Multipolarism

While the economic and military superiority of the United States will not vanish in the 21st
century, the rise of a number of other states and non-state actors is creating a more "multi-polar"
world with multiple centers of power and influence. Two clusters seem poised to be especially
consequential: what Goldman Sachs calls the "BRIC" nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China,
who together represent 40 percent of the world's population, and whose combined economies by
2040 are projected to be larger than those of the United States or Europe; and an emerging "Shi'a
axis" from the Mediterranean to Central Asia, in which Iran will play a leadership role.

Globalist Perspective > Global Diplomacy

Pax Americana or Primus Inter Pares?

By Leon T. Hadar | Friday, July 13, 2007

Many countries view the United States either as the bully or policeman of the world. But after
Iraq, the government has lost the support of its citizens and its allies. As Leon Hadar explains, in
light of recent experiences, even the most ambitious U.S. policymaker should shed any notions
of global hegemony — and accept being first among equals in the global community.
irror, mirror on the wall, who is the biggest superpower of all?” That is the question being asked
by foreign policy pundits in Washington, D.C., these days, as they ponder the impact of the U.S.
military quagmire in the Middle East on the global position of the United States.

The cover of a recent issue of The Economist, the British magazine that has always been bullish
on U.S. power — it considers the United States to be the successor to the British Empire — is
quite simple: “Still No. 1” it reads, next to a drawing of Uncle Sam standing in the boxing arena
and ready to punch again despite his (minor) injuries.

Hobbled hegemon

The magazine calls the United States a “hobbled” hegemon and concludes that while the
problems in Iraq may have weakened the United States, it is still likely to remain the “dominant
There is a huge gap between the pundits' conception of U.S. national interest and the one shared
by the general public.

superpower.”

Much of the support for the America-Is-Still-Number-One thesis — which not surprisingly is
also very popular among members of the foreign policy establishment in Washington is based on
numbers. After all, who really wants to be a member of an elite in charge of a declining power?
The United States has the largest and most advanced economy — and the largest and most
powerful military. Even those who are doing a lot of cheerleading for China these days agree that
that country will not become the world’s largest economy before 2050 — and even that
proposition is very “iffy.”

No challengers

And no one expects any of the United States' potential global rivals (the European Union,
Russia, China and India) to overspend the United States on defense and overtake it in the
military sphere any time soon. It just ain’t gonna happen.
And notwithstanding the advances that the Chinese, Indians and the Europeans are making in
science and technology, the United States' open and dynamic free-market economy — as well as
its impressive elite universities and research institutions — help it to maintain its status as the
world’s center of scientific and technological creativity.

U.S.-led wars

It can therefore be accepted as an axiom that there is no great power — or even a combination of
powers — that is ready to challenge the United States for global supremacy at this time in
Given the Iraq experience, the American people are no longer ready to provide their government
with the money and the manpower it needs to secure its hegemonic position.

history.

At the same time, one cannot deny that the U.S.-led wars in the "Arc of Instability" — ranging
from the Middle East to South Asia, including Iraq and Afghanistan — have overstretched the
U.S. armed forces. In fact, it has reached a point at which the United States would find it very
costly, if not impossible, to fight and win other military conflicts.

Indeed, one does not have to be a military expert to figure out that the decisions by North Korea
and Iran to challenge the United States over the nuclear issue reflected their conclusion that the
U.S. Army and Marines are not ready to fight in a ground war and do regime change à la Iraq in
other parts of the world.

Global cop

In order to maintain its position as a global cop by responding 24/7 to 911 international calls,
oust “rogue regimes,” fight wars in several areas of conflict and deploy hundreds of thousands of
troops to conduct counter-insurgency and do “nation building,” the United States would have to
recruit many more soldiers.

However, given the Iraq experience, the American people are no longer ready to provide their
government with the money and the manpower it needs to secure its hegemonic position.

Domestic discontent

Meanwhile, there are pundits who suggest that “if only” the Bush Administration had done this
(deploying more troops)
If anything, costly interventions like the war in Iraq are only helping to erode the U.S. public's
willingness to support military engagements abroad.

or that (doing more planning for the occupation), the United States would have been marching
towards victory in Iraq.

What has undeniably emerged on this front is the huge gap between the pundits' conception of
U.S. national interest (that the United States has the right and the obligation to use its power to
achieve “regime changes” and do “nation building”) — and the one shared by the general public.
The latter believes it has the right and the obligation to use its power to respond to a clear and
present danger to its security — and preferably through short and relatively cheap wars).

Costly interventions
If anything, costly interventions like the war in Iraq are only helping to erode the U.S. public’s
willingness to support military engagements abroad and increase isolationist sentiments at home.
At the same time, the failure in Iraq is also making it more difficult for the United States to win
support from likely allies — while playing into the hands of potential rivals. Ultimately, it is the
application of the law of diminishing returns in the use of military power by a great power.

Few allies

If one moves beyond the point of conducting a war of necessity and becomes engaged in a war
of choice, rising
It has become more difficult for the United States to win support from likely allies — while
playing into the hands of potential rivals.
costs in terms of casualties and money weaken the ability of the great power to maintain its
dominant status.
The emerging consensus on the war in Iraq in Washington assumes that, even under the best-
case scenario, the Americans would have no choice but to withdraw most of their troops from
Iraq — while perhaps keeping a small number of troops in isolated military bases to provide
limited support and training for the Iraqi forces.
More likely, the United States will have to redeploy its troops from Iraq and protect its interests
in the Persian Gulf through a quick reaction force and over-the-horizon presence of the U.S.
military.

Protecting U.S. interests

Moreover, Washington would need to work in tandem with other regional actors, including Iran
and Syria, and other global powers to maintain the stability in the Persian Gulf and the entire
Middle East.
And if the United States wants other global powers to share in the burden of policing the Middle
East and other parts of the world, it would need to share the process of decision-making with
them.

Giving up the driver's seat

It cannot continue to occupy the driver’s seat and ask the Europeans, Russians or Chinese to help
in navigating from points A to point B and to check the tires and to change the
The notion of U.S. monopoly in the international system will be replaced with the concept of
oligopoly.

oil.

These powers are going to demand to have more of a say on where points A and B are — and
perhaps even insist on occupying the driver’s seat when it comes to their spheres of influence:
China in East Asia, Russia in its “near abroad” — and Europe in the Middle East.
In fact, Washington has an interest in encouraging the Europeans to play a more activist
diplomatic and military role in the Middle East — so as to discourage them from continuing to
do “free riding” on U.S. power in that region.

Still Number One

All in all, while the United States will probably remain Number One for quite a while, it is
becoming clear that domestic resistance and rising global challenges will make it more and more
difficult for Washington to secure its military hegemony on its own.
As a consequence, the notion of a U.S. monopoly in the international system will be replaced
with the concept of oligopoly.

Monopoly to oligopoly

The choice that Washington will face in the aftermath of Iraq is between continuing to strive for
strategic dominance in a way that has ignited more opposition at home and resistance abroad —
or working together with other powers to contain threats to the international system.
In that case, the United States will still be first among equals (or primus inter pares) — which is
the next best thing to being Number One.

What China and India Could Do Together

By Wendy Dobson | Wednesday, December 01, 2010

Despite thousands of years of relative peace, the scars from China and India’s 1962 border war
still remain. However, political and economic ties are strengthening — despite China's close
relationship with India's main rival, Pakistan. Wendy Dobson, author of “Gravity Shift,”
discusses the bright spots in the evolving bilateral relationship.
hina and India have a shared history, now largely forgotten, of exchange and mutual learning
that came to an end when Turkic and Afghan invaders arrived from the northwest around a
thousand years ago.
In the 20th century, the two countries have been deeply mistrustful of each other, and the bitter
border war in 1962 still scars Indians' memories.
China's nuclear capabilities and its patronage of Pakistan have been a source of major anxiety for
India.
The bilateral economic relationship warmed after the Cold War ended, when both governments
began to see the potential mutual benefits of growing economic interdependence.
These warming ties are also efforts to offset mutual suspicions of each other's strategic intents.
China resists India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council and in regional forums,
such as the East Asia Summit and trans-Pacific and Europe-Asia forums, that might elevate India
to peer or rival status in the region.
China's nuclear capabilities and its patronage of Pakistan have been a source of major anxiety for
India. They were the catalyst for the latter's decision to embark on its own costly nuclear
weapons program in the 1990s — and to seek closer cooperation with Japan and the United
States.
The United States and China have clashed repeatedly over China's assistance to Pakistan's
strategic programs, which some see as the central obstacle to better relations between China and
India.
Within this strategic context, economic cooperation is gaining momentum — a joint working
group already oversees the bureaucratic planning and implementation of closer cooperation.
India's IT successes have impressed the Chinese. India's increasingly liberal economic policies
and liberal politics provide a potential counterexample to China's liberal economic policies and
autocratic politics.
Other governments expect that China-India relations will be a significant factor in the Asian
region — and that cooperation and competition, but not confrontation, will characterize the
bilateral relationship.

China resists India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

One of the most interesting future economic possibilities is a bilateral free trade agreement —
indeed, the two countries have been studying the possibility since 2005.
Two-way trade has been growing since then at annual rates of about 46%, reaching $25 billion in
2007 and $38 billion in 2008. If growth continues at that rate, total trade between the two
countries could reach $200 billion by 2015, roughly the size of China and Japan's total trade in
2005.

The problem is that the balance of this trade is strongly in China's favor.

Economic ties are also deepening through the activities of the two countries' international firms,
which are seeking out investment and other opportunities in each country. Indian software
companies such as Wipro, TCS and Infosys are investing in China to serve their global clients
there.
Others are marketing software solutions to increase the efficiency of Chinese manufacturers and
to take advantage of Chinese skills in chip design. Still others are using China as an offshore
design center for business in Japan.
Meanwhile, Chinese multinationals such as Huawei Technologies are investing in India. In 2007
India's Reliance Communications outsourced to Huawei the expansion of its huge, next-
generation mobile phone network deep into rural India.
U.S.-based multinationals such as IBM and GE are also locating business units in both countries,
where they are developing the complementary talents of Chinese and Indian workers and knitting
them closely together.

India's increasingly liberal economic policies and liberal politics provide a counterexample to
China's liberal economic policies and autocratic politics.

Looking to the future, a comprehensive free trade agreement between China and India — one
that has a robust period in which to phase in the reduction of barriers and few sectoral exceptions
— would set the important example that an Asian free trade agreement can have economic, not
just foreign policy, benefits.
A full-fledged China-India free trade agreement is possible by 2030. The strategic potential of
such an agreement would reach far beyond its obvious bilateral benefits if it allowed other
countries in the neighborhood to join. This would solve a conundrum that faces the Asian region.

U.S.-China Relations: Gone Fishin’

By Banning Garrett | Wednesday, November 24, 2010

While the United States might not always agree with China's methods, there is no denying that
the two countries will have to work together on a variety of issues in the coming decades. The
leaders of both nations need to ask some critical questions about how they will collaborate and
what it will mean for each country, writes the Atlantic Council's Banning Garrett.

hen I was about eight years old, my father took me fishing in a stream a few miles from our
ranch in California. After a long day, we came up dry. Dad saw I was disappointed, so he pulled
into a fish farm on the way home. I eagerly dropped my line into a pond roiling with trout. Bingo
— in less than 30 seconds, I had hooked a fish! And then another and another.
At first I was excited at my instant success. But soon I realized there was little skill involved and
it was just too easy. We never went back. I preferred plying the open streams hoping for an
occasional bite even though it was much harder and required far more patience.
We may not have much time to fish in the depleting stream of potential cooperation. The United
States and China now seem caught in an eddy of deepening suspicion of each other’s intentions.

Criticizing China is as easy as landing a rainbow trout at the fish farm. What’s not to dislike?
China does so many things that are lamentable, if not outrageous, to Western sensibilities.

The list ranges from human rights violations, threats to Taiwan and repression in Tibet and
Xinjiang, to the increasingly assertive actions of its ever-modernizing military and “indigenous
innovation” policies that tilt the playing field against foreign competitors. The fact that China is
governed by an opaque, one-party regime obscured by secrecy only bolsters sinister Western
interpretations of China's intentions and ambitions.

Voicing our concerns about our policy differences is essential as we continue to struggle with
China on a wide range of bilateral and international issues. But we also must try to keep the
larger strategic picture in the forefront and try to land the elusive “big one” — a more
cooperative U.S.-China relationship to deal with the great strategic challenges of the 21st
century.

While China and the United States will always be reluctant partners at best, leaders of both
countries have acknowledged that we are in the same boat when it comes to critical 21st century
challenges.

We are compelled to pull together to maintain a growing and stable global economy, mitigate
climate change and adapt to its effects, ensure energy security and transition to a global, low-
carbon economy, move to more sustainable economic models as resource scarcities loom as
billions of people seek to join the global middle class — and combat terrorism, proliferation,
piracy, international crime, pandemics, failing states and a host of other non-traditional threats.

This summer's unprecedented heat and forest fires in Russia and the massive, destructive floods
in Pakistan may be the most recent warning signs that global warming is already altering our
planet’s climate, causing extreme weather and other first-order effects that will have cascading
impacts on virtually all countries.

In the United States, there is growing anxiety about the pace of shifting power and a range of
Chinese behaviors that are perceived as Beijing seeking to challenge a wide range of U.S.
interests.

The implications for the global economy, societies and governments and the security of nations
and peoples are potentially destabilizing and even catastrophic.

The United States and China — the two largest economic powers — will not be immune from
the impact of climate change. Nor, as the biggest energy consumers and producers of greenhouse
gases, will they escape blame from the rest of the world if they fail to act and to cooperate.

In the United States, there is growing anxiety about the pace of shifting power and a range of
Chinese behaviors that are perceived as Beijing seeking to challenge a wide range of U.S.
interests.

The Chinese leadership, for its part, and especially elements of the People’s Liberation Army, is
flush with a sense of their country’s rapidly rising power, which has been turbo-boosted in the
last two years by its superior performance in the global financial crisis.
Beijing seems to be emphasizing narrow national interests and making a new push to gain
recognition for an expanding list of “core interests” which now apparently includes China’s
territorial claims in the South China Sea. The Chinese seem reluctant to place a priority on their
“core interests” in ensuring their prosperity and security by cooperating with other nations,
especially the United States, on long-term global challenges and threats.

We should ask what the prospects are for human civilization in this century as well as for
American and Chinese interests if the United States and China do not cooperate on global
challenges — and even more ominously, if they have a highly competitive and antagonistic
relationship, much less engage in actual military conflict.

China and the United States will always be reluctant partners at best.

We may not have much time to fish in the depleting stream of potential cooperation. The United
States and China need to change course soon. The two giants now seem caught in an eddy of
deepening suspicion of each other’s intentions — despite the stated conviction of the leaders of
both countries that they need to work together.

There needs to be a new effort on both sides of the Pacific to craft a long-term relationship that
can deliver cooperation amidst continuing differences. Chinese and American leaders need to
begin by asking four critical questions:

If we stay on the current course, where will the U.S.-China relationship be in ten years?

Will this relationship be adequate to meet the strategic challenges that both countries and the
world will be facing in 2020 and beyond?
If not, what kind of relationship do the United States and China need to build to meet their
strategic needs?

If we need a more cooperative relationship to meet common strategic challenges, how do we get
there from here?

Even if American and Chinese leaders can agree that they need to change the vectors that are
currently driving the United States and China down divergent paths and move toward greater
collaboration and cooperation to meet long-term challenges, putting this into practice will require
wisdom, political will and reigning in those within their respective governments that oppose
cooperation behind a more coherent and farsighted strategy.

Can Presidents Hu and Obama go fishing together for the big one? We know it won’t be an easy
catch.

China's New Doctrine: Mental Power for Uncertain Times

By Yamei Shen | Monday, November 22, 2010

Hard power? Soft power, Joe Nye-style? Smart power, as preferred by Hillary Clinton and
her policy planning chief, Anne-Marie Slaughter? All for naught in the context of U.S.-
Chinese relations, argues the China Institute of International Studies’ Yamei Shen.

As the Greek philosopher Aristotle remarked in his work on Politics, a big state enjoys glory
and majesty, while a small state enjoys freedom and dignity. Each and every nation — no
matter what size — acts on the world stage under the shadow of her mental power.
She can be delighted or discontent, joyful or anxious, subject to a "mood" — depending
whether the perceived halo of glory is adored or whether the basic claim to dignity is
respected. And the "mood," in reverse, affects how she interprets and responds to
situations.

Mental power, in the context of Sino-U.S. relations, refers to the ability of both countries to
show restraint on emotional impulses and maintain a relatively stable mind-set in getting
along with each other.

The key component of "mental power" is to make the willingness and determination to
pursue an established foreign strategy. By definition, it is a branch of "soft power,"
reflecting the courage and confidence of a country in sticking to its chosen path when
confronting obstacles on the road ahead.

Both China and the United States hold characteristic mental attitudes on world affairs,
derived from their unique cultural traditions. At this juncture, instead of harnessing "smart
power" and sending out mixed signals regarding each other’s strategic intentions, what the
two countries need most is to build strategic trust in a relatively stable and predictable
manner.

Therefore, the willingness and determination to resolve disputes and to build trust between
the two countries, rooted in a strong conviction in peace and cooperation on both sides,
rather than any other transient sentiments, is exactly the mental power that is needed.

Some geopolitical analysts, such as professor Stephan Walt, Dominic Tierney and Michael
Freedman, proceeding from empirical knowledge of the historical tragedy of Great Power
politics, tend to feel the urge to be pessimistic. As a result, they interpret the path of Sino-
U.S. relations as one destined for structural or ideological conflict between the two.

In contrast, I would suggest paying more attention to the healing effect of mental power in
handling U.S.-Sino relations. If we followed that route, we would witness how the conviction
in peace and belief in a strong and mature partnership can grow to be self-sustaining. This,
in turn, helps to put things back on track — even after a slip astray.

In retrospect, the year 2010 unfolded in a series of mutual bickering. Tensions went
especially high on issues such as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the hosting of the Dalai Lama,
allegations against China’s cyberspace policy, the value of the renminbi and China’s South
China Sea claim.

And yet, as the end of the year approaches, the picture for 2011 seems a bit rosy. Both
sides are engaged in preparing a warm atmosphere for the upcoming visit by President Hu
Jintao to the United States. The intention is to keep tensions in check and avoid an
escalation, which helps to heal the wounds toward each other accumulated so far.

A "pendulum effect," is attributed to such recurring cycles of development in Sino-U.S.

relations. However, even though the trajectory of warming up and cooling down in bilateral
relations may seem to repeat itself, changes in the underlying theme are sneaking their way
up, and the healing effect of mental power needs to be unleashed further.

In appreciating the mental power interaction in U.S.-Sino relations, it is important to look at

the relationship through two prisms — the international prism and the soft-power prism.

Sino-U.S. relations are not restricted to a bilateral framework at all. In a broader sense, it
represents a new pattern of correlation between the emerging powers (including China,
India and Brazil) and the traditional western powers (such as the United States, Britain and
Japan).
In handling bilateral relations, the two leaderships find no escape from international
flashpoints. Regional conflicts are perpetuating. Traditional and non-traditional security
threats remain intertwined.

The shadow of the financial crisis lingers on. And the gap between the Global North and the
Global South continues to widen. No country can afford to act alone — and the sensible way
out is to walk a cooperative path.

The soft-power prism underscores the fundamental difference as to where China is standing
now vis-à-vis where the United States stood 200 years ago. In the early days of the 19th
century, the United States closed the door of the whole American continent to outsiders
under the banner of the “Monroe Doctrine.” The American Century, too, was unveiled with
the breakout of the Spanish-American War.

In the world of today, that historical sense of blind obsession with military power can no
longer be justified. Pursuing instruments of war as a matter of state policy has for the most
part been abandoned ever since the world collected itself from the ashes of two world wars.

Looking ahead, nobody will find easy access to arms when all peace-loving peoples of the
world have weaved a web of international laws and institutions for the common good.

Essentially, soft power, including a firm belief in peace and development and the choice of
wise diplomacy, far eclipses the strength of any type of coercive power.

The key to healing wounds with a strong sense of mental power and inner discipline is to
examine oneself first, put oneself into the other’s shoes, build mutual trust and bear in mind
consistently a broader picture of world peace and prosperity.

For over 300 years, ever since the Westphalia system was established, it has been the
privilege of several Anglo-Saxon white men — men like Woodrow Wilson and Theodore and
Franklin Roosevelt — to rewrite the world map with a quill pen. That has now become a
thing of the past.

It is just natural that the United States might feel embarrassed, disappointed or offended
when it no longer held the single most important and final say in international affairs. For
that same reason it is understandable, too, that the United States would sometimes
overreact to China.

Conversely, China, by trusting the United States' ability to face the music and ultimately to
pursue a desire for peace, needs to show wisdom and tolerance toward this spoiled boy who
has so far hesitated to share its toys with neighbors, and it needs to wait for him to mature
a bit.

In the same way, China — as a newcomer in the international system — is still on a learning
curve. With its rise on the world stage comes a larger share of international responsibility.
China in recent years has made its due contribution to regional security arrangements, the
international fight against pirates and international humanitarian assistance, etc.

Out of inexperience with the increasingly heavy weight she is carrying, China may feel that
the expectations loaded down on her from the outside — in terms of assuming responsibility
— exceed her ability. It may sometimes appear unwilling to be pressured beyond the limit.

What is important is for the United States and others in the west to refrain from any
premature judgment suspecting any ill Chinese “strategic intention.” Otherwise, a self-
fulfilling prophecy would become the real danger.
In conclusion, I would like to quote an ancient Chinese poem composed by Su Shi in the
Song Dynasty, dating back nearly 1,000 years ago. It reads as follows:

If we say nice melody flows from the zither,

Then why it remains silent in the box?

If it is the finger making the music,

Then why we cannot hear the sound from the finger?

In short, applying the poem to global affairs, it takes two to tango.

The major changes the world is undergoing have given new impetus to U.S.-Sino relations.
China and the United States both need to reserve some buffer room within, so as to being
able to accommodate each other’s occasionally sentimental torrents in a reliable fashion.

If the healing effect of mental power were applied to Sino-U.S. irritants, a smooth process
of mutual adaptation and trust-building would be facilitated. In this sense, by steering the
Sino-U.S. relations toward a higher degree of maturity, we shall not allow ourselves to be
carried away in time of success, and not be broken down in time of crisis.

BORIS MARTYNOV

MULTIPOLAR OR MULTI-CIVILIZATIONAL WORLD?

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Today the generally accepted opinion is that the global issues of the present cannot be
resolved by a single, even the strongest, country in the world, or by synergetic efforts of a
limited number of major countries. The prospect of global cooperation within the framework of a
multipolar world is viewed by many as an imperative which can guarantee the survival of
mankind on our planet. However, one has to recognize that the multipolar world is not a well-
established reality, and the concept of multipolarism has not yet been developed either in the
academic, or, a fortiori, practical aspect. It entails a number of quite relevant questions, and is a
target of criticism both of those interested in upholding the hegemony of the sole superpower and
of those countries and nations which fear to become again (as under “classic multipolarism”
before the First World War) passive victims of manipulation from the “five” or “ten” of new
“great powers”. The message of the article is not only the need to corroborate that the multipolar
world order has no alternative, but also the need to identify common values in the multipolarism
doctrine of such culturally different and distant countries as Russia and Latin American nations.

The idea of building a multipolar world and maintaining relations in the global system on
the basis of actual diversity has been gaining importance in Russian foreign policy
approximately since the mid-1990s1. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of
2000 incorporates the provision that Russia will continue to seek formation of the multipolar
system of international relations which actually reflects the multifaceted nature of the
contemporary world with the diversity of its interests. It also points out that the guarantee of
effectiveness and reliability of this world order is mutual consideration of national interests, and
that the world order of the 21st century must be based on the mechanisms of collective decisions
on the key issues, on the precedence of law (italics added. – B.M.) and wide democratization of
international relations2.
 Viewing the “emerging multipolarism” as one of the “fundamental tendencies of
contemporary development”, the 2008 version of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian
Federation stated “the growing role, due to objective factors, of multipolar diplomacy,
international institutions and mechanisms in global policy and economy, as a result of growing
independence of States and the need to make global development more manageable”. It also
reiterated Russia’s ambition “to seek the strengthening of principles of multipolarism in
international affairs, development of an architecture of international relations that would be
based on the recognition by the international community of the principles of security
indivisibility in the modern world and would reflect its diversity”. Besides, the establishment of
a fair and democratic world order based on collective principles of resolving international issues
and on the supremacy of the international law was once again delineated as the strategic
guideline of foreign policy3.
Can the “emerging multipolarism” be seen as a feature of the current moment of history?
Certainly, if one does not try to pass the desirable for reality. What is “multipolarism”, and why
is it a fortiori better than what has been already known in history: bipolarity and unipolarity?
Many professional politicians who often use this term prefer to remain hostage of mass
stereotypes. Nevertheless, the designated task of Russia’s active participation in building a
multipolar world demands a more in-depth analysis of the given doctrine which, like any other
theory, has its advantages and weaknesses. On top of that, keeping in mind the recognition of
cultural and civilization diversity of the contemporary world4, such analysis is needed in order to
identify the attitude of the key world civilizations with regard to this doctrine.
So far, a comprehensive academic research of the doctrine of multipolarity has not been
translated into the practical plane. Moreover, as it was correctly noticed by Tatyana Shakleina,
“the advocacy of the concept of a polycentric (multipolar) world without elucidation of details of
such system, its advantages and flaws both for the world in general and individual large
countries in particular, without reaching consensus among the leading world countries on how
the collective management can be materialized, without the recognition by all its participants of
the need for concerted interaction and reasonable competition – will disallow success”5.
The idea of a multipolar world is not new. In fact, the logic of multipolarity took shape
long before the First World War. The decade that immediately preceded the war was
characterized by a quite fragile “balance of forces” between the great powers: Britain, Germany,
France, USA, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Japan. Alexey Bogaturov points out as follows:
“Multipolarity is characterized by an approximate comparability of aggregate concurrent
opportunities for several world countries neither of which enjoys a distinct superiority over
others. Roughly, this structure of international relations existed in Europe of the 19th century
when major European countries were jealously watching each other, prohibiting individual
strengthening to the degree when a united coalition of the rest would a fortiori disallow the
superiority of a contender trying to pull away”6.
Despite a “nearly academic” (according to George F.Kennan) nature of the European
balance of forces which owes its origin to Bismark, a single spark, a shot in Saraevo was enough
to let out the long-accumulated internal differences among the participants of the system. Today,
the inability of multipolarity of the early 20th century to prevent the world to drift to the
nightmare of an all-out war becomes almost the key argument for the scientists, primarily
American (Zb. Bzhezinsky, Ch. Krauthammer, R. Keohane), who see the guarantee of global
security either in the “benevolent hegemonism” of the strongest participant of the system, or in
the bipolar “peace responsibility sharing” by the two strongest states (K. Waltz, J. Meersheimer).
In 1993 one of the patriarchs of American political science Kenneth Walts wrote that the
multipolar world was very stable but at the same time, unfortunately, too prone to war7.
This reasoning has one evident flaw. The authors are somehow reluctant to analyze the
distinctions of the “classic” multipolarity from the one which is currently emerging, thus limiting
themselves to a simple and spectacular, but quite superficial comparison of the two systems.
 The ‘Bismark system” in Europe had a number of specific features, which, in my opinion,
are entirely different from the currently emerging multipolarity. First, it was a closed-off and
elitist system as it was restricted to a number of developed countries of Europe, the United States
and Japan. Second, it existed in the environment when the war, according to the then effective
international law, was still recognized as a legitimate instrument of settling international disputes
and conflicts. It is equally important that the “classic system” existed without a powerful
deterrent. After the Second World War the role of such deterrent came to be played by nuclear
weapons. However, precisely the nuclear arms in many ways prevented the “cold war” from
turning into a “hot war”, and allowed mankind to survive despite an abundance of crises (two
Berlin, one Korean, Suez, Caribbean etc.), which by far exceeded the Saraevo crisis in their
conflict potential.
Finally, the most important aspect. The “Bismark system” incorporated different countries
with varying state systems and sometimes completely opposying state interests. However, they
all (save Japan) belonged to the same Western Christian civilization and, competing or feuding
with each other, as a rule, acted as a united front in their relations with the shapeless,
inadequately shaped or obviously weak in the state-legal, economic and military-political aspects
“non-Western” civilizations – China, India, African and Latin American countries. Today, when
we talk about a “multipolar world”, before all, we imply an emerging inter-civilization
communication not so much of individual countries but of the whole regions or, in a broader
sense, communication of different races, cultures and models of socio-economic development.
This paradigm is entirely different from the multipolarity of the early 20th century.
The emerging multipolarity includes both additional opportunities of cooperation and new,
still barely known loads and risks, as the notion of “inter-civilization communication” also
presupposed the “new generation” crises and conflicts. The Foreign Policy Concept of the
Russian Federation of 2008 stresses that for the first time in the current history the global
competition acquires a civilization dimension, which implies competition between different
value reference points and development patterns within the framework of universal principles of
democracy and market economy8. As to the latter, there are possible value, cultural and other
nuances, which were identified by the international practice of the last twenty years. In
particular, the global economic crisis demonstrated the futility of discussions on “universal
principles of market economy” in the countries which tried to make those principles
unconditional for all and everyone on the planet.
In this respect one can remember an interesting theory of “pluralist unipolarity” proposed
by Alexey Bogaturov in the early 1990s. He spoke of the “change of nature”, “measured
pluralism” of the unipolar US leadership in the world, treating the US not as the sole leader, but
the one in a “tight circle of countries of G7”9, i.e. in fact, as a leader of a unified Western
civilization10.” It allowed the author to presume that the unipolarity of the “moderated type”
would be less harsh in its impact on the outer world than a hegemony of one state, the US.
Upon September 11, 2001 and in its aftermath the discussions on inter-civilization
interaction took on the spirit of gloom prophesy. It seemed that the prognostication of Samuel
P.Huntington on the “clash of civilizations” began to come true. More sophisticated public
became fully aware of the connection between globalization as an eradication of information and
cultural distinctions among different human communities and a protest of “traditional” societies,
for example, Muslims or American Indians against the imposed alien behavioral stereotypes11.
A legitimate question is whether mankind pins too much hope on the concept of multipolarity
with no guarantees that a new multipolarity of the 21st century would not be any worse than all
those systems experienced by the humanity in its relatively recent history – “classic”
multipolarity, bipolarity, “underdeveloped” (or “pluralist”) unipolarity? Before answering the
question, one has to take a closer look at all the aforementioned systems versus each other.

2
 In the first decade of the new century one could notice a burst of nostalgia for the times of
bipolarity, long ago sunk into oblivion, which was branded “the long peace” by J.L. Gaddis who
actually coined the term. The most demanded authors became those who warned the world as
early as at the peak of euphoria of the “end of history” against difficult ramifications of the
destruction of the global world order established after 1945. For instance, just remember the
statement of professor J.Meersheimer made in 1990 that one beautiful day we shall regret the
lost order which, thanks to the “cold war”, replaced chaos in international relations12.
He insisted that the bipolar system had a more peaceful character because its protagonists
were only two major nations. Moreover, under the given system, as a rule, the great powers
demand loyalty from smaller countries, which, in all probability, leads to the establishment of
rigid allied structures. Hence, smaller states are protected not only from the attacks of an
opposing country but also from one another. Consequently, a bipolar system has only one dyad
(pair) that can generate a war. A multipolar system has a greater flexibility and incorporates a
variety of such dyads. Therefore, with other factors being equal, the statistic probability of a war
in a multipolar model is higher than in a bipolar system. It is generally accepted that in a
multipolar world the armed conflicts involving smaller countries alone, or just one major state
are not so devastating as a collision between two major states. However, smaller wars can always
grow into major wars13.
The specifics of the bipolar confrontation of 1945–1991 were far more diversified than the
rigid scheme suggested by J. Meersheimer in an attempt to explain it. For instance, one cannot
disregard the fact that by the end of the “cold war” the world has practically turned into a tri-
polar model, keeping in mind the global role of China which materialized in the multifaceted
interaction within the USSR-USA-PRC triangular and an actual risk of a full-fledged war
between the Soviet Union and China. At the same time, the “intra-system” wars (China-Vietnam,
Ethiopian-Somali, British-Argentina) were not entirely ruled out. Besides, the “loyalty of smaller
countries” was quite relative, bearing in mind that in a number of instances the behavior of East
Germany, Cuba and Vietnam towards the USSR, or that of France and Israel towards the United
States could be well viewed as “quasi-loyal”.
Emphasizing the merits of bipolarity in ensuring the “long peace”, J.L. Gaddis admitted
that to a large extent the peace was a result of a mere coincidence. In his summary review of the
results of the “cold war” he wrote that it could have been much worse, and everything could
have been entirely different. He concluded that the “cold war” ended with the victory of the right
side14.
The doctrine of the “rightness of the US victory” was immediately used by the part of US
ruling elite who viewed “benevolent hegemonism” as the lesser evil as compared to the
hegemony of the “club of the chosen” or to a bipolar balance of forces. Both Democrats and
Republicans were engaged in the doctrine promotion campaign (Zb. Bzhezinsky, Ch.
Krauthammer, R. Kagan, W. Kristol). Their views were comprehensively enough discussed in
Russian and foreign literature15, so there is no need to dwell on the issue any longer. Probably,
the most representative was the statement of Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State in the
Democratic Administration of Bill Clinton, who substantiated the necessity of the US global
leadership by a more strategic vision of the situation by the Americans16.
Practical results of “benevolent hegemonism” turned out to be so deplorable that even one
of the renowned pillars of the neoconservative school of thought, R. Kagan, had to acknowledge
in 2008 that today’s world looked more like the 19th century than the end of the 20th. He then
added that those who thought it was good news had to remember that the 19th century had ended
in a less positive result than the epoch of the “cold war”17. Evidently, the message of the past
events is that while claiming the role of the leader of a unipolar world, the US was physically
and morally unprepared to bear the burden of such leadership. As a result, the American model
of “freedom-democracy” (which initially seemed to be universally acceptable) stumbled into
incomprehension and rejection not only in the countries of different civilization systems than the
US (Middle East, Latin America, Russia) but also in the countries where the model had been
initially “doomed” to success (countries of the so-called “older Europe”).

In my opinion, the new emerging multipolarity cannot be anything but civilization

multipolarity. One has to emphasize that the inter-civilization communication is already a reality
of today’s world where different economic and financial institutions, non-government entities,
religious, business, public associations and, finally, individuals maintain constant multifaceted
and multilevel international contacts of all kinds as representatives of their civilization
archetypes, both in their own capacity or alongside their respective state authorities.
Meanwhile, one has to agree that the development of international communication among
civilization poles of the modern world at the macrolevel is supplemented by the polarization of
values at the microlevel. It is confirmed by a different attitude of individuals of different
civilization archetypes to the in-depth perception of the universal issues on the mankind agenda
(terrorism, fight against poverty and social inequality, nuclear arms non-proliferation, ecology
etc.). As a rule, there are no differences in the superficial (“statement”) perception of the
problem per se. Consequently, the calls made at high international levels (the UN etc.) “to
combat terrorism”, “to prevent proliferation of MDW”, “to eradicate social and economic
inequality”, “to preserve environment” etc. often hang in midair. Many instruments devised to
resolve global issues turn out to be “insipid”, because their authors either deliberately neglect
their substance in order to keep up appearances (agreement of opinion) or because of a special
approach to those issues. For instance, what is the actual value of such a document as the OAS
Anti-Terrorism Convention of 2003 where international terrorism was branded as “evil”?
However, it neither pinpointed the cause of “evil” nor identified those who could be classified as
“wrongdoers”. For instance, how can one enforce the universal compliance with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty while the power politics pursued by the US suggest to the “threshold”
countries that possession of nuclear arms is the only guarantee against outer interference into
their internal affairs?
Against this backdrop the phenomenon of “targeting” gains special importance (under the
principle of facilitation of civilization contact). Obviously, the absence of a distinctly
pronounced center in one of the most influential and thriving civilizations of the modern world,
i.e. Islamic, complicates the system of inter-civilization interaction, while it does not revoke the
necessity to establish one. At the same time, over the recent years one could notice growing
interaction along the lines of “kindred” civilizations, in particular, between Christian Orthodox
(Russia) and Christian Catholic civilizations. It manifested itself in an original “discovery” of
Latin America by Russia in 2005–2008, and to a less degree, in traditionally more constructive
relations between Russia and Catholic countries of “older Europe” (France, Italy, Spain, partially
Germany) than the relationship with the Anglo-Saxon world, for example.
Though Russia’s animation towards Latin America became “in many respects an
unexpected breakthrough in Russian foreign policy”18, apart from the geopolitical grounds, it
was based on a sufficiently deep moral, legal and civilization foundation. Isn’t it a paradox
noticed by the MGIMO researchers, that in 2008-early 2009 the Russian foreign policy displayed
a fairly high efficiency “especially where the available resources of influence are relatively
modest”, primarily on the Latin American vector and inside the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia,
India and China)19? Maybe, one should pose a more general question: probably, our
understanding of the “resources of influence” is somewhat outdated, and needs adjustment?
Talking about “influence” and international image of our country, people traditionally consider
economic, political and, finally, military factors, forgetting that the emotional and psychological
similarity of different nations and cultures, their general perceptions of justice, morals and law
can yield an equally substantial “image effect”.
 If there is an advantage of a multipolar world order over unipolar or bipolar systems, it is
the prerequisite that it must be based on the law. Brute force does not need the law which is
intended to check it with reason. The accuracy of this observation is obvious in the example of
the unipolar world which lived up to the rules of the main player of the global system. It is also
applicable to bipolarity where each of the two “equally responsible” entities seeks to get a “free
hand” in its area of influence disrespecting any international law. As a rule, the latter is used not
for the intended application, but to discredit the opponent’s position in the global war with the
“zero sum game”. However, the interaction of several equal players of approximately
comparable might and influence needs the law in order to ensure a reasonable modus vivendi. It
is even more applicable to such sophisticated system as civilization multipolarity. Its
functionality will directly depend on the attitude of the main players of the system to
international law.
The experience of Russia’s interaction with the Anglo-Saxon nations confirms former and
current substantial differences in value perception of such seemingly universal notions as
“security”, “partnership”, “sovereignty”, “democracy”, “human rights”, “terrorism”. The same
applies to the appreciation of the role of international law as a demiurge of the world politics,
which is advocated by the Russian diplomacy both at the theoretical and practical levels in the
context of multipolar strategy. After the 2008 events in the Caucasus Russia has become ever
more focused on strengthening and perfecting legal fundamentals of international relations. The
importance is being attached to streamlining active interaction with the participants of the global
system whose attitude to international law can be at least qualified as respectful.
Apart from the geopolitical considerations, the Russian discovery of Latin America of the
recent years was accounted for by the fact that the stance of Russia and the majority of Latin
American states on the most urgent political issues of the world are either close, or coincide.
This already trite expression has become commonplace in the political language also because
Russia and Latin American states regard international law as a natural pillar of the multipolar
world order. The basis of our rapprochement is shared legal understanding of such problems as
formation of the multipolar world, consolidation of the UN prestige, establishment and support
of the regional security systems, fight against international terrorism, “old” and “new” threats to
international cooperation, elaboration of non-discriminatory conditions of international trade and
many others.
Historically developed special attitude of Latin Americans to international law20
corresponds to the key imperatives of our times. It disallowed the Latin American approval of
the US and NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and bomb raids in Kosovo in 1999. The
majority of the states refused to recognize the legitimacy of the US and its allies’ invasion in
Iraq. The Latin American interpretation of such an urgent problem as international terrorism
merits special attention. Two years before the 9/11 attack, the White Book of the National
Defense of Chile stated that the “boom of Islamic fundamentalism” can be a ramification of the
attempted and forced global cultivation of the consumption and cultural standards of one and
only civilization, i.e. Western21. All countries of the region subscribe to the idea of the necessity
to build a multipolar world, and are trying to implement the idea in their everyday policy.

***

Talking about civilizations as potential parties of the system of inter-civilization

interaction, one has to avoid a simplistic approach. Many things look different in practice than in
theory. In a more detailed assessment of the stance of the Russian Federation and leading Latin
American countries one can trace a certain difference of approach. The political culture of Latin
American countries, which continue to think about themselves in the context of the “poor” (and
now more and more “rising”) South, is in contrast with the Russian culture which is traditionally
used to perceive the world order through the prysm of interaction of the “developed North”
triangle (US-EU-Japan). Russia is also actively trying to squeeze itself into this triangular
framework (but not always welcome by our Western partners). This is the reason of certain
nuances of Latin American position on the issues of UN reforming, G8 enlargement, revision of
the WTO entry rules. However, keeping in mind that Russia is seeking to restructure the global
and regional systems of political and economic security on the basis of international law
provisions, evidently, certain seemingly inviolable stereotypes will have to be revised. In the
environment of a global economic (and moral) crisis at stake is the choice of preferential partners
in ensuring a long-term strategy of development. One has to answer a question traditionally
difficult for Russia: which party it is siding with: the ascending East (where today one can
attribute Latin America through many value, cultural and ethical indicators), or with the West
featuring the signs of the “descending” development?

Notes

1 We tend to agree with the opinion of A.D.Bogaturov that the unipolar world existed for about
a decade, since signing of the Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship in
Washington in June 1992, till the beginning of the war in Iraq in 2003. It coincides with the
conclusion of the “Review of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” of 2007 that the
“myth of a unipolar world has finally collapsed in Iraq” (http://
www.mid.ru./brp_4.nsf/sps/690A2BAF968B1FA4). The first practical attempts to pursue the
Russian “multipolar” foreign policy could be seen in the 1997 Latin American tour of the then
Russian Foreign Minister Ye.M.Primakov when he signed a number of documents on “strategic
partnership” with several leading countries of the region.
2 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Moscow, June 28, 2000. // System
History of International Relations of 1918-2003 / Edited by A.D.Bogaturov. Volume 4.
Documents. Moscow. 2004. P. 538-539.
3 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of July 12, 2008. (http://kremlin.ru/
text/docs/2008/07204108.shtml).
4 Ibid.
5 Shakleina T. “Order after Georgia” or “Order under Obama”? // International Processes.
2008. No. 3. P. 7.
6 Bogaturov A.D., Kosolapov N.A., Khrustalev M.A. Features of Theory and Application
Study of International Relations. Moscow. 2003. P. 284.
7 Waltz, K. The Emerging Structure of International Politics // International Security. Vol. 18.
No. 2. 1993. P. 321.
8 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of July 12, 2008.
9 Bogaturov A.D. Features of Theory… P. 168, 291
10 Ibid.
111 In this connection it would be interesting to refer to the White Book of the National
Defense of Chile of 1998 (i.e. three years before the terrorist attacks in New York and
Washington!). In this document the “boom” of Islamic fundamentalism is directly attributed to
the protest of traditional societies against the pressure of Western lifestyle and culture under
globalism (Book of the National Defense of Chile. Ministerio de Defensa, 1998. P. 34).
12 Meersheimer J. Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. // Russia in Global Politics. 2008.
No. 6. P. 9.
13 Ibid. P.12.
14 Gaddis J.L. The Cold War. London. 2007. P. ix, 266.
15 See, e.g., Fucuyama F. After the Neocons. America at the Crossroads. London. 2006.
16 Fucuyama F. Op. cit. P. 194.
17 Keigan R. The Paradigm of 9/11. // Russia in Global Politics. 2008. No.6. P. 120.
18 The Potential of International Influence and the Efficiency of Russian Foreign Policy (2008-
early 2009). Analytical Report. MGIMO (U) of MFA RF. Moscow. 2009. P. 92.
 19 Ibid. P. 94.
20 One has to point out the Latin American lead in working out a large number of instruments,
methods and means of the peaceful settlement of international disputes: from negotiations and
“good offices” to shuttle diplomacy, mediation and arbitration, their contribution into
consolidation of the universal principles of international law – equality, non-interference and
territorial integrity. Latin American countries introduced the principle of diplomatic asylum into
international practices, worked out a number of important innovations in the maritime law,
pioneered the establishment of the first nuclear-free zone (1967). See further: Problems of Latin
America and International Law. Two volumes (Moscow. 1995).
21 Book of the National Defense of Chile. Santiago de Chile. 1998. P. 34.

The Twilight of the Nation State

Ernesto Gallo

Researcher in Political Science at the Centre for Studies on Federalism based in Torino, Italy

Prem Shankar Jha

The Twilight of the Nation State: Globalisation, Chaos and War
London, Pluto Press, 2007
An impressive book. Prem Shankar Jha is a well-known Indian journalist and economist, with
academic experience in three continents, Asia, America and Europe. In this massive volume (374
pages) he sketches out an ambitious macrohistorical sociology of capitalism and the state, by
drawing on authors as diverse as Marx and Braudel, Schumpeter and Polanyi. He also provides a
detailed empirical analysis of the world economy of the last three decades. Furthermore, he relies
on two giant social scientists, Eric J. Hobsbawm and Giovanni Arrighi, whose main publications
have respectively been devoted to 'the short' and 'the long' twentieth century. How to reconcile
them?
Hobsbawm, an engaged Marxist historian, has expressed a deeply pessimistic opinion about the
fate of modern ideologies and the future of the capitalist system. In his view, despite the apparent
neoliberal victory, capitalism is undergoing a phase of increasing chaos and demise. A phase
whose roots can be traced back to the early 1970s. Arrighi, on the other hand, has proposed a
long-term history of 'cycles of accumulation', each of them driven by a new hegemonic power.
After the rise and fall of such hegemonic powers as Genoa, the Netherlands and Britain, the
1970s have heralded the early symptoms of the decline of the fourth world leader, the United
States, and the onset of a period of 'systemic chaos' which would end with the domination of a
fifth hegemonic power, possibly Japan or another East Asian country.
Is Arrighi right? To some degree. Certainly his theoretically-informed reconstruction of centuries
of economic history is an excellent starting-point. Certainly the early 1970s unveiled the signs of
crucial transformations. But it is not just about the demise of a hegemonic power and the surge
of the following one. A qualitative turn has occurred: the rise of 'global capitalism'. Jha
challenges several interpretations which are common in the mainstream economic literature. The
'end of the golden age' is no by-product of factors such as oil shocks, crises in productivity or
transformations in the relations of production. The core element which explains the onset of
turbulences and chaos has to be found in the genesis of truly global production processes, which
bring about de-localizations, breakdown of the welfare system in the 'developed' world and
disruptions in the newly-developing 'peripheries'. Such process has so far entailed painful
consequences in terms of continuous marginalization, exclusion and deprivation in both the rich
and poor regions of the world. Jha follows a clear-cut theoretical hypothesis and provides a
substantial amount of data to support it. So far we have, however, a thorough economic history;
but what about politics? What about the states?
Global capital requires a military arm. More precisely, a power capable of breaking down
boundaries and imposing liberal institutions and the free market, either by consent or by force.
Such a role so far has been played by the USA, and in a distinctively imperial fashion. This holds
true as far as both Democratic and Republican presidencies are concerned. Though Bush Jr and
his fellows have probably gone much beyond any sustainable hegemony, the seeds of the empire
can be traced back to Clinton's administration. How to explain otherwise the sequence of tragical
military undertakings, especially in Iraq and the Balkans? How to read otherwise several
declarations by Democratic officers, such as Madeleine Albright and Anthony Lake, who are still
playing a role in Washington's big game? Furthermore, Jha does not subscribe to Hardt and
Negri's understanding of empire. Instead of a blurred overarching constellation of corporations,
international organizations, agonizing nation-states and would-be global rulers (America), he
prefers referring to the 'empire' as the political and military arm of what he appropriately labels
'globalization'. Despite their different interpretations of what the 'empire' actually is, Hardt, Negri
and Jha share the analysis of the crisis of nation-states and of the strains put on them by the
dominance of transnational productive forces.
In political terms, Jha concludes by calling for 'a commonwealth' to deal with global concerns
and provide a minimum framework to address the tragical inequalities which are currently
shaking the world order. In his view, such commonwealth is needed urgently, in order to tackle
the American bid for world primacy and offer the US itself a channel through which to express
its interests. To this goal, the current redistribution of world power towards multipolarism
(especially in the light of the rise of the Asian powers) seems to offer a possible framework. The
'global commonwealth' should be based on consent - so, according to such perspective Jha comes
close to a federalist interpretation.
From a scientific viewpoint, one might object that his combination of different approaches is not
always consistent. Cyclical theories are usually rather mechanistic, and the interplay between 'the
economic' and 'the political' in 'the long twentieth century' is far from being clear. An
interpretation of capitalism based on the modes of production and their inherent social relations
could be heuristically more fruitful. The most interesting legacy of Braudel and Arrighi's thought
is, however, the idea of a 'container': that is, capitalistic relations are embedded in political
institutions which contain them, serve their purposes and change over time according to the
changing size of the markets. The most appropriate 'container' of global capitalism must
therefore be a 'global polity', like the commonwealth he is referring to in the last chapter. Such
an interesting idea could, though, be developed further, to both scientific and political aims. In
other words, Jha comes close to a kind of federalist vision, but does not work it out extensively.
Why is Jha's thick volume a worthwhile reading? Among many reasons, we can single out this
one: it's a challenging book. Challenging because, instead of providing simplistic and
fashionable hypotheses (such as the ones by Fukuyama and Huntington, which he briefly
discusses), he tries to combine various perspectives, draw on their insights and build a coherent
construction. Many passages would deserve deeper investigation, but a kind of overall theory
clearly emerges. Global capitalism, the rise of the US Leviathan and the lack of overarching
world institutions are the main aspects of the planet we are living in. Furthermore, Jha's book is
topical. 2008 is an important year. The USA and Russia choose their new presidents, while the
European countries have to ratify the Reform Treaty. Are the incoming younger leaders, from
Hillary Clinton to Obama, from Medvedev to Sarkozy himself, really aware of the turbulences
which the world might soon face? A final remark. In Jha's account Europe's role is rather
overlooked. Western scholarship has long been charged with 'Eurocentrism' - and with very good
reasons. However, Europe is not only composed of decaying nation-states or greedy
corporations. A transnational polity of decent European citizens is slowly emerging and looking
for political solutions other than the states we have been used to live in. Disregarding it would be
a mistake and possibly a real shame.