Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism

German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared at an

Oct. 16 meeting of young members of her party, the
Christian Democratic Union, that multiculturalism, or
Multikulti, as the Germans put it, “has failed totally.”
Horst Seehofer, minister-president of Bavaria and
the chairman of a sister party to the Christian
Democrats, said at the same meeting that the two
parties were “committed to a dominant German
culture and opposed to a multicultural one.” Merkel
also said that the flood of immigrants is holding
back the German economy, although Germany does
need more highly trained specialists, as opposed to
the laborers who have sought economic advantages
in Germany.

The statements were striking in their bluntness and

their willingness to speak of a dominant German
culture, a concept that for obvious reasons Germans
have been sensitive about asserting since World
War II. The statement should be taken with utmost
seriousness and considered for its social and
geopolitical implications. It should also be
considered in the broader context of Europe’s
response to immigration, not to Germany’s response
alone.
The Origins of the German Immigration Question

Let’s begin with the origins of the problem. Post-

World War II Germany faced a severe labor shortage
for two reasons: a labor pool depleted by the
devastating war — and by Soviet prisoner-of-war
camps — and the economic miracle that began on
the back of revived industry in the 1950s. Initially,
Germany was able to compensate by admitting
ethnic Germans fleeing Central Europe and
Communist East Germany. But the influx only
helped assuage the population loss from World War
II. Germany needed more labor to feed its
burgeoning export-based industry, and in particular
more unskilled laborers for manufacturing,
construction and other industries.

To resolve the continuing labor shortage, Germany

turned to a series of successive labor recruitment
deals, first with Italy (1955). After labor from Italy
dried up due to Italy’s own burgeoning economy,
Germany turned to Spain (1960), Greece (1960),
Turkey (1961) and then Yugoslavia (1968). Labor
recruitment led to a massive influx of “Gastarbeiter,”
German for “guest workers,” into German society.
The Germans did not see this as something that
would change German society: They regarded the
migrants as temporary labor, not as immigrants in
any sense. As the term implied, the workers were
guests and would return to their countries of origin
when they were no longer needed (many Spaniards,
Italians and Portuguese did just this). This did not
particularly trouble the Germans, who were primarily
interested in labor.

The Germans simply didn’t expect this to be a long-

term issue. They did not consider how to assimilate
these migrants, a topic that rarely came up in policy
discussions. Meanwhile, the presence of migrant
labor allowed millions of Germans to move it from
unskilled labor to white-collar jobs during the 1960s.

An economic slowdown in 1966 and full-on

recession following the oil shock of 1973 changed
labor conditions in Germany. Germany no longer
needed a steady stream of unskilled labor and
actually found itself facing mounting unemployment
among migrants already in country, leading to the
“Anwerbestopp,” German for “labor recruitment
stop,” in 1973.

Nonetheless, the halt in migration did not resolve

the fact that guest workers already were in Germany
in great numbers, migrants who now wanted to bring
in family members. The 1970s saw most migration
switch to “family reunions” and, when the German
government moved to close that loophole, asylum.
As the Italians, Spanish and Portuguese returned
home to tend to their countries’ own successive
economic miracles, Muslim Turks became the
overwhelming majority of migrants in Germany —
particularly as asylum seekers flocked into
Germany, most of whom were not fleeing any real
government retribution. It did not help that Germany
had particularly open asylum laws in large part due
to guilt over the Holocaust, a loophole Turkish
migrants exploited en masse following the 1980
coup d’etat in Turkey.

As the migrants transformed from a temporary

exigency to a multigenerational community, the
Germans had to confront the problem. At base, they
did not want the migrants to become part of
Germany. But if they were to remain in the country,
Berlin wanted to make sure the migrants became
loyal to Germany. The onus on assimilating migrants
into the larger society increased as Muslim
discontent rocked Europe in the 1980s. The solution
Germans finally agreed upon in the mid-to-late 1980s
was multiculturalism, a liberal and humane concept
that offered migrants a grand bargain: Retain your
culture but pledge loyalty to the state.

In this concept, Turkish immigrants, for example,

would not be expected to assimilate into German
culture. Rather, they would retain their own culture,
including language and religion, and that culture
would coexist with German culture. Thus, there
would be a large number of foreigners, many of
whom could not speak German and by definition did
not share German and European values.

While respecting diversity, the policy seemed to

amount to buying migrant loyalty. The deeper
explanation was that the Germans did not want, and
did not know how, to assimilate culturally,
linguistically, religiously and morally diverse people.
Multiculturalism did not so much represent respect
for diversity as much as a way to escape the
question of what it meant to be German and what
pathways foreigners would follow to become
Germans.

Two Notions of Nation

This goes back to the European notion of the nation,

which is substantially different from the American
notion. For most of its history, the United States
thought of itself as a nation of immigrants, but with a
core culture that immigrants would have to accept in
a well-known multicultural process. Anyone could
become an American, so long as they accepted the
language and dominant culture of the nation. This
left a lot of room for uniqueness, but some values
had to be shared. Citizenship became a legal
concept. It required a process, an oath and shared
values. Nationality could be acquired; it had a price.

To be French, Polish or Greek meant not only that

you learned their respective language or adopted
their values — it meant that you were French, Polish
or Greek because your parents were, as were their
parents. It meant a shared history of suffering and
triumph. One couldn’t acquire that.

For the Europeans, multiculturalism was not the

liberal and humane respect for other cultures that it
pretended to be. It was a way to deal with the reality
that a large pool of migrants had been invited as
workers into the country. The offer of
multiculturalism was a grand bargain meant to lock
in migrant loyalty in exchange for allowing them to
keep their culture — and to protect European culture
from foreign influences by sequestering the
immigrants. The Germans tried to have their workers
and a German identity simultaneously. It didn’t work.

Multiculturalism resulted in the permanent alienation

of the immigrants. Having been told to keep their
own identity, they did not have a shared interest in
the fate of Germany. They identified with the country
they came from much more than with Germany.
Turkey was home. Germany was a convenience. It
followed that their primary loyalty was to their home
and not to Germany. The idea that a commitment to
one’s homeland culture was compatible with a
political loyalty to the nation one lived in was
simplistic. Things don’t work that way. As a result,
Germany did not simply have an alien mass in its
midst: Given the state of affairs between the Islamic
world and the West, at least some Muslim
immigrants were engaged in potential terrorism.

Multiculturalism is profoundly divisive, particularly

in countries that define the nation in European
terms, e.g., through nationality. What is fascinating
is that the German chancellor has chosen to become
the most aggressive major European leader to speak
out against multiculturalism. Her reasons, political
and social, are obvious. But it must also be
remembered that this is Germany, which previously
addressed the problem of the German nation via the
Holocaust. In the 65 years since the end of World
War II, the Germans have been extraordinarily
careful to avoid discussions of this issue, and
German leaders have not wanted to say things such
as being committed to a dominant German culture.
We therefore need to look at the failure of
multiculturalism in Germany in another sense,
namely, with regard to what is happening in
Germany.

Simply put, Germany is returning to history. It has

spent the past 65 years desperately trying not to
confront the question of national identity, the rights
of minorities in Germany and the exercise of German
self-interest. The Germans have embedded
themselves in multinational groupings like the
European Union and NATO to try to avoid a
discussion of a simple and profound concept:
nationalism. Given what they did last time the matter
came up, they are to be congratulated for their
exercise of decent silence. But that silence is now
over.

The Re-emergence of German Nation Awareness

Two things have forced the re-emergence of German

national awareness. The first, of course, is the
immediate issue — a large and indigestible mass of
Turkish and other Muslim workers. The second is
the state of the multinational organizations to which
Germany tried to confine itself. NATO, a military
alliance consisting mainly of countries lacking
militaries worth noting, is moribund. The second is
the state of the European Union. After the Greek and
related economic crises, the certainties about a
united Europe have frayed. Germany now sees itself
as shaping EU institutions so as not to be forced
into being the European Union’s ultimate financial
guarantor. And this compels Germany to think about
Germany beyond its relations with Europe.

It is impossible for Germany to reconsider its

position on multiculturalism without, at the same
time, validating the principle of the German nation.
Once the principle of the nation exists, so does the
idea of a national interest. Once the national interest
exists, Germany exists in the context of the
European Union only as what Goethe termed an
“elective affinity.” What was a certainty amid the
Cold War now becomes an option. And if Europe
becomes an option for Germany, then not only has
Germany re-entered history, but given that Germany
is the leading European power, the history of Europe
begins anew again.

This isn’t to say that Germany must follow any

particular foreign policy given its new official view
on multiculturalism; it can choose many paths. But
an attack on multiculturalism is simultaneously an
affirmation of German national identity. You can’t
have the first without the second. And once that
happens, many things become possible.
Consider that Merkel made clear that Germany
needed 400,000 trained specialists. Consider also
that Germany badly needs workers of all sorts who
are not Muslims living in Germany, particularly in
view of Germany’s demographic problems. If
Germany can’t import workers for social reasons, it
can export factories, call centers, medical analysis
and IT support desks. Not far to the east is Russia,
which has a demographic crisis of its own but
nonetheless has spare labor capacity due to its
reliance on purely extractive natural resources for
its economy. Germany already depends on Russian
energy. If it comes to rely on Russian workers, and
in turn Russia comes to rely on German investment,
then the map of Europe could be redrawn once
again and European history restarted at an even
greater pace.

Merkel’s statement is therefore of enormous

importance on two levels. First, she has said aloud
what many leaders already know, which is that
multiculturalism can become a national catastrophe.
Second, in stating this, she sets in motion other
processes that could have a profound impact on not
only Germany and Europe but also the global
balance of power. It is not clear at this time what her
intention is, which may well be to boost her center-
right coalition government’s abysmal popularity. But
the process that has begun is neither easily
contained nor neatly managed. All of Europe,
indeed, much of the world, is coping with the
struggle between cultures within their borders. But
the Germans are different, historically and
geographically. When they begin thinking these
thoughts, the stakes go up.

Source : © STRATFOR

Read more:

• Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism |

STRATFOR

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Monetary Reform

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Immigration kategorisinde yayınlandı | Etiketler:

Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism
« AKP iktidarı yıkımda ve farklıkları azdıran
politikalarında inat ederse…

” Almanya, Türk halkına dostlukla bağlıdır.” »

Fransa’ da hayat felç oldu, Belçika da trenler

çalışmadı; Almanya da Türk ve Müslüman
düşmanlığı moda oldu. YA Türkiye de neler oldu?

Erbakan Hoca yeniden siyasete döndü, Ecevit ten de

ibret almadı. AKP ye karşı tek alternatif olduğunu
söyledi.

40 yıl sonra dünya nasıl olacak?

14:59 | 19 Ekim 2010

Amerikalı ünlü düşünürlerden Alvin Toffler'ın

tahminlerine göre, gelecek 40 yıl içinde kadınlar
şimdiye kadar benzeri görülmemiş biçimde iktidarda
 olacak, Batı'ya Müslüman göçü
artacak ve artık "işe gitmek"
gerekmeyecek.

1970'de yazdığı "Gelecek Şoku"

kitabıyla, gelecek bilimi olarak da
adlandırılan "fütürolojinin"
öncülerinden olan Alvin
Toffler'ın, kitabının yayınlanmasının 40. yıldönümü
nedeniyle bir ekiple birlikte hazırladığı rapordaki
tahminlere göre, Güney Afrika önemli bir ekonomik
gelişme kaydederken, Orta Doğu'da dini ve etnik
hareketlerden kaynaklanan karışıklıklar hakim
olacak.

ABD'nin başkenti Washington'da düzenlenen bir

toplantıda açıklanan "Gelecek 40 Yıl için 40 Tahmin"
adlı rapora göre, giderek daha fazla insan, büyük
üretici ve dağıtıcılara daha az bağımlı olmak için
kendi sebzelerini yetiştirecek ve kendi gıdalarını
üretecek.

Yüksek hızlı internet standart olacak ve bu sayede

yaygınlaşacak videokonferans sayesinde çalışmak
için artık büroya gitmeye hiç gerek kalmayacak ve
insanlar dünyanın neresinde olursa olsunlar
çalıştıkları işlerini yapabilecekler.

Kuzey Kore ve İran gibi sadece bir avuç ülke "haydut

devletler" olarak değerlendirilmeye devam ederken,
dünyanın en büyük ekonomik gücü haline gelecek
olan Çin, faiz oranlarını etkilemek için Brezilya ve
Hindistan ile enerji ihtiyacını karşılamak için de
Venezuela ve bazı Afrika ülkeleriyle işbirliği yapacak.

ABD, ÇİN'E BAĞIMLI HALE GELECEK Gelecek 40

yılın tahminine göre, ABD de, yenilenebilir enerji
sistemleri, melez motorlu otomobil, radar ve silah
üretebilmek için gerekli olan yeni değerli metaller
nedeniyle Çin'e bağımlı olacak.

Alternatif enerji biçimlerinin gelişmesi dolayısıyla

Suudi Arabistan, İran, Irak ve Körfez ülkeleri ile
Rusya ve Venezuela'nın "fosil yakıtlar sonrası
dünyanın kaybedenleri" olacağı kaydedilen raporda,
Hristiyanlığın güney yarıküre ülkelerinde yayılırken,
daha fazla sayıda Müslümanın Batı ülkelerine göç
edeceği tahmin ediliyor.

Toffler'ın öngörülerine göre, iklim değişikliği

çatışmalara yol açacak, buzulların erimesi yeni
petrol ve mineral zenginliklerinin keşfedilmesini
sağlayacak. Suların yükselmesi, deniz kıyıları
boyunca yaşayan halkın kitleler halinde başka
yerlere göçüne yol açacak.

Nüfusun giderek yaşlanması nedeniyle ihtiyarların

bakım giderlerinin dörde katlanacağı ve Amerikan
yaşam sigortası sistemlerinin bugünkü şekliyle
devam edemeyeceği öngörüsünde bulunan Toffler,
yeni sigorta sisteminin ne olacağının bilinmediğini,
ancak toplumun ihtiyaçlarına uygun bir biçimde
olacağını belirtiyor.
Gelecek 40 yılın tahminine göre, kadınlar, şimdiye
kadar görülmemiş bir oranda önemli görevlere
gelecekler.

GIGABYTE YERİNE PETABYTE Toffler ve ekibi, bilgi

iletimindeki hızın artışı dolayısıyla, dünyanın,
gigabyte üzerinde bir veri depolama birimi ve bilişim
kuvveti olan "petabyte kainatına" gireceği
öngörüsünde de bulunuyor.

Alvin Toffler, Gelecek Şoku'nda yazdıklarıyla, bilim

ve teknolojinin çok hızlı gelişeceğini, bu nedenle
insanların çoğunun bilgi bombardımanını
sindirmekte güçlük çekeceğini ve gerçek yaşamla
bağlarını koparmaya çalışacaklarını önceden
kestirmişti.

Toffler'ın, kitabında bilgi iletiminde hızın artacağı,

eşcinsel evliliklerin gündeme geleceği ve çevre
felaketlerinin çoğalacağı gibi başka öngörüleri de
doğru çıkmıştı.

Sosyolog Toffler'ın birçok dile çevrilen kitabı,

şimdiye kadar 6 milyondan fazla sattı.

Dünya ekonomisinde eksen kayıyor

ABD’nin dünya ekonomisindeki payı, 1980’de yüzde
24.58 iken, 2011 yılında yüzde 20’nin, 2015’de yüzde
18.4’ün altına inecek. Çin, 1980-2015 döneminde payını
yüzde 2.19’dan yüzde 16.96’ya, Hindistan 2.45’den
yüzde 6.28’e çıkaracak. Türkiye’nin 1980’de aldığı yüzde
1.02’lik pay bu yıl yüzde 1.27’ye çıkacak.

Dünya ekonomisinde eksen son sürat gelişmekte olan

ülkelere doğru kayıyor. Klasik sanayileşmiş ülkeler, ABD,
Japonya, Almanya, İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya, Kanada,
Hollanda, Belçika, İsveç gibi ülkelerin dünya
ekonomisindeki ağırlığı gittikçe azalırken, Çin, Hindistan,
Güney Kore, Endonezya, Türkiye, Malezya, Tayland,
Mısır gibi gelişmekte olan ülkeler dünya ekonomisinde
giderek daha fazla pay kapıyor. Uluslararası Para
Fonu’nun (IMF) verilerinden derlenen bilgilere göre,
ABD’nin dünya ekonomisindeki payı, satın alma gücü
paritesine göre gayri safi yurtiçi hasıla (SGP-GSYH)
bazında, 1980’de yüzde 24.585 iken, 2011 yılında yüzde
20’nin altına, yüzde 19.884’e gerileyecek.

Çin’in payı 8 kat artacak

ABD’nin payı 2015’de ise yüzde 18.4’ün altına inecek.

Dünya ekonomisinden aldıkları pay, Japonya, Almanya,
İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya, Belçika gibi ülkelerde daha
dramatik bir şekilde düşecek. 1980’lerde dünyanın ikinci
büyük ekonomisi konumundaki Japonya’nın 1980’de
aldığı yüzde 9.17’lik pay, 2015’de yüzde 5.15,
Almanya’nın payı yüzde 6.68’den yüzde 3.42’ye,
İngiltere’de yüzde 4.29’dan yüzde 2.74’e, Fransa’da
yüzde 4.72’den yüzde 2.62’ye, İtalya’da yüzde 4.47’den
yüzde 2.08’e, Belçika’da yüzde 0.85’den yüzde 0.47’ye
gerileyecek.

Buna karşın, Çin dünya ekonomisinden aldığı payı bu

dönemde 8 kat, Hindistan 2.5 artıracak. Çin, 1980-2015
döneminde payını yüzde 2.19’dan yüzde 16.96’ya,
Hindistan 2.45’den yüzde 6.28’e çıkaracak.

1980’de 13’üncü büyük ekonomi olan ve sıralamada,

Hindistan, Meksika, Kanada, İspanya gibi ülkelerin
gerisinde kalan Çin, o tarihte İtalya’nın yarısı kadar satın
alma güce paritesine göre GSYH’si vardı. 2015’de
İtalya’nın 8.5 katı, ABD’ye yakın bir SGP-GSYH
düzeyine ulaşacak.

Sanayileşmiş 7 büyük ülkenin (ABD, Japonya, Almanya,

İngiltere, Fransa, İtalya, Kanada) oluşturduğu G-7 (Grup
7), 1980 yılında dünya ekonomisinin yüzde 56.3’ü,
1992’de yüzde 51.4’ü 2010 yılında yüzde 40.1’i
oluştururken, bu oran 2015 yılında yüzde 36’ya inecek.
Bu karşın, Brezilya, Rusya, Hindistan ve Çin’den oluşan
ve bu ülkelerin İngilizce yazılışının ilk harflerinden
oluşturulan bir tabirle BRIC olarak adlandırılan bu
ülkelerin 1992’de dünya ekonomisindeki payı yüzde
14.53 iken, bu yıl yüzde 24.48’e, 2015 yılında ise yüzde
29.08’e yükselecek.

Türkiye’nin dünya ekonomisinde 1980’de aldığı yüzde

1.025’lik pay, 1992 yılında yüzde 1.188’e, 2010 yılında
yüzde 1.274’e çıkarken, 2015 yılında yüzde 1.232’ye
inecek ama 16’ıncılıktaki sırası değişmeyecek.

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