B. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
For these reasons, we hereby declare
1. THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs.COMELEC
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
To ensure order in running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were
delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key
government positions to represent the people. On this note, the theory on
deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make
government accountable. Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to
criticize acts made pursuant to governmental functions.
In the language of the declaration of principles of our Constitution, "The
Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article II).
Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic
because and solely because the people in it can be governed only by officials
whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes.
2. G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012
JAMAR M. KULAYAN vs.GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN
Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise
emergency powers, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers.
ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that
they are exercised by one president
Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President
is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only
be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or
prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the
"calling-out" powers constitutes a portion.
Indeed, while the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 39 of the
Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over
the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military
leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article
VII,Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and
administrative head of the armed forces.
The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of
military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power
to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally,
he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces
to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.40 As Commander-in-Chief,
he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces
placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he may
deem most effectual.41
That the power to call upon the armed forces is discretionary on the
president.
A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises
operational supervision over the police,50 and may exercise control only in
day-to-day operations, meaning, the usual duties being performed by the
ordinary policemen, will be under the supervision of the local executives.
iii. The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as
the President
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to
the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of the Local
Government Code.
3. RESTITUTO YNOT vs IAC G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive
Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626,
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions.
The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge
the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There
is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution
of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the
courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or violated.
Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly
meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they
are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
4. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS
RULING: Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which
is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution
itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to
the legislature for action.
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the
constitution.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall
be preferred.
And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently,
if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right,
such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from
which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is
a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission explains —
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers
not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our
race. Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage.
The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos.
This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos
should be given preference in the grant of concessions, privileges and rights
covering the national patrimony.
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to
those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT
mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the
common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice
has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" and a "qualified Filipino,"
the latter shall be chosen over the former."
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered
by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-
qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that
the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant
equity ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management
and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a
foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give
life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of
the basic law.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from
questioning the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from
the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless.
Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the
qualified Filipino fails to match the highest bid tendered by the foreign
entity. In the case, while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of
the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet
matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or
personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly,
only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the apparent
disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner’s matching bid did the latter have
a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard
unless perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the
Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other
ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of
judgment, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino people.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the
Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS will clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied
in the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future
legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. It is worth
emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish,
much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the
Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained
by the Constitution.
5. CONGRESSMAN JAMES L. CHIONGBIAN vs. HON. OSCAR M. ORBOS G.R.
No. 96754 June 22, 1995
RULING: The purpose for their creation was to promote "simplicity, economy
and efficiency in the government."4
As this Court observed in Abbas, "while the power to merge administrative
regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which
has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments." The regions
themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes."7
The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries8 which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor
General9 or as "administrative in nature."
There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in
conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions. The
question is whether Congress has provided a sufficient standard by which
the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power granted and
whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject
expressed in the title of the law.
The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition
or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of
facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the
President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services.
There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another
except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte,
which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.
6. LAO H. ICHONG, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business).
Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not
seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such
predominance may truly endanger the national interest.
We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens
retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and
powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in
the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or
emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property
subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential
enemy of the State.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted
country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure
of gain and profit.
These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the
national over the alien in the retail trade.
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was
enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens
and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls
within the scope of the police power of the State.
7. IBP vs.HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA
(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy
over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
The petition has no merit.
The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction nor did he commit a violation of the civilian supremacy
clause of the Constitution.
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to
exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The
President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when
no foreign foe appears on the horizon. xxx21
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom.
The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President’s wisdom or
substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits
or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion.
Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the
military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can
show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President’s
exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
The deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian supremacy
clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of the police force.
The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian
supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The
participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is
appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is
evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the
metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. It is noteworthy that the local
police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the
real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is
the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols.37
What we have here is mutual support and cooperation between the military
and civilian authorities, not derogation of civilian supremacy.
x x xWhen this concept is transplanted into the present legal context, we take
it to mean that military involvement, even when not expressly authorized by
the Constitution or a statute, does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act
unless it actually regulates, forbids or compels some conduct on the part of
those claiming relief. A mere threat of some future injury would be
insufficient. (emphasis supplied)
Even if the Court were to apply the above rigid standards to the present case
to determine whether there is permissible use of the military in civilian law
enforcement, the conclusion is inevitable that no violation of the civilian
supremacy clause in the Constitution is committed.
The conclusion is that there being no exercise of regulatory, proscriptive or
compulsory military power, the deployment of a handful of Philippine
Marines constitutes no impermissible use of military power for civilian law
enforcement.71
7. MAXIMO CALALANG v. A. D. WILLIAMS,
The petitioner avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe
upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The promotion
of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy
towards any given group.
Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi
est suprema lex.
Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity
of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to
the greatest number."
OPOSA vs. FACTORAN, JR
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS vs.SECRETARY ANGELO REYES
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal
standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen,
as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It
is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the
Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The
Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there
may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident
Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file
this petition.
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature,"89 Congress enacted the NIP AS Act to secure
the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals through the
establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected areas.
These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a
holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses
outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that
are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland,
or marine.90 It classifies and administers all the designated protected areas to
maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve
genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and
to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public
use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she
promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for violation of
Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI,
Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a valid appropriation.
I. Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent
domain, the several measures before us are challenged as violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses.
The decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive
agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true
freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not
only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and
from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude
will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It
will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff
of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep
despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling
future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities
and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are
SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein
petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only
upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are
retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under
P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under
the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA vs.SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES,
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the IPRA and its
Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the
powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law applicable to
the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.4
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land
on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of
these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale
development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of
any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs.PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI
COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity)
to disclose all facts on PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim portions
of Manila Bay.
"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner
can invoke the right. Requiring government officials to reveal their
deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-
making in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express
their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure
before they decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding
requires PEA to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to
information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation
of the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone,
disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its property. If PEA
fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this
information at any time during the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals
being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately
accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is
still on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the
bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its official
recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the
government. From this moment, the public's right to information attaches,
and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such
definite proposition.
Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986
Constitutional Commission understood that the right to
information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction."
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA
includes evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions,
minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached to
such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to
information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA.34 The right only affords
access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to
inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right must copy the records,
documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject
to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to
minimize disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when
and how to conduct the inspection and copying.35
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers.36 The right does not
also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law
enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused, which courts
have long recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to other
limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is
privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information
does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the
Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either
house of Congress,38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other
limitations on the right to information in several legislations.41
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA vs.CONTE MANGELIN
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall
have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous
Regions ..."
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when
the central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress."
At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to
"ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be
autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in
these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall
be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category
[CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic
act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of
"autonomy."
On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we
noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government).
If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter
sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the
same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only,
it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very
Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao
persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-
immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that
"[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions."
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national
legislation, policies, plans and programs.
AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY ("AKBAYAN"), v. THOMAS G. AQUINO
Petitioners seek to obtain from respondents the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) including the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all
pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people to information on matters
of public concern, which is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need
not show that they have any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general
public which possesses the right.9 As the present petition is anchored on the
right to information and petitioners are all suing in their capacity as citizens
and groups of citizens including petitioners-members of the House of
Representatives who additionally are suing in their capacity as such, the
standing of petitioners to file the present suit is grounded in jurisprudence.
The JPEPA is a matter of public concern
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet
the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine
of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Respondents' claim of privilege
The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is subject to
negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the exceptions to the
right of access to information on matters of public concern and policy of
public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive
privilege. Considering the status and nature of such documents then and
now, these are evidently covered by executive privilege consistent with
existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.
The ground relied upon by respondents is thus not simply that the
information sought involves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains
to diplomatic negotiations then in progress.
The Resolution went on to state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition
of decision which are inherent in executive action. Another essential
characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature.
Similar to the privilege for presidential communications, the diplomatic
negotiations privilege seeks, through the same means, to protect the
independence in decision-making of the President, particularly in its capacity
as "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations."
Whether the privilege applies only at certain stages of the negotiation
process
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting
national security and public order. x x x
Whether there is sufficient public interest to overcome the claim of
privilege
To clarify, there are at least two kinds of public interest that must be taken
into account. One is the presumed public interest in favor of keeping the
subject information confidential, which is the reason for the privilege in the
first place, and the other is the public interest in favor of disclosure, the
existence of which must be shown by the party asking for information.47
Petitioners have failed to present the strong and "sufficient showing of need"
referred to in the immediately cited cases. The arguments they proffer to
establish their entitlement to the subject documents fall short of this
standard.
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the
Constitution vests the same in the President, subject only to the
concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of the Senate.
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA vs.HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
B. Matters of Policy: THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE.
A POLITICAL QUESTION refers to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141
The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an issue
dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to
act upon.
The expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and its
effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the
political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of
this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature
or the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution."144
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between
the Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-
sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to
determine its distribution as political largesse."156
Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and
practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds,
primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective
participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government,
including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary
funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or
collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain
aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures
and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears
under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-
enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective
power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind
of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the
manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall delimit
the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
B. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON THE CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional
demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government.
To the legislative branch of government, through Congress,164belongs the
power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of
government, through the Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws.
Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere."167
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle
when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of
another.
This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in
them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive
department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go
into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA
as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more
any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of
the Executive.
Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture
when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President.
Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established
by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the
Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon
approval and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily
comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the
national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must "not concern it self with details for
implementation by the Executive."176
"From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional."177
It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still
exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances
that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘
role must be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure
allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any
constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference
and/or assumption of executive functions.
As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny
and investigation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among
others, the 2013 PDAF Article – "wrecks the assignment of responsibilities
between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual legislators
to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after
the GAA is passed."
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate
in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior
consultations186 or program menus187 – have been consistently accorded
post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded
through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations.
These post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
The fundamental rule,– from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191
That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does
not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.203
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which
merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of
funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the
actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the
multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation
law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without
a proper line-item which the President may veto.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article
II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which read as
follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the
policy of the State to empower local government units (LGUs) to develop and
ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy.
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel
goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their
judgments in utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees
with petitioners.
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council
and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its execution.
Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even
contributed to "further weakening infrastructure planning and coordination
efforts of the government."
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information
is to file a petition for mandamus.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto,
are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty
on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only
when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which,
together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast
powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative
acts void if violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99(Italics in the original)