Maggie Kloecker

HIST497D

Final Paper

12/9/10

Use of Defense Contracting in the Middle East

“Semper Fi”. ‘This We’ll Defend”. These are branch mottos of the United States Armed Forces.

Since its formation the U.S Military has been a primarily volunteer, proud unit. Even when the wars were

questionable, brave men and women stood up and joined because they believed in their hearts that

what they were doing was ensuring the safety and freedom of their homes, families, and country.

However, over the past 50 years the United States has undergone a change in the way it fights its wars,

primarily in the Middle East. Slowly but surely, the government has been shifting an increasing amount

of the defense responsibility onto the shoulders of Private Defense contractors. Undoubtedly, we are all

aware of the Blackwater incident which took place on September 20 th, 2007 in Baghdad. Although we

may never know the full details of what took place that day, the legal and media backlash was

significant. The real question I wish to pose is what are the “big picture” consequences for the United

States’ heavy use of private military contractors to supplement our own fighting force? Why aren’t we

satisfied with solely using our army, to fight our war, for our country?

Before we can answer these questions we must first examine: What is military contracting? By

definition military contracting is the use of a private company to provide military staff, services or goods

under a contract. Defense contracting has been used in one form or another since the Civil War when
companies were contracted to produce weapons for the Union, but defense contracting as we know it

today started at the turn of the 19 th century when Allan Pinkerton started his private detective agency in

Chicago which eventually became Pinkerton and Burns. Pinkerton and Burns molded their company to

compensate for the Cold War by “adding services to protect against domestic and foreign terrorism,

sabotage, and executive ransom kidnapping in North and South America”.(Weiss.6) Wackenhut

Corporation joined Pinkerton and Burns in 1954. Wackenhut was and former FBI agent, and was

convinced that there was money to be made in providing private security services at the state, federal,

and municipal governments in the 1970’s,

With the help of the law firm of Florida’s Senator George A. Smathers,

Wackenhut found a legal loophole to circumvent the 1893 Pinkerton Act prohibiting

detective agency employees from obtaining private security contracts with the federal

government by creating a wholly owned subsidiary that did not employ “detectives”,

merely “guards”.(Weiss.7)

and thus started the boom of private security contracting. However, many people still have the

perception that military contracting and mercenarism are the same thing. This is a drastic

misconception. Just like the United States Military is not solely consisted of Infantry troops, military

contractors provide a broad range of services; “hired guns” only making up a small portion of this. For

instance, these contracting companies offer an array of services such as: Direct combat, Intelligence

Services, Training, Security in conflicting zones, Consulting and planning, Maintenance and technical

assistance, Operational and logistical support, and Post conflict reconstruction. These jobs fall under

three overhead categories as defined by the Department of Defense: theater support, external support,

and system’s support. Theater support is defined as “recurring services, to include equipment repair,

security, minor construction and intelligence services. (Terry. 661) External support are awarded by
commands outside of “combatant commands involved in the operations such as Defense Logistics

Agency and Army Corps of Engineers, negotiate and award contracts for supplies and services,

respectively, to forces at their forward deployed locations”. (Terry.661) System support contracts

“provide technical and logistics support to maintain weapons and systems”. (Terry.661)

So why do we use military contracting in the first place? As stated by Katherine E. McCoy

“Governments turn to PMC’s for a variety of economic, strategic, and political reasons. These can

include the reduced administrative burden on the government that comes with outsourcing, the

presumably lower economic costs of privatization, the desire to over-come deficiencies (or temporarily

boost capability) in states’ own military forces, and policy makers preferences for military solutions with

the lowest possible political impact.” ( ArmedForcesSociety 36(4). 676)

In other words, private contractors do not present as large of a bulk cost on the state, because

they are not paying the entire bill for the contractors paychecks. In the United State military, the

government pays for the housing, health insurance, and lively-hoods of all of its soldiers, as well as the

costs of the bases, training, weapons, and all other equipment. In a military contracting corporation, the

corporation is paying the hired personnel, and because the corporation has multiple contracts with

multiple different sources. Thus all the different contract sources are sharing the cost of one “army”, as

opposed to each paying the entirety for their own.

In addition to the cost benefit, governments use military contractors to “supplement (or

temporarily boost capability) in states’ own military”. Obviously this can mean a host of things. For

instance, this could simply imply that the states’ own military is short-handed to complete the present

task and simply needs more “boots on the ground” for support. However, “boosting capability” could

also imply helping the military do things it normally could not achieve on its own. Such as in the case of

the private military corporation Vinnell Corporation, a company which was involved in military and
intelligence operations in South-East Asia between 1965-1975. There were more than 5,000 Vinnell

Corporation personnel in country at the height of the Vietnam War. This fighting force was described by

a Pentagon official as “our own little mercenary army in Vietnam…We used them to do things we either

didn’t have the manpower to do ourselves, or because of legal problems.”(WarOnWant.6) Private

military contractors do not have to follow the same Rules of Engagement or other legal restraints that

apply to the United States Armed Forces. Thus as we can see in this example, the United States can used

a private fighting force to skirt around these legal barriers.

Finally the government uses private military contractors to produce a military solution with the

“lowest possible political impact”. This “impact” could represent a host of things from defense budget

impact to the impact of public opinion. As I will later discuss, the majority of military contractors are not

American, but actually from countries like Columbia, or the host nation in which the conflict is taking

place. Therefore this creates a kind of detachment between the public and the violence in theater. In

other words, the government knows the American people are going to be exceptionally more emotional

if a convoy of their own sons, husbands, and fathers getting attacked as opposed to a convoy of

Columbians. This takes a lot of pressure off the government from left-wing supporters and the portion of

the general public who are opposed to the war. The military contractors are not as immediately “visible”

to the public, because it is not the United States military performing an operation, or accidentally

running over an IED, it is a contractor, and contractors wear corporate emblems on their uniforms not

flags. Hence the left hand literally doesn’t see what the right hand is doing.

Less cost, less rules, less of our own guys in danger, sounds like the winning ticket, so what could

possibly go wrong with private defense contractors? Sadly, the answer is: a lot. Private military

contracting is seriously lacking in: Unit cohesion, salary equality, employment in general, codes of
conduct and engagement, representation under the defense budget, motives, and

cooperation/communication with the U.S. Armed Forces in theater.

First, unit cohesion, this is the bond and level of efficiency in which a unit of soldiers work

together. In the United States’ Armed Forces, military units spend months at a time training and doing

exercises together in and out of the field before deployment to build unit cohesion. They become as

close as a second family until working together through various tasks becomes almost instinctive. Much

emphasis is put on the Chain of Command and communication within the unit. However, in private

military corporations this is not always the case. As stated by Katherine E. McCoy: “The emphasis on

flexible, short-term labor means that PMC’s have little incentive to invest in extensive training or

socialization of their employees. Yet in traditional notions of civil-military relations, these investments

are key to cultivating a disciplined and cohesive force. While many PMCs advertise some on-the-job

training, overall the industry tends not to offer extensive training and socializations but to rely instead

on the previous military training that their employees received in the public sector (i.e., as former

military or police officers).”(McCoy.681) As in any “team” environment, it does not matter how good

your players are if they don’t know how to play together, thus this type of training preparation method,

or lack thereof, leaves a lot to be desired in the hope for top performance. Additionally, as I mentioned

earlier, the employees consist of a scattering of different nationalities and cultural backgrounds.

Approximately 60-65 percent of the employees are composed of locals from the host country;

approximately 10 percent are from the United Stated or Britain, and the remaining 25-30 percent are

from neither sending nor receiving countries.(McCoy.767) This causes some obvious problems with unit

cohesion in situations where any of those three groups is not literate in the language of the other two.

As one statement notes:

 “If different languages are used, the fog of battle is significantly increased…Further, and

soldier or security officer who does not know of changes in mission orders as the fight

continues is more likely to respond incorrectly, unnecessarily placing them in harm’s

way and increasing the chances of unit fratricide. Poor tactical communications make

mission failure highly probable.” (McCoy.681)

It is also stated that

“Multiple U.S. government reports have pointed to the existence of significant language

barriers between employees working on the same contract as a problem for effective

security. American and South Asian contractors working in Afghanistan report having to

pantomime to one another to communicate across language barriers.(McCoy.681)

Hence, we can see the problem with trying to cultivate proper unit cohesion in this type of highly

globalized work force without proper and extensive unit training.

The high globalization in private military contractors also breeds a highly stratified payroll. In a

study taken in 2006, the payroll results for private military corporation security guard salaries was

staggering, with the American and British employees earning between $10,000-15,000 per month, as

opposed to the$1,000-3,000 per month made by the Chileans and Columbians for the same job. That is

as much as ten times as much for the same job. The higher end of this payroll however is highly

attractive to currently enlisted U.S. military personnel. A congressional report estimated that an ex-

military security contractor working for Blackwater USA (now Xe) makes approximately six times what

their enlisted equivalent earns.(McCoy.683)This intense stratification among the defense contracting

corporations leads to much angst and animosity between the classes of pay grade, which obviously also

results in deteriorated unit cohesion.

 Globality also poses a third problem for private military contractors, for there is not

international database into which they can log into and perform a simple criminal background check on

potential employees. Some countries have laws in place which prohibit releasing an individual’s criminal

records to a third party, such as a private corporation, while other countries simply don’t compile the

data at a national level at all. This creates a barrier for the employer; for it prevents them from knowing

if or to what extent the person they are hiring has criminal tendencies. Even better to go along with the

lack of previous criminal history knowledge, is the lack of a uniformed code of conduct for all private

military contractors. Since each company is a corporation of its own, each company has its own unique

set of rules and standards, as well as degrees to which they adhere to and enforce them. This problem is

worsened by the practice of subcontracting. Subcontracting is defined as:

“When an individual or a company is involved in a large-scale project, a contractor is

often hired to see that the work is done. The contractor, however, rarely does all the

work. The work that remains is performed by subcontractors, who are under contract to

the contractor, who is usually designated the general or prime contractor. Subcontractors

may, in turn, hire their own subcontractors to do part of the work that they have

contracted to perform.” (USLegal.com)

Therefore the United States Department of Defense may award a contract to a large, well know group

like DynCorp with good a reputation and standards comparable to their own military. However, once the

contract is awarded those contractors may subcontract to smaller, perhaps less upstanding companies,

who then have the freedom to subcontract even farther, thus ensuring no level of conduct or

performance directly to the United State government. For instance, the corporation ArmorGroup was

put under investigation after a “Lord of the Flies” like atmosphere was observed at their post guarding

the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. This display was said by watchdog group Project on Government Oversight to
involve “serious and continual hazing, public drunkenness and nudity, and failure of workers to perform

basic duties or of supervisors to exercise leadership”.(McCoy.678) I would like to point out that type of

behavior in the United States military would most likely result in a Court Martial, Dishonorable

Discharge, or at the very least, push-ups until muscle failure and indefinite latrine duty. Bottom line: It

would never be tolerated.

Also there is always the question of cooperation and communication between these private

corporations and the military they are supposed to be supplementing. Over the course of my research I

came across a very disheartening answer to this question in the form of previous U.S. Army Lieutenant

Colonel Paul Christopher’s account titled Ambush and Aftermath: Contractors and Bureaucracy on the

Interagency Battlefield. His story begins with him finding out that an ambush has occurred on one of the

convoys for which his contracting company had the responsibility of providing security. A goose chase

ensues trying to locate the wounded, dead, and the trucks. The some survivors were found at a nearby

military base confined to rooms and interrogated. Several of the Iraqi drivers, along with three of the

convoy trucks were found quarantined at another logistics base without food, water, or sleep. Worse

yet however were the charred bodies of two Iraqi drivers whom had been so badly disfigured they were

mistaken for Americans, and their remains were shipped back stateside to a morgue in Maryland. The

ambush took place in August; the remains were not returned to the Iraqi families fourteen months later.

LTC Christopher also goes on to describe a latter situation in which he and a convoy were

delivering ammunition to a U.S. military base in central Iraq. They arrived but were prohibited to enter,

even though they presented U.S. military I.D. cards because the base commander prohibited non-

military vehicles to enter the base. After sitting outside the gate for several hours the lame duck

ammunitions truck drew insurgents like a rotting carcass, and the convoy began to take fire. The base

promptly went into lock down, thus locking the convoy and their ammunition out of the base. Convoy
personnel could have been injured or killed and the ammunition would likely have been confiscated by

the insurgents the use against the U.S. military had the convoy not promptly wheeled around and

quickly gotten out of Dodge. However, had the private logistics and convoy security companies

communicated more effectively with the base and base commander the entire situation undoubtedly

could have been avoided.

Finally I would like to call into question what I feel is the largest problem with private military

contractors and corporations: motives. It is one thing for a country to create and build up its own

military for the purposes of defense again foreign and domestic enemies. It is another thing entirely to

allow a world in which giant global corporate armies-for-hire are rising up to fight and profit from wars

between countries. These corporations are massive as well as extremely lucrative, and they thrive on

global conflict. In a perfect world, if global conflict could be eliminated, these corporations would go

bankrupt because there would simply no longer be a need for them. Thus it makes me question if peace

is the antithesis of their job security, what are they fighting for? As Henry C.K. Liu states:

“Private security companies have no financial incentive to promote peace and

stability…The dependence of the state on their contracted services gives them an

influential voice in formulating state policies. Security threat is big business and any

reduction in threats in fact threatens the economy.” Liu (2005c)

In other words, the private security market thrives on supply and demand just like any other

market. The only difference is that the PMC market thrives on insecurity, so stockholders in these

companies are not going to benefit from them creating any kind of situation of lasting peace overall. In

addition, I have been mainly concentrating on “in theater” contractors, but the same reliance is true

right here in our own country with contracts such as equipment production. As stated in Rebecca U.

Thorpe’s findings:
 I find that while defense industry headquarters receive a bulk the bulk of the

prime contract dollars, my focus on a secondary stage in the contracting process- as

opposed to previous academic work-uncovers a striking pattern of defense projects

flowing to economically reliant districts.(Thorpe.638)

Sadly, these areas are as Thorpe suggested “reliant” on defense contracts for employment. So

what happens to a company which makes parts for a defense contract in rural Middleofnowhere, USA

if/when peace time comes around and there is no longer a demand for those parts like there was in war

time? The company must either find a way to convert over to producing something else, or shut down.

We were warned of this almost 50 years ago in President Eisenhower’s farewell speech:

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms

industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political,

even spiritual – is felt in every city, every State house, every office of the Federal

government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not

fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all

involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must

guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by

the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power

exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our

liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and

knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and

military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and

liberty may prosper together.( Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower,

1960, p. 1035- 1040 )

 In conclusion, I do not feel that private military contracting corporations are a force our country

should heavily rely on. There are enlisted personnel in our own military who have signed up to fight in

defense of our country but are on or qualify for food stamps because they don’t make enough to

support their families. I feel that at least a portion of the Defense and State Department budgets

currently being used for defense contracting should be used more towards the pursuit of peace, and the

well-being of the men and women from our own country who have volunteered their entire lives to fight

for our country.

Bibliography

 Contractors and Bureaucracy on the Interagency Battlefield. Paul Christopher. Military

Review; Jan/Fed 2010;90, 1; Military Module pg 117

 Privatizing Defense Support Operations: The Need to Improve DoD’s Oversight and

Management. James P. Terry. Armed Forces & Society 2010 36; 660

 The Role of Economic Reliance in Defense Procurement Contracting. Rebecca U.

Thorpe. American Politics Research 2010 38:636

 Corporate Mercenaries: The threat of private military and security companies. Louise

Richards. War on Want

 Beyond Civil-Military Relations: Reflections on Civilian Control of a Private,

Multinational Workforce. Katherine E. McCoy. Armed Forces & Society 2010 36:671

 From Cowboy Detectives to Soldiers of Fortune: Private Security Contracting and Its

Contradictions on the New Frontiers of Capitalist Expansion. Robert P. Weiss. Social

Justice Vol. 34, Nos. 3-4 (2007-08)