CAYAT V. COMELEC
COMELEC
G.R. No. 163776
April 24, 2007
FACTS:
Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are
the only mayoralty candidates for the May
2004 elections in Buguias Benguet.
Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of
the COC of Cayat on the ground of
misrepresentation. Palileng argues that
Cayat misrepresents himself when he
declared in his COC that he is eligible to
run as mayor when in fact he is not
because he is serving probation after being
convicted for the offense of acts of
lasciviousness.
Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng
and Cayat filed a motion for
reconsideration. Such, MR was denied
because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee
and hence, it was declared final and
executory.
Despite this decision, Cayat was still
proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed
a petition for annulment of proclamation.
Comelec declared Palileng as the duly
elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the
duly elected vice mayor.
Bayacsan argues that he should be
declared as mayor because of the doctrine
of rejection of second placer.
ISSUE:
WON the rejection of second placer
doctrine is applicable.
HELD:
The doctrine cannot be applied in this case
because the disqualification of Cayat
became final and executory before the
elections and hence, there is only one
candidate to speak of.
The law expressly declares that a candidate
disqualified by final judgment before an
election cannot be voted for, and votes cast
for him shall not be counted. As such,
Palileng is the only candidate and the duly
elected mayor.
The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor,
regardless of his intervention in the present
case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayat’s disqualification
remained pending on election day, 10 May
2004, resulting in the presence of two
mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet
in the elections; and (2) the decision on
Cayat’s disqualification became final only
after the elections.
RIVERA III V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 167591
May 9, 2007
FACTS:
A petition for cancelation of the Certificate
of Candidacy of Marino Morales as
mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat,
Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was
filed on the ground the he already served
three consecutive terms in the office he
seeks to run.
Morales argues that this is not so because
although he really served in 1995-1998 (1st
term) and 2004-2007 (3rd term), he was
merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in
1998-2001(2nd term) because his election
was declared void by the RTC due to an
election protest.
Comelec ruled that Morales already served
his third term and after an MR was filed,
declared it final and executory on May 14,
2004.
ISSUE:
WON Morales had already served his 3
consecutive terms and if so, who should
take his position.
HELD:
For the three-term limit for elective local
government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit:
(1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three (3) consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and (2)
that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.
Here, Morales was elected for the term July
1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30,
2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in
the electoral protest case filed by petitioner
Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor.
Such circumstance does not constitute an
interruption in serving the full term.
Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer,
he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables
him "to stay on indefinitely".
With regard to the person who will replace
Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a
candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the
next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate
cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Since his disqualification became final and
executory after the elections, the candidate
having the second highest number of votes
cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the
petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony
Dee who should be declared as the mayor.
DELA TORRE V.
G.R. No. 121592
July 5, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was
disqualified from running as mayor of
Cavinti Laguna on the ground that he was
convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law.
He argues that he should not be
disqualified because he is serving probation
of his sentence and hence, the execution of
his judgment was suspended together with
all its legal consequences.
ISSUE:
WON Dela Torre is disqualified to run for
public office.
HELD:
Sec.40 of LGC provides:
Disqualifications.
The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment within two
(2) years after serving sentence;
Moral turopitude is considered as an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow
men, or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals.
In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by
the "fence" of the fact that property received
is stolen displays the same degree of
malicious deprivation of one's rightful
property as that which animated the
robbery or theft which, by their very nature,
are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence Dela
Torre is disqualified from seeking public
office.
With regard to his argument that he is
under probation, the court ruled that the
legal effect of probation is only to suspend
the execution of the sentence.
Dela Torre's conviction subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding
the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of
conviction in a criminal case ipso facto
attains finality when the accused applies for
probation, although it is not executory
pending resolution of the application for
probation.
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MERCADO V. MANZANO
G.R. No. 135083
May 26, 1999
FACTS:
Respondent Edu Manzano won as vice
mayor of Makati City in the May 1998
elections.
However, upon petition of a certain Ernesto
Mamaril, the COC of Manzano was
cancelled by Comelec on the ground that
he is a dual citizen.
ISSUE:
WON Manzano is eligible to be Makati VP
even if he is a dual citizen.
HELD:
Sec.40 of the LGC provides that persons
with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running any elective position.
However, the court ruled that dual
citizenship under Sec.40 must be
understood as dual allegiance. The former
arises when different laws of citizenship of
different countries are applied to a person
without any voluntary act (jus soli, jus
sanguinis) while the latter arises out of a
positive act of a person who simultaneously
owes loyalty to different countries.
To terminate the status of dual allegiance, it
must conform with the strict processes of
law while in dual citizenship, the mere
election of Philippine Citizenship upon filing
of the COC is sufficient to terminate the
previous status.
By declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.
VALLES V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 137000.
August 9, 2000
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez who was born on
May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother, ran for
governor of Davao Oriental.
Petitioner Cirilo Valles filed a petition for
disqualification against Lopez on the
ground that she is an Australian Citizen.
ISSUE:
WON Lopez is eligible to run as governor.
HELD:
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law, the laws effective at the time of
birth of Lopez before the 1935 Constitution,
her father is considered as Spanish subject
and a Filipino citizen. As such, she is also a
Filipino Citizen.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution has established the principle of
jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship, to wit:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of
foreign parents who, before the adoption of
this Constitution had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the
Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.
The principle of jus sangguinis has been
adopted also by the 1973 and 1987
Constitution. Hence, Lopez is a Filipino
citizen, having been born to a Filipino
father. The fact of her being born in
Australia is not tantamount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows
the principle of jus soli, then at most, private
respondent can also claim Australian
citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.
Also, the mere fact that Lopez was a holder
of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her
claim of Filipino citizenship. For
renunciation to effectively result in the loss
of citizenship, the same must be express.
COQUILLA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914
July 31, 2002
FACTS:
Petitioner Teodulo Coquilla is a Filipino
citizen who was naturalized as an American
Citizen after joining the US Navy.
He then applied for repatriation and on
Nov.2000, his application was approved
and he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines.
On Feb.2001, he filed his COC to run as a
mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar where he
stated that he has been residing in the
place for two years.
Another candidate Neil Alvarez filed a
petition for cancellation of the COC of
Coquilla but the Comelec failed to resolve
the issue so the petitioner later on was
declared the winner.
Alvarez argues that Coquilla has not
complied with the residency requirement for
the position of mayor.
ISSUE:
WON Coquilla complied with the residency
requirement.
HELD:
Although Coquilla was born and grew-up in
Oras, Eastern Samar, he is deemed to
have lost his residence together with his
citizenship when he was naturalized as
American citizen.
He is only deemed to have acquired his
citizenship and residence until his re-
acquisition of his Philippine citizenship
when he took oath on Nov.2000.
As such, when he filed his COC, he is
considered as resident of the place for a
few months and not two years as he stated
therein. Hence, his disqualification is valid
on the ground of misrepresentation.
Coquilla cannot invoke the ruling in
Bengzon v. HRET that upon repatriation, he
is deemed to have reacquired his original
status. This is because the issue here is his
false statement in his COC.
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JUSTIMBASTE V. BALDERIAN
G.R. No. 179413
November 28, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Pricila Justimbaste filed a
disqualification case against Rustico
Balderian, a mayoralty candidate in
Tabobtabob Leyte on the ground of material
misrepresentation in his COC and that he is
not a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner argues that Balderian’s real name
is CHU TECK SIAO but it was not the name
reflected in his COC.
Comelec denied the disqualification case
and Balderian won the election. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON Balderian committed
misrepresentation in his COC.
HELD:
The petition is without merit because SEC.
78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that cancellation of COC is allowed only if
any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false
Although the birth name of the respondent
is CHU TECK SIAO, there is already a
decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (JDRC) granting his
change of name to Rustico Balderian.
The use of a name other than that stated in
the certificate of birth is not a material
misrepresentation, as "material
misrepresentation" under Sec.78 refers to
"qualifications for elective office."
There was also no intent to deceive the
electorate as to private respondent’s
identity, nor that by using his Filipino name
the voting public was thereby deceived.
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of
candidacy. – The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is
announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang
Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to
represent; the political party to which he
belongs; civil status; his date of birth;
residence; his post office address for all
election purposes; his profession or
occupation; that he will support and defend
the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a
foreign country; that the obligation
assumed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts
stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge.
KARE V. COMELEC BORJA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 157526 G.R. No. 133495
April 28, 2004 September 3, 1998
FACTS: FACTS:
Salvador Moll and Avelino Ceriola are Respondent Jose Carpo is the vice-mayor
candidates for mayor in Malinao, Albay. of Pateros for a term ending June 1992.
When the mayor Cesar Borja died, Carpo
Ceriola filed a petition for disqualification became the mayor by operation of law.
against Moll on the ground that he was
previouslt sentenced by final judgment to In 1992, Carpo ran and elected as mayor
suffer the penalty of 6 months to 1 year and in 1998 he again filed his COC for re-
and 9 months for the crime of usurpation of election but petitioner Benjamin Borja Jr.
authority or official functions. contested it on the ground that he had
already served the three-consecutive term
Moll won the May 2001 election but on allowed by law.
March 2003, Comelec issued a resolution
disqualifying him from office and declared ISSUE:
Ceriola to be the mayor. WON Carpo has already served three
consecutive terms.
The vice-mayor Emiliana Kare filed a
petition to against the resolution on the part HELD:
of the proclamation of Cariola. She argues The contention of Borja is unmeritorious.
that she is the rightful successor the the
position of mayor. The three term limit of local officials must
be taken to the right to be elected and the
ISSUE: right to serve the same elective position.
WON the proclaimation of Ceriola is valid. Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive
HELD: terms but he must also be elected in the to
Moll argues that his judgment is not yet final the same position in the same number of
but since he was not able to seasonably file times before the disqualification can apply.
his MR, it did not stay the implementation of
the judgment. In this case, the first term of Carpo cannot
be included in the computation because he
On the issue of who should be the mayor, was not elected in that instance but rather
the court ruled that Comelec was wrong in only served the remaining term of the
proclaiming Ceriola because the resolution deceased mayor by virtue of operation of
disqualifying Moll took effect after the law.
election, that is on March 2003.
Comelec argued that under the OEC
Sec.24, “any vote cast in favor of a
candidate who has been disqualified by
final judgment shall be considered as stray
and shall not be counted but it shall not
invalidate the ballot." Moll, according to
Comelec, was disqualified when he was
convicted by final judgment long before the
election and so Ceriola is the lone
candidate in the election.
The court however disagrees. The court
said that it is clear that it was only on March
19, 2003, that the Comelec en banc issued
Resolution to disqualify Moll from running
as a mayoral candidate. Thus, on May 14,
2001, when the electorate voted for him as
mayor, they were under the belief that he
was qualified. There is no presumption that
they agreed to the subsequent invalidation
of their votes as stray votes, in case of his
disqualification.
To allow the defeated and repudiated
candidate to take over the mayoralty
despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise them through no fault on
their part, and to undermine the importance
and the meaning of democracy and the
right of the people to elect officials of their
choice. As such, in case of permanent
vacancy, the elected vice mayor should be
proclaimed as the mayor.
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LOZANIDA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 135150
July 28, 1999
FACTS:
Romeo Lonzanida was the mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for two consecutive
terms. In 1995, he ran again for his third
term and won. However, after an election
protest has been filed by his opponent Juan
Alves, the Comelec declared a failure of
election and the position vacant but
Lonzanida still continued to function as
such.
After the recounting of votes, Comelec
declared Aves as the winner of the election
and issued a resolution for such in February
1998, a few months after the next election.
Lonzanida acceded to the resolution and
Aves took over the position.
In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again
filed his COC to run as mayor of the place
but his opponent this time, Eufemio Muli
filed a disqualification case on the ground
that he has already served his three-term
limit.
Muli contends that even though Aves has
been declared as the winner in the 1995
polls, Lonzanida still functioned as the
mayor for almost the entire term.
ISSUE:
WON Lonzanida has already served his
three-term limit.
HELD:
The argument of Muli is without merit.
The three-term limitation provided by the
Constitution and the LCG provides that
“The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and
no such officials shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.”
In the present case the assumption in office
of Lonzanida in 1995 cannot be considered
as part of the three-term limit because of
the absence of two requisites. First, the
petitioner cannot be considered as having
been duly elected to the post in the May
1995 elections, and second, the petitioner
did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective
local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same
position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
ADORMEO V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147927
February 4, 2002
FACTS:
Raymundo Adormeo filed a petition for
disqualification against the incumbent
mayor of Lucena City, Ramon Talaga Jr.,
from his re-election bid for the 2001 polls on
the ground that he has already served three
consecutive terms.
Talaga was the mayor of the place in 1992-
1995 and again on 1995-1998. In his re-
election bid in 1998, however, he lost to
Bernard Tagarao. In a recall election in
2000, Talaga run against Tagarao and won
and he served the unexpired term of the
latter.
The Comelec first denied the petition of
Adormeo but granted it after a motion for
reconsideration has been filed.
ISSUE:
WON Tagala already served for three
consecutive terms.
HELD:
Talaga served two consecutive term at
most and then lost. After two years as a
private citizen, he ran again in the recall
election and won. As such, his term cannot
be considered as consecutive although he
merely served the unexpired term of
Tagarao after the recall polls. The continuity
of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the 1998 elections.
The comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a
Constitutional Commission member, stating
that in interpreting said provision that “if one
is elected representative to serve the
unexpired term of another, that unexpired,
no matter how short, will be considered one
term for the purpose of computing the
number of successive terms allowed” is
only applicable to members of Congress
where there is no recall election provided.
LATASA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 154829
December 10, 2003
FACTS:
Arsenio Latasa was the mayor of the
Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in
1992, 1995 and 1998.
In September 2000, a plebiscite was
conducted to convert the municipality to
City of Digos. This marked the end of the
term of Latasa as mayor of the municipality.
However, the charter of the new city
provides that Latasa will stay in position in a
hold-over capacity until the next election.
In 2001 elections, Latasa again filed a COC
to run as mayor. He argues that although
he has already served three consecutive
term in municipal mayor, this is his first bid
as a city mayor.
His opponent in the election Romeo Sunga
filed a disqualification case against Latasa
in the Comelec on the ground of violation of
the three-term rule. Comelec granted the
petition. Latasa filed a MR that was not
acted upon until the day of election and
hence, he won and proclaimed as the
mayor.
ISSUE:
WON Latasa can still run as mayor of Digos
City after serving three terms as mayor of
municipality of Digos.
HELD:
The new city acquired a new corporate
existence separate and distinct from that of
the municipality. This does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying
the subject Constitutional provision, the
office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government
post as that of the office of the city mayor.
As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants
of the municipality are the same as those in
the city. These inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner
Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three
consecutive terms. These are also the
same inhabitants over whom he held power
and authority as their chief executive for
nine years.
The Court believes that Latasa did
involuntarily relinquish his office as
municipal mayor since the said office has
been deemed abolished due to the
conversion. However, the very instant he
vacated his office as municipal mayor, he
also assumed office as city mayor unlike in
Lonzanida case, where petitioner for even
just a short period of time, stepped down
from office. In this case, there was no
interruption in the holding of office and
hence, the three consecutive term is
completed.
Since Latasa was proclaimed but later on
disqualified, the second placer Sunga,
cannot assume the position but the vice
mayor.
 chrism Page 5
PANIS V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 102948
February 2, 1994
FACTS:
Jaime Panis was employed as
Administrative Officer of the Cebu City
Medical Center (CCMC) formerly, Cebu
City Hospita, while private respondent
Bella Veloso was Administrative Officer of
the City Health Department detailed at the
said hospital.
Panis and Veloso are both candidate for the
position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for
Administration of CCMC but the city mayor
appointed the latter.
Panis questioned the appointment of
Veloso on the grounds that the position was
not legally created, there was no screening
process made and that the next in rank rule
was not applied.
ISSUE:
WON Veloso has the right to be appointed
to the disputed position.
HELD:
On the issue of the legality of the position, it
was created under Ordinance 1216 when
the hospital changed its name. It is the
equivalent of Office of the hospital
administrator.
With regard to the screening process, Panis
did not attend the screening process
scheduled by the Personnel Selection
Board even after due notice.
On the issue of the next-in-rank, the court
ruled that the "next in rank" rule specifically
applies only in cases of promotion. The
instant controversy, however, involves a
new office and a position created in the
course of a valid reorganization. Under the
law, a vacancy not filled by promotion may
be filled by transfer of present employees in
the government service, by reinstatement,
by reemployment of those separated from
the service, and appointment of outsiders
who have appropriate civil service eligibility,
but not necessarily in this order.
Assuming nonetheless that a vacancy
actually occurred that can be filled up only
by promotion, the concept of "next in rank"
does not impose any mandatory or
peremptory requirement to appoint the
person occupying the next lower position in
the occupational group of the office. What
the Civil Service Law and the Administrative
Code of 1987 provide is that if a vacancy is
filled up by the promotion, the person
holding the position next in rank thereto
"shall be considered for promotion. In other
words, one who is "next in rank" to a
vacancy is given preferential consideration
for promotion to the vacant position, but it
does nor necessarily follow that he alone
and no one else can be appointed. There is
no vested right granted the next in rank nor
a ministerial duty imposed on the
appointing authority to promote the holder
to the vacant position.
MENZON V. PETILLA
G.R. No. 90762
May 20, 1991
FACTS:
On Feb.1988, DILG Sec. Luis Santos
designated Vice-Gov. Leopoldo Petilla as
active governor of Leyte because no
governor has yet been proclaimed in the
province. The most senior member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Aurelio Menzon
was also designated by Santos to be acting
Vice-Governor.
The SP issued a resolution declaring the
appointment of Menzon invalid on the
ground the law does not provide in cases of
succession in the Office of the Vice-
Governor in case of a temporary vacancy
and the appointment is not necessary since
the Vice-Governor who is temporarily
performing the functions of the Governor,
could concurrently assume the functions of
both offices.
Menzon questioned the said resolution but
it was dismissed by the court and in the
meantime the issue on the governorship of
Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal
was proclaimed the Governor.
The provincial treasurer allowed the
payment of the salary and emoluments for
Menzon as active vice-governor but
Larrazabal later asked to pay it back.
ISSUE:
WON there was vacancy and WON
Menzon is entitled to the emoluments.
HELD:
The issues should be resolved in the
affirmative.
The law on Public Officers is clear on the
matter. There is no vacancy whenever the
office is occupied by a legally qualified
incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a
vacancy when there is no person lawfully
authorized to assume and exercise at
present the duties of the office.
In this case, the office of the Vice-Governor
was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-
Governor Petilla was appointed Acting
Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office
to which he was elected was left barren of a
legally qualified person to exercise the
duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
The LCG is silent on the mode of
succession in the event of a temporary
vacancy in the Office of the Vice-Governor.
However, under the circumstances, the
Court rules that, in order to obviate the
dilemma resulting from an interregnum
created by the vacancy, the President,
acting through her alter ego, the Secretary
of DILG, may remedy the situation.
In view of the foregoing, the petitioner's
right to be paid the salary attached to the
Office of the Vice Governor is indubitable.
SB of San Andres Catanduanes v. CA
G.R. No. 118883
January 16, 1998
FACTS:
Augusto T. Antonio was elected bgy captain
of Sapang Palay, San Andres. In that
capacity, he was appointed by the
President as member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres
and was later elected president of the
Association of Barangay Councils (ABC).
Meanwhile, the election for the president of
Federation of the Association of Barangay
Councils (FABC) was declared void by the
DILG for lack of quorum and the
reorganization in the provincial council
became necessary. Being president of
ABC, the DILG Sec. appointed Antonio as
temporary member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of
Catanduanes. As such, Antonio tendered
his resignation as member of SB.
The VP of ABC, Nenito Aquino was
appointed as member of SB in replacement
of Antonio.
Later SC, invalidate the decision of the
DILG with regard to the election of the
FABC president and also the appointment
of Antonio as member of SP.
Antonio wrote a letter to SB to reassume
his position but it was denied on the ground
that he has already resigned.
ISSUE:
WON there is an effective resignation of
abandonment of office.
HELD:
Antonio cannot assume his previous
position because although there was no
effective resignation, there was an
abandonment of office.
To constitute a complete and operative
resignation from public office, there must
be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of
the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and
(c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
In this case, there is no effective resignation
because there is no evidence that the
resignation was accepted by any
government functionary or office.
However, Antonio has effectively
relinquished his membership in the
Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary
abandonment of said post. This is clear
when he did not simultaneously discharge
the duties and obligations of both positions.
Neither did he, at that time, express an
intention to resume his office as member of
the SB. His overt acts, silence, inaction and
acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him
to his original position, show that Antonio
had abandoned the contested office.
Antonio’s failure to promptly assert his
alleged right implies his loss of interest in
the position. His overt acts plainly show that
he really meant his resignation and
understood its effects.
 chrism Page 6

Republic Act No. 8295 June 6, 1997

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE PROCLAMATION OF A LONE CANDIDATE FOR ANY ELECTIVE OFFICE IN A SPECIAL ELECTION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Section 4. Disqualification. – In addition to the disqualifications mentioned in Sec.s 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40 of Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, whenever the evidence of guilt is strong, the following persons are disqualified to run in
a special election called to fill the vacancy in an elective office, to wit:

a) Any elective official who has resigned from his office by accepting an appointive office or for whatever reason which he previously
occupied but has caused to become vacant due to his resignation; and

b) Any person who, directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes, threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually causes, inflicts or produces
any violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to any person or persons aspiring to become a candidate or
that of the immediate member of his family, his honor or property that is meant to eliminate all other potential candidate.

Section 5. Prohibited acts, election offenses and penalties. – Any act of coercion, bribery, threat, harassment, intimidation, terrorism, or actually
causing, inflicting or producing violence, injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or disadvantage to discourage any other person or persons from filing
a certificate of candidacy in order to eliminate all other potential candidate from running in a special election shall constitute as an election offense.
Violations of this provision shall be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the provision of Sec. 264 of the Omnibus Election Code.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 June 7, 2002

AN ACT INSTITUTING THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed. – The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual
disqualification from any public office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for
confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in this Act.

Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, or have
received any financial or material contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in
this Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its divisions,
subdivisions, and intermediaries, including government-owned or –controlled corporations.

Section 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees. – The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this Act shall be
imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and
employees.
Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and
that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its
duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country
where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those
who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected
thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of
general circulation.
1987 CONSTITUTION (ART. X SEC.8)

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.