancel TCT Nos. 34390 and 34391 . . .; to cancel the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage over TCT Nos. 34390 and 34390 . . .; and thereafter, to enter and
register the Deeds of Sale, dated February 11, 1986 (Exh. "A") and July 10, 1988
(Exh. "C") and forthwith issue corresponding new title/s in the names of the plaintiffs,
free from all encumbrances, except those entered into by them, upon payment of all
taxes and fees prescribed by law;

4. Defendant Joselito P. Garaygay is sentenced to pay each of the [three] plaintiffs . .

., the sum of P100,000. 00 as moral damages;

5. Defendants Joselito P. Garaygay, Century Realty . . . and Premiere Bank, Inc. are
sentenced to pay jointly and severally each of the two plaintiffs, namely Liberato
Yambao and Jesus Morales, the sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and to
plaintiff Jesus B. Rodriquez the sum of P25,000.00 as nominal damages The
defendants are also sentenced to pay jointly and severally the sum of P20,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and the cost of suit;

6. Defendant Joselito P. Garaygay is further sentenced to reimburse Lilian M.

Toundjis the sum of P2,000,000.00 with interest thereon at 6% per annum from the
date of judgment;

7. With the annulment of the [aforementioned] Deed of Assignment and Transfer

between defendant Joselito P. Garaygay and defendant Century Realty . . . and the
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage . . . between defendant Century Realty . . . and
defendant Premiere Bank, Inc., all aforementioned defendants who are respective
parties to the named deeds are hereby ordered to make a full return and restitution to
each other of all monies, things and objects they have received thereunder without
interest within fifteen days from finality of this judgment;

8. All other claims are dismissed.

SO ORDERED. [Words in bracket added]

In time, herein petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals whereat their recourse was docketed
as CA- G.R. CV No. 42121.

In its Decision of November 29, 1995,24 the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the appealed decision
of the trial court, the affirmance being predicated on the following main justifications:

All in all, the Court agrees with the trial court in giving low rating to both Vicente Garaygay of
Cebu and appellant JOSELITO as witnesses. The court notes that Vicente T. Garaygay of
Cebu has no explanation why the deed of sale between him and Arambulo was not adduced
in evidence x x x

In view of the foregoing questionable actuations of Vicente T. Garaygay of Cebu and his
nephew . . . and their cohorts, the trial court (sic) is constrained to declare that
the defendants’ mother title TCT No. 9780 (693) marked as Exhibit 1, which served as the
basis of the reconstitution is a fake and spurious title. x x x Thus, all titles in the name of
Vicente T. Garaygay of Cebu and Joselito Garaygay are null and void. x x x .

On the other hand, the claim of appellees that their certificate of title is a genuine title is
supported with credible and sufficient evidence. The contention of the appellants that the
appellees’ title should not be accepted as genuine because it is not authenticated lacks
merit. The owner’s copy of the title of appellees is a public document (Broce vs. Broce, 4
Phil. 611). Unlike a private document which must be authenticated before its admission . . .,
there is no need to authenticate a public document to make it admissible in evidence (Rule
132, Sec 24). The rule that a document must be authenticated before it is admissible in
evidence does not apply to public documents which are admissible without further proof of
their due execution or genuineness x x x. Public documents are already authenticated by the
official signature and seal which they bear, of which this Court takes judicial notice (Apostol,
Essentials of Evidence, 1991, ed., p. 430) (Underscoring added).

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in its Resolution of
February 6, 1997,25petitioners have separately come to this Court. That of petitioner Premier
Bank was docketed as G.R. No. 128122; that of Toundjis as G.R. No. 128184; and that of Joselito
Garaygay and Century Realty as G.R. No. 128229.

Per this Court’s Resolution dated June 18, 1997,26 the three (3) separate petitions were, upon
private respondents’ motion, ordered consolidated.

The principal issue tendered in the separate petitions, albeit formulated a bit differently, comes down
to the following: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding Garaygay of Rizal, instead
of Garaygay of Cebu, as the real owner of Lot 23. Behind this issue is the corollary question of
whether or not the same court erred in finding Garaygay of Rizal’s owner’s copy, TCT No. 9780,
instead of the Garaygay of Cebu’s copy, TCT No. 9780 (693), as the authentic title covering Lot 23.

Petitioners urge reversal on the submission that, unlike Garaygay of Cebu who came forward and
took the witness stand, the identity of Garaygay of Rizal - who they stressed at every turn had not
been presented to testify - has not been established. Albeit they do not say so, the inference of their
posture is that an impostor has taken the identity of Vicente T. Garaygay. Corollarily, they also
contend that the authenticity of the impostor Garaygay’s adverted owner’s copy of TCT No. 9780
has remained unproven.

The desired reversal cannot be granted.

Both defining documents, Exhibit "1" and Exhibit "B", appear to have been issued by the
appropriate Registry of Deeds and as such would ordinarily enjoy the guarantees flowing from the
legal presumption of regularity of issuance.27 But how and precisely when the legal aberration
occurred where two (2) owner’s duplicate certificates ended up in the hands of two (2) distinct
persons, complete strangers to each other, are questions which the records do not provide clear
answer. It may not be idle to speculate, though, that fraud or other improper manipulations had been
employed along the way, with likely the willing assistance of land registry official/s, to secure what for
the nonce may be tagged as the other title. Consistent with the presumption of regularity of
issuance, however, the authenticity of one copy has to be recognized. And necessarily, one of the
two (2) outstanding owner’s copies has to be struck down as wrongly issued, if not plainly spurious,
under the governing Torrens system of land registration. For, a piece of land cannot plausibly be
covered at the same time, under the same concept of ownership, by two (2) outstanding certificates
of title, each having the same validity, force and effect. One has to be spurious, or at least one has
to prevail over the other.28 Else, the ideal sought to be achieved by the Torrens system would be
illusory. As it were, the Torrens system of land registration aims to obviate possible conflicts of title
by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a
rule, with the necessity of inquiring further;29 on the part of the registered owner, the system gives
him complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his ownership as long as he has not
voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered property.30

The categorical conclusion of the Court of Appeals – confirmatory of that of the trial court – is
that Exhibit "B" is genuine and that Garaygay of Rizal is a real person. On the other hand, Exhibit
"1" was adjudged spurious. These factual determinations as a matter of long and sound appellate
practice must be accorded great weight, and, as rule, should not be disturbed on appeal,31 save for
the most compelling and cogent reasons,32 like when such factual findings were drawn from a
vacuum, or, in fine, reached arbitrarily.33

To be sure, arbitrariness cannot contextually be imputed on the appellate court. Its finding
that Garaygay of Rizal is an authentic person, once residing in and a registered voter of Angono,
Rizal has adequate evidentiary support in his voter’s ID, the COMELEC and barangay certifications
aforementioned and the testimony of an occupant of Lot 23. And for whatever it is
worth, Garaygay of Cebu no less testified that there are three (3) Vicente T. Garaygay in the
Philippines.34 The reality that the private respondents failed to put Garaygay of Rizal on the witness
box to identify his copy of the title and defend his erstwhile ownership of Lot 23 may perhaps support
petitioners’ claim about his being fictitious if his whereabouts during the trial, if still alive then, was
known. But, as found by the appellate court, "Yambao never heard from or about Garaygay of Rizal"
after they have executed the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "A", supra) on February 11, 1986.

Petitioners’ attribution of error on the part of the appellate court’s declaring Garaygay of Rizal as
owner of the disputed parcel of land is untenable. It cannot be overemphasized that the possessor-
owner of the authentic copy of TCT No. 9780 was necessary the real owner of Lot 23. That
possessory distinction happened to belong to Garaygay of Rizal.

Moreover, facts and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom point to Exhibit "1" as being spurious,
necessarily leaving Exhibit "B" as the authentic duplicate copy. For starters, there is the
appearance and physical condition of the owner’s copies in question which, if properly evaluated in
the light of attendant circumstances, would help in determining which is genuine and which is
sham.35 For, the condition and physical appearance of a document would, to borrow from Junquera,
reveal, albeit silently, "the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing and exaggerating nothing."
As aptly observed by the appellate court, rationalizing its conclusion adverted to above, Exhibit
"B" has no defect, except for its partly being torn. Respondents’ explanation for the defective state
of Exhibit "B", as related to them by Garaygay of Rizal, i.e., it was due to exposure of the document
to the elements, like rain, following his evacuation from Manila to a small nipa hut in Angono, Rizal
during the Japanese occupation,36 merited approval from the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Both courts, being in a better position to pass upon the credibility of petitioners’ witness and
appreciate his testimony respecting the less than usual appearance of Exhibit "B", their findings
command the respect of this Court.

Lest it be overlooked, what might be considered as defects in Garaygay of Cebu’s copy are, at

bottom, the combined effects thereon of the passage of time and the elements. Standing alone,
these defects do not, in our view, undermine the integrity of the document.

However, unlike Exhibit "B", Exhibit "1" contained entries and other uncommon markings or
features which could not have existed without human intervention. Although any one of them may
perhaps not be appreciable in isolation, these features and/or markings, taken together, indeed put
the integrity of Exhibit "1" under heavy cloud and indeed cast doubt on its genuineness.

The irregularities listed in the appealed decision may be summed up in the following wise:

1. Two (2) Victory stamps issued after liberation were strangely pasted on the seal
of Garaygay of Cebu’stitle – Exhibit "1" - when such stamps were not yet in existence when
such title was entered in the Registry of Deeds of Manila on June 14, 1944;

2. Exhibit "1" was prepared on "Judicial Form No. 109-D Revised June 1945", which came
into circulation after June 14, 1944;

3. Exhibit "1" bears the handwritten figure "9780" in ink above the typewritten number "693".
There is no initial to suggest that the handwritten number "9780 over the typewritten title
number "693" was officially authorized;

4. The first letter "Y" in the surname "Garaygay" in Exhibit "1" was inserted in ink. In contrast,
there is no such insertion in Exhibit "B"; and

5. Exhibit "1" carries the annotation "subject to further disposition by the government with
respect to real estate transactions consummated during the Japanese regime, and subject to
the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court".37 Such annotation is supposed
to have been contemporaneously made on the date of the issuance of the title in 1944. Yet,
in what appears to be an anomalous instance, advertence is made to "transactions
consummated during the Japanese regime" and to "Rule 74 of the Rules of Court", logically
implying, as aptly observed by the Court of Appeals, that the annotation was entered after
liberation and also after 1964 when the New Rules of Court came into effect.

Almost as if it were an afterthought, petitioners explained that the Victory stamps could have been
pasted, the 1945 revised judicial form utilized, and the annotations referred to in item # (5) entered
when the TCT of Garaygay of Cebu was reissued. Anent the number "9780" appearing in ink, the
proffered explanation was that the handwritten "9780" was a mere provisional marking.

The foregoing explanations are, at best speculative, thus correctly struck down by the appellate
court. And unfortunately, Garaygay of Cebu, the best person to shed light on the foregoing unusual
situations and help the limping case of the petitioners, could not himself offer an explanation.

Petitioners’ insistence that the inscription on Garaygay of Cebu’s copy of the deed of mortgage and
the discharge of mortgage he constituted over Lot 23 in favor of Meralco Employees Savings and
Loan Association proves the authenticity of the latter’s owner duplicate is valid to a point. But, to
suggest that such inscription could not have been possible were his title spurious is altogether a
different matter. We need not cite cases memorialized in books of jurisprudence where land dealings
are annotated on reconstituted certificates secured thru fraud or otherwise issued irregularly. Stated
a little differently, an annotation of what is otherwise a bona-fide land transaction is not a peremptory
argument against the spurious character, if that be the case, of the document on which it is
annotated.

In the same token, the payment by Garaygay of Cebu of land taxes on Lot 23 does not also
necessary detract from the spurious nature of his title, Exhibit "1". After all, any one can pay real
estate taxes on a given property without being quizzed by the local treasury whether or not the payor
owns the real property in question. This is not to say of course that tax receipts are evidence of
ownership, since they are not, albeit they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for
no one would ordinarily be paying taxes for a property not in his actual or at least constructive
possession.38

Other than paying taxes from 1949 to 199039 (mistakenly stated by respondent court as from 1949 to
1960), however, Garaygay of Cebu – and this holds true for his nephew Joselito - did not appear
before the current stand-off to have exercised dominion over Lot 23. For one, it has not been shown
that Garaygay of Cebu was at any time in possession of the property in question, unlike his
namesake from Rizal who managed to place the property under the care of certain individuals who
built semi-permanent structure-dwelling houses thereon without so much of a protest from Garaygay
of Cebu or his nephew Joselito after the latter purportedly bought the property. For another, neither
Garaygay of Cebu nor his nephew Joselito ever instituted any action to eject or recover possession
from the occupants of Lot 23. This passivity bespeaks strongly against their claim of ownership. It
has been said that a party’s failure to raise a restraining arm or a shout of dissent to another’s
possession for an unreasonably long period is simply contrary to his claim of ownership.40 Not lost on
this Court are circumstances noted by the trial court which negatively reflect on Garaygay of Cebu’s
and his nephew’s claim of ownership. Some excerpts of what the trial court wrote:

"On its face, Exh. "5" [the original copy of the deed of sale between Garaygay and his
nephew] was notarized by one Armando Pulgado. However, there are certifications by both
the Bureau of National Archives that ‘no Notarial records of Armando Pulgado exist in
Manila.’ (Exh. "KK") or ‘in Quezon City’ (Exh. "LL"), and by the Clerk of Court that ‘Atty.
Armando Pulgado was not appointed as notary public for and in the City of Manila for the
year 1979’ (Exh. "MM")

Exh. "5" dated April 17, 1979 was registered only on May 26, 1989, over 10 years from the
sale. JOSELITO could not explain how thereafter his own title (TCT 12183) was issued in his
name since it was not he who registered the Deed of Sale, Exh. "5". In other words,
someone else registered it for him.

Neither JOSELITO nor his uncle . . .followed up the petition for reconstitution which was
prepared, filed and processed by interested persons in Manila, which scenario prompted
plaintiffs’ counsel to observe that the reconstitution was ‘among the first of all applicants in
Quezon City’ to be approved (p. 32, TSN August 17, 1992). Of these interested persons, the
most unthinkable was Engr. Felino Cortez of the LRA who did the follow-ups on the
application in Manila. It is remarkable why Cortez, who is neither a friend nor relative, took
special interest in not only following up the application for reconstitution but in effecting the
subdivision of TCT 12183 into [3 lots], for which three derivative titles of TCT 12183 were
issued . . . . Again JOSELITO had no knowledge of this fact of subdivision until his uncle, . . .
telephoned him with the information that the land was already subdivided.
 In short, it appears to the Court that without doing anything, Vicente T. Garaygay of Cebu
has his title (Exh. "1") reconstituted. On the other hand, without knowing anything,
JOSELITO obtained TCT 12183 in his name and had the land subdivided and sold.

These circumstances demonstrate that neither JOSELITO nor his uncle, Vicente T.
Garaygay of Cebu acted ante litem motam like the true owners they claim to be in their
respective times. xxx

Several questions confound the Court’s curiosity. Why were some LRA officials so interested
in the speedy reconstitution and in the subdivision of the land in excess of their bureaucratic
duties? Where did Vicente T. Garaygay of Cebu get his owner’s copy, Exh. "1". Did some
conniving LRA officers supply the judicial form and Victory stamps? Why was JOSELITO so
evasive about his cousin in the LRA as shown in his examination?

xxx xxx xxx

As the Court sees it, the Deed of Sale (Exh. "5" was a simulated transaction because both
JOSELITO and his uncle admit this was a ‘joint venture to sell the property in question.
However, the facts suggest that the ‘joint venture’ was not limited to the two of them. The
persons who prepared and filed the application for reconstitution, and those officers in the
LRA who followed it up and who thereafter subdivided the land into three lots for easier sale,
those at the NBI who tried to persuade Yambao and Morales to settle the dispute . . . are
apparently part of the ‘joint venture’ or stand to profit from it"

This brings us to the core of Toundjis’ and Premiere Bank’s petitions. The first asserts the rights of
a purchaser and the other, that of a mortgagee, in good faith and for value of Lot 23, a status
respectively denied them by the appellate court.

The rule that a subsequent declaration of a title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the
contractual right of a purchaser, rmortgagee or other transferees in good faith, with the exceptions
thereto, is well-settled. Where the certificate of title is in the name of the seller or mortgagor, the
innocent purchaser or mortgagee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate
without inquiring further.41 In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, or except when
the party concerned had actual knowledge of facts or circumstances that should impel a reasonably
cautious person to make such further inquiry, said purchaser or mortgagee is without obligation to
look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the seller or mortgagor. Thus, where innocent
third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate, acquire rights over the property as buyer
or mortgagee, the subsequent declaration of nullity of title is not a ground for nullifying the right of
such buyer or mortgagee.42

Tested by the above norm, may Toundjis be considered, as she has claimed, an innocent
purchaser for value, meaning one who buys or acquires, for valuable consideration, a piece of land
of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property at the
time of purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the
property.43

The Court of Appeals rejected the claim of Toundjis, and rightly so.

A study of the record shows that TCT 14414 covering Lot. 23-A that Toundjis contracted to buy from
Joselito carried an annotation that it was administratively reconstituted. Records also indicate that
Toundjis knew at the time of the sale that Joselito did not have possession of the lot inasmuch as
she agreed to pay the balance of the purchase price as soon as the seller can fence off the property
and surrender physical possession thereof to her.

Even for these two (2) reasons alone, which should have placed Toundjis on guard respecting
Joselito’s title, her claim of being a bona fide purchaser for value must fail. The rejection, therefore,
by the Court of Appeals of such claim is correct. Likewise acceptable is the appellate court’s holding,
citing Republic vs. Court of Appeals,44 that a purchaser of a property cannot be in good faith where
the title thereof shows that it was reconstituted. Noted with approval, too, is the appellate court’s
observation that the "contract to sell (Exh. "44") which is unregistered and not annotated at the back
of the title of the property [cannot adversely affect appellees]" for the reason that under "Sec. 51 of
PD 1529 (Property Registration Act), ‘the act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land in so far (sic) as third parties are concerned.’"45

Premiere Bank cannot also be accorded the status of an innocent mortgagee for value vis-à-vis the
mortgage of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 34390 and 34391 constituted in its favor
by Century Realty. Apart from the annotations that said titles are only administratively
reconstituted,46 the appellate court provided the ensuing compelling reasons:

"Premiere inspected the property to be mortgaged xxx on March 6, and 11, 1991 as can be
seen in its Real Estate Appraisal Report (Exhs. "EE", "EE-1"). The adverse claim of Jesus
Rodriguez was cancelled on March 26, 1991 xxx Hence, when Premiere inspected the
property xxx, it was aware of the existence of Rodriquez’ adverse claim. This is admitted by
Premiere’s witness xxx. The adverse claim of Rodriquez annotated at the back of TCT No.
14415 and marked as Exhibit I-3 and also at the back of TCT No. 14416 (Exh. J) marked as
Exhibit J-3 declares that ‘he is the vendee of the land described.’

There are buildings of strong material on the land in dispute xxx.

Premiere is aware of the existence of these structures as can be seen in its real estate report
(Exh. EE). Said report states that there are ‘shanties erected in the property in dispute.

But despite the existence of alleged ‘shanties’ which are in fact and in truth big structures,
two of them being concrete buildings (Exhs. 0 – to O-3), Premiere Bank proceeded in the
execution of the mortgage contract. xxx.

If the land mortgaged is in the possession of a person other than the mortgagor, the
mortgagee is required to go beyond the certificate of title and make inquiries as to the rights
of the actual possessors. Failure to do so would make him a mortgagee in bad faith
(Sunshine Finance vs. IAC, 203 SCRA 213; Conspecto vs. Fruto, 31 Phil 144)".

It cannot be overemphasized that Premiere Bank, being in the business of extending loans secured
by real estate mortgage, is familiar with rules on land registration. As such, it was, as here, expected
to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in their dealing with registered
lands.47 Accordingly, given inter alia the suspicion-provoking presence of occupants other than the
owner on the land to be mortgaged, it behooved Premiere Bank to conduct a more exhaustive
investigation on the history of the mortgagor’s title. That Premiere Bank accepted in mortgage the
property in question notwithstanding the existence of structures on the property and which were in
actual, visible and public possession of a person other than the mortgagor, constitutes gross
negligence amounting to bad faith.48 Premier Bank is thus not entitled to have its lien annotated on
the genuine title.49
A final consideration: Petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred in annulling the LRA order of
reconstitution (Exh. "3"), even if such relief was not prayed for in private respondents’ amended
complaint and notwithstanding the fact that the LRA was not impleaded as an indispensable party
in Civil Case No. Q-92-8455.

The contention is far from tenable. An action for quieting of title, as here, is equivalent to an action
for reconveyance of title wrongfully or erroneously registered in another’s name. The successful
outcome of such action would in most cases necessarily entail the cancellation of existing title
wrongly issued to another, which in turn requires the action of the LRA and/or the proper Register of
Deeds. As in the past, this Court, to obviate multiplicity of suits, had ordered the LRA or the Register
of Deeds, albeit not impleaded below, to cancel such erroneously issued titles.

Before writing finis to this ponencia, two (2) peripheral matters raised need to be addressed.

First, petitioner Toundjis has, as an alternative prayer, asked that the appealed decision ordering
Joselito to reimburse her the sum of P2,000,000.00 be modified, such that the reimbursable amount
shall bear interest of nineteen (19%) percent (down from the 25% she sought in her answer-in-
intervention) instead of six (6%) per annum reckoned from March 23, 1990, instead of from January
28, 1993, the date of judgment of the trial court. Absent an explanation with cogent legal support
why her plea for a modificatory ruling should be favorably considered, this Court denies the same.

Second, petitioners have invited attention to and made much of this Court’s per curiam Decision
dated April 7, 199350 in A.M. P-91-593, entitled "Office of the Court Administrator vs. Atty. Liberato
Yambao et al."51 In it, the Court dismissed herein respondent Yambao from the service as then Clerk
of Court, RTC, Quezon City, Branch 80 for, among other things, having in his possession a forged
deed of sale executed by Vicente T. Garaygay. It should be stressed in this regard, however, that
this Court, in its Resolution of May 18, 1994,52 resolved to "SUSPEND the implementation of the
effects of the decision of April 7, 1993 pending the judicious review by the Court of Appeals of the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-92-8455."

This Court need not belabor the effects on A.M. P-91-593 of the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals, as hereby affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED and the impugned Decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150897. April 11, 2005

TURADIO C. DOMINGO, Petitioners, 
vs.
JOSE C. DOMINGO, LEONORA DOMINGO-CASTRO and her spouse JUANITO CASTRO,
NUNCIA DOMINGO-BALABIS, ABELLA DOMINGO VALENCERINA and the REGISTER OF
DEEDS, QUEZON CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Decision dated November 26,
1 

2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59331, of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Judgment dated
January 6, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90, in Civil Case No. Q-
89-3820. The trial court dismissed herein petitioner’s complaint in Civil Case No. Q-89-3820 for
declaration of the nullity of a deed of absolute sale over a house and lot located at Project 4, Quezon
City.
2

Petitioner is the oldest of the five children of the late Bruno B. Domingo, formerly the registered
owner of the properties subject of this dispute. Private respondents Leonora Domingo-Castro,
Nuncia Domingo-Balabis, Abella Domingo, and Jose Domingo are petitioner’s siblings. A family
quarrel arose over the validity of the purported sale of the house and lot in Project 4 by their father to
private respondents.

The facts of this case, as synthesized from the findings of the trial court and affirmed by the court a
quo, are as follows:

Bruno B. Domingo, a widower and retired military man, was the registered owner, as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 128297, issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, of a
house and lot with an area of 269.50 square meters, located at 34 H. Honrubia St., Project 4,
Quezon City.

In December 1970, Bruno needed money for his medical expenses, so he sold said properties. On
December 28, 1970, he signed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the abovementioned properties
to his children Leonora, Nuncia, Abella, and Jose for a consideration of ₱10,000. The deed was
witnessed by Concesa Ibañez and Linda Noroña and notarized by Atty. Rosauro V. Noroña. 3

Jose then brought the deed to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, as a result of which TCT No.
128297 was cancelled and a new title, TCT No. 247069 was issued in the names of the vendees.
Bruno Domingo died on April 6, 1975. 4

Sometime in 1981 petitioner, who by then was residing on the disputed property, received a notice
from the Quezon City Hall declaring him a squatter and directing him to demolish his shanty on the
lot. Petitioner found out that the planned demolition was at the instance of his brother, Jose and
sister, Leonora.

Sometime in 1986, petitioner learned of the existence of the assailed Deed of Absolute Sale when
an ejectment suit was filed against him. Upon advice of his counsel, he had the then Philippine
Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP, now Philippine National Police or PNP) Crime
Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City compare the signature of Bruno on the said deed against
specimen signatures of his father. As a result, the police issued him Questioned Document Report
No. 192-86 to the effect that the questioned signature and the standard signatures were written by
two different persons. Another Questioned Document Report, No. 007-89, subsequently issued by
the police came up with the same conclusion.

Petitioner filed a complaint for forgery, falsification by notary public, and falsification by private
individuals against his siblings and Atty. Noroña before the public prosecutor of Quezon City. But
after it conducted an examination of the questioned documents, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) came up with the conclusion that the questioned signature and the specimen signatures were
written by one and the same person, Bruno B. Domingo. The public prosecutor dismissed the
criminal complaint on June 22, 1989. Petitioner appealed the order of dismissal to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) but the latter affirmed the prosecutor’s action. A similar criminal complaint filed by
petitioner before the public prosecutor of Manila was likewise dismissed.

On October 23, 1989, petitioner instituted Civil Case No. Q-89-3820 before the RTC of Quezon City
for the declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, reconveyance of the disputed property, and
cancellation of TCT No. 247069. Petitioner alleged that Bruno B. Domingo’s signature on the deed in
question was forged. He likewise averred that the sale was done in violation of the restriction
annotated at the back of Bruno’s title, to the effect that prior approval of the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation (PHHC) was needed to effect any sale.
5 

In their answer, private respondents relied heavily on the findings of the NBI that Bruno B.
Domingo’s signature on the deed was genuine, and hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale was not a
forgery.

On January 6, 1998, the trial court disposed of Civil Case No. Q-89-3820 in this wise:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered DISMISSING the complaint in this case.

All other claim/s including counterclaim/s are dismissed for lack of legal and/or factual basis.

SO ORDERED. 6

In dismissing the complaint, the trial court disregarded the conflicting reports of the police crime
laboratory and the NBI "for failure of the offering party or parties to show that the standard or
specimen signatures were indeed those of Bruno B. Domingo." The trial court likewise found that
7 

petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that prior PHHC approval was needed before a valid sale of
the properties in dispute could be made.
Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which docketed his appeal as CA-
G.R. CV No. 59331. He contended that the lower court erred in ruling that the vendor’s signature on
the Deed of Absolute Sale of December 28, 1970 was not a forgery.

On January 11, 2000, petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the appellate court on the ground of
newly discovered evidence consisting of a letter of Bruno B. Domingo dated February 1, 1972
purportedly requesting from PHHC permission to mortgage the house and lot in Project 4, Quezon
City. Also on March 22, 2000, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for new trial with the Court of
Appeals, attaching the letter dated February 2, 1972, of PHHC to Bruno B. Domingo, granting the
latter’s request on July 6, 2000. Petitioner moved that the appellate court grant him authority to put
up a sari-sari store on a portion of the disputed lot, allegedly to augment his meager pension.

In its resolution dated December 29, 2000, the appellate court denied all foregoing motions. In 8 

denying the motions for new trial, the appellate court noted that there was no showing whatsoever
that "the letter-request could not have been discovered and produced prior to the trial below by the
exercise of reasonable diligence and…is of such a character as would probably change the result." It 9 

likewise pointed out that both the motion for new trial and the supplemental motion for new trial were
"not accompanied by affidavits showing the facts constituting the grounds therefor and the newly
discovered evidence." 10

On November 26, 2001, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 59331 as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision is AFFIRMED en toto.

SO ORDERED. 11

Hence, the instant petition for review interposed by petitioner grounded on the following reasons for
allowance of writ:

The declaration that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1970 was executed by Bruno B.
Domingo over the properties covered by TCT No. 128297, is not valid, proper and legal, because
said Deed of Absolute Sale was not executed by said Bruno B. Domingo, as per findings of the [PC-
INP] in its laboratory examination, and that the said Deed of Absolute Sale was in violation of the
prohibition annotated at the back of said title, and that the sale was done within the prohibited period
of five (5) years. Moreover, said Bruno B. Domingo should [not have] requested for authority to
mortgage the property in question from the People’s Homesite [and] Housing Authority on February
1, 1972, if he really sold the same in 1970. 12

The crucial issue for our resolution is: Did the court a quo err when it held that the trial court correctly
applied the rules of evidence in disregarding the conflicting PC-INP and NBI questioned document
reports?

Before this Court, petitioner insists that both the trial court and the appellate court should have
considered the PC-INP questioned document report as reliable, without showing any cogent reason
or sufficient arguments why said report should be deemed reliable.

Under the Rules of Court, the genuineness of a handwriting may be proved by the following:

(1) A witness who actually saw the person writing the instrument; 13
(2) A witness familiar with such handwriting and who can give his opinion thereon, such opinion
14 

being an exception to the opinion rule; 15

(3) A comparison by the court of the questioned handwriting and admitted genuine specimen
thereof; and
16 

(4) Expert evidence. 17

The law makes no preference, much less distinction among and between the different means stated
above in proving the handwriting of a person. It is likewise clear from the foregoing that courts are
18 

not bound to give probative value or evidentiary value to the opinions of handwriting experts, as
resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory. 19

In finding that the trial court correctly disregarded the PC-INP Crime Laboratory questioned
document report, the appellate court observed:

The PC-INP used as standards of comparison the alleged signatures of Bruno in two documents,
namely: letter to the Bureau of Treasury dated April 1, 1958 and Republic Bank Check No. 414356
dated November 2, 1962. These documents precede by more than eight years the questioned Deed
which was executed on December 30, 1970. This circumstance makes the PC-INP’s finding
questionable.20

We find no reason to disagree with the Court of Appeals. The passage of time and a person’s
increase in age may have decisive influence in his handwriting characteristics. Thus, in order to
bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standards of comparison must be as close as
possible in point of time to the suspected signature. As correctly found by the appellate court, the
21 

examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory did not conform to the foregoing standard.
Recall that in the case, the signatures analyzed by the police experts were on documents executed
several years apart. A signature affixed in 1958 or in 1962 may involve characteristics different from
those borne by a signature affixed in 1970. Hence, neither the trial court nor the appellate court may
be faulted for refusing to place any weight whatsoever on the PC-INP questioned document report.

We likewise sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals concerning the testimonies of Clerma
Domingo, Leonora, and Jose to the effect that they saw Bruno affixing his signature to the
questioned deed. They were unrebutted. Genuineness of a handwriting may be proven, under Rule
22 

132, Section 22, by anyone who actually saw the person write or affix his signature on a document.
Petitioner has shown no reason why the ruling made by the trial court on the credibility of the
respondent’s witnesses below should be disturbed by us. Findings by the trial court as to the
credibility of witnesses are accorded the greatest respect, and even finality by appellate courts, since
the former is in a better position to observe their demeanor as well as their deportment and manner
of testifying during the trial. 23

Finally, the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in the present case is a notarized document. Being a
public document, it is prima facie evidence of the facts therein expressed. It has the presumption of
24 

regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than
merely preponderant. Petitioner has failed to show that such contradictory evidence exists in this
25 

case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 26, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59331 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 152375               December 16, 2011

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs), MANUEL
H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R. MARCOS,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO
(substituted by his heirs), Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set aside
the February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution)2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the
petitioner’s Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane) (3rd motion).

THE ANTECEDENTS

On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 0009) against Jose L.
Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan
Ponce Enrile, and Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia,
that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and
Wireless Limited in Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings
respondents Jose Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and
the corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos.4

Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the
late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009.5

Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases,6 among them, Civil Case No. 0130.7 The
present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.

I. Civil Case No. 0130

In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board of

directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special stockholders
meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two sets of ETPI board
and officers were elected.8

Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No. 0130),
seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the PCGG. These Orders
directed Africa:

[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting
rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders’ meeting to be held on August 12, 1991,
from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI, and from participating,
directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI.9

During the pendency of Africa’s petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally ‘exercising’ the
rights of stockholders of ETPI,"10especially in the election of the members of the board of directors.
Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders
meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourt’s control and supervision and prescribed guidelines."11

In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africa’s motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be held on
Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room, Telecoms
Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The stockholders meeting
shall be conducted under the supervision and control of this Court, through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de
Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized representatives or their proxies may
vote their corresponding shares.

The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final judicial
resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a proper case the
underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.]12

The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No.
10778913(PCGG’s petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan for
holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to vote.14 In our November
26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from implementing its assailed resolution.

In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation of
Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main case and
the former merely an incident.15

During the pendency of PCGG’s petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a "Very
Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders’ Meeting for [the] Sole Purpose of
Increasing [ETPI’s] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we
referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and immediate
resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No. 0130.17

In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former
director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken– at the petitioner’s instance and after serving
notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents18 – on October 23 and 24, 1996 by way of
deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the
Philippine Embassy in London, England.

Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to depose
Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed their answer, the
notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and testify on the facts set
forth in his affidavit19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of [the petitioner] and/or
establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPI’s] Class A stock in support of
the [Urgent Petition]."20 The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the Bane deposition "in
evidence… in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009."21 On the scheduled deposition date, only Africa
was present and he cross-examined Bane.

On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority to the
PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders’ meeting of ETPI for the sole purpose of
increasing ETPI’s authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered Class ‘A’ shares
of stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as previously scheduled, on March 17,
1997 and the increase in ETPI’s authorized capital stock was "unanimously approved."23 From this
ruling, Africa went to this Court via a petition for certiorari24 docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africa’s
petition).

We jointly resolved the PCGG’s and Africa’s petitions, and ruled:

This Court notes that, like in Africa’s motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of
directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGG’s petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to amend the
articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to apply the two-tiered
test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the PCGG in the stockholders
meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan leaves this Court with no other choice
but to remand these questions to it for proper determination.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for
reception of evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the
sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation to entitle
the PCGG to vote them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors and to amend
the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the authorized capital stock of
ETPI.

The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
Resolution and in conformity herewith.

II. Civil Case No. 0009

Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996 and
March 17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded.25

In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following
witnesses:

WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES

 (1) Maurice V. Bane – representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time
ETPI was organized.

xxxx

(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto – x x x

(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson – x x x

(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. – x x x

(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x

(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque – x x x

(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x

IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition

At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that –

1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050,
0130, 014628 the following witnesses were presented therein:

a. Cesar O.V. Parlade

b. Maurice Bane

c. Evelyn Singson

d. Leonorio Martinez

e. Ricardo Castro; and

f. Rolando Gapud

2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the
documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and the said
documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the [petitioner] in [Civil Case No.
0009].

3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-examine
them.

The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion;29 in turn, the petitioner filed a
Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.

On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying the

petitioner’s 1st motion, as follows:
Wherefore, the [petitioner’s] Motion x x x is –

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral
deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil Case No.
0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available
for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)

2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case, insofar as
plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn
Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary exhibits which said
witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following
conditions :

1. xxx

2. xxx

3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be cross-
examined on their particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by the
respondents].

IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice

The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal Offer of
Evidence on December 14, 1999.33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its
offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative prayer that:

1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiff’s case and setting the same for trial
any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and limited only
to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition] which already forms part of the records
and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;

2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts established
by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis
ours]

On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution35 (2000 resolution) denying the
petitioner’s 2nd motion:

Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." Apparently, this
provision refers to the Court’s duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the pleadings, or in
the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The duty of the Court is
mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is upon the Court. Such being
the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice as something which
need not be acted upon as the same is considered redundant.

On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal offer of
exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on grounds provided by
law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice. [Emphasis ours]
On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their
respective demurrers to evidence.36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the reconsideration
of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its April 3, 2001 resolution37 (2001
resolution).

IIc. Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of

Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)

On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of the
Bane deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents’ demurrers to
evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution,40 denying the petitioner’s
3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:

But in the court’s view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested its case
as to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether the non-
appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane as to qualify the
admission of the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not see any need to dwell
on these matters in view of this Court’s Resolution rendered on April 1, 1998 which already denied
the introduction in evidence of Bane’s deposition and which has become final in view of plaintiff’s
failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.
Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for this court to grant plaintiff’s motion at this point in
time would in effect sanction plaintiff’s disregard for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its
rights for almost two years and it was only in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude
by filing a motion to reopen its case as to enable it to introduce and offer Bane’s deposition as
additional evidence, or in the alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the
deposition. But how can such a motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that
the deposition is inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for reconsideration within the
reglementary period, the resolution has attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the
simple expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a
motion for reconsideration of this court’s 1998 ruling. [emphases ours]

The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.

THE PETITION

The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion:

I.

x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME FINAL.

II.

x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION –WHICH WAS ALREADY

ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) – AS PART
OF PETITIONER’S EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0009).

III.
 x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS
TECHNICAL GROUNDS.

The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an interlocutory
order; thus, the petitioner’s failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have given it a character
of "finality" so long as the main case remains pending.42 On this basis, the petitioner concludes that
the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

On the issue of the Sandiganbayan’s refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial notice of or
to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that Civil Case No. 0130
(where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted in evidence) is but a
"child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship, evidence offered and
admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as evidence in the "parent" case.

Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:

1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would
be used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the
parties concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-
examine the witness when they failed to show up.

2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its
allegation that the respondents’ interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the
government.

3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioner’s formal offer of evidence was
obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed
and the voluminous records that the present case has generated.43

THE RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS

and THE PETITIONER’S REPLY

In the respondents’ Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 200245 ), they
claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary period
prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.46 This assertion proceeds from the view
that the petitioner’s 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier filed by the petitioner,
likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. Along the same line, they posit that the
petitioner’s 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third motion for reconsideration of the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.47 They likewise assert, on the assumption that the 1998 resolution
is interlocutory in character, that the petitioner’s failure to contest the resolution by way
of certiorari within the proper period gave the 1998 resolution a character of "finality."

The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a supplemental
offer of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial court; the
Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case since the
evidence sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and available to [it]
before [it] rested its case."48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of the petitioner’s 3rd
motion – i.e., after the respondents had filed their respective demurrers to evidence.
On the petitioner’s claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right to
cross-examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution and the
petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the allegations in the Bane
deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. The
respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence because the
petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.

In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a party may
opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely because of the
Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane deposition should be
done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the Sandiganbayan seriously erred in
considering the petitioner’s 3rd motion as a proscribed motion for reconsideration. The petitioner
generally submits that the dictates of substantial justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to
rule otherwise.

The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer of
evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence he
formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present further evidence to substantiate
his theory of the case should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence.50

The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deponent
is sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent is not an ordinary
witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign residence, his citizenship,
and his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now Rule 23), and not Section 47, Rule
130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the present case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the
deposition-taking.

To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their
respective comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their
comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments and to consider this petition
submitted for decision.

THE ISSUES

On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:

1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion –

i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;

ii. In holding that the petitioner’s 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion for
reconsideration;

iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane deposition
to the petitioner’s cause; and
 iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior consolidation of
Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.

3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under -

i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court; and

ii. The principle of judicial notice.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

I. Preliminary Considerations

I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution.

In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court order,
resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or decision he
intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998 resolution is "final"
or "interlocutory" in nature.

Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made.52 A judgment or order is considered final if the
order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same
action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution,
however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the
merits of the case, the order is interlocutory53 and the aggrieved party’s remedy is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly holds that:

As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has
been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final" judgment or order signifies a
judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the parties, reserving no further questions
or directions for future determination.

On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the court in
adjudicating the parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other.
In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis supplied)

Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The
Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time
when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of
the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this
end.

We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case is
finally resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon sufficient
grounds shown at any time before final judgment.55 In this light, the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution
– which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the evidence in Civil Case No.
0009 – could not have attained finality (in the manner that a decision or final order resolving the case
on the merits does) despite the petitioner’s failure to move for its reconsideration or to appeal.56

I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.

We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed third
(actually second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. As Section 5,
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere "rehash" of
the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected on the ground
that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.57

I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.

Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a judgment or
final order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of Court declares to
be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved
party is afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed
judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.

On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that the 60-
day period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioner’s notice of the
Sandiganbayan’s 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long been rendered by the
court, the petitioner’s subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a devious attempt to
resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.

We do not find the respondents’ submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an
interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the respondents,
the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by the petitioner
on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely on the issuance of
a disputed interlocutory ruling.58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper, Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the aggrieved party. As a matter of
exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the existence of an available alternative
remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious
effects of the order complained of.59

We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet concluded
the presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At this stage of the
case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to question the admission of the
Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion, the plain remedy available to the
petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its position on the admission
of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this
as evidence in its formal offer61 – as the petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.

Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the denial of
the 1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a petition.
II. The Sandiganbayan’s ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally erroneous but
did not constitute grave abuse of discretion

In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a

question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction.62Without this showing, the Sandiganbayan’s
erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but
not a grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should be dismissed.

Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the unique
circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not availing of the
remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is undoubtedly endowed with
public interest and has become a matter of public concern.63 In other words, we opt to resolve the
petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to avoid their recurrence in the course of
completely resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.

Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure has
inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes the order of
presentation of a

party’s evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial,64 both of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of discharging
the burden of proof,65 he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter allowed to offer
rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in some measure depends on his
manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation of evidence.67

In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to oversight,
[the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the presentation of its
evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009."69 In the face of these categorical judicial admissions,70 the
petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and insist on the introduction of evidence out of the
usual order. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the resting of its case could not have been
conditioned on the admission of the evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition,
which is the lone piece of evidence subject of this present petition, was not among the pieces of
evidence included in its formal offer of evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected
by the trial court.

The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the
petitioner had firmly denied having rested its case.71 Before then, the petitioner never found it
appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its 2nd motion which
prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioner’s case.

Although the denial of the petitioner’s first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse to the
corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of action. The
petitioner’s non-observance of the proper procedure for the admission of the Bane deposition, while
seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been rebuffed on its first attempt
to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and without seeking reconsideration of
the denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of evidence and eventually rested its case. This
time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in
its formal offer of evidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its case.
In resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s 2000 resolution, the
Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has "become part and parcel" of Civil Case No. 0009.
This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition as evidence (considering
that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioner’s attempt to adopt the Bane deposition
as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent cannot be cross-examined in court).
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the petitioner’s motion to reopen the case.
Having judicially admitted the resting of its case, the petitioner should have already questioned the
denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari, since the denial of its attempt to reopen the case
effectively foreclosed all avenues available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead
of doing so, however, the petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.

Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having rested its
case and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more, the petitioner
filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions,72 which allegedly
gave it "mixed signals."73 By pointing to these resolutions, ironically, even the petitioner impliedly
recognized that they were then already ripe for review on certiorari. What the petitioner should have
realized was that its 2nd motion unequivocally aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of
further evidence consisting of the Bane deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the
petitioner could not have been prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any
perceived ambiguity in the resolutions.

On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioner’s motion to
reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of Court does not
prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it has
rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate purpose of the admission of
additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion of the court. It is from the prism of
the exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose
of introducing, "marking and offering" additional evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this
Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted with grave abuse of discretion.

III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen the case
for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition

The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 5. Order of trial. – Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court for
special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pre-trial order
and shall proceed as follows:

xxxx

(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court, for good
reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence upon their original
case[.] [emphases ours]

Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all the
evidence he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal.75 The obvious rationale of
the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in the
administration of justice.76
A party’s declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from
introducing further evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for
instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the other;78 or where the
evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly discovered evidence,79 the party’s right to
introduce further evidence must be recognized. Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the
remedy of certiorari.

Largely, the exercise of the court’s discretion80 under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of the
Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts – i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a
"good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing court to properly
interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower court’s
action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as the
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of
power in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated
duty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law.81 Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare
and unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that
merely constitute errors of judgment82 or mere abuse of discretion.83

In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:

After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may
permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally, additional evidence is
allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered. The
omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was
due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations omitted; emphases ours)

Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:

The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a
relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the
exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material testimony
should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested,
although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of
deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously."

These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly
recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the
order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer
evidence upon their original case." These exceptions are made stronger when one considers the
character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are involved, and
action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not always be
expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulæ, an opportunity should be given to
parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the
ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)

In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:

However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to offer
evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of discretion
appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be properly disallowed
where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86

The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence.87

Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioner’s 2nd motion to avoid any uncertainty on
the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayan’s action actually left the
petitioner’s concern in limbo by considering the petitioner’s motion "redundant." This is tantamount to
a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the circumstances and is equivalent to an act
outside the contemplation of law.

It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the
respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore, would
not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioner’s introduction of the Bane deposition, which was
concededly omitted "through oversight."88 The higher interest of substantial justice, of course, is
another consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89

In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied Section 5,
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioner’s request to reopen the case for the submission of the
Bane deposition.

On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The state
of the parties’ submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil Case No.
0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the parties have more
than extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is
a 25-year old sequestration case that is now crying out for complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is
an issue that would have again been raised on remand and would surely stare us in the face after
remand.90 We are thus left with no choice but to resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane
deposition here and now.

IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition

IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not dispense with
the usual requisites of admissibility

In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in
evidence without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.91 The
petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No.
0130, among others,92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks of no
longer exists.

Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court93 – the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and 0130
were consolidated – provided that:

Rule 31
Consolidation or Severance
Section 1. Consolidation. – When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)

Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and with
economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the court’s docket, or the consolidation of issues
within those cases.95

A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31 is
completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties and the
causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases. Second, while
Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to order the actions
consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used generically and even
synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes.96 In fact, the title "consolidation" of Rule 31
covers all the different senses of consolidation, as discussed below.

These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is basically a
function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself (given the nature of
the cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and the court’s capability and
resources vis-à-vis all the official business pending before it, among other things) what
"consolidation" will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing before it.

To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and convenient
premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation is
to beg the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure and the dearth of applicable
case law on the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this Court to determine the kind of
"consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of admissibility in this case.

In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses:97

(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but
is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98

(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a
single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been
set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)99

(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate
character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not
merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the
other. (consolidation for trial)100

Considering that the Sandiganbayan’s order101 to consolidate several incident cases does not at all
provide a hint on the extent of the court’s exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the
consolidation it ordered – in view of the function of this procedural device to principally aid the court
itself in dealing with its official business – we are compelled to look deeper into the voluminous
records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that would even suggest
that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action, parties and evidence.102 To be
sure, there would have been no need for a motion to adopt (which did not remain unopposed) the
testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually resulted from the order of consolidation, for
in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take judicial notice of the same.

Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a consolidation for
trial.103Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded to the Sandiganbayan’s
1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioner’s 1st Motion on the ground that the witnesses, whose
testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are not available for cross-examination in"
the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other witnesses again in the main case, so that the
respondents can cross-examine them.

These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan’s order of consolidation
had actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with the main case, in the sense
of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these consolidated cases had (at least constructively)
been aware of and had allowed actual consolidation without objection.104

Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and the
fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for
reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a
special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI), the
conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidationand, together with the
parties affected,105 acted towards that end - where the actions become fused and unidentifiable from
one another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also appreciated in another action
– must find support in the proceedings held below. This is particularly true in a case with the
magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise, to impose upon the respondents the
effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear support in the provisions of the Rules of Court,
jurisprudence,106 and even in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan itself and despite the
aforementioned considerations) results in an outright deprivation of the petitioner’s right to due
process. We reach this conclusion especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply
a testimony taken in one of the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in
another jurisdiction and whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on
evidence.

We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993 (that is,
before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order107 issued by the Sandiganbayan in
1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal or substantive, to Civil Case No.
0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996,109 the petitioner even made a
representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.

IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under Section
47, Rule 130

Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit incidental,
case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against the
requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court – the rule on the admissibility of
testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner argues that
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24)110 must, at any rate, prevail over Section 47,
Rule 130111 of the same Rules.

At the outset, we note that when the petitioner’s motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the incident
cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to the
Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioner’s about-face two years
thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayan’s own inconsistency on how to treat the Bane
deposition, in particular, as evidence.

Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene esse)
provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the hearing of a
motion or an interlocutory proceeding.

SEC. 4. Use of depositions. — At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may
be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who
had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:

xxxx

(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose
if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a distance more
than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines,
unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the
witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by
subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make
it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the
testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. – The testimony or deposition of a

witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against
the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioner’s position that the Bane
deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4, Rule
23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a) to (d); it also
requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence." Thus, even
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading Rule 23 in isolation, the
petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility to a deposition under Rule 23
should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section 47, Rule 130.113 In determining the
admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance cannot be given on one provision to the
exclusion of the other; both provisions must be considered. This is particularly true in this case
where the evidence in the prior proceeding does not simply refer to a witness’ testimony in open
court but to a deposition taken under another and farther jurisdiction.

A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule 130
of the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the pleadings
for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an
adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial.114 Since depositions are principally made
available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts, depositions are
not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the
deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing. This is a
requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.115

Examination to be done in open court. — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or

hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.

Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral testimony
of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded under the
hearsay rule – i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to cross-examine the deponent
at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for cross-examination was afforded during
the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the opportunity for cross-examination must
normally be accorded a party at the time that the testimonial evidence is actually presented against
him during the trial or hearing of a case.116 However, under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes laid down in Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without
the deponent being actually called to the witness stand.117

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former testimony
or depositionappears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification of former
testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded.118 A fundamental
characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse party’s lack of opportunity to cross-examine the
out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly requires, inter alia, for the
admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse party must have had an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior proceeding.

This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination119 afforded an

adverse party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected
therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of cross-
examination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite
identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former
testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.

Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be substantially
the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was - or would have been
- sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do so.120 (The requirement of
similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two proceedings should be the
same.121 Although some issues may not be the same in the two actions, the admissibility of a former
testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions cannot be questioned.122)

These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence and
therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on
the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court cannot simply
be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130, for
purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the Sandiganbayan
found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the circumstances laid down under
Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that imposes further requirements in the use of
depositions in a different case or proceeding. In other words, the prior use of the deposition under
Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the
same deposition as hearsay, unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed.
The aching question is whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule.

Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for the admission of a
testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.

1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;

2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;

3. Involving the same parties;

4. Relating to the same matter;

5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him.123

The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or proceeding are
the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness.124 However, before the former testimony or
deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay the proper
predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition
in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must now examine and
resolve.

IV (c). Unavailability of witness

For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to testify." On the
other hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an action, Section 4, Rule
23 of the Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify dispensing with the actual
testimony of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the circumstances of the
deponent’s inability to attend or testify, as follows:

(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126

The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court refers to
a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony.127 Hence notwithstanding
the deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines," which previously appeared in Section 47, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioner’s excuse for the non-
presentation of Bane in open court - may still constitute inability to testify under the same rule. This
is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this instance of unavailability will always be
upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes, but to accommodate the
deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in evidence.129
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding between
the parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in evidence. The
witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were testifying de novo since his
testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The deposition of a witness, otherwise
available, is also inadmissible for the same reason.

Indeed, the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case No.
0130) is an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of
the present case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis to
presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous condition, which previously allowed the
use of the deposition, remains and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition in another
case or proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the same court. Since the basis
for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being necessity,131 the burden of establishing
its existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of the evidence. This burden cannot be
supplanted by assuming the continuity of the previous condition or conditions in light of the general
rule against the non-presentation of the deponent in court.132

IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of

parties; and identity of subject matter

The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness made on
direct examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an essential
safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right of cross-
examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a witness may be
called.134 This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well as on the examination
of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general exclusion of hearsay statements
and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of reported testimony taken at a former
hearing where the present adversary was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the
premise that the opportunity of cross-examination is an essential safeguard135 against falsehoods
and frauds.

In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been
satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to the
admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent is imputed
may not after all be the same "adverse party" who actually had such opportunity.

To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first
proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity, however, is
not required; substantial identity136 or identity of interests137 suffices, as where the subsequent
proceeding is between persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding by privity in law, in
blood, or in estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive relationships to the same rights
of property.138

In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest or
privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents. While Africa
is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should be admissible only
against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed as Civil Case No. 0130
(and, unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose Africa). While Africa and the
respondents are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not establish at all any privity between
them for purposes of binding the latter to the acts or omissions of the former respecting the cross-
examination of the deponent. The sequestration of their shares does not result in the integration of
their rights and obligations as stockholders which remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-
vis other stockholders.139

IV (d1). The respondents’ notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver

The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine the
deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices previously sent
to them.140

In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996,141 the
petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed to
specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Bane’s deposition, the petitioner sent a Second
Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination where it
likewise moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.

The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended
deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent Enrile
appears to have filed an Opposition143to the petitioner’s first notice, where he squarely raised the
issue of reasonability of the petitioner’s nineteen-day first notice. While the Sandiganbayan denied
Africa’s motion for protective orders,144 it strikes us that no ruling was ever handed down on
respondent Enrile’s Opposition.145

It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral
examination is not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be bound
thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that -

The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken
connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion conferred by law
is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and
in consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see to it that the safeguards for the
protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Moran:

. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection against
abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a
writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs — prying that is quite
justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this
reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is intended not as an aid to
litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party, or
both. (emphasis ours)

In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enrile’s Opposition
(which is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even the bare minimum
"safeguards for the protection of," (more so) non-parties,147 and to ensure that these safeguards are
firmly maintained. Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the petitioner’s assertion (that the
taking of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the lingering concerns – e.g., reasonability
of the notice; and the non-party status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident
(docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the Bane deposition was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice
of the respondents.

In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioner’s reliance on the prior notice on the
respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the non-party status of
the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 – the effect of consolidation being merely for trial. As non-
parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically, they cannot be bound by the
taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment of their right of cross-
examination.148 Opportunity for cross-examination, too, even assuming its presence, cannot be
singled out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition since such admissibility
is also anchored on the requisite identity of parties. To reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan
considered the Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case No. 0130, its action was premised on Africa’s
status as a party in that case where the Bane deposition was taken.

Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section 5
which provides:

Effect of substitution of parties. — Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use
depositions previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and another action involving
the same subject is afterward brought between the same parties or their representatives or
successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the former action may be used
in the latter as if originally taken therefor. [italics and underscoring ours]

In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioner’s claim that the respondents waived their
right to cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition. Incidentally,
the respondents’ vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine the deponent speaks loudly that
they never intended any waiver of this right.

Interestingly, the petitioner’s notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.
Section 15 of this rule reads:

Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. — A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to every
other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the
name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. On motion
of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the
time.

Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the individual
notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of the then
opponent’s (Africa’s) cross-examination since, to begin with, they were not even parties to the
action. Additionally, we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking, conspicuously absent was
any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their inexcusable failure to appear at
the deposition taking would amount to a waiver of their right of cross-examination, without prejudice
to the right of the respondents to raise their objections at the appropriate time.149 We would be
treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to hold that one not a party to an action, and
neither in privity nor in substantial identity of interest with any of the parties in the same
action, can be bound by the action or omission of the latter, by the mere expedient of a
notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce a resultant waiver from the respondents’ mere failure to
attend the deposition-taking despite notice sent by the petitioner.

Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil Case
No. 0009 – the principal action where it was sought to be introduced – while Bane was still here in
the Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines was no longer under the Marcos
administration and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No. 0009 was
filed. In fact, the petitioner’s notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is for Mr. Maurice
Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr. Bane had long executed
in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila.150 Clearly, a deposition could then have been taken - without
compromising the respondents’ right to cross-examine a witness against them - considering that the
principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery. These, to our mind, are avoidable
omissions that, when added to the deficient handling of the present matter, add up to the gross
deficiencies of the petitioner in the handling of Civil Case No. 0009.

After failing to take Bane’s deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case,
the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and
proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling thereon. On that occasion,
where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the respondents cannot avoid a resultant
waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail to appear at the deposition-taking.
Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must be stressed that not only were the
respondents non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they likewise have no interest in Africa’s certiorari
petition asserting his right as an ETPI stockholder.

Setting aside the petitioner’s flip-flopping on its own representations,151 this Court can only express
dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his deposition
despite having knowledge already of the substance of what he would testify on. Considering that the
testimony of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioner’s case against the respondents, the
Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an incident case (instead of
the main case) at a time when it became the technical right of the petitioner to do so.

V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice

The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously introduced
and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken judicial notice of
the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.

Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without
proof because these facts are already known to them.152 Put differently, it is the assumption by a
court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on
convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not
ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153

The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law maxim, manifesta (or
notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means that the court will dispense
with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing, the court assumes that the matter is
so notorious that it would not be disputed.

The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Rule 129
either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x x judicial
departments of the Philippines,"155or gives the court the discretion to take judicial notice of matters
"ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions."156 On the other hand, a party-litigant
may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court may allow the parties to be
heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter involved.157 In the present case, after the
petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard
through their corresponding oppositions.

In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before
the same judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.

As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with
the knowledge of, andabsent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for
that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn
from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties,
and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.159

Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient basis
exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case.160

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of judicial
notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice seriously
pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a genealogical
perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases – Civil Case 0130 –
as evidence in the "parent" case – Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family of cases."161 To the
petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of judicial notice.

We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are inapplicable either
because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which proscribes
the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases.163 Second, the
petitioner’s proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly procedure. The petitioner itself
admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases, which, in all likelihood, involve issues of
varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the petitioner’s argument, we would be espousing judicial
confusion by indiscriminately allowing the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably
found competent and relevant in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases.
It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies
upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the
petitioner’s attention to our prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164

Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the Judge
in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts of the case,
except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the case is up for trial, the
judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the litigants to the action to
establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)

We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioner’s argument that we should
take judicial notice of the Bane deposition.

VI. Summation

To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the petitioner’s 3rd motion –
the Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) – was a legal
error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to reopen the
case at the petitioner’s instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3) notwithstanding
the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane deposition is not
admissible under the rules of evidence.165

VII. Refutation of Justice Carpio’s Last Minute Modified Dissent

At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition. His
covering note states:

I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the public
will understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)

In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.

First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at issue
in this case – i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned with the
competence and relevance166 of the evidence, whose admission is sought. While the dissent quoted
at length the Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the relevance of the Bane
deposition (or, to adopt the dissent’s characterization, whether "Maurice V. Bane is a vital witness")
is not an issue here unless it can be established first that the Bane deposition is a competent
evidence.

Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine Jurisprudence,
the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights of the parties are
adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our discussion on consolidation, we
footnoted the following in response to the dissent’s position, which we will restate here for emphasis:

In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Francisco’s Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:

The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions consolidated
into a single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of actions involved had originally
been joined in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until it is vacated or set aside. After
the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the separate actions, which are by virtue of
the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a single action, which should be entitled in such
manner as the court may direct, and all subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights
of the parties adjudicated in a single action (1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).

At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris Secundum,
the following caveat appears:

The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are combined
into one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in which a single judgment is
rendered; second, where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case
the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where several actions are ordered to be
tried together but each retains its separate character and requires the entry of a separate judgment.
The failure to distinguish between these methods of procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two
latter, strictly speaking, not being consolidation, a fact which has not always been noted, has caused
some confusion and conflict in the cases. (1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).

In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term
"consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477 (Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Francisco’s statement out of
context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an unsettled matter
that requires the approach we did in the majority’s discussion on consolidation.167
Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose of
consolidation – to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated cases" and
"the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this can only be achieved if the repetition of the
same evidence is dispensed with.

It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is primarily
addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would be in keeping
with the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what consolidation would actually
bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have become relatively complex). In the
present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan
or the parties themselves (the petitioner and the respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond
joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court – which is not a trial court – impose a purported effect
that has no factual or legal grounds?

Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only
resulted in a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition
considering that they were given notice of the deposition-taking." The issue here boils down to one
of due process – the fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the rigor of
cross-examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence – especially when read
in light of the general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony, in
open court, of a party or witness.

Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning the
reasonableness thereof – an issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the
Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayan’s omission worse, the Sandiganbayan
blindly relied on the petitioner’s assertion that the deposition-taking was a matter of right and, thus,
failed to address the consequences and/or issues that may arise from the apparently innocuous
statement of the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where
only the respondents, and not Africa, are the parties).169 There is simply the absence of "due" in due
process.

Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayan’s Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the
Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the Sandiganbayan
did not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that the deposition-taking was a
matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that these consolidated cases have
reached. Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature, the most minimum of fairness
demands upon the petitioner to move for the taking of the Bane deposition and for the
Sandiganbayan to make a ruling thereon (including the opposition filed by respondent Enrile which
equally applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning omission and failures that have prevailed in
this case cannot be cured by this Court without itself being guilty of violating the constitutional
guarantee of due process.

Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary to the
petitioner’s claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure involve
technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical rules deserve. But the resolution of
the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding discussions show. They
involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to the respondents, particularly to respondent
Enrile, who is portrayed in the Bane deposition to be acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these
shares should be deemed to be those of the Marcoses. They involved, too, principles upon which
our rules of procedure are founded and which we cannot disregard without flirting with the violation
of guaranteed substantive rights and without risking the disorder that these rules have sought to
avert in the course of their evolution.
In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a conclusive
decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote resulted in the
re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is deemed sustained.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 146586             January 26, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS, petitioner, 

vs. 
JULIA DEL ROSARIO, MARIA DEL ROSARIO, PACENCIA DEL ROSARIO, and HEIRS OF
SANTOS DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review1 to set aside the Decision2 dated 25 September 2000 and the Resolution
dated 29 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43929. The Court of Appeals
reversed the Decision3dated 7 July 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 8, Malolos
("trial court") in Civil Case No. 70-M-92.

The Facts

On 14 February 1992, respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario and
the Heirs of Santos Del Rosario ("respondents") filed before the trial court a complaint for Recovery
of Possession against petitioner Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS").
Respondents alleged that they own a parcel of land with an area of 1,181 square meters ("Property")
situated in Kaypombo,4 Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The Property was registered in 1976 in the name of
respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-222432 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds.
Respondents alleged that the Kaypombo Primary School Annex ("KPPS") under DECS was
occupying a portion of the Property through respondents’ tolerance and that of their predecessors-in-
interest. Respondents further alleged that KPPS refused to vacate the premises despite their valid
demands to do so.
In its Answer, DECS countered that KPPS’s occupation of a portion of the Property was with the
express consent and approval of respondents’ father, the late Isaias Del Rosario ("Isaias"). DECS
claimed that some time in 1959 Isaias donated a portion ("Donated Site") of the Property to the
Municipality of Sta. Maria ("Municipality") for school site purposes. Atty. Ely Natividad, now a
regional trial court judge ("Judge Natividad"), prepared the deed of donation and the acceptance.
KPPS started occupying the Donated Site in 1962. At present, KPPS caters to the primary
educational needs of approximately 60 children between the ages of 6 and 8. Because of the
donation, DECS now claims ownership of the 650 square meter Donated Site. In fact, DECS
renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary School.

During the pre-trial conference held on 3 September 1992, DECS admitted the existence and
execution of TCT No. T-222432 (Exhibit "A"), Tax Declaration No. 6310 (Exhibit "B"), and the tax
receipts in respondents’ names for the years 1991 and 1992 (Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"). On the other
hand, respondents admitted the existence of Judge Natividad’s affidavit that he prepared the deed of
donation (Exhibit "1") and the tax declaration for 1985 in the Municipality’s name (Exhibit "2"). Since
there was no dispute that the Property was registered in respondents’ names, the parties agreed to
a reverse trial with DECS presenting its evidence first to prove that there was a valid donation to the
Municipality.

DECS presented three witnesses: Ricardo Nicolas, Vidal De Jesus and Judge Natividad, all
residents of Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The trial court summarized the witnesses’ testimonies,
thus:

Defendant, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, proceeded to present as its first
witness, Ricardo Nicolas, 78 years old, widower, housekeeper and residing at [K]aypombo, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, since 1953 up to the present. He testified that during the duration of his residency in
[K]aypombo, he came across a public elementary school (KPPS); that as far as he knows, the land
occupied by the primary school was formerly owned by Isaias del Rosario who donated said land to
the people of Sta. Maria, Bulacan in 1959; that the act of donating said land was made during a
political meeting in his residence by Isaias del Rosario and in the presence of the then incumbent
mayor; he actually saw Isaias del Rosario and Mayor Ramos sign a document which is a deed of
donation in favor of the Municipality of Sta. Maria; that the signing was made in the presence of
Judge Natividad who was then a municipal councilor; that Isaias del Rosario is now dead but his
death occurred long after the construction of the KPPS and that Isaias del Rosario even witnessed
the construction of the primary school.

Vidal de Jesus, the second witness for the defense, 65 years old, married, a barangay councilman of
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, and presently residing at No. 437 Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
testified that as barangay councilman, he was aware of the land problem of KPPS; that in 1991, the
barangay council and the children of Isaias del Rosario had a meeting in the presence of Judge
Natividad, during which, the latter told the children of Isaias del Rosario that the land had been
donated by their father. The children agreed but requested that the school be renamed after their
father’s name; that the barangay council tried to secure a copy of the deed of donation from the
Municipality of Sta. Maria, but according to the people at the municipal hall, when they transferred to
the new municipal building, the deed got lost, only they were able to get a copy of the tax declaration
in the name of the municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan (Exh. "2"), a certification to that effect was
issued by the municipal mayor (Exh. "3"). They went to the DECS office in Malolos, but could not
likewise find a copy of the deed.

The last witness for the defense was Judge Eli Natividad, 63 years old, widower, resident of
Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He testified that KPPS is very near his house; that the land
occupied by said school is formerly owned by Isaias del Rosario, a close relative; that as far as he
knows, the municipality of Sta. Maria is now the owner of the land; that when he was still one of the
incumbent municipal councilors of Sta. Maria in 1961, his relative Isaias del Rosario went to his
house and told him that he wanted to have a primary school in their place as he saw the plight of
small pupils in their place; that the elementary school then existing was very far from their place and
Isaias del Rosario wanted to have a primary school to help these pupils; that Isaias del Rosario was
willing to donate a portion of the questioned lot for school site, so that said matter was relayed to the
municipal council; he also testified that he prepared the deed of donation which was signed by Isaias
del Rosario in his residence which was accepted by the municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan through
a resolution signed in the office of the secretary and the municipal mayor; that a copy of said
resolution could not be found due to the transfer of the municipal hall from the old to the new
building.5

Respondents presented two witnesses: Eugenia R. Ignacio and Maria Del Rosario-Esteban,
daughters of the late Isaias. The trial court summarized their testimonies, as follows:

For the plaintiffs, Eugenia R. Ignacio, 59, residing at Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan testified that
she knows the plaintiffs as they are her brothers/sisters; that their father Isaias del Rosario died on
April 18, 1966 long after the construction of the school and that she does not know everything about
the donation because her father never informed them of his dealings and she did not inquire from
him about the occupancy of the lot by the school.

Maria del Rosario-Esteban, 66, residing at Pulang-lupa, Pandi, one of the plaintiffs herein, testified
that she knows the property in question and that they own it by virtue of succession and that she
cannot recall how the school was constructed on the land; that her parents never donated any
property because that is their only property. Also, she stated that their father told them that he just
lent the property temporarily to the municipality and she never found any document conveying the lot
in question to the municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan.6

On 7 July 1993, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing respondents’ complaint for recovery of
possession as follows:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, and for a much greater cause, the instituted
complaint, for recovery of possession of 1,181 square meters of land in Kaypombo, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, covered by TCT No. T-222432 against the defendant is hereby DISMISSED without costs.7

The trial court explained its decision in this wise:

After a careful consideration of the facts at hand, taking into account the credibility and
reasonableness of the testimonies of the witnesses, the court is of the opinion that the defense was
able to prove the due execution of the deed of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss of the
same, in accordance with Rule 130[,] Sec. 4. It is recalled that Judge Eli Natividad, then a municipal
councilor of Sta. Maria, testified that he was the person who prepared the deed of donation and later
notarized the same, and that said deed was duly executed and signed before him and in his
presence. Likewise, he affirmed that the municipal board of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, passed a resolution
accepting the deed of donation in favor of the said municipality. Noteworthy is the rule that a
recantation/recollection of witness is a form of secondary evidence to prove the existence/content of
a document. Since the loss of the deed subject matter of this case was likewise duly proved by the
defense, exerting the best possible efforts to locate or secure a copy of the same and without bad
faith on its part, this Court is bent to give a greater weight to the secondary evidence adduced by the
defense vis-à-vis the title in the name of the plaintiff[s], most particularly in this case, where the
plaintiffs failed to make it appear that other and more secondary evidence is known to the defendant
and can be produced by them.
Further judging on the consistency, credibility and personality of the witnesses of the defense,
notably Judge Eli Natividad who was then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria at the time of the
execution of the deed of donation and who is thus in a best position to testify on the matter, not to
mention the fact that their testimonies were all under oath, the Court cannot avoid but give weight to
their statements and declarations. The defense witnesses were not induced by ill motive to testify in
favor of the DECS, considering that they will not derive any personal benefit, material or otherwise,
from such an act. On the contrary, such act may be considered heroic, as it is a manifestation of a
moral compulsion to help shed light to the truth.

On the part of the plaintiffs, it was testified to by Eugenia Ignacio that their father (donor) died on
April 18, 1966, long after the school was constructed on the subject land with the occupation of the
land by the school which continued up to the present, and even after the land was allegedly
transferred by succession to the plaintiffs in 1976, it was only now that it comes to the mind of the
plaintiffs to seek recovery of the possession of the same. This, among other things, may be taken to
favor the stand of the defense that the land occupied by the school was in truth, donated to the
municipality of Sta. Maria.8

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 25 September 2000, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is REVERSED and another one
entered ordering the defendant to vacate the subject premises.9

The appellate court denied DECS’ motion for reconsideration in the Resolution dated 29 December
2000. Hence, this petition.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

The Court of Appeals held that DECS failed to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of
donation as well as the Resolution of the municipal council accepting the donation. The Court of
Appeals was not fully satisfied that DECS or the Municipality had made a diligent search of the
alleged "lost" deed of donation. Pertinent portions of the Court of Appeals’ Decision read:

It is unfortunate that the Deed of Donation and the Resolution were not produced during the trial.
The defendant alleged that these were lost when the Municipality transferred to a new building. The
defendant resorted to proving the documents’ existence through Sec. 5 of Rule 130 (B) of the
Revised Rules on Evidence by relying on the testimony of the witnesses who were present during
the execution of the lost documents. xxx.

xxx

The Court disagrees with the ruling of the lower court to the effect that the defendant was able to
satisfy the foregoing requisites. The defense was not able to prove the due execution or existence of
the deed of donation and the resolution, as well as the loss of these documents as the cause of their
unavailability.

The Rule requires that the defendant must "prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of the witnesses in the order stated".
However, the defendant proceeded with the last resort-testimony of the witnesses, without even
showing any diligent effort to secure a copy of the deed of donation and the resolution. Note that
Atty. Eli Natividad, then a municipal councilor of Sta. Maria, testified that he was the person who
prepared the deed of donation and later notarized the same. He also affirmed that the municipal
board of Sta. Maria, Bulacan passed a Resolution as he was a municipal councilor at that time such
resolution was passed. He testified that he furnished the municipal government, the Division Office
of Education in Bulacan, the court of Sta. Maria a copy of the deed. However, the defendant only
submitted an affidavit showing that the deed can no longer be located in the municipal government.
There was no evidence to show that the defendant looked for a copy from the Clerk of Court of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. If it is true that Atty. Natividad notarized the deed, he should have a copy of it. In
fact, such act of notarizing the deed should have been in his notarial register. This notarial register
was supposed to be forwarded to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of the province and
later, to the Chief of the National Library.

"Before secondary evidence of a writing may be introduced on the ground that the instrument has
been lost there must be proof that a diligent search has been made in the place where it is most
likely to be found and that the search has not been successful."

In the case at bar, this Court is not fully satisfied that a search was made or that there was diligence
in the search. The lower court erred in hastily concluding that the loss of the document was
sufficiently established when in fact, the defendant did not look for it in the office of the Clerk of Court
and the National Library. Since there was no diligent search, this Court finds it hard to believe the
defendant’s theory that such documents existed because, for sure, if there really was a notarized
deed or a resolution, there must be a copy.

"Secondary evidence of the contents of writings is admitted upon the theory that the original cannot
be produced by the party by whom the evidence is offered within a reasonable time by the exercise
of reasonable diligence. Until, however, the non-production of the primary evidence has been
sufficiently accounted for, secondary evidence is not ordinarily admissible."

For this Court to affirm the ruling of the lower court based on testimonies alone will work injustice to
the plaintiffs.10

The Issue

In its memorandum, DECS raises the sole issue of –

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER

FAILED TO PROVE THE DUE EXECUTION OR EXISTENCE OF THE DEED OF DONATION AND
THE RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL ACCEPTING THE DONATION, AS WELL AS
THE LOSS OF THE DOCUMENTS AS THE CAUSE OF THEIR UNAVAILABILITY.11

The Solicitor General contends that DECS had satisfactorily proven by secondary evidence the fact
of donation, the existence and due execution of the deed of donation as well as the municipal
council Resolution accepting the donation. DECS had also adequately proven the loss of these
documents. According to the Solicitor General, based on the evidence presented in the trial court,
DECS established that Isaias donated a parcel of land to the Municipality as the site of a school.
Isaias executed a deed of donation, which then Atty. Eli Natividad notarized. There was a municipal
council Resolution accepting the donation and expressing gratitude to Isaias. There was notice of
this acceptance as DECS constructed the school on the Donated Site during the lifetime of the
donor, without objection on his part. Since all the essential formalities had been followed, the
donation made by Isaias long after the death of his wife Nieves Gumatay is valid and proven by
secondary evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Formal Requisites of Donations of Real Property

The donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is void without the formalities stated in
Article 749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines ("Civil Code"). Article 749 of the Civil Code reads:

Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy.

The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it
shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.

Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that the donation of real property must be made in a public
instrument. Otherwise, the donation is void. A deed of donation acknowledged before a notary public
is a public document.12The notary public shall certify that he knows the person acknowledging the
instrument and that such person is the same person who executed the instrument, acknowledging
that the instrument is his free act and deed. The acceptance may be made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate instrument. An acceptance made in a separate instrument must also be in
a public document. If the acceptance is in a separate public instrument, the donor shall be notified in
writing of such fact. Both instruments must state the fact of such notification.13

Best and Secondary Evidence

The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the deed of
donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce the
original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case
there can be no evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself. Simply put, when
a party wants to prove the contents of the document, the best evidence is the original writing itself.

A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the exceptions in
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) xxx;

(c) xxx;

(d) xxx.

In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. – When the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original
document itself.14 A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument
not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court,
provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily
explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party
must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the
original instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents,
although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary.15

The testimony of Ricardo Nicolas may have established to some extent the existence of the deed of
donation since he testified that he was present when Isaias and the mayor talked about the donation
and that he witnessed the signing of the document.  However, Ricardo Nicolas admitted during
1a\^/phi1.net

cross-examination that he did not read and did not have personal knowledge of the contents of the
document that Isaias and the mayor supposedly signed.16

In the same vein, Vidal De Jesus’ testimony does not help to establish the deed of
donation’s existence, executionand contents. He testified that he never saw the deed of donation.
On cross-examination, Vidal De Jesus admitted that the information that Isaias donated the lot to the
Municipality was only relayed to him by Judge Natividad himself.17 If at all, DECS offered Vidal De
Jesus’ testimony to establish the loss of the deed of donation. Vidal de Jesus testified that the
barangay council tried to get a copy of the deed but the Municipality informed the barangay council
that the deed was lost when the municipal office was transferred to a new building. DECS also made
a search in the DECS office in Malolos but this proved futile too.

This leaves us with Judge Natividad’s testimony. Judge Natividad testified that he prepared and
notarized the deed of donation. He further testified that there was a municipal council Resolution,
signed in the Office of the Secretary and of the Mayor, accepting the donation and expressing
gratitude to the donor. He furnished the municipal government, the DECS Division Office of Bulacan
and the clerk of court of Sta. Maria a copy of the deed of donation.

DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution accepting the donation. There
is also no proof that the donee communicated in writing its acceptance to the donor aside from the
circumstance that DECS constructed the school during Isaias’ lifetime without objection on his part.
There is absolutely no showing that these steps were noted in both instruments.

Sufficiency of Proof of Loss

What mainly militates against DECS’ claim is, as the Court of Appeals found, inadequate proof that
DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search in the places where the deed of donation may likely
be found and that the search was unsuccessful. Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, a
party must establish the existence and due execution of the instrument. After a party establishes the
existence and due execution of the document, he must prove that the document was lost or
destroyed.18 The destruction of the instrument —

may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew
the fact of its loss, or by any one who had made, on the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place [or] places where the document or papers of similar character are usually
kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who
has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed
lost.19

Here, DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division Office in
Bulacan. The copies of the deed of donation furnished these offices were purportedly "lost" when
these offices transferred to new locations. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out,
Judge Natividad who claimed to have notarized the deed of donation failed to account for other
copies of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record, and furnish to other designated
government offices.

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of a notary public. The law requires him to
keep a notarial register where he shall record all his official acts as notary public. The law specifies
the information that the notary public must enter in the notarial register. Failure to perform this duty
results in the revocation of his commission as notary public. We quote the provisions of the Notarial
Law pertinent to the case:

SECTION 245. Notarial register. - Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the
notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a
certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal
fees therefor.1ªvvphi1.nét

Such register shall be kept in books to be furnished by the Attorney-General (Solicitor-General) to

any notary public upon request and upon payment of the actual cost thereof, but officers exercising
the functions of notaries public ex officio shall be supplied with the register at government expense.
The register shall be duly paged, and on the first page, the Attorney-General (Solicitor-General) shall
certify the number of pages of which the book consist[s].

SECTION 246. Matters to be entered therein. - The notary public shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him,
the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the
signature, the date of the execution, oath, or acknowledgment or the instrument, the fees collected
by him for his services as notary in connection therewith, and; when the instrument is contract, he
shall keep a correct copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records
a brief description of the substance thereof, and shall give to each entry a consecutive number,
beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary shall give to each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register,
and shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries.

xxx

At the end of each week the notary shall certify in his register the number of instruments executed,
sworn to, acknowledged, or protested before him; or if none, such certificate shall show this fact.

A certified copy of each month’s entries as described in this section and a certified copy of
any instrument acknowledged before them shall within the first ten days of the month next
following be forwarded by the notaries public to the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the
province and shall be filed under the responsibility of such officer; Provided, that if there is no entry
to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of the certified
copies herein required. (As amended by C.A. 72, Sec. 1.)
SECTION 247. Disposition of notarial register. - Immediately upon his notarial register being
filled, and also within fifteen days after the expiration of his commission, unless reappointed,
the notary public shall forward his notarial register to the clerk of the Court of First Instance
of the province or of the City of Manila, as the case may be, wherein he exercises his office, who
shall examine the same and report thereon to the judge of the Court of First Instance. If the judge
finds that no irregularity has been committed in the keeping of the register, he shall forward the
same to the chief of the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trade-marks. In case the
judge finds that irregularities have been committed in the keeping of the register, he shall refer the
matter to the fiscal of the province - and in the City of Manila, to the fiscal of the city - for action and
the sending of the register to the chief of the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks shall be deferred until the termination of the case against the notary public. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The Notarial Law mandates a notary public to record in his notarial register the necessary
information regarding the instrument acknowledged before him. The Notarial Law also mandates the
notary public to retain a copy of the instrument acknowledged before him when it is a contract.20 The
notarial register is a record of the notary public’s official acts. Acknowledged instruments recorded in
the notarial register are public documents.21 If the instrument is not recorded in the notarial register
and there is no copy in the notarial records, the presumption arises that the document was not
notarized and is not a public document.22

DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register where Judge Natividad as the notary
public should have recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have explained the
unavailability of the notarial register. Judge Natividad could have also explained why he did not
retain a copy of the deed of donation as required by law. As the Court of Appeals correctly observed,
there was no evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from the Clerk of Court concerned or
from the National Archives. All told, these circumstances preclude a finding that DECS or the
Municipality made a diligent search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. "Preponderance of evidence" means that the evidence as a whole adduced by one side is
superior to that of the other. In other words, preponderance of evidence means the greater weight of
the evidence - or evidence that outweighs the evidence of the adverse party. This Court is not
satisfied that the evidence on the side of the party carrying the burden of proof is of preponderating
weight.

Finally, DECS raises for the first time before this Court the issue on whether respondents’ claim is
barred by the equitable defense of laches. DECS did not raise this matter in the complaint or during
the trial in the court below. DECS did not also raise this matter in its appeal to the Court of
Appeals.  This Court cannot entertain this issue at this late stage, for to do so would plainly violate
l^vvphi1.net

the basic rule of fair play, justice and due process.23

Much as we sympathize with the plight of the schoolchildren, we do not find reversible error in the
Decision of the Court of Appeals. We cannot grant the relief DECS is seeking and disregard existing
laws and jurisprudence. DECS, however, is not without remedy. The government can expropriate at
any time the Donated Site, paying just compensation to respondents.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision dated 25 September 2000 and the Resolution
dated 29 December 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43929 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 168168               September 14, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 

vs.
EDGARDO DIMAANO, Appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On January 26, 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2) counts of
rape and one (1) count of attempted rape in the complaints which read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 96-125

That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 10 years of
age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Criminal Case No. 96-150

That on or about the 29th day of December 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a
minor 12 years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Criminal Case No. 96-151

That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and
attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of
Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due
to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.4 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Complainant was born on August 26, 1983, and was 10 years old when she was first sexually
abused in the morning of September 1993. While inside their house in Sucat, Paraaque, appellant
entered her room and laid down beside her. He removed her clothes and asked her to lie face down
then inserted his penis into her anus. Complainant cried and felt so much pain, but she kept the
incident to herself as her father might hurt her.5

A few days later, appellant again ravished her. After removing his clothes, he asked her to lie on her
side facing him and to place her thigh over his. While in that position, appellant inserted his penis
into her vagina which caused tremendous pain.6 As in the first incident, complainant kept the ordeal
to herself. It was only in November 1995 that she confided the sexual abuses to her mother.

On December 29, 1995, appellant again assaulted her daughter. While leaning on the kitchen sink,
he raised her t-shirt, fondled and kissed her breasts. He then removed their shorts, fondled her
vagina and inserted his penis, but when her brother Edwin went out of his room, appellant
immediately asked her to dress up.7

The last sexual assault happened in the afternoon of January 1, 1996. Appellant laid complainant
down on the sofa then placed himself on top of her and made pumping motion even with their shorts
on. Appellant stopped only when he heard the arrival of his wife.8

On January 3, 1996, complainant and her mother visited a relative in Cainta, Rizal, who upon
learning of the abuses done by the appellant, advised them to go to Camp Crame where they filed a
complaint.9 The Medico-Legal Officer at the PNP Crime Laboratory examined complainant and found
her to have suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations and was in a non-virgin state.10

Appellant denied the accusations against him. He testified that he married Maria Loreto V. Dimaano
on December 25, 1976 and begot three children with her, namely, Edwin, Eric, and Maricar. He
alleged that he worked in several companies abroad11 but admitted that he was in the Philippines in
September 1993. He contended though that he could not have raped complainant because he was
always in the office from 7:00 a.m. until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment
overseas.12

He claimed it was impossible for him to rape his daughter on December 29, 1995 or January 1, 1996
because there were other people in the house. He argued that had he raped complainant, then she
would not have accompanied him to the Paraaque Police Station and Barangay Hall of San Antonio
to apply for police clearance and barangay I.D., and to Uniwide Shopping Center at Sucat,
Paraaque, where they applied for membership at the Video City Club.13 He also maintained that the
fact that his daughter was in a non-virgin state did not conclusively prove that he was responsible for
it because it is also possible that his daughter had sexual intercourse with another man her age.14
The trial court found the testimony of complainant to be spontaneous and credible. She narrated the
obscene details of her harrowing experience which no girl of tender age would have known unless
she herself had experienced it. It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the
fear complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel between
complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious charge of rape against
appellant. It disregarded the Compromise Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng
Sumbong since complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same. Besides, she
testified in open court that she was pursuing the case against her father. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the accused Edgardo Dimaano is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of rape (2 counts) and the crime of attempted rape. For the rape committed in September
1993, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua. For the rape on December 29, 1995, he is
imposed the supreme penalty of death. And for the crime of attempted rape, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103 as amended), he is sentenced to a penalty of 4 years
and 2 months of prision correccional medium to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision
mayormaximum. He is ordered to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.15

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque City, Branch 257 convicting accused-appellant Edgardo Dimaano of the crime of rape is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

In Criminal Case No. 96-125, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua is
also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php50,000.00
as moral damages and Php25,0000.00 as exemplary damages.

In Criminal Case No. 96-150, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO, as found guilty of
qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act 7659, and sentenced to death penalty, is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO
Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

In Criminal Case No. 96-151, the accused-appellant EDGARDO DIMAANO as found guilty of
attempted rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic
Act 7659, is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years
of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years and 1 day to 10 years of prision mayor as maximum.
Accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim MARICAR DIMAANO Php30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, Php25,000.00 as moral damages, and Php10,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty
Cases (A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, effective 15 October 2004), this case is CERTIFIED to the Supreme
Court for review.

Let the entire record of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.16

In his Brief, appellant raises the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION HAS

OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.

II. WHETHER OR NOR THE VOLUNTARY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF
DESISTANCE BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DULY
CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR WHICH PUT TO DOUBT THE REASONS BEHIND THE
FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES OF RAPE AGAINST HEREIN ACCUSED.17

Appellant contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could have reported them
to the authorities when she accompanied him to Paraaque Police Station and the Barangay Hall of
San Antonio or to their relatives when she had the opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the
trial court considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng
Sumbong, it would have known that complainant was only pressured by her mother into filing the
complaint.

We are not persuaded.

This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence which
appellate courts can rely on because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly
their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and cross-examination by counsel.18 Absent any
showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances
of weight which would affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility deserves the
appellate court's highest respect.19

It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally given full weight and
credit, more so if she is a minor. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused
deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the humiliation of a public trial is
an eloquent testament to the truth of her complaint. In so testifying, she could only have been
impelled to tell the truth, especially in the absence of proof of ill motive.20

In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave credence to the testimony of the
complainant who was only 12 years old when she narrated to the court the violations of her person
as follows:

For rape committed in September 1993:

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

When was the first time that he committed sexual assault upon you?

A: September 1993.

COURT:

No specific date?

A: I cannot remember, Maam.

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

Can you remember how old were you at that time?

A: 10 years old, Maam.

Q: So, after he removed your T-shirt, bra and pan(t)y and shorts, what happened next, if anything
happened?

A: He asked me to lie face down. Pinadapa po niya ako.

Q: After he asked you to lie face down, what happened next?

RECORD: The witness is crying.

A: He inserted in my anus ' ipinasok niya ang titi niya sa puwet ko.

Q: Did you tell anybody about what happened to you?

A: No, Maam.

Q: Why not?

A: Because I was afraid of my father.

Q: Why are you afraid of your father?

A: Because he might hurt me.

Q: After that incident in September 1993, do you recall any other incident that occurred?

A: There is, Maam.

Q: When was it?

A: After a few days after the first incident.

Q: After he entered your room, what happened next?

A: He laid beside me and he removed my clothes.

Q: What did your father do with the clothes he was wearing?

A: He removed his clothes.

Q: After removing his clothes, what happened next, if any?

A: We were lying in my bed and he asked me to lie on my side ' pinatagilid niya ako.
Q: After he asked you to lie down on your side, what happened next, if any?

A: He asked me to raise my right leg and placed it on his side because he was then lying on his side.

Q: After he asked you to place your right thigh over his left thigh, what happened next, if any?

A: He inserted his penis into my organ.21

For rape committed on December 29, 1995:

Q: On December 29, 1995, do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?

A: There was, Maam.

Q: What is that incident?

A: I was raped by my father on that day.

Q: Where were you on that day when you said he raped you?

A: I was then at the kitchen of our house.

Q: What were you doing at the kitchen at that time?

A: I was then sitting at our dining set.

Q: What about your father, what he doing?

A: He was cooking.

Q: What happened while sitting at the dining set, if any?

A: He told me to approach him.

Q: After you approached him, what happened next?

A: I was leaning then at the kitchen sink and he asked me to embrace him.

Q: What happened after you embraced him?

A: After that, he raised my T-shirt.

Q: After raising your T-shirt, what happened next?

A: He held my breast.

Q: After that, what happened next?

A: He kept kissing my breast.

Q: How many times did he kiss your breast?

A: Many times.

Q: What happened next after he kissed you breast?

A: He put my shorts down.

Q: After putting your shorts down, what happened next, if any?

A: He also put down my panty.

Q: After putting down your panty, what happened next, if any?

A: He held my organ.

ATTY. MALLARES:

At this juncture, Your Honor, may we request witness to be more specific with respect to organ.

ATTY. AMBROSIO:

When you say organ', what do you mean?

A: Pekpek.

COURT: Proceed.

ANSWER:

After he held my vagina, he also put down his shorts and brief.

Q: After putting down his shorts and brief, what happened next?

A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.22

For Attempted rape committed on January 1, 1996:

Q: Do you recall of any incident that happened on Jan 1, 199[6] 3:00 to 4:00 P.M.?

A: We were in our sala on the sofa.

Q: When you say 'we', who are those you are referring to?

A: Me and my father.

Q: While you and your father were in the living room and on the sofa, what happened?

A: While we were on the sofa, my father was then raising my T-shirt and kissing my breast.
Q: What were you wearing at that time?

A: Shorts, T-shirt, bra and panty.

Q: What did your father do with your shorts, T-shirt and bra?

A: He raised them.

Q: What about your father, how was he dressed at that time?

A: Shorts and T-shirt.

Q: After raising your bra and T-shirt, what happened next?

A: While he was kissing my breast, we were already lying on the sofa, then he went on top of me.

Q: After he went on top of you, what happened next, if any?

A: He was forcing to insert his penis while we were still wearing shorts.

Q: So, you mean to say, you were still wearing shorts at that time?

A: Yes, Maam.

Q: What happened next when he was forcing to push his penis into your vagina?

A: It did not push through because my mother suddenly arrived.23

The trial court believed the complainant and held that:

The testimony of Maricar of her ignominious experience contains all the indicia of truth. It is
spontaneous, direct and clear. It is vivid and complete with details. Her testimony is truthful and
convincing. Her credibility is beyond question.

The Court believes that at her tender age, Maricar could not make public the offense, undergo the
troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its gory details if she
has not in fact been raped. The Court believes that a girl who is only twelve (12) years old would not
ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father, if it is not true.24

We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court.

Contrary to appellant's assertion, complainant's credibility was not diminished by her failure to report
the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite opportunities to do so. Delay in
reporting the rape incidents, especially in the face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken
against the victim, more so when the lecherous attacker is her own father. Strong apprehensions
brought about by fear, stress, or anxiety can easily put the offended party to doubt or even distrust
what should otherwise be a positive attitude of bringing the culprit to justice. The Court has thus
considered justified the filing of complaints for rape months, even years, after the commission of the
offense.25
In the case at bar, the delay of more than two years is not an indication that the charges were
fabricated for complainant's reactions were consistent with reason. Her complete obedience to
appellant, her lack of struggle and the studied silence she kept about her ordeal were all brought
about by genuine fear posed by her own father against her.

Appellant's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A survey

of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially
when executed as an afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact
that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the appellant arrested
by the police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a
physical examination of her private parts, repeating her accusations in open court and recounting
her anguish in detail, will suddenly turn around and declare that she is no longer interested in
pursuing the case.26

Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no lawyer
assisted her when she affixed her signature27 and had shown her resolve to continue with the
prosecution of the cases.28 Besides, the trial court is not bound to dismiss the cases, as it is still
within its discretion whether or not to proceed with the prosecution,29 considering that the
compromise agreement and the affidavit of desistance were executed long after the cases have
been filed in court.

Moreover, a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power
to prosecute and punish crimes.30 By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action, once it has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute
privilege to decide whether the rape charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and
must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court.31

In addition, a careful scrutiny of the affidavit of desistance reveals that complainant never retracted
her allegation that she was raped by her father. Neither did she give any exculpatory fact that would
raise doubts about the rape. All she stated in the affidavit was that she had decided to withdraw the
complaints after the appellant agreed not to disturb the complainant; to consent to annul his
marriage; allow his wife to solely manage the conjugal properties; and entrust the custody of his
children to his wife. Rather than contradict, this affidavit reinforces complainant's testimony that
appellant raped her on several occasions.

The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and without
consent.  If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and consent becomes immaterial not
1âwphi1

only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent is
presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12
years of age or over at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it
was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat.32

We have ruled that in incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be
employed where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant's father,
would suffice. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into
submission to his beastly desires.33 The instant case is no exception. Appellant took advantage of his
moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his lechery upon his daughter.

Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in Criminal Case Nos.
96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in September 1993 and on December 29, 1995.
However, we acquit appellant in Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure
to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 96-151 is again quoted as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and
attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of
Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his spontaneous desistance that is due
to the timely arrival of the complainant's mother.

CONTRARY TO LAW.34

For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed.35What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of
the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.37

Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not allege specific
acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient
allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rapethe complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted
the complaint. This insufficiency therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of
conviction; otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of
the accusation against him.

The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 96-125 as
the rape was committed in September 1993 prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known
as the Death Penalty Law, on December 31, 1993. Prior to R.A. No. 7659, Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the the crime of rape, when committed
against a woman who is under 12 years old or is demented. Anent the rape in Criminal Case No. 96-
150 which was committed on December 29, 1995, Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, thus
applies. It provides:

ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

In Criminal Case No. 96-150, appellant was correctly sentenced to death as the special qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship were properly alleged in the information and proved
during trial by the testimonies of the complainant, her mother and the appellant himself; they were
also supported by the photocopy of the marriage certificate and birth certificate, respectively.

In the case of People v. Cayabyab,38 this Court, in affirming the death penalty, held that a photocopy
of the birth certificate is admissible to prove the age of the victim, as the original thereof is a public
record in the custody of a public officer. The admission of this secondary evidence is one of the
exceptions to the 'best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Further, we held that production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion,
whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose will be served by requiring its production.

Indubitably, the marriage and birth certificates are public records in the custody of the local civil
registrar who is a public officer. The presentation, therefore of their photocopies is admissible as
secondary evidence to prove their contents. It is also well to note that appellant did not dispute their
contents when offered as evidence to prove relationship and minority. Having failed to raise a valid
and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a
primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other party is bound thereby.39

Anent the awards of damages, the Court of Appeals correctly modified the awards of civil indemnity
and exemplary damages, which the trial court lumped together for all the crimes committed, by
separately awarding the sums of P50,000.0040 and P75,000.0041 as civil indemnity in Criminal Case
Nos. 96-125 and 96-150, respectively, and P25,000.0042 as exemplary damages, for each count of
rape, in line with the prevailing jurisprudence.

The award of civil indemnity, which is in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, is
mandatory upon a conviction for rape.43 On the other hand, exemplary damages is awarded when
the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or
qualifying.44

Finally, the awards of P50,000.0045 and P75,000.0046 as moral damages in Criminal Case Nos. 96-
125 and 96-150, respectively, by the Court of Appeals are also sustained in line with the prevailing
jurisprudence. The award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of
further proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has
actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award. 47

WHEREFORE , the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263 affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-
150, finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed against his own daughter, Maricar Dimaano, and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua and DEATH, respectively; and ordering him to pay the complainant in Criminal Case No.
96-125 the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the amounts of 75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
is AFFIRMED. Appellant is however ACQUITTED for the crime of attempted rape in Criminal Case
No. 96-151 for failure of the complaint to allege the specific acts or omissions constituting the
offense.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 137232               June 29, 2005

ROSARIO TEXTILE MILLS CORPORATION and EDILBERTO YUJUICO, petitioners, 

vs.
HOME BANKERS SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated March 31, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48708 and its Resolution dated January 12,
1999.

The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are:

"Sometime in 1989, Rosario Textile Mills Corporation (RTMC) applied from Home Bankers Savings
& Trust Co. for an Omnibus Credit Line for ₱10 million. The bank approved RTMC’s credit line but
for only ₱8 million. The bank notified RTMC of the grant of the said loan thru a letter dated March 2,
1989 which contains terms and conditions conformed by RTMC thru Edilberto V. Yujuico. On March
3, 1989, Yujuico signed a Surety Agreement in favor of the bank, in which he bound himself jointly
and severally with RTMC for the payment of all RTMC’s indebtedness to the bank from 1989 to
1990. RTMC availed of the credit line by making numerous drawdowns, each drawdown being
covered by a separate promissory note and trust receipt. RTMC, represented by Yujuico, executed
in favor of the bank a total of eleven (11) promissory notes.
Despite the lapse of the respective due dates under the promissory notes and notwithstanding the
bank’s demand letters, RTMC failed to pay its loans. Hence, on January 22, 1993, the bank filed a
complaint for sum of money against RTMC and Yujuico before the Regional Trial Court, Br. 16,
Manila.

In their answer (OR, pp. 44-47), RTMC and Yujuico contend that they should be absolved from
liability. They claimed that although the grant of the credit line and the execution of the suretyship
agreement are admitted, the bank gave assurance that the suretyship agreement was merely a
formality under which Yujuico will not be personally liable. They argue that the importation of raw
materials under the credit line was with a grant of option to them to turn-over to the bank the
imported raw materials should these fail to meet their manufacturing requirements. RTMC offered to
make such turn-over since the imported materials did not conform to the required specifications.
However, the bank refused to accept the same, until the materials were destroyed by a fire which
gutted down RTMC’s premises.

For failure of the parties to amicably settle the case, trial on the merits proceeded. After the trial, the
Court a quorendered a decision in favor of the bank, the decretal part of which reads:

‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and

against defendants who are ordered to pay jointly and severally in favor of plaintiff, inclusive of
stipulated 30% per annum interest and penalty of 3% per month until fully paid, under the following
promissory notes:

90-1116 6-20-90 ₱737,088.25 9-18-90

(maturity)
90-1320 7-13-90 ₱650,000.00 10-11-90
90-1334 7-17-90 ₱422,500.00 10-15-90
90-1335 7-17-90 ₱422,500.00 10-15-90
90-1347 7-18-90 ₱795,000.00 10-16-90
90-1373 7-20-90 ₱715,900.00 10-18-90
90-1397 7-27-90 ₱773,500.00 10-20-90
90-1429 7-26-90 ₱425,750.00 10-24-90
90-1540 8-7-90 ₱720,984.00 11-5-90
90-1569 8-9-90 ₱209,433.75 11-8-90
90-0922 5-28-90 ₱747,780.00 8-26-90

The counterclaims of defendants are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED." (OR, p. 323; Rollo, p. 73)."2

Dissatisfied, RTMC and Yujuico, herein petitioners, appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending
that under the trust receipt contracts between the parties, they merely held the goods described
therein in trust for respondent Home Bankers Savings and Trust Company (the bank) which
owns the same. Since the ownership of the goods remains with the bank, then it should bear the
loss. With the destruction of the goods by fire, petitioners should have been relieved of any
obligation to pay.

The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the bank is merely
the holder of the security for its advance payments to petitioners; and that the goods they
purchased, through the credit line extended by the bank, belong to them and hold said goods at their
own risk.

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied by the Appellate Court in its
Resolution dated January 12, 1999.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors:

"I

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACTS OF THE
PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS WERE TANTAMOUNT TO A VALID AND EFFECTIVE TENDER OF
THE GOODS TO THE RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF ‘RES
PERIT DOMINO’ IN THE CASE AT BAR CONSIDERING THE VALID AND EFFECTIVE TENDER
OF THE DEFECTIVE RAW MATERIALS BY THE PETITIONERS-DEFENDANTS TO THE
RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF AND THE EXPRESS STIPULATION IN THEIR CONTRACT THAT
OWNERSHIP OF THE GOODS REMAINS WITH THE RESPONDENT-PLAINTIFF.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED ARTICLE 1370 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND
THE LONG-STANDING JURISPRUDENCE THAT ‘INTENTION OF THE PARTIES IS
PRIMORDIAL’ IN ITS FAILURE TO UPHOLD THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES THAT THE
SURETY AGREEMENT WAS A MERE FORMALITY AND DID NOT INTEND TO HOLD
PETITIONER YUJUICO LIABLE UNDER THE SAME SURETY AGREEMENT.

IV

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE SURETYSHIP AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND EFFECTIVE,

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE BASIC LEGAL PRECEPT THAT A
SURETY IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS THE DEBTOR IS HIMSELF LIABLE.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED THE PURPOSE OF TRUST RECEIPT LAW
IN HOLDING THE PETITIONERS LIABLE TO THE RESPONDENT."

The above assigned errors boil down to the following issues: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that petitioners are not relieved of their obligation to pay their loan after they tried to tender
the goods to the bank which refused to accept the same, and which goods were subsequently lost in
a fire; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners are solidarily liable for the
payment of their obligations to the bank; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals violated the Trust
Receipts Law.

On the first issue, petitioners theorize that when petitioner RTMC imported the raw materials needed
for its manufacture, using the credit line, it was merely acting on behalf of the bank, the true owner of
the goods by virtue of the trust receipts. Hence, under the doctrine of res perit domino, the bank took
the risk of the loss of said raw materials. RTMC’s role in the transaction was that of end user of the
raw materials and when it did not accept those materials as they did not meet the manufacturing
requirements, RTMC made a valid and effective tender of the goods to the bank. Since the bank
refused to accept the raw materials, RTMC stored them in its warehouse. When the warehouse and
its contents were gutted by fire, petitioners’ obligation to the bank was accordingly extinguished.

Petitioners’ stance, however, conveniently ignores the true nature of its transaction with the bank.
We recall that RTMC filed with the bank an application for a credit line in the amount of ₱10 million,
but only ₱8 million was approved. RTMC then made withdrawals from this credit line and issued
several promissory notes in favor of the bank. In banking and commerce, a credit line is "that amount
of money or merchandise which a banker, merchant, or supplier agrees to supply to a person on
credit and generally agreed to in advance."3 It is the fixed limit of credit granted by a bank, retailer, or
credit card issuer to a customer, to the full extent of which the latter may avail himself of his dealings
with the former but which he must not exceed and is usually intended to cover a series of
transactions in which case, when the customer’s line of credit is nearly exhausted, he is expected to
reduce his indebtedness by payments before making any further drawings.4

It is thus clear that the principal transaction between petitioner RTMC and the bank is a contract of
loan. RTMC used the proceeds of this loan to purchase raw materials from a supplier abroad. In
order to secure the payment of the loan, RTMC delivered the raw materials to the bank as collateral.
Trust receipts were executed by the parties to evidence this security arrangement. Simply stated, the
trust receipts were mere securities.

In Samo vs. People,5 we described a trust receipt as "a security transaction intended to aid in
financing importers and retail dealers who do not have sufficient funds or resources to finance the
importation or purchase of merchandise, and who may not be able to acquire credit except through
utilization, as collateral, of the merchandise imported or purchased."6

In Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America,7 we elucidated further that "a trust receipt, therefore,
is a security agreement, pursuant to which a bank acquires a ‘security interest’ in the goods. It
secures an indebtedness and there can be no such thing as security interest that secures no
obligation."8 Section 3 (h) of the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. No. 115) defines a "security interest" as
follows:

"(h) Security Interest means a property interest in goods, documents, or instruments to secure
performance of some obligation of the entrustee or of some third persons to the entruster and
includes title, whether or not expressed to be absolute, whenever such title is in substance taken or
retained for security only."

Petitioners’ insistence that the ownership of the raw materials remained with the bank is untenable.
In Sia vs. People,9 Abad vs. Court of Appeals,10 and PNB vs. Pineda,11 we held that:

"If under the trust receipt, the bank is made to appear as the owner, it was but an artificial expedient,
more of legal fiction than fact, for if it were really so, it could dispose of the goods in any manner it
wants, which it cannot do, just to give consistency with purpose of the trust receipt of giving a
stronger security for the loan obtained by the importer. To consider the bank as the true owner
from the inception of the transaction would be to disregard the loan feature thereof..." 12

Thus, petitioners cannot be relieved of their obligation to pay their loan in favor of the bank.

Anent the second issue, petitioner Yujuico contends that the suretyship agreement he signed does
not bind him, the same being a mere formality.

We reject petitioner Yujuico’s contentions for two reasons.

First, there is no record to support his allegation that the surety agreement is a "mere formality;" and

Second, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the Suretyship Agreement signed by petitioner
Yujuico binds him. The terms clearly show that he agreed to pay the bank jointly and severally with
RTMC. The parole evidence rule under Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court is in point,
thus:

"SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been reduced in
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written
agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after
the execution of the written agreement.

x x x."

Under this Rule, the terms of a contract are rendered conclusive upon the parties and
evidence aliunde is not admissible to vary or contradict a complete and enforceable agreement
embodied in a document.13 We have carefully examined the Suretyship Agreement signed by
Yujuico and found no ambiguity therein. Documents must be taken as explaining all the terms of the
agreement between the parties when there appears to be no ambiguity in the language of said
documents nor any failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.14

As to the third and final issue – At the risk of being repetitious, we stress that the contract between
the parties is a loan. What respondent bank sought to collect as creditor was the loan it granted to
petitioners. Petitioners’ recourse is to sue their supplier, if indeed the materials were defective.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48708 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 123546 July 2, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

What could be more compelling than deciding a case which involves the sexual abuse of a five-year
old child? Equally important is the fact that the case before us involves the highest penalty
imposable by law. Being the guardian of the most fundamental liberties of every citizen, the Court
must pass upon every intricate detail of the case at bar to determine whether or not accused-
appellant committed the gruesome act imputed against him.

Accused-appellant Joeral Galleno seeks reversal of the judgment of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial
Court of the 6th Judicial Region stationed in Roxas City, relying on the defense of denial. Since the
case involves the death penalty, the matter has been elevated to this Court for automatic review.

Accused-appellant was charged in an Information docketed as Criminal Case No. C-4629 for the
crime of Statutory Rape, reading as follows:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, upon prior authority and approval
of the Provincial Prosecutor, and the original complaint filed by the guardian of the
offended party, accuses JOERAL GALLENO of the crime of STATUTORY RAPE,
committed as follows:

That on or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 16, 1994, at Brgy. Balighot,
Maayon, Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused did, then
and there, wilfully and feloniously, and without the permission of anyone, enter the
house of EVELYN OBLIGAR, a five-year old child, and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her thereby inflicting upon the latter a vaginal laceration which caused
continuous bleeding and her admission of five (5) days at the Roxas Memorial
Hospital.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

(p. 9, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, resulting in a
judgment of conviction, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING ESTABLISHED FACTS, the Court finds

accused JOERAL GALLENO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt under Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accordingly, accused JOERAL GALLENO is sentenced to suffer the supreme

penalty of DEATH and to indemnify the victim Evelyn Obligar Garganera the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS.

Let this DECISION serve as clear signal, warning the perverts, the misguided
elements of our society, especially their lackadaisical parents in their innate moral
obligation and responsibility in educating their children that in this corner of the world
the wheels of justice is not asleep and its unforgiving hands and watchful eyes are as
vigilant as ever.

(pp. 44-45, Rollo.)

In flashback, let us visualize the events.

Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera who had to leave
the province to find work in Manila after separating from her husband. Evelyn, together with her
younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus left under the care and custody of their uncle,
Emeterio Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar.

Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-appellant, 19-year old Joeral
Galleno, known well to Evelyn's family due to his frequent visits at the Obligars' abode as he was
paying court to Emeterio's eldest child, Gina.

On August 16, 1994, Emeterio and Penicola left their residence to work at the sugarcane plantation
owned by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three children had all earlier left for school. The only persons
left in the house were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar.

At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola Esing to have his
pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars' residence and found the two
children left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions on what
occurred at said residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration in her
vagina which resulted in profuse, and to our mind, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.

The prosecution's version of what took place at the Obligars' residence is based on the testimony of
Evelyn herself, her uncle Emeterio, and the doctors who examined and treated her. The Solicitor
General summarized the same in this wise:

2. Appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. After

lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn sit on his lap, facing him. Then he forcibly
inserted his penis into her vagina. As Evelyn was only five-years old while appellant
was a fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making
her cry in pain. (pp. 10-11 and 18-25, tsn, Garganera, January 10, 1995).

3. Appellant tried to stop the bleeding by applying, with his finger, the sap of "madre
de cacao" leaves on her vagina. Unsuccessful in his attempt, he left Evelyn
grimacing and crying in pain. (pp. 14-15, tsn, Garganera, January 10, 1995; pp. 6-7,
tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).

4. Shortly, Emeterio and Penicola came home from work. The spouses were laborers
in a sugarcane plantation about two kilometers away from their house. They arrived
to find Evelyn crying. Emeterio noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and
she was pressing a rug against her genital organ. (pp. 11-12, tsn, Obligar, January
10, 1995; pp. 8-9, tsn, Obligar, February 7, 1995).

5. Emeterio asked Evelyn what happened but she did not answer. Emeterio spread
the child's legs and saw that her vagina had been lacerated and blood was oozing
therefrom. He summoned a "quack" doctor who applied herbal medicine on Evelyn's
vagina but this did not stop the bleeding. (pp. 12-14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).

6. The following day, August 17, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the clinic of Dr.
Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician of Maayon, Capiz. Dr. Orosco
reported, upon examining Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood, about 1 centimeter
in diameter, in her vaginal opening, and (2) a vaginal laceration, measuring 1.0
centimeter x 0.5 centimeter, between the 3:00 o'clock and 6:00 o'clock position. He
also affirmed that Evelyn's vaginal laceration could have been caused by a blunt
instrument inserted into the vagina, that it was possible that a human penis in full
erection had been forcibly inserted into her vagina and that a human penis in full
erection is considered a blunt instrument. (pp. 4-7, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994;
p. 14, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).

7. While he was examining Evelyn, Dr. Orosco asked Evelyn what caused her
injuries. The child told him that a penis was inserted into her vagina and that its
insertion caused her pain. (pp. 9-10, 14 and 18-19, tsn, Orosco, November 28,
1994).

8. Since his clinic lacked the proper medical facilities needed to treat Evelyn, Dr.
Orosco, after dressing the victim's wound which continued to bleed, advised
Emeterio and Penicola to bring the child to the hospital for further medical treatment
(p. 8, tsn, Orosco, November 28, 1994; pp. 14-16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).

9. On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General
Hospital where she was examined by resident physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada,
Dr. Lañada, upon examining Evelyn, found that "there was a 3 cm. lacerated wound
at the left anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the presence of about 10-15 cc of
blood" at the vaginal vault. Dr. Lañada recommended that Evelyn be admitted for
confinement in the hospital because the wound in her vagina, which was still
bleeding, had to be repaired. Due to financial constraints, Evelyn was not admitted
into the hospital that day and went home with Emeterio to Barangay Balighot. (pp. 6-
8, tsn, Lañada January 4, 1995; pp. 15-16, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995).

10. Upon her examination of the victim on August 18, 1994, Dr. Lañada opined that
"a lot of things will cause the lacerated wound in the vagina." (p. 9, tsn, Lañada,
 January 4, 1995). According to Dr. Lañada, the vaginal laceration may be caused (1)
by trauma to the area, when a girl falls and hits her genital area on a blunt
instrument; (2) by medical instrumentation, like the insertion of a speculum into the
vagina; or (3) by the insertion of a blunt foreign object into the vagina, like a finger of
a penis of a man in full erection. (pp. 8-10, tsn, Lañada, January 4, 1995).

11. On August 19, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn back to the Roxas Memorial
General Hospital where she was attended to by Dr. Machel Toledo, the resident
physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area.
Dr. Toledo ". . . pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) . . . admitted
the patient for possible repair of that laceration and blood transfusion because she
has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding." Two hundred five (255) cc of blood was transfused
to Evelyn and she was given antibiotics to prevent infection. However, she was no
longer operated on because the laceration had healed. Five days later, Evelyn was
discharged and sent home with medication. (pp. 11-13, 17 and 26, tsn, Toledo,
December 2, 1994).

12. Upon his examination of Evelyn on August 19, 1994, Dr. Toledo disclosed that
the child suffered severe compound laceration which could have been caused by a
normal and fully developed penis of a man in a state of erection that was forcibly
inserted into her vagina and that the insertion caused her vagina to hemorrhage
which thus required the transfusion of 255 cc of blood. (pp. 14-16 and 26, tsn,
Toledo, December 2, 1994).

13. Prior to her confinement in the Roxas Memorial General Hospital on August 19,
Emeterio and Penicola Obligar brought Evelyn to the Maayon Police Station on
August 18, 1994, where they reported the crime to SPO1 Paulino Durana. That same
day, appellant was apprehended in a house near the Balighot Elementary School
and brought to the police station. (pp. 17-19, tsn, Obligar, January 12, 1995; pp. 5-9,
16-17 and 21, tsn, Durana, January 16, 1995).

(pp. 164-171, Rollo.)

Denial is presented as the defense. Accused-appellant testified that when he arrived at the Obligar
residence that afternoon of August 16, 1994, he found the two children, Evelyn and Eleazar (also
referred to in the record as Pilfo). While seated at the balcony, accused-appellant was approached
by Evelyn, who knew him (tsn, April 5, 1995, pp. 5 and 8). He cajoled her by throwing her up and
down, his right hand holding the child and his left hand covering her vagina (Ibid., p. 21). Upon lifting
up the child the first time, his left ring finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of the child
since his fingernail was long and the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn
began to cry because her vagina started to bleed. Upon seeing this, he immediately went down the
house and got some bark or leaves of a madre de cacao tree and applied the sap on the child's
wound. The bleeding ceased and Evelyn stopped crying. Thereafter, accused-appellant went home.
(Ibid., pp. 9-10).

Accused-appellant further testified that on August 18, 1994, at around 9 o'clock in the morning, he
was arrested. On the same day, Emeterio Obligar asked him to admit the offense so that he could
be released the next day, but accused-appellant did not do so (Ibid., pp. 26-27).

Accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno was also called to the witness stand and he testified that he
learned about the arrest of his son on August 18, 1994 (tsn, May 12, 1995 p. 6). The following day,
he went to the house of the Obligars to ask Evelyn what happened to her. The child allegedly
answered that a finger was accidentally inserted into her genital organ, but that Penicola who was
then present, butted into the conversation and told Raul Galleno that the penis of accused-appellant
was likewise inserted (Ibid., p. 8).

The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the defense, pointing out in its decision that
accused-appellant's defense of denial hinged on the argument that the statement of Evelyn as to
how she sustained her vaginal laceration was a mere concoction and a plain distortion of facts by
her guardian. The trial court called this a "desperate attempt of the defense to becloud the charge of
rape."

The trial court believed and accepted the testimony of Police Officer Paulino Durana that during the
interrogation of Evelyn which he conducted at the PNP Station of Maayon, Emeterio and Penicola
Obligar did not interfere with the responses of Evelyn, although, true enough, it was difficult to obtain
answers from her because of her tender age.

The trial court deemed the following circumstances significant in finding accused-appellant culpable:

1. Accused-appellant failed to explain how his left ring finger accidentally came in contact with
Evelyn's vagina, while in the process of throwing her up and down. Besides, the prosecution was
able to establish that Evelyn was wearing shorts. And assuming for the sake of argument that Evelyn
was not wearing any pants or underwear at that time, accused-appellant failed to explain how his
finger could possibly penetrate the victim's vagina by about one-fourth of an inch (p. 23, tsn, April 5,
1995).

2. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant left the victim with her 3-year old brother, in pain and
bleeding.

3. Evelyn's statement given to Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, the physician who examined her at the
Roxas Memorial General Hospital, that it was accused-appellant's finger which injured her, was a
consequence of the victim's confusion.

4. The formal offer of settlement made by accused-appellant's father Raul Galleno militates against
the cause of the defense.

Hence, the instant appeal and review, with accused-appellant assigning the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE MEDICAL DOCTORS WHEN THE SAME FAILED TO
CONCLUSIVELY AND SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE
LACERATION IN THE OFFENDED PARTY'S VAGINA

THE TRIAL COURT SHOWED MANIFEST BIAS THEREBY DEPRIVING THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL AND DISREGARDED
THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT, WHEN HE
ACTIVELY PARTICIPATED IN THE CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST

OF THE ACCUSED AS UNJUSTIFIED
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
EXTENDED BY THE PARENTS OF THE ACCUSED TO THE OFFENDED PARTY
AS AN IMPLIED ADMISSION OF GUILT.

(pp. 81-82, Rollo.)

One can not escape the feeling of utmost compassion for any rape victim, and more especially so for
a 5-year old statutory rape victim. However, in our consideration of the matter before us, we set
aside emotion and observe impartiality and coldness in drawing conclusions.

Under the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the testimony of the three expert
witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Dr. Alfonso Orosco, Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada, and
Dr. Machael Toledo, which convinced the trial court that rape was committed against the offended
party, is not impeccable considering that they found that there was no presence of spermatozoa, and
that they were not sure as to what caused the laceration in the victim's vagina; that Dr. Lañada
herself testified that Evelyn told her that it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the
laceration. In addition, accused-appellant banks on the victim's testimony on cross-examination, that
it was the finger of accused-appellant which caused the laceration; and that she even disclosed this
to accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno.

We are not persuaded.

As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the
court's duty to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved
(Francisco, Pleadings and Trial Practice, Vol. 1, 1989 ed., pp. 889-890). However, conclusions and
opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based
on the principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or
because of the nature of the subject matter under observation, or for other reasons, the testimony
will aid the court in reaching a judgment (Ibid., p. 886).

In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert
testimony of doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but
also the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, especially the victim herself. In other words,
the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses. Such expert testimony
merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts. Hence, the fact that the
experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean that the trial
court's inference is wrong.

The absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not negate the conclusion that it was his
penis which was inserted in the victim's vagina (People vs. Cañada, 253 SCRA 277 [1996]). In rape,
the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia
by the male organ (People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696 [1996]). Verily, it is entirely probable that
climax on the part of accused-appellant was not reached due to the cries of pain of the victim and
the profuse bleeding of her vagina.

As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declarations, particularly as to what really caused the
laceration, we are convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused. This is best
exemplified by the testimony of Dr. Lourdes Lañada on cross-examination, as follows:

Q Now, Doctor, at the time that you conducted your examination, you
were aware that this child was only five years old?
 A Yes, sir.

Q And at that tender age, Doctor, is it possible that the child may not
know the difference or distinction between fingers of the hands and a
finger protruding between the legs of a person?

A Yes, sir, it is possible.

Q So that it is possible, Doctor, that the child may have referred to a

finger that is between the legs?

WITNESS

You mean the penis?

PROSECUTOR OBIENDA

Yes.

WITNESS

It is possible.

(tsn, p. 27 March 30, 1995.)

Of vital consideration and importance too is the unreliability, if not the outright incredulity of the
version of accused-appellant which is not in accord with ordinary human experience. We thus can
not help expressing sentiments similar to those of the trial court when it said:

The contention of accused Joeral Galleno raises serious doubts to his credibility. He
failed to explain how his ring finger accidentally came in contact with the genitalia of
Evelyn, while in the process of throwing her up and down, when it was established by
the prosecution that at that time Evelyn was wearing shorts. Even assuming "ex
gratia argumente" that Evelyn was pantyless, how could it be possible for his finger
to penetrate the vagina for about one-fourth of an inch . . . when she was in shorts.
The Supreme Court, in People vs. Fulgencio Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451, (held that)
evidence, to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but it must be credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by the impact of
events and testimony colored by the unconscious workings of the mind. No better
test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.

(pp. 42-43, Rollo.)

Sec. 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "(e)vidence must have such a relation to the fact
in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence." This simply means that relevancy is
determinable by the rules of logic and human experience (Regalado, Remedial law Compendium,
Vol. II, 1988 ed., p. 434). There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law.
However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion
of the court, which must be exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience
(Sibal and Salazar; Compendium on Evidence, 1995 ed., p. 6, citing Alfred Asmore Pope Foundation
vs. New York 138 A. 444, 106 Conn. 432).

There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with a long fingernail) of accused-appellant
penetrated the victim's vagina by a depth of one fourth of an inch. Admittedly, accused-appellant's
right hand held the child while his left hand supposedly held her in the vagina area. Why would he
hold the child's vagina if his only intention was to frolic and kid around with her?

Accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring Evelyn (and after applying to the
wound the sap of madre de cacao), he left her in the company of an even younger child, the victim's
3-year old brother. He did not even make an effort to immediately inform Emeterio and Penicola of
what had happened. Instead, he went home and kept mum about the incident.

Accused-appellant also said that after the alleged accident, before going home, he removed
Eleazar's shorts and put them on Evelyn. Assuming this to be true, this only shows that the child was
still bleeding. Why then would he leave the child considering that there was no adult to attend to
her? Significantly, his act of immediately leaving the place, when considered in the light of the other
evidence, reflects his fear because of what he had done. The proverb "the wicked fleeth even when
no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion" was correctly adopted by the trial court in
drawing its conclusions.

All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the credibility of accused-
appellant's story on which his defense is based.

Besides, the trial court's conclusions find support in the testimony of accused-appellant's own
witness, Dr. Lourdes Lañada (who was earlier presented during the trial as a prosecution witness),
who testified that a laceration is caused by a blunt instrument and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a
sharp instrument (tsn, pp. 32-33, March 30, 1995).

As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a concocted story of
what really happened, we apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was
abused deserves full credence (People vs. Cagto, 253 SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the
fact that her uncle and aunt, virtually her foster parents, themselves support her story of rape. It is
unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a
daughter to embarrassment and even stigma (People vs. Dones, supra.).

Accused-appellant's father, Raul Galleno, tried to destroy the credibility of Evelyn when he took the
stand and testified that the child disclosed to him that it was accused-appellant's finger which was
inserted into her vagina. Nevertheless, this testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of the victim,
to wit:

FISCAL OBIENDA

Q You said that Joeral Galleno the accused in this case hurt you
while you were in the farm, can you tell the Honorable Court which
part of your body was hurt by Joeral Galleno?

A (Witness pointing to her vagina)

Here.
Q When you said you were hurt did you bleed?

WITNESS

A Yes, Sir.

FISCAL OBIENDA

Q What was used by Joeral Galleno in hurting your sexual organ?

A His (Pitoy). Penis.

COURT

Make the translation of "Pitoy" into Penis. Do you agree that the
translation of Pitoy is Penis in English?

ATTY. DISTURA

Agreeable, Your Honor.

FISCAL OBIENDA

Q What did Joeral Calleno do with his Pitoy (Penis) to your vagina
(Putay)?

A It was inserted (ginsulod) to my vagina (Putay).

Q When Joeral Galleno inserted his penis (Pitoy) to your vagina

(Putay), that was the reason why it bleed?

A Yes, sir.

Q And it was very painful?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And you cried because of the pain?

A Yes, Sir.

FISCAL OBIENDA

Q And you were brought to the Doctor and admitted to the hospital
because of that?

A Yes, Sir.

(tsn, pp. 10-12, January 10, 1995.)

Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant alleges that he was deprived of a fair and
impartial trial since the trial court showed bias by discounting his testimony, and by actually
participating in the cross-examination of accused-appellant.

We recently pronounced in People vs. Malabago (265 SCRA 198 [1996]) that a judge may properly
intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time and
clarify obscure and incomplete details after the witness has given direct testimony. And such
discretion to question witnesses in order to clear obscurities in their testimony cannot be assailed as
a specie of bias.

Of course, we are aware of Rule 3.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some
obscurity, properly intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should
always be borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.

And there is undoubtedly undue interference if the judge extensively propounds questions to the
witnesses which will have the effect of or will tend to build or bolster the case for one of the parties.
We have, however, carefully examined the record and transcript of stenographic notes of the instant
case. The trial court judge, the Honorable Salvador S. Gubaton, did propound questions but this was
done only for clarification purposes and not to build the case for one of the parties. For instance,
accused-appellant, in his brief, refers to the questions propounded by the trial court on his act of
cajoling the child. A perusal of the line of questioning referred to hardly shows bias on the part of the
trial court, but pure clarification.

In the third assigned error, accused-appellant questions the validity of his arrest.

It is settled jurisprudence that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters
his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived (People vs. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95 [1995]). An
accused should question the validity of his arrest before he enters his plea in the trial court (Filoteo,
Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 [1996]). He is estopped from questioning any defect in the
manner of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court
(People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 [1995]) or if he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by entering a plea and by participating in the trial (People vs. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93
[1993]; People vs. Lopez, Jr., supra).

It does not appear in the record that accused-appellants raised this matter before entering his plea of
"not guilty" to the charge (pp. 63 & 67, Record). Further, this issue was not even touched during the
trial.

Lastly, accused-appellant, in his fourth assigned error, argues that the trial court misinterpreted the
financial assistance extended by his parents as an attempt to settle the case. Accused-appellant
even banks on the alleged close relationship between Emeterio Obligar and Raul Galleno
as compadres, and the fact that Emeterio borrowed forty pesos from Raul Galleno, despite the fact
that Emeterio already knew that accused-appellant caused the laceration in Evelyn's vagina.

Accused-appellant also draws attention to two incidents involving alleged financial assistance
extended by Raul Galleno to the spouses Emeterio and Penicola Obligar. First, Emeterio Obligar,
whom Raul Galleno said is his compadre, borrowed P40.00 for fare going to Roxas City where
Evelyn was confined. Second, on August 20, 1994, Raul Galleno and his wife and one of the
brothers of Penicola Obligar went to Roxas Memorial General Hospital. There he gave P400.00
financial assistance to Penicola Obligar. Raul Galleno later admitted that the sum of P440.00 was
returned to him by the spouses. Accused-appellant insists that these offers of financial assistance
were not attempts at an amicable settlement but were prompted out of a sincere desire on the part of
Raul Galleno to help the offended party.

We find no merit in me above-stated argument. It may be inferred that Raul Galleno wanted to settle
the case by offering an amount to the spouses Obligar, to wit:

Q Now, according to you, you were paid in the amount of Four

Hundred Pesos (P400.00) then you expected your Comareng Pening
as financial assistance to Evelyn Garganera, isn't it?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q How long after August 19, 1994, that your Comareng Pening
returned to you the amount of Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?

A A week after when Evelyn had already checked up from the

hospital.

Q It was given by you or as voluntary financial assistance, why did

you receive the amount or the payment returned to that amount of
Four Hundred Pesos (P400.00)?

A That was telling me that they refused already for the settlement of
the case.

Q And that is why they returned the amount of Four Hundred Pesos
(P400.00).

(tsn, pp. 29-30, May 12, 1995.)

From the above-stated clarificatory questions by the trial court, it may be gleaned that Raul Galleno
no longer had any interest in aiding the victim when he found that the Obligar spouses would still
pursue the case against his son, accused-appellant, and hence he found that his offer for settlement
was unavailing. Hence, on this point we likewise agree with the trial court when it took the financial
assistance to mean an act of settling the case. This act does manifest a father's attempt to rescue
his guilty son from sure incarceration.

The nightmare that was forced into the tender mind of 5-year old Evelyn Obligar Garganera may
unfortunately haunt her all her life. Justice may not be able to save her from this nightmare but it can
calm and assure her that her tormentor and abuser shall undoubtedly face retribution.

Four members of the Court — although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People vs. Echegaray (G.R. No. 117472, February 7, 1997) that Republic Act No.
7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty is unconstitutional — nevertheless submit to the
ruling of the Court, by a majority vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should
accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record, the
assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the record of the case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of
the President for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 223155, July 23, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANILO JAPAG AND ALVIN LIPORADA, Accused,

DANILO JAPAG, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this appeal is the May 21, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No.
01807 which affirmed with modification the October 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 13, Carigara, Leyte, finding appellant Danilo Japag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.

The Antecedent Facts

Appellant, together with his co-accused, Alvin Liporada (Liporada), was charged with the, crime of murder in
an Information3 dated May 11, 2009 which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of March, 2009[,] in the Municipality of Tunga, Province of Leyte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and helping one
another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab RODEL PARROCHO y MONTE, with the use of a
bladed weapon, which accused Danilo Japag provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon the
victim an incised wound at the back left, medial to the inferior portion of the left scapula, penetrating the
thoracic cavity, which was the direct and immediate cause of death of said Rodel Parrocho y Monte.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
During his arraignment on July 7, 2009, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4 Trial thereafter ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution's version of the incident is as follows:

On March 16, 2009, at around 3:00 p.m., Ramil Parrocho (Ramil), the victim's twin brother, was at a sari-
sari store in front of Gregorio Catenza National High School when he saw appellant, Liporada, and Eman
Macalalag (Macalalag) blocking the way of the victim who was then about to the enter the school gate.5

Ramil thereafter saw Liporada punch his brother at the left cheek while being held in place by Macalalag.
Suddenly, appellant, who was positioned behind the victim, drew a bladed weapon from his pocket and
stabbed the latter at the back. Upon receiving the stabbing blow, the victim fell on the ground. The attack
on the victim was so unexpected that Ramil and even the security guards at the school outposts were not
able to come to his rescue. Appellant, Liporada and Macalalag immediately fled towards the direction of the
highway.6

The victim was rushed to the EVRMC Hospital in Tacloban City, but he was pronounced dead on arrival. He
died while the ambulance was en route to the hospital from the Municipality of Jaro.7

Based on the post-mortem examination conducted on the victim's body by Dr. Crescento A. Uribe (Dr.
Uribe), the Municipal Health Officer, the cause of death was Intrathoracic Hemorrhage Secondary to a
Penetrating Stab Wound. The victim sustained an incised wound about 2 centimeters in length below the
scapular bone of his back. The wound was fatal because it penetrated the victim's thoracic (chest) cavity.8

Version of the Defense

Appellant raised the justifying circumstance of self-defense in order to exculpate himself from criminal
liability, viz.:
x x x x On the mentioned date[,] at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was practicing together with his
classmates a song for their MSEP subject. Alvin Liporada and Eman Macalalag were also there. While they
were practicing, Rodel Parrocho came in and threatened to kill him if he goes outside the school. Later that
day, while he was on his way home, Rodel Parrocho attacked him and hit him on his face with a fist blow
causing him to fall. When he was about to get up, Rodel Parrocho stabbed him with the use of [a] short
bladed weapon locally known as sipol. Fortunately, he was able to parry it and wrestled for the knife. The
next thing he knew was Rodel Parrocho fell to the ground with a stab wound. This gave him an opportunity
to run home. The following day, March 17, 2009[,] at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he went to [the]
Tunga Police Station to surrender. His father accompanied him.9
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated October 29, 2013, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The RTC found no merit in appellant's contention that he had acted in self-defense which resulted in the
victim's killing. Aside of the absence of proof showing that he had sustained any injury as a result of the
supposed hard punch thrown at him by the victim,10 the RTC also explained that:
Verily, the self-defense invoked by the accused cannot be appreciated, as it is unworthy of belief. The
wound sustained by the victim at his back, would belie the claim of the accused that the stabbing was not
deliberate. In fact, accused['s] intent to kill the victim was proven through the deadly weapon used by him,
his fatal stab thrust, and the location where the fatal blow was directed, which stab wound resulted in the
severe blood loss of the victim leading to the latter's immediate death. x x x11
Moreover, the RTC ruled that the victim's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery,
as the suddenness of appellant's attack on the victim from behind rendered the latter defenseless and
unable to flee or escape. The RTC held that appellant had consciously adopted the manner by which he
mounted the attack on the victim in order to ensure his safety from any retaliatory attack and to deny the
victim an opportunity to defend himself or repel the attack.12

Accordingly, the RTC sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It likewise ordered
appellant to pay the heirs of the victim: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages,
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P17,500.00 as actual damages.13

The RTC also issued an alias warrant of arrest against Liporada "to be served in his residence or anywhere
where he could be found within the territory of the Philippines."14

Appellant thereafter appealed the RTC Decision before the CA. 

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated May 21, 2015, the CA affirmed the assailed RTC Decision with modification as regards
the imposition of interest at 6% per annum on all damages awarded from date of finality of the judgment
until fully paid.15

Like the RTC, the CA also rejected appellant's claim of self-defense in the absence of proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim.16 It noted that Ramil's "clear and detailed account of the incident
negate[d] any hint that the unlawful aggression originated from the victim,"17 as did the nature and location
of the wound sustained by the latter.18

The CA further ruled that the elements of the qualifying circumstance of treachery were present in the case,
since "[t]he victim had no chance to avoid the attack when he was boxed by Alvin first and then suddenly
stabbed from behind by [appellant], while being held by Eman."19 It thus concluded that under those dire
circumstances, the victim could not have had the chance to defend himself.20

Aggrieved, appellant filed the present appeal.

The Issues

Appellant raises the following issues for the Court's resolution:

First, whether appellant was able to sufficiently prove the justifying circumstance of self-defense;21

And second, whether the victim's stabbing was attended by treachery.22

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

It is settled that when an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution
to the defense,23 and it becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
the existence of the following requisites of self-defense: first, unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; second, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and third, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.24

As the burden of proof is shifted to the defense, the accused must rely on the strength of his evidence
and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence. After all, by invoking self-defense, the accused, in
effect, admits having killed or injured the victim, and he can no longer be exonerated of the crime
charged if he fails to prove the requisites of self-defense.25

The most important requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression which is the condition sine qua nonfor
upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance.26 In other words, unless it is shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the victim had committed unlawful aggression against the accused, "self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated, for the two other essential elements [thereof]
would have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel."27

Unlawful aggression "contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof,
and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The person defending himself must have been
attacked with actual physical force or with actual use of [a] weapon."28

After a thorough review of the records, we find that appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving that
the unlawful aggression had originated from the victim.

First, it is undisputed that appellant boarded a motorcycle and fled the situs criminis immediately after
stabbing the victim at the back.29 "Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and negates the plea of self-defense."30

Second, the location, nature and seriousness of the wound sustained by the victim is inconsistent with self-
defense;31 rather, these factors indicate a determined effort to kill.

On this point, Dr. Uribe testified that the stabbing wound sustained by the victim at the back portion of his
body can be characterized as fatal, as it penetrated the latter's chest cavity, viz.:

[PROS. CONSTANTINO F. ESBER]

Q: Going now straight [to] your external findings, will you please explain
your finding Number 4[?] [W]hat is meant by that?
A: 'Incised wound about 2 centimeters in length located at the back left,
medial to inferior portion of the left scapula, penetrating the thoracic
cavity.'
Q: Since there is no sketch attached to your post mortem report[,] will
you indicate using the [interpreter as medium where that wound [was]
exactly located?
A: This is the inferior portion of the scapula, so medial portion, [i]t is
located here.
Witness indicated at the left side of the back portion below the
scapular bone.
Q: In your examination[,] [d]octor, were you able to determine the entry?
A: At the back.
Q: Considering that it was at the back, was it probable that the assailant
was at the back of the victim?
A: Yes.
Q: How many incise[d] wound[s] have you found on the said victim?
A: Only one incised wound.
Q: Considering that [sic] its location and nature, how would you classify
the wound[?] [W]as it fatal?
A: It was fatal because it penetrated the thoracic cavity.
Q: What is meant, [d]octor, by thoracic cavity?
A: Chest cavity.32 (Emphasis supplied)
And third, both the RTC and the CA found the testimony of Ramil (the victim's twin brother) to be clear and
convincing in its vital points, i.e., on his detailed narration of the stabbing incident and his positive
identification of appellant as one of his brother's assailants.33 The pertinent portion of Ramil's testimony is
quoted below:

[PROS. CONSTANTINO F. ESBER]

Q: What did [Danilo Japag, Alvin Liporada, and Eman Macalalag] do
next[,] if any[,] aside from being at the gate of the school?
A: A: I saw them x x x x obstructing the passing on that gate of my
brother Rodel and Danilo Japag stabbed Rodel.34
xxxx
Q: Of the three, who boxed [the victim]?
A: Alvin Liporada.
Q: And was your brother hit?
A: Yes[,] sir.
Q: Where?
A: On his face[.] ([W]itness indicated the left cheek.)
Q: How many times did Alvin Liporada [delivered the] boxing blow [on the
victim]?
A: Only once[,] sir[,] and immediately thereafter[,] Danilo Japag
delivered [a] stab thrust.35
xxxx
Q: Is Danilo Japag around in the court room today?
A: Yes[,] sir.
Q: Will you point him out?
A: There[.] ([W]itness pointed to a person inside the court room
[who], when asked of his name[,] identified himself as Danilo
Japag.)36
We, too, see no reason to disbelieve Ramil's testimony, as it was not shown that the lower courts
had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated facts or circumstances of weight and substance which, if
properly considered, would have altered the result of the case.37

Simply stated, appellant's self-serving and unsubstantiated allegations that the victim was the unlawful

aggressor must necessarily fail when weighed against the positive, straightforward and overwhelming
evidence of the prosecution. Where unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is not proven,
there can be no self-defense.

We likewise agree with the CA's conclusion that the victim's killing was qualified by treachery.38

"There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution of any of the
crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make."39

In this case, the records clearly show that the victim's killing was attended by treachery, considering that:
(a) the victim was fatally stabbed40 by appellant from behind41 immediately after receiving a punch in the
face from Liporada;42 (b) the victim was held in place by Macalalag when the stabbing blow was delivered by
appellant;43 and (c) the attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim's brother and even the nearby
security guards were unable to prevent it.44

The totality of these circumstances clearly shows that the means of execution of the attack gave the
victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and said means of execution
was deliberately adopted by appellant.45

In light of these, we find no reason to overturn the factual findings and conclusions of the lower courts as
they are supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws. However, we deem it appropriate
to increase the amount of exemplary damages from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00 in conformity with prevailing
jurisprudence.46 In addition, and in lieu of actual damages, appellant is ordered to pay temperate damages
in the amount of P50,000.00.47
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The May 21, 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC. No. 01807 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of exemplary damages is
increased to P75,000.00; and in lieu of actual damages, temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is
awarded.

SO ORDERED.