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Folklorica
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BIBLIOTECA 101
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102 MYERS
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 103
we reverse
alization of space". My this order of primacy and follow the lead
intuition in
was contrastive, of
thehunter-gatherers
need in taking to
the human condition
draw
different peoplesto be that of a being immersed
might "see" from the start,
diffe like
other creatures, in an active, practical and percep-
same "place" 3, a project akin to
tual engagement with constituents of the dwelt-in
eation of the "behavioral environm
world. This ontology of dwelling, I contend, provides
wa (1969). The untheorized assum
us with a better way of coming to grips with the
- the three-dimensional, infinit
nature of human existence than the alternative,
background against which
Western ontology distin
whose point of departure is that
("theirs" and "ours")
of a mind detached from might
the world and which has pr
expressed. My own concern
literally to formulate mor
it- to build an intentional world
in consciousness - interpretiv
book was not merely prior to any attempt at engage-
ment. [ibid: 120-121]
accounting or translation of the m
nal people found or constructed
Ingold's concern to avoid the separation of
ment, their country. Rather, I soug
mind and nature, of culture and nature, is of long
analyze the social and political pr
standing. The embrace of a Heideggerian
which places were invested wi
value. dwelling-perspective and a critique of the "world
picture" formulation in some forms of cultural
Two recent thoughtful discussions of "place"
construction are continuous with his earlier effort
have taken issue with my representation, each
to force the recognition that the practical activi-
relying on a "dwelling" perspective drawn either
ties of foraging are also distinctly human activi-
directly from (1977, 1979) or from phenomenol-
ties, and not simply a creatural infrastructure
ogy more generally, which questions the apparent
(see Ingold 1987).
primacy given to "space" over "place" (see Casey
1995; Ingold 1993, 1996). Casey, for example, Let me now express my concerns, because
criticizes the (Enlightenment) presumption of athey are not simply a rejection of phenomenology
preexisting medium of space and time withintout court. Phenomenological approaches have
which "place" is produced. Instead, he argues,had great value in the efforts of anthropologists
the phenomenologically prior experience is ofto fathom distinctive relationships to the world
distinctive and particular places, with "being-in- (see Merlan 1998, Munn 1970), especially in
place". Indeed, the "very idea of space", he challenging taken-for-granted (i.e., cultural)
insists, "is posterior to that of place, perhaps assumptions about subjectivity - as in critiques
even derived from it..." (Casey 1995: 16). of the Cartesian ego, the so-called "ghost in the
Equally concerned with the implications of the machine". Much of the current phenomenologi-
phrase "culturalization of space," Ingold (1996)cally-inspired interest concerns the experience or
takes particular issue with the primacy given tosenses of place, the dwelling in it. I have no doubt
"culture" and "construction," arguing that that some component of what places mean to
Aboriginal people can be approached in this way.
hunter-gatherers do not, as a rule, approach their One of my informants, indeed, said it: "I can close
environment as an external world of nature that has my eyes and see that green place" (where he
to be 'grasped' conceptually and appropriated grew up).
symbolically within the terms of an imposed cultur- The assumption of Ingold's argument is that
al design, as a precondition for effective action. if we "follow the lead of hunter-gatherers," the
They do not see themselves as mindful subjects
concrete activities of hunting and foraging will
having to contend with an alien world of physical
have primacy. But as Munn (1970) pointed out,
objects; indeed, the separation of mind and nature
the experiences of "country" are not innocent of
has no place in their thought and practice. [Ingold
1996: 120] social life: one of the significant concerns of
Aboriginal social practice (at least in Central
He suggests Australia) is in producing a particular mode of
orientation to the world, a kind of subjectivity.
People do not simply "experience" the world; they
3 I am indebted to Deborah Elliston for this Heidegger regarded as a modern formula- are taught - indeed, disciplined - to signify their
formulation. I also recognize that the tion (the "world picture") on a very different experiences in distinctive ways. Moreover, ritual
emphasis on "seeing" would conform to metaphysics. life is highly valued as the means through which
the problem of possibly imposing what this orientation most adequately secured - an
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104 MYERS
orientation in which "what is" (to use the relations of Pintupi life (Myers 1986a, see also
language of metaphysics) is interpreted as a sign Myers 1988b). Moreover, by the particular focus
of prior sentient, ancestral activity. Experience, they
or give to an individualized subjective experi-
knowledge of the world, is therefore in partence, an their discussions offer inadequate atten-
effect of power. Furthermore, the insistence tion on to the social mediation of "place" - of
the "activities of hunting and gathering" has the "place" as something already constituted in
danger of reproducing one of the most problem- social relations. What is proposed in my
atic assumptions of ecological anthropology's approach is not the construction of "pure
emphasis on "the band" (Myers 1988a) - name- culture". It is, rather, a dialectical model of
ly, ignoring the significance of what are, perhapsconstruction that I identify more with activity theo-
to the hunter-gatherers themselves, the more ry and Vygotsky (1962, 1978) or Piagetian
enduring, broader social categories and spatial
notions of construction (see Turner 1973) - a
aggregates which are brought into being at any construction that emphasizes operations and
particular place. practices that mediate between a subject and
There remains, therefore, a hint of primitivismthe world. I find these models to be most produc-
in Ingold's provision of primacy to hunting and tive for understanding how environment is consti-
gathering as activities defining the experiencetuted of socially. In contrast, the reliance of a
place. This is my second concern. Phenomenolo- "dwelling" perspective on the primacy of percep-
gy also has a history, in Western European tion in the constitution of place seems problem-
responses to rationality: one should be wary of a atic to me, insofar as sociopolitical mediation is
deployment of "dwelling" that runs along lines ignored at all levels. The model of place-constitu-
that parallel the profound primitivist separation tion we are left to ponder assumes a singular
between modern/pre-modern, alienated/unalien- existential subject of perception - not the Vygot-
ated that occupied Heidegger's search for Being skyian subject who is himself or herself also
as much as our New Age contemporaries. constructed out of activities, nor even the subject
To be fair, it is not entirely clear to me how whose perception is guided by the instruction or
serious might be the deeper differences between tutelage that Vygotsky's "zone of proximal devel-
Casey and Ingold's invocations of "dwelling" and opment" (1978) allowed.
my account and those of others. Indeed, I fully Indeed, Vygotsky is famous for this emphasis
endorse Ingold's formulation that it is through on socially mediated learning. Ingold attempts to
dwelling in a landscape, through the incorporation forestall the objection that he has "taken no
of its features into a pattern of everyday activi- account of that vital component of knowledge
ties, that it becomes home to hunters and gath- that comes to people through their instruction in
erers (1991: 16). traditional lore" (1996: 142). But nevertheless I
At its most productive, Ingold's argument is find his treatment of knowledge to be problemat-
against the separation of "the activities of hunting ic. While I never claimed such knowledge should
and gathering, on the one hand, and singing, story- be understood as "maps" in the direct sense, I
telling, and the narration of myth, on the other" do believe that my ethnography supports the view
within the terms of "a dichotomy between the that stories, songs, designs, and the like provide
material and the mental, between ecological inter-components of an "inner representation" of the
actions in nature and cultural constructions of country, instructing learners what to find. These
nature" (1996: 144). He argues against a vieware of what one means by representations: under-
the landscape as "culturalized space [which]
standings objectified and transmitted through a
range of activities of kinship and social relations.
entails the naturalization of hunting and gathering.
[In this view] only as represented in thought [i.e., My
a principal concern is that the "dwelling"
mind detached from the world] is the environmentapproach, while potentially able to envisage the
drawn into the human world of persons" (Ibid).significance of activity, tends to suggest that
As applied to what I wrote, however, these such experience is largely unmediated by social
phenomenological critiques selectively concern processes of the sort that have occupied my
only the most descriptive of the chapters. Theyresearch.
do Perhaps on the general significance of
not address my analysis of the processes of "activity" we ultimately agree, although the only
projection, objectification, or construction which
activities Ingold is concerned to mention are
occur, in my view, within and through the social
those of hunting and gathering as concrete labor.
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 105
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106 MYERS
The entirety
Dreaming, encompasses the travels of ancestors
Knowledge, Pla
My research through a Pintupi
with great number of placesAborigi
and many cere-
Australia beganmonies, ina Dreaming-track
1973. links It several
has localized ta
number of settlements and homeland communities. groups. It joins the groups at one level and differ-
The vital conception of Aboriginal life, here asentiates them within it. Because initiation (of
in so many other regions, is The Dreaming (see men) is necessary both to gain a wife and to gain
Stanner 1956), constituting the very framework access to the religious knowledge which defines
of Aboriginal society. Most Aboriginal ceremony is adulthood, access to religious knowledge (and its
"totemic" or (more suitably), in Strehlow's (1970)distribution) structures the defining social rela-
terms, "land-based". Derived from the mytholog-tionships of Pintupi social life - that is, the rela-
ical period - The Dreaming - in which powerfultionship of young men to old men and of women
ancestral beings gave the world its shape and to men -just as it structures the relationships of
meaning, Aboriginal ceremonies both re-enact locality. However, the meaning of these places,
the events of The Dreaming and come from it their value, must be understood as constructed-
(thus, their authenticity). Aborigines say that in not by the application of some pure cultural
performing the ceremonies they merely "follow up model to blank nature, to which Ingold rightly
The Dreaming" (Stanner 1956), sometimes objects - but in activities that constitute relation-
ships within a system of social life that structures
called "the Law" Knowledge is restricted, and the
difference and similarity among persons, a
ceremonies are revelatory: they present the story
system of practices for which "land" is one medi-
of what happened at a particular place and how it
shaped the geography there. Thus, they make um. It is the neglect of such social processes as
available knowledge of fundamentally importantcentral to the production of value in place to
and invisible events and structures. which I object in the over-emphasis on "dwelling".
Almost invariably, Pintupi discussions of
Pintupi Practices/Activities of Place:
country are punctuated by descriptions of what
happened in The Dreaming. Every significant Exchange
feature is held to result from Dreaming events.
Pintupi Aborigines traditionally occupied an
Yumarinya, for example, means "wife's mother-
arid region south of Lake MacKay with an average
place". The yumari of this case is the mother-in-
yearly rainfall of 5-10 inches, a few permanent
law of a mythological Old Man, who travelled west
and semi-permanent waterholes, and significant
from the Henty Hills, and who copulated with her
seasonal variation of resources. (When I began
at this place. Rock outcroppings, a rockhole, and
studying them in 1973, they lived sedentarily in a
various markings within a few hundred yards are
small outstation near Papunya, where they had
interpreted as the result of the illicit actions of the
recently been settled.) To understand "place"
mythological beings. The name signifies here a
among the Pintupi, we must begin with how it is
specific feature of the event, the involvement of
lived in bands, among those who share a camp.
the Old Man and his mother-in-law.
Pintupi live in a material world of practices that
These kinds of stories and the places they must produce itself with the resources of its envi-
endow or describe are owned by particular groups
ronment but also reproduce the relations of
and controlled by men (and women) who have the
production. The coordination of these practices,
right to display the ceremony. Where a myth in its
in kinship, involves the production of social
persons - imaged in the Pintupi metaphor of
I By identity here I do not mean a person's "nurturance"
tion to all others, although they may be: as or "looking after" (kanyininpa).
total or integrated conception of himself orI have shown in more extensive presenta-
Band sizes varied from 10-25 persons during
herself. First, I am using the term to refer to tion of the Pintupi case elsewhere (Myers
bases for (or markers of) self-differentiation
most of the year. As I have shown previously
1986a), these markers may constitute a
and self-relationship. While these markersbasis for differentiating oneself from others (Myers 1982b, 1986a, 1988b), an individual-
do not need to be "natural species", L6vi- in some contexts but for expressing rela- oriented approach to these groupings, based on
Strauss (1962, 1966) is correct to point outtionship with different others in other the indigenous concept of "one countryman", is
that the culturally recognized bases for clas-
contexts. Finally, the degree to which any of necessary insofar as society was potentially
sification do typically find their purchase these multiple, particular bases are synthe-
outside of human social relations them-
boundary-less, with individual networks and ritu-
sized into more context-independent formu-
lations of selfhood and society is a problem al links extending beyond any definable group.
selves. Second, I do not mean to say that
these identities are necessarily permanent
for analysis and comparison. Individuals did not live entirely in one place or with
or enduring dimensions of a person's rela- a single set of people, even during the course of
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 107
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108 MYERS
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 109
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110 MYERS
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 111
gala, and thein the east. These were places to which he regu-
significance
Yumarinya larlyor
- traveled, "Mother-i
"up and down" along the plain.
hole is one of
They were the"one country" places
in respect to his resi- w
to live, priordentialtohabits; heleaving
"sat" (camped) there. Marriageth
in 1956. It was filled
exchanges reinforced some of these with
- so that his
rience, of life historical
sister's daughter was married to a man from the e
important toPollock Hills. He can paint these designs and
him.
So, how did he
"hold" come
that country to
in ceremony because thesebe
place (and not
rights of only
identification werewith
given to him by histh
father was not from
one countrymen, this
recognizing in this manner their
from the south, from
relationship. The shared the
identity is objectified in
known as Yawalyurrunya
their mutual identification with the place and
place"). Yumari
places. was part o
try," her In ritual exchange,
ngurra. and in controlling
His fathe their
he married her, and
sons for initiation and daughtershe co
for marriage,
north, nearWuta Yumarinya
Wuta, Minpuru, and other brothers acted as w
common practice a group - performing forceremoniesaas "brothers".
peri
father subsequently The place Yumarinya is a vehicledied
of their shared a
Yumarinya, identity, and is
as "sons" of thenow kn
group of fathers. In
place of burial. Wuta Wuta's mother was terms of my argument, his identification with
conceived near to Yumarinya, which means Yumarinya
that (and other places) provides Wuta
her Dreaming is identified with the place - thus,
Wuta with something he can exchange with other
providing a significant basis to claim ownership.
men - and in this sense, undergirds his identity
Wuta Wuta himself had his conception dream- as an autonomous, equal man. He probably
ing (i.e., was conceived through the essence ofacquired
the the knowledge necessary to do so post-
Dreaming at) at Ngurrapalangunya, a place asso- initiation, as the film Pintupi Revisit Yumari
(Sandall 1969) shows to be the case for some of
ciated with the activities of Two (ancestral) Women
who were heading for Lake Mackay to the north, his "brother's sons".
but who were frightened at this site - a hill andWuta Wuta was associated with a range of
claypans - by the Old Man on his way to Yumari. places through the circumstances, experiences, of
his life. This relationship is not necessarily a
According to Pintupi understanding, these figures
phenomenological
left Wuta Wuta behind, hiding in a cave, from which expression of dwelling in a
he was eventually conceived. Wuta Wuta's older
place, although this may be a basis for some of his
brother, Minpuru, was conceived at Yawarrankun-
claims (residence, conception). The larger process
in which these dwellings take place suggest that
ya, a site identified with yet another Dreaming story
place gains its significance through the value
(of Two Boys), to the west of Yumarinya. Yumarinya
is tied in to places east and west, through sharing
making social processes of identity production,
in the creative activities of this Old Man and his
processes of kinship in the Pintupi sense, mediat-
travels: one Dreaming. ed by exchange. All of these associations to place
Both men claim Yumarinya through theirare objectifications, projections through time, of
(shared) mother and her father (Wuta Wutavarious relations of shared identity.
Tjapanangka) and through their own father, who One's country is a projection - in a sense - of
is buried in the area, as well as through concep-
one's movements and social relations, of
tion. Wuta Wuta also claims links to the south,kinship, converted to identity with place. "Resi-
through his father, at Yawalyurrunya in his dence" or dwelling - living on the land, at a place
father's country, which were recognized by his
- is very important in establishing one's identity
relatives there because he had been able to with it and its meaning for one. But this fact is
maintain his ties. He activated these ties and his socially significant by virtue of a discursive
valorization in making claims, as an acceptable
identification with that place by marrying a woman
from the southern area and moving there forbasis a of identity. In fact, if one doesn't live with
while - that is, through exchange. those from the place or in the area regularly, one
Wuta Wuta also had important rights to the loses one's basis of claim: one is said to have
Pollock Hills in the west and also to Tjitururrnga
"nothing to do". It is woven phenomenologicall
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112 MYERS
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 113
- which I translate
a reflexive byproduct
partially
of its use to reproduce the a
the formation
family. of identity
appears that theAt this pointcritical
in the hierarchy of social process-proc
duction of Pintupi
es, there is a changesocialin the form of social life
extensive levels, are
consciousness from those
the viewpoint of actors. o
persons. This Relations activity and processes are nointegra
longer repre-
people with "looking sented in cultural terms as after"
products of deliberate (o
places that contain social activity. "Higherthe vital
level processes, the repro-
ty of human beings. duction of which is not directly under social
To understand how "place" conceivably control, tend to be represented not as artifacts of
figures within such a system, let me sketch anhuman activity but as products of natural forces
approach to its situation in social consciousnessor supernatural agencies" (ibid.: 32)'". What are
and its location in something we might call theemergent properties of social action are
"environment" - perceived to be outside of socialdiscerned as invariant, natural. It is regarded as
production, but in fact its product. In this view,beyond the scope of social agency to create or
which I adopt from Turner (1980)14, social struc-change these processes which, Turner says, are
tures are to be seen as the hierarchical organi-
zation of productive activities. Here, the upper not seen as interdependent parts of a system of
levels consist of reproductive processes which social relations and activities, but rather as norma-
subsume productive processes as lower levels or tive entities with a reality of their own independent of
components. Turner once discussed the rela- the pattern of social relations that results from their
enactment. They are objectified or reified, that is,
tionship of these levels in Piagetian terms, as
considered as things-in-themselves that constrain
one of "coordination", in which the higher level
behavior but are not constrained by it. [ibid.: 32]
structurally expresses the commonalities of activ-
ities at the lower level.
Thus, Turner is interested in how social
Turner points out as well that such hierarchi-
consciousness at higher levels of social structure
cal organization can also be seen as a hierarchy
tends to be alienated, tends to define the value
of modes of social control. The lower levels
attached to a level of organization as simply inher-
consist of social forms and techniques for
ent in itself, rather than as a product of human
controlling processes of transformation. Higher
social activity or of a system of interdependent
levels are comprised of reproductive processes,
relations among parts of a whole. This fetishized
consisting of relational mechanisms for control-
character of the collective representations consti-
ling the production of primary processes and
tuting the society's form of consciousness of itself
attendant social relations (e.g., marriage as a can become an obstacle in its reformulation.
mechanism to reproduce the family). As one
moves higher in such structures, he observes,
Practices and New Conditions of Place
differentiated social mechanisms of control and
reproduction disappear: My concern here, pursued under the abstract
sign of "fetishization", is not immediately with the
question of misrecognition so much as it is with
A level is reached in every social structure in which
production and reproduction are not directlythe relationship between the qualities of "place"
controlled through specialized social relations or
and the cycles of social activity in which they are
processes, but instead take place indirectly and as constructed. This is, I hope to have indicated, a
it were reflexively through the repetition of the insti-rather different process of "construction" than
tution, process or level of organization in question
the one Ingold (1996) criticizes and attributes to
as a means of reproducing some lower level. [Turn-
me. It is one in which the value of "places" is
er 1980: 31]
produced in their capacity to mediate relation-
ships of shared identity and difference, of hierar-
Thus, for example, marriage is reproduced as
chy and equality within a regional sociopolitical
system. The process of placemaking is also to be
14 Terry Turner has developed and extend- understood as one in which the material proper-
1980) as is its relationship to the practical
ed his theorization of culture considerably
consequences of culture's theorization. ties made significant by movement or travel in the
beyond the simple form of this early paper,
15 For a similar argument, see Myers world - constituted through processes of aggre-
but its outline is clearest here (Turner1980.
gation and dispersal, in the traditional mode, and
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114 MYERS
16 Such indigenous practices often refor-Such an integration of distinctive places Problems of Placemaking
mulate the relationship among places inwithin encompassing relations of similarity
terms of newly revealed (or discovered)and difference in larger systems is familiar There is more to the story Merlan provides,
ancestral activities linking them. In that in Arnhem Land, too, in various groupings leading us to the next and final topic to be consid-
respect, they represent the discovery of of clans. ered here-the importance of changing politics and
new qualities in place, consequent to their17 For a recent attempt to develop this sortrelations of signification in defining the meaning of
integration of changing supralocal regimes of point about secrecy, see Weiner's place. The uprooted rainbow provides a distinctive
of order. Thus, the Warlpiri Gadjari (Meggitt
(1996) discussion of the controversial
1966) cycle connects places of differentHindmarsh Island bridge affair in South image as "an autochthonous force that assaults
local groups through the visits - "above the the unfamiliar" (1998: 85). In the story, then, the
Australia and Brunton's (1996) response.
ground" - of a unifying set of ancestors. anonymous stranger is seen to uproot and destroy
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 115
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116 MYERS
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 117
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118 MYERS
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WAYS OF PLACE-MAKING 119
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