Full Body Scanners,

Enhanced Pat-downs
and the role of Kavod
HaBriyos
By Rabbi Joshua Flug

For technical information regarding use of

.this document, press ctrl and click here
I. Introduction-
a. The term "human dignity" is used in a lot of different contexts. Some may argue for
human dignity in an end of life issue. Some might argue for human dignity in
treating prisoners properly and refraining from enhanced interrogation methods. The
list goes on and on. We have a term called kavod habriyos which can be loosely
translated as human dignity. The main discussion about kavod habriyos in the
Gemara involves cases where following halacha will place someone in an
embarrassing situation. For example, someone is walking in the public domain and
he realized that the only clothing he has on contains sha'atnez. Should kavod
habriyos be a factor in allowing this person to continue to wear the garment until he
can get to a location where he can comfortably change his clothing?
b. In recent weeks, the TSA has introduced new policies regarding screening
passengers. Depending on the airport, certain passengers are asked to enter a full
body scanner that allows a screener to see through one's clothes and detect any
incendiary devices one might be carrying. The screener actually sees a nude image of
the body. The passenger can opt out of a full body scan and receive an enhanced pat
down from a TSA agent. Many reports from passengers indicate that both the full
body scan and the enhanced pat down can be very intrusive and embarrassing. How
should one balance kavod habriyos and public safety?
c. R. Chaim Shmulevitz (1902-1979) has a mussar schmooze about kavod habriyos
where he provides a number of examples of acts of kavod habriyos in cases where
one would think that the person doesn't deserve kavod (e.g. Bilam). He notes that the
fact that the Gemara entertains violating all halacha to protect human dignity teaches
us the importance of kavod habriyos and the greatness of man. It is only because we
don't properly understand the greatness of man that we don't properly fulfill our
mandate of kavod habriyos. {} [Click here to access to entire sicha.]
II. The Role of Kavod haBriyos in Exempting one From Halachic Obligations
a. The Gemara states that if one is walking in the public domain and he realized that the
only clothing he has on contains sha'atnez, he must remove it immediately because
nothing can stand in the way of the Torah. {}
i. R. Elazar Azikri (Sefer Chareidim 1533-1600) writes that kavod habriyos (or
what the Yerushalmi calls kavod harabim) is a rabbinic mitzvah and therefore,
one cannot violate negative commandments to fulfill kavod habriyos. {}
ii. R. Yosef Teomim (P'ri Megadim 1727-1793) writes that kavod habriyos is a
biblical mitzvah. Yet, it still does not allow one to violate negative
commandments. {}
b. The Gemara states that although one cannot actively violate a Torah commandment to
protect human dignity, one can passively violate a commandment. {}
i. There is an important dispute among the Rishonim regarding this rule.
 1. Rambam (1138-1204) is of the opinion that if one sees another person
wearing sha'atnez, he must rip the clothing off of the other individual.
{}
2. Rabbeinu Asher (c. 1250-1327) disagrees and maintains that one only
has to remove one's own clothing. However, if informing someone
else about a violation will cause embarrassment, it is better to wait to
inform them in a private location. {}
3. R. Yechezkel Landa (1713-1793) suggests that the dispute between
Rambam and Rabbeinu Asher might be relevant to other situations
where informing someone about a violation will cause embarrassment,
such as the case of informing a husband that his wife had an affair. {}
ii. R. Elchanan Wasserman (1874-1941) presents two ways to understand why
one can passively allow a violation to happen when it conflicts with kavod
habriyos: {}
1. There is a conflict between the mitzvah and kavod habriyos and
therefore, the best solution is to remain passive. One cannot actively
violate a transgression, but one is not obligated to embarrass oneself in
order to actively fulfill a mitzvah. If one assumes this approach, the
critical factor is the method of violation or lack thereof that determines
when kavod habriyos trumps a mitzvah.
2. Failure to fulfill a mitzvah is not as severe as violation of a
transgression. Therefore, kavod habriyos trumps obligations to fulfill
mitzvos but not violations. According to this approach, the critical
factor is the severity of the violation.
c. The Gemara states that one can violate rabbinic prohibitions if it interferes with
kavod habriyos. {}
i. Rashi (1040-1105) implies that the reason why kavod habriyos trumps
rabbinic laws is that the rabbis never intended that their institutions should
cause someone embarrassment. Therefore, the gezeirah or takanah does not
apply. {}
ii. R. Avraham Erlanger (Maggid Shiur at Kol HaTorah) writes that one can
alternatively understand that there is an override of the rabbinic law when it
comes in conflict with kavod habriyos. He relates this to the question of
whether it is hutrah or dechuyah. {}
iii. There are times when poskim have been reluctant to allow kavod habriyos to
override a rabbinic law:
1. R. Ya'akov Yisrael Kanievski (the Steipler Rav 1899-1985) discusses
the permissibility of shaking hands with a member of the opposite sex.
The questioner suggested that perhaps it should be permissible to
 avoid embarrassment given that shaking hands is only a rabbinic
prohibition. The Steipler responded that kavod habriyos is only
applicable when must choose between two results, neither of which are
beneficial. Regarding shaking hands, the concern is that one will
desire the touch of the handshake and benefit from it. Therefore,
kavod habriyos cannot override the prohibition. {}
2. R. Moshe Feinstein (1895-1986) discusses the minhag of a husband
and wife refraining from passing items to one another while she is a
niddah. R. Moshe asserts that kavod habriyos is not a valid claim
because there is nothing to be embarrassed about. {}
III. Actively Embarrassing Someone for a Purpose
a. The Gemara derives from the story of Yehuda and Tamar that it is preferable to allow
oneself to be killed rather than embarrass someone publicly. Tamar had the
opportunity to vindicate herself by stating that she was impregnated by Yehuda.
However, instead she was prepared to have herself killed if Yehuda was not willing to
admit that he was the owner of the collateral that she took. {}
i. Tosafos ask: If embarrassing someone is ‫ יהרג ואל יעבר‬why isn't this on the list
of aveiros chamuros? Tosafos answer that the list only includes prohibitions
that are explicit in the Torah. Tosafos' answer implies that in fact,
embarrassing someone is ‫יהרג ואל יעבר‬. {}
ii. Rabbeinu Yonah (d. 1263) writes that it is ‫ יהרג ואל יעבר‬because it is ‫אבזרייהו‬
‫דרציחה‬. Just as activities that relate to arayos are ‫יהרג ואל יעבר‬, even if one
does not violate actual arayos, the same applies to publicly embarrassing
someone, which is a form of retzicha. {}
iii. R. Menachem Meiri (1249-1306) writes that the Gemara was not meant to be
taken literally and the rabbis are merely stressing the severity of embarrassing
someone. {}
b. R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (1910-1995) asks: if public embarrassment is equivalent
to murder, why don't we consider saving someone from embarrassment to be pikuach
nefesh and allow violation of Shabbos or other Torah law? He answers that even if
one assumes that one cannot embarrass someone else to save a life, that doesn't mean
that it is pikuach nefesh. Rather, saving a life is bound by certain rules and according
to Tosafos and Rabbeinu Yonah, embarrassing someone is not a valid means of
saving a life. Yet, because the individual doesn't actually die from embarrassment,
one cannot violate Torah law to save a life. Even rabbinic law is limited by the rules
of kavod habriyos [which does not allow someone to violate rabbinic law to prevent
another individual from embarrassing someone publicly.] {}
i. R. Shlomo Zalman highlights an important distinction between causing a
situation of embarrassment and getting out of an embarrassing situation.
Causing embarrassment is very severe and according to some Rishonim,
 should not even be employed to save a life. Getting out of an embarrassing
situation is the discussion in the Gemara about kavod habriyos.
c. Rambam writes that when rebuking someone, the first attempts should try to
minimize embarrassment as much as possible. If that does not work, one may even
embarrass the individual publicly for bein adam LaMakom violations. {}
i. R. Yosef Babad (1801-1874, Minchas Chinuch) suggests that there is no real
distinction between bein adam LaMakom and bein adam lachaveiro. Rambam
is merely stating the victim himself may not embarrass the violator as rebuke
for the violation. {}
ii. How is it possible that it is permissible to embarrass someone just to give
someone rebuke? Meiri writes that it is based on the principle in the Mishna
that embarrassment is contingent on intent to embarrass. {} When one intends
to rebuke and not embarrass, it is not as severe and the mitzvah of tochachah
overrides the prohibition. Meiri notes that one must be careful in determining
that the act is done for altruistic reasons. {}
iii. R. Avraham D. Wahrman (of Buchatch 1770-1840) suggests that there is no
prohibition against embarrassing someone if there is no intent to embarrass.
Even if the person was mistaken and embarrassed accidentally, the victim has
no claim against the "violator." {}
IV. Applications to Original Discussion
a. Kavod HaBriyos serves as an exemption from passive violations as well as rabbinic
laws. In both scenarios, the severity of public embarrassment may play a role.
b. The question of what mechanism is used to ignore rabbinic law is an important public
policy question.
i. If the rabbis didn't include it in the original gezeirah, this implies that in
theory, that have the right to do so in situations of need.
ii. If kavod habriyos is an override, it is possible that the rabbis cannot create an
institution that interferes with kavod habriyos.
iii. R. Naftali Z.Y. Berlin (The Netziv 1816-1893) writes that we do find a case
where the rabbis specifically instituted something knowing that it will affect
kavod habriyos. The case is burial on Yom Tov Sheni Shel Galuyos. The
rules of kavod habriyos (which Netziv applies to kavod hameis) should dictate
that one should be allowed to violate the rabbinically mandated holiday to
bury a corpse. However, because of the concern for denigrating Yom Tov
Sheni, the rabbis specifically allowed for the discretion to prohibit burial on
Yom Tov Sheni. This is true despite the kavod habriyos factor.{}
c. Public embarrassment is severe enough so that it as least arguable that one should not
embarrass people, even if the purpose is to protect them from danger. [I.e. one should
not use overly invasive procedures, even if it is to prevent a terrorist attack.]
d. Nevertheless, when one is conducting an activity that has an embarrassing outcome, it
is not the same as specifically intending to embarrass someone. Therefore, it is
arguable (based on Meiri and R. Wahrman) that the government has the right to
institute policies that might cause embarrassment since the purpose is to protect not to
embarrass.
 ‫‪ .5‬ברכות יט‪-:‬כ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ .1‬שיחת מוסר תשל"ב מאמר לו‬
‫נמצינו למדים עד כמה גדול כבוד הבריות‪,‬‬
‫מגדול שבגדולים על הפחות שבפחותים‪,‬‬
‫וגופי תורה נדחים מפניו‪ ,‬וכל כך למה?‬
‫ונראה שיסוד חומר כבוד הבריות וגדולתו‬
‫הוא משום שהאדם עצמו גדול מאד ולכן‬
‫כבודו חמור כל כך‪ ,‬אלא שאנו אין לנו‬
‫השגה בגדלות האדם‪ ,‬ולכן אנו תמהים על‬
‫כך‪.‬‬

‫‪ .2‬ברכות יט‪:‬‬

‫‪ .6‬רמב"ם הל' כלאים י‪:‬כט‬

‫‪ .3‬פירוש החרדים לירושלמי ג‪:‬א‬

‫‪ .4‬שושנת העמקים ריש כלל ו'‬

‫‪ .7‬רא"ש הלכות כלאי בגדים אות ו'‬

‫‪ .8‬שו"ת נודע ביהודה או"ח א‪:‬לה‬

 ‫‪ .12‬ברכת אברהם שבת צד‪.‬‬ ‫‪ .9‬קובץ ביאורים גיטין אות כו‬

‫‪ .13‬קריינא דאגרתא עמ' קעח‬

‫‪ .10‬ברכות יט‪:‬‬

‫‪ .11‬רש"י ברכות יט‪:‬‬

‫‪ .18‬בית הבחירה סוטה י‪:‬‬ ‫‪ .14‬אגרות משה יו"ד ב‪:‬עז‬

‫‪ .19‬מנחת שלמה א‪:‬ז‬

‫‪ .15‬בבא מציעא נט‪.‬‬

‫‪ .16‬סוטה י‪:‬‬

‫‪ .20‬רמב"ם הל' דעות ו‪:‬ח‬

‫‪ .17‬שערי תשובה ג‪:‬קלט‬

‫‪ .25‬העמק שאלה צד‪:‬ה‬ ‫‪ .21‬מנחת חינוך מצוה רמ‬

‫‪ .22‬מש' בבא קמא פו‪:‬‬

‫‪ .23‬בית הבחירה ב"ק צא‪.‬‬

‫‪ .24‬כסף הקדשים חו"מ תכ‪:‬לט‬

‫מ"ש בס' תכ שגם שהמבייש בדברים פטור מ"מ יש‬
‫עונש ע"ש נראה שאין זה כי כשעל פי הבחנת השומעי'‬
‫יש בדברים ההם סגנון אונאות דברים ונתכוון האומרם‬
‫כדי לבייש‪ .‬משא"כ כשהאומרם הי' סבור שאין‬
‫בדברים ההם בחינת בושה לפי השומעים‪ .‬או שהי'‬
‫סבור שכפי הנכון ראוי לו לומר דברים ההם שיש לו‬
‫מה שראוי לו לעשות קובלנא על חברו ולהרעים עליו‪.‬‬
‫גם שנודע שטעה בזה ואין לו שום צד תרעומת עליו‬
‫מ"מ כל השומעים מבחינים שהוא הלך בתומו או שהי'‬
‫אז מוטעה נראה שפטור מכלום‪.‬‬