10 a 12 13 4 1S 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Darryl D. Yorkey (SBN 280351) P.O. Box 9636 Berkeley, California 94709 Telephone: (510) 221-6874 Fax: (888) 491-5926 Email: dyorkey@gmail.com ALAN A. BECK (SBN 276646) 2692 Harcourt Drive San Diego, California 92123 Telephone: (619) 905-9105 Email: alan alexander. beck@gmail.com CATHERINE A. BEEKMAN (SBN 245605) 940 Adams Street, Suite J Benicia, California 94510 Telephone: (707) 346-3060 Fax: (707) 561-6646 Email: cate@beekmancortes.com Attomeys for Petitioner Cedric Epple SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA. CEDRIC EPPLE, No. RG18922005 Petitioner, MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS (CODE vs. CIV. PROC. §§ 1094.5, 1085) ALAMEDA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent. TO: THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, AND TO THE ALAMEDA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on the above-noted date and time Petitioner Cedric Epple, by and through counsel, will move this court to issue a writ of administrative mandamus ordering MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE (case No, RG18922005, MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§1098:, 1085)w 14 15 16 18 19 20 22) 23 24 25 the Alameda County Board of Education to reverse its decision affirming the expulsion of Petitioner on the grounds that Petitioner did not receive a fair hearing. This motion is based upon the attached points and authorities, the administrative record filed herewith, and any argument presented at the hearing on this motion, Dated: June 5, 2020 Respectfully submitted, Attomey for Petitioner MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE Case No. RG18922008, MANDAMUS (CODE CIV, PROC. §§ 1088.5, 1085)10 u 12 1B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 2 23 24 25 TABLE OF CONTENTS STATEMENT OF FACTS. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES. 1. Kim Trutane had an Obligation to Recuse herself from Presiding over Petitioner's Expulsion Hearing due to her Involvement in the Community Response to his Instagram Account A. Kim Trutane has Shown Actual Bias Against C.E, B. The “Extreme Facts" of this Case Create a "Probability of Bias”. C. AtMinimum, there was an Appearance of Bias.. Il. By Upholding Petitioner’s Expulsion, the Alameda County Board of Education Committed an Error of Law. CONCLUSION MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘Case No, ROI8922005 MANDAMUS (CODE CIV, PROC. §§ 1094.5, 1085)10 u 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 4 25 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 US. 813 (1986). 12,13 Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 10, 11, 12, 15 Gai v, City of Selma, 68 Cal.App.4th 213 (1998). 9,11 Inre Murchison 349 US. 133 (1955)... Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Board, 45 Cal.4th 731 (2009). Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles, 125 Cal.App.4th 470 (2004). Nightlife Partners, Ltd. v. City of Beverly Hills, 108 Cal.App.4th 81 (2003 Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732 (9th Cir, 1995). Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510.. Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (2016)... Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS Cal. Const. art. I, § 7(@).. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE (case No, RG18922005, MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 10945, 1085)10 u 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 a 22 23 24 25 STATEMENT OF FACTS Until his expulsion in June 2017, Cedric Epple was a student at Albany High School (“AHS”). In November 2016, Cedric Epple created a private Instagram “spam” account; Cedric Epple limited the followers of this account to approximately thirteen (13) of his friends. On the account, Cedric Epple shared images and memes he created that he and his friends thought were funny, but which he knew were not appropriate for posting to a broader audience. Cedric’s posts ranged from immature and tasteless to overtly racist. Several AHS students were depicted in a negative light on the account. On March 20, 2017, the existence of the account became known to the larger AHS community. The school community was severely disrupted, with large numbers of students upset, screaming and crying, and the police were called to campus. Administrative Record «4 21, 2017, Cedric Epple and several of the account’s followers were suspended from AHS. Later -R.”) at 382-384; 394. In short, the school went into “crisis mode.” A.R. at 410. On March that week, AHS administrators extended Cedric’s suspension and recommended him for expulsion. During the days and weeks that followed the exposure of Cedric Epple’s account, the AHS community rallied around the students who were targeted on the account, and protested racism. (See new evidence) Community members called on AHS, District officials, and schoo! board members to immediately expel the students responsible for the account. (Do we have evidence of this?) Numerous protests, rallies, sit-ins, and other community gatherings were held in response to the account, (¢.g.; A.R. at 39-44, 367). There was also significant media coverage of the account and the aftermath within the community. A.R. at 256. Melissa Pfohl, MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘Care No, RG18922005 MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1094.5,10 u 12 3 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 a yes 23 24 25 then Vice Principal of AHS, testified at Epple’s expulsion hearing that the impact of the ‘account's exposure on the community was “far greater than ... Cedric had ever imagined,” and that it “flavored” the remainder of the school year. A.R. at 257. Tami Benau, then an assistant principal for AHS. A.R. at 380. Cedric Epple’s expulsion hearing was held June 1, June 10, and June 20, 2017, in front of three members of the Albany Unified School Board: Charles Blanchard, Jacob Clark, and Kim Trutane. On June 20, 2017, Kim Trutane moved to expel Cedric, and the two other board members joined her motion. Following Cedric Epple’s expulsion hearing, new evidence of Board Member Kim ‘Trutane’s bias and involvement in the underlying events emerged. On appeal to the Alameda County Board of Education, Petitioner presented new evidence that demonstrated at least an appearance of bias against Petitioner on the part of Kim Trutane. This “new evidence” of bias is contained administrative records at pages 39-44, and is described below. Petitioner timely appealed his expulsion to the Alameda County Board of Education (the “County Board,” Respondent herein). On August 8, 2017, a hearing on his administrative appeal ‘was held. Petitioner presented new evidence, and argued he was denied due process of law at his expulsion hearing due to the bias of one of the Board Members who presided over the hearing (Kim Trutane). The same day, the County Board voted unanimously to uphold Petitioner's expulsion, in further violation of Petitioner’s right to due process of law. On or about September 11, 2017, the County Board sent a brief written order upholding the expulsion, via certified mail, to Petitioner. The order did not make any findings of fact, nor did it provide any analysis; the Board later incorporated by reference the analysis contained in a staff report dated August 8, 2017. AR. at 660-676. MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘case No, RO18922005, MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§1094:, 1085)10 a 12 13 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 a 22 23 24 Summary of New Evidence of Bias Petitioner Presented on Appeal On March 22, 2017, two days after Cedric Epple’s Instagram account was exposed, the African American/Black Parent Engagement Committee (AABPEC) held an emergency meeting to discuss the recent events, and to strategize their response. A.R. at 39-42. Ms. Trutane attended that meeting, and apparently made certain “commitments.” A.R. at 40. (An email sent out to the group after the meeting stated, “There were several commitments made from teachers, board members and administration on making this issue and student climate a priority.”). The following day, March 23, Ms. Trutane sent the following personal message to the “targeted” students: Personal Message To The Students and The Parents of Students Targeted in Monday's Incident: You are on my mind. I am concerned about the impact of Monday's incident on you and how you are feeling today, and next week, and next year. Please know that there is tremendous support in the Albany community for you. ‘You can see evidence of that support in your friends, neighbors, teachers, and school staff. ‘My heart goes out to you, because it is so painful to be targeted. My heart goes out to your parents, because I am a parent, and something hurtful happening to my kids is painful to me. As a school board member, I will support efforts to eliminate racism at our schools and build a safe, inclusive environment for every student. Please know that. Kim Trutane, Ph.D. Board Trustee Albany Unified School District 7 MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘case No, RO18922005 [MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1094.5, 1085)10 ul 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 23 24 25 AR. at 41. Also on March 23, someone posted an event notification to Facebook, called “#albany4all Gathering for Solidarity,” which was to be held March 26 in front of Albany High School. A.R. at 43. The event notification said, “At noon, we will join hands around the school in a show of solidary against racism and social injustice.” Id. The next day, March 24, Ms. Trutane commented on that Facebook event notification: “Has this been conceived in coordination with the Black/African American Parent Engagement group?” Several people replied, and discussed coordinating with AABPEC to plan a Unity Rally scheduled for the following week. On March 25, Ms. Trutane replied, “So glad you are joining forces! I am definitely going to both events. Looking forward to sending a strong message of support tomorrow and next Friday that we will not tolerate racism, Albany is for everyone.” A.R. at 43. On March 26, 2017, the “#albany4all Gathering for Solidarity” occurred at AHS. Ms Trutane participated in that demonstration. A photograph published on www. sfgate.com shows Ms. Trutane demonstrating in the crowd, holding up a sign that says, “WE ARE DIVERSE & GREAT.” A.R. at p. 44. On March 30, 2017, Ms. Trutane participated in another demonstration at AHS, which occurred outside of a restorative justice session related to the Instagram incident. At that demonstration, Ms. Trutane told some of the demonstrating students that the boys would be coming out soon, and urged MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘case No. 618922005, MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 10943, 1085)10 u 12 B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 24 25 nonviolence. A.R. at 36. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. Kim Trutane had an Obligation to Recuse herself from Presiding over Petitioner’s Expulsion Hearing due to her Involvement in the Community Response to his Instagram Account. Students facing the deprivation of their fundamental right to education are entitled to due process under the United States and the California Constitutions. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; Cal. Const. art. I, § 7(a); Nightlife Partners, Lid. v. City of Beverly Hills, 108 Cal.App.4th 81 (2003) (noting constitutional due process guarantees also apply to administrative proceedings at the local level). Although only minimal due process rights apply at expulsion hearings, even the Constitutional floor of due process demands a neutral arbiter. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 US. 35, 46 (1975). “Procedural due process in the administrative setting requires that the hearing be conducted “before a reasonably impartial, noninvolved reviewer.” Nasha L.L.C. v. City of Los Angeles, 125 Cal.App.4th 470, 488 (2004), citing Gai v. City of Selma, 68 Cal.App.4th 213, 219 (1998) [italics original]. “Violation of this due process guarantee can be demonstrated not only by proof of actual bias but also by showing a situation ‘in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias of the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Board, 45 Cal.4th 781, 737 (2009), citing Withrow v, Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). “[D]ue process in an administrative hearing also demands an MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘Case No. RG18922005 ‘MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §f 1094.5, 1085)20 21 23 24 25 appearance of fairness and the absence of even a probability of outside influence on the adjudication.” Nightlife, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at 90 [italics original]. In Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., the United States Supreme Court found that the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to recuse himself or herself when actual bias has been demonstrated; when the judge has an economic interest in the outcome of the case; or when "extreme facts” create a "probability of bias.” 556 U.S. 868 (2009). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that even the probability of bias is enough to offend the Due Process Clause (Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S.____ (2016) [“Chief Justice Castille’s significant, personal involvement in a critical decision in Williams's case gave rise to an unacceptable risk of actual bias. This risk so endangered the appearance of neutrality that his participation in the case ‘must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Withrow, 421 U. S., at 47.”,}) The Ninth Circuit has also found that an appearance of bias is sufficient to offend the 14% Amendment. See Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 1995). In Nasha, the Court of Appeals found an unacceptable probability of bias on the part of a Planning Commissioner who presided over an appeal by opponents to a development project in Los Angeles. Nasha, supra, 125 Cal.App. 4th at 478. Prior to the appeal, the Commissioner authored an article in a neighborhood newsletter which contained a summary of the proposed development project. Id. at 476. The article was entitled, “Multiview Drive Project Threat to Wildlife Corridor.” Ibid. ‘The brief article was mostly factual, summarizing the proposed development 10 MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘Case No. RG18922005, MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 10945, 1085)10 u 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 23 25 project and the procedural history of proposal. Jbid. But one sentence in the article evidenced the Commissioner's bias: “The Multiview Drive site is an absolutely crucial habitat corridor.” Ibid. Not surprisingly, the Commissioner voted with the majority to halt the project. Id. at 477-478. The Court of Appeals set aside the Planning Commission's decision, finding the Commissioner's “authorship of the newsletter article gave rise to an unacceptable probability of actual bias and was sufficient to preclude [the Commissioner] from serving as a ‘reasonably impartial, noninvolved reviewer.” Id. at 484, citing Gai, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at 219. The court held the Commissioner “clearly should have recused himself from hearing this matter. His participation in the appeal to the Planning Commission requires the Commission's decision be vacated.” Ibid. In Caperton, the Court reviewed two factual scenarios in which it had previously found a “probability of bias,” or circumstances in which a reasonable decisionmaker would at least be seriously tempted to tender bias toward one side. The first scenario is where the decisionmaker may receive some indirect pecuniary benefit based on the outcome of a matter over which he or she is charged with presiding. In Tumey v. Ohio, due process prohibited the village mayor from presiding over a hearing where part of the mayor's salary was derived from fines assessed against individuals who were found guilty of violating the law. 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927). Similarly, in Ward v. Monroeville, due process prohibited another mayor from presiding over a hearing where the potential fine went into the general i MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘case No, RG18922005, MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 10945, 1085)10 ul 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 fund of the town, due to “possible temptation” by the mayor to generate funds. 409 U.S. 87, 60 (1972). And in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, due process precluded a judge from deciding a question of punitive damages in a case very similar to another pending case in which the judge was a plaintiff. 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986). In each of these cases, the courts found that it was not possible to identify actual bias, but the circumstances were such that a reasonable person would be tempted to adjudicate in a particular direction due to potential personal interest in the outcome of the matter. ‘The second category of cases that the Caperton Court examined involved factual scenarios in which a judge who was presiding over a matter would have a high probability bias because of a previous history in presiding over related. matters whereby ether a prior relationship with the defendant may have existed and/or the judge had a familiarity with outside facts. Caperton at 869, citing In re Murchison 349 U.S. 133 (1955), Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). ‘The facts of Caperton did not fall under either of these categories of cases just discussed. There, the appellant alleged a judge presiding over the appeal was probably biased because one party in the case played a pivotal role in getting the judge elected. Id at 881-882. There, the appellant contributed approximately 3 million dollars to unseat the incumbent and help the judge in question get elected. Id, at 884-885. The Court also found significant the timing of the election, as it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the appeal at issue would be pending before the court on which the winner of the contested election would sit. Id. at 884-887. 12 MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘Case No, RG18922005 “MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §f 1094.5, 1085)10 MW 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 a1 23 24 25 The Court held the facts in Caperton created “a possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.” (Caperton at 886, citing Lavoie at 825.) The Court found the facts in Caperton were “extreme,” and noted that those facts which create an unconstitutional probably of bias “cannot be defined with precision.” Id. at 887, citing Lavoie at 822. As shown below, Petitioner has demonstrated actual bias on the part of Ms. Trutane. At a minimum, the extreme facts of Cedric Epple’s expulsion hearing and Ms. Trutane’s active participation in community protests create a probability — or at Jeast an appearance - of bias. A. Kim Trutane has Shown Actual Bias Against C.E. Under the high court's cases, due process requires disqualification when a jurist has either a personal pecuniary stake in the outcome of the case or has become embroiled in the battle. Such circumstances rebut the presumption of judicial impartiality and it becomes constitutionally intolerable to permit the affected jurist to continue to preside over the matter. These protections have been applied government administrative hearings as well. See Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 782 (Oth Cir. 1995). Here, Ms. Trutane became directly embroiled in Petitioner's expulsion case when she involved herself in community demonstrations and made public statements on the internet related to the demonstrations. The Alameda County Board of Education, affirming Petitioner's expulsion on appeal, adopted the reasoning that to find Ms. Trutane should have recused herself “would result in an 1B [MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘case No, RG18922008, MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1094.5, 1088)10 iT 12 13 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 2 22 23 24 25 elected official constantly being subject to allegations of bias and recusal for simply performing the duties in office the official was elected to do.” Ms. Trutane exceeded the threshold and did more than simply showing up to community events, or listen to the concerns of her constituents. The evidence is clear that Ms. Trutane actively inserted herself into the community response to Petitioner's Instagram account, going as far as demonstrating at a rally held in protest to his account, holding a sign with the following statement emblazoned, “We are diverse and great.” Prior to that demonstration, Ms. Trutane had made a statement online that she would be attending two community demonstrations for the purpose of “sending a strong message of support...that we will not tolerate racism, Albany is for everyone.” While these statements by themselves might not show a direct bias against Petitioner, the context in which Ms. Trutane made the statements — when the Albany community was mobilizing in heated, active protest to Petitioner's Instagram account, and, in the case of the “We are diverse and great” sign, while Ms. Trutane herself was actively participating in a rally held in protest to Petitioner's account ~ shows Ms. ‘Trutane intentionally embroiled herself in the controversy, all-the-while knowing that her position as a member of the Albany Board of Education could eventually result in her adjudication or supervision of discipline on the student who was the center of the controversy . Given these undisputed facts, there can be no claim that Ms. Trutane did not become so engrossed in Petitioner's matter that her objectivity was compromised. This Court should issue a writ of mandate, finding Ms. Trutane 14 MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘case No. RG18922005 MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 10943, 1085)10 u 12 3 4 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 23 25 demonstrated impermissible bias against Petitioner, in violation of his right to due process. cts" of this ate a "Probability of Bi: Even if this Court does not find actual bias on Ms. Trutane’s part, the extreme facts of this case require that this Court find a probability of bias. ‘This case presents a similar concern as expressed by Caperton, in that the facts do not neatly fit into a precedential case whereby due process was found to require recusal of a decisionmaker, yet an examination of the full facts demonstrates that a reasonable decisionmaker would face at least, temptation to be biased against Petitioner. The Albany community was outraged at Epple’s Instagram account, and mobilized in protest during the weeks and months following its exposure. Vice Principal Melissa Pfohl testified at Epple’s expulsion hearing, “[W]hat was done here was hurtful to so many people. Not just the people who were targeted on the account, but so many people. I believe there needs to be a very extreme interruption of business as usual. There needs to be an extreme interruption of the support for [Petitioner] that led him to do this.” (A.R. at 248: 6-13.) ‘The heated atmosphere in which Petitioner's expulsion hearing occurred, along with Ms. Trutane’s active involvement in community demonstrations, constitute extreme facts under which this court should find at least a probability of bias too great not to require recusal. MW 15 MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘case No, RG18922005 MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 10945, 1085)10 u 12 1B 14 15 16 7 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 C. At Minimum, there was an Appearance of Bias, Government arbitrators must avoid even the appearance of bias even when. no bias exists. That the appearance of bias can be grounds for a Fourteenth Amendment violation is illustrated in the Supreme Court's 2009 ruling in Caperton. The U.S. Supreme Court disqualified the judge in question, holding that his participation in his benefactors case violated Due Process guarantees. Notably, the Court did not determine that Justice Benjamin was actually biased. Instead, it concluded that the high independent expenditures created at least a perception of bias that undermined the public's confidence in a fair and impartial judiciary. Similarly, in Stivers the Ninth Circuit found: [T]he adjudicator's pecuniary or personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings may create an appearance of partiality that violates due process, even without any showing of actual bias. Gibson, 411 U.S. at 578, 93 S.Ct. at 1697-98; see also Exxon Corp. v. Heinze, 32 F.3d 1399, 1408 (9th Cir.1994) (“the Constitution is concerned not only with actual bias but also with ‘the appearance of justice.’”). Stivers at 741. While there is no claim here that Ms. Trutane had any direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of Petitioner's hearing, Caperton nonetheless instructs that appearance of bias is itself sufficient to warrant recusal. The evidence of Ms. ‘Trutane’s conduct in the aftermath of the exposure of Petitioner's Instagram account easily give the appearance that Petitioner was not afforded a fair and neutral arbiter. Just as taking a large endorsement from a litigant may give the appearance of bias, so does Ms. Trutane attending a political rally protesting Petitioner's conduct and making public statements in support of the groups 16 MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ‘case No, RG18922005 MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 10945, 1085)10 u 12 14 15 16 17 18 BOR g protesting Petitioner. At a minimum, Ms. Trutane’s active involvement in the community demonstrations created an appearance of bias, and she therefore should have recused herself from presiding over Petitioner's expulsion hearing. Il. _ By Upholding Petitioner’s Expulsion, the Alameda County Board of Education Committed an Error of Law. ‘The Alameda County Board of Education made an error of law in that it did not apply the law correctly to the underlying proceedings regarding impartial decision makers. See Nasha v. ity of Los Angeles, 125 Cal.App.4th 470 (2004) (decision makers in qua: icial hearings ‘must be reasonably impartial and noninvolved). The evidence of Ms. Trutane’s bias, raised at the County Board of Education appeal, demonstrated that Ms. Trutane was neither reasonably impartial nor uninvolved. Given the arguments above, and the undisputed evidence of Ms. ‘Trutane’s involvement in the community response to Petitioner's account, the County Board erred in finding “{t]he involvement proffered by Appellant did not create an objective appearance of bias or establish Trustee Trutane’s personal interest in the outcome of the expulsion proceedings.” A.R. at 208, CONCLUSION For the reasons argued herein, Petitioner asks this court to issue a writ of mandate ordering the Board to reverse its August 8, 2017, decision affirming Petitioner's expulsion. Dated: June 5, 2020 Respectfully submit DARRYL YO) ALAN BECK, CATHERINE BEEKMAN Attorneys for Petitioner Cedric Epple 7 MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE case No. RG18922005 [MANDAMUS (CODE CIV, PROC. $§ 1098, 1085)wk ww 10 ll 12 13 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 25 26 27 PROOF OF SERVICE Superior Court of California for the County of Alameda Cedric Epple v. Alameda County Board of Education Case No.: RG18922005 I, the undersigned, declare that I am employed in the City of Berkeley, State of California. I am over the age of 18 years and not a party to the within action(s); my business address is P.O. Box 9636, Berkeley, California, On June 5, 2020, I served the following documents: 1) MOTION FOR WRIT OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANDAMUS (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1094.5, 1085) on the parties and real parties in interest in said action(s), via U.S. Mail addressed as follows: Attorneys for Respondents Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost, LLP Attn: Seth Eckstein 70 Washington Street #205 Oakland, CA 94607 Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo Attn: Guy A. Bryant 5075 Hopyard Road, Suite 210 Pleasanton, CA 94588 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed on June 5, 2020 at Berkeley, California. Darryl Yorke Proof of Serie 7