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G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999 issuing the proper order.

issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation
of
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner, _______________
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents. *EN BANC.
97
Courts; Judgments; The rule on finality of judgment cannot VOL. 301, JANUARY 19, 1999 97
divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
same judgment—the finality of a judgment does not mean that the functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending
Court has lost all its powers over the case.—Contrary to the of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then
submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution
cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and
same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of
well established jurisprudence on this issue as follows: x x x “the the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the
finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty
powers over the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court and to pardon. Getting down to the solution of the question in the
loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must
after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known
jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the
to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the
the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under
judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways:
x x x For after the judgment has become final facts and (1) by command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court;
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust and (3) by mandate of the law.
or impossible. Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to control the execution of
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Death Penalty; Notwithstanding its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction—supervening events
the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent
sentences of death.—In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General unfairness.—The power to control the execution of its decision is an
has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of
the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, viz.: “This judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which may be established by law. To be sure, the most important part of a
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of
the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance
same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment, as of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights
its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these
the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been
the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
1
conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its cases. It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of
processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions
Same; Same; Same; Same; What the Supreme Court to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
temporarily restrained is the execution of its own Decision to give it Isagani Cruz “without independence and integrity, courts will lose
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
Congress as alleged by petitioner—it did not restrain the effectivity champions of justice.”
of a law enacted by Congress.—Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that Same; Same; Same; Same; The 1987 Constitution took away
“when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it pleading, practice and procedure.—The rule making power of this
into Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the
98 power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987
procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or
specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process supplement
or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable 99
to the spirit of said law or rules.” It bears repeating that what the VOL. 301, JANUARY 19, 1999 99
Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the
events in Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
enacted by Congress. Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to
Same; Same; Rule-Making Powers; Pleadings and Practice; It strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as
should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control
practice and procedure was granted by the Constitution to the the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and
Supreme Court to enhance its independence.—The more disquieting which it has exercised since time immemorial.
dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Same; Same; Constitutional Law; President; Pardoning
Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is Power;Separation of Powers; The constitutional provision which is
that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the the source of the pardoning power of the President cannot be
implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement
the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this of their decisions after their finality; An accused who has been
unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these
pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.—The text and tone
the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the
on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of
incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and
their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also
of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the
2
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny,
courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of
finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final the Bill of Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan
judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be reminds us “x x x it is the very purpose of the Constitution—and
claimed in the appropriate courts. particularly the Bill of Rights—to declare certain values
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The powers of the transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political majorities.”
Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of Law; Man has yet to invent
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is a better hatchery of justice than the courts, a hatchery where justice
no higher right than the right to life.—The powers of the Executive, will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown
the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict away by the winds of rage—the flame of the rule of law cannot be
do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of
higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the unfairness.—Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than
United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we
courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of
constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe rage. The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage,
upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The
respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass
the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is
the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches momentarily the most hated by society.
of our government.
100 RESOLUTION
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
PUNO, J.:
Same; Same; Death Penalty; Mob Mentality; When the debate
deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the special
of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily
duty of the Supreme Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent
of Rights to the minority fully hold.—In 1922, the famous Clarence Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents
Darrow predicted that “x x x the question of capital punishment has that:
been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be
settled so long as men believe in punishment.” In our clime and time 1. The Decision in this case having become final and
when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the
regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of
of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness executive authority;
of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no more than 2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . .
an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an

3
end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital
Congress may repeal a law. punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question may now be
raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern
Congress within the 6-month period given by this matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death
Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction
upon . . . by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No.
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection
praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by
the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999
transcended its power of judicial review. merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated
events transpired to the effect that the repeal or January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the
modification of the law imposing death penalty has case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly
become nil, to wit: represented by the Solicitor General.

a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes. I
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that
they are against the repeal of the law;
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and
the law only bears his signature and that of
hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously,
Senator Pimentel.
public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no
longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin
respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the final Decision. It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and
House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and
7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the
House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death
penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen
(113) congressman. This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision
rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this
Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . .
is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on
executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the
not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters involved or arising from assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177)
the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar
4
as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act
No. 8177 are concerned, which are
hereby declared INVALID because (a)
Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and
(b) Section 19 fails to provide for review
and approval of the Lethal Injection
Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and
unjustifiably makes the manual
confidential, hence unavailable to
interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel.
Respondents are hereby enjoined from
enforcing and implementing Republic Act
No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
appropriately amended, revised and/or
corrected in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become


final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgment.

Manila, Philippine.

C
l
e
r
k
o
f
C
o
u

5
J the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court
u has lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the
d judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
i modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
c become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute
i and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the
a jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its
l jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The
R former continues even after the judgment has become
e final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter
c terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For
o after the judgment has become final facts and
r circumstances may transpire which can render the
d execution unjust or impossible.5
s
In truth, the Oarguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by
this Court. Asf aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this
f
Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge
i
of First Instance, 6
viz:
c
e This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various
decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject,
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October pronounced and the period for reopening the same
21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has
Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the
Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the
Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a
the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court that follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the
became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations judicial authority terminates by having then passed
to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be completely to the Executive. The particulars of the
enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and execution itself, which are certainly not always included in
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while
the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment the executive has no power over the person of the convict
cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to
same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well pardon.
established jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2 Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at
bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence, it
xxx xxx xxx must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of
6
the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
this point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
the order of execution and the executory nature thereof Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the Congress. 1âwphi 1.nêt

common law this postponement can be ordered in three


ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public
(arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of
sufficient to state this principle of the common law to petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since
render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded
after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In accord with this
can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning
the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by pleading, practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the
direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after rules on execution of judgments. These rules are all predicated on the
the date of the execution has been fixed, and assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has power to control and supervise the process of execution of their
performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of
and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It
that ought to delay the execution, and there is an should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz
application for postponing the execution ought to be "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so
addressed while the circumstances is under investigation essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
and so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation. justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this
Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of
execution of decisions where supervening events may change the Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice
unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice
6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement
not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court
7
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may integration of the Bar,
appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its which, however, may be
power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the repealed, altered, or
practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered supplemented by the
as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after Batasang Pambansa.
July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. Such rules shall provide a
This Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. simplified and inexpensive
Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a procedure for the speedy
judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited disposition of cases, shall
years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court be uniform for all courts of
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it the same grade, and shall
is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive not diminish, increase, or
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department modify substantive rights.
would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
question." 12The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court.
the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
to the practice of law in the Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
"to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
following powers:
courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by
the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its
Article X provided: xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx (5) Promulgate rules


concerning the protection
and enforcement of
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the
constitutional rights,
following powers.
pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the
xxx xxx xxx admission to the practice
of law, the Integrated Bar,
(5) Promulgate rules and legal assistance to the
concerning pleading, underprivileged. Such
practice, and procedure in rules shall provide a
all courts, the admission to simplified and inexpensive
the practice of law, and the procedure for the speedy

8
disposition of cases, shall xxx xxx xxx
be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall 5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge
not diminish, increase, or Ponferrada's Manifestation however,
modify substantive rights. herein respondent is submitting the instant
Rules of procedure of Manifestation and Motion (a) to
special courts and quasi- stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of
judicial bodies shall remain the date of execution deprives herein
effective unless respondent of vital information necessary
disapproved by the for the exercise of his statutory powers, as
Supreme Court. well as renders nugatory the constitutional
guarantee that recognizes the people's
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the right to information of public concern, and
first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also the appropriate relief.
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 6. The non-disclosure of the date of
Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or execution deprives herein respondent of
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, vital information necessary for the
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no exercise of his power of supervision and
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If control over the Bureau of Corrections
the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book
independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in
do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution relation to Title III, Book IV of such
of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since Administrative Code, insofar as the
time immemorial. enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and
the Amended Rules and Regulations to
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is
jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its concerned and for the discharge of the
decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules
and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after relative to the execution of sentence are
November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary faithfully observed.
of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation
and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. 7. On the other hand, the willful omission
Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true to reveal the information about the precise
copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the day of execution limits the exercise by the
designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow President of executive clemency powers
(him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the pursuant to Section 19, Article VII
execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." (Executive Department) of the 1987
The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of
Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
relief" state: which provides that the death sentence
shall be carried out "without prejudice to
9
the exercise by the President of his means of which the right to information
executive powers at all times." (Emphasis may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on
supplied) For instance, the President the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972])
cannot grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the by guaranteeing the right and mandating
execution of a sentence to a day certain the duty to afford access to sources of
(People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in information. Hence, the fundamental right
the absence of a precise date to reckon therein recognized may be asserted by
with. The exercise of such clemency the people upon the ratification of the
power, at this time, might even work to the Constitution without need for any ancillary
prejudice of the convict and defeat the act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What
purpose of the Constitution and the may be provided for by the Legislature are
applicable statute as when the date at reasonable conditions and limitations
execution set by the President would be upon the access to be afforded which
earlier than that designated by the court. must, of necessity, be consistent with the
declared State policy of full public
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure disclosure of all transactions involving
of information about the date of execution public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec.
to herein respondent and the public 28). However, it cannot be
violates Section 7, Article III (Bill of Rights) overemphasized that whatever limitation
and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of may be prescribed by the Legislature, the
Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7
Philippine Constitution which read: have become operative and enforceable
by virtue of the adoption of the New
Sec. 7. The right of the people to Charter." (Decision of the Supreme
information on matters of public concern Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service
shall be recognized. Access to official Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535
records, and to documents and papers [1987].
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of
research data used as basis for policy execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty.
development shall, be afforded the citizen, Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due
subject to such limitations as may process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as
beprovided by law. counsel for public respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the
ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions execution of Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the
prescribed by law, the State adopts and Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution
implements a policy of full public of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the
disclosure of all transactions involving public respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this
public interest. Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this
Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
9. The "right to information" provision is
self-executing. It supplies "the rules by II

10
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted
"decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments that they infringe
By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public
which is an executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
which reads: principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.
Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may III
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of
shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts.
Congress. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December
28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b)
suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency
of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and/or review or repeal of the law authorizing capital punishment; (b.1)
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be
provides the authority for the President to grant amnesty with the granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators; (b.2) Senate President
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared
to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality. In truth, an they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4)
collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other
For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final congressmen are demanding review of the same law.
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed
by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its
prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999.
person who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special
a death sentence is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to resolve
same — the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the
In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether petitioner's
amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the Death
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like that of Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there
commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the were good reasons why the Court should not immediately dismiss
exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted
as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial
to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital
11
punishment are still unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659
different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate,
No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House
Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual of Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all
bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law."
execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from Congress was The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11,
impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the 1999. In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the
Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious morning, the House of Representative with minor, the House of
stance by temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner. The Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez
suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the resolution by an overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed
constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review
it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not
going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the
compelled, among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these
stopping the execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its
all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to legal and humanitarian purpose.
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's
majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not petitioner A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the
as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable question of capital punishment had been the subject of endless
considerations demand no less before allowing the State to take the life discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in
of one its citizens. punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be
unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral predicates of capital
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the
result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and
to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor righteousness of their postulates. To be sure, any debate, even if it is no
General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when
that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that
these supervening events as follows: wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it is the
especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of
xxx xxx xxx Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is
the very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary
will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice
heinous crimes. than the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage.
against the repeal of the law; The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of courts in
only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18 rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only
when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by
society. 21
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the
Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion
12
for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in submission to arbitration is a contract. A clause in a
its Resolution of January 4, 1999. contract providing that all matters in dispute between the
parties shall be referred to arbitrators and to them alone is
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A.
Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of
the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with jurisdiction. However, unless the arbitration agreement is
applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay. such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against
the parties, the courts should look with favor upon such
SO ORDERED. amicable arrangements.
5.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Case at Bar.—Section 11 of Act No.
[No. 37878. November 25, 1932] 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of
Manila Electric Company, petitioner, vs. Pasay Trans- a democratic government constitutionally established.
portation Company, Inc., et al., respondents. 6.Id.; Id,; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—It would be improper and illegal
1.Constitutional Law; Act No. 1446, Section 11, Validity of; for the members of the Supreme Court, to sit as a board of
Members of the Supreme Court Sitting as a Board of Ar- arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom shall be final.
bitrators; Division of Powers.—The Supreme Court of the ORIGINAL ACTION in tjae Supreme Court. Petition under
Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of the provisions of section 11 of Act No. 1446.
power in the Philippine Government. It is judicial power The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Ross, Lawrence & Selph for petitioner.
Court. The Supreme Court and its members should not and Rivera & Francisco for respondent Pasay Transportation
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any Co.
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected P. A. Remigio for respondent E. B. Gutierrez.
with the administering of judicial functions. A. M. Zarate for respondent Raymundo Transportation Co.
601
Vicente Ampil for respondent J. Ampil.
VOL. 57, NOVEMBER 25, 1932 601 Malcolm, J.:
Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. The preliminary and basic question presented by the
2.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.—The petition of the Manila Electric Company, requesting the mem-
Supreme Court exercises jurisdiction as a court and this bers of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to
jurisdiction does not include the exercise of jurisdiction by fix the terms upon which certain transportation com-
the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of 602
arbitrators. 602 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
3.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—A board of arbitrators is not a "court" Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co.
in any proper sense of the term and possesses none of the ju- panies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila
risdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be exer- Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the
cised by the Supreme Court. Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies,
4.Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.; Arbitration and Award.—Arbitration relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the
represents a method of the parties' own choice. A legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a
13
board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No. 1446 above The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of
referred to is entitled, "An Act granting a franchise to Charles the parties' own choice. A submission to arbitration is a
M. Swift to construct, maintain, and operate an electric contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust
railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric the courts of jurisdiction of the matters submitted to
light, heat, and power system from a point in the City of arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in
Manila in an easterly direction to the town of Pasig, in the articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of authority
Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever is hardly necessary, except that it should be recalled that in
any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or the Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it
corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the has been held that a clause in a contract, providing that all
lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said matters in dispute between the parties shall be referred to
other person or corporation shall use such right of way, and arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and
the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such cannot oust the courts of jurisdiction. (Wahl and
other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301;
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of Puentebella vs. Negros Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69;
arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final." Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed of Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
in this court, it was ordered that the petitioner be required to We would not be understood as extending the principles
serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation governing arbitration and award too far. Unless the ar-
companies -affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney- bitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of
General disclaimed any interest in the proceedings, and the courts against the parties, the courts should look with
opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive
utility operators. On the submission of memoranda after an a distinction between a private contract for submission to
oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution. arbitration and agreements to arbitrate falling within the
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting
is first noted that power is attempted to be granted to the others than the parties to a particular franchise. Here,
members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains
arbitrators and not to the Supreme Court as an entity. It true that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final,
603 which if literally enforced
VOL. 57, NOVEMBER 25, 1932 603 604
Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. 604 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
is next seen that the decision of a majority of the members of Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co.
the Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally observed would leave a public utility, not a party to the contract
that the franchise granted the Manila Electric Company by authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts for
the Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a a judicial determination of the question in dispute.
contract between the parties to it, is now made to effect the Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of
rights of persons not signatories to the covenant. Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioners' Court [1908], 158
14
Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state legislature Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the
authorizing the commissioners' court of a certain county to court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a
regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the owners of court at all.
a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents
to the courts. But that is not the question before us. Here the one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is
question is not one of whether or not there has been a judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by
delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the
the issue concerns the legal right of the members of the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision usurpations by any other department of the government, so
of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not
judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise administrative trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to with the administering of judicial functions.
fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the
conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to bring Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as
the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall
construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and hereafter be prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act
render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court,
construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by it could only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of Supreme Court acting as a court, and could hardly mean the
arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme
coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important
would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. distinction between the Supreme Court as an entity and the
Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of "court" in any proper sense of the term, and possesses none of
arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall be
in nature, that would result in the porformance of duties which exercised by the Supreme Court.
the members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice
upon Taney, it was said:
605 "The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial,
VOL. 57, NOVEMBER 25, 1932 605 and it cannot be required or authorized to exercise any
Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. 606
themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an 606 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co.
15
other. * * * Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being [No. L-5279. October 31, 1955]
defined in the organic law of the government, and being all PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND
strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF
court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform EDUCATION and the BOARD OF TEXTBOOKS,
any other duty. * * * The award of execution is a part, respondents.
and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court 807
exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense VOL. 97, OCTOBER 31, 1955 807
of the term, without it. Without such an award the judgment Phil. Assn. of Colleges & Univ. vs. Sec. of Edu.
would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved
party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which 1. 1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; WHEN QUESTION OF
would remain a dead letter, and without any operation upon CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE
the rights of the parties, unless Congress should at some RAISED; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.—Where the
future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court petitioning private schools are actually operating by virtue
of permits issued to them by the Secretary of Education
to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power
under Act No. 2706, who is not shown to have threatened to
confided to this court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdic- revoke their permits, there is no justiciable controversy that
tion; yet it is the whole power that the court is allowed to would authorize the courts to pass upon the
exercise under this act of Congress, * * * And while it constitutionality of said Act.
executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it, the court
will carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not 1. 2.ID.; POLICE POWER; SCHOOLS AND
strictly judicial in its character, and which is not clearly COLLEGES; PREVIOUS PERMIT SYSTEM.—The
confided to it by the Constitution. * * *" (Gor- Government, in the exercise of its police power to correct a
don vs. United States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S„ 697, great evil, which consisted in that the great majority of the
Appendix.) private schools from primary grade to university are money-
Confining the decision to the basic question at issue, the making devices for the profit of those who organize and
administer them, may validly establish the previous permit
Supreme Court holds that section 11 of Act No. 1446 contra-
system provided for by Commonwealth Act No. 180.
venes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic
government constitutionally established, and that it would be 1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; DISCRETION OF SECRETARY OF
improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, EDUCATION; FIXING OF MINIMUM STANDARDS OF
sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of INSTRUCTION.—To confer, by statute, upon the Secretary
whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila of Education power and discretion to prescribe rules fixing
Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction to
Court decline to proceed further in the matter. be observed by all private schools and colleges, is not to
Avancena, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, unduly delegate legislative powers.
Ahad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
Petition denied. 1. 4.ID.; OFFICIALS' ABUSE, NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.—Abuse, if any, by the officials

16
entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing
sedemonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. substantial privileges or rights for so doing.

1. 5.ID; CIRCULAR OR MEMORANDUM ALLEGED TO BE ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MUST BE SPECIFIED.—In order The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
that a circular or memorandum issued by the Department Manuel C. Briones, Vicente G. Sinco, Manuel V.
of Education may be constitutionally assailed, the circular Gallegoand Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.
or memorandum must be indicated, the wrong inflicted or
Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Assistant Solicitor
threatened must be alleged and proved, and the
General Francisco Carreon for respondents.
constitutional point raised and argued specifically.
BENGZON, J.:
1. 6.ID. ; ID. ; COMPLETE CONTROL OF PRIVATE
SCHOOLS, INVALID.—If any of the Department circulars
The petitioning colleges and universities request that Act No. 2706 as
or memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond the amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
bounds of regulation and seek to establish complete control unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of schools and
of the various activities of private schools, it would surely colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without
be invalid. due process of law; B. They deprive parents of their natural rights and
duty to rear their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions
1. 7.ID.; ASSESSMENT OF ONE PER CENT ON GROSS conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion
RECEIPTS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS; JURISDICTION OF to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
COURTS OF FlRST INSTANCE.—The constitutionality of legislative power.
the one per cent levied on gross receipts of all private
schools for additional Government expenses in connection A printed memorandum explaining their position in extenso is attached to
the record.
with their supervision and regulation, which is assessed in
section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as amended by Republic Act
The Government's legal representative submitted a mimeographed
No. 74—whether it be considered a fee or a tax—involves
memorandum contending that, (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable
investigation and examination of relevant data, which controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the
should best be carried out in the courts of first instance. constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge the
validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are constitutionally valid.
808
808 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above arguments.
Phil. Assn. of Colleges & Univ. vs. Sec. of Edu.
Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act making the inspection
1. 8.ID.; JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY.—There is no and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the
justiciable contro-versy as regards section 1 of Republic Act Secretary of Public Instruction." Under its provisions, the Department of
Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and regulated all private
No. 139, abut textbooks, where the petitioners have not
schools in this country apparently without audible protest, nay, with the
shown that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited this or general acquiescence of the general public and the parties concerned.
that textbook, or that he petitioners refused or intend to

17
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly interest common to all members of the public. (Ex parte Levitt,
reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.)
aforesaid, specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no
wrong—nor allege any—from the enforcement of the criticized statute. Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a operation. (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405;
legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610; Coffman vs. Breeze Corp.,
the fallability of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in 323 U. S. 316-325.)
any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to
duty and official oath decline the responsibility. (Cooley The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only
Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.) when the interests of litigant require the use of that judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference, a
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United Public
rights have become dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L. Ed. 754.)
consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. 204.)
Bona fide suit.—Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed cases and controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of
on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where
involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative
protection of the rights of the parties concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is
207.) legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between
In support of their first proposition petitioners contend that the right of a litigants. (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines,
citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, p. 1138.)
and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before
such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education might under the law
restraint, a practice abhorent to our system of law and government. withdraw the permit of one of petitioners does not constitute a justiciable
Petitioners obviously refer to section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended controversy. (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks (Ky.)
which provides that before a private school may be opened to the public it 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)
must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of Education. The Solicitor
General on the other hand points out that none of the petitioners has And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain
cause to present this issue, because all of them have permits to operate actual and positive relief. (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January,
and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.1 And they do not 1951.) Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy
assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has threatened to scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem may
revoke their permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms of be. This is specially true where the issues "reach constitutional
law—and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain. dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to
avoid decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1995,
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of Law Ed., Vol. 99, p. 511.)
that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a general to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or The above notwithstanding, in view of the several decisions of the United
legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is States Supreme Court quoted by petitioners, apparently outlawing

18
censorship of the kind objected to by them, we have decided to look into institutions of university grade that some board of control be
the matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the face of clear organized under legislative control to supervise their
violation of fundamental personal rights of liberty and property. administration. The Commission believes that the
recommendations it offers at the end of this chapter are more
Petitioners complain that before opening a school the owner must secure likely to bring about the needed reforms.
a permit from the Secretary of Education. Such requirement was not
originally included in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by Commonwealth Recommendations.—The Commission recommends that
Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why? legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any school by an
individual or organization without the permission of the Secretary
In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 3162 creating of Public Instruction. That before granting such permission the
a Board of Educational Survey to make a study and survey of education Secretary assure himself that such school measures up to proper
in the Philippines and of all educational institutions, facilities and standards in the following respects, and that the continued
agencies thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe, Columbia existence of the school be dependent upon its continuing to
University, assisted by a staff of carefully selected technical members conform to these conditions:
performed the task, made a five-month thorough and impartial
examination of the local educational system, and submitted a report with (1) The location and construction of the buildings, the lighting and
recommendations, printed as a book of 671 pages. The following ventilation of the rooms, the nature of the lavatories, closets,
paragraphs are taken from such report: water supply, school furniture and apparatus, and methods of
cleaning shall be such as to insure hygienic conditions for both
PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS pupils and teachers.

There is no law or regulation in the Philippine Islands today to (2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be adequate to the
prevent a person, however disqualified by ignorance, greed, or needs of instruction in the subjects taught.
even immoral character, from opening a school to teach the
young. It it true that in order to post over the door "Recognized by (3) The classes shall not show an excessive number of pupils per
the Government," a private adventure school must first be teacher. The Commission recommends 40 as a maximum.
inspected by the proper Government official, but a refusal to grant
such recognition does not by any means result in such a school (4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal to those of
ceasing to exist. As a matter of fact, there are more such teachers in the public schools of the same grade.
unrecognized private schools than of the recognized variety. How
many, no one knows, as the Division of Private Schools keeps xxx xxx xxx
records only of the recognized type.
In view of these findings and recommendations, can there be any doubt
Conclusion.—An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented that the Government in the exercise of its police power to correct "a great
under the caption Private Adventure Schools leads but to one evil" could validly establish the "previous permit" system objected to by
conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from primary grade to petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the other statutes
university are money-making devices for the profit of those who declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And if any doubt still exists,
organize and administer them. The people whose children and recourse may now be had to the provision of our Constitution that "All
youth attend them are not getting what they pay for. It is obvious educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to
that the system constitutes a great evil. That it should be regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to regulate
permitted to exist with almost no supervision is indefensible. The establishments or business occupations implies the power to require a
suggestion has been made with the reference to the private permit or license. (53 C. J. S. 4.)
19
What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for the power to Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to the uncontrolled
revoke such permit on account of violation of rules or regulations of the discretion of the Secretary of Education or his department. The Secretary
Department. of Education is given the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the
statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the exclusive authority of
II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that the questioned the legislature to formulate standard. . . .."
statutes "conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited power and
discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the Secretary of
delegation of legislative power." Education to prescribe rules fixing minimum standards of adequate and
efficient instruction to be observed by all such private schools and
This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No. 2706 which, as colleges as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend that as
amended, provides: the legislature has not fixed the standards, "the provision is extremely
vague, indefinite and uncertain"—and for that reason constitutionality
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to objectionable. The best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness
maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and
and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations,
and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private
Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years.
authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and Which only shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the
colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department
the same, of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of
adequate instruction as the basis of government recognition of any
private school.
"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any description,
either general or specific, of what constitutes a 'general standard of
efficiency.' Nowhere in this Act is there any indication of any basis or At any rate, petitioners do not show how these standards have injured
condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction to the public.' any of them or interfered with their operation. Wherefore, no reason
Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of conditions, acts, or factors, exists for them to assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the
which the Secretary of Education must take into account to determine the power by the Secretary of Education.
'efficiency of instruction.'"
True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has issued rules and
The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 which provides: regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power
has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of
private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those
The Department of Education shall from time to time prepare and
regulations specifically, and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper
publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of
administrative or judicial proceedings—not to invalidate the law. For it
primary, intermediate, and high schools, and colleges granting
needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the
the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science, or any other
execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality
academic degree. It shall also from time to time prepare and
of such statute.
publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of law,
medical, dental, pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and
other medical or vocational schools or colleges giving instruction Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be sufficiently sustained by
of a technical, vocational or professional character. the decision in Alegra vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon
holding the statute that authorized the Director of Agriculture

20
to "designate standards for the commercial grades of abaca, maguey and convenience or relevancy of the measures criticized by them. (See also
sisal" against vigorous attacks on the ground of invalid delegation of Republic Act No. 176.)
legislative power.
If however the statutes in question actually give the Secretary control
Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be considered over private schools, the question arises whether the power of
sufficient, in the same way as "public welfare" "necessary in the interest supervision and regulation granted to the State by section 5 Article XIV
of law and order" "public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial was meant to include control of private educational institutions. It is
merits of the case" have been held sufficient as legislative standards enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution
justifying delegation of authority to regulate. (See Tañada and Fernando, provides for control of Education by the State. (See Tolentino,
Constitution of the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.) Government of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez,
Philippine Social Life and Progress, p. 335.)
On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has been no undue
delegation of legislative power. The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all educational
institutions" even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all
In this connection, and to support their position that the law and the education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline,
Secretary of Education have transcended the governmental power of civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended a list of circulars citizenship. (Malcolm & Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.)
and memoranda issued by the said Department. However they failed to
indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show that the power to
objectionable for being "capricious," or pain "nuisance"; and it is one of regulate means power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the
our decisional practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically Constitutional Convention to prove that State control of private education
raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court will not consider it. was intended by the organic law. It is significant to note that the
(Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil., 408.) Constitution grants power to supervise and to regulate. Which may mean
greater power than mere regulation.
We are told that such list will give an idea of how the statute has placed
in the hands of the Secretary of Education complete control of the various III. Another grievance of petitioners—probably the most significant—is the
activities of private schools, and why the statute should be struck down assessment of 1 per cent levied on gross receipts of all private schools
as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that the statute does not in for additional Government expenses in connection with their supervision
express terms give the Secretary complete control. It gives him powers to and regulation. The statute is section 11-A of Act No. 2706 as amended
inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to give them official by Republic Act No. 74 which reads as follows:
permits to operate under certain conditions, and to revoke such permits
for cause. This does not amount to complete control. If any of such SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the Office of Private
Department circulars or memoranda issued by the Secretary go beyond Education shall be met by the regular amount appropriated in the
the bounds of regulation and seeks to establish complete control, it would annual Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for additional
surely be invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but expenses in the supervision and regulation of private schools,
besides not having before us the text of such circulars, the petitioners colleges and universities and in the purchase of textbook to be
have omitted to specify. In any event with the recent approval of Republic sold to student of said schools, colleges and universities and
Act No. 1124 creating the National Board of Education, opportunity for President of the Philippines may authorize the Secretary of
administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or encroachments is Instruction to levy an equitable assessment from each private
amply afforded herein petitioners. A more expeditious and perhaps more educational institution equivalent to one percent of the total
technically competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the necessity, amount accruing from tuition and other fees: . . . and non-
payment of the assessment herein provided by any private

21
school, college or university shall be sufficient cause for the the right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical of government
cancellation by the Secretary of Instruction of the permit for institutions or policies.
recognition granted to it.
Herein lies another important issue submitted in the cause. The question
Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of a constitutional is really whether the law may be enacted in the exercise of the State's
right—the right to open a school, the liberty to teach etc. They claim this constitutional power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private
is unconstitutional, in the same way that taxes on the privilege of selling schools. If that power amounts to control of private schools, as some
religious literature or of publishing a newspaper—both constitutional think it is, maybe the law is valid. In this connection we do not share the
privileges—have been held, in the United States, to be invalid as taxes belief that section 5 has added new power to what the State inherently
on the exercise of a constitutional right. possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is necessarily
more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is
The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that insofar as petitioners' conflict between an express individual right and the express power to
action attempts to restrain the further collection of the assessment, courts control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must
have no jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes by injunction, and in yield to the former—conflict of two express powers. But if the power to
so far as they seek to recover fees already paid the suit, it is one against control education ismerely implied from the police power, it is feasible to
the State without its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving uphold the express individual right, as was probably the situation in the
"the legality of any tax impost or assessment" falls within the original two decisions brought to our attention, of Mississippi and Minnesota,
jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. states where constitutional control of private schools is not expressly
produced.
There are good grounds in support of Government's position. If this levy
of 1 per cent is truly a mere fee—and not a tax—to finance the cost of the However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable controversy has been
Department's duty and power to regulate and supervise private schools, presented to us. We are not informed that the Board on Textbooks has
the exaction may be upheld; but such point involves investigation and prohibited this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend to
examination of relevant data, which should best be carried out in the refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger of losing substantial
lower courts. If on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still privileges or rights for so refusing.
be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance.
The average lawyer who reads the above quoted section of Republic Act
The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of Republic Act No. 139 will fail to perceive anything objectionable. Why should not the State
139 which in its section 1 provides: prohibit the use of textbooks that are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos
or adverse to governmental policies or educationally improper? What's
The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or the power of regulation and supervision for? But those trained to the
authorized by the government shall be submitted to the Board investigation of constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger to
(Board of Textbooks) which shall have the power to prohibit the civil liberties, of possible educational dictatorship or thought control, as
use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the petitioners' counsel foresee with obvious alarm. Much depends, however,
law or to offend the dignity and honor of the government and upon the execution and implementation of the statute. Not that
people of the Philippines, or which it may find to be against the constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's effects. But if the
general policies of the government, or which it may deem Board on Textbooks in its actuations strictly adheres to the letter of the
pedagogically unsuitable. section and wisely steers a middle course between the Scylla of
"dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no cause for
complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial review will develop.
This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship in "its baldest
Anyway, and again, petitioners now have a more expeditious remedy thru
form". They cite two U. S. cases (Miss. and Minnesota) outlawing statutes
an administrative appeal to the National Board of Education created by
that impose previous restraints upon publication of newspapers, or curtail
Republic Act 1124.
22
Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, that when and if, membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable
the dangers they apprehend materialize and judicial intervention is controversy; There can be no justiciable controversy involving the
suitably invoked, after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the constitutionality of a proposed bill—the Court can exercise its power
courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit constitutional boundaries of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.—In the
and protect individual liberties.
instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of
the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a
IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the petitioners the
postponement of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are
right to institute in the proper court, and at the proper time, such actions
as may call for decision of the issue herein presented by them, this nevertheless amenable to a resetting of the SK elections to any date
petition for prohibition will be denied. So ordered. not later than July 15, 2002. RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections
to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ., concur. date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy
requiring judicial intervention. Petitioners’ prayer to prevent
G.R. No. 152295. July 9, 2002. *
Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable
ANTONIETTE V.C. MONTESCLAROS, MARICEL
controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because
CARANZO, JOSEPHINE ATANGAN, RONALD ATANGAN it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty
and CLARIZA DECENA, and OTHER YOUTH OF THE legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal
LAND SIMILARLY SITUATED, effect, violates no con-
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, _______________
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
EN BANC.
GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
*

270
MANAGEMENT, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the OFFICE 270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON in ANNOTATED
his capacity as Senate President and SENATOR AQUILINO
Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections
PIMENTEL in his capacity as Minority Leader of the Senate
stitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare a
of the Philippines, CONGRESSMAN JOSE DE VENECIA in proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would
his capacity as Speaker, CONGRESSMAN AGUSTO L. be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act
SYJOCO in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and CONGRESSMAN vacuo. The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
EMILIO C. MACIAS II in his capacity as Chairman of the Constitution states—“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
Committee on Local Government of the House of of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
Representatives, THE PRESIDENT OF THE PAMBANSANG legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN, AND not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
ALL THEIR AGENTS AND REPRESENTATIVES, excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
respondents. of the Government.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, there can be no
justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK); Courts; Judicial
bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a
Review; Separation of Powers; Petitioners’ prayer to prevent
law is enacted, not before.
Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
23
Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent a clear violation of specific Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by Congress is
constitutional limitations or of constitutional rights of private always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court
parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review over the cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the
internal processes or procedures of Congress.—Under the separation power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.
of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law, Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A party must
or from setting into motion the legislative mill according to its also show that he has a real interest in the suit, and by “real interest”
internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential
filing of bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each interest.—Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in
chamber of Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral maintaining this suit. A party must show that he has been, or is
Committee of approved bills, and the eventual approval into law of about to be denied some personal right or privilege to which he is
the reconciled bills by each chamber of Congress. Absent a clear lawfully entitled. A party must also show that he has a real interest
violation of specific constitutional limitations or of constitutional in the suit. By “real interest” is meant a present substantial interest,
rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its power of as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent,
judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of subordinate, or inconsequential interest. In the instant case,
Congress. petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court has also no power to those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old. Now,
dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who
enact into law.—The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years
the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age
judicial power to review the constitutionality of laws does not group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased
include the power to prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The to be members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate
Court has no power to compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have
allowing petitioners, regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for a personal and substantial interest in the SK elections.
in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To do so would destroy the delicate Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court will not strike down a law
system of checks and balances finely crafted by the Constitution for unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate
the three co-equal, coordinate and independent branches of action and adequately argued.—This petition does not raise any
government. constitutional issue. At the time petitioners filed this petition, RA
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners do not have a vested No. 9164, which reset the SK elections and reduced the age
right to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law. After
the Local Government Code of 1991.—Under RA No. 9164, Congress the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any provision
merely restored in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant petitioners’
271 prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK
VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 271 elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164.
Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a
the age requirement in PD No. 684, the original charter of the law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate
SK, which fixed the maximum age for membership in the SK to action and adequately argued.
youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not have a vested right 272
to the permanence of the age requirement under Section 424 of the
24
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS officio member of a local government legislative council, the law
ANNOTATED does not confer on petitioners a proprietary right or even a
Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative councils. The
constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust precludes
Same; Administrative Law; Public Officers; SK membership is
any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy
not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere
directing “equal access to opportunities for public service” cannot
statutory right conferred by law—Congress may amend at any time
bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a
the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right.—Congress
proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK
Same; Same; Same; Congress has the power to define who are
membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an
the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of
amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a
Congress, and those who do not qualify because they are past the age
proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK
group defined as the
members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act 273
disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK VOL. 384, JULY 9, 2002 273
elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the
Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections
Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even youth cannot insist on being part of the youth.—While the State
withdraw the statutory right. policy is to encourage the youth’s involvement in public affairs, this
Same; Same; Same; A public office is not a property right—no policy refers to those who belong to the class of people defined as the
one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right youth. Congress has the power to define who are the youth qualified
to an expectancy of holding a public office; The constitutional to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress. Those who do
principle of a public office as a public trust precludes any proprietary not qualify because they are past the age group defined as the youth
claim to public office.—A public office is not a property right. As the cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service, once
Constitution expressly states, a “[P]ublic office is a public trust.” No an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke
one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since
to an expectancy of holding a public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel, petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the
decided in 1920, the Court already ruled: “Again, for this petition to SK, they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK
come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary membership.
to consider an office a “property.” It is, however, well settled x x Same; Election Law; Presumption of Regularity; The Comelec’s
x that a public office is not property within the sense of the acts enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust duties.—The Comelec exercised its power and duty to “enforce and
or agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
popular representative government, the officers being mere agents election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall” and to
and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has “recommend to Congress effective measures to minimize election
a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every spending.” The Comelec’s acts enjoy the presumption of regularity
officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and holds in the performance of official duties. These acts cannot constitute
the office as a trust for the people he represents.” (Emphasis proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there “exists a connivance and
supplied) Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention of the present
should realize from the very start that no one has a proprietary right law.” As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v. Comelec, the
to public office. While the law makes an SK officer an ex- “Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the enforcement
25
and administration of elections laws, is entitled to the presumption of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), membership in the SK is limited to youths at
of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections.” least 15 but not more than 21 years old.
Courts; Actions; Certiorari; Words and Phrases; Grave abuse of
discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that Petitioners allege that public respondents "connived, confederated and
is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a conspired" to postpone the May 6, 2002 SK elections and to lower the
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.—Grave abuse of membership age in the SK to at least 15 but less than 18 years of age.
Petitioners assail the alleged conspiracy because youths at least 18 but
discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
not more than 21 years old will be "summarily and unduly dismembered,
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty unfairly discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Public disassociated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK organization."1
respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional
powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of discretion in their Thus, petitioners pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or
assailed acts. preliminary injunction -

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, "a) To prevent, annul or declare unconstitutional any law, decree,
Prohibition and Mandamus. Comelec resolution/directive and other respondents' issuances,
orders and actions and the like in postponing the May 6, 2002 SK
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. elections.
Abraham Mantilla, Celestino Hilvano, Michael
b) To command the respondents to continue the May 6, 2002 SK
Roaand Jim Baliad for petitioners.
elections set by the present law and in accordance with Comelec
274
Resolutions No. 4713 and 4714 and to expedite the funding of the
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED SK elections.
Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections
The Solicitor General for respondent. c) In the alternative, if the SK elections will be postponed for
whatever reason, there must be a definite date for said elections,
CARPIO, J.: for example, July 15, 2002, and the present SK membership,
except those incumbent SK officers who were elected on May 6,
The Case 1996, shall be allowed to run for any SK elective position even if
they are more than 21 years old.
Before us is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. The d) To direct the incumbent SK officers who are presently
petition seeks to prevent the postponement of the Sangguniang representing the SK in every sanggunian and the NYC to vacate
Kabataan ("SK" for brevity) elections originally scheduled last May 6, their post after the barangay elections."2
2002. The petition also seeks to prevent the reduction of the age
requirement for membership in the SK. The Facts

Petitioners, who are all 20 years old, filed this petition as a taxpayer's and The SK is a youth organization originally established by Presidential
class suit, on their own behalf and on behalf of other youths similarly Decree No. 684 as the Kabataang Barangay("KB" for brevity). The KB
situated. Petitioners claim that they are in danger of being disqualified to was composed of all barangay residents who were less than 18 years
vote and be voted for in the SK elections should the SK elections on May old, without specifying the minimum age. The KB was organized to
6, 2002 be postponed to a later date. Under the Local Government Code
26
provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed
opinions on issues of transcendental importance.3 their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the
Bicameral Conference Committee ("Bicameral Committee" for brevity) of
The Local Government Code of 1991 renamed the KB to SK and limited the Senate and the House came out with a Report13 recommending
SK membership to those youths "at least 15 but not more than 21 years approval of the reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill No. 205014 and
of age."4 The SK remains as a youth organization in every barangay House Bill No. 4456.15 The Bicameral Committee's consolidated bill reset
tasked to initiate programs "to enhance the social, political, economic, the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002 and lowered the
cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18 years of
youth."5 The SK in every barangay is composed of a chairperson and age.
seven members, all elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
The Katipunan ng Kabataan in every barangay is composed of all citizens On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.
actually residing in the barangay for at least six months and who meet the
membership age requirement. On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee's
consolidated bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives
The first SK elections took place on December 4, 1992. RA No. 7808 approved the same. The President signed the approved bill into law on
reset the SK elections to the first Monday of May of 1996 and every three March 19, 2002.
years thereafter. RA No. 7808 mandated the Comelec to supervise the
conduct of the SK elections under rules the Comelec shall promulgate. The Issues
Accordingly, the Comelec on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos.
47136 and 47147 to govern the SK elections on May 6, 2002. Petitioners16 raise the following grounds in support of their petition:

On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros "I.


("Montesclaros" for brevity) sent a letter8 to the Comelec, demanding that
the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. Montesclaros
RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND
also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days upon
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH
receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO
On February 20, 2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo ("Chairman Benipayo" for POSTPONE THE SK ELECTIONS.
brevity), then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the Speaker of
the House9 and the Senate President10 about the status of pending bills
II.
on the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman
intimated that it was "operationally very difficult" to hold both elections
simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND
support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH
Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
November 2002. EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY INTENDED TO
DISCRIMINATE, DISENFRANCHISE, SINGLE OUT AND
DISMEMBER THE SK MEMBERS WHO ARE 18 BUT NOT
Ten days lapsed without the Comelec responding to the letter of
LESS17 (SIC) THAN 21 YEARS OLD COMPOSED OF ABOUT 7
Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy of Comelec En
MILLION YOUTH.
Banc Resolution No. 476311 dated February 5, 2002 recommending to
Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but
holding the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.12 III.

27
RESPONDENTS ACTED WHIMSICALLY, ILLEGALLY AND turn 21 years old between May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY THUS CONSTITUTED (SIC) WITH elections. Petitioners claim that a reduction in the SK membership age to
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR 15 but less than 18 years of age from the then membership age of 15 but
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN THEY WILLFULLY FAILED not more than 21 years of age would disqualify about seven million
TO FUND THE SK ELECTION PURPORTEDLY TO POSTPONE youths. The public respondents' failure to hold the elections on May 6,
THE SAME IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT THEIR ILLEGAL 2002 would prejudice petitioners and other youths similarly situated.
SCHEME AND MACHINATION IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT
THERE ARE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE PURPOSE. Thus, petitioners instituted this petition to: (1) compel public respondents
to hold the SK elections on May 6, 2002 and should it be postponed, the
IV. SK elections should be held not later than July 15, 2002; (2) prevent
public respondents from passing laws and issuing resolutions and orders
THE INCUMBENT SK OFFICERS WANTED TO PERPETUALLY that would lower the membership age in the SK; and (3) compel public
SIT ON THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES CONTRARY TO THE respondents to allow petitioners and those who have turned more than 21
ENVISION (SIC) OF THE CREATION OF THE SK years old on May 6, 2002 to participate in any re-scheduled SK elections.
ORGANIZATION, HENCE, IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND
CONSTITUTION."18 The Court's power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional
cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
The Court's Ruling existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional
The petition is bereft of merit. question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the
case.21
At the outset, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that
have transpired since petitioners filed this petition:
In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise
of the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement
1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay
of the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable
elections were not held as scheduled.
to a resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002.
RA No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date
2. Congress enacted RA No. 916419 which provides that voters acceptable to petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections,
and candidates for the SK elections must be "at least 15 but less there is therefore no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention.
than 18 years of age on the day of the election."20 RA No. 9164
also provides that there shall be a synchronized SK and
Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed
Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.
bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
3. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no
regulations for the conduct of the July 15, 2002 synchronized SK duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal
and Barangay elections. effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to
declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that
Petitioners, who all claim to be 20 years old, argue that the postponement would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed
of the May 6, 2002 SK elections disenfranchises them, preventing them act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be
from voting and being voted for in the SK elections. Petitioners' theory is exercised in vacuo.22 The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of
that if the SK elections were postponed to a date later than May 6, 2002, the Constitution states –
the postponement would disqualify from SK membership youths who will
28
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally vote or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or those who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years
of the Government." (Emphasis supplied) old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to
Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the decide whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners' remedy is
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of legislation, not judicial intervention.
judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.
Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this
Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some
passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled.25 A party must
to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By "real interest" is meant
of its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy
bills by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of or future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.26
Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved
bills, and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred
chamber of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.
limitations or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who
exercise its power of judicial review over the internal processes or on the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old.
procedures of Congress.23 The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group.
Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be
The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or subject members of the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July
of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to review 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and
the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to prescribe to substantial interest in the SK elections.
Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to compel
Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners, regardless of This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time
their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. To petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections
do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and balances finely and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet
crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal, coordinate and enacted into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to
independent branches of government. assail any provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To
grant petitioners' prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July
Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in 15, 2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA
PD No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age No. 9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down
for membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do a law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action
not have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under and adequately argued.27
Section 424 of the Local Government Code of 1991. Every law passed by
Congress is always subject to amendment or repeal by Congress. The The only semblance of a constitutional issue, albeit erroneous, that
Court cannot restrain Congress from amending or repealing laws, for the petitioners raise is their claim that SK membership is a "property right
power to make laws includes the power to change the laws.24 within the meaning of the Constitution."28 Since certain public offices are
"reserved" for SK officers, petitioners also claim a constitutionally

29
protected "opportunity" to occupy these public offices. In petitioners' own Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize
words, they and others similarly situated stand to "lose their opportunity from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office.
to work in the government positions reserved for SK members or While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local
officers."29 Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the president of government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a
the federation of SK organizations in a municipality, city or province is proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative
an ex-officio member of the municipal council, city council or provincial councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust
board, respectively.30 The chairperson of the SK in the barangay is an ex- precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy
officio member of the Sangguniang Barangay.31 The president of the directing "equal access to opportunities for public service"35 cannot
national federation of SK organizations is an ex-officio member of the bestow on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a
National Youth Commission, with rank of a Department Assistant proprietary expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
Secretary.32
Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youth's involvement
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK in public affairs,36 this policy refers to those who belong to the class of
membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are
in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress.
membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as
on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service,
from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke
protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since
conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK,
even withdraw the statutory right. they cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership.

A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, The petition must also fail because no grave abuse of discretion attended
a "[P]ublic office is a public trust."33 No one has a vested right to any the postponement of the SK elections. RA No. 9164 is now the law that
public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a prescribes the qualifications of candidates and voters for the SK
public office. In Cornejo v. Gabriel,34 decided in 1920, the Court already elections. This law also fixes the date of the SK elections. Petitioners are
ruled: not even assailing the constitutionality of RA No. 9164. RA No. 9164
enjoys the presumption of constitutionality and will apply to the July 15,
"Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law 2002 SK elections.
prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office a
"property." It is, however, well settled x x x that a public office Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or with grave
is not property within the sense of the constitutional abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by petitioners contradict
agency. x x x The basic idea of the government x x x is that of a their allegation of illegality. The evidence consist of the following: (1)
popular representative government, the officers being mere Comelec en banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 that
agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set recommended the postponement of the SK elections to 2003; (2) the
of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but letter of then Comelec Chairman Benipayo addressed to the Speaker of
where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate; and (3)
the law and holds the office as a trust for the people he the Conference Committee Report consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050
represents." (Emphasis supplied) and House Bill No. 4456.

30
The Comelec exercised its power and duty to "enforce and administer all controversy. Petitioners do not cite any provision of law that is alleged to
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, be unconstitutional. Lastly, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the
initiative, referendum and recall"37 and to "recommend to Congress part of public respondents.
effective measures to minimize election spending."38 The Comelec's acts
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
duties.39 These acts cannot constitute proof, as claimed by petitioners,
that there "exists a connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in SO ORDERED.
contravention of the present law." As the Court held in Pangkat Laguna v.
Comelec,40 the "Comelec, as the government agency tasked with the
enforcement and administration of elections laws, is entitled to the
presumption of regularity of official acts with respect to the elections." G.R. No. 132986. May 19, 2004. *

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SENATE


The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR.,
and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of respondents.
elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec committed grave Actions; Election Law; Moot and Academic Issues; A case
abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of
becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual
the May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in
establish that the Comelec has demonstrated an earnest effort to address
the practical problems in holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The passing upon the merits.—At any rate, we agree with the Solicitor
presumption remains that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to General that the petition has become moot and academic. The
Congress the postponement of the elections was made in good faith in tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of this petition
the regular course of its official duties. expired as early as June 30, 1998. A case becomes moot and
academic when there is no more actual controversy between the
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a merits. In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that “where the issues
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
law.41 Public respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or
constitutional powers and duties, we find no grave abuse of discretion in value.”
their assailed acts.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Petitioners contend that the postponement of the SK elections would
allow the incumbent SK officers to perpetuate themselves in power,
depriving other youths of the opportunity to serve in elective SK positions.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
This argument deserves scant consideration. While RA No. 9164 Ponce Enrile, Reyes and Manalastas for petitioner.
contains a hold-over provision, incumbent SK officials can remain in Pimentel, Yusingco, Pimentel and Garcia Law Officesfor
office only until their successors have been elected or qualified. On July private respondent.
15, 2002, when the SK elections are held, the hold-over period expires
and all incumbent SK officials automatically cease to hold their SK offices SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
and their ex-officio public offices.
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
In sum, petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing for having been issued with grave
maintaining this suit. This petition presents no actual justiciable abuse of discretion Resolution 97-221 denying petitioner’s Motion to

31
Annul/Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentel’s Protest and to Conduct In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET admitted there was an
Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of All Parties; and "oversight," hence, the tally of votes for Paoay, Ilocos Norte should be
Resolution No. 98-022 denying his motion for reconsideration in SET made. Consequently, the 30,000 votes deducted by the SET from those
Case No. 001-95, "Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. vs. Gregorio B. Honasan, et al." garnered by petitioner were "given back to him."

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Nevertheless, the SET denied petitioner’s motion, holding that there is no
sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation.
On January 20, 1995, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, private
respondent herein, filed with the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) "The Tribunal took pains in reviewing its records and hereby
an election protest against Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner, acknowledges that an adjustment should be made in the tally of
and other senatorial candidates who won in the May 1995 votes for the Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte. However, the
senatorial elections, docketed as SET Case No. 001-95. On June Tribunal alone should not be faulted for this oversight. Although
30, 1995, petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. the Regional Tally for Region I was offered in evidence by the
Protestant, Protestee Enrile, far from claming that the same
Issues having been joined, the SET required the parties to submit the list reflected the accurate number of votes garnered by the senatorial
of pilot precincts numbering not more that 25% of the total precincts candidates, even went to the extent of objecting to its
involved in respondent’s protest. Subsequently, the SET conducted the admissibility.
revision of ballots in the pilot precincts, namely: Paoay, Ilocos Norte;
Tarlac, Tarlac; Tawi-Tawi; Maguindanao; Sulu; Bulacan; Lanao del Sur; In the province of Ilocos Norte, the vote total of Enrile in the
Lanao del Norte; Pasig City; Biñan, Laguna; Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija; SOV/M of 65,343 is listed in the PCOC at 95,343 or an increase
Pangasinan; Agusan del Sur and Agusan del Norte. Thereafter, the SET of 30,000 votes. As unearthed, Enrile’s votes had already been
directed the parties to submit their evidence and memoranda. corrected by the COMELEC in the Regional Tally such that the
30,000 votes deducted by the Tribunal must be, as it is hereby,
On August 21, 1997, the SET, without resolving the election protest, held given back to him. Similarly, Mitra regains the 20,000 votes
a press conference at the Supreme Court Session Hall announcing the deducted from him in this province.
partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts.
A press release entitled "Partial Results in Pimentel’s Protest"3 was then These corrections, notwithstanding, the Tribunal finds no
issued accompanied by the tabulation of votes for the parties. In the said sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation. In fact, the ranking
tabulation, the name of petitioner dropped from number 11 to number of the parties is not at all affected by the omission.
15.4
Finally, to grant Enrile’s prayer to have himself represented in the
On September 24, 1997, petitioner filed a "Motion to Set Aside Partial appreciation of ballots by the Tribunal amounts to an
Results in Pimentel’s Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of encroachment on judicial functions. Needless to state,
Ballots in the Presence of All Parties."5 Petitioner alleged that the partial appreciation of evidence is the Tribunal’s exclusive domain."
results were manifestly erroneous. The SET then issued Resolution No.
97-20 requiring all the parties to file their respective comments on Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration but was denied by the SET
petitioner’s motion. Only respondent and Senator Nikki Coseteng filed in its Resolution No. 98-02.
their separate comments alleging, among others, that petitioner’s motion
is premature considering that the SET has not yet resolved respondent’s Hence, this petition, petitioner contending that:
election protest.
"A.

32
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF In its assailed Resolution No. 97-22, the SET explained the process in
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF determining the partial results, thus:
JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT NO SIFFICIENT BASIS
EXISTS TO ANNUL THE MANIFESTLY ERRONEOUS "The entire process in determining the parties’ votes in the pilot
TABULATION OF THE RESULTS OF REVISION AND municipalities is explained in the corresponding written reports
APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS. thereon shortly to be completed. In the meantime, let it be
stressed that the proceedings conducted by the Tribunal with
B. respect to the pilot areas of Protestant Pimentel consisted of
several stages or steps, to wit:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED PATENT AND GROSS
ERROR IN RECTIFYING THE RESULTS OF THE PHYSICAL a. Recount and revision of the ballots where the parties
COUNT, AS REFELCTED IN THE REVISION RPORTS BY are represented;
USING OTHER ELECTIOB DOCUMENTS.
b. Recount and revision of the ballots where the parties
C. are represented;

PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF c. Examination of the different election documents
DISCRETION WHEN IT RELEASED "PARTIAL AND including the verification of the accuracy of the addition of
TENTATIVE" RESULTS WHICH CAUSED GRAVE PREJUDICE the figures appearing on Statement of Votes by Precincts
TO HEREIN PETITIONER. (SOV/M or SOV/C); and

D. d. Comparison of the figures appearing on the SOV/P, the


Municipal or City Certificate of Canvass (MCOC or
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF CCOPC), the SOV/M or SOV/C and the Provincial
DISCRETION IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT Certificate of Canvass (PCOC).
ENTITLED TO BE HEARD IN THE APPRECIATION
PROCEEDINGS." From the arguments of protestee Enrile, it is apparent that only
the revision of ballots and the SOV/P were taken into account.
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the SET committed Worse, he speculated on the rulings made in the appreciation of
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s "Motion To Set Aside ballots.
Partial Results in Pimentel’s Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation
of Ballots in the Presence of all Parties." xxx

Petitioner contends that the partial results released by the SET are Put differently, the number of ballots objected to against a
erroneous because they are improbable and not supported by evidence. particular party is not necessarily the maximum number of votes
that may be deducted from the said party, in the same way as the
In their comments, both respondent and the Solicitor General maintain number of ballots/votes claimed by a party is not necessarily the
that the SET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the maximum number of votes that may be credited to said party. As
challenged Resolutions. Furthermore, the Solicitor General asserts that a result of the appreciation of the contested ballots, the parties
the "present petition has become moot and academic because the tenure may be deducted more votes than the number of ballots
of the contested senatorial position subject of respondent’s protest where specifically objected to against them, or may be credited with
the assailed Resolutions originated expired on June 30, 1998." additional votes even if the parties made no claims.
33
Aside from the ruling on the claims and objections, the Tribunal In Garcia vs. COMELEC,7 we held that "where the issues have become
likewise verified the accuracy of the counting of ballots done by moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering
the revision teams. Errors in the revision reports were rectified the resolution of the same of no practical use or value."
which also resulted in the addition to, or deduction of votes from
the parties. Likewise, in Gancho-on vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment,8 we
ruled:
Consistent with the allegation of Protestant Pimentel that
‘Operation Dagdag-Bawas’ was affected through the padding or "It is a rule of universal application that courts of justice
deduction of votes in the different election documents, the constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider
Tribunal also conducted accuracy checks on the addition of the questions in which no actual interests are involved; they decline
figures appearing on the SOV/P and the SOV/M. The verification jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has become moot
process disclosed errors which have resulted in the addition or and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a
deduction of votes from the parties. declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. There
is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be
To ensure that the correct figures were recorded from one entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the
election document to the other, the Tribunal compared the figures petition."
appearing on the SOV/P vis-à-vis the MCOC/CCOC; the
MCOC/CCOC with the PCOC. Where the discrepancies in the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
figures were noted, the corresponding adjustments were made
which resulted in the addition or deduction of votes from the SO ORDERED.
parties.
G.R. No. 157509 January 18, 2005
Thus, while the votes of the parties in the municipal level are
determined through the counting and appreciation of the ballots,
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY WORKERS ALLIANCE (AIWA) and its
the votes of the parties on the provincial level are also adjusted
Affiliated Unions: Mitsubishi Motors Workers Phils. Union;
on the basis of the comparison of the different election
Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Supervisors Union, Nissan Motors Phils.,
documents. The written report/decision on the pilot precincts,
Inc. Workers Union, Toyota Motors Phils. Workers Union,
soon to be released, contains the specifics and sets forth in detail
DURASTEEL WORKERS UNION, FILSHUTTERS EMPLOYEES &
the reason for each addition or deduction of votes."
WORKERS UNION, NATIONAL LABOR UNION, PEPSI-COLA
SUPERVISORS AND EMPLOYEES UNION, PSBA FACULTY
The above process clearly shows why the figures presented by petitioner ASSOCIATION, PLDT SECURITY PERSONNEL UNION, PUREFOODS
in his motion do not tally with the figures released by the SET. UNIFIED LABOR ORGANIZATION, SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG
BICUTAN CONTAINERS CORP., SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG
At any rate, we agree with the Solicitor General that the petition has CINDERELLA, SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG LAURA’S FOOD
become moot and academic. The tenure of the contested senatorial PRODUCTS, petitioners,
position subject of this petition expired as early as June 30, 1998. vs.
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual and HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Secretary of
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in Labor and Employment, respondents.
passing upon the merits.6
DECISION

34
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: maintain that a taxpayer suit will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not
require additional appropriation for its implementation. As the petition can
Petitioners, composed of ten (10) labor unions, call upon this Court to be decided without passing on the validity of the subject executive order,
exercise its power of judicial review to declare as unconstitutional an respondents conclude that the same should be forthwith dismissed.
executive order assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers. Even on the merits, respondents advance the view that the petition must
fail as the administrative supervision granted by the Labor Code to the
In an original action for certiorari, petitioners invoke their status as labor NLRC Chairman over the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel,
unions and as taxpayers whose rights and interests are allegedly violated does not place them beyond the President’s broader power of control and
and prejudiced by Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March 2003 supervision, a power conferred no less than by the Constitution in Section
whereby administrative supervision over the National Labor Relations 17, Article VII thereof. Thus, in the exercise of the President’s power of
Commission (NLRC), its regional branches and all its personnel including control and supervision, he can generally oversee the operations of the
the executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was transferred from the NLRC, its regional branches and personnel thru his alter ego, the
NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. In support Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the doctrine of qualified political agency.
of their position,1 petitioners argue that the NLRC -- created by
Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, during In their Reply,5 petitioners affirm their locus standi contending that they
Martial Law – was an integral part of the Department (then Ministry) of are suing for and in behalf of their members – estimated to be more or
Labor and Employment (DOLE) under the administrative supervision of less fifty thousand (50,000) workers – who are the real parties to be
the Secretary of Justice. During the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, affected by the resolution of this Court. They likewise maintain that they
and while she was endowed with legislative functions after EDSA I, are suing in behalf of the employees of the NLRC who have pending
Executive Order No. 2922 was issued whereby the NLRC became an cases for dismissal. Thus, possessed of the necessary standing,
agency attached to the DOLE for policy and program coordination and for petitioners theorize that the issue before this Court must necessarily be
administrative supervision. On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor decided as it involves an act of the Chief Executive amending a provision
Code was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715 declaring that of law.
the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy
coordination only while the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its For clarity, E.O. No. 185 is hereby quoted:
regional branches and personnel, was turned over to the NLRC
Chairman. The subject E.O. No. 185, in authorizing the Secretary of EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 185
Labor to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional
branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-Rep. Act No. 6715
AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT TO
set-up, amending the latter law which only Congress can do.
EXERCISE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
The respondents herein, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General, opposed the petition on procedural3and substantive4 grounds.
WHEREAS, Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides that the
Procedurally, it is alleged that the petition does not pose an actual case
President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
or controversy upon which judicial review may be exercised as petitioners
offices and shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed;
have not specifically cited how E.O. No. 185 has prejudiced or threatened
to prejudice their rights and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers.
Closely intertwined therewith, respondents further argue that petitioners WHEREAS, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which was
have no locus standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not even in created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 442, otherwise known as the
their capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are exempt "Labor Code of the Philippines," is an agency under the Executive
from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997. Even Department and was originally envisaged as being an integral part of the
assuming that their individual members are taxpayers, respondents Department (then Ministry) of Labor and Employment (DOLE) under the
35
administrative supervision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment SECTION 1. Authority To Exercise Administrative Supervision. – The
("Secretary of Labor"); Secretary of Labor is hereby authorized to exercise administrative
supervision over the NLRC, its regional branches and all its personnel,
WHEREAS, upon the issuance of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise including the Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters, with the
known as the "Revised Administrative Code of 1987" (the "Administrative objective of improving the rate of disposition of cases pending before it
Code"), the NLRC, by virtue of Section 25, Chapter 6, Title VII, Book IV and its regional and sub-regional branches or provincial extension units
thereof, became an agency attached to the DOLE for policy and program and to institute adequate measures for the prevention of graft and
coordination and administrative supervision; corruption within the said agency.

WHEREAS, Article 213 of the Labor Code and Section 25, Chapter 6, For this purpose, the Secretary of Labor shall, among others:
Title VII, Book IV of the Administrative Code were amended by Republic
Act. No. 6715 approved on March 2, 1989, which provides that the NLRC a. Generally oversee the operations of the NLRC and its regional
shall be attached to the DOLE for program and policy coordination only and sub-regional branches or provincial extension units for the
and transferred administrative supervision over the NLRC, all its regional purpose of ensuring that cases pending before them are decided
branches and personnel to the NLRC Chairman; or resolved expeditiously;

WHEREAS, Section 16, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right b. Require the submission of reports as the Secretary of Labor
of all persons to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, may deem necessary;
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies;
c. Initiate measures within the agency to prevent graft and
WHEREAS, the Secretary of Labor, after evaluating the NLRC’s corruption, including but not limited to, the conduct of
performance record in the last five (5) years, including the rate of management audits, performance evaluations and inspections to
disposition of pending cases before it, has informed the President that determine compliance with established policies, standards and
there is a need to expedite the disposition of labor cases pending before guidelines;
the NLRC and all its regional and sub-regional branches or provincial
extension units and initiate potent measures to prevent graft and d. To take such action as may be necessary for the proper
corruption therein so as to reform its systems and personnel, as well as performance of official functions, including rectification of
infuse the organization with a sense of public service in consonance with violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; and
the imperative of change for the greater interest of the people;
e. Investigate, on its own or upon complaint, matters involving
WHEREAS, after consultations with the relevant sectors, the Secretary of disciplinary action against any of the NLRC’s personnel, including
Labor has recommended that the President, pursuant to her powers Presidential appointees, in accordance with existing laws, rules
under the Constitution and existing laws, authorize the Secretary of Labor and regulations. After completing his/her investigation, the
to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC and all its regional Secretary of Labor shall submit a report to the President on the
and sub-regional branches or provincial extension units with the objective investigation conducted with a recommendation as to the penalty
of improving the rate of disposition of pending cases and institute to be imposed or other action to be taken, including referral to the
adequate measures for the prevention of graft and corruption within the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), the Office of the
said agency; Ombudsman or any other office, committee, commission, agency,
department, instrumentality or branch of the government for
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, President of appropriate action.
the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution and existing laws, do hereby order:

36
The authority conferred herein upon the Secretary of Labor shall not The constitutionality of a governmental act having been challenged, it
extend to the power to review, reverse, revise, or modify the decisions of comes as no surprise that the first line of defense is to question the
the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (cf. Section 38(2) standing of petitioners and the justiciability of herein case.
(b), Chapter 7, Book IV, Administrative Code).
It is hornbook doctrine that the exercise of the power of judicial review
SECTION 2. Report to the Secretary of Labor. – The NLRC, through its requires the concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) the
Chairman, shall submit a report to the Secretary of Labor within thirty (30) existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial
days from issuance of this Executive Order, on the following matters: by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity
a. Performance Report/Audit for the last five (5) years, including that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the
list of pending cases and cases disposed of within the said period case.71awphi1.nét

by the NLRC en banc, by Division and by the Labor Arbiters in


each of its regional and sub-regional branches or provincial As correctly pointed out by respondents, judicial review cannot be
extension units; exercised in vacuo. The function of the courts is to determine
controversies between litigants and not to give advisory opinions.8 The
b. Detailed Master Plan on how to liquidate its backlog of cases power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona
with clear timetables to clean up its dockets within six (6) months fide case or controversy which involves the statute sought to be
from the issuance hereof; reviewed.9

c. Complete inventory of its assets and list of personnel indicating Even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may
their present positions and stations; and refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is
brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge
d. Such other matters as may be required by the Secretary of it.10 Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a "personal and
Labor. substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged."11 For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he
SECTION 3. Rules and Regulations. – The Secretary of Labor, in
has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
consultation with the Chairman of the NLRC, is hereby authorized to
illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
issue rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
provisions of this Executive Order.
action.12
SECTION 4. Repealing Clause. All laws, executive issuances, rules and
Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of
regulations or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No.
this Executive Order are hereby repealed, amended, or modified
185. As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that
accordingly.
E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering that the
scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not
SECTION 5. Effectivity. – This Executive Order shall take effect extend to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the decisions of
immediately upon the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.13 Thus, only
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. NLRC personnel who may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of
Labor’s disciplinary authority, conferred by Section 1(d) of the subject
City of Manila, March 10, 2003.6 executive order, may be said to have a direct and specific interest in
raising the substantive issue herein. Moreover, and if at all, only

37
Congress, and not petitioners, can claim any injury14 from the alleged In fine, considering that the governmental act being questioned has a
executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify limited reach, its impact confined to corridors of the executive
and/or repeal laws. department, this is not one of those exceptional occasions where the
Court is justified in sweeping aside a critical procedural requirement,
Neither can standing be conferred on petitioners as taxpayers since rooted as it is in the constitutionally enshrined principle of separation of
petitioners have not established disbursement of public funds in powers. As succinctly put by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
contravention of law or the Constitution.15 A taxpayer’s suit is properly dissenting opinion in the first Kilosbayan case:19
brought only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of
Congress.16 As correctly pointed out by respondents, E.O. No. 185 does . . . [C]ourts are neither free to decide all kinds of cases dumped into their
not even require for its implementation additional appropriation. laps nor are they free to open their doors to all parties or entities claiming
a grievance. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus
All told, if we were to follow the strict rule on locus standi, this petition standi is by no means trifle. It is intended "to assure a vigorous adversary
should be forthwith dismissed on that score. The rule on standing, presentation of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the
however, is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for judiciary’s overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators elected organ of government."20 It thus goes to the very essence of
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of representative democracies.
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.17 1aw phi 1.nét ...

The question is, does the issue posed in this petition meet the exacting A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons
standard required for this Court to take the liberal approach and who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given
recognize the standing of herein petitioners? the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient
judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to
The instant petition fails to persuade us. indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for
them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render
The subject matter of E.O. No. 185 is the grant of authority by the themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil
President to the Secretary of Labor to exercise administrative supervision that clearly confronts our judiciary today.
over the NLRC, its regional branches and all its personnel, including the
Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. Its impact, sans the All things considered, whether or not E.O. No. 185 is indeed
challenge to its constitutionality, is thereby limited to the departments to unconstitutional will have to await the proper party in a proper case to
which it is addressed. Taking our cue from the early case of Olsen v. assail its validity.
Herstein and Rafferty,18 the subject executive order can be considered as
nothing more or less than a command from a superior to an inferior. It WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition dated 27 March
creates no relation except between the official who issued it and the 2003 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.
officials who received it. It has for its object simply the efficient and
economical administration of the affairs of the department to which it is SO ORDERED.
issued in accordance with the law governing the subject matter.
Administrative in its nature, the subject order does not pass beyond the
G.R. No. 149036. April 2, 2002. *
limits of the departments to which it is directed, hence, it has not created
any rights in third persons, not even in the fifty thousand or so union MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner, vs. ALFREDO
members being represented by petitioners who may or may not have L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO
pending cases before the labor arbiters or the NLRC. A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE
38
GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge, Finance 50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Services Department of the Commission on Elections, Matibag vs. Benipayo
respondents. the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity.
Courts; Judicial Review; An employee’s personal and The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it
substantial injury, if a particular appointee is not the lawful in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same,
COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to such that, “if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered
raise the constitutional issue regarding the ad interim appointment at the trial, and, if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered
of said COMELEC Chairman.—Benipayo reassigned petitioner on appeal.” Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad
from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to the Law interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed
Department, where she was placed on detail service. Respondents her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for
claim that the reassignment was “pursuant to x x x Benipayo’s pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body.
authority as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and as the Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound
Commission’s Chief Executive Officer.” Evidently, respondents discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon.
anchor the legality of petitioner’s reassignment on Benipayo’s There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time.
authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. The real issue then turns Same; Same; In keeping with the Supreme Court’s duty to
on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the determine whether other agencies of government have remained
COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting Director of the EID, within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
her reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is not the lawful discretion given them, the Supreme Court may even brush aside
COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the Constitution. On the technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue
other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman because raised.—In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount
he assumed office in accordance with the Constitution, then importance to the public. The legality of the directives and decisions
petitioner’s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain made by the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national
provided the reassignment is in accordance with the Civil Service elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised by
Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake in the petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this Court’s duty to
resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayo’s assumption of office. determine whether other agencies of government have remained
Petitioner’s personal and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the
lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus discretion given them, this Court may even brush aside
standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition. technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue
Same; Same; The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional raised. Here the petitioner has complied with all the requisite
issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires the resolution of
resolve the same.—Respondents harp on petitioner’s belated act of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
questioning the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Administrative Law; Public Officers; Appointments; Words and
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition Phrases; An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment
only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad interim appointments because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date by the President once the appointee has qualified into office—the fact
of filing of the petition that determines whether that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
______________ does not alter its permanent character.—An ad interim appointment
is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and
*EN BANC.
50 can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
39
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the person thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen
character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His
permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by title to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution,
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the Commission
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’ ”
Constitution provides as follows: “The President shall have the Same; Same; Same; Same; The term “ad interim appointment,”
51 as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
VOL. 380, APRIL 2, 2002 51 permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that
Matibag vs. Benipayo Congress is in recess.—The term “ad interim appointment”, as used
power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time. The
(Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim appointment term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has
remains effective untilsuch disapproval or next adjournment, acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.
signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the The Court had again occasion to explain the nature of an ad
President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at interimappointment in the
any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly 52
without basis. 52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution imposes no Matibag vs. Benipayo
condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, where
an ad interim appointment takes effect immediately; In case of an the Court stated: “We have already mentioned that an ad
appointment made by the President when Congress is in session, the interimappointment is not descriptive of the nature of the
President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment
on Appointments may the person thus named assume office, while is temporary or in an acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner
with reference to an ad interim appointment, it takes effect at once, in which the appointment was made. In the instant case, the
and the individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU
without loss of time.—The Constitution imposes no condition on the President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation as
effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent’s
interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at appointment as Executive Assistant II was recognized and attested
once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No.
pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on 12. Petitioner’s submission that private respondent’s ad interim
Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad appointment is synonymous with a temporary appointment which
interim appointment as follows: “A distinction is thus made between could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad
the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation interim appointments are permanent but their terms are only until
by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session the Board disapproves them.”(Emphasis supplied)
and when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment becomes
only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office,
40
and the withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; An appointment or
possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the designation in a temporary or acting capacity is the kind of
moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from
tantamount to removal from office.—An ad interim appointee who making to the three independent constitutional commissions.—
has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable
government employee and therefore part of the civil service. He except as provided by law, an appointment or designation in a
enjoys the constitutional protection that “[n]o officer or employee in temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the
the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or acting appointee
provided by law.” Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is
complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the
office. The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment President from making to the three independent constitutional
is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the commissions, including the COMELEC.
moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Commissions; Commission
is tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has on Elections; Statutory Construction; To hold that the independence
qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
not only by statute but also by the Constitution. He can only be confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume
removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the office will negate the President’s power to make ad interim
requirements of due process. appointments.—While the Constitution mandates that the
Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment can be COMELEC “shall be independent,” this provision should be
terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution—first, by the harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad
disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on interimappointments. To hold that the independence of the
Appointments, and, second, by the adjournment of Congress without COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment.— confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes office will negate the President’s power to make ad
specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory
his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. construction to give meaning and effect to every provision of the law.
The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two Constitution.
causes are resolu- Same; Same; Same; Commission on Appointments; Principle of
53 Check and Balance; An ad interim appointee disapproved by the
VOL. 380, APRIL 2, 2002 53 Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new
Matibag vs. Benipayo appointment—the disapproval is a final decision of the Commission
tory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad on Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the
interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in appointing authority of the President.—There is no dispute that
effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. an ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on
No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointment. The
that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments
interimappointees. in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of

41
the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a from where the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the
refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent present Constitution on ad interim appointments was
54 lifted verbatim. The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED governing ad interim appointments by the President is doubtless
Matibag vs. Benipayo applicable to the present Constitution. The established practice
after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since under the present Constitution is that the President can renew the
the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, appointments of by-passed ad interim appointees. This is a
the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on continuation of the well-recognized practice under the 1935
the appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer Constitution, interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did
renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition not provide for a Commission on Appointments but vested sole
on reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission appointing power in the President.
on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment. 55
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A by-passed appointment is VOL. 380, APRIL 2, 2002 55
one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Matibag vs. Benipayo
Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition on
Congress.—An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution
lack of time or failure of the Commission on Appointments to applies neither to disapprove nor by-passed ad interim
organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has appointments.—The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2),
not been finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Article IX-C of the Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor
Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is no by-passed ad interim appointments. A disapproved ad
final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or interimappointment cannot be revived by another ad
withhold its consent to the appointment as required by the interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Section
Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointment
the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A
recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a new ad
Appointments, which provides as follows: “Section 17. Unacted interimappointment because there is no final disapproval under
Nominations or Appointments Returned to the Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new
President.Nominations or appointments submitted by the President appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond the
of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at the close of the fixed term of seven years.
session of Congress shall be returned to the President and, unless Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the
new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be Constitution made it quite clear that any person who has served any
considered by the Commission.” (Emphasis supplied) Hence, under term of office as COMELEC member—whether for a full term of
the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-passed seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for an
appointment can be considered again if the President renews the unexpired term of any length of time—can no longer be reappointed
appointment. to the COMELEC.—The framers of the Constitution made it quite
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The clear that any person who has served any term of office as
jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim COMELEC member—whether for a full term of seven years, a
appointments by the President is doubtless applicable to the present truncated term of five or three years, or even for an unexpired term
Constitution.—Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution of any length of time—can no longer be reappointed to the
42
COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this intent in the prohibition on reappointment can apply. To hold otherwise will
this manner: “MR. FOZ. But there is the argument made in the lead to absurdities and negate the President’s power to make ad
concurring opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in the case of Visarra interim appointments.
vs. Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court will not
applies only when the term or tenure is for seven years. But in cases subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital government
where the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he would services.—In the great majority of cases, the Commission on
be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying words Appointments usually fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad
“without reappointment” in the case of those appointed, then it is interimappointments first issued to appointees. If such ad
possible that an interpretation could be made later on their case, they interimappointments can no longer be renewed, the President will
can still be reappointed to serve for a total of seven years. Precisely, certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments because most of
we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear that even in the her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere inaction of
case of those first appointed under the Constitution, no the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the
reappointment can be made.” (Emphasis supplied) constitutional power of the President to make ad
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment interim appointments, a power intended to avoid disruptions in vital
that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does government services. This Court cannot subscribe to a proposition
not constitute a term of office—the period from the time the ad that will wreak havoc on vital government services.
interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The framers of the present
term nor an unexpired term.—However, an ad interim appointment Constitution prohibited reappointments for two reasons—first, to
that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments prevent a second appointment for those who have been previously
does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad appointed and confirmed even if they served for less than seven years,
interim appointment is made to the time it and, second, to insure that the members of the three constitutional
56 commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.—The
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional
Matibag vs. Benipayo commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited
lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second
otherwise would mean that the President by his unilateral action appointment for those who have been previously appointed and
could start and complete the running of a term of office in the confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second
COMELEC without the consent of the Commission on is to insure that the members of the three constitutional
Appointments. This interpretation renders inutile the confirming commissions do not serve beyond the fixed term of seven years.
power of the Commission on Appointments. 57
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The VOL. 380, APRIL 2, 2002 57
phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one who has been Matibag vs. Benipayo
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; One who has been given an
Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of ad interim appointment as COMELEC Chairman is a de jure officer,
office.—The phrase “without reappointment” applies only to one and consequently, he has full authority to exercise all the powers of
who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the that office for so long as his ad interim appointment remains
Commission on Appointments, whether or not such person effective; The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is
completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the expressly empowered on his own authority, without having to secure
Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the approval of the COMELEC en banc, to transfer or reassign
43
COMELEC personnel in accordance with Civil Service Law.— 58
Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess 58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
any color of title to the office of Chairman of the COMELEC. We Matibag vs. Benipayo
have ruled, however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC be considered permanent, and she can claim no security of
Chairman, and consequently he has full authority to exercise all the tenure in respect of that position.
powers of that office for so long as his ad interim appointment Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The COMELEC
remains effective. Under Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested with the power to
V of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chairman of the transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel, the COMELEC en banc
COMELEC is vested with the following power: “Section cannot arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean
7. Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties. The amending the Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC
Chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the en banc cannot legally do.—The proviso in COMELEC Resolution
Commission, shall: x x x (4) Make temporary assignments, rotate No. 3300, requiring due notice and hearing before any transfer or
and transfer personnelin accordance with the provisions of the Civil reassignment can be made within thirty days prior to election day,
Service Law.” (Emphasis supplied) The Chairman, as the Chief refers only to COMELEC field personnel and not to head office
Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly empowered on his own personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised Administrative
authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel in Code, the COMELEC Chairman is the sole officer specifically vested
accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this power, with the power to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The
the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the COMELEC Chairman will logically exercise the authority to
COMELEC en banc. transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel pursuant to COMELEC
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Transfers; Security of Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en banc cannot arrogate unto
Tenure; Career Executive Service; One who is not a Career Executive itself this power because that will mean amending the Revised
Service (CES) officer, nor a holder of a Career Executive Service Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot legally
Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for holding the do.
position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications Standards Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Election
(Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service Commission, does not Period; COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every
enjoy security of tenure as Director IV.—Petitioner’s appointment transfer or reassignment of COMELEC personnel, should carry the
papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15, 2000 and February 15, concurrence of the COMELEC as a collegial body.—COMELEC
2001, attached as Annexes “X”, “Y” and “Z” to her Petition, Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or
indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the EID reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the concurrence
only in an acting or temporary capacity. Petitioner is not a Career of the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No.
Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career 3300 to require such concurrence will render the resolution
Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for meaningless since the COMELEC en banc will have to approve
holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the every personnel transfer or reassignment, making the resolution
Qualifications Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 should be interpreted for what
Commission. Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure it is, an approval to effect transfers and reassignments of personnel,
as Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. without need of securing a second approval from the COMELEC en
Josefina G. Bacal, this Court held that: “As respondent does not banc to actually implement such transfer or reassignment.
have the rank appropriate for the position of Chief Public Attorney,
her appointment to that position cannot

44
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Commission on Appointments on May 22, 2001 the ad
Prohibition. interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason for
confirmation.6 However, the Commission on Appointments did not act on
said appointments.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin & On June 1, 2001, President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments
Martinez Law Offices for petitioner. of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason to the same positions and for the same
The Solicitor General for respondents. term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008.7 They took their oaths
of office for a second time. The Office of the President transmitted on
CARPIO, J.: June 5, 2001 their appointments to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation.8
The Case
Congress adjourned before the Commission on Appointments could act
Before us is an original Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the on their appointments. Thus, on June 8, 2001, President Macapagal
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra
order under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner Ma. and Tuason to the same positions.9 The Office of the President submitted
J. Angelina G. Matibag ("Petitioner" for brevity) questions the their appointments for confirmation to the Commission on
constitutionality of the appointment and the right to hold office of the Appointments.10 They took their oaths of office anew.
following: (1) Alfredo L. Benipayo ("Benipayo" for brevity) as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC" for brevity); and (2) In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a
Resurreccion Z. Borra ("Borra" for brevity) and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. Memorandum dated April 11, 200111 addressed to petitioner as Director IV
("Tuason" for brevity) as COMELEC Commissioners. Petitioner also of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco
questions the legality of the appointment of Velma J. Cinco1 ("Cinco" for Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the Law
brevity) as Director IV of the COMELEC’s Education and Information Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain
Department ("EID" for brevity). objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a Memorandum dated April 14,
200112 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner
The Facts Sadain questioned Benipayo’s failure to consult the Commissioner-in-
Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as
"Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then Chairperson On April 16, 2001, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief
Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On February 15, 2001, Department.13 Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier renewed again the appointment of Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government
petitioner to the same position in a "Temporary" capacity.2 offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the
election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001." Benipayo
denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001,14 citing
On March 22, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, which states
interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman,3 and Borra4 and Tuason5 as
in part:
COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of seven years and all
expiring on February 2, 2008. Benipayo took his oath of office and
assumed the position of COMELEC Chairman. Borra and Tuason "NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of
likewise took their oaths of office and assumed their positions as the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
COMELEC Commissioners. The Office of the President submitted to the Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the

45
foregoing prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby 1. Whether or not the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before
RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new employees or fill new positions this Court may exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional
and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the cases;
effective performance of its mandated functions during the
prohibited period, provided that the changes in the assignment of 2. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and
its field personnel within the thirty-day period before election day Tuason on the basis of the ad interimappointments issued by the
shall be effected after due notice and hearing." President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1
(2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the
COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23, 2001.15 Petitioner 3. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first
also filed an administrative and criminal complaint16 with the Law assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether
Department17 against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated or not the renewal of their ad interim appointments and subsequent
Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution assumption of office to the same positions violate the prohibition on
No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution;
pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
4. Whether or not Benipayo’s removal of petitioner from her position as
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department is
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the illegal and without authority, having been done without the approval of the
right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and COMELEC as a collegial body;
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that
the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the 5. Whether or not the Officer-in-Charge of the COMELEC’s Finance
constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well Services Department, in continuing to make disbursements in favor of
as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco, is acting in excess of jurisdiction.
its Chairman and members. Petitioner also assails as illegal her removal
as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
First Issue: Propriety of Judicial Review
Simultaneously, petitioner challenges the designation of Cinco as Officer-
in-Charge of the EID. Petitioner, moreover, questions the legality of the
disbursements made by COMELEC Finance Services Department Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites
Officer-in-Charge Gideon C. De Guzman to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason before this Court may exercise its power of judicial review in
by way of salaries and other emoluments. constitutional cases. Out of respect for the acts of the Executive
department, which is co-equal with this Court, respondents urge this
Court to refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of the ad
In the meantime, on September 6, 2001, President Macapagal Arroyo
interim appointments issued by the President to Benipayo, Borra and
renewed once again the ad interimappointments of Benipayo as
Tuason unless all the four requisites are present. These are: (1) the
COMELEC Chairman and Borra and Tuason as Commissioners,
existence of an actual and appropriate controversy; (2) a personal and
respectively, for a term of seven years expiring on February 2,
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional issue; (3) the
2008.18 They all took their oaths of office anew.
exercise of the judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case.19 Respondents
The Issues argue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in this case.
Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and
The issues for resolution of this Court are as follows: substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a direct
injury as a result of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out that

46
petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions Respondents harp on petitioner’s belated act of questioning the
assumed by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and
be directly injured by the appointments of these three respondents. Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when
the first ad interimappointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001.
Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the However, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether
constitutionality of the ad interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest
Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001 despite the fact that opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings
the ad interimappointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not
as early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the petition was filed after the raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not
third time that these three respondents were issued ad considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal."22 Petitioner
interim appointments. questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of
Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court,
Respondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legality of which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue
petitioner’s reassignment from the EID to the Law Department. before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the
Consequently, the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments is not exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be
the lis mota of this case. passed upon.23 There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue
on time.
We are not persuaded.
Moreover, the legality of petitioner’s reassignment hinges on the
constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad interimappointment and assumption of
Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting
office. Unless the constitutionality of Benipayo’s ad interim appointment
Director, to the Law Department, where she was placed on detail
and assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioner’s
service.20 Respondents claim that the reassignment was "pursuant to x x x
reassignment from the EID to the Law Department cannot be determined.
Benipayo’s authority as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and
Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue raised by
as the Commission’s Chief Executive Officer."21 Evidently, respondents
petitioner.
anchor the legality of petitioner’s reassignment on Benipayo’s authority
as Chairman of the COMELEC. The real issue then turns on whether or
not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to
is only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal the public. The legality of the directives and decisions made by the
basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections may be
by the Constitution. put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left
unresolved. In keeping with this Court’s duty to determine whether other
agencies of government have remained within the limits of the
On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELEC Chairman
Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, this Court
because he assumed office in accordance with the Constitution, then
may even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any
petitioner’s reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain
constitutional issue raised.24 Here the petitioner has complied with all the
provided the reassignment is in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
requisite technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires the resolution of
Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
the constitutionality of Benipayo’s assumption of office. Petitioner’s
personal and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC
Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the Second Issue: The Nature of an Ad Interim Appointment
constitutional issue in this petition.

47
Petitioner argues that an ad interim appointment to the COMELEC is a We find petitioner’s argument without merit.
temporary appointment that is prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
the Constitution, which provides as follows: An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes
effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the adjournment of Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
a temporary or acting capacity." (Emphasis supplied)
"The President shall have the power to make appointments
Petitioner posits the view that an ad interim appointment can be during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
withdrawn or revoked by the President at her pleasure, and can even be compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only
disapproved or simply by-passed by the Commission on Appointments. until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
For this reason, petitioner claims that an ad interim appointment is next adjournment of the Congress." (Emphasis supplied)
temporary in character and consequently prohibited by the last sentence
of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval
or next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or
Based on petitioner’s theory, there can be no ad interim appointment to revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or
the COMELEC or to the other two constitutional commissions, namely the revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is
Civil Service Commission and the Commission on Audit. The last utterly without basis.
sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution is also found in
Article IX-B and Article IX-D providing for the creation of the Civil Service More than half a century ago, this Court had already ruled that an ad
Commission and the Commission on Audit, respectively. Petitioner interim appointment is permanent in character. In Summers vs.
interprets the last sentence of Section 1 (2) of Article IX-C to mean that Ozaeta,25 decided on October 25, 1948, we held that:
the ad interim appointee cannot assume office until his appointment is
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments for only then does his "x x x an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of
appointment become permanent and no longer temporary in character. paragraph (4), Section 10, Article VII of the Constitution, which
provides that the ‘President shall have the power to make
The rationale behind petitioner’s theory is that only an appointee who is appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments can guarantee the appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
independence of the COMELEC. A confirmed appointee is beyond the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
influence of the President or members of the Commission on Congress.’ It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the
Appointments since his appointment can no longer be recalled or circumstance that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
disapproved. Prior to his confirmation, the appointee is at the mercy of on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad
both the appointing and confirming powers since his appointment can be interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other
terminated at any time for any cause. In the words of petitioner, a Sword than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is
of Damocles hangs over the head of every appointee whose confirmation of course distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is
is pending with the Commission on Appointments. merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is
issued." (Emphasis supplied)

48
The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of
interim appointment, and thus an ad interimappointment takes effect appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment
immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It
a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office. In Pacete vs. does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or
Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,26 this Court elaborated on revoked at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the
the nature of an ad interim appointment as follows: Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine
jurisprudence. The Court had again occasion to explain the nature of
"A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs.
presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission Court of Appeals,28 where the Court stated:
on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in
recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the "We have already mentioned that an ad interim appointment is
consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not
thus named assume office. It is not so with reference to ad interim indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in an acting
appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment
thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to
to such office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the private respondent by then MSU President Alonto, Jr. was issued
appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the Commission on without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.’" status of private respondent’s appointment as Executive Assistant
II was recognized and attested to by the Civil Service
Petitioner cites Black’s Law Dictionary which defines the term "ad interim" Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that
to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time being." Hence, petitioner private respondent’s ad interim appointment is synonymous with
argues that an ad interim appointment is undoubtedly temporary in a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated at any
character. This argument is not new and was answered by this Court time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent
in Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them."
Court,27 where we explained that: (Emphasis supplied)

"x x x From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner should An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes
experience difficulty in understanding the situation. Private respondent at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil
had been extended several ‘ad interim’ appointments which petitioner service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that "[n]o officer or
mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature. Perhaps, it employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
is the literal translation of the word ‘ad interim’ which creates such belief. cause provided by law."29 Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes
The term is defined by Black to mean "in the meantime" or "for the time complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office.
being". Thus, an officer ad interim is one appointed to fill a vacancy, or to The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible
discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he
incapacity of its regular incumbent (Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to
Fourth Edition, 1978). But such is not the meaning nor the use intended removal from office.30 Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a
in the context of Philippine law. In referring to Dr. Esteban’s legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by
appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and
appointments given to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.
which said appointments were made, that is, done by the President of the
Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in
originally vested by the University Charter with the power of appointment, the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad
is unable to act. x x x." (Emphasis supplied) interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second
49
cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on acting Commissioner would undermine the independence of the
Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes are COMELEC and hence violate the Constitution. We declared then: "It
resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad would be more in keeping with the intent, purpose and aim of the framers
interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a of the Constitution to appoint a permanent Commissioner than to
Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, designate one to act temporarily." (Emphasis supplied)
however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the
Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interimappointees. In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent
Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of
capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing Congress. They were not appointed or designated in a temporary or
power.31 A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in Brillantes vs.
tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Yorac34 and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs.
Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent Bautista.35 The ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC. Thus, in Brillantes are expressly allowed by the Constitution which authorizes the President,
vs. Yorac,32 this Court struck down as unconstitutional the designation by during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
then President Corazon Aquino of Associate Commissioner Haydee immediately.
Yorac as Acting Chairperson of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that:
While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be
"A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially independent"36 , this provision should be harmonized with the President’s
temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first
designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the confirm ad interim appointees before the appointees can assume office
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of will negate the President’s power to make ad interim appointments. This
the Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and effect
It is doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of
will not be estopped from challenging its withdrawal. the framers of the Constitution.

xxx The original draft of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution - on the
nomination of officers subject to confirmation by the Commission on
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the Appointments - did not provide for ad interim appointments. The original
independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among intention of the framers of the Constitution was to do away with ad
which is the security of tenure of its members. That guarantee is interim appointments because the plan was for Congress to remain in
not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the session throughout the year except for a brief 30-day compulsory recess.
Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the However, because of the need to avoid disruptions in essential
Philippines." government services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise to
reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on ad
Earlier, in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista,33 a case decided under the interim appointments. The following discussion during the deliberations of
1935 Constitution, which did not have a provision prohibiting temporary or the Constitutional Commission elucidates this:
acting appointments to the COMELEC, this Court nevertheless declared
unconstitutional the designation of the Solicitor General as acting "FR. BERNAS: X x x our compulsory recess now is only 30 days.
member of the COMELEC. This Court ruled that the designation of an So under such circumstances, is it necessary to provide for ad

50
interim appointments? Perhaps there should be a little discussion interruptions in vital government services that otherwise would result from
on that. prolonged vacancies in government offices, including the three
constitutional commissions. In his concurring opinion in Guevara vs.
xxx Inocentes,38 decided under the 1935 Constitution, Justice Roberto
Concepcion, Jr. explained the rationale behind ad interim appointments in
MS. AQUINO: My concern is that unless this problem is this manner:
addressed, this might present problems in terms of anticipating
interruption of government business, considering that we are not "Now, why is the lifetime of ad interim appointments so limited?
certain of the length of involuntary recess or adjournment of the Because, if they expired before the session of Congress, the evil
Congress. We are certain, however, of the involuntary sought to be avoided – interruption in the discharge of essential
adjournment of the Congress which is 30 days, but we cannot functions – may take place. Because the same evil would result if
leave to conjecture the matter of involuntary recess. the appointments ceased to be effective during the session of
Congress and before its adjournment. Upon the other hand, once
FR. BERNAS: That is correct, but we are trying to look for a Congress has adjourned, the evil aforementioned may easily be
formula. I wonder if the Commissioner has a formula x x x. conjured by the issuance of other ad interim appointments or
reappointments." (Emphasis supplied)
xxx
Indeed, the timely application of the last sentence of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution barely avoided the interruption of essential
MR. BENGZON: Madam President, apropos of the matter raised
government services in the May 2001 national elections. Following the
by Commissioner Aquino and after conferring with the
decision of this Court in Gaminde vs. Commission on
Committee, Commissioner Aquino and I propose the following
Appointments,39 promulgated on December 13, 2000, the terms of office
amendment as the last paragraph of Section 16, the wordings of
of constitutional officers first appointed under the Constitution would have
which are in the 1935 Constitution: THE PRESIDENT SHALL
to be counted starting February 2, 1987, the date of ratification of the
HAVE THE POWER TO MAKE APPOINTMENTS DURING THE
Constitution, regardless of the date of their actual appointment. By this
RECESS OF CONGRESS WHETHER IT BE VOLUNTARY OR
reckoning, the terms of office of three Commissioners of the COMELEC,
COMPULSORY BUT SUCH APPOINTMENTS SHALL BE
including the Chairman, would end on February 2, 2001.40
EFFECTIVE ONLY UNTIL DISAPPROVAL BY THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS OR UNTIL THE NEXT
ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONGRESS. Then COMELEC Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou was appointed only
on January 11, 2000 to serve, pursuant to her appointment papers, until
February 15, 2002,41 the original expiry date of the term of her
This is otherwise called the ad interim appointments.
predecessor, Justice Bernardo P. Pardo, who was elevated to this Court.
The original expiry date of the term of Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco
xxx Flores was also February 15, 2002, while that of Commissioner Julio F.
Desamito was November 3, 2001.42 The original expiry dates of the terms
THE PRESIDENT: Is there any objection to the proposed of office of Chairperson Demetriou and Commissioners Flores and
amendment of Commissioners Aquino and Bengzon, adding a Desamito were therefore supposed to fall after the May 2001 elections.
paragraph to the last paragraph of Section 16? (Silence) The Suddenly and unexpectedly, because of the Gaminde ruling, there were
Chair hears none; the amendment is approved."37 (Emphasis three vacancies in the seven-person COMELEC, with national elections
supplied) looming less than three and one-half months away. To their credit,
Chairperson Demetriou and Commissioner Flores vacated their offices on
Clearly, the reinstatement in the present Constitution of the ad February 2, 2001 and did not question any more before this Court the
interim appointing power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding applicability of the Gaminderuling to their own situation.
51
In a Manifestation43 dated December 28, 2000 filed with this Court in appointing officials who are subject to confirmation by the Commission on
the Gaminde case, Chairperson Demetriou stated that she was vacating Appointments. First, while Congress is in session, the President may
her office on February 2, 2001, as she believed any delay in choosing her nominate the prospective appointee, and pending consent of the
successor might create a "constitutional crisis" in view of the proximity of Commission on Appointments, the nominee cannot qualify and assume
the May 2001 national elections. Commissioner Desamito chose to file a office. Second, during the recess of Congress, the President may extend
petition for intervention44 in the Gaminde case but this Court denied the an ad interim appointment which allows the appointee to immediately
intervention. Thus, Commissioner Desamito also vacated his office on qualify and assume office.
February 2, 2001.
Whether the President chooses to nominate the prospective appointee or
During an election year, Congress normally goes on voluntary recess extend an ad interim appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the
between February and June considering that many of the members of the President because the Constitution grants her that power. This Court
House of Representatives and the Senate run for re-election. In 2001, the cannot inquire into the propriety of the choice made by the President in
Eleventh Congress adjourned from January 9, 2001 to June 3, the exercise of her constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion
2001.45 Concededly, there was no more time for Benipayo, Borra and amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, which has not
Tuason, who were originally extended ad interim appointments only on been shown in the instant case.
March 22, 2001, to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments
before the May 14, 2001 elections. The issuance by Presidents of ad interim appointments to the COMELEC
is a long-standing practice. Former President Corazon Aquino issued
If Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were not extended ad an ad interim appointment to Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg.47 Former
interim appointments to fill up the three vacancies in the COMELEC, President Fidel V. Ramos extended ad interim appointments to
there would only have been one division functioning in the COMELEC Commissioners Julio F. Desamito, Japal M. Guiani, Graduacion A.
instead of two during the May 2001 elections. Considering that the Reyes-Claravall and Manolo F. Gorospe.48 Former President Joseph
Constitution requires that "all x x x election cases shall be heard and Estrada also extended ad interim appointments to Commissioners Abdul
decided in division",46 the remaining one division would have been Gani M. Marohombsar, Luzviminda Tancangco, Mehol K. Sadain and
swamped with election cases. Moreover, since under the Constitution Ralph C. Lantion.49
motions for reconsideration "shall be decided by the Commission en
banc", the mere absence of one of the four remaining members would The President’s power to extend ad interim appointments may indeed
have prevented a quorum, a less than ideal situation considering that the briefly put the appointee at the mercy of both the appointing and
Commissioners are expected to travel around the country before, during confirming powers. This situation, however, is only for a short period -
and after the elections. There was a great probability that disruptions in from the time of issuance of the ad interim appointment until the
the conduct of the May 2001 elections could occur because of the three Commission on Appointments gives or withholds its consent. The
vacancies in the COMELEC. The successful conduct of the May 2001 Constitution itself sanctions this situation, as a trade-off against the evil of
national elections, right after the tumultuous EDSA II and EDSA III disruptions in vital government services. This is also part of the check-
events, was certainly essential in safeguarding and strengthening our and-balance under the separation of powers, as a trade-off against the
democracy. evil of granting the President absolute and sole power to appoint. The
Constitution has wisely subjected the President’s appointing power to the
Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant case of her checking power of the legislature.
constitutional power to make ad interimappointments prevented the
occurrence of the very evil sought to be avoided by the second paragraph This situation, however, does not compromise the independence of the
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to make ad COMELEC as a constitutional body. The vacancies in the COMELEC are
interim appointments is lodged in the President to be exercised by her in precisely staggered to insure that the majority of its members hold
her sound judgment. Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article confirmed appointments, and not one President will appoint all the
VII of the Constitution, the President can choose either of two modes in
52
COMELEC members.50 In the instant case, the Commission on authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on the merits,
Appointments had long confirmed four51 of the incumbent COMELEC being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent
members, comprising a majority, who could now be removed from office after deliberating on the qualifications of the appointee. Since the
only by impeachment. The special constitutional safeguards that insure Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the
the independence of the COMELEC remain in place.52 The COMELEC disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the
enjoys fiscal autonomy, appoints its own officials and employees, and appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew the
promulgates its own rules on pleadings and practice. Moreover, the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on
salaries of COMELEC members cannot be decreased during their tenure. reappointment, but because of a final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments extended by the
President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or
Commissioners, respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting failure of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter.
appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on
the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the
Third Issue: The Constitutionality of Renewals of Appointments session of Congress. There is no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment as
Petitioner also agues that assuming the first ad interim appointments and required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free
the first assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is
constitutional, the renewal of the their ad interim appointments and their recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on
subsequent assumption of office to the same positions violate the Appointments, which provides as follows:
prohibition on reappointment under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution, which provides as follows: "Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to
the President. Nominations or appointments submitted by the
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines which are not finally acted upon at
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first President and, unless new nominations or appointments are
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two made, shall not again be considered by the Commission."
Members for five years, and the last members for three (Emphasis supplied)
years, without reappointment. X x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, a by-
Petitioner theorizes that once an ad interim appointee is by-passed by the passed appointment can be considered again if the President renews the
Commission on Appointments, his ad interim appointment can no longer appointment.
be renewed because this will violate Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution which prohibits reappointments. Petitioner asserts that this is It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the President can renew the ad
particularly true to permanent appointees who have assumed office, interim appointments of by-passed appointees. Justice Roberto
which is the situation of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason if their ad Concepcion, Jr. lucidly explained in his concurring opinion in Guevara vs.
interim appointments are deemed permanent in character. Inocentes53 why by-passed ad interim appointees could be extended new
appointments, thus:
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new "In short, an ad interim appointment ceases to be effective upon
appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on disapproval by the Commission, because the incumbent can not
Appointments in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing continue holding office over the positive objection of the

53
Commission. It ceases, also, upon "the next adjournment of the situations where this provision will apply. The first situation is where
Congress", simply because the President may then issue new an ad interim appointee to the COMELEC, after confirmation by the
appointments - not because of implied disapproval of the Commission on Appointments, serves his full seven-year term. Such
Commission deduced from its inaction during the session of person cannot be reappointed to the COMELEC, whether as a member
Congress, for, under the Constitution, the Commission may affect or as a chairman, because he will then be actually serving more than
adversely the interim appointments only by action, never by seven years. The second situation is where the appointee, after
omission. If the adjournment of Congress were an implied confirmation, serves a part of his term and then resigns before his seven-
disapproval of ad interimappointments made prior thereto, then year term of office ends. Such person cannot be reappointed, whether as
the President could no longer appoint those so by-passed by the a member or as a chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement because a
Commission. But, the fact is that the President may reappoint reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more than seven
them, thus clearly indicating that the reason for said termination years. The third situation is where the appointee is confirmed to serve the
of the ad interim appointments is not the disapproval thereof unexpired term of someone who died or resigned, and the appointee
allegedly inferred from said omission of the Commission, but the completes the unexpired term. Such person cannot be reappointed,
circumstance that upon said adjournment of the Congress, the whether as a member or chair, to a vacancy arising from retirement
President is free to make ad interim appointments or because a reappointment will result in the appointee also serving more
reappointments." (Emphasis supplied) than seven years.

Guevara was decided under the 1935 Constitution from where the The fourth situation is where the appointee has previously served a term
second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the present Constitution of less than seven years, and a vacancy arises from death or resignation.
on ad interim appointments was lifted verbatim.54 The jurisprudence under Even if it will not result in his serving more than seven years, a
the 1935 Constitution governing ad interim appointments by the President reappointment of such person to serve an unexpired term is also
is doubtless applicable to the present Constitution. The established prohibited because his situation will be similar to those appointed under
practice under the present Constitution is that the President can renew the second sentence of Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.
the appointments of by-passed ad interim appointees. This is a This provision refers to the first appointees under the Constitution whose
continuation of the well-recognized practice under the 1935 Constitution, terms of office are less than seven years, but are barred from ever being
interrupted only by the 1973 Constitution which did not provide for a reappointed under any situation. Not one of these four situations applies
Commission on Appointments but vested sole appointing power in the to the case of Benipayo, Borra or Tuason.
President.
The framers of the Constitution made it quite clear that any person who
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the has served any term of office as COMELEC member – whether for a full
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad term of seven years, a truncated term of five or three years, or even for
interim appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be an unexpired term of any length of time – can no longer be reappointed to
revived by another ad interimappointment because the disapproval is the COMELEC. Commissioner Foz succinctly explained this intent in this
final under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a manner:
reappointment is prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the
Constitution. A by-passed ad interim appointment can be revived by a "MR. FOZ. But there is the argument made in the concurring
new ad interim appointment because there is no final disapproval under opinion of Justice Angelo Bautista in the case of Visarra vs.
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, and such new appointment will Miraflor, to the effect that the prohibition on reappointment applies
not result in the appointee serving beyond the fixed term of seven years. only when the term or tenure is for seven years. But in cases
where the appointee serves only for less than seven years, he
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution provides that "[t]he would be entitled to reappointment. Unless we put the qualifying
Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed x x x for a term of words "without reappointment" in the case of those appointed,
seven years without reappointment." (Emphasis supplied) There are four then it is possible that an interpretation could be made later on
54
their case, they can still be reappointed to serve for a total of To hold otherwise will lead to absurdities and negate the President’s
seven years. power to make ad interim appointments.

Precisely, we are foreclosing that possibility by making it clear In the great majority of cases, the Commission on Appointments usually
that even in the case of those first appointed under the fails to act, for lack of time, on the ad interim appointments first issued to
Constitution, no reappointment can be made."55 (Emphasis appointees. If such ad interim appointments can no longer be renewed,
supplied) the President will certainly hesitate to make ad interim appointments
because most of her appointees will effectively be disapproved by mere
In Visarra vs. Miraflor,56 Justice Angelo Bautista, in his concurring inaction of the Commission on Appointments. This will nullify the
opinion, quoted Nacionalista vs. De Vera57 that a "[r]eappointment constitutional power of the President to make ad interim appointments, a
is not prohibited when a Commissioner has held office only for, power intended to avoid disruptions in vital government services. This
say, three or six years, provided his term will not exceed nine Court cannot subscribe to a proposition that will wreak havoc on vital
years in all." This was the interpretation despite the express government services.
provision in the 1935 Constitution that a COMELEC member
"shall hold office for a term of nine years and may not be The prohibition on reappointment is common to the three constitutional
reappointed." commissions. The framers of the present Constitution prohibited
reappointments for two reasons. The first is to prevent a second
To foreclose this interpretation, the phrase "without reappointment" appointment for those who have been previously appointed and
appears twice in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the present Constitution. confirmed even if they served for less than seven years. The second is to
The first phrase prohibits reappointment of any person previously insure that the members of the three constitutional commissions do not
appointed for a term of seven years. The second phrase prohibits serve beyond the fixed term of seven years. As reported in the Journal of
reappointment of any person previously appointed for a term of five or the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Vicente B. Foz, who
three years pursuant to the first set of appointees under the Constitution. sponsored58 the proposed articles on the three constitutional
In either case, it does not matter if the person previously appointed commissions, outlined the four important features of the proposed
completes his term of office for the intention is to prohibit any articles, to wit:
reappointment of any kind.
"Mr. Foz stated that the Committee had introduced basic changes
However, an ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the in the common provision affecting the three Constitutional
Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The Commissions, and which are: 1) fiscal autonomy which provides
period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it (that) appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released
lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. To hold otherwise to the Commission in the same manner (as) provided for the
would mean that the President by his unilateral action could start and Judiciary; 2) fixed term of office without reappointment on a
complete the running of a term of office in the COMELEC without the staggered basis to ensure continuity of functions and to minimize
consent of the Commission on Appointments. This interpretation renders the opportunity of the President to appoint all the members during
inutile the confirming power of the Commission on Appointments. his incumbency; 3) prohibition to decrease salaries of the
members of the Commissions during their term of office; and 4)
The phrase "without reappointment" applies only to one who has been appointments of members would not require
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on confirmation."59 (Emphasis supplied)
Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term of office.
There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the There were two important amendments subsequently made by the
previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply. Constitutional Commission to these four features. First, as discussed
earlier, the framers of the Constitution decided to require confirmation by

55
the Commission on Appointments of all appointments to the constitutional circumvention of the prohibition on reappointment that may result in an
commissions. Second, the framers decided to strengthen further the appointee’s total term of office exceeding seven years. The evils sought
prohibition on serving beyond the fixed seven-year term, in the light of a to be avoided by the twin prohibitions are very specific - reappointment of
former chair of the Commission on Audit remaining in office for 12 years any kind and exceeding one’s term in office beyond the maximum period
despite his fixed term of seven years. The following exchange in the of seven years.
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:
Not contented with these ironclad twin prohibitions, the framers of the
"MR. SUAREZ: These are only clarificatory questions, Madam Constitution tightened even further the screws on those who might wish
President. May I call the sponsor’s attention, first of all, to Section to extend their terms of office. Thus, the word "designated" was inserted
2 (2) on the Civil Service Commission wherein it is stated: "In no to plug any loophole that might be exploited by violators of the
case shall any Member be appointed in a temporary or acting Constitution, as shown in the following discussion in the Constitutional
capacity." I detect in the Committee’s proposed resolutions a Commission:
constitutional hangover, if I may use the term, from the past
administration. Am I correct in concluding that the reason the "MR. DE LOS REYES: On line 32, between the words
Committee introduced this particular provision is to avoid an "appointed" and "in", I propose to insert the words OR
incident similar to the case of the Honorable Francisco Tantuico DESIGNATED so that the whole sentence will read: "In no case
who was appointed in an acting capacity as Chairman of the shall any Member be appointed OR DESIGNATED in a
Commission on Audit for about 5 years from 1975 until 1980, and temporary or acting capacity."
then in 1980, was appointed as Chairman with a tenure of
another 7 years. So, if we follow that appointment to (its) logical THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): What does the
conclusion, he occupied that position for about 12 years in Committee say?
violation of the Constitution?
MR. FOZ: But it changes the meaning of this sentence. The
MR. FOZ: It is only one of the considerations. Another is really to sentence reads: "In no case shall any Member be appointed in a
make sure that any member who is appointed to any of the temporary or acting capacity."
commissions does not serve beyond 7 years."60 (Emphasis
supplied)
MR. DE LOS REYES: Mr. Presiding Officer, the reason for this
amendment is that some lawyers make a distinction between an
Commissioner Christian Monsod further clarified the prohibition on appointment and a designation. The Gentleman will recall that in
reappointment in this manner: the case of Commissioner on Audit Tantuico, I think his term
exceeded the constitutional limit but the Minister of Justice opined
"MR. MONSOD. If the (Commissioner) will read the whole Article, that it did not because he was only designated during the time
she will notice that there is no reappointment of any kind and, that he acted as Commissioner on Audit. So, in order to erase
therefore as a whole there is no way that somebody can serve for that distinction between appointment and designation, we should
more than seven years. The purpose of the last sentence is to specifically place the word so that there will be no more
make sure that this does not happen by including in the ambiguity. "In no case shall any Member be appointed OR
appointment both temporary and acting capacities."61 (Emphasis DESIGNATED in a temporary or acting capacity."
supplied)
MR. FOZ: The amendment is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Plainly, the prohibition on reappointment is intended to insure that there
will be no reappointment of any kind. On the other hand, the prohibition MR. DE LOS REYES: Thank you.
on temporary or acting appointments is intended to prevent any

56
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Trenas): Is there any objection? xxx
(Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved."62
(4) Make temporary assignments, rotate and transfer personnel in
The ad interim appointments and subsequent renewals of appointments accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Law."
of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason do not violate the prohibition on (Emphasis supplied)
reappointments because there were no previous appointments that were
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. A reappointment The Chairman, as the Chief Executive of the COMELEC, is expressly
presupposes a previous confirmed appointment. The same ad empowered on his own authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC
interim appointments and renewals of appointments will also not breach personnel in accordance with the Civil Service Law. In the exercise of this
the seven-year term limit because all the appointments and renewals of power, the Chairman is not required by law to secure the approval of the
appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are for a fixed term expiring COMELEC en banc.
on February 2, 2008.63 Any delay in their confirmation will not extend the
expiry date of their terms of office. Consequently, there is no danger Petitioner’s appointment papers dated February 2, 1999, February 15,
whatsoever that the renewal of the ad interim appointments of these 2000 and February 15, 2001, attached as Annexes "X", "Y" and "Z" to her
three respondents will result in any of the evils intended to be exorcised Petition, indisputably show that she held her Director IV position in the
by the twin prohibitions in the Constitution. The continuing renewal of EID only in an acting or temporary capacity.64 Petitioner is not a Career
the ad interim appointment of these three respondents, for so long as Executive Service (CES) officer, and neither does she hold Career
their terms of office expire on February 2, 2008, does not violate the Executive Service Eligibility, which are necessary qualifications for
prohibition on reappointments in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the holding the position of Director IV as prescribed in the Qualifications
Constitution. Standards (Revised 1987) issued by the Civil Service
Commission.65 Obviously, petitioner does not enjoy security of tenure as
Fourth Issue: Respondent Benipayo’s Authority to Reassign Petitioner Director IV. In Secretary of Justice Serafin Cuevas vs. Atty. Josefina G.
Bacal,66 this Court held that:
Petitioner claims that Benipayo has no authority to remove her as
Director IV of the EID and reassign her to the Law Department. Petitioner "As respondent does not have the rank appropriate for the
further argues that only the COMELEC, acting as a collegial body, can position of Chief Public Attorney, her appointment to that position
authorize such reassignment. Moreover, petitioner maintains that a cannot be considered permanent, and she can claim no security
reassignment without her consent amounts to removal from office without of tenure in respect of that position. As held in Achacoso v.
due process and therefore illegal. Macaraig:

Petitioner’s posturing will hold water if Benipayo does not possess any ‘It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued
color of title to the office of Chairman of the COMELEC. We have ruled, only ‘to a person who meets all the requirements for the
however, that Benipayo is the de jure COMELEC Chairman, and position to which he is being appointed, including the
consequently he has full authority to exercise all the powers of that office appropriate eligibility prescribed.’ Achacoso did not. At
for so long as his ad interim appointment remains effective. Under best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only
Section 7 (4), Chapter 2, Subtitle C, Book V of the Revised Administrative as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will
Code, the Chairman of the COMELEC is vested with the following power: by the appointing authority and ‘at a moment’s notice’,
conformably to established jurisprudence x x x.
"Section 7. Chairman as Executive Officer; Powers and Duties.
The Chairman, who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career
Commission, shall: Service does not automatically confer security of tenure
on its occupant even if he does not possess the required

57
qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the the COMELEC from Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. The
nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his resolution states in part:
eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the
requisite qualifications for the position cannot be "WHEREAS, Sec. 56 and Sec. 261, paragraphs (g) and (h), of the
appointed to it in the first place, or as an exception to the Omnibus Election Code provides as follows:
rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in
the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment xxx
extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if
it may be so designated x x x.’"
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of
an election offense:
Having been appointed merely in a temporary or acting capacity, and not
possessed of the necessary qualifications to hold the position of Director
xxx
IV, petitioner has no legal basis in claiming that her reassignment was
contrary to the Civil Service Law. This time, the vigorous argument of
petitioner that a temporary or acting appointment can be withdrawn or (h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service
revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power happens to apply – Any public official who makes or causes any transfer or
squarely to her situation. detail whatever of any officer or employee in the civil
service including public school teachers, within the
election period except upon approval of the Commission.
Still, petitioner assails her reassignment, carried out during the election
period, as a prohibited act under Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election
Code, which provides as follows: WHEREAS, the aforequoted provisions are applicable to the
national and local elections on May 14, 2001;
"Section 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an
election offense: WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to appoint, transfer or
reassign personnel of the Commission on Elections during the
prohibited period in order that it can carry out its constitutional
xxx
duty to conduct free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections;
(h) Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service - Any
public official who makes or causes any transfer or detail
"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections by virtue of
whatever of any officer or employee in the civil service including
the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
public school teachers, within the election period except upon
Election Code and other election laws, as an exception to the
prior approval of the Commission."
foregoing prohibitions, has RESOLVED, as it is hereby
RESOLVED, to appoint, hire new employees or fill new positions
Petitioner claims that Benipayo failed to secure the approval of the and transfer or reassign its personnel, when necessary in the
COMELEC en banc to effect transfers or reassignments of COMELEC effective performance of its mandated functions during the
personnel during the election period.67 Moreover, petitioner insists that the prohibited period, provided that the changes in the assignment of
COMELEC en banc must concur to every transfer or reassignment of its field personnel within the thirty-day period before election day
COMELEC personnel during the election period. shall be effected after due notice and hearing." (Emphasis
supplied)
Contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the COMELEC did in fact issue
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000,68 exempting The proviso in COMELEC Resolution No. 3300, requiring due notice and
hearing before any transfer or reassignment can be made within thirty
58
days prior to election day, refers only to COMELEC field personnel and SO ORDERED.
not to head office personnel like the petitioner. Under the Revised
Administrative Code,69 the COMELEC Chairman is the sole G.R. No. 152895 June 15, 2004
officer specifically vested with the power to transfer or reassign
COMELEC personnel. The COMELEC Chairman will logically exercise OFELIA V. ARCETA, petitioner,
the authority to transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel pursuant to vs.
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300. The COMELEC en banc cannot The Honorable MA. CELESTINA C. MANGROBANG, Presiding
arrogate unto itself this power because that will mean amending the Judge, Branch 54, Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Metro
Revised Administrative Code, an act the COMELEC en banc cannot Manila, respondent.
legally do.
x--------------------------x
COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 does not require that every transfer or
reassignment of COMELEC personnel should carry the concurrence of
G.R. No. 153151 June 15, 2004
the COMELEC as a collegial body. Interpreting Resolution No. 3300 to
require such concurrence will render the resolution meaningless since the
COMELEC en banc will have to approve every personnel transfer or GLORIA S. DY, Petitioner,
reassignment, making the resolution utterly useless. Resolution No. 3300 vs.
should be interpreted for what it is, an approval to effect transfers and The Honorable EDWIN B. RAMIZO, Presiding Judge, Branch 53,
reassignments of personnel, without need of securing a second approval Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, respondent.
from the COMELEC en banc to actually implement such transfer or
reassignment. Remedial Law; Certiorari; Requisites before the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review when the issue of
The COMELEC Chairman is the official expressly authorized by law to unconstitutionality of a legal act is raised.—When the issue of
transfer or reassign COMELEC personnel. The person holding that office, unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established
in a de jure capacity, is Benipayo. The COMELEC en banc, in COMELEC doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review
Resolution No. 3300, approved the transfer or reassignment of only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and
COMELEC personnel during the election period. Thus, Benipayo’s order appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and
reassigning petitioner from the EID to the Law Department does not substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
violate Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code. For the same
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest
reason, Benipayo’s order designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID
is legally unassailable. opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis
mota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the
Fifth Issue: Legality of Disbursements to Respondents Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or
invalidity of an act of Congress.
Based on the foregoing discussion, respondent Gideon C. De Guzman, Same; Same; In a special civil action of certiorari the only
Officer-in-Charge of the Finance Services Department of the Commission question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent has
on Elections, did not act in excess of jurisdiction in paying the salaries acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
and other emoluments of Benipayo, Borra, Tuason and Cinco. discretion; A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a
grave abuse of discretion is manifested.—Perusal of these petitions
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against reveals that they are primarily anchored on Rule 65, Section 1 of the
petitioner. 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In a special civil action of certiorari
the only question that may be raised is whether or not the
59
respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with QUISUMBING, J.:
grave abuse of discretion. Yet nowhere in these petitions is there
any allegation that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of For resolution are two consolidated1 petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil of Court, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a
action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion temporary restraining order. Both assail the constitutionality of the
is manifested. Bouncing Checks Law, also known as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.
Same; Same; Court could not entertain questions on the
In G.R. No. 152895, petitioner Ofelia V. Arceta prays that we order the
invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised,
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas, Metro Manila, Branch 54, to
insisted upon, and adequately argued.—Seeking judicial review at
cease and desist from hearing Criminal Case No. 1599-CR for violation of
the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the B.P. Blg. 22, and then dismiss the case against her. In G.R. No. 153151,
matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity means that the question petitioner Gloria S. Dy also prays that this Court order the MeTC of
of unconstitutionality of the act in Caloocan City to cease and desist from proceeding with Criminal Case
_______________ No. 212183, and subsequently dismiss the case against her. In fine,
however, we find that what both petitioners seek is that the Court should
*EN BANC. revisit and abandon the doctrine laid down in Lozano v. Martinez,2 which
137
upheld the validity of the Bouncing Checks Law.
VOL. 432, JUNE 15, 2004 137
Arceta vs. Mangrobang The facts of these cases are not in dispute.
question should have been immediately raised in the
proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have 1. G.R. No. 152895
moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the
cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta
unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that with violating B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information, which was docketed as
petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings below. Criminal Case No. 1599-CR. The accusatory portion of said Information
Needless to emphasize, this Court could not entertain questions on reads:
the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically
raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Taking into account That on or about the 16th day of September 1998, in Navotas,
the early stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant petitions Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
are patently premature.
and feloniously make or draw and issue to OSCAR R. CASTRO,
to apply on account or for value the check described below:
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
Check No.: 00082270
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Drawn Against: The Region Bank
Rogelio P. Nogales for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents. In the Amount of: ₱740,000.00

RESOLUTION Date: December 21, 1998

60
of ANITA CHUA well knowing at the time of issue that she has no
Payable to: Cash
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment which check was
said accused well-knowing that at the time of issue Ofelia V. subsequently dishonored for the reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED"
Arceta did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee and with intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said
bank for the payment, which check when presented for payment complainant the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 despite receipt of
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently notice from the drawee bank that said check has been
dishonored by the drawee bank for reason "DRAWN AGAINST dishonored and had not been paid.
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS," and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee with the face Contrary to Law.5
amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving notice. Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the
ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 any move on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges
on said ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a
Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the petition with this Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the
Information quashed on the ground that B.P. Blg. 22 was said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.
unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in
place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly Both Arceta and Dy raise the following identical issues for our resolution:
unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go against
prevailing jurisprudence. [a] Does section 1 really penalize the act of issuing a check
subsequently dishonored by the bank for lack of funds?
On October 21, 2002,4 Arceta was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to
the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should be [b] What is the effect if the dishonored check is not paid pursuant
without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would to section 2 of BP 22?
take to suspend proceedings in the trial court.
[c] What is the effect if it is so paid?
Arceta then filed the instant petition.
[d] Does section 2 make BP 22 a debt collecting law under threat
2. G.R. No. 153151 of imprisonment?

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet [e] Does BP 22 violate the constitutional proscription against
against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed imprisonment for non-payment of debt?
by the MeTC of Caloocan City as Criminal Case No. 212183. Dy
allegedly committed the offense in this wise: [f] Is BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power of the state?6

That on or about the month of January 2000 in Caloocan City, After minute scrutiny of petitioners’ submissions, we find that the basic
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this issue being raised in these special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there and mandamus concern the unconstitutionality or invalidity of B.P. Blg.
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make and issue Check No. 22. Otherwise put, the petitions constitute an oblique attack on the
0000329230 drawn against PRUDENTIAL BANK in the amount of constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law, a matter already passed
₱2,500,000.00 dated January 19, 2000 to apply for value in favor
61
upon by the Court through Justice (later Chief Justice) Pedro Yap almost hierarchy of courts outlined in Rule 65, Section 411 of the 1997 Rules of
two decades ago. Petitioners add, however, among the pertinent issues Civil Procedure. Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does
one based on the observable but worrisome transformation of certain not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest
metropolitan trial courts into seeming collection agencies of creditors opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in
whose complaints now clog the court dockets. question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the
court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the
But let us return to basics. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in
legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the
present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could not
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not
question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.12 Taking into
opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis account the early stage of the trial proceedings below, the instant
mota of the case.7 Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court petitions are patently premature.
assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of
an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel’s spirited advocacy in Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis
both cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the
been adequately met. presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must
be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is
Perusal of these petitions reveals that they are primarily anchored on doubtful, speculative or argumentative.13 We have examined the
Rule 65, Section 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. In a special civil contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us
action of certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a
the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of petitioner Dy that the
abuse of discretion.9 Yet nowhere in these petitions is there any present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the
allegation that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil action consideration. As we stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying
for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and
manifested.10 confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy
confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to
Noteworthy, the instant petitions are conspicuously devoid of any prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while
attachments or annexes in the form of a copy of an order, decision, or indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by
resolution issued by the respondent judges so as to place them bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged
understandably within the ambit of Rule 65. What are appended to the invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of
petitions are only copies of the Informations in the respective cases, dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere.
nothing else. Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and appropriate cases WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for utter lack of
contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this merit.
Court’s power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their
faces petitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action. SO ORDERED.

Instead, it appears to us that herein petitioners have placed the cart G.R. No. 226679. August 15, 2017.*
before the horse, figuratively speaking. Simply put, they have ignored the

62
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, petitioner, vs.HON. VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 161
FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted.” Fully
PHILIPPINES, respondents. aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country
Courts; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; It is within and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere,
the SupremeCourt’s (SC’s) power to make exceptions to the rules of must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally
court. Under proper conditions, it may permit the full and exhaustive eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users.
ventilation of the parties’ arguments and positions despite the Courts; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The power to promulgate
supposed technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Supreme
flaws.—On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG Court’s(SC’s) exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
maybe correct. Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be Executive and Legislative departments.—The power to promulgate
underscored that it is within this Court’s power to make exceptions rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our exclusive
to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, We may permit the domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
full and exhaustive ventilation of the parties’ arguments and departments. In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96
positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a petition or (1999), then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puna
its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the traced the history of the Court’s rulemaking power and highlighted
final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its evolution and development.
its obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, Political Law; Separation of Powers; The separation of powers
with far-reaching implications. among the three (3) coequal branches of our government has erected
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Matters of procedure and an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of substantial pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of the
and transcendental importance are present.—Matters of procedure Supreme Court (SC).—The separation of powers among the three
and technicalities normally take a backseat when issues of coequal branches of our government has erected an impregnable
substantial and transcendental importance are present. We have wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
acknowledged that the Philippines’ problem on illegal drugs has and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other
reached “epidemic,” “monstrous,” and “harrowing” proportions, and branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue
that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural
have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this perspective, We
of thousands especially our young citizens. At the same time, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the
have equally noted that “as urgent as the campaign against the drug exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules).
problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Speedy
in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the Trial Act of 1998; Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8493 (“Speedy
Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the Trial Act of 1998”) required that plea bargaining and other matters
_______________ that will promote a fair and expeditious trial are to be considered
during pretrial conference in all criminal cases cognizable by the
* EN BANC. Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC), Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Regional Trial Court
(RTC), and the Sandiganbayan.—When R.A. No. 8493 (“Speedy
161 Trial Act of 1998”) was enacted, Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was
63
substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per
bargaining sethe right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under
the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without
justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
162 judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves
162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED of the remedies against the judgment. It is not correct to say that
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the
and other matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial
power of the Supreme
are to be considered during pretrial conference in all criminal cases
cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and
the Sandiganbayan. 163
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The Supreme Court’s VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 163
(SC’s) sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules is Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former Court to “provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.—The Supreme the speedy disposition of cases.” This provision protects the courts
Court’s sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules from delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases — delay
is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former arising from the simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused
should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. “Substantive law on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, Same; Same; Plea Bargaining; In this jurisdiction, plea
or which regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and
action; that part of the law which courts are established to the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which case subject to court approval.”—In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the
invasions.” prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Promulgation of subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation
Judgments; Failure to Appear at the Promulgation; The Supreme common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that
Court (SC) said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 746 SCRA both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid
452 (2015), that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
an accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment encouraged because the chief virtues of the system — speed,
of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, economy, and finality — can benefit the accused, the offended party,
does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the the prosecution, and the court. Considering the presence of
manner through which an existing right may be implemented.—We mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create
said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 746 SCRA 452 (2015), a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means
that Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
conviction shall lose the remedies available against the judgment, justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
does not take away substantive rights but merely provides the infraction of them.
manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
64
Same; Same; Same; Under the present Rules, the acceptance of included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise
an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
is necessarily included in the offense charged.—The decision to plead supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for
guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant’s appraisal of the the convenience of the accused.
prosecution’s case against him and by the apparent likelihood of Same; Same; Same; Plea bargaining is allowed during the
securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. In arraignment, the pretrial, or even up to the point when the
any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a prosecution already rested its case.—Plea bargaining is allowed
guilty plea is a “serious and sobering occasion” inasmuch as it during the arraignment, the pretrial, or even up to the point when
constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed the prosecution already rested its case. As regards plea bargaining
innocent until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and during the pretrial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion
counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. “Grave abuse of
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when discretion” is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so
evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness against virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
himself. Yet a defendant has no constitutional right power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of
passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
164
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo 165
to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 165
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance Same; Same; Same; If the accused moved to plead guilty to a
of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution
the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is charged.—If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense
that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case,
actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have
lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The
sustain. only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act
Same; Same; Same; Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the
is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against said
compromise for the convenience of the accused.—The plea is further motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which mayallow prosecution’s evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which
the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of
65
justice and of the public will be served. The ruling on the motion weight of a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one-centavo coin (2.0
must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s grams).”
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, Same; Same; Same; Same; View that preventing the accused
the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper from pleading to the lesser offense of possession is a cruel, degrading,
and irregular. and unusual punishment for those who genuinely accept the
Leonen, J., Separate Concurring Opinion: consequences of their actions and seek to be rehabilitated.—Plea
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Plea Bargaining; Rule- bargaining does not necessarily mean that the accused will
making Power of the Supreme Court; View that the prohibition found automatically be sentenced to the lesser offense. The plea is subject
in Section 23 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 is unconstitutional not to the acceptance of the prosecution and is only allowed by discretion
only because it contravenes the rulemaking power of of the court. What is essential is that the choice exists. Preventing
the Supreme Court (SC), it also constitutes “cruel,to a lesser offense, the accused from pleading to the lesser offense of possession is a
he or she waives all the fundamental rights degrading, [and] cruel, degrading, and unusual punishment for those who genuinely
inhuman” punishment for the accused.—In my view, the prohibition accept the consequences of their actions and seek to be rehabilitated.
found in Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional not It will not advance the policy of the law to punish offenders with
only because it contravenes the rulemaking power of this Court, it penalties not commensurate with the offense and to hinder their
also constitutes “cruel, degrading, [and] inhuman” punishment for reintegration into society.
the accused. It is the declared policy of the law “to provide effective SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
mechanisms or measures to reintegrate into society individuals who and Prohibition.
have fallen victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug dependence The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
through sustainable programs of treatment and rehabilitation.” The Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
aim is to rehabilitate, not punish, those drug offenders. The Solicitor General for respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Plea to a Lesser Offense; View that when an
PERALTA, J.:
accused pleads to a lesser offense, he or she waives all the fun-
damental rights guaranteed to an accused.—When an accused
pleads to a lesser offense, he or she waives all the fundamental Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is
rights the constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
_______________

1 With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order


166 and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
guaranteed to an accused. It is essentially a choice that only 167
the accused can make, as a way to acknowledge his or her guilt and VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 167
as atonement for that guilt. The reality is that most “drug pushers” Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
that come before the courts are found with less that 0.1 gram of 9165, or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
illegal drugs. While some of these accused will be charged with both 2002,”2 which provides:
selling and possession, most of them will have to suffer the penalty
of selling, that is, life imprisonment. They will be sentenced to life
imprisonment for evidence amounting to “only about 2.5% of the
66
SEC. 23. Plea Bargaining Provision.—Any person charged guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
under any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea bargaining.3 Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
The facts are not in dispute. minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
accused in Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). Section 2 thereof; (2) the rulemaking authority of the Supreme
The Information alleged: Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution;
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three
Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
equal branches of the government.
Court, the above named accused, not being lawfully authorized to
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the
possess or otherwise use any regulated drug and without the
corresponding license or prescription, did then and there, willfully, prosecution moved for the denial of the motion for being
unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be
control and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic justified by the Congress’ prerogative to choose which offense
sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16-1G containing 0.084 [gram] of white it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or
crystalline substance, which when examined were found to be Opposition7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it “is open
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to
drug. give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3,
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express
_______________
mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165 prohibiting plea
2 Approved on June 7, 2002. bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the
3 This repealed Section 20-A of R.A. No. 6425 (“Dangerous Drugs Act of proposal of the accused.”
1972”), as amended by R.A. No. 7659 (“Death Penalty Law”), which was On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the
approved on December 13, 1993. It provided:
SEC. 20-A. Plea bargaining Provisions.—Any person charged under any
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay,
provision of this Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death issued an Order denying Estipona’s motion. It was opined:
shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea bargaining. _______________
4 Rollo, p. 47.
5 Id., at pp. 49-51.
6 Id., at p. 52.
7 Id., at p. 53.
168
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo 169
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 169
Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement,5praying to Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of

67
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, 170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional
procedure because plea bargaining is a “rule of procedure.” Indeed, given the potential ramifications that such declaration might have
plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial
particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pretrial conference. It is station.8
only the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its constitutional rulemaking power that breathes life
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
to plea bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic denied in an Order9 dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition
Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the raising the issues as follows:
operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea I.
bargaining as part of the mandatory pretrial conference in criminal WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
cases. PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE
also the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
accused of a drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in OF THE LAW.
cases of use of illegal drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. II.
However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces of UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE
dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES
December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case OF PROCEDURE.
manifested the relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of III.
Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent for the enactment WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY
of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender. HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23
9165, which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the
exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court. We grant the petition.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded _______________
from resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the
8 Id., at pp. 44-45.
Court is not unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that
9 Id., at pp. 46, 54-55.
lower courts must observe a becoming modesty in examining 10 Id., at pp. 3, 15-16.
constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus not for
this
171
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 171
170
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
68
Procedural Matters
172
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the 172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Solicitor General (OSG), contends that the petition should be Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
dismissed outright for being procedurally defective on the “monstrous,” and “harrowing” proportions,13 and that its
grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects
an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 have broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the
of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the future of thousands especially our young citizens.14 At the
proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory same time, We have equally noted that “as urgent as the
relief before this Court or a petition for certiorari before the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as
RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona rights of the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x
lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law enforcers,
there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the may be unjustly accused and convicted.”15 Fully aware of the
constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis gravity of the drug menace that has beset our country and its
mota of the case. direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere, must
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally
maybe correct. Nonetheless, without much further ado, it eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and
must be underscored that it is within this Court’s power to users.16
make exceptions to the rules of court. Under proper conditions, Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues
We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the raised in this petition, technical matters should not deter Us
parties’ arguments and positions despite the supposed from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
technical infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural that everyone else depends for enlightenment and
flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final arbiter of guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may
constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its brush aside procedural rules in order to resolve a
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first constitutional issue.18
impression, with far-reaching implications.11 _______________
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally
13 See People v. Castro, 340 Phil. 245, 246; 724 SCRA 115, 117
take a backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental (1997); People v. Camba, 302 Phil. 311, 323; 232 SCRA 280, 290 (1994); People
importance are present.12 We have acknowledged that the v. Tantiado, 288 Phil. 241, 258; 213 SCRA 365, 379 (1992); People v. Zapanta,
Philippines’ problem on illegal drugs has reached “epidemic,” 272-A Phil. 161, 166; 195 SCRA 200, 204 (1991); People v. Taruc, 241 Phil. 177,
_______________ 186; 157 SCRA 178, 187 (1988); and People v. Ale, 229 Phil. 81, 87; 145 SCRA
50, 58 (1986).
11 See Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 84; 699 SCRA 352, 403 (2013). 14 People v. Tanliado, id., as cited in People v. Camba, id., and People v.
12 GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 742 Phil. 174, 209-210; Caco, 294 Phil. 54, 65; 222 SCRA 49, 58 (1993).
734 SCRA 88, 125 (2014). 15 People v. Quintana, 256 Phil. 430, 436; 174 SCRA 675, 680-681 (1989).

69
16 See People v. Gatlabayan, 669 Phil. 240, 261; 653 SCRA 803, 824-825 19 Philippine Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R.
(2011); People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 632; 306 SCRA 157, 181 (1999); Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc., 731 Phil. 269, 292; 720
and People v. Arcega, G.R. No. 96319, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 681, 688. SCRA 522, 544-545 (2014). (Citation omitted and italics supplied)
17 Supra note 12 at p. 210; p. 126.
18 Matibag v. Benipayo, 429 Phil. 554, 570; 380 SCRA 49, 65-66 (2002).
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
173
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 173
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
application of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
its power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
Padilladiscussed the rationale for this tenet, viz.: speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive
procedure is now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has
already declared to be final, x x x. with the Executive and Legislative
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every departments.20In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,21 then
party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. the history of the Court’s rulemaking power and highlighted
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not its evolution and development.
be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.19 x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of
Substantive Issues pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions
to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice
Rulemaking power of the Supreme Court under the 1987 Isagani Cruz “without independence and integrity, courts will lose
Constitution that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as
champions of justice.” Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested
this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
provides: concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: appeared to be coexistent with legislative power for it was
xxxx _______________
_______________
20 Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73, 88; 301 SCRA 96, 112
(1999), as cited in Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the

70
Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fee, 626 Phil. 93, jurist further ruled: “It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power
106; 612 SCRA 193, 206 (2010) and Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 549; 613
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter
SCRA 733, 740 (2010).
21 Id.

176
175 176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 175 Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix
subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, the minimum conditions for the license.” By its ruling, this Court
its Section 13, Article VIII provides: qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to repeal, alter
“Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said Philippines.
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and The ruling of this Court in In re: Cunanan, was not changed by
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby power of this Court “to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or Pambansax x x.” More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and provided:
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the xxxx
Philippines.” “Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may xxxx
appear on its surface. In In re: Cunanan, Congress in the exercise of (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and
to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
“x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a substantive rights.”
judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court strengthenedthe independence of the judiciary by giving to it the
certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the the Bar.
legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
function, as is the case with the law in question.” The venerable power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
71
xxx Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
Division)23 further elucidated:
177 While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 177 jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
“Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
powers: pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs
xxx exclusively to this Court. Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement Constitution reads:
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all xxxx
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same sharing scheme with Congress. As it now stands, the 1987
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme solidifying in one body the Court’s rule-making powers, in
Court.” line with the Framers’ vision of institutionalizing a “[s]tronger
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court, for and more independent judiciary.”
the first time, was given the power to promulgate rules concerning The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court Commission would show that the Framers debated on whether or
was also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of not the Court’s rule making powers should be shared with Congress.
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence “The National
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court,” right after the
and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, phrase “Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
Congress, more so with the Executive. x x x22 procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
_______________ integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]” in the
enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
22 Id., at pp. 85-88; pp. 109-112. (Citations omitted) See also Re: Petition Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and,
for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System
instead, after the word “[under]privileged,” place a comma (,) to be
from Payment of Legal Fee, supra note 20 at pp. 106-108; pp. 206-208 and In
Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of followed by “the phrase with the concurrence of the Na-
Filing/Docket Fees, 629 Phil. 1, 4-5; 615 SCRA 1, 4-6 (2010). _______________

23 G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.

178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
72
179 26 Id.
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 179 27 356 Phil. 787; 295 SCRA 470 (1998).
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
tional Assembly.” Eventually, a compromise formulation was
180
reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to
Commissioner Aquino’s proposal to delete the phrase “the 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court” and (b) in of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of
turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A.
add “the phrase with the concurrence of the National No. 6770.
Assembly.” The changes were approved, thereby leading to 2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multipurpose
the present lack of textual reference to any form of Cooperative, Inc.28 — The Cooperative Code provisions on notices
Congressional participation in Section 5(5), Article cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that “both 3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their Payment of Legal Fees;29 Baguio Market Vendors Multipurpose
inherent powers.” Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and Filing/Docket Fees;31 and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et
procedure. x x x24 al.32 — Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO,
and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by
The separation of powers among the three coequal branches Rule 141 of the Rules.
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps 4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 — The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order
procedure within the sole province of this Court.25 The other
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation
branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it contravenes
issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the Rule 58 of the Rules.
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.26 Viewed from this _______________
perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of
the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend 28 738 Phil. 37; 728 SCRA 482 (2014).
29 Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
the Rules of Court (Rules) to wit: Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, supra note 20.
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 — Appeal from the decision of the Office of 30 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEM-
the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be PCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, supra note 20.
taken to the Court 31 In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
_______________ Filing/Docket Fees, supra note 22.
32 638 Phil. 353; 633 SCRA 64 (2010).
24 Id., at pp. 505-508. (Citations omitted) 33 Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23.
25 Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service
Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fee, supra note 20 at p. 108; pp. 208-
209. 181
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VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 181
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
182
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified
the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal 182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
the legislative and executive branches of government. To As well, the term “plea bargaining” was first mentioned and
reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on expressly required during pretrial. Section 2, Rule 118
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the mandated:
safeguards of Our institutional independence.34 SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects.—The pretrial conference
shall consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
Plea bargaining in
(b) Stipulation of facts;
criminal cases (c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing (e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious
in our jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the trial. (n)
1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas) of which
stated: The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense.—The defendant, with the Section 2, Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was
consent of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser modified in 1987. A second paragraph was added, stating that
offense than that charged which is necessarily included in the “[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a
offense charged in the complaint or information.
conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy.”
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964,
When R.A. No. 8493 (“Speedy Trial Act of 1998”) was
the same provision was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).
enacted,35 Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially
Subsequently, with the effectivity of the 1985 Ruleson
adopted. Section 2 of the law required that plea bargaining
January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser
and other matters36 that will promote a fair and expeditious
offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
trial are to be considered during pretrial conference in all
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.—The accused with the
consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court,
trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court,
or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the
of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118) 2000 Rules37 are quoted below:
_______________ _______________

34 Id., at pp. 517-518, citing Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose 35 Approved on February 12, 1998.
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes, supra note 20 at p. 550; p. 36 Such as stipulation of facts, marking for identification of evidence of
741. parties, and waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence.
74
37 Effective December 1, 2001 (People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 74; 412 Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
SCRA 438, 456 [2003]).
Plea bargaining is a
rule of procedure
183
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 183 The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to issue, amend, or
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo repeal procedural rules is limited to the preservation of
substantive rights, i.e., the former should not diminish,
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
increase or modify the latter.38 “Substantive law is that part of
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.—At arraignment, the the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense action; that part of the law which courts are established to
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for
plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not their invasions.”39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in
(Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98) nature.
RULE 118 (Pretrial): It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between
SEC. 1. Pretrial; mandatory in criminal cases.—In all criminal those rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, of this Court’s rulemaking power, and those which are substantive.
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, In fact, a particular rule may be procedural in one context and
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court substantive in another. It is admitted that what is procedural and
shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It is
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and
a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the pragmatic approach is taken within the context of our own
Supreme Court, order a pretrial conference to consider the procedural and jurisdictional system.
following: In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court,
(a) plea bargaining; for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges,
(b) stipulation of facts; enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties; rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the _______________
charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of 38 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Ogayon v. People, 768 Phil.
the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Secs. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98) 272, 288; 768 SCRA 670, 686 (2015) and San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (Thirteenth Division), 352 Phil. 405, 415-416; 289 SCRA 568, 577-578
(1998).
39 Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23 at
184 pp. 516-517.
184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 40 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, supra note 27.
75
376, 383 (2003); and Bernabe v. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933, 941; 374 SCRA 180, 187
(2002).
42 448 Phil. 317; 400 SCRA 267 (2003).
185
43 See Los Baños v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229; 586 SCRA 303, 316 (2009).
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 185
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or 186
infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not 186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a
stantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process.
means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
with procedure.41
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the
accused and notice to the offended parties. The time bar fixed by the
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period is
procedural rule violates substantive rights. For example, manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
in People v. Lacson,42 Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules on justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or
provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural insufficiency of the time bar.
limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the
making the time bar an essence of the given right or as an Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court En Banc primarily
inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to to enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the rights to due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the
deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing
accused.43Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J.
criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or
Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has
specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor.
fixed a time bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal
There were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived
cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the
or refiled due to causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor
accused and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time bar
or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of
may appear, on first impression, unreasonable compared to the
public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused
periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in
despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to
fixing the time bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and
expedite criminal proceedings.
those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes
criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
delay as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears
accused. It took into account the sub-
the consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb
_______________
the hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to
41 Id., at pp. 808-809; pp. 491-492. See also Carpio-Morales v. Court of expire.
Appeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23 at p. 517; Securities and Exchange The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases
Commission v. Laigo, 768 Phil. 239, 269-270; 768 SCRA 633, 667 (2015); Jaylo may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with
v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), 751 Phil. 123, 141-142; 746 SCRA 452, 471 the disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical
(2015); Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 503; 399 SCRA
76
evidence may have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have justifiable cause on the scheduled date of promulgation of the
grown dim or have faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail themselves
more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from justice or of the remedies against the judgment.
commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the _______________
dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to
prove the crime. 44 People v. Lacson, supra note 42 at pp. 387-389; pp. 307-309. (Citations
omitted)
45 Jaylo v. Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra note 41.

187
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 187 188
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo 188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
a criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of
that the case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners.
not derail, the chances of the accused for employment, curtail his It only works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to
association, subject him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him “provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of disposition of cases.” This provision protects the courts from delay
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer in the speedy disposition of criminal cases — delay arising from the
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
of innocence. He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may promulgation of the judgment of conviction.46
fade with the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his
capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a
criminal justice system.
The time bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice disposition of cases in all court47 that the rules on plea
system for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal
accused only.44 charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is
considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.45that desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an of justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:
accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the
judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are
against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights obvious — his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can
begin immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are
but merely provides the manner through which an existing
eliminated. For the State there are also advantages — the more
right may be implemented.
promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per
effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the
se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under
avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are
the Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without
77
conserved for those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
defendant’s guilt or in approval.”49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea
_______________
bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 142-143; p. 472. (Citation omitted).
47 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Neypes v. Court of Appeals,
49 People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730; 210 SCRA 246, 251 (1992),
506 Phil. 613, 626; 469 SCRA 633, 643-644 (2005) and San Ildefonso Lines, Inc.
citing Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1037, 5th ed., 1979. See also Gonzales III v.
v. Court of Appeals (Thirteenth Division), supra note 38.
Office of the President of the Philippines, 694 Phil. 52, 106; 679 SCRA 614, 670
48 See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison,
(2012); Amante-Descallar v. Ramas, 601 Phil. 21, 40; 582 SCRA 22, 40
431 U.S. 63 (1977); and the Majority Opinion and Mr. Justice Douglas’
(2009); Daan v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), 573 Phil. 368, 375; 550
Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
SCRA 233, 240-241 (2008); and People v. Mamarion,supra note 37 at p. 75; p.
457.
50 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
189
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 189
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo 190
which there is substantial doubt that the State can sustain its 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
burden of proof. (Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970]) Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid
prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids potential losses.51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to
much of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial be encouraged because the chief virtues of the system — speed,
confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it
economy, and finality — can benefit the accused, the offended
protects the public from those accused persons who are prone to
continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by
party, the prosecution, and the court.52
shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53the
whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away
they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement
257, 261 [1971]) an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or
of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start infraction of them.
in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by
Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The the defendant’s appraisal of the prosecution’s case against him
public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with
and by the apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a
criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion
of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71
guilty plea be offered and accepted.54 In any case, whether it
[1977]) be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a
“serious and sobering occasion” inasmuch as it constitutes a
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent
process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a until the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and
78
counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except those 57 The State is the offended party in crimes under R.A. No. 9165. In People
v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49 at p. 732; p. 254, the Court ruled:
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when “x x x While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves,
evidence of guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The
reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a witness threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is
against himself.55 malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, supra note 13). Such pernicious effect
is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result,
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. society’s survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the
No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the
_______________ criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who
represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests,
51 Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990). threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were the person
52 See Santobello v. New York and Blackledge v. Allison, supra note 48. directly injured by the offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696).
53 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e., the state, will have
54 Id. to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government.”
55 Id., and Mr. Justice Douglas’ Concurring Opinion in Santobello v. New 58 People v. Villarama, Jr., id.
York, supra note 48 at p. 264. 59 Id.

191 192
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 191 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance other tangible and intangible factors, such as government
of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to
depends on the consent of the offended party57and the allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply
cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge.
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of
Because these decisions “are not readily susceptible to the kind of
guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the analysis the courts are competent to undertake,” we have been
offense charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has “properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.”60
full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is
to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the
one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.59 trial court, which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known.
charged. The word may denotes an exercise of discretion upon
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to
assessing the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also
the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such
must consider plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of
_______________ guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not
supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or
56 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). See also Mr. Justice Scalia’s compromise for the convenience of the accused.62
Dissenting Opinion in Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2011).
79
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than
pretrial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor has
rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining during the pre- submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it
_______________ behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution’s
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
60 Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).
61 Daan v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), supra note 49 at p. 377; pp. accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests
242-243. In Capati v. Ocampo (199 Phil. 230, 234; 113 SCRA 794, 796 [1982], of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the
citing In Re: Hirsh’s Estate, 5A. 2d 160, 163; 334 Pa. 172; Words & Phrases, motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the
permanent edition, 26a.), the Court also held:
prosecution’s evidence.68 Absent any finding on the weight of
“It is well settled that the word ‘may’ is merely permissive and operates to
confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term ‘may the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s
be’ connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. ‘May’ is an auxiliary verb change of plea is improper and irregular.69
indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.” _______________
62 Daan v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), id. and People v. Villarama,
Jr., supra note 49. 64 Id.
63 Id., at p. 378; p. 243; People v. Mamarion, supra note 37 at p. 75; p. 65 Albania v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017, 826
457; Ladino v. Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 258; 265 SCRA 422, 426-427 (1996); SCRA 191.
and People v. Villarama, Jr., id., at p. 731; p. 252. 66 People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49 at p. 731; p. 252, as cited
in Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, supra note 49,
and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37 at p. 76; p. 457.
67 Id.
193
68 Id.
VOL. 837, AUGUST 15, 2017 193 69 Id.
Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not
amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 “Grave abuse of discretion” 194
is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the On whether Section 23 of
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner R.A. No. 9165 violates the
because of passion or hostility; it arises when a court or equal protection clause
tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.65 At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional
subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt any
case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations
does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on
crime charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a
the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as

80
invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all taxes, assessments, fees,
until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to
_______________
through an administrative circular duly issued for the
purpose. * SECOND DIVISION.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition 6
is GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared 6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
unconstitutional for being contrary to the rulemaking Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs
authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article of Fernando F. Caballero
VIII of the 1987 Constitution. exempt it from the payment of legal fees—the Supreme Court now has the
SO ORDERED. sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
G.R. No. 158090. October 4, 2010.* procedure in all courts.—In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption
of the Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal Fees, 612
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),
SCRA 193 (2010), the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the
petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO, represented GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all
by his daughter, JOCELYN G. CABALLERO, respondents. taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to
Actions; Counterclaims; Tests to Determine Whether a Counterclaim is exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935
Compulsory or Permissive.—To determine whether a counterclaim is and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal, alter or
compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice and
of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress. Hence,
(b) Would res judicatabar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.
support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and Same; Same; Same; The third rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office,
(d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A Ltd. v. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), regarding awards of claims not
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is specified in the pleading, refers only to damages arising after the filing of the
compulsory. complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor
Same; Same; Docket Fees; Jurisdiction; The rule in permissive shall constitute a lien on the judgment.—Petitioner also invoked our ruling
counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274 (1989), where
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.—The rule in the Court held that: x x x x 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. This, petitioner did filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court,
was a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
judgment rendered by the RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. In Ayala
the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any Corporation v. Madayag, 181 SCRA 687 (1990), the Court, in interpreting the
decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down third rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Asuncion, 170
at any time, even on appeal before this Court. SCRA 274 (1989), regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading,
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The provision in the Charter held that the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the
of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), i.e., Section 39 of complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. The amount of any claim for damages,
81
therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading 8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
should be specified. While it is true that the determination of certain damages Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of
as exemplary or corrective damages is left to the sound discretion of the court,
it is Fernando F. Caballero
7
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 4, 2010 7 On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs a loan from petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in
of Fernando F. Caballero the amount of P20,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note. Fernando
the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount and his wife likewise executed a real estate mortgage on the same date,
sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and mortgaging the afore-stated property as security.
for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence,
contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are on January 20, 1973, the mortgage covering the subject property was
left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may foreclosed, and on March 26, 1973, the same was sold at a public auction
arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will where the petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P36,283.00.
not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount For failure of Fernando to redeem the said property within the
thereof. designated period, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Ownership on September 5, 1975. Consequently, TCT No. T-16035 was
Court of Appeals. cancelled and TCT No. T-45874 was issued in the name of petitioner.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. On November 26, 1975, petitioner wrote a letter to Fernando,
GSIS Legal Services Group for petitioner. informing him of the consolidation of title in its favor, and requesting
Jorge D. Zerrudo for respondents. payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando’s continued occupancy
PERALTA, J.: of the subject property. In reply, Fernando requested that he be allowed
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 to repurchase the same through partial payments. Negotiation as to the
of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 and the repurchase by Fernando of the subject property went on for several
Resolution,2 dated December 17, 2002 and April 29, 2003, respectively, years, but no agreement was reached between the parties.
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300. On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for
The antecedents are as follows: public bidding. On the scheduled date of bidding, Fernando’s daughter,
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered Jocelyn Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount of P350,000.00, while
owner of a residential lot designated as Lot No. 3355, Ts-268, covered Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation (CMTC) submitted a bid in
by TCT No. T-16035 of the Register of Deeds of Cotabato, containing the amount of P450,000.00. Since CMTC was the highest bidder, it was
an area of 800 square meters and situated at Rizal Street, Mlang, awarded the subject property. On May 16, 1989, the Board of Trustees
Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent built a residential/commercial of the GSIS issued Resolution No. 199 confirming the award of the
building consisting of two (2) stories. subject property to CMTC for a total consideration of P450,000.00.
_______________
Thereafter, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between petitioner
1 Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justices and CMTC on July 27, 1989, transferring the subject property to CMTC.
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; Rollo, pp. 162-172. Consequently,
2 Id., at p. 173. 9
8 VOL. 632, OCTOBER 4, 2010 9

82
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of requiring the CMTC to submit its supporting papers as required by the
Fernando F. Caballero law.
TCT No. T-45874 in the name of GSIS was cancelled, and TCT No. T- Petitioner and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative
76183 was issued in the name of CMTC. Defenses and Counterclaim.4 The GSIS alleged that Fernando lost his
Due to the foregoing, Fernando, represented by his daughter and right of redemption. He was given the chance to repurchase the property;
attorney-in-fact, Jocelyn Caballero, filed with the Regional Trial Court however, he did not avail of such option compelling the GSIS to dispose
(RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint3 against CMTC, the GSIS and of the property by public bidding as mandated by law. There is also no
its responsible officers, and the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, “prior right to buy back” that can be exercised by Fernando. Further, it
Cotabato. Fernando prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered: averred that the articles of incorporation and other papers of CMTC
declaring GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, were all in order. In its counterclaim, petitioner alleged that Fernando
1989, null and void; declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale between owed petitioner the sum of P130,365.81, representing back rentals,
petitioner and CMTC null and void ab initio; declaring TCT No. 76183 including additional interests from January 1973 to February 1987, and
of the Register of Deeds of Kidapawan, Cotabato, likewise, null and the additional amount of P249,800.00, excluding applicable interests,
void ab initio; declaring the bid made by Fernando in the amount of representing rentals Fernando unlawfully collected from Carmelita Ang
P350,000.00 for the repurchase of his property as the winning bid; and Hao from January 1973 to February 1988.
ordering petitioner to execute the corresponding Deed of Sale of the After trial, the RTC, in its Decision5 dated September 27, 1994, ruled
subject property in favor of Fernando. He also prayed for payment of in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. In the same decision,
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation the trial court granted petitioner’s counterclaim and directed Fernando
expenses. to pay petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of
In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in P249,800.00. The foregoing amount was collected by Fernando from
the conduct of the bidding. CMTC misrepresented itself to be wholly the CMTC and represents payment which was not turned over to
owned by Filipino citizens. It misrepresented its working capital. Its petitioner, which was entitled to receive the rent from the date of the
representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior authority from its board consolidation of its ownership over the subject property.
of directors in an appropriate board resolution to participate in the Fernando filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by
bidding. The corporation is not authorized to acquire real estate or invest the RTC in an Order dated March 27, 1995.
its funds for purposes other than its primary purpose. Fernando further Aggrieved by the Decision, respondent filed a Notice of
alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to bid despite knowledge that said Appeal.6 The CA, in its Decision dated December 17, 2002, affirmed the
corporation has no authority to do so. The GSIS also disregarded decision of the RTC with the modification that the portion of the
Fernando’s prior right to buy back his family home and lot in violation judgment ordering Fernando to pay rentals in
_______________
of the laws. The Register of Deeds of Cotabato acted with abuse of
power and authority when it issued the TCT in favor of CMTC without 4 Id., at pp. 72-77.
_______________ 5 Id., at pp. 190-199.
6 Records, p. 416.
3 Rollo, pp. 200-207. 11
10
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 4, 2010 11
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero
Fernando F. Caballero
83
the amount of P249,800.00, in favor of petitioner, be deleted. Petitioner the trial court erred in concluding that GSIS personnel have regularly
filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution performed their official duty when they conducted the public bidding;
dated April 29, 2003. Hence, the instant petition. Fernando, as former owner of the subject property and former member
An Ex Parte Motion for Substitution of Party,7 dated July 18, 2003, of the GSIS, has the preemptive right to repurchase the foreclosed
was filed by the surviving heirs of Fernando, who died on February 12, property.
2002. They prayed that they be allowed to be substituted for the These additional averments cannot be taken cognizance by the Court,
deceased, as respondents in this case. because they were substantially respondents’ arguments in their petition
Petitioner enumerated the following grounds in support of its for review on certiorari earlier filed before Us and docketed as G.R. No.
petition: 156609. Records show that said petition was denied by the Court in a
I Resolution9 dated April 23, 2003, for petitioners’ (respondents herein)
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any
LAW IN HOLDING THAT GSIS’ COUNTERCLAIM, AMONG OTHERS, reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the exercise by
OF P249,800.00 REPRESENTING RENTALS COLLECTED BY PRIVATE this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction.10 Said resolution
RESPONDENT FROM CARMELITA MERCANTILE TRADING became final and executory on June 9, 2003.11 Respondents’ attempt to
CORPORATION IS IN THE NATURE OF A PERMISSIVE
re-litigate claims already passed upon and resolved with finality by the
COUNTERCLAIM WHICH REQUIRED THE PAYMENT BY GSIS OF
DOCKET FEES BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT CAN ACQUIRE Court in G.R. No. 156609 cannot be allowed.
JURISDICTION OVER SAID COUNTERCLAIM. Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its
II counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is in
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of
LAW IN HOLDING THAT GSIS’ DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of
SUPPORTING ITS CLAIM OF P249,800.00 LACKS PROPER absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other hand,
IDENTIFICATION.8 alleged that petitioner’s counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay
The petition of the GSIS seeks the review of the CA’s Decision the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
insofar as it deleted the trial court’s award of P249,800.00 in its favor _______________
representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC.
In their Memorandum, respondents’ claim that CMTC cannot 9 CA Rollo, pp. 190-191.
10 The petition was also denied for lack of proof of the petition on the adverse party
purchase real estate or invest its funds in any purpose and its failure to attach the affidavit of service of copy of the petition on the adverse parties.
_______________ (Id., at p. 190.)
11 CA Rollo, p. 193.
7 Rollo, pp. 234-285. 13
8 Id., at p. 152.
12
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 4, 2010 13
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero
Fernando F. Caballero
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court
other than its primary purpose for which it was organized in the absence
has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised
of a corporate board resolution; the bid award, deed of absolute sale and
by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b)
TCT No. T-76183, issued in favor of the CMTC, should be nullified;
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent
84
the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same Petitioner further argues that assuming that its counterclaim is
evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s permissive, the trial court has jurisdiction to try and decide the same,
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim considering petitioner’s exemption from all kinds of fees.
and the counterclaim? A positive answer to all four questions would In In Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the
indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.12 Government Service Insurance System from Payment of Legal
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, this Court agrees with Fees,15 the Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e.,
the CA’s view that petitioner’s counterclaim for the recovery of the Section 39 of Republic Act No. 8291, which exempts it from “all taxes,
amount representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds,” cannot operate to
permissive. The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment exempt it from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the
of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which empowered Congress to repeal,
required to establish petitioner’s claim for the recovery of rentals. alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning pleading,
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid practice and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from
award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court now has the sole authority to
different from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
entitled to receive the CMTC’s rent payments over the subject property courts.
when petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of In said case, the Court ruled that:
the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor. “The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province
docket fees.13 This, petitioner did not do, because it asserted that its of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact
laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory
procedural rules promulgated by this Court. Viewed from this perspective, the
counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did claim of a legislative grant of exemption from the payment of legal fees under
not acquire jurisdic- Section 39 of RA 8291 necessarily fails.
_______________ _______________

12 Manuel C. Bungcayao, Sr., represented in this case by his Attorney-in-fact Romel 14 Id.
R. Bungcayao, v. Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation, G.R. 15 A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 193.
No. 170483, April 19, 2010, 618 SCRA 381. 15
13 Id.
14
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 4, 2010 15
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of Fernando F. Caballero
Fernando F. Caballero
Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
tion over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important
RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence—fiscal autonomy. Fiscal
he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have
at any time, even on appeal before this Court.14 two basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which established the JDF
85
and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the
“guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the
and public policy.” Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.”(Emphasis
the Court’s financial resources but also comprise an essential element of the supplied.)
Court’s fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees Petitioner’s claim for payment of rentals collected by Fernando from
granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and the CMTC did not arise after the filing of the complaint; hence, the rule
local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. laid down in Sun Insurance finds no application in the present case.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s Due to the non-payment of docket fees on petitioner’s counterclaim,
guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.” the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over it and, thus, there is no
Petitioner also invoked our ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. need to discuss the second issue raised by petitioner.
Judge Asuncion,16 where the Court held that: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and the
“x x x x
Resolution, dated December 17, 2002 and April 29, 2003,
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
_______________
the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if 17 G.R No. 88421, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 687, cited in Proton Pilipinas
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional Corporation v. Banque Nationale De Paris, G.R. No. 151242, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the 260, 278.
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce 17
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.” VOL. 632, OCTOBER 4, 2010 17
_______________ Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of
16 252 Phil. 280; 170 SCRA 274 (1989). Fernando F. Caballero
16 respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 49300, are
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED AFFIRMED.
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) vs. Heirs of SO ORDERED.
Fernando F. Caballero Velasco, Jr.,** Nachura*** (Actg. Chairperson),
In Ayala Corporation v. Madayag,17 the Court, in interpreting the Mendoza and Sereno, JJ., concur.
****

third rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Judge Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Asuncion regarding awards of claims not specified in the pleading, held Note.—The rules of counterclaim are designed to enable the
that the same refers only to damages arising after the filing of the disposition of a whole controversy of interested parties’ conflicting
complaint or similar pleading as to which the additional filing fee claims, at one time and in one action, provided all parties be brought
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. before the court and the matter decided without prejudicing the rights of
“The amount of any claim for damages, therefore, arising on or before the any party. (Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 339 SCRA
filing of the complaint or any pleading should be specified. While it is true that 534 [2000])
the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is ——o0o——
left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming
such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court G.R. No. 202242. July 17, 2012.*
may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND
appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO
specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., respondents.
86
Constitutional Law; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; Declaratory intervention for rectification of legal blunders.―A vast number of
Relief; Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised aspirants to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by
_______________ the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process
* EN BANC. of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the
580
controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED must be passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a right
in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and
those within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as 581
provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.―The VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 581
Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the at the same time, armed with issues of transcendental
petition should properly be considered as that which would result in importance to society. The claim that the composition of the JBC is
the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a
only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to
the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Same; Statutory Construction; It is a well-settled principle of
Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as technical terms are employed.―One of the primary and basic rules
provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Limitations on the Supreme clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
Court’s Power of Judicial Review.―The Courts’ power of judicial meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-
review, like almost all other powers conferred by the Constitution, settled principle of constitutional construction that the language
is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible,
person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a recedendum―from the words of a statute there should be no
party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua departure.
non are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a Statutory Construction; Noscitur a Sociis; Under the maxim
co-equal branch of government is put in issue. noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
Same; Judicial and Bar Council (JBC); The claim that the itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) is illegal and construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial associated.―Under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular
87
word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of Same; Doctrine of Operative Facts; In the interest of fair play
various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.―In the
or with which it is associated. This is because a word or phrase in a interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions
statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters Products, Inc. v.
The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as Fertiphil Corporation, 548 SCRA 485 (2008), the Court explained:
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule,
the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence
be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an
whenever possible. In short, every meaning to be given to each word operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
or ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
582 declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.583
modified or restricted by the latter. VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 583
Constitutional Law; Judicial and Bar Council; Doubtless, the Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
Framers of our Constitution intended to create a Judicial and Bar ABAD, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Council (JBC) as an innovative solution in response to the public Statutory Construction; View that it is a basic principle in
clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of statutory construction that the law must be given a reasonable
members of the Judiciary.―Doubtless, the Framers of our interpretation at all times.―It is a basic principle in statutory
Constitution intended to create a JBC as an innovative solution in construction that the law must be given a reasonable interpretation
response to the public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the at all times. The Court may, in some instances, consider the spirit
appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial and reason of a statute, where a literal meaning would lead to
independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped that, in absurdity, contradiction, or injustice, or would defeat the clear
creating a JBC, the private sector and the three branches of purpose of the law makers. Applying a verba legis or strictly literal
government would have an active role and equal voice in the interpretation of the constitution may render its provisions
selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the
having more than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one- principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,
half (1/2) a vote each, would, as one former congressman and resort should be made to the rule that the spirit of the law controls
member of the JBC put it, “negate the principle of equality among its letter.
the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitutional Law; Congress; Judicial and Bar Council (JBC);
Constitution.” View that to insist that only one member of Congress from either the
Senate or the House of Representatives should sit at any time in the
88
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), is to ignore the fact that while these presence of an elected Senator and an elected member of the House
two houses of Congress are involved in the common task of making of Representatives in the JBC is more consistent with the
laws, they are separate and distinct.―To insist that only one member republican nature of our government where all government
of Congress from either the Senate or the House of Representatives authority emanates from the people and is exercised by
should sit at any time in the JBC, is to ignore the fact that while representatives chosen by them.
these two houses of Congress are involved in the common task of PETITION to question the composition of the Judicial and Bar
making laws, they are separate and distinct. Senators are elected Council.
by the people at large, while the Members of the House of The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Representatives, by their respective districts or sectors. They have MENDOZA, J.:
detached administrative organizations and deliberate on laws
The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the
separately, indeed, often coming up with dissimilar drafts of those
unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on
laws. Clearly, neither the Senate nor the House of Representatives
can by itself claim to represent the Congress. Those who drafted May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General
Section 8(1) did not intend to limit the term “Congress” to just either Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as his potential successor,
of the two Houses. triggered the filing of this case. The issue has constantly been
Same; Same; Same; View that allowing a Senator and a nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of
Congressman to sit alternately at any one time cannot be a solution constitutional challenge.
since each of them would actually be representing only his half of As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the
Congress when he takes part in Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) constitutional deadline in the process of selecting the
deliberations.―Allowing a Senator and a Congressman to sit nominees for the vacant seat of the Chief Justice, the Court
alternately at any one time cannot be a solution since each of them cannot delay the resolution of the issue a day longer.
would actually
584
Relegating it in the meantime to the back burner is not an
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED option.585
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 585
be representing only his half of Congress when he takes part in Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
JBC deliberations. Allowing both, on the other hand, to sit in those
deliberations at the same time with half a vote each is absurd since Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the
that would diminish their standing and make them second class 1987 Constitution allow more than one (1) member of
members of JBC, something that the Constitution clearly does not Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2)
contemplate. It is presumed when drafting laws that the legislature representatives from each house of Congress with one (1) vote
does not intend to produce undesirable consequences. Thus, when a each sanctioned by the Constitution? These are the pivotal
literal translation would result to such consequences, the same is to questions to be resolved in this original action for prohibition
be utterly rejected.
and injunction.
Same; Same; Same; View the presence of an elected Senator and
Long before the naissance of the present Constitution, the
an elected member of the House of Representatives in the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) is more consistent with the republican nature annals of history bear witness to the fact that the exercise of
of our government where all government authority emanates from appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the
the people and is exercised by representatives chosen by them.―The exclusive prerogative of the executive and legislative branches

89
of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, Bar Council (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are
both the Malolos Constitution1 and the 1935 Constitution2 had provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz.:
vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in “Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created
the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Appointments. It was during these times that the country Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
confirmation of their appointment in the Judiciary to
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative
sector.
body.3 (2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by
Then, with the fusion of executive and legislative power the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
under the 1973 Constitution,4 the appointment of judges and Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the
justices was no longer subject to the scrutiny of another body. representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
_______________ professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years,
1 Article 80 Title X of the Malolos Constitution provides: “The Chief Justice and the representative of the private sector for one year.
of the Supreme Court and the Solicitor-General shall be chosen by the National
Assembly in concurrence with the President of the Republic and the
(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex
Secretaries of the Government, and shall be absolutely independent of the officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
Legislative and Executive Powers.” (4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such
2 Section 5 Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution provides: “The Members of emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.” appropriations for the Council.
3 1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates,
(5) The Council shall have the principal function of
437.
4 Section 4 Article X of the 1973 Constitution provides: “The Members of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such
the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall be appointed by the other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.”
President.” _______________
586 5 1 Records, Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, p. 487.
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 587

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 587
It was absolute, except that the appointees must have all
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments creation of the JBC, designated one representative to sit in the
to the Judiciary from political pressure and partisan JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.6Perhaps in order
activities,5 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw to give equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive
the need to create a separate, competent and independent body, the House of Representatives and the Senate would send
body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in had only one (1) representative.
the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially
altered. Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth

90
(8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives The composition of the JBC providing for three ex-officio
from Congress began sitting in the JBC—one from the House members is purposely designed for a balanced representation of
of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having each of the three branches of the government.
one-half (1/2) of a vote.7 Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in V
One of the two (2) members of the JBC from Congress has no
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
right (not even ½ right) to sit in the said constitutional body and
representatives from the Senate and the House of
perform the duties and functions of a member thereof.
Representatives one full vote each.8 At present, Senator VI
Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, The JBC cannot conduct valid proceedings as its composition is
Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as illegal and unconstitutional.10
representatives of the legislature. On July 9, 2012, the JBC filed its Comment.11 It, however,
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this abstained from recommending on how this constitutional issue
petition,9 setting forth the following should be disposed in gracious deference to the wisdom of the
GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION Court. Nonetheless, the JBC was more than generous enough
I to offer the insights of various personalities previously
Article VIII, Section 8, Paragraph 1 is clear, definite and needs
connected with it.12
no interpretation in that the JBC shall have only one representative
Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
from Congress.
_______________ respondents defended their position as members of the JBC in
6 List of JBC Chairpersons, Ex Officio and Regular Members, Ex their Comment13 filed on July 12, 2012. According to them, the
OfficioSecretaries and Consultants, issued by the Office of the Executive Officer, crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Con-
Judicial and Bar Council, Rollo, pp. 62-63.
_______________
7 Id.
10 Id., at pp. 17-18.
8 Comment of the JBC, p. 80, citing Minutes of the 1st En Banc Executive
Meeting, January 12, 2000 and Minutes of the 12th En Banc Meeting, May 30, 11 Id., at pp. 76-106.
2001. 12 Id., at p. 80.
9 Rollo, pp. 3-69. 13 Id., at pp. 117-163.
588 589
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 589
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
gress.”14 Reverting to the basics, they cite Section 1, Article VI
II of the Constitution15 to determine the meaning of the term
The framers of the Constitution clearly envisioned, contemplated “Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate
and decided on a JBC composed of only seven (7) members. and the House of Representatives, are permanent and
III mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of
Had the framers of the Constitution intended that the JBC either divests the term of its substantive meaning as
composed of the one member from the Senate and one member from
expressed under the Constitution. In simplistic terms, the
the House of Representatives, they could have easily said so as they
House of Representatives, without the Senate and vice-versa,
did in the other provisions of the Constitution.
IV is not Congress.16 Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the
Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
91
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to effectively diminishing the republican nature of the
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the government.20
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2)
should mean one representative each from both Houses which representatives of Congress to be members of the JBC does not
comprise the entire Congress.17 render the latter’s purpose nugatory. While they admit that
Tracing the subject provision’s history, the respondents the purpose in creating the JBC was to insulate appointments
claim that when the JBC was established, the Framers to the Judiciary from political influence, they likewise
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby cautioned the Court that this constitutional vision did not
allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the intend to entirely preclude political factor in said
JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with appointments. Therefore, no evil should be perceived in the
the change to bicameralism, the legislative system finally current set-up of the JBC because two (2) members coming
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. from Congress, whose membership to certain political parties
According to respondents, if the Commissioners were made is irrelevant, does not necessarily amplify political
aware of the consequence of having a bicameral legislature partisanship in the JBC. In fact, the presence of two (2)
instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the members from Congress will most likely provide balance as
corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
the JBC.18 presidential appointees.21
_______________ The Issues
14 Id., at p. 142.
In resolving the procedural and substantive issues arising
15 “The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the from the petition, as well as the myriad of counter-arguments
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.” proffered by the respondents, the Court synthesized them into
16 Id. two:
17 Rollo, p. 143. _______________
18 Id., at p. 148. 19 Id.
590 20 Id.
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 21 Id., at pp. 150-153.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council 591
The ambiguity having resulted from a plain case of VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 591
inadvertence, the respondents urge the Court to look beyond Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
the letter of the disputed provision because the literal
adherence to its language would produce absurdity and (1) Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise
incongruity to the bicameral nature of Congress.19 In other of the power of judicial review have been met in this case; and
(2) Whether or not the current practice of the JBC to perform
words, placing either of the respondents in the JBC will
its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members
effectively deprive a house of Congress of its representation.
of Congress, runs counter to the letter and spirit of the 1987
In the same vein, the electorate represented by Members of Constitution.
Congress will lose their only opportunity to participate in the The Power of Judicial Review
nomination process for the members of the Judiciary,
92
In its Comment, the JBC submits that petitioner is clothed for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
with locus standi to file the petition, as a citizen and taxpayer, Procedure.25
who has been nominated to the position of Chief Justice.22 The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and
For the respondents, however, petitioner has no “real construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised,
interest” in questioning the constitutionality of the JBC’s the petition should properly be considered as that which would
current composition.23 As outlined in jurisprudence, it is well- result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process
settled that for locus standi to lie, petitioner must exhibit that because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of
he has been denied, or is about to be denied, of a personal right the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being
or privilege to which he is entitled. Here, petitioner failed to so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the
manifest his acceptance of his recommendation to the position appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC). Notwithstanding the
of Chief Justice, thereby divesting him of a substantial fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an
interest in the controversy. Without his name in the official action for declaratory relief is not among those within the
list of applicants for the post, the respondents claim that there original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5,
is no personal stake on the part of petitioner that would justify Article VIII of the Constitution.26
his outcry of unconstitutionality. Moreover, the mere _______________
25 Section 1. Who may file petition.―Any person interested under a deed,
allegation that this case is of transcendental importance does will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a
not excuse the waiver of the rule on locus standi, because, in statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental
the first place, the case lacks the requisites therefor. The regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
respondents also question petitioner’s belated filing of the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
petition.24 Being aware that the current composition of the xxx
JBC has been in practice since 1994, petitioner’s silence for 26 1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
eighteen (18) years show that the constitutional issue being other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
_______________ prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
22 Id., at p. 78. (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as
23 Id., at p. 131. the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
24 Id., at pp. 131-133. courts.
592 (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED international or executive agreement, law, presidential de-
593
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 593
raised before the Court does not comply with the “earliest Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
possible opportunity” requirement.
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to
Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court
government processes involved but also to the sanctity of the
deems it proper to first ascertain the nature of the petition.
Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take
Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined
cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition
by the allegations therein and the character of the relief
under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2)
sought, the Court views the petition as essentially an action
representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.

93
The Courts’ power of judicial review, like almost all other constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several is put in issue.
limitations, namely: (1) there must be an actual case or Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the the party possess a personal stake in the outcome of the
person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete and legal
he conflict of rights and duties from the issues presented before
_______________ the Court? In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,28 the Court
cree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
summarized the rules on locus standi as culled from
question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, jurisprudence. There, it was held that taxpayers, voters,
or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue. to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1)
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election
without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a
justice. showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators,
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the there must be a claim that the official action complained of
admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. public, asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with differently from any other person, and can be suing as a
the Civil Service Law. “stranger,” or as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.” Thus, taxpayers
594 _______________
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 27 Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. 1, 27; 488 SCRA 1, 35
(2006).
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council 28 522 Phil. 705; 489 SCRA 160 (2006).
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, 595
such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 595
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
case.27 Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are
these conditions sine qua nonare present, especially when the wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage
94
caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit
wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all
of an invalid statute.29 limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the
In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the
taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the position of country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner importantly, the legality of the very process of nominations to
invokes his right to demand that the taxes he and the rest of the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy.
the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be
lawful purposes. According to petitioner, “since the JBC passed upon, lest a constitutional process be plagued by
derives financial support for its functions, operation and misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a
proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal
both right and legal standing to demand that the JBC’s standing and at the same time, armed with issues of
proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its transcendental importance to society. The claim that the
composition and actions do not violate the Constitution.” 30 composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an
Notably, petitioner takes pains in enumerating past actions object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but
that he had brought before the Court where his legal standing for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention
was sustained. Although this inventory is unnecessary to for rectification of legal blunders.
establish locus standi because obviously, not every case before With respect to the question of transcendental importance,
the Court exhibits similar issues and facts, the Court it is not difficult to perceive from the opposing arguments of
recognizes the petitioner’s right to sue in this case. Clearly, the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence
petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds or
because he has a personal stake in the outcome of this other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
controversy. case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a direct and specific interest in the questions being raised.31 The
“personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus allegations of constitutional violations in this case are not
_______________ empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the
29 LAMP v. The Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No. 164987,
government. The allegations are substantiated by facts and,
April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373.
30 Rollo, p. 6. therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court
596 _______________
31 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899; 415 SCRA
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
44, 139 (2003), citing Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994,
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council 232 SCRA 110, 155-157.
standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the post 597
of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 597
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
95
need not elaborate on the legal and societal ramifications of Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the
constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so
magistrates in our judicial system. provided.
The Composition of the JBC One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction
Central to the resolution of the foregoing petition is an is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
understanding of the composition of the JBC as stated in the from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. applied without attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-settled
It reads: principle of constitutional construction that the language
“Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.” compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
readily be discerned that the provision is clear and mean what they say.33Verba legis non est recedendum―from
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a the words of a statute there should be no departure.34
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
Then it goes to its composition where the regularmembers are because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a attained;35 and second, because the Constitution is not
representative from the private sector. On the second part lies primarily a lawyer’s document but essentially that of the
the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an
officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief important condition for the rule of law to prevail.36
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a
and “a representative of Congress.” particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
As petitioner correctly posits, the use of the singular letter susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may
_______________
“a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and 32National Food Authority (NFA) v. Masada Security Agency, Inc., 493
leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of Phil. 241, 250; 453 SCRA 70, 79 (2005); Philippine National Bank v. Garcia,
what the members of the Constitutional Commission had in Jr., 437 Phil. 289; 388 SCRA 485 (2002).
mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) 33 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 31 at
p. 885, citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, L-21064,
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
than 34 Id.
598 35 Id.
598 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 36 Id.

96
599 600 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 599 Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council Court and consultant of the JBC in his memorandum,40“from
be made clear and specific by considering the company of the enumeration of the membership of the JBC, it is patent
words in which it is founded or with which it is that each category of members pertained to a single individual
associated.37 This is because a word or phrase in a statute is only.”41
always used in association with other words or phrases, and Indeed, the spirit and reason of the statute may be passed
its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the upon where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
latter.38 The particular words, clauses and phrases should not contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the
be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole lawmakers.42 Not any of these instances, however, is present
and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the in the case at bench. Considering that the language of the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous,
harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the
harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever Constitutional Commission.
possible.39 In short, every meaning to be given to each word or Nevertheless, even if the Court should proceed to look into
phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission,
statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended
association with other words or phrases and its meaning may that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus:
be modified or restricted by the latter. “MR. RODRIGO: Let me go to another point then.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes On page 2, Section 5, there is a novel provision about the
apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of the
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No lower courts. At present it is the President who appoints them. If
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate there is a Commission on Appointments, then it is the President
or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointment. In this
in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed proposal, we would like to establish a new office, a sort of a
board composed of seven members called the Judicial and Bar
to sit in the JBC. The foregoing declaration is but sensible,
Council. And while the President will still appoint the member of
since, as pointed out by an esteemed former member of the the judiciary, he will be limited to the recommendees of this Council.
_______________
37 Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (CCBPI), Naga Plant v. Gomez, G.R. No. xxx xxx xxx
154491, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 18, 37; People v. Delantar, G.R. No. MR. RODRIGO. Of the seven members of the Judicial and
169143, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 115, 139; and Republic v. Bar Council, the President appoints four of them who are regular
Sandiganbayan, 255 Phil. 71; 173 SCRA 72 (1989), citing Co Kim Chan v. members.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, 75 Phil. 371 (1945). _______________
38 People v. Delantar, G.R. No. 169143, February 2, 2007, 514 SCRA 115, 40 Memorandum of Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, dated March
139; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 Phil. 71; 173 SCRA 72 (1989), citing Co 14, 2007; Rollo, pp. 95-103.
Kim Chan v. Valdez, 75 Phil. 371 (1945). 41 Id., at p. 103.
39 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154, 180; 354 SCRA 651, 673 (2001). 42 Ursua v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 157, 163; 256 SCRA 147, 152 (1996).
600 601

97
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 601 _______________
43 1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, p.
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council 445.
602
xxx xxx xxx 602 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
MR. CONCEPCION. The only purpose of the Committee is to Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
eliminate partisan politics.43 say, Mr. Presiding Officer, that event the Chief Justice of the
xxx xxx xxx Supreme Court is an appointee of the President. So it is futile he
MR. RODRIGO. If my amendment is approved, then the will be influence anyway by the President.”44 [Emphases supplied]
provision will be exactly the same as the provision in the 1935 At this juncture, it is worthy to note that the seven-member
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5.
composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to
xxx xxx xxx
provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
If we do not remove the proposed amendment on the creation of
the Judicial and Bar Council, this will be a diminution of the underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
appointing power of the highest magistrate of the land, of the vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
President of the Philippines elected by all the Filipino people. The representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
appointing power will be limited by a group of seven people who members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned
are not elected by the people but only appointed. practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle
Mr. Presiding Officer, if this Council is created, there will be no the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is
uniformity in our constitutional provisions on appointments. The reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered
members of the Judiciary will be segregated from the rest of the illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the
government. Even a municipal judge cannot be appointed by the Constitution itself created. While it would be unreasonable to
President except upon recommendation or nomination of the three
expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it
names by this Committee of seven people, commissioners of the
is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition
Commission on Elections, the COA and the Commission on Civil
Service…even ambassadors, generals of the Army will not come is the best means to break a voting deadlock.
under this restriction. Why are we going to segregate the Judiciary The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature
from the rest of our government in the appointment of high-ranking of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII
officials? of the Constitution should be read as including both the
Another reason is that this Council will be ineffective. It will just Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that
besmirch the honor of our President without being effective at all it was so worded because at the time the said provision was
because this Council will be under the influence of the being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral
President. Four out of seven are appointees of the President and form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission
they can be reappointed when their term ends. Therefore, they eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the
would be kowtow the President. A fifth member is the Minister of
Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII,
Justice, an alter ego of the President. Another member represents
the Legislature. In all probability, the controlling part in the
Section 8 of the Constitution.45 On this score, the Court cites
legislature belongs to the President and, therefore, this the insightful analysis of another member of the Court and
representative form the National Assembly is also under the JBC consultant, retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-
influence of the President. And may I Santiago.46 Thus:
98
_______________ regarding aspiring nominees to the judiciary. The
44 1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, representatives of the Senate and the House of
pp. 486-487.
Representatives act as such for one branch and should not
45 Comment of Respondents, Rollo, pp. 142-146.
46 Comment of JBC; id., at pp. 91-93. have any more quantitative influence as the other branches
603 in the exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 603 three. Sound reason and principle of equality among the three
branches support this conclusion.” [Emphases and underscoring
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
supplied]
604
“A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission 604 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
desire “to have in the Council a representation for the major
elements of the community.” xxx The ex-officio members of the More than the reasoning provided in the above discussed
Council consist of representatives from the three main branches of rules of constitutional construction, the Court finds the above
government while the regular members are composed of various thesis as the paramount justification of the Court’s conclusion
stakeholders in the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of that “Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should
Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member be considered as one body. It is evident that the definition of
as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function
Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with in government—to legislate.47 In the passage of laws, the
the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each
judicial nominees. house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-
xxx
legislative powers such as, inter alia, the power of
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative
of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its
appropriation,48 the declaration of an existence of a state of
legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers war,49 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
under Article XVII of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to Vice-
the executive and judicial branches of government, is _______________
47 1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 27(1)―Every bill passed by the
constitutionally treated as another coequal branch of in the matter Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, the exercise of approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and House of same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter
Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to
scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House
by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all
separateness of the two houses of Congress as they
the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes
relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Congress interacts with the other two co-equal branches of Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President
government. shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as
governmental branches to assign the same weight to if he had signed it.
considerations that any of its representatives may have
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48 1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 24―All appropriation, revenue or xxx
tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills of local application, (6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice
49 1987 Constitution, Article 6 Section 23 (1)―The Congress, by a vote of of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war. Senate.
605 606
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 605 606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
President,50 and impeachment.51 In the exercise of these workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between the
powers, the Constitution employs precise language in laying Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
down the roles which a particular house plays, regardless of nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress”
whether the two houses consummate an official act by voting must be taken to mean the entirelegislative department.
jointly or separately. An inter-play between the two houses is A fortiori, a pretext of oversight cannot prevail over the more
necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid pragmatic scheme which the Constitution laid with firmness,
dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. Verily, each that is, that the JBC has a seat for a single representative of
house is constitutionally granted with powers and functions Congress, as one of the co-equal branches of government.
peculiar to its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its Doubtless, the Framers of our Constitution intended to
relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in consonance create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the
with the principle of checks and balances, to the other public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the
branches of government. appointment of members of the Judiciary.52 To ensure judicial
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped
representation because no liaison between the two houses that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three
exists in the branches of government would have an active role and equal
_______________ voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
50 1987 Constitution, Article 7 Section 4―The returns of every election for
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more
President and Vice President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one
of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all each, would, as one former congressman and member of the
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in
joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity
JBC put it, “negate the principle of equality among the three
and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes. branches of government which is enshrined in the
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but Constitution.”53
in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of To quote one former Secretary of Justice:
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of
“The present imbalance in voting power between the Legislative
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
51 1987 Constitution, Article 11 Section 3 (1)―The House of and the other sectors represented in the JBC must be corrected
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of especially when considered vis-à-vis the avowed purpose for its
impeachment. creation, i.e., to insulate the appointments in the Judiciary against
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political influence. By allowing both houses of Congress to the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts,
have a representative in the JBC and by giving each ac-
representative one (1) vote in the Council, Congress, as _______________
compared to the other members of the JBC, is accorded 54 Memorandum of Justice Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera, Comment of
greater and unwar- the JBC, id., at pp. 105-106.
_______________ 55 Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,
52 1 Records of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010, 637 SCRA 78, 137-138, citing Cruz,
Records of the Constitutional Convention, p. 487. Philippine Political Law, 2002 ed., p. 12.
53 Comment of the JBC, Rollo, p. 104. 56 Claudio S. Yap v. Thennamaris Ship’s Management and Intermare
607 Maritime Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369, 380.
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 607 608
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council 608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
ranted influence in the appointment of judges.”54 [Emphasis Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
supplied] tions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that legally recognized. They are not nullified. In Planters
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,57 the Court explained:
inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or “The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general
half (1/2) of it, goes against that mandate. Section 8(1), Article rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence
voice with other members of the JBC in recommending of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
the constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the declaration.
Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
conform and to which all persons, including the highest relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case
officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in
remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.”
situations and much more tailor itself to the whims and Considering the circumstances, the Court finds the
caprices of the government and the people who run it.55 Hence, exception applicable in this case and holds that
any act of the government or of a public official or employee notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
which is contrary to the Constitution is illegal, null and void. current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions are
As to the effect of the Court’s finding that the current nonetheless valid.
composition of the JBC is unconstitutional, it bears At this point, the Court takes the initiative to clarify that it
mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is is not in a position to determine as to who should remain as
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords the sole representative of Congress in the JBC. This is a
no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has matter beyond the province of the Court and is best left to the
not been passed at all.56 This rule, however, is not absolute. In determination of Congress.
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Finally, while the Court finds wisdom in respondent’s
contention that both the Senate and the House of
Representatives should be equally represented in the JBC, the
Court is not in a position to stamp its imprimatur on such a
construction at the risk of expanding the meaning of the
Constitution as currently worded. Needless to state, the
remedy lies in the amendment of this constitutional provision.
The courts merely give effect to the lawgiver’s intent. The
solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the
law does not
_______________
57 G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, 548 SCRA 485, 516-517.
609
VOL. 676, JULY 17, 2012 609
Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
include the power to correct, by reading into the law what is
not written therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current
numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only
one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

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