Locke The Way of Ideas

J O H N LOCKE
A N D T H E W A Y OF
IDEAS
BY
J O H N W. Y O L T O N
OXFORD
» A T T H E C L A R E N D O N PRESS
F I R S T P U B L I S H E D i956 I N T H E
Oxford Classical and Philosophical Monographs

REPRINTED LITHOGRAPHICALLY IN GREAT BRITAIN
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i968
T O P R O F E S S O R
JULIUS R.WEINBERG
PREFACE
I
O C K E is usually treated by intellectual historians as a
member of the philosophical tradition stemming from
^/Descartes and going on to Berkeley, Hume, and Kant.
There can be very little doubt that his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding defined the area of problems for his
successors and specified the terminology i n which those
problems were to be discussed. From the time of Locke
to the present day it is possible to trace a steady empirical
descent which, though it would be extravagant to claim i t as
the sole direction of Locke's own thought, owes its impetus
to the formulation Locke gave to many empirical doctrines.
The roots of Locke's analyses i n his predecessors cannot so
readily be traced. The terminology of ideas which found its
most forceful statement i n the Essay finds many prior formu-
lators both i n England and in France. The Cartesian influence
seems most evident here. There are many other doctrines
invoked by Locke which also had had a long history before he
began to reflect about problems of knowledge and reality, a
history which i n some cases goes back into the Middle Ages.
Locke was widely read and his travels i n France in 1675-9
brought him into contact with many ideas which found a
sympathetic exposition in the Essay. I t is correct, then, to
treat the Essay as a major philosophical work related to the
traditional problems of philosophy handled by his prede
cessors and successors.
But there is another side to Locke's philosophical analyses
which is usually ignored or only insufficiently remarked. For
all the cosmopolitanism of his analysis of knowledge, it had
an immediate effect upon his own contemporaries i n England,
the nature of which strongly suggests that Locke himself was
not unmindful of the relevance of his theory of knowledge
to the problems and debates on morality and religion en
gaged i n by his friends and associates. Locke in fact tells
viii P R E F A C E
us that the need for such an analysis as the Essay makes

was first brought home to him after a discussion with certain
friends on some problems in morality and religion. The
initial purpose of his thought was not to extend the tradi
tional analyses of the Cartesians or the medievalists: it was
more simply to arrive at a way of dealing with important
difficulties in normative conduct and theological discussion.
During the course of composition Locke discovered that
his designs were to grow, that the simple difficulties which
first gave rise to his reflections were almost becoming lost
in the maze of theoretical problems in metaphysics and
epistemology. I t was his careful extension of his first
analysis of knowledge which brought the Essay fully into
the philosophical tradition. But if one examines the moral
and religious context i n which Locke was living at the time
of his initial reflections, it becomes quite clear that one of the
traits of the Essay which created such an active interest i n
Locke's contemporaries was the way in which its philosophical
doctrines were almost always directly related to the moral and
religious disputes of the day. This relevance gave to Locke's
work an immediate importance for his readers. What came to
fan the flames of controversy and invective was the solutions
he proposed to the traditional disputes.
But the solutions which disturbed his readers concerned
only indirectly the problems in morals and religion. The
Essay was primarily an examination into what has come to be
called 'epistemology', the study of man's processes of gaining
knowledge, the kinds and limits of this knowledge, and the dis
tinction between knowledge and belief. I n such an examination
ontological questions inevitably arise, such as the nature of
the objects of knowledge, their relation to our knowledge, and
the different kinds of objects which man can be said to know.
Various subsidiary questions have also to be met, such as the
nature of cause, of substance, of power, of liberty and neces
sity. I t was the solutions to these epistemological and meta
physical problems which Locke's contemporaries felt had a
crucial effect upon theological and ethical issues, reinforcing
P R E F A C E ix
many of the new trends in these areas. Not all of Locke's
epistemological doctrines, however, received the same degree
of attention: it was more the second book than the fourth
which occupied the minds of most of his critics, although we
shall see that almost all of the major epistemological views of
the Essay figured in the debates. Knowledge by means of
ideas which are causally connected with, but only representa
tive of, objects distinct from the mind was the 'new' doctrine
which aroused the attention of Locke's contemporaries. The
subsidiary doctrines (with the exception of the doctrine of
substance, which was more intimately related to his episte-
mology than the others) were for the most part left alone.
I have been concerned to present, i n this study, the recep
tion given to Locke's theory of knowledge i n the seventeenth
century, and its impact upon the religion and morality of that
period, indicating wherever necessary the general lines this
impact took i n the early years of the eighteenth century. I
have also argued that the full significance of Locke's epis-
temology can only be grasped once we have set the Essay
within the context of its own century, studied the reactions of
Locke's contemporaries, and thereby seen what meaning these
doctrines held for the men p f that century. The results of this
analysis disclose that Locke's epistemological doctrines had a
disturbing effect upon the traditional moral and religious
beliefs of his day; that, being i n the midst of many radical
movements of the century (the new science, the growing
naturalistic tendency in religion, the empirical foundation for
all knowledge), Locke's doctrines were held suspect from the
start; and that so forceful was his formulation of many of the
principles presupposed by these movements that he was
considered by his contemporaries one of the more dangerous
and important writers of the day.
I wish to thank the Keeper of the Western Manuscripts
of the Bodleian Library for permission to quote from
material i n the Lovelace Collection of Locke manuscripts, and
the editor of the Journal of the History of Ideas for permission
to reprint portions of an article of mine on Locke and
824331 B
X P R E F A C E
Sergeant. I am greatly indebted to Professor R. I . Aaron of

University College, Aberystwyth, for reading the whole of
an earlier version of this study and for making many i n
valuable suggestions for its improvement. I have also profited
from many critical suggestions of Professor Gilbert Ryle, for
whose guidance I am indebted. I wish to express my thanks
to Professor H . H . Price for his encouragement of the pub
lication of this study, and to Sir W. D. Ross for his careful
reading of the proof-sheets. Professor E. A. Strong of the
University of California was responsible for first directing
my attention to the need and value of such an historical study
of Locke as I have here made. M y wife has helped throughout
to make the prose more readable and is also responsible for
the bibliography.
J. W . Y .
CONTENTS
I. T H E N A T U R E A N D SCOPE O F T H E R E A C T I O N i
TO T H E ESSAY
II. T H E D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E 26
§ I . The Doctrine ofInnate Knowkdge Prior to 1688 30
§ 2. The Critics of Locke's Polemic 48
§ 3. Conclusion 64
III. E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M 72
$i.EmpiricismandRationalism 72
§ 2. The Nature ofIdeas 86
§ 3 . Idealism in Knowledge and Truth 98
IV. R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M 115
§ I . The Role ofIdeas in Religious Knowledge 118
§2. TheDoctrineofSubstance 126
§ 3. The Controversy on Thinking Matter 148
V. E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N 167
§ I . The Charge ofDeism against Locke 169
§ 2. The Orthodox Application ofLocke's Epistemology 181
§ 3. General Conclusion 202
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 209
I N D E X 238
I
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE

REACTION TO THE ESSAY
AN examination of the contemporary scene surrounding

yuA Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding reveals
JL A- that from the very first the responses to his doctrines
were highly critical. I n his review in the May 1690 issue of his
Bibliotheque Universelle, Jean LeClerc says that the abridge
ment of the Essay which appeared i n the January issue of 1688
of the same journal 'fut si bien recu des Connoisseurs, que le
Livre meme ne manquera pas de plaire, ä ceux qui tächent de
distinguer ce qui est connu de ce qui ne l'est pas, car c'est-lä le
principal but de cet Ouvrage'. However, the reactions to this
1
summary were not all favourable. Locke later wrote, ' I have
been told, that a short epitome of this treatise, which was
printed i n 1688, was by some condemmed without reading,
because innate ideas were denied in i t . ' The letters of Christian
2
Knorr von Rosenroth and Fredericus van Leenhof preserved in

the Lovelace Collection, both dated 1688 fromAmsterdam, are
two of the earliest written reactions to this doctrine. Both men
favour innate ideas and principles. I t may have been these men
to whom Locke referred in a letter to Lady E. Guise of Utrecht,
although the men of whom Lady Guise spoke were more
probably theologians of her own city. Locke's comments and
rejection of the criticism referred to in this letter, even before
he had seen or heard the discussion directly, are characteristic of
much of his reaction to his critics. I t is significant to notice the
very early awareness of the disturbing effects of the Essay upon
religion.
I see b y y o u r L a d y ' s letter there are m e n t o u c h y e n o u g h to be p u t
into a heat b y m y little treatise w h i c h I t h i n k h a s n o n e i n it. I f t h e y are
1
t. xvii, p. 400.
2
'Epistle to the Reader', in his Essay, in Works ( 1 8 2 3 ) , vol. i, p. li. All refer
ences to Locke's works are from the 1823 edition, unless otherwise noted.
2 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F CH. I
soe c o n c e r n e d for t r u t h & religion as becomes sober m e n , they w i l l

a n s w e r the e n d o f its p u b l i c a t i o n & s h o w m e the mistakes i n it. B u t i f
they are o f those religious m e n , w h o w h e n they c a n s h e w noe faults i n
h i s book c a n look into the heart o f the author & there see flaws i n the
religion o f h i m that w r i t it, t h o u g h there b e noe t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g r e
ligion i n it, o n l y because it is not suited to the systems they w e r e taught
I leave t h e m to bethink themselves w h e t h e r they are h i s disciples w h o s e
c o m m a n d it w a s , J u d g not. S u c h gossiping talkers w h o s u p p l y the w a n t
of k n o w l e d g w i t h a s h e w o f zeale, & w h o i f censure & tatle w e r e r e a s o n
& a r g u m e n t w o u l d certainly b e v e r y infallible I leave to t h e i r o w n good
h u m o r & c h a r i t y ; I t h a v e i n g s e l d o m been observed that a n y are f o r w a r d
to s u s p e c t o r question others religion but those w h o w a n t s u c h a m a s q u e
to cover some defect i n their o w n . I have soe sincerely p r o p o s e d t r u t h
to m y s e l f i n all I have w r i t & doe soe m u c h prefer i t to m y o w n e o p i n i o n
that I s h a l l t h i n k m y s e l f obleiged to any one w h o w i l l s h e w m e w h e r e I
have m i s s e d i t . 1
I n her letter of i o May 1688 to Locke, Lady Guise had re

marked : Ί know not how fare Emulation or a mistaken Zeal
may prevaile over the minds of some, to Cavill with your
philosophy or question your relegion but I leave them to
answare for their Ignorance/ Locke had sent her a copy of
2
the 1688 abridgement which she fully enjoyed and claimed to

follow perfectly. She praised Locke for having
w i t h s u c h a d m i r a b l e fasility offer'd to o u r sences w h a t has b e e n b u t
o b s c u r e l y treated o f b y others, & tho I a m p e r s w a d e d y o u r flight i s not
lesse E x a l t e d t h a n that o f other P h i l o s o p h e r s , y e t does i t not r e m a i n i n
the c l o u d s ; b u t desends w i t h a q u i c k e t h o E a s y t o u c h u p o n t h e a p r e -
h e n t i o n & i f i t leaves n o t a n I m p r e s s i o n , t h e fault m u s t be w h o l l y
asigned to the reader, since I can't b u t believe y o u have E x t r e a m l y w e l l
perform'd your p a r t . . . . 3
Lady Guise's praisemay have been elicited by the good opinion

Locke expressed of her character, but the 1688 abridge 4
ment of the Essay was much discussed by Locke's friends i n

Amsterdam. Limborch wrote that he and his associates had
discussed its doctrines, and Peter Guenellon indicated that
5
1
Locke to Lady E . Guise, Rotterdam, 21 June 1688. MS. Locke, C . 2 4 ,ff.5 1 ,
52. The references to Locke manuscript material thus indicated are to the Love
lace Collection in the Bodleian Library.
2
Lady E . Guise to Locke, Utrecht, 10 May 1688. MS. Locke, C . 11, f. 130.
3
Lady Guise to Locke, 17 April 1688. MS. Locke, C . 11, f. 129.
4
Cf. Lady Guise's reference to Locke's praise in hef letter of 17 April.
5
Limborch to Locke, Amsterdam, 3 April 1688. MS. Locke, C . 14, f. 13.
cH.i T H E R E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 3
Locke's discussions were followed with interest by members

of his college. Guenellon was the intermediary for Leenhof
1
and transmitted the latter's criticisms to Locke. I t was typical

of the general reaction that, while his friends expressed un
limited praise for the Essay even i n its abridged form, those
readers who lay outside the orbit of Locke's direct and intimate
friendship quite early found points of criticism. This situation
was duplicated i n Ireland, where Molyneuxwrotenothing but
commendation, while William King, a friend of Molyneux but
no acquaintance of Locke, sent to Locke a series of critical
comments indicating places i n the Essay where he thought
Locke had erred. I t was in England, however, that this
situation of praise from intimate friends and hostile criticism
from those outside this circle proliferated into its widest and
most extensive form. A friend of James Tyrrell wrote i n 1690:
' M r . Locks new Book admits of no indifferent censure, for tis
either extreamly commended, or much deeny'd, but has ten
Enemies for one friend; Metaphysics being too Serious a sub
ject for this Age.' But Tyrrell himself, the manwho had been
2
in Locke's confidence since the early days of the inception of

the Essay, reported a different reception from Oxford. I n
December of 1689 he wrote Locke that many copies of his book
were being sold ' & I hear it is well approved of by those who
have begun the reading of i t ' . A t that time, Tyrrell had read
3
onlythe epistle and part of the preface of the published version.

I n February, after he had read and heard more, he told Locke
that he had begun the serious reading of his book
and to refresh those N o t i o n s ; w h i c h I h a d fro y o u r M a n u s c r i p t copy
c o n c e r n i n g that m a t t e r : a n d I m u s t tell y o u that y o u r booke is r e c e i v e d
here w i t h m u c h greater applause t h a n I find it is at L o n d o n ; t h e persons
here b e i n g m o s t a d d i c t e d to c o n t e m p l a t i o n . 4
1
Guenellon to Locke, Amsterdam, 25 March 1687/8. MS. Locke, C. 11, f. 5.
2
Enclosed in Tyrrell's letter to Locke, 2 7 January 1689/90. MS. Locke, C. 2 2 ,
f.80.
3
Tyrrell to Locke, Oxford, 20 December 1689. MS. Locke, C. 2 2 , f.72. It is
apparent from this letter of Tyrrell that the Essay was already appearing in its
first edition form as early as the middle of December 1689.
4
Tyrrell to Locke, 18 February 1 6 8 9 / 9 0 . MS. Locke, C. 2 2 , f. 8 2 . Cf. his
letter of February 1683/4, MS. Locke, C. 2 2 , f. 50, where he speaks of having
seen an early draft of the Essay.
4 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F c H . i
The reception from Oxford was not all praise, however, for
Locke was even charged with plagiarism, a charge probably
false, but one that shows the recognition by Locke's contem
poraries of the continuity of his thought with that of his
predecessors. Tyrrell wrote i n March 1690 that
a friend told m e the other day that h e h a d it f r o m one w h o p r e t e n d s to be
a great J u d g e of bookes: that y o u h a d taken all that w a s good i n i t ; f r o m
oeseftr4es [sic] divers m o d e r n e french A u t h o u r s , not o n l y as to the notions
but the m a n n e r of c o n n e c t i o n of t h e m . 1
But as early as 1692 the Essay was being used by Dr. Ashe,
friend of Molyneux, in the university of Dublin as required
reading for all bachelors, By 1697 it had made its appearance
2
in the universities of Cambridge and Oxford and was exerting

someinfluence deemed by not afew tobe dangerous. I n 1699, 3
Samuel Bold,one who was outside t h e o r b i t of intimate

friends, wrote a defence of Locke in which he bestowed high
praise upon the Essay asserting that it 'is a Book the best
f
Adapted of any I know, to serve the Interest of T r u t h , Natural,

Moral, and Divine: And that it is the most Worthy, most
Noble, and best Book I ever read, excepting those which were
writ by Persons Divinely inspired'. The Essay was cited by 4
William Wotton i n his Reflections upon Ancient and Modern

Learning (1694), along with the works of Descartes and Male¬
branche, as representative of modern logic and metaphysics
(pp. 156, 158). LeClerc dedicated his Ontologia (1692) to
Locke, pointing out that he had borrowed many doctrines of
the Essay a borrowing which introduced the Lockean modi
y
fications of the Cartesiati way of ideas into France. Richard 5
1
Tyrrell to Locke, 18 March 1689/90. MS. Locke, C. 2 2 , ff. 8 6 - 8 7 .
2
Molyneux to Locke, 2 2 December 1692, in Works, vol. ix, p. 2 9 9 . Thomas
Hearne confirms this point. See Hearne's Collections, entry for 21 November
1734, vol. xi, p. 3 9 4 .
3
See John Sergeant, Solid Philosophy Asserted ( 1 6 9 7 ) , P· [xv]. Cf. Hearne's
Collections, ibid., 'Mr. John Wynne . . . was a great Tutor in Jesus College when
he abridged Locke's Essay ofHuman Understanding, and being a great Lockist,
he read the same to his Pupils and got many other Tutors in the University to
read it. . .
4
Some Considerations On the Principal Objections ( 1 6 9 9 ) , p. 1.
5
An interesting absorption of the Lockean and Cartesian logics through the
intermediary of LeClerc is to be found in J. P. de Crousaz's La Logique ( 1 7 1 2 ) .
Burthogge also dedicated his Essay upon Reason (1694) to Locke,

not, as Leclerc had done, because he made use of many of
Locke's principles, but rather because the way of ideas elabor
ated in the Essay of Locke reaffirmed many of Burthogge's own
earlier ideas, as expressed i n his Organum Vetus & Novum.
William Molyneux's comment, made prior to his friendship
with Locke, is by now well known. I n the Dedication to his
Dioptrica Nova (1692), Molyneux had given credit to Locke
for making great strides forward in logic.
B u t to none do w e owe m o r e for a greater A d v a n c e m e n t i n t h i s P a r t
of P h i l o s o p h y , t h a n to the i n c o m p a r a b l e M r . Locke, W h o , i n h i s Essay
Concerning Humane Understanding, h a s rectified m o r e r e c e i v e d M i s t a k e s ,
and d e l i v e r e d m o r e p r o f o u n d T r u t h s , established o n E x p e r i e n c e a n d
O b s e r v a t i o n , for the D i r e c t i o n of M a n ' s m i n d i n the P r o s e c u t i o n of
K n o w l e d g e , ( w h i c h I t h i n k m a y be p r o p e r l y t e r m ' d L o g i c k ) t h a n are to
be m e t w i t h i n all the V o l u m e s of the A n t i e n t s . H e h a s clearly o v e r
t h r o w n all those M e t a p h y s i c a l W h y m s i e s , w h i c h infected m e n s B r a i n s
w i t h a S p i c e of M a d n e s s , w h e r e b y they feign'd a Knowledge where they
had none, by making a noise with Sounds, without clear and distinct Signi
fications. 1
After the correspondence had begun between Molyneux and

Locke, he told Locke that 'Upon myreading your Essay, Iwas
so taken with it, that when I was in London, in August, 1690,1
made inquiry amongst some of my learned friends, for any
other of your writings.' We know from a letter which Locke
2
wrote to Molyneux that the copies of the first edition were

all sold out by September 1692. I n that same letter, he 3
asked Molyneux for his suggestions of deletions, additions, or

corrections for the second edition, which was then in prepara
tion.
I n his reply, Molyneux said he had not sufficient leisure
to carry out Locke's request but that he had given the Essay
to a learned friend who had kindly made some.written
comments which Molyneux enclosed with the letter. These
remarks were made by William King, then Bishop of Derry
1
p. [4] of the 'Dedication to the Royal Society'. Also quoted in Fraser's
edition of the Essay, vol. i, pp. xl-xli, and in Works, vol. ix, p. 289.
2
Letter ofsummer 1692. Reprinted in Works, vol. ix, pp. 2 9 1 - 2 .
3
Letter of 2 0 September 1692, in Works, vol. ix, pp. 2 9 2 - 3 .
and later Archbishop of Dublin—brief remarks running from

Book One of the Essay to the section on Freedom i n Book
Two. King's remarks are highly critical of many of the episte
1
mological doctrines, but Locke did not consider them valid.

Replying to Molyneux, he wrote as follows about King's
remarks:
I r e t u r n y o u m y h u m b l e t h a n k s for the papers y o u d i d m e the favour to
s e n d m e i n y o u r l a s t : b u t a m apt to t h i n k y o u agree w i t h m e that there
is v e r y little i n those papers, w h e r e i n either m y sense i s not m i s t a k e n ,
or v e r y little, w h e r e i n t h e a r g u m e n t i s directly against m e . I s u p p o s e
that l e a r n e d gentleman, i f h e h a d h a d the leisure to r e a d m y E s s a y q u i t i
t h r o u g h , w o u l d have f o u n d several o f h i s objections m i g h t have b e e n
spared. 2
King admitted that his remarks were written i n a hurry and

that he had not 'had the leisure to read them over or to make
English of them where words were left out'. But the criticisms 3
he made, as we shall see i n a later chapter, hardly merit the

complete rejection which Locke gave them. Locke suggested
to Molyneux that King was blinded by the fact that he was
concerned to defend some theory of his own or that his ex
pression was hampered by the use of words which 'signify
nothing at alP. Locke insisted, as he had done earlier to Lady
Guise, that he was not fond of his own principles because they
were his but only because he believed they were true. He con
fessed that he did not understand why two thinking men should
disagree or be unable to reach agreement i f they were both
devoted to the truth. I t was Molyneux's devotion to truth
which attracted him and led him to value his criticism. Collins
and Tyrrell received similar praise from Locke: both men were
fond of telling him about the criticisms levelled against his
Essay, and, like Molyneux, they found them all fallacious,
irrelevant, or nonsensical. Molyneux finally wrote some
4
comments of his own on the Essay in December 1692, but his

remarks consisted of nothing more than praise for the Essay as
1
These remarks are preserved in the Lovelace Collection, MS. Locke, C . 2 8 ,
ff. 99 et seq.
2
Letter of 26 December 1692, in Works, vol. ix, p. 3 0 0 .
3
King to Locke, 1692. MS. Locke, C. 13, f. 6.
4
See MS. Locke, the Tyrrell-Locke and Collins-Locke correspondence.
cH.i T H E R E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY η
it stood and the assurance that Locke was the person best fitted
tojudge concerning alterations and additions. Hemadeitplain
that he and his learned friends with whom he discussed the
Essay all thought well of Locke's book and could find nothing
to which to take exception. Molyneux did later take issue
with Locke's analysis ofpersonal identity; but i n the end he
seems to have been convinced that Locke's arguments i n this
connexion were, with one or two qualifications, sound. The
whole exchange of letters on the subject was friendly and co
operative. Judging from Locke's letters to Molyneux, we can
say that Locke was always anxiousto have Molyneux's reac
tions to his material before publication, ostensibly because he
felt him to be such a good critic. But Molyneux's 'criticisms'
were usually a restatement of Locke's doctrines and a con
demnation of Locke's critics. Molyneux provided solace for
Locke i n the face of the many dissenting critics who ques
tioned the teachings of the Essay. More than once, Locke
confided i n him his disappointment over the kind of attacks
räised against him. I t is significant that the critics whom
Locke acknowledged as valuable were those friends who very
seldom had anything more than praise for the Essay, and who
consistently made the assertion that the men who wrote against
Locke were incomprehensible.
The many criticisms which appeared after the publication
of the second edition were all considered by Locke to be
fallacious for one reason or another. They received much the
same treatment as the remarks of William King. I n a letter to
Molyneux dated 28 June 1694, Locke said:
T h e r e appears to m e to b e so little material i n the objections that I
have seen i n p r i n t against m e , that I h a v e p a s s e d t h e m a l l b y b u t o n e
gentleman's, w h o s e book not c o m i n g to m y h a n d till those parts o f m i n e
were p r i n t e d that he questions, I w a s fain to p u t m y a n s w e r i n the latter
end o f the epistle. 1
The critic in this case was James Lowde, author of A Discourse

Concerning the Nature ofMan (1694), one of the many attacks
upon Locke's rejection of innate moral principles. The reply
1
Reprinted in Works, vol. ix, p. 339.
8 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F
to Lowde i n 'Epistle to the Reader', i n the second and sub

sequent editions of the Essay, is one of the few published
reactions of Locke to his critics. By 1697 a storm of negative
criticism had engulfed the Essay, but Locke failed to take up
the challenge of the majority of these attacks. One explanation
for this failure to respond to criticism was, of course, his long
controversy with Stillingfleet, the Bishop of Worcester, who
saw in the Essay doctrines of dangerous consequence to Chris
tianity. Undoubtedly because of Stillingfleet's prominence as
well as his own desire to protect religious doctrines and beliefs,
Locke felt called upon to respond at length to the bishop's
attacks, even though he considered the charges made by the
Bishop of Worcester to be misdirected and even malicious. But
the bishop's long attacks were by no means all misdirected nor
were these the most important of the unfavourable reactions
published by Locke's contemporaries. I n a letter to Molyneux
of 22 February 1696/7, Locke declared that a Dr. S., 'a man
of no small name . . . has been pleased to declare against my
doctrine of no innate ideas, from the pulpit i n the Temple,
and, as I have been told, charged i t w i t h little less than atheism'. 1
Moreover, Locke had by this time received Leibniz's com

ments, sent to him from the Continent through their mutual
acquaintance, Thomas Burnet of Kemnay; John Sergeant, a 2
Catholic priest, had written his long and detailed criticism,

Solid Philosophy Asserted, Against the Fancies of the Ideists
1
Works, vol. ix, p. 396. Dr. S. is William Sherlock, later Bishop of London.
He published his charge of atheism against Locke in 1704 in his 'Digression
Concerning Connate Ideas, or Inbred Knowledge' (pp. 1 2 4 - 6 4 of his Discourse
Concerning the Happiness of Good Men, part i).
2
Leibniz wrote three short sets of remarks on the Essay which Gerhardt dates,
with insufficient supporting evidence, 1696 and 1 6 9 8 . (Cf. Die Philosophischen
Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ed. by C. J . Gerhardt, 1 8 7 5 - 9 0 , bd.
ν, p. 6 for his dating; and bd. v, pp. 1 4 - 2 5 for his reprinting of the remarks.)
Locke was enabled to examine the first set of remarks on two different occasions.
Leibniz sent them to Thomas Burnet in his letter of 7/17 March 1696, and
Burnet sent them to Locke via Mr. Cunningham (letter of Burnet to Leibniz,
30 November 1696) and again in a letter to Locke directly (cf. Burnet to
Leibniz, 3 May 1697). These letters are reprinted by Gerhardt in bd. iii, pp. 1 7 4 ¬
9 , pp. 1 8 5 - 6 , and pp. 1 9 7 - 9 . Besides these and the 1698 remarks, Leibniz wrote
long comments on the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy. (Cf. Leibniz to Burnet,
2 0 / 3 0 January 1699, Gerhardt, bd. iii, pp. 2 4 3 - 5 3 , pp. 2 2 3 - 4 3 , and pp. 2 5 6 - 6 1 . )
(1697); John Norris, who had published the first criticism of

the Essay in 1690, was still reprinting the original edition of
1
his objections. I t is no wonder that Locke wrote to Molyneux

in the following manner:
M y book crept into the w o r l d about six or s e v e n years ago, w i t h o u t
a n y opposition, a n d h a s s i n c e p a s s e d amongst some for useful, a n d , the
least favourable, for i n n o c e n t . B u t , as it seems to m e , it i s agreed b y s o m e
m e n that it s h o u l d no longer do so. S o m e t h i n g , I k n o w not w h a t , i s at
last s p i e d out i n it, that is like to be t r o u b l e s o m e , a n d therefore it m u s t
be a n i l l book, a n d be treated accordingly. I t is not that I k n o w a n y t h i n g
i n p a r t i c u l a r , b u t some t h i n g s that have h a p p e n e d at the s a m e t i m e t o
gether, s e e m to m e to suggest t h i s : w h a t it w i l l p r o d u c e , t i m e w i l l s h o w . 2
Locke was incorrect in claiming that his book crept into the
world without any opposition, for even the short epitome in
LeClerc'sjournal was subjected to criticism; but he was right
in pointing out that criticisms had increased by 1697. Samuel
Bold, whose defence I have already referred to, expressed the
same surprise at the number of attacks which were being made
on the Essay by the end of the century. Nor was he sure of the
explanation for the great outcry against Locke's doctrines, but
he suggests that the fact that so many 'hands should be em
ployed, just at the same time, to Attack and Batter this Essay\
is significant, implying, as Locke also had done, that some sort
of malicious plot was under way to cry down the Essay. Moly 3
neux thought he could place his finger upon the disturbing

features of the Essay which called forth these suspicions.
I fancy I pretty w e l l guess w h a t it i s that some m e n find m i s c h i e v o u s
i n y o u r Essay: it is o p e n i n g the eyes o f the ignorant, a n d rectifying t h e
m e t h o d s o f reasoning, w h i c h p e r h a p s m a y u n d e r m i n e some r e c e i v e d
errors, a n d so abridge the e m p i r e o f d a r k n e s s ; w h e r e i n , t h o u g h t h e s u b
j e c t s w a n d e r deplorably, yet the r u l e r s have t h e i r profit a n d a d v a n t a g e . 4
He considered it ridiculous that anyone could find the doc

trines of the Essay dangerous to religion.
1
'Cursory Reflections', 4 4 pp. appended to his Christian Blessedness (1690).
2
Letter of 2 2 February 1696/7, in Works, vol. ix, pp. 3 9 6 - 7 .
3
Op. cit., p. 2.
* Letter of 16 March 1696/7, in Works, vol. ix, pp. 4 0 1 - 2 .
io T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F c H . i
Locke had expressed the same fears i n his short reply to the
first of Thomas Burnet's attacks i n 1697. 1
Before a n y t h i n g c a m e out against m y E s s a y c o n c e r n i n g Human

U n d e r s t a n d i n g the last year, I w a s told, that I m u s t prepare m y s e l f for a
s t o r m that w a s c o m i n g against i t ; it b e i n g resolved b y s o m e m e n , that it
w a s necessary that book of m i n e s h o u l d , as it is p h r a s e d , be r u n d o w n . 2
I have found no evidence to indicate that the doctrines of the

Essay were plotted against i n this manner by a group of men
unconcerned with their truth or falsity. Many of the doctrines
were felt to be dangerous to Christianity and to morality, being
sympathetic to the Socinian interpretations of the Scriptures.
This fact led somemen to class Locke among the Socinian
writers of the day and to view him with the same hatred as
they held for all members of this class. But whereas many of
the writers of this group were damned without much attention
being paid to their principles, Locke (with the interesting
exception of William Carroll, whom I shall discuss i n a later
chapter) had no undiscriminating critics. Specific charges
were brought against his epistemological doctrines. Several
writers tried to point out to Locke that he could easily throw
ofF this charge of Socinianism by stating his views on the Holy
Trinity and other Christian doctrines then being hotly debated.
Locke candidly refrained from giving a clear answer to Stil-
lingfleet's charge that he denied the Trinity, undoubtedly
because he was very sympathetic to the naturalistic Soci
nian and deistical interpretations. His extended replies to
Stillingfleet's charges are, on the whole, free from personal
animosity: he tries to meet the challenges and to explain his
position. But Locke's reaction to his critics was not always of
this nature. Stillingfleet's position and the cogency and weight
of his charges probably led Locke to consider him seriously.
I have already referred to an early letter of Locke's to Lady
1
There were two Thomas Burnets actively concerned with the Essay. The
one of Kemnay already mentioned served as the intermediary between Locke
and Leibniz; the other, who himself wrote against Locke, was of the Charter
house, and author of Telluris Theoria Sacra ( 1 6 8 1 - 9 ) .
2
'An Answer to Remarks upon an Essay concerning Human Understanding',
in Works, vol. iv, p. 186.
Guise showing his readiness to dismiss criticism from the men

of religion. We have learned of his reactions to William King's
brief remarks and have found that the number of criticisms
made against him by 1697 led him to believe that the critics were
out to undermine the Essay and to give i t a bad name by foul
means. I f there was such a plot, it was at least partially success
ful at the turn of the century. The Grand Jury of Middlesex
handed down a presentment on the last day of Easter term
1697 banning Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity, on the
grounds that it denied the Trinity, appealed to reason as the
sole criterion of religious truth, gave rise to Arianism, Socinian-
ism, atheism, and Deism. The Essay was the subject of a 1
similar censure to the tutors of Oxford in 1703. About this

matter Collins wrote in February 1704:
I a m p r o m i s ' d b y a F r i e n d at O x f o r d a p a r t i c u l a r a c c o u n t o f the
P r o c e e d i n g s o f the H e a d s of Colleges w i t h relation to t h e i r f o r b i d d i n g
a n y o f y o u r B o o k e to be r e a d i n the U n i v e r s i t y . I s h o u l d be v e r y glad
so considerable a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n m i g h t for the benefit o f m a n k i n d
be m a d e p u b l i c k to the W o r l d , for w h a t they have done p l a i n l y s h o w s
that i n the w a y of r e a s o n they are not to be dealt w i t h w h i c h they v e r y
w e l l approve of w h e n it serves t h e i r p u r p o s e . 2
Tyrrell referred to the incident in his letter of 28 February

1703/4 and in April 1704 he gave Locke the full account.
T h a t i n the b e g i n n i n g of N o v e m b e r last, there w a s a m e e t i n g o f the
H e a d s o f H o u s e s t h e n i n t o w n ; it w a s there p r o p o s ' d b y D r . M i l l , a n d
s e c o n d e d b y D r . M a u n d e r , that there w a s a great decay of logical e x e r
cises i n the u n i v e r s i t y , w h i c h c o u l d not be attributed to a n y t h i n g so
m u c h as the n e w P h i l o s o p h y w h i c h w a s so m u c h r e a d , a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r
y o u r B o o k a n d L e C l e r c s P h i l o s o p h y : against w h i c h it w a s offred, that
a P r o g r a m m a s h o u l d p u b l i s h , forbiding all tutors to r e a d t h e m to t h e i r
Pupils. 3
Tyrrell went on to point out that the order was not enforced.
Although the proposal to ban the Essay at Oxford was
1
J. Gailhard, The Epistle and Preface To the Book against the . . . Socinian
Heresie ( 1 6 9 8 ) , reproduces the edict, pp. 8 2 - 8 3 . It is also referred to in A Free but
Modest Censure On the late Controversial Writings and Debates ( 1 6 9 8 ) by one
F.B., M.A., of Cambridge, p. 15.
2
Collins to Locke, 18 February 1703/4, MS. Locke, C. 7, f. 18.
Tyrrell to Locke, April 1704, MS. Locke, C. 22, f. 167. Reprinted in King's
3
Life ofJohn Locke ( 1 8 3 0 ) , vol. i, pp. 357-9.

not successful, those opposing the book were able to give it a

bad reputation which did persuade some not to read it. Thomas
Hearne recalled that when John Wynne had introduced the
Essay for the first time, many students read it, but that he
himself 'always declined it. For indeed I neither then nor ever
since have had any good opinion of Locke, who though a man
of parts, was, however, a man of very bad principles'. The 1
champions of Locke were described by Hearne as 'a set of men

of republican Principles, but orthodox and truly honest men
have detected his errors, and fallacies, and endeavoured . . . to
obstruct his infection'. But, however much against Locke
Hearne may have been, he did not fail to speak out against
the attacks of William Lancaster (the Provost of Queen's
College in 1706) against Locke. Hearne's opinion of Lancaster
was not high.
T h i s day at one of the C l o c k , that old, h y p o c r i t i c a l , ambitious, d r u n k e n
sot, W i l l . L a n c a s t e r P r o v o s t of Q u e e n ' s College w a s admitted V i c e -
C h a n c e l l o u r , being the 4th Y e a r of h i s entering u p o n that office. . . . I t
m u s t be here o b s e r v ' d that whereas he spoke n o w w e l l of D r . W y n n e he
spoke v e r y s c u r v i l y of h i m sometime agoe, a n d w a s p l e a s ' d to r u n d o w n
M r . L o c k i n the Convocation-House. 2
Wynne himself was criticized by Lancaster as being a Lockist. 3
Hearne reports on the Convocation House incident as follows:

Lancaster assured the House that
h e w o u l d take as m u c h C a r e as possible, & endeavour all he c o u l d to
manage the trust c o m m i t t e d to h i m to the H o n o u r & C r e d i t of the
u n i v e r s i t y ; & for that E n d he h o p ' d the S e n i o r s of the university,
especially those w h o h a d the m o r e immediate C a r e of Y o u t h , w o u l d
j o i n w i t h h i m i n stifHing the M i s c h i e f s of i l l & p e r n i c i o u s Books, w r i t t e n
o n purpose to r u i n both the C h u r c h & u n i v e r s i t y , & b r i n g a D i s g r a c e
u p o n L e a r n i n g & R e l i g i o n , a m o n g w h i c h he n a m ' d D r . Tyndale's Book
of t h e R i g h t s of the C h u r c h , i n w h i c h are p u b l i s h ' d n e w F o r m s of
E c c l e s i a s t i c a l & C i v i l G o v e r n m e n t & M r . Lock's Humane Understand
ing, w r i t t e n to advance n e w S c h e m e s of P h i l o s o p h y & b r i n g a n odium
upon Ancient Learning. 4
1
Hearne's Collections
f vol. xi, p. 3 9 4 . Entry for 21 November 1734.
2
Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 2 8 1 - 2 . Entry for 6 October 1709.
3
Ibid., vol. ii, p. 283. Hearne to T . Smith, 6 October 1709.
4
Ibid., vol. i, pp. 2 9 3 - 4 . Entry for 9 October 1706.
cH.i T H ER E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 13
William Carroll, who charged Locke with holding a Spino-

zistic doctrine of one material substance, gives a slightly
different version of this convocation address.
And S i n c e t h e R e v e r e n d D r . Lancaster, Vice-Chancellor of Oxford,
has b e e n p l e a s ' d to r e c o m m e n d the Dissertation [upon the Tenth Chapter
ofthe Fourth Book ofMr. Lock's Essay (1706)] m a d e u p o n that Chap, i n
his S p e e c h to the U n i v e r s i t y , as a n Antidote a g a p s t M r . L's B o o k , a n d a
Key to u n d e r s t a n d i t ; I here p u b l i c k l y r e t u r n h i m m y T h a n k s . 1
I f Lancaster did in fact recommend Carroll's book i n pre

ference to Locke's, Hearne's judgement of him was not as
distorted as i t might seem, for Carroll's dissertation on the
Essay is one critical book of which Locke's friends could
say with justice that i t was incomprehensible or entirely
irrelevant. But whatever be the full story about Lancaster's
speech, it is clear that he was against Locke and his followers
and that he had some sympathizers among his listeners. The
Essay had acquired i n the minds of many men the reputation
of being a dangerous treatise.
The attacks of Lancaster and Carroll may have merited
the charge suggested by Locke, that his critics were deter
mined to attack the Essay with any means at their disposal.
John Edwards's attacks agäinst Locke might also legitimately
be included i n this list. But the truth of the matter is that
2
Locke did not receive criticism well. When Tyrrell wrote to

Locke about certain objections some friends of Tyrrell had
made concerning the polemic against innate ideas, Locke
apparently took Tyrrell for one of the objectors and criticized
him for so being. Locke's tone was strong enough to cause
Tyrrell to write back a letter in which he concludes: ' I have no
more [to say] but if you do not like that I should tell you what
objections the world make against what you write, I shall for
the future be more reserved.' Locke did, however, write a
3
long reply to the arguments used by Tyrrell and his friends. 4
1
A Letter to the Reverend Dr. Benjamin Prat ( 1 7 0 7 ) , p. 2 4 .
2
Cf. his Socinianism Unmask'd ( 1 6 9 6 ) and Some Thoughts Concerning the
Several Causes and Occasions ofAtheism (1695).
3
Tyrrell to Locke, 27 July 1690. MS. Locke, C . 2 2 , f. 9 3 .
4
Locke to Tyrrell, 4 August 1690, in King's Life of Locke vol. i, pp. 3 6 6 - 7 .
y
824331 C
i4 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F c H . i
When Burnet wrote a mild, inquisitive letter to Locke {Remarks

upon an Essay concerning Humane Understanding, 1697), rais
ing quite legitimate questions about certain doctrines of the
Essay, Locke appended a bitter, sarcastic note in reply, at the
end of his Letter to the Bishop of Worcester. Burnet, like many
other men of the century, found Locke's rejection of innate
ideas, his treatment of conscience, and his dissociation of the law
of nature from the inward principles commonly supposed to be
inherent in man dangerously challenging to the established
morality and to revealed religion. He wrote seeking to obtain
fromLocke some indication as to how he felt his principles
could protect these values. Instead of explanations, Burnet
received from Locke the accusation of being malicious. I t is
not surprising to find Burnet astonished at Locke's attitude.
B u t I k n o w no good R e a s o n y o u c a n have for w r i t i n g i n s u c h a s n a p
p i s h a n d p e e v i s h w a y . I f y o u affect the C h a r a c t e r o f a C a p t i o u s D i s p u
tant, I do not envy it y o u , I t h i n k y o u have taken the ready w a y to gain
it, b y y o u r w a y of W r i t i n g , b o t h here a n d elsewhere. I f y o u have b e e n
so treated b y other P e n s , as to m a k e y o u angry a n d out o f h u m o u r , y o u
ought not to take y o u r R e v e n g e or ease y o u r S p l e e n u p o n a n inoffensive
Pen. 1
Similarly, Leibniz's critical comments were completely re

jected by Locke and their author condemned.
M r . B u r n e t has h a d it this year or two, b u t never c o m m u n i c a t e d it to
m e , till about a fortnight agone. I n d e e d M r . C u n n i n g h a m p r o c u r e d m e
a sight of it last s u m m e r , a n d he a n d I read it p a r a g r a p h b y p a r a g r a p h
over together a n d he confessed to m e , that some parts of it, he d i d not
u n d e r s t a n d ; a n d I s h o w e d h i m i n others, that M r . L — ' s o p i n i o n w o u l d
not h o l d , w h o w a s perfectly of m y m i n d . I m e n t i o n M r . C u n n i n g h a m to
y o u , i n the case, because I t h i n k h i m a n extraordinary m a n of parts a n d
learning, a n d he is one that is k n o w n to M r . L — . T o a n s w e r y o u r free
d o m w i t h the like, I m u s t confess to y o u , that M r . L — ' s great n a m e h a d
raised i n m e a n expectation w h i c h the sight of h i s paper d i d not a n s w e r ,
n o r that discourse of h i s i n the A c t a E r u d i t o r u m , w h i c h h e quotes, a n d
I have since read, a n d h a d j u s t the same thoughts of it, w h e n I r e a d it,
as I find y o u have. F r o m w h e n c e I o n l y d r a w this inference, that even
great parts w i l l not master any subject w i t h o u t great t h i n k i n g , a n d even
the largest m i n d s have b u t n a r r o w s w a l l o w s . 2
1
SecondRemarks(1697),p. 10.
2
Locke to Molyneux, 10 April 1697. Reprinted in Works, ix, p. 407. The
cH.i T H ER E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 15
Locke was careful, however, not to reveal his true opinion of

these remarks to Leibniz. The joint efforts of Leibniz and
Burnet to elicit Locke's judgement never succeeded i n pro
curing any detailed comments from Locke. The most Locke
ever said was that there were some things in the remarks which
he did not understand, refusing to specify his judgement any
further. Molyneux had written to Locke i n March that he
1
would like to see Leibniz's paper, but he commented that he

did not expect 'any great matters' from Leibniz, 'for methinks
(with all deference to his great name) he has given the world no
extraordinary samples of his thoughts this way, as appears by
his two discourses he has printed, both in the Acta Erudit.'. I n 2
a subsequent letter, Locke quoted LeClerc's comments upon

Leibniz's observations on the Essay, substantiating his and
Molyneux's opinion.
Mr. L e i b n i t z , M a t h e m a t i c i e n de H a n o v e r , aiant 0u1 dire, qu'on
traduisoit v6tre ouvrage, et q u ' o n l'alloit i m p r i m e r , a envoie i c i ä u n d e
m e s a m i s ce j u g e m e n t q u ' i l e n fait, c o m m e p o u r le mettre ä l a tete.
C e p e n d a n t i l a ete b i e n aise q u ' o n v o u s le communicät. I I m ' a ete r e m i s
entre les m a i n s p o u r cela. O n m ' a dit m i l l e biens de ce M a t h e m a t i c i e n
i l y a longtemps que magna & preclara minatur, sans r i e n p r o d u i r e , que
q u e l q u e s demonstrations detachees. J e croi n e a n m o i n s q u ' i l n e v o u s
entend pas, et ie doute q u ' i l s'entende b i e n l u i - m e m e . 3
work referred to in the Acta Eruditorum (November 1684 issue) is the Medita-
tionesDe Cognitione, Veritate, & Ideis, which Leibniz had recommended to Locke
in hisfirstcomments. Cf. Gerhardt, op. cit., bd. iv, pp. 4 2 2 - 6 .
1
Locke first declared that he was honoured that a man of Leibniz's stature
had made remarks upon his work. Later he pleaded that he was too busy with
other matters to find the time requisite for making proper and detailed com
ments. Cf. Burnet to Leibniz, 30 November 1696; Burnet to Leibniz, 3 May
1 6 9 7 ; and Burnet to Leibniz,23 October 1700 (Gerhardt, bd. iii, pp. 1 8 5 - 6 ;
1 9 7 - 9 ; and 2 7 3 ) . Locke even solicited, indirectly, Leibniz'sjudgement on his
controversy with Stillingfieet. Cf. Burnet to Leibniz, 26 July 1698, Gerhardt,
bd. iii, p. 242. Locke continued to express to Leibniz his high esteem of his per
son and of his philosophy. Cf. Lady Masham to Leibniz, 3 June 1704, Gerhardt,
bd. iii, pp. 3 4 - 5 2 .
8
2
Molyneux to Locke, 16 March 1696/7. Reprinted in Works, vol. ix, p. 4 0 4 .
The two discourses of Leibniz here referred to are the 'De primae philosophiae
Emendatione, & de Notione Substantiae' (Acta Eruditorum, March 1694, pp. 110¬
12, reprinted in Gerhardt, bd. iii, pp. 4 6 8 - 7 0 ) , and 'Specimen Dynamicum, pro
admirandis Naturae legibus' (Acta Eruditorum, April 1695, PP· H 5 " 5 7 ) ·
3
LeClerc to Locke, 19 April 1697. MS. Locke, C . 13, f. 113. Locke's
letter containing this quotation from LeClerc is reprinted in Works, vol. ix,
p.417.
l6 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F CH. I
Locke adds to what he has already said concerning Leibniz: T

see you and I , and this gentleman, agree pretty well concerning
the man; and this sort of fiddling makes me hardly avoid think
ing, that he is not that very great man as has been talked of
h i m / One begins to wonderjust what Locke would have con
1
sidered to be valid adverse criticism of his position. There is no

indication in any of his published or unpublished remarks that
he ever admitted the validity of his critics' observations.
Locke's own attitude towards the task of the critic is revealed
in two passages, one from his brief reply to Burnet, the other
from an early unpublished draft of his reply to John Norris. I n
the former he writes,
T h e w o r l d has n o w m y book, s u c h as it i s : i f a n y one finds, that there
be m a n y questions that m y p r i n c i p l e s w i l l not resolve, h e w i l l do t h e
w o r l d m o r e service to lay d o w n s u c h p r i n c i p l e s as w i l l resolve t h e m , t h a n
to q u a r r e l w i t h m y i g n o r a n c e ( w h i c h I readily acknowledge) a n d possibly
for that w h i c h cannot be done. I shall n e v e r t h i n k t h e w o r s e o f m i n e ,
because they w i l l not resolve every one's doubts, till I see those p r i n
ciples, laid d o w n b y any one, that w i l l ; a n d t h e n I w i l l quit m i n e . 2
Critics are not to raise questions, but to supply answers. Locke

will not enter into discussion with anyone for the purpose of
working out a better solution to his problems. He was faithful
to this statement of his position, for i n the few replies he did
write, he always shows impatience at the critic's inability to
understand his arguments or to see that they are true; he re
veals a slight bitterness at having to write replies. He wrote no
reply with the idea in mind of benefiting from the pro and con
of argumentation. But it must be admitted that such an attitude
was i n general vogue at the time. The thought of exchanging
views for mutual benefit had not taken hold of the intellectual
world. Moreover, i n his unpublished early draft of his reply
to Norris, he shows a more balanced attitude towards criticism.
I for m y part have always thought i f a w r i t e r w e r e not guilty either o f
great disingenuity or great mistakes . . . h i s other m a r k s o f h u m a n frailty
m u s t be forgiven h i m & w i t h m e the obligation I h a d to h i m for w h a t h e
taught o r seemed sincerely to i n t e n d to t e a c h m e compensated for those
1
Locke to Molyneux, 3 May 1697, * n
Works, vol. ix, p. 417.
2
In Works, vol. iv, p. 188.
си.: T H E R E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 17
slips w h i c h p e r h a p s I m e t w i t h i n h i m . A l w a y s I t h i n k e t h i s i s d u e to
every o n e that h i s w o r d s s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d i n the m o s t favourable &
m o s t consistent m e a n i n g c o u l d be p u t u p o n t h e m . 1
Locke had been justly disturbed by Norris's failure to read to

the end of a sentence i n the introduction to the Essay, taking
Locke to say that the mind never knows itself, when what
Locke said was that it takes great pains and hard work to know
one's own mind. There were undoubtedly people who con
demned the Essay without reading it or without reading it
carefully. Mrs. Cockburn, i n her Defence of the Essay (1702)
tells of having talked with several people who had read the
Remarks of Burnet and had fromthese 'concluded it [theüwoy]
contain'd verydangerous Principles, and without farther Ex
amination, condemn'd the Essay, having never read, or as
they own'd, very little consider'd it'. (Preface, p. [7].) But few
of the published or extant criticisms of Locke's book can be
written off as easily as Locke was wont to do, ascribing them to
blind desires to undermine the book, or to misguided under
standing. Even within the seventeenth century, when polemics
were a popular form of writing and writers very seldom strove
to comprehend their objector's point of view, Locke's attitude
towards his critics seems unwarranted.
I f a n y one find a n y t h i n g i n m y E s s a y to be corrected, he m a y , w h e n h e
pleases, w r i t e against i t ; a n d w h e n I t h i n k fit I w i l l a n s w e r h i m . F o r I do
not i n t e n d m y time shall be w a s t e d at the pleasure o f every one, w h o m a y
have a m i n d to p i c k holes i n m y book, a n d s h e w h i s skill i n the art o f
confutation. 2
I n his opinion, almost all the criticisms brought against him

were examples of trifling and not worth his time. But many
sound criticisms of the doctrines, especially of the epistemo
logical doctrines, were formulated by men like Norris, Henry
1
MS. Locke, C. 28, f. 108.
2
Locke's 'Answer' to Burnet's Remarks, in Works, vol. iv, p. 189. Locke was
of course justly disturbed by the rancour and ill will of the many religious con
troversies of his day. It was one of the aims of his Letter on Toleration to plead for
a wide, though clearly circumscribed, toleration in such matters. But appeal to
the Letter as a defence for Locke's disdain of his critics only provides a con
venient though suspect excuse. Locke's attitude towards his critics was not just
that he did not wish to enter into polemics: he very clearly thought they were
wrong, biased, and unscrupulous.
i8 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F CH. I
Lee, Sergeant, Stillingfleet, Peter Browne, and lesser known

or anonymous writers. Many of these, notably Norris, Lee,'
and Sergeant, exemplify the gradual growth of the recognition
of the sceptical tendencies i n the epistemology of the Essay,
scepticism both as regards the abstract epistemological doc
trines and as regards the effects of these doctrines upon morality
and religion.
Stillingfleet charged the Essay with a propensity towards
scepticism and the overthrow of important articles of the
Christian faith; but Locke could not see that Stillingfleet had
offered any arguments which proved this charge.
I cannot see a n y a r g u m e n t y o u r l o r d s h i p has a n y w h e r e brought, to
s h o w its t e n d e n c y to scepticism, b e y o n d w h a t y o u r l o r d s h i p has i n these
w o r d s i n the same page, v i z . , that it i s y o u r l o r d s h i p ' s great prejudice
against it that it leads to s c e p t i c i s m ; or, that y o u r l o r d s h i p c a n find n o
w a y to attain to certainty i n it, u p o n m y g r o u n d s . 1
The pursuit of this type of scepticism i n the Essay was carried

forward by many writers into the eighteenth century. The seeds
of the charge of scepticism against what we should call today
Locke's epistemology, of epistemicscepticism as opposed to the
religious and moral scepticism entailed in his epistemological
doctrines, are to be found i n Norris's first comments on the
Essay when he criticized Locke's definition of truth as the 'joyn-
ing or separating of Signs, as the Things signified do Agree or
Disagree with one another'. Such a definition, Norris pointed
out, placed the emphasis on ^Truth of the Mind or of the
Subject' instead of on ' T r u t h of the Thing or of the Object, which
consists not i n the mindsjoyning or separating either Signs or
Ideas, but i n the Essential Habitudes that are between the
Ideas themselves.' Norris went on to develop the sceptical
2
direction of Locke's constant separation of things and ideas.

The objections to this separation grew in the years between
1690 and 1700. By the turn of the century the charge of
scepticism had become one of the most frequently repeated
objections, a charge not always clearly divided into the two
1
'Mr. Locke's Reply to . . . the Bishop ofWorcester's Answer to his Letter',
in Works, vol. iv, p. 184.
2
Norris, 'Cursory Reflections', in his Christian Blessedness (1690), pp. 37-38.
branches of scepticism which I have suggested. I t had been

the source of theoriginal dispute between the Bishop ofWor-
cester and Locke; William K i n g made substantially the same
accusation; Lee wrote a careful commentary on each section
1
of the Essay i n an effort to combat its sceptical doctrines; and

John Sergeant attacked the entire method of ideas, both in truth
and in knowledge, as resulting in a vicious scepticism. Between
1696-7, the years of the publication of Sergeant's attack and of
Toland's controversial book, Christianity not Mysterious (the
latter of which borrowed the epistemological doctrines of Locke
for an unorthodox form of religion), and 1704, the year of
Locke's death, there are numerous tracts and pamphlets taking
issue with one side or another of the epistemological doctrines
of Locke; but Locke consistently failed to profit by a discussion
or, i n most cases, even a recognition of these criticisms.
He penned many detailed replies to Sergeant's attack in the
margins of his copy of Solid Philosophy Asserted; 2
the Third
Remarks of Burnet also contain many marginalia in Locke's
hand which were probably the preparation for an intended
publication; he wrote two drafts of a reply to Norris, the
3
first still preserved in the Lovelace Collection, the second pub

lished after his death ; Stillingfleet drew considerable fire from
4
Locke; and Bold, Mrs. Cockburn, and LeClerc sought to act as

substitutes for Locke by replying to other critics. Apart from 5
1
Anti-Scepticism (1702).
1
Locke's copy of this book is now in the St. John's College library at Cam
bridge. For a discussion of some of these marginal notes, see my article, 'Locke's
Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sergeant', Journal of the History of Ideas
(October 1 9 5 1 ) , vol. xii, pp. 5 2 8 - 5 9 .
3
These have been published, not too satisfactorily, by Noah Porter, 'Mar
ginalia Locke-a-na', in New Englander and Yale Review, July 1887, vol. xi, N.s.
PP· 33-49·
4
Locke also wrote a careful attack upon the philosophy of Malebranche,
Norris's archetype. Neither this nor his reply to Norris was published during
his lifetime. It is undoubtedly to one or the other of these papers that Robert
South refers in his letter to Locke (6 December 1699, MS. Locke, C. 18, f. 173).
Locke had apparently sent his remarks on Norris, or those on Malebranche, to
South for his critical opinion. South recommended that Locke's opponent should
not receive a reply, advice which Locke seems to have followed.
The opponents of Locke to whom Bold replied in 1699 are not named. Mrs.
5
Cockburn's defence was written against Burnet's Remarks, while LeClerc de
fended Locke, after his death, against Pierre Bayle. Tyrrell suggested that Mrs.
20 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F
these replies, the frequent attacks relevant to his epistemo

logical doctrines went unanswered.
The Essay had a wide circulation and received ample notices
in the press. The popularity of the book was in some ways
surprising. Other works in England dealing with the same
problems, those of Glanvill, Norris, and Burthogge, for ex
ample, did not gain anything like the notoriety that the Essay
of Locke did. Burthogge presents the most interesting case i n
this respect. His Organum Vetus & Novum (1678) was in many
ways an anticipation of Locke's Essay, and a development
of the way of ideas into a phenomenalism presaging Kant. 1
His later book, A n Essay upon Reason (1694), carries forward

the analysis of the 1678 work. But despite the fact that Bur
thogge's two works on the human understanding and the nature
and role of ideas in knowledge cover much the same ground as
did Locke, he failed to achieve that level of distinction which
Locke acquired. His lack of fame was not due to inadequate
announcements, for he received several notices in the English
journals. His Essay upon Reason was advertised in the Athenian
Gazette (vol. 13, no. 25, 1 May 1694) as being 'dedicated to
M r . Lock\ I n the 5 May issue, it was again advertised with the
comment: T n this Essay the Author hath advanc'd many
things wholly new . . . and concludes with Reflections on D r .
SherlocKs Notions about Individuation? I t was listed in the
12 May issue as being reviewed in the Compkat Library for
May and June, another periodical of the time. A short notice
of this book occurred in the 18 December 1694 issue of the
Athenian Gazette, repeated in the 20 April 1695 issue and again
in the 4 February 1695-6 issue. A long review appeared i n the
April 1694 issue of the Compleat Library (vol. iii, pp. 107¬
12), in which the reviewer called attention to Burthogge's debt
to Locke, but no mention is made of the earlier work. I n the
C o c k b u r n ' s defence w a s a b l y d o n e . C f . h i s letter to L o c k e , 25 J u l y 1 7 0 3 , M S .
L o c k e , C . 2 2 , f. 159.
1
Burthogge's phenomenalism is developed i n a s u m m a r y fashion i n several
w o r k s . C f . G . L y o n , L4dealisme en Angleterre au XVIIP Siecle, pp. 72-96;
C a s s i r e r ' s Erkenntnisproblem, bd. i , pp. 543-53; and M . W . Landes's reprinting
of m u c h of B u r t h o g g e ' s w o r k s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a l o n g i n t r o d u c t i o n , The Philoso
phical Writings of Burthogge ( 1 9 2 1 ) .
March 1694 issue of this samejournal, the announcement of

Burthogge's Essay upon Reason was made with the following
praise:
T h e r e is i n the P r e s s a n E s s a y u p o n H u m a n e R e a s o n . I t is a v e r y
extraordinary Book, a n d as he treats all h i s t h i n g s v e r y l e a r n e d l y a n d
w i t h great C o n d u c t , so he h a t h h a n d l e d a b u n d a n c e o f things w h i c h have
not yet fallen u n d e r the C o n s i d e r a t i o n of any w h o have treated u p o n that
Subject. I t is a fine a n d C o m p l e a t S y s t e m of thoughts, a n d the p r o d u c t
of a long t i m e a n d great experience i n the W o r l d . 1
I t may have been that the failure to notice Burthogge's earlier

work, combinedwith the attention Locke's Essaycommanded,
served to restrict him to an inferior status in terms of popular
ity.
Niceron says that the followers of Malebranche claimed
that Locke's book 'n'a eu de la reputation, que parce qu'il est
fort bien ecrit en Anglois'. There can be no doubt that the
2
style in which the Essay was written had much to do with its
popularity. Burthogge probably suffered because his manner
of writing was not so polished as that of Locke, but his ob
scurity was also very probably due to the way in which his
epistemological discussions w ere obvious digressions from his
T
main task, i.e. the presentation of a doctrine of a world soul or

of the presence of spirits in the world. His epistemology 3
tended to become lost in these minor theological questions.

Besides his style, another important factor accounting for
Locke's popularity was the way in which he orientated his
discussions around the religious and moral questions of great
significance to the majority of people in the seventeenth century.
Non-epistemological questions served as the stimulus for the
discussion of problems of knowledge. I t should have been no
surprise to Locketo find his doctrines taken as applying to
the context from which they originated. Those who had the
1
T h i s notice is found i n the section ' N e w s of L e a r n i n g , f r o m L o n d o n * .
2
Memoires pour servir ä VHistoire des Hommes Illustres, t. χ , 1729 [ p a r t i ] , p . 7.
3
I t i s c u r i o u s t h a t L o c k e , w h o h a d a p p a r e n t l y r e a d t h e Essay upon Reason,
n o t e d a q u o t a t i o n f r o m p . 196 o f t h a t w o r k d e a l i n g w i t h w i t c h c r a f t , a d o c t r i n e
w h i c h c o n c e r n e d B u r t h o g g e c o n s i d e r a b l y . S e e M S . L o c k e , C . 2 8 , f. 114.
22 T H E N A T U R E A N D S C O P E O F c H . i
keenest interest i n his book were theologians and moralists

concerned with seeing what good or harm its principles would
involve for their values. The seventeenth century was marked
by a strong interest in science, but the interests of religion and
morality were still paramount in most men's minds. Thus
Locke's concern to solve problems of knowledge for the sake
of these values went along with his literary style and fluency to
give his book a wide popularity. Another important factor was
the reception and publicity the Essay received i n the journals
of the day, a reception far outreaching that of Burthogge or any
other similar writer on a kindred subject. The abridgement
which Locke made for the Bibliotheque Universelle aided in the
early dissemination of his doctrines outside England and
stimulated many people to look with anticipation for the
publication of the entire work. LeClerc was undoubtedly
correct in remarking: 'Cet abrege plut ä une infinite de gens et
leur fit souhaiter de voir l'Ouvrage entier.' This abridgement 1
appeared in an English translation in 1692 in The Young-

Students-Library, a publication of the Athenian Society (pp.
162-79). LeClerc's review of Norris's attack in 'Cursory Re
flections' was also reprinted in English in another publication
of this same society, The Athenian Gazette. Thus within two 2
years of its first appearance, the Essay and the first published
attack on it had received close attention in a popular journal
in England.
The widespread foreign reception of the Essay is traceable
quite definitely to the publication of reviews of it in the French
journals of Holland. I t was the abridgement i n the Bibliotheque
Universelle that had first called Leibniz's attention to Locke. 3
Basnage de Beauval mentioned the Essay i n a notice of the

Coste French translation of Locke's Some Thoughts Concerning
Education* The publication and French translation of Locke's
1
'Eloge de feu M. Locke', Bibliotheque Choisie t. vi, 1705, p. 3 7 7 .
y
'Supplement to the Third Volume of the Athenian Gazette', 1691, pp. 2 - 3 .

2
Apparently Norris did not realize that this was a translation of the French review,
for in the third edition of his Practical Discourses ( 1 6 9 4 ) his 'Cursory Reflections'
are reprinted with a reply to the Athenian Society against their unjust attack
upon him. 3
Cf. Gerhardt, op. cit., bd. v, p. 6.
Histoire
4
des Ouvrages des Savans, June 1695, p. 4 4 1 .
CH.i T H E R E A C T I O N T O T H E ESSAY 23
other works and of the various attacks upon him were also
recorded by Basnage. I n the October 1697 issue of Nouvelhs
1
de la Republique des Lettres, Jacques Bernard summarized the

Locke-Stillingfleet controversy at length, giving Locke more
credit than the bishop. This summary was continued i n the
November issue. I n June 1700, Bernard noticed the appearance
of the fourth edition of the Essay and called attention to the
Latin translation soon to appear, adding: ' J crois qu'on ne e
l'estimera pas moins au delä de la Mer, quand on aura lu la

Traduction Fran90ise, qu'en a faite M r . Coste, ä laquelle je sai
qu'il a travaille avec la derniere exactitude' (p. 682). The Coste
translation was reviewed by Bernard in August 1700, with the
following words of praise for Locke:
Un des p l u s penetrans & des p l u s j u d i c i e u x E c r i v a i n s [i.e. P i e r r e
Bayle, i n h i s Dictionnaire, t. i i , p . 540] de ce siecle a r e m a r q u e ; que la
phipart des Savans ne sont propres qu'ä cultiver Us terres qui ont ete deja
defrickees. Ilpeuvent, d i t - i l , aplanir ou elargir un chemin que d'autres ont
deja fait. Mais quehpies-uns en tres-petit nombre, q u i b u s arte benignä &
meliore luto finxit p r a e c o r d i a T i t a n , peuvent defricker les terres les plus
incultes, & faire une route dans des forets ой personne n'avoit passe. M r .
Locke est sans doute de ce petit n o m b r e . 2
Basnage had been the first of the journalists to review Coste's

translation, opening his July 1700 review with the remark: 'I1
y a lon tems que cet Ouvrage fait du bruit & par le nom de
l'Auteur, & par la matiere.' He remarked upon the difficulty
that Coste had i n translating the ideas and expressions of
Locke but felt that Coste had on the whole performed his task
well. I n September 1700 the Coste translation was carefully
3
and favourably reviewed by Leibniz i n the German journal,

the Monatlicher Auszug.* I n January of the following year, the
Memoires pour VHistoire des Sciences & des Beaux Arts (ä
Trevoux) also gave it a brief review. The reviewer i n the latter
1
Cf. June 1695, pp. 43S ff.; November 1695, p. 135; May 1696, p. 4 1 9 ;
June 1700, p. 280 ; and July 1700, pp. 291 ff.
2
Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres, August 1700, pp. 1 2 3 - 4 .
3
Coste did have great difficulty in translating certain sections of the Essay,
difficulties which he and Pierre Bayle discussed together. See Bayle's CEuvres
Diverses, t. iv, letter to Coste, 30 August 1701, pp. 8 0 0 - 1 .
4
pp. 611-36. Reprinted in Gerhardt, op. cit., bd. v, pp. 24-37.
journal ends by excusing the brevity of his review and reminds

the reader that this is only a summary and does not contain his,
the reviewer's, own opinions: 'On prie le Lecteur de se sou
venir qu'en faisant les extraits des ouvrages, on n'adopte pas les
sentimens des Auteurs' (p. 131). The continental dissemina
tion of Locke's doctrines was further aided by his friendship
with Nicolas Thoynard and the Abbe D u Bos, both of whom
saw the Coste translation as soon as the printer finished each
section. D u Bos was responsible for its introduction into the
1
Royal Court of France.

A v a n t de partir de P a r i s j a v o i s p r o m i s m o n e x e m p l a i r e de M r L o c k e
p o u r lire a M r . le d u c de C h a r t r e s . J e v o u s ser6 b i e n oblige de scavoir
de m r . l'abbe d u B o i s q u i loge r u e des b o n s enfans a lhotel de M a l u s i n e
si s o n altesse R o y a l l e e n a encore a faire et de l u i e x p l i q u e r p o u r q u o y j e
lai r e c u s i t a r d . 2
Pierre Bayle mentioned Locke several times i n the 1702 edition

of his Dictionnaire and discussed some of his doctrines, such as
the ability of matter to think and his doctrine of substance.
Locke is referred to as T u n des plus profonds Metaphysiciens
du monde'. Without a doubt Coste did Locke a great service
3
by translating the Essay into French. The Latin edition fur

ther extended the range of Locke's doctrines and heightened
interest in them. By 1704, the year of Locke's death, his epis
4
temological, moral, and religious doctrines were thoroughly

disseminated both i n England and abroad. These doctrines had
been so much discussed, criticized, and praised by then, that
1
Du Bos to N. Thoynard, 15 July 1699. 'M. Lock auoit toujours souhait£ que
l'on vous envoia les feuilles de la traduction de son traite de l'entendement
humain a mesure quelles rimprimoient, mais le libraire ne l'auroit point voulu
faire crainte que son livre ne fut contrefait sur ces feuilles la.' (Bib. Nat., n.a. 560,
f. 3 0 1 . Reprinted by Paul Denis, Lettres Autographes, 1912, p. 9 7 . )
2
Du Bos to Thoynard, March 1701. Bib. Nat., ibid, f. 357. Reprinted in
Denis, p. 115.
3
Article on Dicaearchus, note м. Cf. also the article on N. Perrot d'AbIan-
court, note L. There are other references which discuss Locke and refer to the
Locke-Stillingfleet controversy.
4
One of Locke's correspondents, Robert South, expressed what must have
been a common belief among many of Locke's readers, i.e. that a Latin transla
tion should be made in order to give the universally valid and appealing doctrines
of the Essay their expression in a universal tongue. Cf. South to Locke, 2 2 Sep
tember 1697, and 18 June 1699, MS. Locke, C. i 8 , ff. 169, 171.
no responsible thinker i n the eighteenth century could afFord

to omit reference to Locke.
Many of the controversies i n which the epistemological
doctrines of the Essay became embroiled during Locke's life
time continued over into the following century. Anthony
Collins, Samuel Clarke, Isaac Watts, and others in and outside
the clergy carried forward the discussion of mind and matter,
the nature of substance, of liberty and free will. The epistemo
logical and moral scepticism to which the doctrines of the Essay
were believed by many to lead, especially within the context of
deism, was further discussed by men like Peter Browne, John
Witty, and Bishop Berkeley, the first of whom had written i n
1697 one of the most penetrating of all the replies to Toland's
use of Locke's principles i n Christianity not Mysterious. The
polemic against innate ideas had won general acceptance by
the first years of the eighteenth century, although there were
some outstanding exceptions who still defended innateness,
Interest i n Locke, however, began to wane towards the middle
of that century. Philosophical discussion came to be centred
in the new systems of Berkeley, Hume, and other Scottish
thinkers. I n religion, Deism, the movement to which Locke's
doctrines, both religious and epistemological, gave such a
strong impetus, had gained its ascendancy. Many of Locke's
doctrines had been absorbed into the thought of his own
century, even by those who most vehemently objected to his
system. By the middle years of the following century, the
fierceness of the debate over Locke's philosophy had abated.
Isaac Watts's comment sums up the opinion of Locke held by
many men around 1730.
H i s Essay on the human Understanding h a s diffused fairer Light
t h r o u g h the W o r l d i n n u m e r o u s Affairs of S c i e n c e a n d of h u m a n L i f e .
T h e r e are m a n y a d m i r a b l e C h a p t e r s i n that B o o k , a n d m a n y T r u t h s i n
t h e m , w h i c h are w o r t h y L e t t e r s of G o l d . B u t there are s o m e O p i n i o n s i n
h i s P h i l o s o p h y , especially relating to intellectualBeings, their Powers a n d
O p e r a t i o n s , w h i c h h a v e not g a i n ' d m y A s s e n t . (Philosophical Essays,
1733, p . v i i i . )
II
THE D O C T R I N E OF INNATE
KNOWLEDGE
0 C K E was opposed to innate ideas as well as to innate

principles. Both types of innateness were considered
JL ;superfluous i n accounting for human knowledge. The
scholastic method of basing all knowledge upon maxims which
were supposed to be intuitively known as certain was dangerous
because it led us to be uncritical of the basic axioms of know
ledge. Locke was seeking to introduce a new critical attitude
towards all knowledge, its conclusions as well as its base. He
thought he had been able to construct a system of knowledge in
which appeals to maxims, to innate principles, or to innate ideas
were no longer needed. He recognized that this jettisoning
of the traditional grounds of knowledge leads to a restriction
of knowledge, but he did not believe it opened the way for a
defeating scepticism. Ethics, he thought, could still be placed
on a deductive basis; and the three primary objects of know
ledge—God, the self, and the external world—were all retained,
the first two as certain, the third with a status stronger than
ordinary probability. Innateness on the speculative and prac
tical levels was not only false, it served to obscure the proper
foundation of human knowledge, i.e. experience, taken i n its
broadest sense. Thus, the doctrine of innate knowledge had to
be disposed of before Locke could develop his theory con
cerning the experiential basis of knowledge. But critics of
Locke, even in his own day, were puzzled by the historical
referents of Book One of the Essay; for, so they argued,
no one ever held the na'ive form of the doctrine of innateness
as it was formulated by Locke. Modern critics have varied i n
their interpretations, from assigning Descartes as the opponent
who is attacked in the Essay, to modifying this interpretation
to include more directly the Cambridge Platonists and their
сн.и D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E 27
many followers i n the pulpits of England, and the older schol

astic philosophers who based all knowledge upon maxims.
Fraser is too anxious to defend the need for some sort of
rational principles presupposed i n knowledge to think Locke
could have meant that anyone had ever held the naive form
of the doctrine of innateness. He thinks Descartes was probably
in the forefront of Locke's mind while he was writing Book
One, but he points out that Descartes's theory of innateness is
much more subtle than that discussed by Locke. Fraser sug
gests that Locke could, upon a superficial reading of certain
passages i n More, Hale, or Cudworth, 'have found expressions
of theirs which . . . appear to countenance the sort of innateness
which he attributes to the "established opinion"'. He criti 1
cizes Locke for attacking the theory i n its 'crudest form' and
for failing to recognize the need for a doctrine of innateness
in order to account for man's relations with the divine or the
infinite. Gibson emphasizes the prevalence of the doctrine of
2
innateness in the seventeenth century, and its relations withthe

doctrine of laws of nature. He cites Descartes and the Cam
bridge Platonists, and he also wisely calls attention to the fact
that the same kind of language, that of the stamp and its
impression upon the mind, was commonly employed i n talking
about this doctrine. Windelband names only Descartes and
3
the Cambridge Platonists, Hoffding rules out Descartes and

4
substitutes the scholastic philosophers with their dependence

on maxims, while Rivaud has recently assumed that Locke
5
was opposing the Scholastics, Descartes, and Herbert of Cher-

bury. Seth Pringle-Pattison agrees with Höffding and Gibson.
6 7
Like Gibson, Lamprecht has argued that Locke was directing

his attack against the Cambridge Platonists 'and enthusias
tic sectarians i n religion and politics who abused the idea
1
Fraser's edition of the Essay, vol. i, p. 37, note 1. Cf. his Prolegomena, vol. i,
pp. lxxi-lxxiii.
2
Id., Essay, vol. i, p. 37, note 2.
3
Locke's Theory ofKnowledge, pp. 3 0 - 3 3 .
4
Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie ( 1 9 5 0 ) , p. 3 8 6 .
s
Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, bd. i, p. 4 3 9 .
6
Histoire de la Philosophie, t. iii, p. 3 8 9 .
7
Introduction to his edition of the Essay, pp. xxxi-xxxii.
28 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.п
badly', showing Fraser's reluctance to believe the doctrine was

1
ever held in its na'ive form. Cassirer has advanced the novel
suggestion that Locke really had no one in mind i n Book One.
'Das System der "angeborenen Ideen" das Lockevor Augen
hat, ist indessen in seinen Einzelheiten keine geschichtliche
Realität, sondern eine polemische Konstruktion, die er als
Erläuterung und als Gegenbild der eigenen Anschauung
braucht.' Aaron has returned to the traditional answer and
2
names Descartes along with the 'various English thinkers and

teachers, who, whilst not direct followers of Descartes, agreed
with him i n holding a theory of innate ideas'. He cites Leib 3
niz's and Voltaire's interpretation of Descartes's doctrine of

innateness to show that Descartes was interpreted in the na'ive
way by prominent men of his country in touch with the various
debates within the ranks of the Cartesians.
None of these identifications of 'these men of innate prin
ciples' of Book One of the Essay can be said to be wrong. Locke
was writing to reveal certain implications of the belief in
innate knowledge no matter how it was formulated, implica
tions which were either entirely unwarranted and hence must
be rejected, or which were important but not as radical as it
might seem at first sight. He was not writing primarily as an
historian, concerned to explain and refute the views of his
predecessors. There is a certain amount of the 'constructivist'
tendency in his thinking, as Cassirer suggests. But it is very
doubtful whether any of the crucial problems discussed in the
Essay would have occurred to his mind had they not been the
subjects of debate in his own day. He looked to his society and
to his predecessors in order to determine what the problems
were and what solutions had been offered. When he scanned
the literature of moralists and theologians of his century, he
found that frequent appeals were made to a doctrine of innate
ness. Lamprecht, Aaron, and Gibson have been correct in
suggesting that the doctrine had a wide circulation among the
1
'The R81e of Descartes in Seventeenth-Century England', in Studies in the
History of Ideas, vol. iii, p. 2 3 2 .
1
Das Erkenntnisproblem, bd. ii, pp. 2 3 0 - 1 .
3
John Locke ( 1 9 3 7 ) , pp. 7 7 - 8 0 .
сн.п D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E 29
men of the period, but none of the critics of Locke has indicated
just how prevalent its acceptance was. When we cease to search
far and wide for opponents of Locke's polemic and concen
trate our attentionupon his own contemporaries and immediate
predecessors i n England, we find that the doctrine of innate
knowledge was held, in one form or another, to be necessary
for religion and especially for morality from the early years of
the century right through to the end and into the beginning of
the following century. The doctrine underwent, i n general, a
1
transformation from its naive form to a modified version. The

naive form claimed that God wrote into or impressed upon
the soul or mind at birth certain ideas and precepts (or a
developed conscience capable of deciding what is right and
wrong, independentof custom or learning) for the guidance of
life and the foundation of morality, even though we do not
become aware of these innate principles (or of the conscience)
until maturity. For those who questioned at all how we recog
nize these principles as innate, the reply was usually 4he ready
and prompt assent we give to them upon first having them
presented to us'. This form of the doctrine was modified, both
before and after 1688, so that the claim for these principles
being imprinted at birth was no longer included, and later, so
that the name 'innate' was meant to apply only to those prin
ciples which we easily assent to. But the naiVe form of the
theory reappears even as late as the early years of the eigh
teenth century. I n every case, it is invoked as a means of
stabilizing morality and religion, of providing menwithcertain
and sure foundations for the virtuous life. The principles which
are listed as innate are always formulations of the existing
values of the society. The listing of what Locke calls 'specul
ative' principles as innate is much less prevalent because they
had less significance for his contemporaries.
1
G . R . C r a g g , i n h i s From Puritanism to the Age ofReason, indicates an aware
ness of the pervasiveness of the doctrine, t h o u g h he is not concerned w i t h p r e
senting a detailed account. ' T h r o u g h o u t the seventeenth century, m a n y of the
f o r e m o s t r e l i g i o u s w r i t e r s h a d c l u n g to t h e c o n v i c t i o n t h a t G o d h a d i m p r i n t e d o n
the m i n d of m a n certain indelible truths, a n d that o f t h e s e ideas the assurance of
H i s o w n e x i s t e n c e w a s at o n c e t h e c l e a r e s t a n d t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t * ( p p . 115¬
16).
824331 D
30 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E си.и
I t is very difficult to doubt that it was against this firm

tradition in English moral and religious thought that Locke
was writing. He was probably not unmindful that Descartes
and some of the Cartesians held a doctrine of the same genre
as many of his English contemporaries on this issue; but Locke
was primarily concerned to offer solutions to problems which
arose out of his own society. He was not concerned to go
abroad i n his criticism, even though he looked to the Continent
in the development of his own epistemological principles.
Moreover, even his criticisms of the theory of innate knowledge
were not original. George Hickes claimed that 'there is scarce
one argument in it [the Essay] against Innate Ideas, which he
[Locke] had not heard, or read i n the University, upon the
trite Question, commonly disputed on in the schools, An dantur
innatae ideaeV Whether Hickes's charge is correct or not, it is
1
quite true that the issue of innate knowledge had been debated
extensively by Locke's contemporaries and many of his own
criticisms anticipated. No clearer evidence for the existence of
the na'ive form of innateness could be found, save its formula
tion in the writings of many men, than the repeated denials of
its validity. The fact that we do find the theory formulated i n
this form, that the language of these formulations and the
language of the criticisms against the nai've form made prior to
1688 are incorporated into the Essay, would seem to establish
the identity of the referents of Book One of that work. A n
awareness of the role of the theory of innateness i n the moral
ists and theologians of the early half of the century is essential
for a full appreciation of the intimate connexion between
Locke's epistemology and the contemporary debates of which
he was aware, and for understanding m a n y o f the criticisms
made against Locke's polemic by his contemporaries.
§ ι — T h e Doctrine ofInnate Knowhdge Prior to 1688

The doctrine of innate knowledge took several different
forms in Englandpriorto i688. Many writers who appealed to
1
P· [34] °f his 'Preliminary Discourse' in William Carroll's Spinoza Reviv'd
(1709).
SECT:i P R I O R T O 1688 31
the doctrine explicitly said that they did not mean that chil
dren are born with completed ideas ready for use. But even these
writers employ a vocabulary for expressing the doctrine which
must have been rigid and universally accepted. Some variant
of the theory can be found i n almost any pamphlet of the early
part of the century dealing with morality, conscience, the ex
istence of God, or natural law. For many men of the period,
natural law required a natural conscience to enable men to
recognize the laws laid down by God. Without a natural
conscience supplied by God with the ability of leading men
towards good and away from evil, there would be no sure
foundation for morality. Richard Carpenter expressed this
point of view i n his The Conscionabk Christian (1623), where,
in the preface 'To the Reader', he says:
N o w the w h o l e a n d intire w o r k o f c o n s c i e n c e . . . consists, as I c o n -
ceiue it, i n a p r a c t i c a l l s y l l o g i s m e : t h e maior proposition whereof
a r i s e t h . f r o m the Synteresis or treasury of morall principles, a n d of
s a c r e d rules w h e r e w i t h the p r a c t i c a l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s f u r n i s h e d , for the
s a v i n g direction of u s i n all actions ( p . [ 2 ] ) .
John Bullokar, i n An English Expositor (1616), defined 'syn-

teresie' as 'the inward conscience: or a naturall qualitie i n
grafted i n the soule, which inwardly informeth a man, whether
he do well or ilF. Carpenter preserved the terminology of this
definition i n his description of conscience as
a n o b e l a n d d i u i n e p o w e r a n d faculty, p l a n t e d o f G o d i n the s u b s t a n c e
of m a n s soule, w o r k i n g v p o n itself b y reflection, a n d t a k i n g exact notice,
as a S c r i b e o r R e g i s t e r , a n d d e t e r m i n i n g as G o d s V i c e r o y a n d deputy,
J u d g e o f all that is i n the m i n d , w i l l , affections, actions, a n d w h o l e life
of m a n (p. 4 1 ) .
The conscience is 'borne with us', as a book 'euen in thine

owne bosome, written by the finger of God, i n such plaine
Characters, and so legible, that though thou knowest not a
letter i n any other booke, yet thou maist reade this'. (pp. 43-44)
The entire na'ive form of the theory is to be found i n Carpen
ter's book. Besides asserting conscience to be written by God
into the heart of man i n such plain language that even the
ignorant could read its dictates, he specified the contents of
32 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.и
this book of conscience as being 'sorted with singular precepts

and principles concerning the knowledge and practice of good
and euill' (p. 44). The term 'innate' carried the meaning of
'natural' in Bullokar's dictionary, and the conscience was the
most natural of faculties. I n Carpenter's opinion, the con
science was an indispensable factor for morality.
Even where not fully developed to the lengths of Carpenter's
analysis, the theory of natural conscience and synteresis appears
in places where it is clear that an elaborate theory is presup
posed. For example, Burton, in his The Anatomy of Melancholy
(1621), invoked the same principleof conscience and placed syn
teresis, which is for him the pure part of the conscience, i n the
understanding. Synteresis is asserted to be innate, along with
the dictamen rationis and the conscience proper. 'Synteresie, or
the purer part of the Conscience, is an innate habit, and doth
signifie, a conservation of the knowledge of the Law of God and
Nature, to know good or evill.' Burton appeals to Plato for
1
support of this view, revealing a common interpretation of

Plato in Renaissance thought. The same point of view is pre
supposed by and given dramatic exposition in Thomas Nabbes's
Microcosmus, A Morall Maske (1637), a play which seeks to
depict the elements of the world and the moral development of
man from his first state. I n the last scene of the play, Conscience
makes the following speech:
C o n s c i e n c e t h e j u d g e o f actions
I s neither power, n o r habit, b u t a n a c t ;
T o w i t a n application of that knowledge
T h a t shewes the difference. I t s S y n t e r e s i s ,
O r p u r e r part, is t h ' instigation
O f w i l l to good a n d honest things, a n d seates
T h e m i n d i n a r i c h throne of endlesse quiet. ( L e a f G - 2 . )
I t would be difficult to reconstruct the doctrine of synteresis

from this oblique reference in Nabbes's play, but once we know
the theory which this reference presupposes, its incorporation
into a dramatic presentation reveals something of the extensive
and pervasive acceptance of this point of view. Criticisms were
1
p. 42, part i, member 2, subsection 10.
sECT.i P R I O R T O 1688 33
raised against this doctrine even in the early part of the century,
but the essentials were retained. I n his A Key to the Key of
Scripture (1611), William Sclater couples conscience with the
law of nature and asserts that 'The law of nature, is that rule of
pietie, and honestie, that the Lord hath written i n the hearts of
all men: whereby they know confusedly, and i n generall, what
is good; what is euill; what to be done; what to be forborn.'
(p. 170) But Sclaterwas reluctant to espouse the bold form of
the theory, even though his use of the vivid language seemed
to involve no other interpretation. The knowledge of the law of
nature is, he said, 'vouchsafed vnto all by a generall influence
of Gods grace, which is indeed as common as nature; and
therefore called the law of nature*. (Ibid.) Just what form this
influence takes was left obscure by Sclater, probably because he
could think of no alternative save that of its being inborn in
man. But conscience meant for him the same function as for
Carpenter, informing man of good and evil. He never relin
quishes the literal language, repeating many times that the
principles of conscience are 'imprinted i n the vnderstanding4
The theory prevailed and grew as the century moved on. The
language of conscience and synteresis was not always invoked;
but the foundation of morality in the internal nature of man, the
inscription of specific injunctions, was constantly championed.
Writing i n 1677, Sir Matthew Hale (The Primitive Origination
of Mankind) distinguished between sensation, ratiocination,
and intuition as sources of knowledge. Of intuition he said:
T h e r e are some t r u t h s so p l a i n a n d evident, a n d o p e n , that n e e d not
any process of ratiocination to e v i d e n c e o r evince t h e m ; t h e y s e e m to be
objected to the I n t e l l e c t i v e N a t u r e w h e n it is g r o w n perfect a n d fit for
intellectual operation, as the O b j e c t s of L i g h t o r C o l o u r are objected
to the E y e w h e n it i s o p e n ( p . 2 ) .
The movement from premise to conclusion is so swift, short,

and clear i n these cases that it seems to be instantaneous and
without reasoning. Moral and intellectual truths are said to
belong to this class. I n virtue of the swiftness of assent to these
truths, they 'seem upon this accompt to be congenite with us,
connatural to us, and engraven in the very frame and compages
of the Soul'. (Ibid.) He compares these rational intuitions to

the involuntary instincts of man, those that are 'settled, con
trived, implanted and directed there by a higher Wisdom'
(p. 30). Even though the principles said to be innate can be
deduced by rational arguments, Hale insisted that this fact
d i d n o t nullify their innateness.
I come n o w to consider of those rational I n s t i n c t s as I call t h e m , the
connate P r i n c i p l e s engraven i n the h u m a n e S o u l ; w h i c h t h o u g h they are
T r u t h s acquirable a n d d e d u c i b l e b y rational consequences a n d A r g u
mentation, yet they s e e m to be i n s c r i b e d i n the v e r y crasis a n d texture
of the S o u l antecedent to a n y acquisition b y i n d u s t r y or the exercise of
the discursive F a c u l t y i n M a n , a n d therefore they m a y b e w e l l called
anticipations, prenotions, o r sentiments characterized a n d e n g r a v e n
i n the S o u l , b o r n w i t h it, a n d g r o w i n g u p w i t h it till t h e y receive a check
b y i l l c u s t o m s or educations, o r a n i m p r o v e m e n t a n d a d v a n c e m e n t b y
the due exercise of the F a c u l t i e s (p. 6 0 ) .
Examples of such congenite truths are, 'There is a God', 'God

is all powerful', Tromises are to be kept', 'the obscene parts
and actions are not to be exposed to publick view'.These are all
rational instincts or congenite notions whereby the soul is 'pre
disposed, inclined, and byassed to the good and convenience
proportionable to a rational and intellectual life', truths which
incline man 'to such a trade and way as is suitable to the good
of his Nature; so that he is not left barelyto the undetermina¬
tion, incertainty, and unsteadiness of the operation of his
Faculties' (p. 61). Moral principles for Hale have two sources
of origin: divine revelation and the internal constitution of
man's soul. To learn the principles by the first means man has
only to read the Bible; to learn them by the second he has only
to transcribe the original which is written i n the heart (p. 63).
These engraven principles have three main functions: syn
teresis, syneidesis, and epicrisis; which shows the conscious
relation of his doctrine with the earlier versions of conscience
and synteresis. The theory had undergone manymore specific
1
1
The body of doctrine ofwhich these terms were an integral part is scholastic,
although uses of synteresis and prolepsis (another term in the doctrine) can be
traced to the Stoics. Liddell and Scott cite Periander and Bias as having used
syneidesis in the sense of conscience. Synteresis or synderesis is used by St.
Thomas as a habit of mind concerned with the precepts of the natural law
SECT. I PRIOR •TO 1688 35
developments i n Hale's hands than i n those of any of its

advocates earlier in the century, but he was not alone i n this
development. The author of 'Remarks upon the Nature and
Office of Conscience' i n TheMischiefofPerseciition Exemplified
( i 6 8 8 ) invoked the same sort of principles as did Hale, group
ing them all under the 'universal and immutable Law engraven
on the M i n d of Man', principles which are said to have been
'known to the generality of Mankind' by their effect, 'and by
natural anticipations and common notions of Good and Evil
imprinted in Humane Nature'. Even though the innate moral
rules become confused by environment and bad precepts,
they are a 'fixt and permanent Faculty in the rational Soul, a
connate Habit in the Practical Understanding' (p. 2). The
author speaks frequently of the law of conscience being 'writ
ten in the Heart'. A l l men partake of 'the universal law of
Nature, engraven on the Heart, which no positive or revealed
Institution discharges any Man from' (p. 5). The law of
conscience is caused by 'little sparks of that greater light,
wherewith the mind of man was invested before his fall'
(p. 6).
Many writers were concerned to defend the. doctrine of
innate knowledge as a means of proving the existence of God.
John Bachiler, in his edition of Philippe de Mornay's The
Soule's Own Evidence, for its Own Immortality (1646) , pre
1
faces the work with the observation:

the i n i q u i t y of the times, h a v i n g so far c o r r u p t e d the m i n d s o f s o m e ,
that the very innate and inbred principles qf Nature (especially about a
(Summa Theologica, PP, Q. 7 9 , art. 1 2 ; PS, Q. 9 4 , art. 1 - 2 ) . The Oxford English
Dictionary gives the meaning of syneidesis as 'that function or department of
conscience which is concerned with passingj udgement on acts already performed',
in contrast with synteresis which passes judgements on the acts to be performed.
The term epicrisis was obviously part ofthe same technical vocabulary but is not
listed in the O E D , and I have not been able to discover its use in any other con
temporary tract. Liddell and Scott define it as determination or judgement.
The doctrine of these terms was known and associated with that of innate
knowledge as late as 1735, when Wollaston (The Religion ofNatureDelineated,
6th edition) described synteresis as 'the set of those practical principles (or a
habit flowing from them)' used in moral judgements (p. 23, note F ) .
1
This work by Bachiler is a new edition of Sir Philip Sidney's translation of
the Traite de la verite de la religion chretienne by Philippe de Mornay, published
in 1581.
Deity, the sovereign welfare, a n d the Immortality of the Souk) seeme i n

a m a n n e r to be quite obliterated and extinct in them.
Edward Fowler, The Principles and Practices Of certain

Moderate Divines (1670), voices the same resentment at the
denial of the idea of God being innate.
T h a t doctrine [i.e. that w e m u s t be sceptics u n l e s s w e c a n a n s w e r a l l
questions c o n c e r n i n g existence, e.g. w h y bodies cohere] doth as evidently
contradict the n a t u r a l notions G o d h a t h i m p r i n t e d i n the original c o n
stitution of h u m a n e souls, as c a n be . . . a n d I m u s t adde, that I cannot
question but it w o u l d to all, that w i l l be but p e r s w a d e d freely to c o n s u l t
those innate notions ( p p . 2 1 2 - 1 3 ) .
Similarly, arguing that the idea of God can be derived from

the common consent of nations, William Bates, Considerations
of the Existence of God (1676), defines universal consent as
including all men 'in whom the sense of Nature is not perver
ted' (p. 85). True to the tradition of innate knowledge, Bates
says that the idea of God is 'indelibly stamp'd on the minds of
men', and argues that 'the author of the Humane Soul has so
fram'd it, that by the free use of its faculties it necessarily comes
to the knowledge of its original' (pp. 82-83). But the most
forceful statement of the nai've form of the theory is that given
by Stillingfleet, Locke's great antagonist. I n his Origines Sacrae
(1662) he uses the familiar language of the idea of God being
stamped on the soul.
I begin w i t h Üitfirst of t h e m , w h i c h c o n c e r n s the existence of God and
immortality o f the soul; both w h i c h s e e m to be s u p p o s e d as general
Prolepses i n the writings of Moses, a n d as things, so consonant to humane
nature, that none to w h o m h i s writings s h o u l d c o m e c o u l d be supposed to
question t h e m (bk. i i i , c h . i , no. 2, p . 363).
The doctrine of 'prolepsis' was current in the seventeenth

century as 'a preassumed notion, a presupposition'. Leibniz 1
says that innate ideas were called 'prolepses' by the Stoics,

'c'est ä dire des assumtions fondamentales, ou ce qu'on prend
pour accorde par avance'. But Rivaud has pointed out that the
2
1
The OxfordEnglish
See Dictionary article on 'prolepsis'. Cf. Thomas Jackson,
f
Works, vol. vi, 1844, p. 2 7 9 , containing a sermon originally preached in 1637, and
John Ray, Miscellaneous Discourses ( 1 6 9 2 ) , p. 109.
2
Nouveaux Essais, p. 4 2 , in Gerhardt's edition, bd. v.
SECT.i P R I O R T O 1688 37
Stoic doctrine of 'prolepses' was not a genuine doctrine of

innateness in its naive form.
*
S e l o n Z e n o n , l ' h o m m e possede, e n r a i s o n de sa parente d i v i n e , le
p o u v o i r i n n e de c o m p r e n d r e certains p r i n c i p e s m e t a p h y s i q u e s et m o r a u x ,
ou le b o n sens. . . . M a i s ce p o u v o i r ne s'exerce qu'ä l ' o c c a s i o n des i m
pressions sensibles. C h r y s i p p e aurait substitue les 'prolepses' a u b o n
sens. M a i s l a 'prolepse' o u 'anticipation' n ' a r i e n d ' u n e idee i n n e e . E l l e
n'existe pas e n n o u s a u m o m e n t de la naissance, m e m e ä l'etat v i r t u e l ,
car i l ne peut exister a u c u n e realite potentielle. 1
I t was to Cicero's formulation of the doctrine that Stilling

fleet referred.
A n d yet after all the labours o f Epicurus, he k n e w it w a s to no p u r p o s e
to endeavour to root out w h o l l y the belief of a Deity out o f the w o r l d ,
because o f the u n a n i m o u s consent of the world i n i t ; a n d therefore h e
a d m i t s o f it as a necessary Prolepsis or Anticipation of humane nature,
quod in omnium animis deorum notionem impressit ipsa natura, that nature
it self h a d stamped a n Idea o f God u p o n the m i n d s of m e n ( p . 3 6 5 ) .
At one point Stillingfleet seems aware of the criticism this

position invites, and so denies that the idea of God is connate
to the soul in the usual sense, affirming only that 'there is a
faculty in the soul, whereby upon the free use of reason, it can
form within itself a settled notion of such a Being, which is as
perfect as it ispossible for us to conceive a Being to be' (p. 369).
But only three pages later he affirms unconditionally that the
idea is imprinted upon the soul, seeking to demonstrate the
truth of this claim by appeal to the common agreement con
cerning it and to the clarity of this idea. He speaks frequently
of the idea of God as a prolepsis, indicating in his usage that he
has gone beyond the guarded Stoic application of that concept
and has equated it with the ideas which areimprinted at birth.
To the argument that not all peoples have an idea of God, he
replies
that the dissent ofthesepersons is not sufficient to manifest the consent not to
be universal. . . . F o r I d e m a n d of the greatest Atheist, W h e t h e r it be.
sufficient to say, that it is not natural for m e n to have tivo legs, because
some have been born w i t h one (p. 3 9 2 ) .
1
Histoire, t. i, p. 377. Cf. Cicero's De Natura Deorum, bk. 1, xvi, xvii.
3 8 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.п
This particular argument frequently appears i n defence of

universality of assent. I n his The Immortality of the Human
Soul (1657), Walter Charleton argues for the universality of
the belief in immortality along the same lines. Even though
there have been and are people and nations who lack this belief,
it*does not follow
that the p e r s w a s i o n of its I m m o r t a l i t y ought not t o b e r e p u t e d G e n e r a l ;
a n d that the dissent o f a few persons doth not make a G e n e r a l C o n s e n t
not to be N a t u r a l . F o r , as, t h o u g h some m e n are b o r n o n l y w i t h one foot,
a n d some lay violent h a n d s u p o n t h e m s e l v e s ; it is not lawful for u s
thence to argue, that it is not natural to m e n to have two feet, o r that the
desire o f life is not natural to all m e n (pp. 1 2 7 - 8 ) .
The same defence of universal consent is found in John W i l -

kins's Of the Principles and Duties of Natural Religion (1675)
(pp. 58 ff.). The reference to universal consent was a generali
zation about a class, but as with all generalizations exceptions
were recognized within the class. The exceptions aside, Stilling
fleet and a host of othertheologianswere convinced that the
idea of God is an 'indelible character* upon the mind.
I n the same year as Stillingfleet's Origines Sacrae was first
published, Robert South preached a sermon at St. Paul's
Cathedral on 9 November in which he advocated the naive
form of the theory of innateness almost as strongly as did
Stillingfleet. South claimed that the speculative branch of the
1
understanding has several general maxims and notions 'which

are the rules of Discourse, and the basis of all Philosophy'. 2
Examples of such speculative innate truths are 'the same thing

cannot at the same time be, and not be', 'the whole is bigger
than a part', 'two proportions severally equal to a third, must
also be equal to one another'. He was concerned to argue for
the innateness of such speculative truths in order to show the
possibility of moral maximsbeing innate.He recognized that
Aristotle affirmed 'the M i n d to be at first a meer Rasa tabula\
and that these Notions are not ingenite, and imprinted by the
finger of Nature but by the latterand more languid impressions
1
Sermon on Genesis i. 27. Reprinted in his Twelve Sermons (1692), pp. 53-91.
1
Ibid.,p.62.
sECT.i PRIOR T O 1688 39
of sense;.. .' But South argues (1) that since these notions are
1
universal, they must proceed from some universal constant

principle which can be nothing else but human nature; (2)
that 'These cannot be infused byobservation, becausetheyare
the rules by which men take their first apprehension and ob
servations of things, and therefore in order of Nature must
needs precede them', and (3)that therefore 'it follows that these
were Notions not descending from us, but born with us; not
our Offspring, but our brethren; and (as I may so say) such as
we were taught without the help of a Teacher'. He then goes 2
on to make the same claims for practical principles which 'are

treasured up' i n the practical understanding and constitute the
'seeds of Morality'. Many men who deny innate speculative
3
principles admit, South says, innate practical principles. He

offers as examples of the latter, 'God is to be worshipped',
'parents are to be honoured', 'a man's word is to be kept'. A l l
of these are 'of universal influence, as to the regulation of the
behaviour, and converse of mankind', and are 'the ground of
all vertue, and civility, and the foundation of Religion'. 4
Thus, in Carpenter, Stillingfleet, and South, the na'ive form

of the doctrine of innate knowledge found its strongest ad
vocates. The various other men who espoused one form or
another of the doctrine testify to its pervasiveness in the period
before 1688. I n every case, appeal to it was made to protect
the existing values of the society, whether these were the very
belief i n the existence of a God or the various moral rules
embedded in the religion of their faith. Not even Stillingfleet
was ignorant of the objections which could be raised against
the nai've form of the theory, but so necessary was the doctrine
felt to be for morality and religion that objections were swept
aside or incompletely met. But the tendency to modify the
naive form into a dispositional doctrine of innate knowledge
was implicit as early as 1611 i n William Sclater. Under this
tendency the theory claimed not that men are born with
completed ideas and principles of morality, but only that such
1
Ibid., pp. 6 2 - 6 3 . 2
Ibid., pp. 6 3 - 6 4 .
3
Ibid.,p. 67. 4
Ibid.
4 o D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.п
knowledge was implicit in the soul and merely required ex

perience to elicit awareness of it. The Cambridge Platonists
developed this particular twist to the theory with great care,
showing at the same time an almost emotional attachment to
the literal language of the nai'veversion. I n An Antidote against
Atheisme (1653), Henry More argued that the fact that the idea
of God arises upon the occasion of external stimuli does not
detract from its connaturality and essentiality to the soul. He
compared this idea with the various ideas of geometry which
are readily consented to. He argues for actual knowledge i m
plicit in the soul but defines his position as follows:
A n d w h e n I say actuall Knowledge, I doe not m e a n that there i s a
certaine n u m b e r of Ideas flaring a n d s h i n i n g to the Animadversive
faculty like so m a n y Torches o r Starres i n the Firmament to o u r o u t w a r d
sight, o r that there are a n y figures that take their distinct places & are
legibly w r i t there like the Red Letters o r Astronomicall Characters i n an
Almanack; b u t I u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e b y a n active sagacity i n the S o u l , o r
q u i c k recollection as it w e r e , w h e r e b y some s m a l l businesse b e i n g h i n t e d
unto h e r , she r u n s out presently into a m o r e clear & larger c o n c e p t i o n
(bk. i , c h . v , p . 13).
He compares the mind to a musician who can sing a song upon

being awakened and given a few notes of the tune. 'So the Mind
of man beingjogg'd and awakened by the impulses of outward
objects, is stirred up into a more full and cleare conception of
what was but imperfectly hinted to her from externall occa
sions' (p. 14). Two lines of proof are suggested by More: the
first, that ideas of cause and effect, of whole, part, like and
unlike, &c., cannot be derived from the senses and hence must
find their origin within the soul itself; the second, that princi
ples such as 'the whole is bigger than the part', ' i f you take
equals from equals, the remainders are equal', 'every number
is either even or odd', are 'true to the soul at the very first
proposal' (bk. i , ch. v i , p. 17). His main objective throughout
is to show that the idea of God is ''Natural, necessary and
essential to the soul of man'. The light of nature i n all men is
the foundation of his doctrine. We even find him still speaking
of the innate truths of the soul dictating laws to us. Like
Stillingfleet, More recognized the objection against universal
SECT.i P R I O R T O 1688 41
consent; but unlike Stillingfleet, who gave an unsatisfactory

answer to this objection, More rejects universal consent as a
sign of innateness. The mark of innateness for him was i m
mediate assent upon examining the reasons and nature of the
given concept or principle.
A n d it is sufficient to m a k e a t h i n g true a c c o r d i n g to the light of
Nature, that no m a n u p o n a p e r c e p t i o n of w h a t is p r o p o u n d e d & the
R e a s o n s of it ( i f it be not clear at first sight, a n d n e e d reasons to b a c k i t )
w i l l e v e r stick to acknowledge for a T r u t h (bk. i , c h . x , p . 3 2 ) .
More, in other words, was careful to formulate the doctrine in

as unobjectionable a manner as possible, but he was not willing
to relinquish the doctrine entirely. The terminology of 'red
letters' and 'torches', which More was careful to avoid, was less
clearly denied by Culverwel, who, i n An Elegant And Learned
Discourse of the Light ofNature (1654), openly claimed that
'There are stamp't and printed upon the being of man, some
clear, and undelible principles, some first and Alphabetical
Notions; by putting together of which it can spell out the Law
of Nature' (p. 47). This vigorous and literal-sounding language
is carried on throughout Culverwel's book.
T h e r e ' s scatter'd i n the S o u l of M a n s o m e seeds o f light, w h i c h fill it
w i t h a v i g o r o u s p r e g n a n c y , w i t h a m u l t i p l y i n g fruitfulnesse, so that it
brings forth a n u m e r o u s a n d s p a r k l i n g posterity o f s e c o n d a r y notions,
w h i c h m a k e for the c r o w n i n g a n d e n c o m p a s s i n g of the s o u l w i t h h a p p i
ness ( p . 4 7 ) .
But the language is deceptive, for, like More, Culverwel only

wished to stress the activity and spontaneity of the soul i n
the generation of its ideas and i n its ready and immediate
assent to certain moral and speculative principles. The dis
covery of these principles is made by 'an Intellectual Lamp 1
which is set up in the soul (p. 53). He speaks, in this connexion,

of the
heavenly b e a m w h i c h G o d h a s darted into the s o u l of m a n ; f r o m the
Candle of the Lord, w h i c h G o d has lighted u p for the d i s c o v e r y of h i s
o w n L a w e s ; f r o m that intellectual eye w h i c h G o d h a s f r a m ' d a n d m a d e
exactly proportionable to this L i g h t (p. 5 9 ) .
But i n chapter eleven he makes it quite plain that he did not

accept the doctrine of connate species as it was generally for

mulated by his contemporaries. The soul does not bring any
notions along with it from another world, as Plato was com
monly interpreted as holding. Like More, Culverwel found it
necessary to attack the nai've form of the theory:
do but analise y o u r o w n thoughts, do but consult w i t h y o u r o w n breasts,
tell u s w h e n c e it w a s that the light first s p r a n g i n u p o n y o u . H a d y o u
s u c h notions as these w h e n y o u first peep't into b e i n g ? at the first o p e n
i n g of the souls eye ? i n the first exordium of I n f a n c y ? h a d y o u these c o n
nate species i n the Cradle ? a n d w e r e they r o c k ' t asleep w i t h y o u ? or d i d
y o u t h e n meditate u p o n these p r i n c i p l e s , Totum est majus parte, & Nihil
potest esse & non esse sitnuU (p. 78.)
Heassertswith the Aristotelians that all knowledge first enters

by the senses, and, like Locke later in the century, asks for 'a
catalogue of all these truths you brought with you into the
world'. He denies that the idea of God is innate, asserting it to
be only a power. I n The Darkness ofAtheism Dispelled (1652)
Walter Charleton advanced a similar argument, insisting that
the idea of God is not a signature impressed upon the minds of
all men; and that, if it were, the impression 'would be one and
the same in all men; that all men would then conceive God
under the same Form and Idea' (p. 35). Even if the belief were
universal, he argues, after the fashion of More, this would not
be evidence that it is one of those 4mplantate Notions, which
the same hand, that made our nature, hath engraven on the
table of our minds, and left it not in the power of our depraved
Wills totally to obliterate* (p. 105). I n a later work, The Im
mortality ofthe Human Soul (1657), he uses 'innate* in the sense
of 'potential* only. This work is written in dialogue form, with
Lucretius, Athanasius, and Isodicastes asparticipants. Athana
sius seems to represent the views of Charleton. I n opposition
to Lucretius' assertion of the Aristotelian principle of 'nothing
in the intellect but what is first in the senses*, Athanasius cites
as exceptions 'the Common Notions, that are as it were en
graven on our Minds' (p. 92), but he hastens to explain that by
'innate* he means only thatwhich is 'potential'. Later, arguing
for the immateriality of the soul, Athanasius insists that
it w i l l n o t b e a c c o u n t e d p a r a d o x i c a l i n m e to affirm, that I m m a t e r i a l
Objects are m o s t g e n u i n e a n d n a t u r a l to t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g ; especially
since Des Cartes h a t h i r r e f u t a b l y d e m o n s t r a t e d , that t h e K n o w l e d g e w e
have o f t h e existence o f t h e S u p r e m e B e i n g , a n d o f o u r o w n S o u l s , i s
not o n l y P r o l e p t i c a l a n d I n n a t e i n t h e M i n d o f m a n , b u t also m o r e
certain, clear, a n d distinct, t h a n t h e K n o w l e d g e of any Corporeal
N a t u r e w h a t e v e r ( p . 119).
The qualification of 'innate* as 'potential* is not repeated, but

we may assume that Charleton meant i t to be operative. 1
The terminology of the doctrine which More, Culverwel,

and Charleton all combatted was the same: it was the termino
logy of the nai've form of the theory of innateness. A l l three
were concerned, however, to retain a modified version of the
theory. Their example was followed by other writers of the
period before 1688. I n The Interest ofReason in Religion (1675)
Robert Ferguson argues that one meaning of the term 'reason'
is those truths which are 'so connate to Sense and Reason;
that upon their bare Representation they are universally
assented to*. Like More and Culverwel, he denies that we
are born with these truths.
I do not say that w e are b r o u g h t forth w i t h a L i s t a n d S c r o l l o f Axioms
formally I m p r i n t e d u p o n o u r F a c u l t i e s ; b u t I s a y that w e are f u r n i s h e d
w i t h s u c h P o w e r s , u p o n t h e first E x e r c i s e o f w h i c h about s u c h t h i n g s
without any Harangues o f Discourse, or previous Ratiocinations, w e
cannot w i t h o u t d o i n g V i o l e n c e to o u r R a t i o n a l N a t u r e , b u t p a y t h e m a n
Assent (pp. 22-23).
He calls these truths 'natural* and makes them the foundation

of all science, knowledge, and discourse. He cites the law of
contradiction and the law of causality as examples, and con
cludes the argument with the observation:
I k n o w n o Idea's f o r m a l l y Innate; w h a t w e c o m m o n l y call so, are
the R e s u l t s o f the E x e r c i s e o f o u r R e a s o n . T h e N o t i o n o f G o d i s n o t
Natural
1
Charleton may have changed his views, for in a still later work,
History ofthe Passions ( 1 6 7 4 ) , in large partatranslation ofJean Francois Senault's
De UUsage des Passions ( 1 6 4 1 ) , the early portions contain positive assertions of
the naive form of innateness which are not to be found in Senault's work.
Equating innate knowledge with the natural instinct of animals, he speaks of
such knowledge as 'being by the omnipotent Creator, in the very act of their
Formation, infused, and as an indelible Character impress'd upon their very
principles or natures' (p. 3 9 ) . Later he writes of 'a law engraven upon their
hearts' (p. 4 1 ) .
44 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.н
otherwise i n b r e d , t h e n that the S o u l is f u r n i s h e d w i t h s u c h a N a t u r a l

Sagacity, that u p o n the E x e r c i s e of h e r rational P o w e r s , she i s I n f a l l i b l y
l e d to the A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f a D e i t y (p. 4 1 ) .
The same rejection of the idea of God as innate is present in

John Pearson's An Exposition of the Creed (1659).
F o r a l t h o u g h some have i m a g i n e d that the knowledge of a D e i t y is
c o n n a t u r a l l to the s o u l of m a n , so that every m a n h a t h a connate i n b r e d
notion of a G o d ; yet I rather conceive the s o u l of m a n to have no c o n
naturall knowledge at all, no p a r t i c u l a r notion of a n y t h i n g i n it f r o m the
beginning, but to receive the first apprehensions of things b y sense, a n d
b y t h e m to m a k e all rationall collections. I f t h e n the s o u l of m a n be
at first like a fair s m o o t h table w i t h o u t a n y actuall characters of k n o w
ledge i m p r i n t e d i n i t ; i f all knowledge w h i c h w e have comes successively
b y sensation, i n s t r u c t i o n , a n d rationall collection, t h e n w e m u s t not
referre the a p p r e h e n s i o n of a D e i t y to a n y connate notion o r i n b r e d
o p i n i o n (p. 3 2 ) .
Samuel Parker not only denied the doctrine of innateness in

whatever form it was couched, but went on to develop the
alternative in some detail and sought for an explanation of why
men have held to the naiVe form of the theory. I t is significant
that the argument Parker opposes is not the modified version
but the na'ive form. Ascribing to Plato the doctrine that all
knowledge is obtained by comparing objects perceived with
their Tdeal Pictures or Images engraven on our understand
ing', he argues that all knowledge, even that supposedly drawn
from maxims, is had from experience and observation. 1
N o w to w h a t p u r p o s e s h o u l d P r o v i d e n c e i m p r i n t s u c h obvious a n d
apparent N o t i c e s as this [that the w h o l e is greater t h a n its parts] u p o n
the m i n d s of M e n , w h e n as b u t to o p e n o u r eyes, is e n o u g h to discover
t h e i r u n d o u b t e d T r u t h a n d E v i d e n c e ? . . . B u t suppose that w e w e r e
b o r n w i t h these congenite A n t i c i p a t i o n s , a n d that they take R o o t i n o u r
v e r y F a c u l t i e s , yet h o w c a n I be certain of their T r u t h a n d V e r a c i t y ?
F o r 'tis not impossible b u t the seeds o f E r r o r m i g h t have been the
n a t u r a l R e s u l t s of m y F a c u l t i e s , as W e e d s are the first a n d n a t u r a l
I s s u e s of the best Soyles, h o w t h e n s h a l l w e be s u r e that these spontaneous
N o t i o n s are not false a n d s p u r i o u s ? 2
The only means of gaining such certainty is to test these truths

by experience. Even if there are connate principles, they are of
1
A Free and Impartial Censure Of The Platonick Philosophie ( 1 6 6 6 ) , p . 55.
2
Ibid.,p.56.
no use since 'before I have made Tryal, I cannot use them'. N 0

good purpose is served by invoking innate notions.
B u t w h e n w e begin o u r knowledge f r o m N o t i o n s w i t h i n o u r selves,
besides that 'tis a difficult a n d n i c e dispute to p r o v e that the m i n d o f
m a n is f u r n i s h e d w i t h a n y s u c h innate Prolepses, a n d that w e are d e s t i
tute of a n y s u r e κριτήριον to d i s c e r n N a t u r a l A n t i c i p a t i o n s f r o m P r e c o n
ceptions of C u s t o m e a n d E d u c a t i o n (unlesse w e b r i n g t h e m to the
Touchstone of E x p e r i e n c e ) 'tis doubtless that G e n e r a l i t i e s are not
capable of so palpable a n d c o n v i c t i v e a n E v i d e n c e , as S i n g l e a n d p a r t i c u
lar O b s e r v a t i o n s . 1
He sought, in A Demonstration of the Divine Authority of the

Law ofNature (1681), to account for the growth of the na'ive
form of the doctrine on the basis of the misuse of language.
A s to the Sufficiency of the P u b l i c a t i o n of the L a w o f N a t u r e , the
p l a i n A c c o u n t of it has b e e n o b s c u r e d b y n o t h i n g m o r e , t h e n that it has
alwaies b e e n d e s c r i b e d a n d d i s c o u r s e d of i n m e t a p h o r i c a l a n d allusive
E x p r e s s i o n s , s u c h as Engravings, a n d Inscriptions, a n d the Tables of the
Heart, &c. A s i f the L a w of N a t u r e consisted of a c e r t a i n n u m b e r of
P r o p o s i t i o n s that w e r e i m p r i n t e d u p o n the M i n d s of M e n , a n d c o n -
created w i t h t h e i r U n d e r s t a n d i n g s , b y attending to a n d reflecting u p o n
w h i c h t h e y w e r e i n s t r u c t e d or b o u n d to govern their moral Actions
(P. 5).
N 0 better statement of the na'ive form of the argument and the

reasons for its appeal can be found in the literature of the
seventeenth century. Parker suggests here, as he had done
earlier, that even though the law of nature is imprinted upon
our minds, we can never know it to be so. For man, the law of
nature has an empirical origin, is derived by man's own
reasonings from his observations of nature.
Parker w as, of course, strongly influenced by the new science
T
and was himself a member of the Royal Society. The appeal to

innate, pre-experiential principles was opposed to the em
piricism of this new movement. When religion ceased to be an
affair of the heart, a private, personal relation between a man
and his God, men began to find God in nature. Religion became
less complex, more open, andmorerational. I f G o d is Himself
in nature, what need is there for His laws and commands to be
1
Ibid.,p.57.
824331 E
46 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн. п
written in the heart ? The function of these laws was usurped by

reason and observation. I n his own early Essays on the Law of
Nature, Locke exemplifiedthis externalizing tendencybyargu-
ing that from the reports of our senses we infer a God as maker
of the world: 'as soon as this is laid down, the notion of a uni
versal law of nature binding on all men necessarily emerges ' 1
The law of nature accordingly lost its innate basis; but i n the
minds of those who defended this concept of a law of nature,
the force and certainty of the law were not rendered any the less
powerful. When Locke came to reflect upon the problems of
knowledge and religion, he found appealing this new attitude
towards a simple naturalistic religion and an empirical basis for
values. The old nai've form of the doctrine of an innate basis for
values had been thoroughly exploded by i688. Locke merely
gave to these arguments their classic and most thorough state
ment. He had been preceded in this statement of the arguments
against the naive form of the theory by More, Culverwel, and
Parker, and a number of lesser-known men. Burthogge, too,
had gone far towards summarizing the older point of view on
this issue. I n Causa Dei (1675), Burthogge had insisted that
the general articles of religion
w h e r e i n all m e n the W o r l d over c o m m o n l y agree, a n d w h i c h are t h e r e
fore called common sentiments though they be not (what b y some t h e y b e
i m a g i n e d ) Innate Idea's o r N o t i o n s ingrafted a n d i m p r i n t e d o n t h e
M i n d s o f M e n b y N a t u r e , b u t . . . main andsubstantial Points of thefirst
Tradition (pp. 3 4 0 - 1 ) .
Like Locke, he put his finger upon the customary basis of the
religious values of his age. I n Organum Vetus & Novum (1678),
Burthogge referred to both sides of the doctrine, to the prac
tical and speculative maxims claimed to be innate. He remarks
that some men have been convinced that theunderstanding
has been furnished with
Anticipations, that is, with Connatural a n d Ingrafted Notions;
P r i n c i p l e s designedly i m p l a n t e d i n the M i n d e , to be a rule to it to direct
it. T h u s i n the speculative U n d e r s t a n d i n g they h a v e set u p a habit, w h i c h
1
Essays on the Law ofNature, ed. by W. von Leyden, Oxford, 1954, p. i 3 3 i
cf. p. 151.
they call Intelligence; i n the Practical another w h i c h is called Synteresis;

i n b o t h a C o n s t e l l a t i o n of Principles, shining w i t h their o w n L i g h t , and
i m p a r t i n g it to others that w a n t it (p. 55).
The doctrine which we have found invoked by various writers

in the century is well summarized by Burthogge. He rejects
the theory entirely.
B u t w e r e there really s u c h a S y s t e m of N o t i o n s a n d first P r i n c i p l e s i n
grafted i n the M i n d e b y N a t u r e , i n w h o s e L i g h t all others w e r e to s h i n e
a n d to be seen, it w o u l d follow that C o n t e m p l a t i o n of o u r o w n m i n d e s ,
a c q u a i n t i n g u s w i t h the C h a i n , C o n c a t e n a t i o n , a n d S o r i t e s of the P r i n
ciples t h e r e i n , a n d P r o p o s i t i o n s deducible t h e r e f r o m , w o u l d m o r e i m p a r t
to the r e n d r i n g u s P h i l o s o p h e r s (not to say D i v i n e s also) t h a n o b s e r
vation of the W o r l d a n d E x p e r i e n c e ; a n d so the greatest School-men
(those M e t a p h y s i c a l A l c h y m i s t s ) that i n s i s t e d m u c h o n t h i s Method,
a n d s p u n out all their notions of their o w n B o w e l s , s h o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e
wisest a n d most fruitful of m e n ( p p . 55—56).
Burthogge was not impressed with the systems o f t h e school

men. Like Parker, he sought to relate all knowledge to
experience.
A g a i n , the S o u l i n its state of U n i o n a n d C o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the B o d y ,
is so dependent o n it i n all its O p e r a t i o n s , that it exercises none w i t h o u t
the A i d s of it. R a t i o c i n a t i o n it self it is a n A n i m a l a c t ; not a n abstract
A c t i o n of the S o u l , b u t a ( C o n c r e t e ) act of the A n i m a l ; it is the M a n
reasons. A n d i n the o r d i n a r y m e t h o d o f N a t u r e , w e receive into o u r
M i n d e s no I m p r e s s i o n s , no I m a g e s , b u t w h a t are h a n d e d to t h e m by o u r
S e n s e s . I a m apt to t h i n k that a p e r s o n w h o s h o u l d n e v e r have seen, n o r
h e a r d , n o r tasted, n o r smelt, n o r felt a n y t h i n g , w o u l d have h i s m i n d e as
little f u r n i s h ' d w i t h I d e a ' s or N o t i o n s , as h i s M e m o r y w i t h I m a g e s , a n d
w o u l d u n d e r s t a n d as little as h e h a d s e n s e d ( p p . 5 6 - 5 7 ) .
He goes on to affirm that the propositions commonly assented

t o d o not involve a natural or automatic assent but äjudicial
assent, based on the evidence which the propositions bring.
'For instance, that the whole is greater than the part, we
assented not unto it on the first hearing, but first considering
what was meant by Whole, what by Part, what by Greater,
what by Lesser' (pp. 57-58). Such propositions are so easily
assented to that some doubt arises as to just when we did first
assent to them. But, he concludes, 'Beings are not to be
multiplied without Necessity' Hence, innate notions are to be

dispensed with as unnecessary.
§ 2 — T h e Critics of Locke's Pokmic

A n examination of the literature i n England prior to 1688
reveals, then, a firm and pervasive acceptance of the doctrine
of innate knowledge, a doctrine held by many i n its na'ive form,
modified into a dispositional doctrine by others, and criticized
thoroughly by still other men sympathetic to the new move
ments within science and religion. A l l mystery as to the re
ferents of Book One of Locke's Essay would seem to be
dispelled. T o askwhom Lockewas attacking i n that book is like
asking whom Parker, Burthogge, More, or Culverwel were
attacking. These men were not writing about a mythical
doctrine never held by anyone. They were all attacking a firmly
established doctrine which they considered to be no longer use
ful, and even injurious to religion and to the values they held.
But should any doubts still linger i n our minds concerning the
adherents to the na'ive form of the doctrine, a close look at the
reception accorded to Locke'spolemic confirms the impression
we acquire while examining the literature prior to i688. Some
of Locke's critics deny that anyone ever held the na'ive form of
the doctrine, referring only to the modified dispositional ver
sion which they still feel to be necessary for morality and reli
gion. Others admit the cogency of Locke's criticisms but only
grudgingly. A few others, even into the eighteenth century,
still advance the nai've form in opposition to Locke's denial.
None of the critics recognizes the validity of grounding values
or the law of nature in experience.
The doctrine of innate knowledge is found i n some men
after 1688 who make no reference to Locke. Of these, John
Hartcliffe, A Treatise ofMoralandIntellectual Virtues (1691),
sought to defend the naive form of the theory.
F i r s t there is a secret i m p r e s s i o n u p o n the M i n d s o f M e n , w h e r e b y
they are naturally directed to approve s o m e t h i n g s as good, a n d avoid
other t h i n g s as evil. . . . N o w these inclinations do not p r o c e e d f r o m
R e a s o n , b u t f r o m N a t u r e , a n d are antecedent to a l l D i s c o u r s e , as it i s
sECT.ii T H E C R I T I C S O F L O C K E ' S P O L E M I C 49
manifest f r o m h e n c e , that t h e y are as strong, a n d do p u t forth t h e m s e l v e s

as v i g o r o u s l y i n y o u n g persons, as i n those that are o l d e r ; t h e y do s h e w
t h e m s e l v e s as m u c h i n the r u d e a n d ignorant sort o f P e o p l e , as i n those
w h o are m o r e refined, a n d better i n s t r u c t e d ( p p . 3 5 2 - 3 ) .
T o the suggestion that this doctrine is contradicted by the fact

that some men have ideas of good and evil different from those
of others, he replies that there is a paucity of such men and that
they are no less than monsters, 'and no more to be drawn into
an argument against the truth of this assertion, than a M a n
being born with three legs can be an argument, that M e n
naturally have not two' (p. 358). There is a natural instinct i n
man i n terms of which 'we know what we ought to do, ante
cedent to all Reason & Discourse' (p. 359). Richard Bentley, i n
the first of his Boyle lectures, The Folly ofAtheism (1692),
speaks favourably of the 'commonly received notion of an
Innate Idea of God, imprinted upon every Soul of M a n at their
Creation, i n Characters that can never be defaced' (p. 4 ) .
William Nicholls, A Conference with a Theist y Part i i i (1697),
remarks that the alternative to innateness 'may be subject to as
many difficulties' as inhere i n the doctrine of innateness (p. 33).
William King, De Origine Mali (1702), was concerned to defend
the modifiedversion of the doctrine (pp. 7-9). I n the remarks
which he sent to Locke via Molyneux i n 1692, he charged
Locke with confusing the observation or recognition of a
principle as innate with the use of such a principle. He there
defined 'innate' as 'a thought that the natural frame of the mind
& circumstances i n which God and nature has placed us, w i l l
bring into our minds, i f we do not do violence to our minds to
keep it out'. Locke, K i n g objected, 'will allow no idea innate
1
but such as a man brings coined i n his mind like a shilling. So

that an innate idea is an actuall thought with him, which no
body, that I know of, ever said.' He cites the example of a2
child drawing back from fire the very first time it experiences
heat, thus showing that the child has an idea of heat framed i n
his mind.
1
MS. L o c k e , C . 2 8 , f. 100.
2
Ibid., ff. 9 9 - 1 0 0 .
So D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.и
I t is no a r g u m e n t that there are no notions g r a v e n i n the m i n d b y

nature antecedent to a l l sense because m e n do not i m m e d i a t e l y t h i n k o f
t h e m a n y m o r e t h a n it i s a n a r g u m e n t that a p h i l o s o p h e r n e v e r k n o w s
a n y t h i n g i n h i s life because h e is h a r d to be a w a k e n e d out o f s l e e p . 1
Further, King does not believe Locke has explained suffi

ciently the origin of ideas or shown that, for example, the appli
cation of heat gives rise to the idea of heat.
S o m e w i l l t h i n k a l l ideas preexisting i n the soul, & that the application
of o u t w a r d objects o n l y oblige the s o u l t o attend to t h e m ; as letters w r i t
t e n w i t h the fluid of l e m o n are i n the p a p e r b u t not visible till flre m a k e
them so. 2
Finally, the making of all ideas adventitious provides us with

no certainty or assurance that men can have the same idea of
heat, &c. This assurance is secured by the doctrine of innate
ideas. I n short, the doctrine of innate ideas, taken i n its dis
positional form, is both plausible and useful.
King borrowed other epistemological doctrines from the
Essay and incorporated them in his Ш Origine Mali; but in the
English translation of that work made after his death, the notes 3
on innate ideas have been removed and copious references to

Locke's polemic inserted and quoted as authority to show that
the doctrine of innate knowledge had been thoroughly ex
ploded. His translators were working from manuscript mater
ial left by King, so it looks as if he altered his opinion on this
doctrine after the first edition of his book. I f so, we have an
interesting example of Locke's persuasive powers. Locke was
not so fortunate with his other critics. At the end of his abridge
ment of his Essay i n the i688 issue of LeClerc's Bibliotheque
Universelle, he had asked for reactions and comments upon
this outline to be sent to him in Amsterdam. A t least two sets
of comments were received by him in response to this sug
gestion. Both authors defend the doctrine of innate knowledge
against Locke, the one with great detail, the other only i n
passing. Christian Knorr von Rosenroth begins his remarks,
' Observationes: I n Tractatüm On. J. Locke de Intellectu:
1
MS. Locke, C. 28, f. 99. 2
Ibid., f. 100.
3
An Essay on the Origin ofEvil ( 1 7 3 1 ) , tr. by Edmund Law.
secundum doctrinam Hebraeorum & Philosophorum antiquo-

rüm', by pointing out that the tabula rasa doctrine does not
1
find support in the old Hebrew texts or in Plato. He admits,

however, two qualified senses i n which one could speak of the
mind as being a tabula rasa: one at the time of creation, where
the mind 'nihil in se continebat, quam quod ä Luminibus
divinis ipsi imprimeretur', the other at the time of the final
reunion with God, 'ubi abrasis omnibus ideis prioribus,
Intellectus iterum erit tabula rasa, nihilque contemplabitur
quam summum illud Visionis suae beatificae Objectum'. The
nearer the mind ascends to the beatific vision, the more i t
merits to be called a tabula rasa. But minds of this calibre are
rare. The ordinary man's mind is never a blank tablet, but
always contains divine impressions.
The other reply to the abstract in LeClerc's journal was
written by Fredericus van Leenhof at the instigation of a friend
in Holland who knew Locke. He was much impressed by the
2
Essay and had many words of praise for Locke, but he admitted
that he lacked the time required for making himself familiar
enough with the terminology and the required distinctions to
warrant his making extended and detailed criticisms. He does,
however, indicate that he finds the rejection of innate ideas in
the Essay difficult to accept, since for him the very concept of a
soul entails the concept of ideas within the soul. T o speak of the
soul as a tabula rasa 'without previously created ideas' distorts
the very meaning of the term. Leenhof belonged to atradition
in which the doctrine of innate knowledge was so firmly rooted
that it was taken for granted. Although he does not indicate the
specific details of the doctrine which he accepted, it is probable
that itwas similar to that formulated by Knorr von Rosenroth.
1
MS. Locke, C. 13, fT.14-15. Knorr von Rosenroth was a well-known Judaic
scholar, author of Kabbala Denudata ( 1 6 7 7 - 8 4 ) .
2
MS. Locke, C. 13, f. 152. These comments are in the form of a letter, the
recipient of the letter being undoubtedly Peter Guenellon, friend of Locke and
Leenhof. Guenellon also refers to them in one of his letters to Locke. (Cf. MS.
Locke, C. i l , f. 5.) Leenhof was a prominent minister and mathematician of
Holland ( 1 6 4 7 - 1 7 1 2 ) , interested in Descartes and Spinoza, whogotintotrouble
with his book, Den Hemel op Aaide ( 1 7 0 3 ) . For further information concerning
him, cf. Biographisch Woodenboek der Nederlanden.
But the interesting aspect of these two comments from Holland

is that they show again the peculiar character of the appeal to
innate knowledge in England i n the seventeenth century.
Among the Cartesians on the Continent, innateness was invoked
as part of the theoretical structure laid down by Descartes. The
twoexamples of advocates of the doctrine which we have from
Holland indicatethat the doctrine there took the Cartesian form
as well as, in the case of Knorr von Rosenroth, being rooted i n
the Judaic tradition. I n England, the doctrine was always i n
timately bound up with the defence of the law of nature, with
the foundations of morality and religion. But in Holland as
well as in England it was the divines who reacted most strongly
against Locke's polemic. Tyrrell w T o t e in 1690 that the theo
logians were 'much scandalized that so sweet & easy a part of
their sermons: as that of the Laws written i n the heart, is
rendered false & uselesseV One of the first attacks upon Book
One to which Locke replied was written by James Lowde
(A Discourse Concerning the Nature 0fMa1i, 1694), who was in
theheart of this English tradition. For Lowde, there werejust
two basic sources of knowledge: the natural inscriptions on the
minds of men, and revelation (p. 51). Lowde denied that any
one ever held to the nai've form of the doctrine, indicating that
in accepting a doctrine of innate knowledge he did not mean
that the soul has an existence prior to this life or that all
knowledge is, as the Platonists say, a recollection.
T h e s e natural N o t i o n s are not so i m p r i n t e d u p o n the S o u l , as that
they naturally a n d necessarily exert t h e m s e l v e s (even i n C h i l d r e n a n d
Ideots) w i t h o u t a n y assistance f r o m the o u t w a r d S e n s e s , or w i t h o u t the
help of some previous C u l t i v a t i o n ( p p . 5 2 - 5 3 ) .
He was an adherent of the dispositional modification. When

working properly, the understanding has
a native p o w e r of finding or f r a m i n g s u c h P r i n c i p l e s or Propositions, the
T r u t h or K n o w l e d g e w h e r e o f no w a y s d e p e n d s u p o n the evidence of
sense or o b s e r v a t i o n : t h u s k n o w i n g w h a t is m e a n t b y a w h o l e , a n d w h a t
b y a part, h e n c e naturally results the t r u t h of this P r o p o s i t i o n , totum est
majus sudparte, w i t h o u t a n y w a y s o b l i g ' d to sense for it (p. 5 3 ) .
1
T y r r e l l to L o c k e , 18 F e b r u a r y 1689/90. M S . L o c k e C . 2 2 , f. 8 2 .
Lowde attacked Parker along with Locke, insisting that 'it must
be granted, that it is at least possible for God to imprint truths
upon the minds of M e n : and i f so then it cannot be done any-
other way, than by making 'em thus plain and self evident'
(p. 56). I t was Lowde's conviction that God 'hath communi
cated something of a Divine Ray, relating both to Intellectual
and Moral Notices, into the very constitution of our humane
Nature, something that is both a light and a law unto us' (pp.
63-64). Innate ideas are not 'super-induc'd or imprinted upon
the Soul, I n esse completo' but are 'native Properties and
Qualifications of the Soul' (p. 82).
Lowde went on to charge Locke with reducing the founda
tion of morality to custom, a charge which Locke stoutly
denied. Moral goodness and evil for Locke were grounded i n
the law of nature; but his denial of the naive form of innate
ness led many of his readers to interpret him as uprooting the
traditional and, in their eyes, the only legitimate basis for
morality. Locke insisted that he was not opposed to the dis
positional version of the theory of innateness. He only wished
to point out that in this form the theory claimed so little that it
no longer meritedthename 'innate'. Lowde's doctrine asserted,
he pointed out in his reply, that 'there are certain propositions
which, though the soul from the beginning, or when a man is
born, does not know, yet "by assistance from the outward
senses, and the help of some previous cultivation", it may
afterwards come certainly to know the truth of; which is no
more than what I have affirmed i n my First Book'. But Lowde
did not wish to assert only this minimal claim. Locke was
pointing out in effect that the test for dispositional innateness
can only come after experience and that then, as Parker had
observed, the claim for innateness becomes pointless. But with
this interpretation Lowde did not agree. Like many other men
in the period he believed that it was necessary and meaningful
to adhere to the dispositional form of the theory. The revisions
of Parker and Locke were too radical for most men of the
century to follow. Once innate knowledge had been denied, i n
both its naive and its dispositional forms, the readers of the
54 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн-.н
Essay looked about for Locke's substitute. The besttheycould

find there as a basis for morality was custom or praise and
blame. Tyrrell's friends, and even Tyrrell himself, found it
difficult to construct any other interpretation of Book One.
S i n c e I came into the c o u n t r y I have b e g u n again to r e a d over y o u r
excellent E s s a y w i t h great satisfaction; a n d d i s c o u r s e i n g w i t h some
t h i n k i n g m e n at O x f o r d , no long since I f o u n d t h e m dissatisfyed w i t h
w h a t y o u have sayed c o n c e r n e i n g the L a w of nature (or reason) w h e r e b y
wee d i s t i n g u i s h m o r a l good f r o m evil & vertue f r o m vice. F o r tho I c o n -
fesse i n y o u r t h i r d chap p . 21 y o u thinke they equally forsake the t r u t h ,
w h o r u n n i n g into the contrary extremes, either affirme a n innate L a w ;
or d e n y that there is a L a w knowable b y the light of n a t u r e ; i.e. w i t h o u t
the help of positive revelation. Y e t they thinke y o u have i n y o u r s e c o n d
c h a p : p . 158, 159, 160 destroyed this reasonable concession, & resolved
all vertue & vice & the law b y w h i c h it is establisht out of a c o m m o n
w e a l t h , & abstracted f r o m divine revelation; into the praise or dispraise
that m e n give to certain actions i n g e n e r a l . 1
Thomas Becconsall in The Grounds andFoundation ofNatural

Religion (1698) saw the same dangers in the first book of the
Essay. He was firmly convinced of the existence of a law of
nature prior to revelation, a natural instinct for self-preserva
tion being given to man which shows him upon reflection that
he owes his present existence to God. From this fact alone, man
is able to deduce what duties he owes to God, and from these
to set up laws referring to God and man. Becconsall recog
nized that Locke did not deny the law of nature; but in under
mining universal consent as its foundation, he believed Locke
had in effect weakened the law and left the way open for the
T
Latitudinarians and for those other men who wished to deny

all such laws and base religion upon reason. Where is that
universal consent which 'assures us there are Laws of Nature,
or indispensable established Rules of Morality' (p. 46) ? Like
Parker, Becconsall tried to suggest reasons why laws of nature
had been considered by so many as being innate, but in his
suggestions he reveals a language which itself suggests reluc
tance to relinquish the doctrine.
1
Tyrrell to Locke, 30 June 1690, MS. Locke, C. 22, ff. 90-91.
B u t further, that w h i c h i n reality gives t h e m the appearance o f I n n a t e

P r i n c i p l e s a n d the d e n o m i n a t i o n of L a w s of N a t u r e , is the evidence a n d
p e r s p i c u i t y of ' e m . F o r since it is c o n c l u d e d , that L a w s o f N a t u r e result
f r o m the v e r y F r a m e a n d O r d e r of N a t u r e , f r o m that state a n d c o n d i t i o n
of T h i n g s w h e r e i n w e w e r e b o r n , a n d w h e r e b y w e s u b s i s t ; they m u s t
u n d o u b t e d l y discover 'emselves to the M i n d s o f M e n , e v e n t h o ' they
w e r e lodged i n the most simple and unimproved State of Nature. . . . In a
w o r d , they are L a w s o f N a t u r e , because they are Impressions that are
stamped on the Mind f r o m the m o s t i m p o r t u n a t e cravings a n d exigencies
of N a t u r e ; a n d they c a r r y the appearance of I n n a t e P r i n c i p l e s , because
they are certainly some of the first Suggestions that a c c o m p a n y a M i n d
after its a r r i v e d to a State of T h i n k i n g . ( P p . 6 7 - 6 8 . M y italics.)
Moreover, to Locke's dictum that there can be no ideas

which are not actual and conscious perceptions of the mind,
Becconsall replies that he can see no reason
w h y native I n s c r i p t i o n s m a y not r e m a i n w i t h o u t b e i n g actually attended
to, as w e l l as w r i t t e n L a w s , or a c q u i r ' d I d e a s . I t ' s w e l l k n o w n , those that
c o n t e n d for I n n a t e I d e a s , or P r i n c i p l e s , do not t h i n k they discover ' e m
selves w i t h o u t the E x e r c i s e o f o u r n a t u r a l P o w e r s a n d F a c u l t i e s ; a n d
some o f those external M e a n s a n d I n s t r u m e n t s that are necessary to
a c q u i r e d K n o w l e d g e (p. 73).
Becconsall makes a show of dispensing with the doctrine of

innate knowledge, claiming that a fully rational religion can
serve all the ends of the appeal to innateness; but the doctrine
is not dead for him. Not only does it reappear in the termino
logy he employs, in his partiality for the criterion of universal
consent for the laws of nature, but he defends a doctrine of
natural conscience as well.
The dispositional version of the theory and the doctrine of
natural conscience had been strongly defended the year before
BecconsalPs book by Thomas Burnet i n a series of three
Remarks on the Essay. Conscience for Burnet was 'a Natural
Sagacity to distinguish Moral Good and Evil, o r a different
perception and sense of t h e m , w i t h a different affection of
the M i n d arising from i t ; and this so immediate as to prevent
and anticipate all External Laws, and all Ratiocination'. I n 1
the marginal replies in his copy of Burnet's third series of

comments, Locke points out that Tt is not conscience that
1
Third Remark ( 1 6 9 9 ) , pp. 7-8.
makes the distinction of good & evil, conscience only judging

of any action by that which it takes to be the rule of good &
evil' (note iii, p. 5). Burnet confused the precepts by means of
1
which conscience works with the conscience itself. Like many

of his predecessors, he criticized Locke's formulation of the
doctrine of innate practical principles on the ground that
the adherents of this doctrine do not insist upon complete ideas
before the use of reason, but only on tendencies or instinct.
Burnet's own sympathies were clearly on the side of the dis
positional analysis. He speaks of a natural sense of beauty and
order in all men and thence seeks to argue for a natural moral
sense. A list of innate rules, as Locke required, is not necessary,
since the natural moral conscience dictates anew each time it is
consulted. But such a position, such a modification of the na'ive
form of the theory, cuts the ground from under the theory
itself; for, as Locke pointed out,
O f those w h o say there are a set o f f u n d a m e n t a l propositions n e c e s

sary to b e believed b y every one for salvation, i t is reasonable to aske a
list o f t h e m . A n d of those w h o say there are innate l a w s or r u l e s of r i g h t
or w r o n g , 'tis reasonable to d e m a n d a list of t h e m , & h e that cannot p r o
duce w h a t he soe tells o f 'tis p l a i n folly (note x x x v , p . 15).
For Locke there were just two alternatives. Either ideas and
principles are innate i n the sense of full-blown and perfect
ideas, or they can be only tendencies which arise with ex
perience. The former is absurd and false, the latter trivial and
of no consequence. ^
I f m o r a l I d e a s or m o r a l r u l e s ( w h i c h are the m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s I d e n y
to be innate) are innate, I s a y c h i l d r e n m u s t k n o w t h e m as w e l l as
m e n . I f b y m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s y o u m e a n a faculty to finde out i n t i m e the
m o r a l difference o f actions. B e s i d e s that this i s a n i m p r o p e r w a y o f
s p e a k i n g to cal a p o w e r p r i n c i p l e s ; I n e v e r d e n y ' d s u c h a p o w e r to b e
innate, b u t that w h i c h I d e n y ' d w a s that a n y I d e a s o r c o n n e c t i o n o f
I d e a s w a s innate (note ix, p . 8 ) .
1
Locke's copy of Burnet's third set of Remarks, with Locke's marginal notes,
is in the Yale University Library. The manuscript notes have been published
by Noah Porter. The numbering of the notes is mine and refers to their order of
appearance in Locke's copy. The pagination refers to their location in Burnet's
text.
Moral good and evil must be learned before they can be

achieved or avoided. Locke will allow a disposition towards
good and evil i f we mean by this only that men will be able in
time to make the distinction between good and evil. He firmly
denied that the soul has a natural disposition towards good and
away from evil prior to experience.
M e n h a v e a n a t u r a l t e n d e n c y to w h a t delights a n d f r o m w h a t p a i n s
t h e m . T h i s u n i v e r s a l observation h a s established past doubt. T h a t the
soul has s u c h a t e n d e n c y to w h a t is m o r a l l y good & f r o m w h a t is m o r a l l y
evil has not fallen u n d e r m y observation, & therefor I cannot grant it for
as b e i n g (note x i , p. 9 ) .
Writing in 1704, Anthony Collins observed that

ι there c a n be n o t h i n g a d v a n c e d c o n t r a d i c t o r y to the design o f the Essay
of Human Und. b u t o n the P r i n c i p l e o f I n n a t e I d e a s , i n that sense t h e y
are refuted b y the A u t h o r i n the i s t book. 2 T h a t M r . L e e , M r . L o w d e ,
&c., w h o p r e t e n d to m a i n t a i n I n n a t e I d e a s & b y u s i n g the t e r m s i m
p r o p e r l y , m a y s e e m to those, that w i l l not e x a m i n e , to be of a different
o p i n i o n f r o m h i m , do, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e i r i n c l i n a t i o n to c o n t r a d i c t
h i m , state the Q u e s t i o n so as to leave n o t h i n g c o n t r a r y to w h a t the
A u t h o r has said. 1
But Collins failed to see the very real antithesis which existed
between Locke and his critics on this issue. The conviction
held by Lowde, Burnet, and others was that there exists in the
mind a disposition which, independent of experience, leads
man towards good and away from evil. Locke was no more
willing to subscribe to this dictum than he was to the na'ive
form of the theory of innate knowledge. John Milner (An
Account of Mr. Lock's Religion, 1700) seems to have under
stood this fundamental difference which existed between
Locke and those who held even to the dispositional form of the
theory. Milner was concerned to defend Lord Herbert of
Cherbury against Locke's analysis as well as to defend the
modified version of the theory. But Milner could not square
Locke's total rejection of innate knowledge with his retention
of the concept of a law of nature.
I t is k n o w n to be M r . Lock's d a r l i n g N o t i o n , T h a t there are no innate
I d e a s , a n d no innate L a w , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y , a c c o r d i n g to h i m , the L a w
1
Collins to Locke, 15 March 1703/4. MS. Locke C. 7, f. 26.
S8 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.и
of N a t u r e is not i n n a t e ; b u t h e tells u s , that the Knowledge ofit is attairtd

by the light of Nature, or by our natural Faculties from natural Principles.
B u t I w o u l d ask h i m , W h e n c e w e have these n a t u r a l P r i n c i p l e s , f r o m
w h i c h b y o u r n a t u r a l F a c u l t i e s , w e attain to the K n o w l e d g e o f the L a w
of N a t u r e ; for h e denies all innate P r i n c i p l e s (p. 6o).
The test for innateness for Milner was the ready andprone
assent of reason.
N o w of s u c h things, as so soon as they are alledged, all M e n a c k n o w -
l e d g e t h e m to be t r u e o r good, they r e q u i r e no P r o o f or farther D i s c o u r s e
to be assured of the T r u t h or G o o d n e s s of t h e m , w e n e e d not fear to
say, that they s e e m to have a good T i t l e , to be r e c e i v ' d for c o m m o n
N o t i o n s or C a t h o l i c k T r u t h s w r i t t e n i n the hearts of M e n ; w h i c h is all
that the L o r d Herbert contends for (p. 177).
Henry Lee (Anti-Scepticism, 1702) gave the usual expression

to this belief. A l l men are born with a certain genius or capa
city, a set of dispositions which are universally the same. A n
external-object is required to serve as a stimulus for bringing
forth the latent disposition, but the reason these truths or
principles are called innate is that the soul is not indifferent to
receiving and recognizing them. The soul is not a tabula rasa
because it does not receive all impressions or truths with equal
indifference. And the kind of truths it does receive are a result
of the dispositions given to us by God. The classic statement of
this position is found in Leibniz, who in his Nouveaux Essais
urged against Locke that truths are innate in the sense that the
figure of Hercules is in the marble potentially, waiting for the
sculptor and even determining the way in which the sculptor
proceeds. Ideas and truths are innate in us as 'une disposition,
une aptitude, une preformation'. Like Lee, Leibniz had ar
gued:
il ne m e semble point q u ' i l s'ensuit que les occasions q u i les font e n -
visager, les font naistre. E t cette experience ne s£auroit d e t e r m i n e r , s i
c'est par i m m i s s i o n d'une espece oü p a r l ' i m p r e s s i o n des traces s u r u n
tableau vuide, o u si c'est par le developpement de ce q u i est deja e n
nous, que nous nous e n appercevons. I I n'est pas extraordinaire q u ' i l
y ait quelque chose e n nostre esprit dont n o u s ne n o u s appercevions
point toujours. L a r e m i n i s c e n c e fait voir, que n o u s avons souvent de
la peine ä nous s o u v e n i r de ce que n o u s s$avons, et ä attraper ce q u i est
deja dans le clos et dans l a possession de nostre e n t e n d e m e n t . C e l a se

trouvant v r a y d a n s les connoissances acquises, r i e n n ' e m p e c h e q u ' i l ne
soit v r a y aussi d a n s celles q u i sont nees avec nous. E t m e m e i l y a encor
p l u s de difficulte de s'appercevoir de ces dernieres, q u a n d elles n ' o n t pas
encor este modifidees, et circonstanciees p a r des experiences, c o m m e les
acquises le sont, dont souvent les circonstances n o u s font s o u v e n i r . 1
W i t h this orientation, neither L e i b n i z nor Lee w o u l d consider

Locke's example*of children as a legitimate test case, since they
are hardly capable of any thoughts. Whereas L e i b n i z was
concerned w i t h the merits and defects of Locke's epistemology
itself, Lee was concerned w i t h these doctrines only as they
affected religion and morality. L e i b n i z was w i l l i n g to take as
the criterion of innate t r u t h s , the familiar 'ready and prone
assent'. ' M a i s l'usage fait, q u ' o n a coustume d'appeler nees
avec nous les verites ä q u i on donne creance aussitost q u ' o n
les entend . . .' D i s t i n g u i s h i n g between derived or c o n t i n
2
gent, and necessary or p r i m i t i v e truths, L e i b n i z sought to make

his meaning more clear to Locke. Contingent truths depend
uponexperience, b u t
les verites p r i m i t i v e s (telles que le p r i n c i p e de la contradiction) ne
viennent point des sens o u de l'experience et n ' e n s9aur0ient estre
prouvees parfaitement, m a i s de l a l u m i e r e naturelle interne, et c'est ce
que j e v e u x , e n disant qu'elles sont nees avec n o u s . 3
B u t these distinctions were not only wasted on Locke, who

found t h e m unintelligible; they went far beyond anything that
Lee and the other contemporary English critics of Locke en
visaged. L i k e most of the other critics, Lee was concerned to
defend the stable t r a d i t i o n . H e w a s afraidof the consequences of
what he took to be the relativity of moral laws i m p l i e d i n Locke's
rejection of innate kowledge. H e insisted that p r i o r to the
influence of all custom, there are certain m o r a l dispositions
implanted i n man's nature by G o d .
' T i s so far f r o m being true, that there are no L a w s of Nature or
Practical P r o p o s i t i o n s i m p r e s s ' d u p o n the M i n d s of all M e n , that all
1
'Enchantillon de Reflexions sur le I Livre de l'Essay de l'Entendement de
l'homme', 1698, Gerhardt, op. cit., bd. v, p. 20.
2
Ibid., p. 21.
3
Ibid., p. 22.
6o D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.н
Human L a w s w h a t e v e r derive the m a i n strength o f their O b l i g a t i o n f r o m

t h e m , a n d are either v a l i d or i n v a l i d , as they are agreeable or disagreeable
to t h e m . 1
The distinction between innate laws and natural laws was

taken as entailing a relativity of morality. The Esssay was
attacked from various quarters for this abandonment of the
stable tradition. William Sherlock had preached from the
pulpit the charge that Locke's book was atheistical because i t
rejected innate ideas. Lee had even found a connexion between
2
the rejection of innate ideas and the suggestion that matter

might be able to think, arguing that the only justification he
could find for Locke's devoting time to denying innate ideas
and principles was that he meant to make the soul material and
to follow Hobbes on idea-genesis. Locke's rejection of innate
knowledge was labelled by many theologians as Socinian and
atheistical, so that the publicationof Sherlock's charge came as
no new attack. But the clergy considered they had won a great
triumph through Sherlock's publication.
T h e C l e r g y t r i u m p h u p o n D r . S ' s Digression concerning Connate Ideas
i n his late book. T h o s e that I a m a c q u a i n t e d w i t h take all occasions to
tell m e of i t : b u t i f r e d u c i n g ' e m to silence be a m a r k of its b e i n g indefens
ible, I have h a d that advantage over ' e m . U p o n w h i c h I m a d e this
observation, that it is easier to defend nonsense i n p r i n t t h a n i n discourse
w h e r e they have time to i n v e n t disguises & artifices to i m p o s e o n t h e
R e a d e r , & w h e r e they have t h e liberty to omitt speaking to w h a t i s
material. 3
1
Lee, op. cit., p. 3 7 .
2
See Collins's remark in his letter to Locke, 13 June 1704. 'Dr. Sherlock in
a book that will be publish'd in two or three days, hath printed some part of
what he formerly preach'd against your Essay &c: & I presume intends more by
his calling this afirstpart.Whatrelates to you I have read over & since there are
several new & extraordinary Arguments & Questions put to you I shall transcribe
a little whereby you mayjudge of the rest.' (MS. Locke, C. 7, f. 45.)
3
Collins to Locke, 20 June 1704. MS. Locke, C. 7, f. 47. Tyrrell commented on
Sherlock as follows: ' I have not yet Read what Dr. Sherlock has written against
your thoughts of Innate Ideas, but if that book be no better than others I have
seen of the same Author's, I cannot from the character I have received of it, but
think he had done much better to have confin'd himself to practical rather than
polemick divinity . . . ( T y r r e l l to Locke, 4 July 1704. MS. Locke, C. 22, f. 169.)
Robert South urged Locke to reply to Sherlock in forceful terms, so erroneous
and damaging did hethinkthecharge of atheism was. (South to Locke, 18 July
1704, MS. Locke, C . 18, ff. 1 7 5 - 6 . )
The denial of innate ideas meant for Sherlock the banishment

of Original M i n d and Wisdom out of the World' and the
making of ' M i n d younger than Matter, later than the making
of the World, and therefore not the Maker of i t . ' I f God be 1
admitted, innate ideas follow, since ideas are necessary to God

prior to the world. Man's mind is like that of God. Thus, our
knowledge must also resemble God's knowledge.
F o r a M i n d is, w h e t h e r created or u n c r e a t e d : a n d i f created M i n d s are
m a d e after the P a t t e r n of the D i v i n e M i n d , ( a n d there is no other P a t t e r n
for M i n d s ) N a t u r a l I d e a s m u s t be as essential to created M i n d s , as they
are to the u n c r e a t e d M i n d ; for there is no N o t i o n o f a M i n d w i t h o u t
them. 2
Sherlock went on to offer other arguments in his own favour

such as that ideas, not being in the objects external to the mind,
must be in the mind and hence cannot come from without; or,
that from the nature of a rational soul we can conclude the
existence of ideas which are there. Knowledge for him comes
from reflection upon knowledge given us by God. Like Lee, he
denies that any man ever held the naive doctrine of innate
ness: 'most of the Certain and Useful Notions we have, are
Innate; and yet I doubt not but our Actual Knowledge is
acquired, and possibly much in the same way that M r . Lock
represents i t . ' 3
The motivation behind Sherlock's attack is found in one of

his closing remarks in his 'Digression', where he expresses the
fear that Locke's doctrine will provide solace for the atheists.
F o r after all, there is not a m o r e formidable O b j e c t i o n against R e
ligion, t h a n to teach, T h a t M a n k i n d is m a d e withoüt a n y Connate
N a t u r a l I m p r e s s i o n s a n d I d e a s o f a G o d , a n d of G o o d a n d E v i l : F o r i f
all the K n o w l e d g e w e have of G o d , a n d o f G o o d a n d E v i l , be m a d e b y
o u r selves, A t h e i s t s w i l l easily c o n c l u d e , that it is o n l y the Effect o f
Education, and Superstitious f e a r s ( p p . 161-2).
Most of the critics of Book One were content to defend the

dispositional version of the theory of innate knowledge,
1
Sherlock, 'Digression', in his A Discourse Concerning the Happiness of Good
Men(iyo4), p. 124.
2
Ibid., p. 126.
3
Ibid., p. 144.
F
824331
believing that this satisfied all the needs of religion and

circumvented many objections which had been raised. But a
few stoutly refused to give up the naive form of the doctrine.
Robert South's sermon defending the nai've form was reprinted
in 1697 unaltered. John Edwards, who attacked Locke's Reason
ableness of Christianity for its unorthodox character, presents
an interesting example of a late defender of this form of the
doctrine. I n one of his attacks against Locke, The Socinian
Creed (1697), Edwards had objected to Locke's rejection of
innate principles, calling attention to the fact that Socinus also
denied innate knowledge. He insisted thatinnate principles are
the foundation of religion and morality, as well as the standard
of truth (p. 122). I n a later work, A Free Discourse Concerning
Truth andError (1701), he develops his own positive form of
the doctrine of innateness. There he divides ideas into two
classes: those in God's and those in man's mind. 'The former
made things to be True, the latter convey the notice of the
T r u t h of them to us' (p. 27). Although the original pattern of
truth is located i n God,
yet H e h a t h C o p i e d it out into the M i n d of M a n , a n d h a t h i m p r i n t e d the
F i g u r e of it o n h i s R a t i o n a l N a t u r e . H u m a n e S o u l s created after G o d ' s
I m a g e do i n s o m e m a n n e r contain i n t h e m T h i s T r a n s c r i p t a n d R e s e m
blance. T h e r e are i n o u r M i n d s N a t u r a l I m p r e s s i o n s & I n b r e d N o t i c e s
of T r u e a n d F a l s e , w h i c h are as it w e r e S t r e a m s i s s u i n g forth f r o m the
U n c r e a t e d a n d E v e r l a s t i n g S p r i n g of T r u t h . A n d these N o t i o n s are not
Indifferent a n d A r b i t r a r y , b u t F i x e d a n d I n d e l i b l e ( p p . 2 7 - 2 8 ) .
He proceeds to satisfy Locke's demand for a list of these

principles, both speculative and practical, which he deems to be
innate. Under speculative he lists the following: 'What is not
cannot be known', 'Nothing can't possibly have any qualities
or affections', 'a thing can't act without Existence', 'an
Effect supposes a Cause', 'a thing cannot be and not be at the
same time', 'the whole is bigger than its part' (p. 28). Under
practical innate principles, Edwards lists the following: 'we
ought to venerate, love, serve, and worship the Supreme Being',
'we must honour and obey our Parents', 'we must not injure
and harm any Person, but render to every Man his due', 'we
SECT.ii T H E C R I T I C S O F L O C K E ' S P O L E M I C 63
ought to deport ourselves towards others as we desire and

expect they should act towards us' (pp. 29-30). Of the first
class he says they are shown to be innate because they 'are
assented to without the help of Ratiocination, without the least
study, or dispute, or making of Deductions, or framing of
Consequences' (p. 28). Without these principles we should
attain to no truth and there would be no science or certainty.
Of the second class, he says that 'These and other Natural
Sentiments and Moral Principles, which are the basis of all
Laws that respect the Moral Actions of Men, are those Ideas
we speak of, which every Rational Person agrees to without any
help of arguing' (p. 30). He appeals to Whichcote, who asserted
in one of his sermons: 'Had there not been a Law written in the
heart of Man, a Law without him had been to no purpose: for
had we not principles that are concreated, i.e., did we not know
something, no Man could prove anything.' Whichcote had 1
;
developed the doctrine at more length in the same sermon. 'The

truth of first inscription is connate to man, it is the light of
God's creation, and it flows from the principles of which man
doth consist in his very first make.' Whichcote went on to
2
use the familiar language of the laws engraven in the heart,

listing the usual moral principles as examples. Edwards found
inspiration i n this sermon of Whichcote. The phrase 'the law
written i n the Heart' means, Edwards said, 'that the same
Truths and Duties which are commanded by the Moral Law
or Decalogue, are primitively engraven on their Consciences'
(pp. 31-32). St. Paul 'proves the existence and reality of these
Inherent Signatures and Impresses of T r u t h and Goodness on
the Soul from the office and known acts of Conscience, namely
accusing or excusing, that is, its checking or applauding them
according as their Actions are' (p. 32). He speaks of these
principles being 'riveted into the very essence and specifick
nature of Man', and of those notions 'which we came into the
World with' (p. 33). A l l pretence at an allegorical interpretation
of the doctrine is discarded. The doctrine is asserted i n its
1
Cf. Select Sermons ofDr. Whichcot (1698), sermon on John vii. 46, p. 8.
2
Whichcote, ibid., p. 7.
6 4 D O C T R I N E O F I N N A T E K N O W L E D G E сн.и
na'ive form, the form that Locke had challenged and sought to
refute. Writing after Locke's extended polemic, Edwards's
defence of the doctrine did not differ from that of his many
predecessors i n the first part of the century.
T h a t a l l m e n w e r e b o r n w i t h these I d e a s , a n d h a d t h e m e v e n i n t h e
State of I n f a n c y a n d C h i l d h o o d appears f r o m this, that at thefirst asking
t h e m a b o u t t h e m , or at the veryfirstproposal of the G e n e r a l P r i n c i p l e s
of T r u t h to t h e m , w h e n t h e y c o m e to a n y m a t u r i t y of years, a n d m a k e
use o f S p e e c h , t h e y freely give their assent to t h e m , a n d a c k n o w l e d g e
t h e m for T r u t h (p. 37).
I t is nonsense, he claims, to expect the child to be able to use

these notions from the very first day, since it takes him some
time to use his rational soul. The fact that some nations do
not agree on the alleged innate principles is no argument
against their innateness but rather proof of that nation's de
pravity.
§ 3—Conclusion
Isaac Watts wrote in 1726 in his Logick: Or, The Right Use
of Reason:
T h e r e h a s b e e n a great C o n t r o v e r s y , about the Origin of Ideas, ( v i z )
w h e t h e r a n y o f o u r I d e a s are innate o r n o , i.e., b o r n w i t h u s , a n d n a t u r a l l y
belonging to o u r M i n d s . M r . Locke utterly denies i t ; others as positively
affirm it (p. 2 8 ) .
The debate had not been concluded by the time of Locke's

death, but the general movement towards a naturalistic religion
had made his criticisms more acceptable. By far the majority of
his critics, however, preferred to stand by the dispositional
variety of the theory. I n the minds of these critics of Locke's
polemic against innate knowledge, the alternative was clear:
innate ideas and principles, or relativity of morals. This alter
native haunted all the men who read Locke's polemic i n the
seventeenth century, except those whose interests were i n
the new forms of natural religion which were growing in popu
larity towards the end of the century. I n the minds of these
sympathizers with deism and Unitarianism, rationality was
substituted for innateness as a basis for morality and religion.
sECT.iii C O N C L U S I O N 65
For the traditionalists, however, the denial of a connatural

ground for moral rules and laws opened the way forscepticism
and atheism. Sherlock was even perceptive enough to recognize
that the question of innate ideas could not be settled on the
basis of experience. A l l that observation can prove is
T h a t o u r K n o w l e d g e increases g r a d u a l l y , a n d that the external I m
pressions, w h i c h are m a d e o n u s b y external O b j e c t s , are h e l p s to u s i n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g the N a t u r e s a n d I d e a s o f T h i n g s ; a n d that w e have n o
K n o w l e d g e of a n y I d e a s , w h i c h w e n e v e r h a d a n y H i n t s o r I n t i m a t i o n s
of f r o m w i t h o u t : B u t o u r O b s e r v a t i o n a n d E x p e r i e n c e , that i s , w h a t w e
feel w i t h i n u s , cannot p r o v e , w h e t h e r t h e M i n d , u p o n these e x t e r n a l
N o t i c e s , finds these I d e a s i n it self, o r f o r m s t h e m a n e w ; for w h i c h w a y
soever it be, t h e W o r k i n g s o f o u r M i n d s . . . m u s t be so near the same,
that o u r E x p e r i e n c e c a n ' t certainly d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m . . . . 1
I t was not a question of empirical verification forSherlock,

whether he or Locke was correct on this issue. The important
point was that i n his opinion religion and morality could not
survive or escape an extreme relativism (a relativism which
several critics thought they saw i n the Essay on other grounds
as well) without constant appeal to characters imprinted upon
the mind. Religion and morality dictated the outlines of theory
of knowledge. Locke was seeking to show that these two areas
could be separated and that the separation was not injurious to
religion or morality. Collins was prepared to reject Sherlock's
criticisms entirely as missing the point of Locke's argument, as
in fact Sherlock and the other critics did. A man of Sherlock's
position, imbued with the values of traditional morality and
religion, could hardly be expected to appreciate the innovations
which Locke and his followers were introducing.
There were very few men in the seventeenth century who
were able to view Locke's epistemology objectively, to consider
its consistency and validity apart from its implications for
religion. Norris, one of the first critics of the Essay, stands
almost alone i n this respect. I n his 'Cursory Reflections',
Norris sought to show that Locke's discussion of innate know
ledge was both inconsequential, because it failed to prove what
he claimed, and inconsistent, because the denial of innate ideas
1
Sherlock, op. cit., pp. 154-5.
conflicted with other principles i n the Essay. Norris argued, i n

favour of the latter point, that although Locke denied i n Book
One that any propositions have universal consent, he later
admits such propositions when he recognizes self-evident pro
positions. The self-evident propositions which Locke speaks
about and accepts are the same as those receiving universal con
sent, becauseLockecalls 'self-evident' thosepropositionswhich
receive the 'ready and prone assent' of men. We have seen that
the appeal to quick assent to certain propositions crucial for
morality and religion was frequent i n the early part of the
century and reappears among the many critics ofLocke. Norris
apparently considered such quick assent to be synonymous
with universal consent. Like many defenders of the two ver
sions of innate knowledge, Norris insisted that the examples of
children and idiots were ill chosen, since such persons are not
capable of thinking of such propositions. 'Now I always thought
that Universality of Consent had been sufficiently secured by
the Consent of all, and the Dissent of none that were capable of
either' (p. 5). Since children and idiots are not even capable of
assenting to or dissenting from such propositions, they have no
bearing on the issue. 'And how then does the want of their
Suffrage destroy universal Consent, when all Persons that think
at all about such Propositions, think after one and the same
way?' (p. 6). Norris concludes, then, that 'the most therefore
that this author can mean by want of Universal Consent, is
that every individual Person does not actually Assenf. The
question then comes to be, whether lack of actual assent on the
part of every individual is evidence that there are no innate
truths. Norris points out that this is Locke's belief, for in book
i , ch. i , no. 5, Locke asserts:'it seeming to me near a contra
diction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul,
which it perceives or understands not', and 'to imprint any
thing on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, seems to
me hardly intelligible'. Norris, in other words, takes as crucial
to Locke's argument the doctrine that the mind is not always
thinking. Norris himself did not wish to champion the Leib-
nizian position of 'petites perceptions', but (and this is charac-
teristic of his method of analysis) only to show that Locke

recognized ideas which make an impression on us without our
being aware of them. I n book i i , ch. i , no. 6, Locke says: 'But
all that are born into the world, being surrounded with bodies
that perpetually and diversely affect them, a variety of ideas,
whether care be taken of it or not, are imprinted on the minds
of children.' Again, while discussing perception, Locke recog
nizes what Norris thinks he rejects while discussing innate
principles:
H o w often m a y a m a n o b s e r v e i n h i m s e l f , that w h i l s t h i s m i n d is i n t e n t l y
e m p l o y e d i n the c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f s o m e objects, a n d c u r i o u s l y s u r v e y i n g
s o m e ideas that are there, it takes no notice o f i m p r e s s i o n s of s o u n d i n g
bodies m a d e u p o n the o r g a n o f h e a r i n g , w i t h the s a m e alteration that
u s e s to be for the p r o d u c i n g o f the i d e a o f s o u n d ? ( B k . i i , c h . ix, no. 4 . )
Later, in the chapter on memory, Locke wrote:

T h e other w a y o f retention i s , the p o w e r to revive again i n o u r m i n d s
those ideas w h i c h , after i m p r i n t i n g , have disappeared, or have b e e n as it
w e r e laid aside out of sight. . . . F o r , the n a r r o w m i n d of m a n not b e i n g
capable o f h a v i n g m a n y ideas u n d e r v i e w a n d consideration at once, it
w a s necessary to have a repository to lay u p those ideas w h i c h , at
another t i m e , it m i g h t have u s e of. ( B k . i i , c h . x, no. 2.)
Locke apparently sought to correct the literal interpretation

of this doctrine of memory, for in the second edition he argued
that the laying up of ideas in the mind meant no more than a
power 'to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this
additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them
before . Ideas were defined by Locke as actual objects of aware
9
ness. We cannot have ideas of which we are unconscious, since

this violates our very definition. I f those who claimed innate
ideas had meant only that at some period in man's growth he
will come to accept certain ideas about God, and moral good
ness and evil, which none of Locke's critics would admit, then
Locke's doctrine would not have been so disturbing.
I t was left to an anonymous writer of the early eighteenth
century to seek to synthesize the opposing views of the seven
teenth century over this crucial problem of innate knowledge.
I n A Philosophick Essay concerning Ideas (1705), the author of
this brief but penetrating and clarifying pamphlet sought to

show that i f we start out from the assumption that thought and
idea are the same thing, we are led to the conclusion that 4here
can be no M i n d without some Idea' (p. 9). Thus, 'so soon as
the M i n d was Created, as itwas ofNecessity Created Thinking,
so was itlikewise with some Idea. (And this is what we are to
understand when we speak of an Innate or Connate Idea.)'
(Ibid.) This author was pushing Locke's reduction of ideas to
powers, and Locke's claim that there can be no ideas without
conscious awareness of them, to their logical conclusion, where
ideas are nothing distinct from thoughts. 'A11 this seems to be so
plain and obvious, that I cannot but wonder, how anyone, who
allows this Notion of Ideas, can assert that the Soul of Man is but
a Rasa Tabula... unless he at the same time does deny, that it is
the very Essence of the Soul to think' (p. 10). What Leenhof
claimed in 1688 is advanced by this writer as theinevitable
conclusion to Locke's definition of 'idea'. I t can be doubted
whether Locke meant to equate thought and idea so closely,
but the author of this tract is correct'in suggesting that this is
implied by Locke's doctrine. Even this definition of innateness,
clever as it is, would not contradict Locke's position; but, i f
taken seriously, it might have offered a ground for reconciling
both sides of the debate, that of the traditional moralists
and that of the innovators of reason whose spokesman Locke
became by tacit agreement. Had Locke entered into more
discussions with these various contemporary critics, he might
have been able to convince the old guard that he was just as
much concerned to find a firm and unshakeable foundation
for morality and religion as they were. The real issue was
not over the reality or unreality of innate ideas and principles.
Locke showed that the traditional arguments invoked in favour
of the doctrine of innateness could not stand up to careful
scrutiny. Sherlock pointed out that the issue was not empirical.
The vital issue between Locke and his critics on this question
was the grounds and foundations of morality and religion. The
epistemological question concerning the genesis of our ideas
was not an isolated theoretical problem for Locke or for his
SECT.iii C O N C L U S I O N 69
contemporaries. I t was a question integral to the practical
problems of life.
Deism and rational theology i n general gained the ascen
dancy early in the eighteenth century, so that Locke's rejection
of innate knowledge was only infrequently questioned after
1704. Even i n 1703, Pierre Bayle was able to write: 'Je vous
avoue qu'il m'a semble victorieux, & qu'il faut donner ä son
combat la gloire dudebellatumest.' HenryLayton, i n Observa
1
tions upon a Treatise Intituled, A Discourse concerning the

Happiness of Good Men (1704), argued against Sherlock that
the denial of innate ideas does not deny the existence of God
(pp.38-39). Taking 'ideas' as 'images',hearguedthatthereare
no ideas in God's mind and that all ideas come fromwithout the
mind (p. 40). John Harris, writing a dictionary of terms, Lexicon
Technicum (1704), followed Locke closely i n defining 'ideas' as
'whatsoever the M i n d perceives in itself, or stands thereforthe
immediate Object of anyPhantasm, Notion, Species, Thought,
or Understanding', and gives the usual definition of 'innate
principles'. I n the second edition (called the 'second vol
ume') i n 1710, Locke's entire doctrine of ideas is extensively
summarized, and Harris explicitly states that the doctrine of
innateness has been conclusively refuted by Locke. Similarly,
under 'idea', Chambers, Cyclopaedia: Or, An UniversalDic-
tionary ofArts and Sciences (1728), says that 'our great M r .
Locke seems to have put this Matter [of innate ideas] out of
dispute'. Under 'innate idea' he writes further that such ideas
or principles 'are certain primary Notes or Characters, sup
posed to be stamped on the M i n d of Man when it first receives
its Being, and which it brings into the World with i t ; but the
Doctrine of Innate Ideas is abundantly confuted by M r . Locke\
Wollaston wrote in 1722 of the doctrine of innateness:
T h e y , w h o contenting themselves w i t h superficial a n d transient v i e w s
deduce the difference b e t w e e n good a n d e v i l f r o m the common sense o f
m a n k i n d , a n d certain Principles that are b o r n w i t h u s , p u t the matter
u p o n a v e r y infirm foot. F o r it is m u c h to be s u s p e c t e d there are n o s u c h
innate m a x i m s as t h e y p r e t e n d , b u t that the i m p r e s s i o n s of e d u c a t i o n are
1
Bayle to Coste, 27 December 1703, in CEuvres Diverses (1728), t. iv, p. 834.
m i s t a k e n for t h e m : a n d besides that, the sentiments of m a n k i n d are not

so uniform a n d constant, as that w e m a y safely trust s u c h a n i m p o r t a n t
distinction u p o n t h e m . 1
But adherents of the doctrine still spoke out against Locke.

William Carroll, i n a fantastic book, Spinoza Reviv'd (1709),
charging Locke with advocating a Spinozistic universe of one
material substance, mocks Locke for his ignorance in denying
innate ideas of God (p. 101). LeClerc is criticized for accepting
Locke's rejection of innate ideas. The doctrine of no innate
ideas or principles is, Carroll says, 'one of the grand Principles
of our Modern Atheists. And tho' 'tis thus positively asserted,
yet our Philosopher neither does, nor can know what he says
when he thus pronounces Magisterially, that we have no
Innate Idea of God' (p. 162, footnote). A much more sober
thinker than Carroll, Isaac Watts, Philosophical Essays on
Various Subjects (1733), agrees that 'those Writers who hold
innate Ideas in this Sense [the nai've sense] seem to lye under a
great Mistake' (p. 99). But he does not wish to abandon the
doctrine of innateness entirely. He suggests that the term can
be applied to the natural and necessary connexion which he
believed subsisted between brain traces and the origin of ideas
connected with those traces, as well as to those maxims which
cannot be doubted once the mind is confronted with them
(pp. 104-s).
T h e r e f o r e I take the M i n d o r S o u l of M a n not to be so perfectly i n

different to receive all I m p r e s s i o n s , as a Rasa Tabula, or white Paper;
a n d 'tis so f r a m e d b y its M a k e r as not to be equally disposed to a l l sorts
of Perceptions, n o r to e m b r a c e a l l Propositions, w i t h a n IndifTerency to
j u d g e t h e m true or false ( p p . 1 0 5 - 6 ) .
I n the same way Watts thinks it is impossible for man to deny

the ethical proposition, 'He that made me should govern me',
suggesting that this and similar propositions are innate. I n
short, the moral-sense doctrine, which Watts accepted, is
described as a doctrine of innateness. The familiar arguments
for innate knowledge were also reasserted in the eighteenth
1
The Religion ofNature Delineated, p. 17.
century by an anonymous writer i n A Dissertation on Deistical
and Arian Corruption (1742).
B u t yet w e m u s t allow that the S o u l of every M a n has the K n o w l e d g e ,
the L a w a n d L o v e of G o d naturally w r o t e within, a n d so i n t e r w o v e n , as
I m a y say, into its v e r y B e i n g , that it cannot be a rational S o u l w i t h o u t
i t ; so that this i n t e r n a l , or innate L i g h t is essential to every reasonable
S o u l , as a reasonable a n d M o r a l B e i n g (p. 2 8 ) .
We can neither make truth, since it is eternal, nor receive it

from the material world, since the concept of truth does not
apply tothatworld. Hence, 'all the Ideas, orinward Characters,
of Divine T r u t h and Holiness, must be Innate' (p. 29). The
writer admits that man's awareness of these principles has been
dulled by the Fall; but he concludes:
U p o n the w h o l e t h e n , the D o c t r i n e o f innate Ideas is s u c h a certain a n d
necessary T r u t h , that every M a n that has b u t the least I n s i g h t into the
N a t u r e of the human Soul, cannot b u t see that the c o n t r a r y D o c t r i n e o f
M a n ' s h a v i n g no L i g h t b u t w h a t comes into the M i n d f r o m Sensation, or
sensible I d e a s , is a new D o c t r i n e , suggested b y S a t a n , to m a k e M e n
Infidels, or p r a c t i c a l A t h e i s t s (p. 2 9 ) .
The doctrine was anything but new in 1742. I t had a long

history in the seventeenth century but only reached its clearest
and most detailed exposition in Parker, Burthogge, and Locke.
But the force of this doctrine was still being felt i n the middle
of the eighteenth century. I t would not be too much to suggest
that without the careful attacks by these writers, the new move
ments in religion would have had a much harder struggle for
acceptance. So long as the belief i n innateness persisted,
religion could not be turned into the naturalistic doctrines of
the deists, into a rational theology. But for those who found
this transformation of the traditional religion anathema, the
rejection of innate knowledge did appear as a suggestion of
Satan. Religion and morality had been shaken, tradition
questioned.
III
EPISTEMOLOGICAL SCEPTICISM
Τ
Η Ε reaction to Locke's denial of innate knowledge was
based almost entirely, as we have seen, upon the danger
ous consequences such a position boded for religion and
especially for morality. A few critics, like Norris, objected
to Book One of the Essay on the grounds that the thorough
empiricism implied by i t and continued i n the rest of the
work would not account for all our knowledge and all our
ideas, citing the non-sensible idea of God, and mathematics,
as evidence. Most of the critics went on to show how the
positive epistemological features of the Essay were just as
unacceptable as the rejection of innate knowledge. Later i n
this study, I shall be concerned with the way i n which these
doctrines of the Essay were believed to lead to religious
scepticism and disbelief. But before we pursue that aspect
of the seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century reaction to
Locke's epistemology, we must examine the charge of epistemo
logical scepticism which was made by many critics quite
apart from a charge of religious scepticism. Not all the critics
examined i n this chapter were detached from religion; very
few could be said to have made their criticisms of Locke i n
abstraction from religion altogether, but the majority of them
were content to point out first the epistemological scepticism
inherent i n the Essay. They could then go on to show the
ways i n which this scepticism led to religious and moral
scepticism.
§ ι — E m p i r i c i s m and Rationalism
While the greater number of Locke's non-theological critics
hastened to call attention to the difficulties of establishing
the reality of knowledge, to the problems of the meaning and
function of ideas, and to the idealism entailed by the definition
sECT.i E M P I R I C I S M A N D R A T I O N A L I S M 73
of knowledge i n the Essay, a few, notably Lee and Sergeant

in England and Leibniz on the Continent, went to the
very roots of Locke's empirical contentions and criticized
what they took to be their essential weakness. The point
involved i n all three of these attacks is rather more subtle
than the points raised by the other non-theological critics.
Traditional religion was immediately suspicious of any move
ment which purported to dispense with non-empirical factors
in the attainment or formulation of knowledge. Locke was
clearly aligned on the side of the new science: his friends and
his interests belonged there rather than with the familiar
obscurities of orthodoxy. But the three men mentioned above
saw i n the Essay a concise expression of this empirical or
inductive character of the new science, which demanded a
direct attack. Of the three, Lee was the only one who showed
any tendency to misread Locke as a sensationalist, i.e. as
holding that all knowledge comes from our external sensa
tions. Lee did not allow reflection as a source of knowledge,
since he viewed this function of the mind as synonymous
with awareness or consciousness. But, of course, Locke would
not be guilty of a narrow sensationalism merely on the ground
of a rejection of reflection or internal sensation as a source
of knowledge. What concerned Lee most was the failure on
Locke's part to derive knowledge from general principles.
I t is this question, whether knowledge can be derived from
ideas of sensation and reflection without any appeal to
rational postulates (a question Leibniz poses i n the same
form), which Lee believed Locke had answered incorrectly,
and one which Lee believed to be fundamental to all theories
of knowledge.
I f all K n o w l e d g e c o m e s b y o u r Senses o r Reflexion, w h i c h is his M a x i m ,
t h e n there c a n be no certain K n o w l e d g e o f the T r u t h o f a n y ^ w e r a / P r o -
p o s i t i o n w h a t e v e r ; because o u r S e n s e s c a n r e a c h b u t to particulars, and
Reflexion no farther . . . T h e r e c a n be no K n o w l e d g e at all of Substances,
not so m u c h as of their Existence; because n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n , a c c o r d
i n g to that P r i n c i p l e , b u t w h a t affects o u r Senses, a n d S u b s t a n c e s , to be
s u r e , d o n ' t ; b u t o n l y their M o d e s , Properties a n d Q u a l i t i e s . A n d tho
t h i s abstracting F a c u l t y be the p e c u l i a r P r i v i l e g e w h i c h h e i n t i r e l y
74 E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
reserves for Mankind above Brutes, yet at l o n g r u n this a m o u n t s to n o

m o r e t h a n the F a c u l t y of speakingor using Signs of their C o n c e p t i o n s . . . .
F o r i f M e n , a c c o r d i n g to h i s a v o w ' d P r i n c i p l e , do never exercise their
rational F a c u l t i e s b y inferring a n y t h i n g f r o m general M a x i m s , tho o w n ' d
b y a l l M a n k i n d , b u t o n l y b y I n d u c t i o n , E x e m p l i f i c a t i o n or E n u m e r a t i o n
o f particulars, there w i l l remain n o t h i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h M e n f r o m
B r u t e s , b u t o n l y the F a c u l t y of speaking, i n most M e n , or of m a k i n g
artificial Signs of C o n c e p t i o n s . 1
Lee did not pretend that actual knowledge was derived by

careful deductions from maxims or principles of reason.
Appeal to maxims will not convince anyone of the truth of
some particular belief which they may learn from their senses. 2
Maxims are defined as 'Propositions, whose parts . . . consist

of such general Words as imply the Relation between them is
natural or immutable.' These maxims are alternatively re
3
ferred to as axioms, aeternae Veritates, self-evident truths,

innate or natural truths, or common principles of reason.
Locke's conviction that such principles have been used as
the actual source of knowledge is unfounded, Lee claims,
since the use for which these are employed is one of justifica
tion: less obvious or less certain truths can be resolved into
these firmly established principles and thereby be seen to
be valid and certain. Understanding is never enlarged by
maxims, but knowledge can be rendered more acceptable by
their use. Thus, Lee does not wish to claim that the tradi
tional maxims are integral to all knowledge, presupposed by
all thought, but only that they serve a very useful purpose in
organizing knowledge and in discovering which particular
propositions can be trusted as sound. Even sensation, he
suggests, could make all the necessary discoveries; but re
course to maxims saves time and effort. Moreover, the ability
to derive knowledge from general principles is that ability
which, in Lee's opinion, marks men off from brutes.
Locke had not stressed as much as his system demanded
the role of reason in obtaining knowledge. His rejection of
innate knowledge led many to believe that he did not recog-
1
Anti-Scepticism, p. 67.
Ibid., p. 272.
3
2
Ibid.
nize the function of the rational faculty i n knowledge. His

prejudice against the use of maxims i n knowledge only
added to the general suspicion under which his epistemology
fell. Lee was trying to reinstate reason in the structure of
knowledge. The same sort of criticism of Locke's empirical
inductive procedures came from Leibniz; but unlike Lee,
Leibniz had rooted his criticism i n a careful doctrine of
necessary, as opposed to contingent, truths. I n the preface
to his Nouveaux Essais, he called attention to the disagreement
between himself and Locke on the issue of innate knowledge,
linking this to the further question of whether all truth is
dependent upon induction, i.e. the enumeration of examples,
or whether i t does not have its foundations in some other
source. His criticism of Locke's empiricism echoes that of Lee.
'Les sens quoyque necessaires pour toutes nos connoissances
actuelles ne sont point suffisans pour nous les donner toutes,
puisque les sens ne donnent jammais que des exemples, c'est
ä dire des verites particulieres ou individuelles.' Mathe 1
matics and geometry are areas of knowledge in which we

find truths independent of experience, but Leibniz argued as
well that theology and jurisprudence contain many necessary
truths. As Lee also held, the distinction between empirical
and rational sources of knowledge accounts for the difference
between men and animals: 'les bestes sont purement empiri-
ques et ne font que se regler sur les exemples, car elles
n'arrivent jamais ä former des propositions necessaires autant
qu'on en peut juger; au lieu que les hommes sont capables
des sciences demonstratives'. The simple listings or enumera
2
tions which animals were supposed to make 'sont purement

comme celles des simples empiriques qui pretendent que ce
qui est arrive quelquesfois, arrivera encor dans un cas ou ce
qui les frappe est pareil, sans estre capables de juger, si les
memes raisons subsistent'. Reason alone is
3
capable cPetablir des regies seures et de s u p p l e e r ce q u i m a n q u e ä celles

q u i ne Testoient point, e n y inserant leur e x c e p t i o n s ; et de t r o u v e r enfin
1
Gerhardt, op. cit., bd. v, p. 4 3 .
2
Ibid., pp. 4 3 - 4 4 . 3
Ibid., p. 4 4 .
des liaisons certaines dans l a force des consequences necessaires, ce q u i

donne souvent le m o y e n de prevoir l ' e v e n e m e n t sans avoir b e s o i n d ' e x -
p e r i m e n t e r les liaisons sensibles des i m a g e s . 1
The theme of the role of truths of reason i n knowledge,

of the necessary augmentation of empirical knowledge by
rational principles, continues throughout the rest of Leibniz's
Nouveaux Essais. I n effect, Lee's criticism found an extended
though unconscious elaboration in this work. The same type
of criticism is found in Sergeant's Solid Philosophy Asserted
(1697), although it is there buried under Sergeant's meta
physical verbiage. Besides having written one of the longest
attacks against Locke of any of his contemporaries, Sergeant
was an exponent and stout defender of the syllogistic method,
his The Method to Science (1696) being an elaborate defence of
this method of reasoning. The term 'science' i n this work is
used loosely to indicate any body of organized knowledge
which can be demonstrated from principles by means of deduc
tions. These two, principles and deductions, constitute the
framework of knowledge around which any specific branch
of human investigation can be arranged.
F o r , o u r N o t i o n s being C l e a r ' d , F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s establish'd, the true
F o r m of a S y l l o g i s m manifested, P r o p e r M i d d l e T e r m s found, a n d the
N e c e s s i t y of the C o n s e q u e n c e e v i d e n c e d ; a l l those C o n c l u s i o n s m a y be
D e d u c e d w i t h Demonstrative Evidence, w h i c h ly within our K e n , or
w h i c h w e c a n have occasion to e n q u i r e after ( p . [12], Preface D e d i c a
tory).
Whether the subject-matter be physics, morality, or religion,

Sergeant was convinced that the truths of that discipline
could be demonstrated by the syllogism. Hence logical
certainty was the earmark of genuine knowledge. The chief
aim of science in this broad sense was 4o beget Virtue; and
not onely to raise us to Higher Contemplation, but also to
comfort, and strengthen Divine Faith i n us, and to make it
Lively and Operative (p. [26], Preface). Only certain truth
9
could achieve this end. The way of ideas, practised by the

Cartesians and by Locke, could never lead to this desired result
1
Gerhardt, op. cit.
because it begins analysis at the wrong end, with ideas

instead of with things. Moreover, as Sir Kenelm Digby had
argued earlier i n the century, it is only when we add reason
to sensation that knowledge is possible. For both Digby and
Sergeant, certain basic principles constitute the foundation
upon which reason seeks to interpret the reports of the senses.
Empiricism cannot yield valid knowledge of the world inde
pendently of certain rational principles. T o this extent,
Sergeant criticizes empiricism from what can be called a
Kantian point of view. But there were two basically different
kinds of principles employed by Sergeant to augment what
has been called 'pure empiricism': metaphysical assumptions
and principles of reason.
Indicating that his own metaphysics lies i n the Aristotelian-
Thomistic tradition, Sergeant resorts to explanations in terms
of this metaphysics at the slightest provocation. One entire
section of his The Method to Science is devoted to elucidating
the various ways i n which Aristotle's ten categories are divided
and to deducing certain particular truths about the nature of
man, of living beings, and of being per se from these catego
ries. Nothing brings out the difference between Sergeant's
and Locke's methodology so strongly as does the presence of
metaphysics throughouttheformer'swritings. Where Sergeant
cannot offer an explanation based upon experience, he does
not hesitate to introduce a metaphysical explanation, and even
his apparently empirical explanations are usually grounded i n
a metaphysical doctrine. As Locke commented i n the margins
of his copy of Solid Philosophy Asserted, 'The author has
found a short way to solid philosophie by haveing nothing to
doe that does not agree with our systems' (Locke, Notes,
no. 72, p. 352). Locke's philosophizing was not restricted by
1
such devotion to tradition. He has fairly well separated his

epistemology from his metaphysics. I f he cannot find an
1
As in the case of the Locke marginalia in Burnet's Third Remarks, so here
the numbering refers to the succession of Locke notes in Sergeant's Solid Philo
sophy Asserted, while the pagination refers to their location in Sergeant's text.
The Locke marginalia appear here with the kind permission of St. John's
College, Cambridge*
G
824331
empirical explanation, he usually admits the limitations of

human knowledge, as in the case of explaining why and how
parts of bodies cohere. Locke was seeking to interpret nature,
as Bacon had enjoined, rather by a careful attention to nature
than by anticipating her with metaphysical explanations.
Where natural causes were not evident, Locke usually ceased
inquiry, although there are some striking exceptions i n the
Essay. Such limitations of human knowledge were unnecessary
for Sergeant and resulted, he felt, i n confusions. I n fact,
Sergeant credited many confusions i n human knowledge to
one's seeking natural causes for various effects when the true
reasons or causes were 'only owing to Trans-natural ones, or
from these Altissimae Causae, which only Metaphysicks give
us; . . . Let any one ask a Naturalist, why Rotundity does
formally make a Thing Round, and you will see what a Plunge
he will be put to, not finding i n all Nature a Proper Reason
for i t ' . Locke was very clear about the needed separation
1
between natural philosophy and metaphysics.

T r a n s n a t u r a l causes i n n a t u r a l philosophie are not n a t u r a l causes a n d
consequently s u p e r n a t u r a l i.e. i m m e d i a t e effects of d i v i n e p o w e r o p e n
i n g out of the course of natural causes & effects: a sort of p h i l o s o p h i z i n g
w h i c h J . S . v e r y m u c h explodes ( L o c k e , Notes, no. 4 3 , p . 2 4 8 ) .
I n the margins of his copy of Sergeant's book, Locke took

time to write more than one comment against this theorizing.
The rationalistic method ofgaining knowledge was too far
removed from the reality of things, too indirect, and too
private for Sergeant. The way of ideas was rationalistic
without having recourse to general principles, i n thatfrom an
analysis of ideas it attempted to derive conclusions about
reality. But Locke was also too much like the experimental
or inductive scientists who attempted to proceed entirely by
observation unaided by any basic principles. The rationalism
of the way of ideas was inherent in the methodology itself,
while the professed aim ofLocke's application of this methodo
logy was experimental. By denying the value of general
principles of reason, of maxims, Locke provoked Sergeant's
1
Solid Philosophy Asserted, pp. 248, 249.
criticism on two counts: the method was fanciful and unreal
when it relied upon ideas for knowledge, but useless and weak
in refusing to augment observation by maxims. Asserting
that the aim of natural science was to obtain universal con
clusions, Sergeant asks: 'what one Universal Conclusion i n
Natural Philosophy . . . has been Demonstrated by Expert-
ments, since the time that Great man, Sir Francis Bacon, writ
his Natural History?' I t is impossible, Sergeant declares, to
1
deduce universal conclusions from particular observations

without the addition of some general metaphysical principles.
The task of assigning 'the True Natural Cause for that Effect,
and explicating it right, must be Decided by way of Reason;
that is, by demonstrating first whose Principles of Natural
Philosophy are True and Solid . He never does, of course,
9 2
demonstrate that his metaphysics is the only true one. The

only condition for such a metaphysics which he mentions, and
this only obliquely, is that the true system must explain the
essences of things and their causes. He apparently believed
that a metaphysics which would not offer an explanation for
certain problems such as why the parts of matter cohere, or
how material effluvia get into the brain and cause thought,
should be condemned from the start. Nor did he go beyond
this to specify the rules for a proper metaphysics. His own
books, however, disclose a strong faith that his system is the
only true system. As Locke was led to remark while reading
Solid Philosophy Asserted, 'J. S. speaks every where as i f
Truth & Science had personally appeard to him & by word
of mouth actually commissioned him to be their sole Defender
& Propagator' (Locke, Notes, no. 39, p. 239).
Metaphysical principles, however, are only one type of
supplement to empiricism for Sergeant. I n addition, there
must be principles of reason. The laws of identity and contra
diction in traditional logic are the most frequently cited
examples. Sergeant insists i n many places that knowledge
must be capable of being reduced to such principles of reason,
1
The Method to Science, p. [58] of Preface.
2
Ibid., pp. 5 9 - 6 0 .
8o E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M
which principles are intuitively true. I t is generally recog

nized that an empiricism which rejects principles of reason
or presuppositions of thought cannot provide an adequate
foundation for knowledge. A n empirical epistemology can be
constructed without explicitly or implicitly assuming a
metaphysical point of view, but i t is impossible to develop
such a systemwithout implying principles of reason. I t was the
custom i n the seventeenth century to refer to such principles
of reason as 'maxims', and i n many cases knowledge was
demonstrated as being deduced from maxims i n the same
fashion as any syllogistic inference. As Locke commented i n
the Essay:
I t h a v i n g b e e n the c o m m o n received o p i n i o n amongst m e n o f letters,

that maxims w e r e the foundation o f all k n o w l e d g e ; a n d that the sciences
w e r e each o f t h e m built u p o n certain praecognita, from whence the
u n d e r s t a n d i n g w a s to take its rise, a n d b y w h i c h it w a s to c o n d u c t itself
i n its i n q u i r i e s into the matters belonging to that science, the beaten r o a d
of the S c h o o l s has been, to lay d o w n i n t h e b e g i n n i n g o n e o r m o r e
generalpropositionSy as foundations w h e r e o n to b u i l d the knowledge that
w a s to be h a d of that subject. ( B k . i v , c h . x i i , n o . i . )
I t was this use of maxims against which Locke was, i n the

main, arguing in the Essay; he offered two additional warnings
concerning maxims: that they must not be transferred from
one field to another, and that they must not be accepted
uncritically. But one of the merits of Sergeant's discussion is
that he did not advocate the use of maxims i n this way. Taking
as an example the maxim, 'yellow is yellow', Sergeant argued
that this is presupposed i n all thought and discourse con
cerning colour, 'For, i f any part of that Discourse makes
Yellow not to be Yellow . . . 'tis concluded to be most evidently
Fake; or, i f it agrees with it, to be True' Discourse, judging, 1
and action all presuppose such principles. When a man loses

some object and looks for it, saying, '/ arn sure it must be
somewhere or other\ Sergeant maintains that such a man
'guides himself all the while by this foreknown General
1
Solid Philosophy Asserted, p. 3 6 8 .
E M P I R I C I S M A N D R A T I O N A L I S M 81
Maxim, "Everyparticular Body in the World must be in some

place"' (p. 370). Sergeant rejects innate ideas just as stoutly
as Locke, so the term 'foreknown' does not mean innateness.
This term is best translated by the other term which he
himself uses, 'foregranted'. Such principles which are fore-
granted may not always be explicit i n our thinking and
acting, but they are present as guides nevertheless. 'To
apprehend more clearly the usefulness of these two
Principles [those of identity and contradiction], let us
suppose a Man quite Devested of them, and to have neither
of them i n his Judgment, and then reflect what he is good
for' (p. 369). Locke agrees with Sergeant that a man devoid
of the principles of identity and contradiction would be
incapable of knowledge, but not f o r t h e reasons offered by
Sergeant.
A m a n divesfd, i.e., quite bereft o r i n c a p a b l e o f k n o w i n g t h e m to b e
t r u e , is i n c a p a b l e of a l l k n o w l e d g for h e i s i n c a p a b l e o f k n o w i n g t h e
s a m e to be the s a m e & different I d e a s to b e different. B u t the s a m e
w o u l d h a p p e n to one that k n o w s not that a M a n g a s t a n is a M a n g a s t a n
a n d not a T u r n e p . ( L o c k e , Notes, n o . 8 2 , p . 3 6 9 . )
Knowledge for Locke presupposes the ability to recognize

difference and sameness, but it does not entail an awareness
of general principles. Such ability is intuitive. Locke was
concerned to deny the principles of identity and contradiction
as innate speculative principles i n Book One for the same
reason as he denies them i n Book Four: they never function
in obtaining human knowledge. He does agree that i n dis
course or argumentation these principles have to be agreed
upon, having in mind perhaps Aristotle's observation con
cerning the difficulty of discoursing with those who reject
these principles; but the use of maxims i n discourse for Locke
is to stop the Mouths of Wranglers'. Sergeant interpreted this
(
admission as a recognition of the value of maxims in gaining

knowledge, for how could principles 'have this strange Virtue
to stop the Mouths of such Unreasonable Men, but because
their Evidence is Greater than any others, or than Particular
Self-evident Propositions are' ? (pp. 367-8). Locke, however,
82 E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M
is careful to clarify his meaning in the marginal notes. 'Not

because their evidence is greater than any more particular
self-evident proposition but because serving in all cases they
are more inculcated and used than the other.' (Locke, Notes,
no. 8o, p. 368.) Principles have practical use in debates as a
means of ending arguments; Locke was not concerned to deny
this. What he wished to deny is their use in knowledge. I n
response to the assertion by Sergeant that 'it is impossible we
can make an Ordinary, much lessany Speculative, Discourse,
but the Discoursers must agree in something that is either
Foreknown or (at least) Foregranted; . . .' Locke underlined
the word 'Discoursers' in the text of his copy of Solid Philo
sophy Asserted, and added in the margin: 'He means Dis
putants, but M r . L speaks not of Disputation but Knowledg.'
(Ibid., no. 8 1 , p. 368.)
Sergeant presented his views on maxims directly to Locke
in 1696 in a letter accompanying his The Method to Science,
summarizing his position for Locke.
T h e most substantiall Difference between u s (as far as I yet observe)
is about the N e c e s s i t y a n d U s e f u l n e s s bf I d e n t i c a l l Propositions, o n
w h i c h I m a i n l y b u i l d ; a n d to w h i c h ( i n m y i u d g m e n t ) a l l T r u t h s m u s t
either be r e d u c ' d , or they w i l l , i f s c a n n ' d by S p e c u l a t i v e a n d A c u t e
L o g i c i a n s , be left destitute of their D e e p e s t a n d F i r m e s t G r o u n d . F o r
since y o u have so solidly confuted Innate Ideas, it m u s t follow of c o u r s e
that T r u t h s m u s t be taken f r o m the Things without us; a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y
m u s t be first built on, a n d finally resolved into their Metaphysical Verity
or their being what they are, w h i c h is a n I d e n t i c a l l P r o p o s i t i o n , a n d c a n
be n o t h i n g else: n o r c a n w e Speak or say a n y t h i n g of their N a t u r e s o r
E s s e n c e s as such . . . o r express t h e m at all but b y s u c h a n I d e n t i c a l l
S p e e c h , as u p o n triall y o u w i l l find. A g a i n , w e m u s t either come at last
to Self-evidence, o r no D i s p u t e c a n ever come to a n e n d ; n o r c a n a n y
Propositions, but s u c h as these, possibly lay a n y c l a i m to S e l f - e v i d e n c e ,
since all else c a n bear E x p l i c a t i n g o n the m a k i n g t h e m plainer, a n d
clearer w h i c h these c a n n o t . 1
Sergeant apparently failed in his attempt to convince Locke

that every system of thought has to presuppose certain general
maxims or principles as underlying the assertions made i n
1
MS. Locke, C. 18, f. 134.
that system. One reason for his failure in this respect is

undoubtedly his own confusion and oscillation between
metaphysical and rational principles. Since the metaphysical
principles are used by Sergeant as starting points for know
ledge, such a confusion of these w i t h principles of reason
clouds the insight that all knowledge contains certain pre
suppositions. Locke could easily agree with Sergeant i n the
above-quoted letter when he says that self-evidence is the
basis for all certainty, since Locke himself made intuitive
self-evidence the foundation of knowledge i n his system.
But whereas Sergeant restricted self-evidence to identical
propositions, Locke found that the human mind can intuit
self-evidence o f a more complex nature, thereby dispensing
with the one major argument i n Sergeant's favour. Even
i n his letter to Locke, Sergeant strove to find some meta
physical support for his case by arguing that truth must be
found i n the things themselves and that truth of things is
ultimately grounded upon their metaphysical verity. But
in Solid Philosophy Asserted, where he put his case with
Locke specifically in mind, the distinction between meta
physical and logical supplementation to empiricism is often
obscured. I n the midst of his discussion of maxims,
Sergeant asserts that the fundamental error of the methodo
logy of the ideists is that 'they rate the Clearnqss of their Ideas
from the fresh, fair, and lively Appearances they make to the
Fancy. Whereas only the Definition, by explicating the true
Essence of a Thing, shew s us Distinctly the true Spiritual
r
Notion of i t ' (pp. 371-2). Notions can never be wrong since

they owe their truth to God, although Sergeant admits that
we may mistake what our words signify to others. However,
'if I , mistaking, or not mistaking, have such a Meaning of it
i n my Mind. . . that Meaning is truly in me' (p. 374). Locke
is just i n his criticism of Sergeant at this point.
W h e r e are those definitions that explicate the t r u e essences o f t h i n g s ?

& (excepting mathematical) h o w m a n y of t h e m has J . S . ? H e w o u l d
obleige the w o r l d b y a list o f t h e m i f it w e r e o f noe m o r e b u t those
things he has t a l k ' d o f i n h i s books & p r e t e n d s to k n o w . . . . H e that h a s a
m e a n i n g to a n y w o r d h a s it no d o u b t w h i l s t he h a s it. B u t h e that v a r y s
the m e a n i n g o f h i s t e r m s o r k n o w s not precisely w h a t he m e a n s b y t h e m
(as noe t h i n g i s m o r e o r d i n a r y ) fills h i s discourse w i t h o b s c u r e & c o n
fused I d e a s . ( L o c k e , Notes, nos. 84, 85, p p . 372, 374.)
Generally, however, Sergeant is clear as to the function of

principles of reason. Taking identical propositions as the form
in which all such principles can best be stated, Sergeant
suggests that Locke's distaste for such propositions stems
from a misunderstanding of how they are used. They are not
set up as first bits of knowledge from which other knowledge
is deduced but rather lie at the bottom of our reasoning on all
things, to which all other knowledge can be reduced. I f these
principles of reason were false, or i f we were not ^pre-hnbu!d
with them, w e could have no Truth, nor any Knowledge at all'
T
(p. 382). Locke misunderstood these attempts, insisting that

'Knowledge has its bottom only in the perception of the agree
ment or diversity of any two Ideas & is neither founded on
nor can be reduced to Identical propositions.' (Locke, Notes,
no. 92, p. 382.) But Sergeant sought to drive home his point
by calling attention to the fact that i f Locke denies the usual
maxims he must substitute other principles in their place.
Sergeant finds such a basic principle i n Locke's assertion
that 'all knowledge of the certainty of principles and conse
quently the way to improve our knowledge is to get, and fix
in our minds, clear, distinct, and complete ideas'. However,
if this is Locke's substitute, Sergeant argues that 'we must
be oblig'd t o q u i t all our Self-evident Maxims, as of little Use,
upon which our selves and all the Learned part of the World,
have proceeded hitherto' (p. 406). Locke's comment, 'who
is it obleig'd him to quit them ?' (Locke, Notes, no. 101,p. 406),
suggests that he did not mean to deny maxims altogether, just
as he previously admitted the necessity of such principles as
a means of enabling men to recognize the conditions of know
ledge. But if he does not mean to reject maxims, while still
denying their use i n knowledge, he would not seem to allow
them to retain much significance. I n an earlier note, Locke
repeats his assurance that he does not intend men to give up
general maxims: 'who says they should be laid aside?' (Ibid.,
no. 86, p. 374.)
Thus i t is clear that Locke did not reject maxims entirely,
but it is not clear what use i n epistemology he believed them
to have. While being partial to the inductive procedures of
the sciences contemporary with him, he by no means over
looked the necessity of rational faculties i n acquiring know
ledge from experience. Nor did he recognize induction alone
as the primary source of knowledge, for intuition and demon
stration have a prominent role i n his analysis. I n the concept
of substance he in effect postulates a general principle or
category of knowledge which functions to unify the ex
perienced qualitative events. He was not satisfied with sets
of qualities furnished by experience, although he admitted
that we can have no clear idea of the nature of substances
except as this combination of qualities. A compulsion of
reason, a rational postulate, forces him to add to the empirical
qualities an unknown substratum, the abode of the real
essence. Similarly, an examination of Locke's arguments i n
favour of the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities, on the basis of the reality of the former and the
ideality of the latter, reveals that the answer given for the
legitimacy of such a distinction is not empirical. On the basis
of sense-experience and the introspective reflections of the
mind, we cannot conclude that some sensations are real while
others are not. Locke's arguments to this effect are based upon
the conviction that solidity, extension, figure, motion, and rest
are utterly inseparable from bodies, 'in what estate soever'
they be, for these qualities characterize physical reality. This
concept of reality was not derived from empirical observation
but constituted the presupposition of the corpuscular hypo
thesis.
Locke's criticswho wrote from the vantage point of the
older rational systems did not challenge his concept of reality
as such, although some held that his distinction between
primary and secondary qualities was i l l founded and of little
use. But Lee, Sergeant, and Leibniz all objected to the
ostensible objective of the Essay, to found all knowledge upon

experience. These men wrote to show that i f this dictum is
taken in its literal sense as denying all contributions of the
rational faculties and all function of general principles of
reason presupposed by empirical knowledge, it is an obviously
false dictum. While writing in reply to Lowde and Burnet,
Locke had several occasions to point out that in denying
innate ideas and principles he was not denying that man has
certain rational faculties and capacities which aid his acquisi
tion of knowledge. There was, in fact, a general tendency
throughout the seventeenth century and the early years of the
eighteenth to interpret Locke as advocating a simple sensa
tionalism: so dominant and new was his formulation of the
empiricism of the way of ideas that it overshadowed, i n the
minds of his critics, the careful analyses of knowledge and
probability, of the degrees and extent of human knowledge,
expounded in Book Four. While Leibniz invoked principles
of reason as a means of organizing knowledge into a system
from which certain truths could be deduced, and while Lee
restricted the role of maxims i n knowledge to the resolution
of dubious truths into these certain and accepted prin
ciples, Sergeant saw, more clearly than either, the pre-
suppositional character of principles of reason. Locke very
likely would have agreed w ith Sergeant's position on this
r
point had he fully understood it, for we have seen that he did
not rule out maxims completely and that he recognized the
necessity of man's being able to distinguish objects from one
another. Had he taken the arguments of his objectors more
seriously he might have been able to make explicit the exact
roles of empirical and rational procedures i n his system.
§ 2 — T h e Nature of Ideas
Locke's empiricism was attacked because it was deemed
insufficient in accounting for knowledge and in explaining its
foundation. Lee, Leibniz, and Sergeant were concerned with
laying bare what they took to be the necessary rational pre
suppositions of any theory of knowledge. A l l three were
sECT.ii T H E N A T U R E O F I D E A S 87
committed to a theory of knowledge which i n effect removed

analysis and investigation from experience and gave i t an
a priori foundation i n general principles. They were willing
to allow Locke his empiricism provided that he recognized
the role of general principles as a supplement to observational
knowledge. I n their emphasis upon principles of reason as
sources of knowledge these men were removing themselves
in some degree from the realm of experience to the realm of
reason. The curious aspect of the situation is that two of the
three who attacked Locke i n this manner, Lee and Sergeant,
also charged him with idealism because of his preoccupation
with ideas instead of with things. Locke, they believed, had
retreated too far from reality by basing all knowledge upon
ideas. Many critics of the Essay were profoundly disturbed
by his usage of the term 'idea': some of the misunderstandings
which arose between Locke and his critics came about un
doubtedly because of the reader's unfamiliarity with this term
as it occurred i n Locke's epistemology.
Henry Lee admitted that he had not always been able to
follow the language of the Essay since it was 'writ i n a kind
of new Language'. Lee's struggles to understand the dis
1
tinction between real and nominal essences were occasioned

by what for him were the new words and phrases.
A n d so far as I c a n y e t perceive, i f m y A u t h o r be p u t out o f h i s I d e a l
T r o t , a n d c a n b u t be p r e v a i l ' d w i t h to c o n d e s c e n d to o r d i n a r y F o l k s
L a n g u a g e , a l l the D u s t h e h a s r a i s ' d i n t h i s w h o l e M a t t e r w i l l fall, a n d
that it w i l l clearly appear he is quite o u t o f the w a y o r o n l y i n t r o d u c i n g
a n e w w a y of talking. 2
I t was not only the term 'idea' which troubled Lee: the
entire Essay was written i n an unfamiliar language. He sum
marized his distrust of this language as follows:
S o that w h e n t h e matter c o m e s to t h e P u s h a l l t h i s P u d d e r a n d C o n
fusion arises f r o m these n e w i n c h a n t i n g W o r d s , Ideas a n d E s s e n c e . F o r
suppose, that instead o f h i s P h r a s e o f c o m p l e x Ideas o f S u b s t a n c e s , one
s h o u ' d say, several Q u a l i t i e s a n d P r o p e r t i e s u n i t e d o r c o m b i n ' d , instead
of s i m p l e Ideas, single Q u a l i t i e s ; instead o f E s s e n c e , a l l t h e P r o p e r t i e s ,
1
Anti-Scepticism, p. 1, preface. Cf. p. 48.
2
Ibid., p. 260.
Q u a l i t i e s , o r A c c i d e n t s b y w h i c h one i n d i v i d u a l S u b s t a n c e is d i s t i n g u i s h
able f r o m a n o t h e r ; instead of abstract Idea, one s h o u ' d p u t Genus or
Species . . . t h e n all t h i s S m o k e w i l l v a n i s h , w e s h a l l b o t h see one
another a n d p l a i n l y discover that o u r K n o w l e d g e of S u b s t a n c e s a n d
t h e i r M o d e s . . . i s not o n l y real a n d certain, but is the A U w e h a v e or c a n
a t t a i n ; a n d that all other is m e e r w h i m s y , is a n e w N a m e for N o t h i n g . 1
This distrust of and unfamiliarity with the language of ideas

was expressed by many other readers. I n each case, the reader
professed to hold up common speech as the proper alternative.
Peter Browne, writing against Toland's Christianity not
Mysterious, singled out Toland's use of the way of ideas as a
foundation for his radical version of religion and complained:
A n d the t a l k i n g of I d e a ' s , a n d r u n n i n g endless d i v i s i o n s u p o n t h e m ,
is a cheap a n d easie w a y , some M e n n o w a d a y s have taken u p , of a p p e a r
i n g w i s e a n d l e a r n e d to the w o r l d . W h e r e a s the bottom of it a l l is no
m o r e t h a n this, T h a t M e n of nice heads have agreed to speak o f p l a i n
things i n a p e c u l i a r dialect of t h e i r o w n ; w h i c h i f they w e r e stript of
those t e r m s of A r t , a n d p u t into p l a i n language, have n o t h i n g i n t h e m
m o r e t h a n w h a t is obvious to the c o m m o n sense a n d r e a s o n of all m e n . 2
Referring to the same work by Toland, Stillingfleet censured

the terminology of the way of ideas.
B u t none are so b o l d i n attacking the Mysteries of the Christian Faith:
as the S m a t t e r e r s i n Ideas, a n d n e w T e r m s of P h i l o s o p h y , w i t h o u t a n y
true U n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e m . F o r these Ideas are b e c o m e b u t another
sort o f C a n t i n g w i t h s u c h m e n ; a n d they w o u l d reason as w e l l u p o n
Genus a n d Species, or u p o n Occult Qualities, a n d Substantial Forms, b u t
o n l y that they are Terms out o f Fashion?
I n his answer to Locke's second letter of defence against his

attacks, the bishop repeated his charge that the falsity and
4
inadequacies of Locke's epistemology were attributable in

large measure to his terminology.
A s to the Term of Ideas, I have n o O b j e c t i o n to the u s e of the w o r d
it self; p r o v i d e d it be u s e d i n a c o m m o n S e n s e , a n d no W e i g h t be l a i d
u p o n it m o r e t h a n it c a n b e a r ; for I a m for n o n e w affected Terms w h i c h
1
Anti-Scepticism, p. 2 6 1 .
2
A Letter in Answer to . . . Christianity not Mysterious ( 1 6 9 7 ) , pp. 2-3.
3
A Discourse in Vindication ofthe . . . Trinity ( 1 6 9 7 ) , p. 2 7 3 .
4
Mr. Locke's Reply to the . . . Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Letter (1697).
sECT.ii г T H E N A T U R E O F I D E A S 89
are apt to c a r r y M e n s M i n d s out o f the w a y ; they are like Ignes fatui

w h i c h s e e m to give light, b u t lead those that follow t h e m into B o g s . 1
Later, i n the same answer, he blames the lack of general

principles and rigid demonstrations upon the newness of the
language, showing his own fondness for the methods of
Sergeant.
B u t y o u r W a y of Certainty by Ideas is so w h o l l y N e w , that h e r e w e h a v e
n o general Principles; no Criterion, n o Antecedents and Consequents; no
Syllogistical Methods o f Demonstration; a n d yet w e are t o l d o f a better
W a y of C e r t a i n t y to be attained, m e e r l y b y the h e l p of Ideas. 2
Timothy Goodwin, the biographer of Stillingfleet, also

stressed the newness of Locke's terminology, citing it as one
factor leading to the popularity of the Essay.
T h i s E s s a y a b o u n d i n g w i t h a S e t o f n e w P h i l o s o p h i c a l T e r m s , as
i f some w o n d e r f u l I m p r o v e m e n t o f K n o w l e d g e w a s to have b e e n h o p e d
for f r o m it, a n d b e i n g w r i t t e n w i t h a graceful A i r , a n d liveliness o f
S p i r i t , a n d elegancy of Style a n d politeness o f E x p r e s s i o n , a s m a r t n e s s
i n R e a s o n i n g , a n d a n ingenious i m p r o v e m e n t o f h i s A r g u m e n t s to the
best advantage, b y a closeness of R e f e r e n c e , a n d patness of S i m i l i t u d e s
a n d A l l u s i o n s , no w o n d e r a n e w S c h e m e o f N o t i o n s , a n d a profess'd
D e s i g n of p r o m o t i n g true U n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d a right A p p r e h e n s i o n o f
T h i n g s , set off w i t h these u n c o m m o n A d v a n t a g e s , s h o u l d easily r e c o m
m e n d it self to the Affections of the S t u d i o u s , especially the y o u n g e r
part of t h e m . 3
Another (anonymous) writer of the seventeenth century,

besides stating that Locke was inconsistent, a sceptic, and a
materialist, agreed with Stillingfleet that Locke had intro
duced a new vocabulary into the language. John Milner (An 4
Account ofMr. Lock's Religion, 1700) objects that the frequent

use of the term 'idea' confuses the reader, suggesting that
' M r . Lock and others, had done better, i f they had not amus'd
the World so much with the term Idea as they have done'
(p. 14). Like Lee and Browne, Milner contrasts this language
with the ordinary language which he prefers, arguing that
1
The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter ( 1 6 9 8 ) , p. 71.
2
Ibid., p. 120.
3
The Life and Character of. . . The Late Dr. Edw. Stillingfleet ( 1 7 1 0 ) , pp. 86¬
87.
* B . , F . A Free but Modest Censure ( 1 6 9 8 ) , p . 6.
' M r . Lock had made his Essay more easie and intelligible to
all sorts of Readers, i f he had made use of other Terms, and
not fiird every Page almost with the mention of Ideas' (p. 15).
George Hickes, who accused Locke of borrowing from the
scholastics, urged that 'there is not one sound Notion i n it
[the Essay], under his affected new Terms, to improve Human
Understanding ( I say, to improve, not to Poyson it) which the
School Logicks, and Metaphysicks, which are Subordinate to
one another, have not taught under the old'. 1
The very newness of the language employed by Locke

startled some, convinced others that he was merely using
another ruse to attempt to persuade the reader of the novelties
to be found within, and led still different readers to distrust
the entire position. Traditional language, they thought,
provided sufficient material for the expression of any new
opinions which might occur. To such critics as these, the
suggestion that part of the blame for faulty philosophy or for
inadequate analysis lay in the rigid and unquestioned language
of the past could be no more than pretence. When Book
Three, with its concern for linguistic analysis, was taken
seriously by Locke's contemporaries, little understanding of
his objective was shown. I n most cases, this part of the Essay
was completely ignored. But the new uses of old terms which
2
were an essential feature of Locke's work served many as the

initial clue that something was contained i n this book which
was not in harmony with orthodox doctrines. Sergeant had
written his Solid Philosophy Asserted in an effort to counteract
the scepticism into which he believed Descartes's and Locke's
new way of talking led. He undoubtedly summarized the
opinion of many of Locke's critics when he concluded the
preface of his Transnatural Philosophy (1700) by remarking:
I n a w o r d , since Ideas are b o t h Unintelligible, a n d altogether Usekss,

& ( I fear) ill Use is m a d e of t h e m , contrary to the I n t e n t i o n o f t h e i r
1
Carroll,William. Spinoza Reviv'd(iyog), p. [34] of 'Prelim. Discourse' by
Hickes.
2
The important doctrine of real and nominal essence ofBook Three was much
discussed, together with the doctrine of substance. Cf. below, pp. 1 2 6 e t s e q .
A u t h o r s ; it seems b u t fitting that the Way of Ideas s h o u l d be lay'd aside;

nay, that the v e r y Word w h i c h h a s got s u c h a Vogue, s h o u l d be n o
longer h e a r d of, u n l e s s a good reason m a y be g i v e n w h y w e s h o u l d u s e
such Words as no Man understands.
ButSergeant was not so much troubled by the newness of the

terminology of the Essay as he was by the essential errors i n
the method of ideas. He seems to have seriously endeavoured
to determine precisely what the ideists meant by 'idea', but
he found that the Cartesians were not united over the question
of the nature of ideas, and discovered, so he thought, that
Locke meant by the term only similitudes of things. But
whatever the exact intention behind the new term i n philo
sophy, Sergeant was convinced that its use could lead only to
scepticism. Like several other contemporary critics, Sergeant
found that the doctrines implied by the new terms were them
selves inadequate and erroneous.
Sergeant was not alone in trying to overcome the difficulties
of understanding the new terminology. John Norris, i n his
'Cursory Reflections', raised the crucial question concerning
the key term 'idea', namely, 'what sort of entities are ideas ?'
Norris, like Sergeant, could not be satisfied with Locke's
reluctance to deal with such ontological problems, and was
even less pleased with Locke's inclusive definition of ideas as
'whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate
object of perception'. He wanted to know what kind of things
these ideas are i n essence: 'Are they i n the first place Real
Beings or not?' (p. 22). He was certain that they were real
beings for Locke, in the sense that they have 'Real Properties,
and [are] really different one from another, and representing
things really different' i n nature. (Ibid.) But, 'are they Sub
stances, or are they Modifications of Substances?' (p. 23).
Norris argued that Locke could not have meant them to be
modifications of substances, since modifications cannot be
'representative' of substances, as ideas must be for Locke.
Thus, ' i f an Idea be a Modification only it cannot subsist by
it self, but must be the Modification of some Substance or
other, whereof also there may be an Idea; which Idea being
(as is supposed) only a Mode, must have another Substance,

and so on without end\ (Ibid.) Thus Locke would be driven
to say ideas are substances, substances and modes being
exclusive alternatives for Norris. Norris's question then
becomes, 'are they Material Substances or Immaterial ?' That
they cannot be material is proved, he believed, in the following
way:
I f he says they are Material S u b s t a n c e s or C o r p o r e a l E m a n a t i o n s f r o m
sensible Objects, I w o u l d desire h i m to w e i g h w i t h himself, a n d t r y i f h e
c a n answer, w h a t is alledged b y M . Malebranch against the P o s s i b i l i t y
of s u c h E m a n a t i o n s . P a r t i c u l a r l y , let h i m tell m e h o w this c a n consist
w i t h the Impenetrability of Bodies, w h i c h m u s t needs h i n d e r these C o r
poreal Effluvias f r o m possessing the s a m e Ubi or P o i n t , w h i c h yet m u s t
be s u p p o s e d , i f these be the R e p r e s e n t e r s of Objects, S i n c e there is no
assignable P o i n t w h e r e the same, a n d w h e r e m u l t i t u d e s o f O b j e c t s
m a y not be seen (p. 2 4 ) .
Norris pressed Locke even more closely by asking how and

where such material effluvia can be received. He did not
think we could receive them upon the soul since this is an
incorporeal substance which cannot receive any 'stamp' or
'impression'. Since he conceives of the brain as a fluid, he does
not understand how it could retain any of these effluvia i f it
did receive them, since 'The least jog of a Mans Head must
needs obliterate such slight and Aerial Traces, as the W i n d
does the Figures that are written upon the Sand' (p. 25).
Moreover, the great number of such impressions coming to
the brain must soon fill the brain beyond capacity. Even i f we
'could get over all this', the greatest difficulty, Norris insisted,
still remains: 'How will such Corporeal Effiuvias be able to
represent immaterial and intellectual Objects?' (Ibid.) A t
best, they will be able 'to represent Material Objects, and not
all of them neither, but only those whose Emanations they
are'. (Ibid.) The only alternative which NoFris can see for
Locke is that he must mean by 'ideas' immaterial substances.
Norris himself agrees with this interpretation, for he believes
they are all in essence immaterial, although not all of them
are immaterial i n their representation. However, this position
is not free from difficulties. 'How shall Bodies send forth such
Immaterial Species? They can emit nothing but what is

Corporeal, like themselves' (p. 26). Thus, Norris believed
he had driven Locke into the corner from which he could only
emerge an Occasionalist.
T h e short o f this A r g u m e n t is, I f o u r I d e a s are d e r i v e d f r o m sensible
O b j e c t s , t h e n t h e y are M a t e r i a l B e i n g s , because M a t t e r c a n s e n d f o r t h
n o t h i n g b u t M a t t e r . B u t t h e y are not M a t e r i a l B e i n g s , for the R e a s o n s
alledg'd above. T h e r e f o r e t h e y are not d e r i v e d f r o m S e n s i b l e O b j e c t s .
W h i c h I t h i n k has the force of D e m o n s t r a t i o n ( p p . 2 6 - 2 7 ) .
I n his later work, An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal

or Intelligible World (1701-4), Norris argues that i f Locke
means that material objects send ideas to the mind, then he
has 'derived our Ideas from a false Original' (vol. i i , p. 37),
but i f all he means is that 'sensible Objects do by the Impres
sion which they make upon our outward Senses serve to excite
Ideas i n our Minds', then there is nothing very dangerous
or original i n Locke's doctrine. But he repeats his charge
that Locke has left to one side the most important question
concerning the nature of ideas. Locke had, of course, expressly
indicated i n his Introduction that he was not concerned to
explain how perception takes place once the material particle
has reached the organ of sense, for he found himself totally
incapable of offering any explanation of the process which
converts material particles into immaterial apprehension.
I n his 1693 'Remarks upon Some of M r . Norris's Books' (first
published posthumously i n 1720 by Pierre Desmaizeaux),
Locke reiterated this belief and added as a reason for the
inexplicableness of the transposition that 'no man can give
any account of any alteration made i n any simple substance
whatsoever; all the alteration we can conceive, being only of
the alteration of compounded substances; and that only by
a transposition of parts'. I n this short tract, as i n the longer
1
one on the 'Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion' (first

published in 1706 by Anthony Collins and Peter King), Locke
sought to show that the occasionalist explanation did not
account for the important question of the nature of ideas, and
1
Section no. 2, in Works, vol. x, p. 2 4 8 .
824331 H
suggested as well that an examination of optics would seem

to show that we see all things in the bottom of our eyes and
not in God. But although Locke was capable of writing coolly
1
against Norris and Malebranche, he was more than a little

annoyed that Norris should have spent so much time in his
'Cursory Reflections' over this question of the nature of ideas.
I n the early, unpublished draft of this reply to Norris, Locke
had observed :
T i s a h a r d case that this m a n of Reflections w i l l not suffer a poor n e i g h
b o u r o f h i s to k n o w h i s o w n e designe i n w r i t i n g , or p u r s u e that designe
a c c o r d i n g to h i s owne fashion or abilities p e r h a p s I w a s lazy & thought
the plain historical method I h a d p r o p o s e d to m y self w a s e n o u g h for m e
p e r h a p s I h a d other b u s i n e s s & c o u l d afford noe m o r e o f m y t i m e to
these speculations, n a y possibly I f o u n d that discovery b e y o n d m y r e a c h
& being one o f those that doe not p r e t e n d to k n o w a l l things a m not
a s h a m e d to confesse m y ignorance i n this & a great m a n y other & t h e r e
fore shall a c k n o w l e d g it as a great favour f r o m the Reflector to i n s t r u c t
m e better i n the nature of Ideas 2
He could not see in Norris's questionings the pure speculative

interests which Norris claimed to be following. He thought he
detected there the traces of a pervasive egoism: 'There are
some happy Genius's who thinke they either are not or ought
not to be ignorant of any thing. The unlimited possessions
which these sons of light by the luckinesse of their birth enjoy
in the intellectuall world justly deserve our admiration.' I f 3
not attempts to show off his learning against the shallowness

of Locke's thought, then the series of questions concerning
the nature of ideas is, Locke argued, useless and withoutsigni-
ficance.
I m u s t confesse it a m a r k e o f m y poverty not to be p r o v i d e d w i t h
R a g o u s t s to entertain h i m a c c o r d i n g to h i s r e l i s h o n all those subjects
for there is [never a n one of those materiale or i m m a t e r i a l e E m a n a t i o n s ]
or Effluvias not I perceive a leg or a w i n g o f a n y o f those dotrell I d e a s
that imitate everything w h e t h e r y o u w o u l d h a s h t h e m u p as material
effluvias or serve u p as i m m a t e r i a l , immaterial as to their substance or Im
material as to their representation b u t m a n g ' d b y good cookry m i g h t m a k e
1
'Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion', section no. i i ; in Works, vol.
ix, pp. 2 1 7 - 1 8 .
2
MS. Locke, C. 2 8 , f . 109. 3
Ibid., f. 110.
m o s t a considerable d i s h , as y o u m a y see p . 2 1 - 3 1 w h e r e out o f h i s

a b o u n d a n t liberality & i n consideration o f m y u n p r o v i d e d k i t c h i n h a s
f u r n i s h e d out to h i m self a large entertainment a c c o r d i n g to h i s o w n e
pallate & t h i t h e r I s e n d a n y one w h o h a s a m i n d e to feast h i m s e l f u p o n
Ideas. 1
Norris was clearly a victim of his own set of categories i n

seeking to push Locke into the occasionalist position. The
substance-accident ontology was applied to Locke's empirical
epistemology, an ontology which Locke rejected as far as ideas
were concerned. He did not conceive of ideas as real beings,
in Norris's sense, independent of the mind. The discussion
in the Essay does not proceed without a large element of
ambiguity about the term 'idea', but it should be clear that
Norris's ontology is inapplicable to ideas. Anthony Collins
understood Locke's intentions on this issue of the nature of
ideas, pointing out the irrelevance of most ofNorris's criticism.
I o n l y observe that h o w c u r i o u s soever s o m e m a y t h i n k these e n -
q u i r y s are, as they c a r r y no opposition to the design of the E s s a y , so
neither are they pertinent to the A u t h o r s design, for h o w does the
k n o w i n g the n a t u r e of I d e a s c o n c e r n one w h o o n l y c o n s i d e r s ' e m as
objects o f the U n d e r s t a n d i n g ? & h o w does the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r the
senses are the real or o c c a s i o n a l causes (for it is g r a n t e d that w e e c a n
k n o w n o t h i n g w i t h o u t e m ) o f o u r I d e a s contradict a m a t t e r o f fact about
the O r i g i n a l of o u r I d e a s , that m a y be true, w h e t h e r the senses be either
the real o r occasional causes of ' e m . M a l e b r a n c h & h i s following as w e l l
as those that a c c o u n t for the m o d e o f H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g after the
4 other w a y s assigned b y h i m do agree that w e e cannot have I d e a s o f
sense w i t h o u t o u r senses, & so agree to as m u c h as the A u t h o r of H . U .
affirms or is necessary to h i s d e s i g n . 2
Likewise, the anonymous writer of 1705, to whom I have

referred in the previous chapter, saw that the kind of criticism
levelled by Norris was misplaced. Just as this writer sought to
bring harmony into the disputes over innate ideas, so he tried
to unite the opposing camps over the meaning of the term
'idea'. He opens his remarkably clear-sighted tract with a
succinct summary of the various definitions of 'ideas' then
current.
1
Ibid., ff. 1 1 0 - 1 1 . The passage in brackets was crossed out.
2
Collins to Locke, MS. Locke, C. 7, f. 2 8 . Letter of 15 March 1703/4.
T h e r e is H a r d l y a n y T o p i c k w e shall meet w i t h that the L e a r n e d h a v e

difTer'd m o r e about t h a n this of I d e a s ; like M e n b l u n d e r i n g i n the dark,
they feel after t h e m to find t h e m ; some c a t c h at t h e m u n d e r one A p p e a r
ance, some u n d e r another; some m a k e t h e m to be Material, others
Spiritual; some w i l l have t h e m to be Effluvia, f r o m the B o d i e s t h e y
R e p r e s e n t , others T o t a l l y D i s t i n c t Essences; some h o l d t h e m to be
Modes, others Substances; some assert t h e m All to be Innate; others
None: S o that one w o u l d t h i n k there m u s t needs be a v e r y great I n t r i
cacy i n that w h i c h has given R i s e , not o n l y to s u c h a Variety b u t also
s u c h a Contradiction of O p i n i o n s . 1
The writer suggests two reasons for the confusions on this

subject, the first of which is the failure to explain meanings
sufficiently. He describes the second cause of confusion as
follows :
T h a t i n c o n s i d e r i n g the Mind, some m e n do not sufficiently abstract
their T h o u g h t s f r o m Matter, b u t m a k e use of s u c h T e r m s as c a n p r o p e r l y
relate to Matter only, a n d a p p l y t h e m to the Mind i n the s a m e S e n s e as
they are spoken of Matter, s u c h as Images a n d Signatures, Marks, and
Impressions, Characters a n d Notes of Things, a n d Seeds of Thoughts a n d
Knowkdge (p. 5 ) .
The anonymous writer of 1705 then proceeds by laying down

certain definitions as a preliminary to expounding his thoughts
on the problem. 'By an Idea, I mean the Representation of
something in the M i n d . (This Definition I think all sides are
agreed in thus far, but whether this Representation be only a
Modification of the M i n d , or be a Distinct Being, or Substance
United to the M i n d , is a Question)' (p. 6). He cites 'Marle-
branch' as holding the latter 'curious hypothesis'. M i n d is de
fined, according to the standard conception, as a thinking thing
possessed of perception, understanding, &c. From these and
several other definitions, the author of this tract proceeds to
deduce, in an orderly and valid fashion, certain conclusions
which he thinks should bring light into the many disputes
over the question of ideas. Like Locke, he insists that thoughts
and ideas are identical and that hence there can be no un
conscious thoughts. To the question raised by Sherlock, 'what
becomes of these ideas when they go out of the mind?', the
1
A Philosophick Essay concerning Ideas ( 1 7 0 5 ) , p. 4 .
author very cleverly replies that this is an improper question

to ask unless ideas be real beings independent of minds.
B u t this Q u e s t i o n c a n be n o w i s e p r o p e r for those w h o m a k e T h o u g h t
a n d I d e a to be the s a m e ; for a c c o r d i n g to t h i s N o t i o n they are not Real
Beings but only Modifications of the Mind, o r so m a n y several Modes of
Thinking u p o n the several O b j e c t s p r e s e n t e d to the M i n d ; o r i f y o u
please, it is the M i n d it self operating after such a n d such a M a n n e r , j u s t
as the R o u n d n e s s o f a B o d y , a n d its M o t i o n are n o t h i n g b u t the B o d y it
self figur'd a n d translated after s u c h a n d s u c h a S o r t ( p . 13).
Moreover, the writer sees that once we have identified ideas

and thoughts, it is incorrect to speak of ideas as coming from
without, since they 'are wholly owing to the M i n d , and are
indeed nothing else but the natural Operations of the Mind
upon the several Objects presented to if (p. 20).
Had Locke seen sufficiently clearly these implications of his
position, he could have written a reply to clarify the difference
between his own epistemological analysis and that which used
the older metaphysical categories of substance and accident. He
so quietly dispensed with the traditional categories on this
question that many of his critics did not appreciate the novelty
which he was introducing. What was required i n the Essay
was not so much an elucidation of the meaning of 'idea', which
Norris demanded, as a careful explanation of how the analysis
of ideas i n that work differed from the older methods and why
Locke had found it expedient to depart from tradition i n this
instance. But I do not think anyone i n the seventeenth
century was capable of appreciatingjust what did differentiate
Locke's epistemological analysis from that of his contem
poraries and predecessors, although many saw that i t did
indeed differ. A polemic against the categories of substance,
accident, real being, essence, and existence could not have
been written by Locke, but not entirely because he himself
adopted this terminology with slight modifications i n later
portions of the Essay: he did not fully understand the impli
cations of his own analysis. Locke was the inheritor of two
traditions: the one, the new science with its radically new
categories, the other, the older scholastic tradition which he
in part ridiculed but did not entirely reject. He did succeed

moderately well i n modifying the traditional categories of
substance, accident, and essence to make his acceptance of
them fairly consistent with his radical rejection of them i n the
earlier portions of the Essay, although he was not clever
enough to escape the pitfalls of his own representative theory
of perception. I t was undoubtedly this confusion of accept
ance and rejection of the familiar traditions which raised
doubts and suspicions in the minds of his readers when he
based all knowledge upon ideas.
§ 3—Idealism in Knowkdge and Truth

I n an interesting section in his 'Examination of P. Male-
branche's Opinion', Locke very clearly saw the implicit
immaterialism in Malebranche's analysis of ideas, an implica
tion of the way of ideas already developed by Burthogge i n his
Organum Vetus & Novum and given its classical expression
by Berkeley i n the early years of the eighteenth century. On
Malebranche's principle of seeing all things in God, how,
Locke queries, can we know that there is any physical world
existing without ?
F o r w e see n o t h i n g b u t the ideas that are i n G o d ; b u t b o d y itself w e
neither do n o r c a n possibly see at a l l ; a n d h o w t h e n c a n w e k n o w that
there is a n y s u c h t h i n g existing as body, since w e c a n b y no m e a n s see o r
perceive it b y o u r senses, w h i c h is a l l the w a y w e c a n have of k n o w i n g
a n y corporeal t h i n g to exist P 1
I t will not do, Locke points out, to say dogmatically that upon
the occasion of objects being presented to us God causes us
to have their perception, for this conclusion is precisely what
awaits proof.
B u t the s u n b e i n g risen, a n d the horse b r o u g h t w i t h i n convenient d i s
tance, a n d so being present to m y eyes, G o d s h o w s m e their ideas i n
h i m s e l f : a n d I say G o d s h o w s m e these ideas w h e n h e pleases, w i t h o u t
the presence of a n y s u c h bodies to m y eyes. F o r w h e n I t h i n k I see a star
at s u c h a distance f r o m m e ; w h i c h t r u l y I do not see, b u t the idea of it
1
Works, vol. ix, p. 2 5 3 .
sECT. i n I D E A L I S M I N K N O W L E D G E A N D T R U T H 99
w h i c h G o d s h o w s m e ; I w o u l d h a v e it p r o v e d to m e that there is s u c h a
star existing a m i l l i o n of m i l l i o n of m i l e s f r o m m e w h e n I t h i n k I see it,
m o r e t h a n w h e n I d r e a m of s u c h a star. F o r u n t i l it be p r o v e d that there
is a candle i n the r o o m b y w h i c h I w r i t e this, the s u p p o s i t i o n of m y
seeing i n G o d the p y r a m i d i c a l idea of its flame, u p o n o c c a s i o n of the
c a n d l e ' s b e i n g there, is begging w h a t is i n q u e s t i o n . 1
But what Locke here charged against the occasionalists,

namely, that their doctrines led them into an idealism or
phenomenalism by offering no way in which the reality of
physical objects could be proved, was itself strongly urged
against the doctrines of the Essay by some of its more for
midable critics. William Carroll, in his Dissertation (1706),
remarked :
T h a t w h i c h h i s Words are the Marks of, are the Ideas i n h i s o w n Mind:
N o r c a n h e a p p l y t h e m , as Marks i m m e d i a t e l y to any thing else, but the
Ideas that h e h i m s e l f h a t h : F o r this w o u l d be to m a k e t h e m S i g n s of h i s
o w n Conceptions, a n d yet a p p l y t h e m to other Ideas; w h i c h w o u l d be
to m a k e t h e m Signs, a n d not Signs of h i s Ideas at the same t i m e ; a n d so
i n Effect, to have no Signification at alL W o r d s b e i n g v o l u n t a r y Signs,
t h e y cannot be v o l u n t a r y Signs i m p o s e d b y h i m o n things he knows not
(pp. 4 4 - 4 5 ) .
John Witty, in The First Principles of Modern Deism Confuted

(1707), likewise places his finger upon the crucial sceptical
feature of Locke's epistemology. I f knowledge is limited to
simple and complex ideas,
w e m u s t give u p all pretence to a n y real C e r t a i n t y of all matters of Fact
w h i c h w e see not, or have not seen o u r s e l v e s ; of all Persons o r Things
w h i c h exist, live, or are transacted out of o u r v i e w ; o r w h i c h have existed,
l i v ' d or w e r e transacted out of o u r t i m e s ; . . . ( p p . 2 3 - 2 4 ) .
Norris was the first critic to notice this epistemological

scepticism inherent in the principles of the Essay, and ob
jected in his 'Cursory Reflections' to the purely verbal or
ideal definition of truth and knowledge as the agreement of
ideas or the words standing for ideas. Norris insisted that if
knowledge is defined in terms of agreement and disagreement,
these relations must refer to real objects. I t was undoubtedly
because of this kind of criticism of the way of ideas that the
1
lbid., pp. 253-4.
ioo E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
anonymous writer of 1705 defined truth as 'the RealRelatio7i

that there is between things as to their Agreement or Disagree-
ment\ clearly distinguishing this from the idea of truth which
'is the Thought that we form concerning this Relation; the
former is in the Object without, the latter is within us in the
Mind'. 1
Samuel Bold, in Some Considerations On the Principal Objec

tions (1699), said that two main charges were brought against
Locke's definitionof knowledge: (1) 'That the Proposition is
not true. I n consequence of which, the way of Ideas is con
demned as no way at all to Certainty, or Knowledge'; and (2)
that the definition 'is inconsistent with, and of dangerous
consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith' (pp. 3-4).
But an examination of the various criticisms made against the
Essay i n the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
reveals thatalong with the first charge cited by Bold there
went the more important claim that the definition ofknow-
ledge in the Essay led to epistemological scepticism. I f a valid
claim for epistemological scepticism had not been made, i t is
doubtful whether the second charge which Bold distinguished
would ever have been raised. I n his defence of Locke, Bold
failed to comprehend the significance of this additional
charge. He championed the verbal definition of propositions
given by Locke and accepted completely the Lockean defini
tion of knowledge, arguing throughout his tract along strictly
coherence-theory lines. Bold claimed that no one questioned
the definition of the truth of propositions as the correlation
of words with ideas; but we have seen that both Norris and
Carroll singled out precisely this feature of the Essay for
criticism. Bold was of course correct in arguing that we cannot
know that a given proposition is true or false unless we do
perceive the relation between the ideas which i t expresses i n
words, unless 'certainty, or knowledge of the truth of Proposi
tions, may be had without perception, or without perceiving
the truth of what is expressed' (p. 5). Bold was correct i n
arguing that even self-evident propositions demand a per-
1
Op. cit., p. 2i.
sECT.iii I D E A L I S M I N K N O W L E D G E A N D T R U T H 101
ception or awareness of the connexion of the terms of the

propositions. What Bold did not see was that the apprehension
of self-evident propositions was not of the same kind as the
apprehension of existential propositions; for, although it is
true that i n both cases the awareness of the order of terms and
of their relations must be had and compared with the corre
sponding ideas before we can apprehend the truth or falsity
involved, existential propositions carry an important rider
along with them without which they become useless or else
mere components of a coherent system. I t was largely against
the rationalist thinkers who maintained that existential know
ledge could be deduced from maxims and general principles
of reason that Bold wrote; but Bold himself, and Locke with
him, would be guilty of somewhat the same errors as he com
plains against i f he could not show that the propositions of
perception have a real referent existing in the world.
Henry Lee saw these pitfalls of the way of ideas clearly, de
fining truth, like the anonymous writer of 1705 and like Norris
in the previous century, as the 'Conjunction or Disjunction
of things according to the real Relation those things have to
each other/ Locke's definition can give no certainty of
1
existence since it is restricted to the realm of ideas. I n the

case of particular propositions, affirmative or negative, there
can be no certainty, since, unless we assume the existence of
the subjects of such propositions, we have an empty assertion.
But to make this assumption is to go beyond our ideas. The
'ideal' principles of Locke lead to scepticism 'because they
will neither allow us to suppose, nor can prove the real
Existence of things without us'. Throughout his long com
2
mentary on the Essay, Lee sought to prove (1) that 'Our

Knowledge is of something else, besides of our own Ideas';
(2) that i f it is only of our own ideas, knowledge is entirely
useless; and (3) that such a definition as Locke gives 'involves
us i n endless Scepticism or Doubtfulness of the T r u t h of all
Propositions whatever.' The basic presupposition of the
3
2
1
Anti-Scepticism, p. 2 6 4 . Ibid., preface.
3
Ibid., p. 235. There is an error in the pagination at this point, the pages 235
io2 E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
corpuscular hypothesis is that perception takes place through

a causal process which passes from object to sense organ, the
object end of the process having certain definite character
istics which constitute its 'reality'. But Lee found weak and
invalid the arguments produced by Locke i n support of his
belief in the reality of knowledge. What good is it, he asked,
'to know that the Ideas of White, Red, Round, and Square,
disagree, i f there be really no Bodies without me that have
those Powers to reflect Light differently, or have any such
Figures?' Lee was quite willing to admit that 'we can know
1
nothing but our own Thoughts', in the sense that without

taking notice of outward effects, knowledge is impossible.
The terms 'thought', 'perception', or 'operation' did not
trouble Lee, but the term 'idea' held for him the power of a
new entity capable of keeping knowledge restricted within
this realm of ideas. By employing the term 'thought' in
Locke's definition rather than 'idea', Lee believed we were
less liable to overlook the importance of the external referent
in our definition. I t was upon the suppositions of common
sense, i.e. ( i ) that our 'senses and other faculties are true',
and (2) that God is infinitely wise, powerful, and good and
hence cannot be deceived Himself or allow man to be deceived,
that Lee sought to base his own system, failing to understand
that these suppositions themselves were on no better (and
perhaps on a worse) footing than Locke's careful attempts to
defend the common-sense belief. Lee was not to be shaken
2
out of his traditional beliefs and assumptions, even when the

doctrines of the ideists had revealed the epistemological and
ontological difficulties inherent in establishing the validity of
any existential claim. Like the defenders of the two forms of
the doctrine of innate knowledge, Lee was tenaciously
attached to tradition. I n this case, the tradition was not
religious and moral, but for the most part independent of
these areas of thought. Past thinkers had based their specula-
and 236 being repeated. The reference here is to the second occurrence and cor
responds with the signature, ккк.
1
Anti-Scepticism, p. 2 3 7 .
2
Ibid., p. 247. Cf. pp. 2 6 7 - 8 .
tions upon the conviction of an external world existing inde

pendent of man. Locke's formulation of knowledge i n terms
of ideas made Lee aware of the objections to Locke's own
system, but he did not see that they had equal application to
his own.
Sergeant was another critic who clung to tradition in the
face of the many challenges the Essay offered, but i n many
ways Sergeant saw more clearly than did Lee the episte
mological difficulties of the way of ideas. I t was the entire
method of ideas as a means to knowledge which he attacked;
and, although the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition which he
offered as an alternative did not circumvent the dangers of
epistemological scepticism, or did so only by bold unquestioned
assumptions, Sergeant's extended attack upon the way of
ideas laid bare some crucial difficulties which Locke might
have been able to patch up had he found the time and i n
clination to reply seriously to him. Sergeant had disputed
with the Cartesians, as with Locke, over the criterion of
certainty being centred in clear and distinct ideas; for this
approach seemed to him, as to Norris and Lee, to be placing
the criterion of truth within the knowing mind rather than
in the objects known. He never found a satisfactory answer
to the question of the nature of ideas, but he was convinced
that they functioned to deny the mind direct access to things
by restricting it to some kind of third entity. Cognition was
thus made to consist i n a triadic relation involving the know
ing mind, the object or referent, and the ideas by means of
which the mind came to know things. Sergeant wished to
reduce the process of knowing to a dyadic relation consisting
only of the knowing mind and the object known. The 'notion'
was his attempted way of defending such a direct realist
position. I n making more precise Sergeant's concept of the
notion, one of the first tasks is to elicit the distinction between
a notion and an idea. His twofold analysis of man into a
corporeal and a spiritual part is the basis for this further
distinction. Corresponding to the two aspects of man are two
separate faculties: the fancy and the understanding. Both
faculties must operate i n every act of knowledge; but, since

the faculties are distinct, 4he Immediate Objects peculiar to
those Different Faculties, must likewise be as widely Different
from one another, as are those Powers to which they belong;
and consequently, be as vastly Opposite, as the Natures of
Body and Spirit can distance them'. I n other words, to every
'Thought or Act of Knowledge we have . . . there must be two
sorts of Interiour Objects concur; whereof, the one is Cor
poreal, the other of a Spiritual Nature/ I t is this distinction 1
between the object of the fancy (the idea or the phantasm)

and the object of the understanding (the notion) which
differentiates man from the beasts on the one hand, who have
only material phantasms, and the angels on the other, who
have only spiritual notions. The phantasms are material
copies of the external objects, while the notions are meanings
and hence intellectual. Phantasms are causally related to
physical objects and to notions, serving as a necessary middle
term between the external world and the mind. Without
material phantasms, there would be no notions; but, whereas
the phantasm is a crude duplication of the physical object
(or some aspect of it), the notion has become refined to the
point at which there is no significant difference between it and
the physical object. Hence, by restricting the method of
knowledge to such spiritual 'notions', Sergeant believed him
self able to avoid the dualism which he found i n the epistemo-
logies of Descartes and Locke. He sought thereby to maintain
a kind of direct or nai've realism.
He explains that the words 'notion', 'simple apprehension',
'conception', and 'meaning' are all synonymous terms. He
calls the immediate objects of the mind 'notions' because
'they are the Parts or Elements of Knowledge', which when
put together constitute cognition. 'They are call'd "Simple
Apprehensions", to distinguish them from Judgments, which
are compounded of more Notions, and belong to the second
Operation of our Understanding.' Apprehension on this 2
1
Solid Philosophy Asserted, p. [25] of the Preface.
2
The Method to Science, p. 3.
SECT.iii I D E A L I S M I N K N O W L E D G E A N D T R U T H 105
simple level does not take place until the impressions of the
senses have been communicated to the soul. The apprehension
is simple because it involves no judgement. Sergeant does not
work out a semiotic theory whereby what is communicated to
the mind becomes a meaning-sign, but he does say that 'mean
ing' is synonymous with 'notion'; notions affect the mind,
'which only can mean or intend\ I t is mainly i n this sense that
he defines notions as simple apprehensions, but apparently
he meant to use the term in a still wider sense, as concep
tions, because the mind conceives or breeds these notions as
'the Embryo's of Knowledge'. When the impressions of sense
reach the mind, the conception which takes place amounts to
a simple apprehension of a sign conveying meaning to the
mind. The only difference between notions i n the mind and
the things of which they are notions is that the former have
a different manner of existing. T o avoid the epistemological
dualism which he found i n the ideists' method, Sergeant
refused to convert the simply apprehended meanings into
media of knowledge which communicate the natures of
things external to the observer. The meanings are the things
themselves. We intend or mean not some idea but the thing
itself when we assert something about the world. The things
themselves exist in our mind i n the form of notions. There is
no difficulty i n this view, Sergeant hastens to add, when we
recognize that 'the same Ens or Thing may have diverse
Manners of Existing; one Corporeal, the other Intellectual or
Spiritual; since the Thing . . . abstracts even from Existence
it self (Ibid.). There is nothing contained in the notion or the
meaning apprehended by the mind which signifies that the
thing exists or does not exist. The only notion which entails
existence is that of God. A word or sign i n cognition implies a
meaning, but existence is not contained in that meaning. The
fact that the thing external to the mind has a corporeal exist
ence while the notion of it in the mind has an immaterial
existence does not mean that we do not know the thing directly
in experience, since what is essential to the thing is contained
in the notion of that thing and is precisely the thing itself
in these respects. Thus, Sergeant has drained off all aspects

of objects except their meanings, and then argued that
those objects thus bereft exist i n the mind. I t is in this
sense, and this sense only, that his epistemology can be said
to be direct realism; the mind is i n immediate contact with
the essential natures of objects, since by definition the form
of the object contains its essence, and the form is transmitted
to the mind. T o the extent that notions are signs, conveyors
of meaning, Sergeant's epistemology is just as dualistic as
Locke's.
Sergeant assumes from the beginning that we do have
knowledge of things. A l l men agree, he believes, with this
assumption. The question then is not whether we have know
ledge of an external world, but how we gain this knowledge.
I f such knowledge is indirect, as the Cartesian method
implies, our 'knowledge' cannot always be certain or sound.
Thus, the only way in which we can have trustworthy know
ledge of the world is by direct contact with that world.
Sergeant's implicit objective is to justify direct realism and
to show how direct knowledge of the world is possible. By
means of his concept of a 'notion' he seeks to argue that
knowledge goes on in terms of meanings which reveal the full
and direct nature of objects. He recognized two levels of the
genesis of meaning, however: the primary level where mean
ings are given to the mind directly by external objects (a
physiological genesis), and the secondary level where mean
ings are inherited and passed on or refined through usage
(an ethnological genesis). The important level from the
epistemological point of view is, of course, the physiological.
None of Sergeant's arguments in support of his position on
the nature of notions proves his thesis, since the most they
show is that meanings exist in our minds. Had he offered some
convincing proofs for the physiological genesis of notions
from material phantasms, he could have placed his direct
realism on stronger ground. But notice the nature of his
explanation. External bodies are said to give off effluvia which
are literal aspects of the object and which enter the pores of
the various sense organs. The material and the spiritual parts
of man come together at some point, such as at Descartes's
pineal gland. Following scholastic tradition, Sergeant terms
it the 'seat of knowledge'. Every effect which alters the material
part of man at this point (the brain or nearby regions) also
creates an effect i n the spiritual part. This effect is the union of
matter and form. The material effluvia do not enter the form
or spiritual part. Rather, a Spinozistic parallelism takes place
in which the alterations in the spiritual part correspond with
and duplicate therein the alterations in the material section.
T h o s e Effluviums sent out f r o m B o d i e s , h a v e the very Natures of
those B o d i e s i n t h e m , o r rather are t h e m s e l v e s L e s s e r B o d i e s o f the
Self-same N a t u r e , . . . w h i c h are c u t off b y N a t u r a l A g e n t s f r o m the great
L u m p ; a n d , therefore, b y A p p l i c a t i o n of themselves, t h e y i m p r i n t the
very Body it self, o r a B o d y o f that N a t u r e , o n that m a t e r i a l part w h i c h
i s the Seat of Knowledge. W h e n c e the S o u l being, at the s a m e t i m e ,
affected after her m a n n e r (or Knowingly) as that p a r t w a s affected, s h e
has also the very Nature o f that B o d y (as far as the S e n s e exhibits it) p u t
i n h e r b y that conformable I m p r e s s i o n , w h e n s h e h a s a Notion o f i t . 1
This physiological account is really a metaphysical explana

tion devised to support his correspondence theory of truth.
I t fails to give an adequate metaphysical, let alone an empirical,
account of how meanings enter the mind directly from objects.
As Locke satirically remarked, 'And now let the reader
consider whether by reading what he finds from hither
[where Sergeant's explanation begins] he has not got a
perfect clear knowledge how material things get into the
imateriall soule.' (Locke, Notes, no. 24, p. 76.)
Forced in the direction of a more immediate realism by the
objectionable features of the ideists' theory, Sergeant saw he
had to maintain that the process of knowing consists in our
having the very predicates and accidents of objects within our
minds. He insisted that his notions or meanings differed
fundamentally from Locke's ideas, but this conviction was
attributable to his interpreting all ideas in the Essay as re
semblances in the crude sense. His notions were not like
1
SolidPhilosophy Asserted, p. 69.
objects; they were the objects themselves as they exist i m

materially in the mind. The term 'idea', i n fact, could signify
nothing else for Sergeant than a resemblance of physical
objects; otherwise, parallel with his attempted definition of
'notion', it must be the very thing itself. Hence, since ideas
were so carefully separated from things by both Descartes and
Locke, the only way they could be representative and thus
conveyors of the natures of objects was to be similitudes of
things. Only under these conditions, Sergeant thought, can
an examination of ideas yield a knowledge of the natures of
objects. But is this a sufficient condition ? Sergeant points out
that 'had I known such things formerly, then a Resemblance
of them might, i n that case, revive, and call into my mind the
knowledge of them', as a picture revives and calls to mind
a distant friend. But he fails to understand how we can have
1
our first knowledge of things by means of copies or resem

blances, since a prerequisite for recognizing a picture as a
picture of something in the world is to have some prior know
ledge of the thing pictured. Secondary knowledge of nature
may be obtained by the way of ideas, but this way presupposes
a primary knowledge obtained in some more direct manner.
Even on the secondary level, cognition by means of ideas
encounters difficulties. I f the ideas which represent objects
are only like those objects in some respects, our knowledge
will obviously be limited so that we can never have a complete
knowledge of objects. If, on the other hand, an idea is like the
thing in all respects, 4hen 'tis in no Respect unlike it; and, by
Consequence, in no Respect Differentfrom it, (for that Differ
ence would be an Unlikeness;) and, i f it be in no respect Differ
ent, it follows, out of the very Terms, that it is the very same,
in the M i n d , and out of the M i n d ; . . .' Sergeant did not wish
2
to say that two patches of red of exactly the same shade are
really identical. What he maintains is that there is a sameness
in all respects save number. The fact that the one, the idea or
notion of this shade of red, exists in the understanding i n
tellectually, while the other, the patch of colour, exists outside
1
Solid Philosophy Asserted, p. 2 0 . 2
Ibid., p. 36.
the understanding corporeally, shows that they are not

identical. Notion and object do differ i n this respect. Locke
was aware of the importance, for Sergeant's position, of
establishing an essential but non-numerical identity between
notion and object, but he did not understand what it is for
'a material thing to exist spiritualy'. (Locke, Notes, no. 17,
p. 59.) Moreover, he disagreed entirely with the argument
employed by Sergeant to show that exact likeness results in
sameness. After following Sergeant's many arguments to the
effect that i f x and Y are alike they must be the same, Locke
remarks: T cannot but wonder to hear a man soe often repeat.
What if he were not a Dictator i n philosophie? would be
Nonsense, viz., that a like is the same' (Ibid., no. 18, p. 61.)
I f this argument were true, Sergeant would be committed
to the conclusion that i n knowing God (or any object), Hhe
soul becomes god' or its object. (Ibid., no. 14, p. 40.) I n an
attempt to persuade Stillingfleet that the new way of ideas
was nothing new and that, on the definitions of 'idea' used
in the Essay, even Stillingfleet has to admit to such entities,
Locke satirized Sergeant's doctrine of notions.
Not t h i n k i n g y o u r l o r d s h i p therefore yet so perfect a convert of
M r . J . S . ' s , that y o u are p e r s u a d e d , that as often as y o u t h i n k of y o u r
c a t h e d r a l c h u r c h , or of D e s C a r t e s ' s v o r t i c e s , that the v e r y c a t h e d r a l
c h u r c h at W o r c e s t e r , or the m o t i o n of those v o r t i c e s , itself exists i n y o u r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; w h e n one o f t h e m n e v e r existed b u t i n that one place
at W o r c e s t e r , a n d the other n e v e r existed a n y w h e r e i n rerum natura. 1
Such a position as Sergeant tried to maintain blurs the distinc

tion between object and knower, a distinction which Locke
wished to keep precise. But Sergeant saw no objection to
such a position. Like Sir Kenelm Digby, he belongs to that
tradition i n epistemology which explains knowing i n the
Aristotelian fashion as an absorption of the form of objects
by the mind, the form constituting the essential features of
the object which is known. That which is cognized directly
by the mind is the spiritual apprehension; but this appre
hension is the same as the object external to the mind, which
1
Locke's Reply to the . . . Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Second Letter
in Works, vol. iv, pp. 3 9 0 - 1 .
824331 I
no E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
is corporeal, because every essential aspect of the physical

object is contained i n the spiritual notion. However, it is
contained there by definition or assumption and not on the
evidence of experience. When the postulational nature of the
argument is recognized, Sergeant's direct realist position
degenerates into a Lockean dualism.
When Locke objects to the principle that 'a like is the same',
or when he expresses inability to understand what is meant
by saying a material thing exists spiritually, he is calling
attention to the fact that Sergeant's epistemological position
is not as direct as Sergeant would have his readers believe.
There is for Sergeant an epistemological object which is
distinct, in certain well-defined ways, from the ontological
object. The latter cannot be known without the former. But
it is Sergeant's contention that his epistemological object is
translucent, so that in cognition the mind knows the onto
logical object without any third mediating factor. The
epistemological object on Sergeant's system purports to be
just the ontological object translated into intelligible terms.
A mind which is spiritual simply cannot cognize a material
object without some such translation taking place. The
greater the alteration the less direct the cognition. Unlike
Locke, who sought to develop a theory of knowledge within
experience, Sergeant went beyond experience in order to
defend his belief in direct realism. Accordingly, he resorted
to the Aristotelian-Thomistic position for support, since i t
makes the minimum amount of change in translating the
material phantasm into spiritual form or notion. The only
change which that position allows is that which is necessary
to enable a material object to be known by a mind. Locke's
fault, and the fault of all ideists, from Sergeant's perspective,
is that their translation of the material particles which strike
the senses goes beyond this minimum alteration.
As Sergeant interprets the ideas of the ideists throughout
his writings, the medium of knowledge for these men is not
the thing known but only a copy or resemblance of the thing.
However correct such an interpretation of some of the
sECT.iii I D E A L I S M I N K N O W L E D G E A N D T R U T H i n
Cartesians may be, it is obviously false when applied to Locke.

The very first marginal note i n his copy of Solid Philosophy
Asserted calls attention to this error. 'Where is it M r . Locke
says ideas are the similitudes of things? He expresly says
most of them are not similitudes.' (Locke, Notes, no. i ,
p. [vi].) I t is important to notice that in this note Locke does
not deny that some ideas are similitudes of things i n the
literal sense in which Sergeant interprets all ideas as being so.
I n his A Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop
of Worcester (1697), Locke reminds Stillingfleet of a similar
qualification already expressed i n the Essay: 'not that they are
all of them the images or representations of what does exist;
the contrarywhereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies,
hath been already shown'. Again w r i t i n g t o Stillingfleet,
1
Locke is careful to assure his lordship, i n reply to charges of

scepticism, that he has everywhere affirmed 'that the simple
ideas, of primary qualities, are the images or representations
of what does exist without us'. Likewise, after Sergeant has
2
repeated the assertion that the word 'idea' is used by Locke i n

the sense of resemblance, similitude, or image, Locke places
in the margins the questioning word 'where?' (Locke,
Notes, no. 9, p. 23.) When Sergeant, i n discussing secondary
qualities, expresses an inability to conceive 'why the ideas
of secondary qualities should have nothing existing like
the bodies', Locke calls attention to the fact that 'idea' is
never given a blanket definition i n the Essay as resemblance.
'Blewnesse or heat i n the minde are the Ideas there whether
they be like any thing in the object or noe. But he will have
M r . Locke to mean resemblances by Ideas, though M r . L says
expresly that he does not.' (Ibid., no. 31, p. 137.) The
essential, defining characteristic of ideas for Locke is that
they are i n the mind in some sense of the phrase. He does
not mean by 'idea' any object of the mind, i f we mean by the
term 'object' an ontological object. I n other words, the very
definition of idea given at the beginning of the Essay embodies
1
Bk. ii, ch. XXX, no. 2; quoted by Locke in Letter, in Works, vol. iv, p. 75.
2
Letter, ibid.
ii2 E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
an epistemological dualism. The phrase 'whatever is the

object of the mind when the mind thinks' uses the word
'object' in an epistemological sense. A t most, only some of
these objects are exact copies of their ontological referents.
But i f all ideas are not even resemblances of things, Locke's
transition from material particles to intellectual objects is
rendered even more difficult than before, since now the episte
mological objects are in some cases entirely unlike the onto
logical objects. There is a difficulty concerning just what is
meant by any idea being like a quality which belongs to a
material object; but when Locke so clearly makes a distinction
between primary and secondary qualities on the basis of the
latter being unlike anything in the object, i t is hard to under
stand how Sergeant could have misinterpreted Locke as saying
all ideas are resemblances. I t is especially difficult to under
stand this misconception when a recognition of the nature of
secondary qualities would have made Sergeant's case against
Locke even stronger: for ideas which are unlike anything i n
nature would seem to be more un-solid than 'meer resem
blances'.
Despite this important misunderstanding of Locke's use of
'ideas', Sergeant was able to point out one of the crucial
difficulties of the dualistic epistemology set forth i n the Essay.
Whether ideas are copies of things or not, if all knowledge is
dependent upon ideas, it seems impossible to escape from the
circle to establish the reality of knowledge. Sergeant could
have called attention to the fact, as Descartes did, that even
if we grant the difference between the idea of the sun during
the day and the idea of the sun in our recollection, there is no
reason for concluding that the former idea represents more
correctly the physical object called the sun. Descartes escaped
this difficulty by means of a metaphysical assumption con
cerning causality; but, since Locke denied this view of
causality (at least on the sensory level), he could not use this
route of retreat. Interpreting Locke's ideas to mean resem
blances (thereby anticipating a growing tendency among
Locke's critics of the early eighteenth century), Sergeant was
sECT.ni I D E A L I S M I N K N O W L E D G E A N D T R U T H 113
content to rest his case against this aspect of the representative

theory of perception on the ground that Locke could provide
no means of discovering the correctness of the representation.
Epistemological scepticism was inherent i n the fundamental
methodology of the ideists.
The question which L o r d Herbert of Cherbury solved by
the assumption of a conformity between faculty and object;
which Hobbes sought to circumvent by reducing the physical
and the mental world to motion; and which Descartes and
Henry Lee resolved by appeal to a good God, turned out, i n
the hands of Locke, to be incapable of solution without going
outside a strict empiricism. The idealism or phenomenalism
inherent i n a consistent and thorough application of the way
of ideas, a kind of scepticism which Burthogge and Berkeley
found consistent with religion, was avoided by Locke's
reluctance to relinquish the common-sense beliefs of ordinary
experience. Just why Burthogge's application of the way of
ideas did not bring down precisely the same sort of criticism
as Locke's much milder version evoked will remain forever
a mystery, but it is clear that Locke did not wish to commit
himself to that sort of phenomenalistic analysis. Although he
continually stressed the ambiguities and invalidity of any
attempt at formulating a concept of substance which went
beyond the nominal essence or collection of sensible qualities,
he found some inner compulsion to retain that much of the
older tradition in metaphysics which posits a substance and
a real essence in objects. He did not wish to merge the object
with the idea. He was forced, by his own convictions and by
his attachment to the two traditions i n theory of knowledge,
to accept an epistemological and ontological dualism with its
attendant difficulties in accounting for knowledge of the world
of objects. Even his own recognition of these difficulties did
not deter his critics from attaching to the Essay the label of
'idealist' and 'sceptical'.
Controversy with his critics being foresworn, the episte
mological difficulties of scepticism remained precisely i n the
same unsatisfactory stage as that found in the fourth book of the
ii4 E P I S T E M O L O G I C A L S C E P T I C I S M сн.ш
Essay. Discussion did not clarify the problems. Thus, for the
men of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, with
the epistemological scepticism of the Essay firmly established
by several capable critics, the stage was set for the unveiling
of the religious scepticism implicit i n the acceptance of the
epistemological doctrines of that work.
IV
RELIGIOUS SCEPTICISM
H
A D Locke's Essay been written during a period in
which religious controversy was less rampant (were
this conceivable), it is doubtful whether the doctrines
advanced in that work could have aroused much reaction.
Although the non-theological criticisms which we have
examined in the previous chapter showed an appreciation of
the epistemological doctrines in themselves, each of the critics
there discussed, with the exception of Leibniz, had an
ulterior purpose behind his arguments. Each wrote in defence
of religion and was concerned to break down popular acclaim
for the Essay in both the purely theoretical and the practical
spheres. The publication of the Essay, coming especially at
a time when new radical sects of natural religion were emerg
ing, led to its becoming the centre of much religious discussion;
for the parallels between the empiricism of Locke's episte-
mology and the naturalistic doctrines in religion, with their
appeal to reason, could not have been overlooked by his
contemporaries. I n many respects, Locke expounded the
epistemology and even ontology of the deistic movement.
His own sympathies were strongly in support of the new
religious theories advanced by Thomas Firmin, his friends,
and associates. The extent to which Locke wrote with the
express purpose of giving support to deism cannot, un
fortunately, be established. We have seen how prevalent was
the doctrine of innate knowledge among his contemporaries
and have found reasöns for thinking that Locke wrote the
first book of his Essay to refute this view of his fellow country
men. Since we know from his own statement that his reflec
tions upon the problems of the Essay were stimulated by
certain difficulties in religion and morality, and since we know
where his own sympathies lay in respect to religious beliefs,
Il6 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M C H . IV
it does not seem extravagant to suggest that the positive

doctrines of that work were also written with the religious
problems in mind. I t would be a gross overstatement to
claim that Locke was unaware of the implications for religion
of many of his epistemological doctrines, for a man so well
versed in the controversies of his day could not fail to grasp
the revolutionary character of many of these doctrines for
religion. I am sensible of Locke's many asseverations to
Stillingfleet that he wrote with none of these controversies
in mind. For example, in his Letter to Stillingfleet hewrites:
T h e r e is i n the w o r l d a great a n d fierce contest about nature a n d
g r a c e : it w o u l d be v e r y h a r d for m e , i f I m u s t be b r o u g h t i n as a p a r t y
o n either side, because a disputant, i n that controversy, s h o u l d t h i n k the
clear a n d distinct apprehensions of nature a n d grace c o m e not u n t o o u r
m i n d s b y the s i m p l e ideas of sensation a n d reflection. I f this be so, I m a y
be r e c k o n e d a m o n g the objectors against all sorts a n d points of o r t h o
doxy, w h e n e v e r a n y one pleases: I m a y be called to account as one
heterodox, i n the points of free-grace, f r e e - w i l l , predestination, original
s i n , justification b y faith, transubstantiation, the pope's s u p r e m a c y , a n d
what n o t ? 1
Locke was drawn into the debate over the nature of the
Trinity in part through a misunderstanding aroused by
Toland's use of clear and distinct ideas, but it was neverthe
less true that Locke's epistemological doctrines were appearing
more and more in the writings of the new men of religion, as
the century came to an end. I t is difficult to consider Locke
completely sincere in his repetitious assertions of his non-
involvement in such important religious doctrines as that of
the Trinity or the role of reason and faith in religion. I t would
be most strange if a man of Locke's learning sincerely believed
he could write in the seventeenth century about such doctrines
as the method to and sources of knowledge, the nature of
substance and essence, the empirical foundations of all know
ledge, and escape an assessment of these doctrines from the
theologians, since these were all doctrines of direct relevance
to religion. Modern critics are given to seeing in Locke's
1
I n Works, vol. iv, p. 68.
cH.iv R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M 117
Essay a treatise on theory of knowledge and metaphysics,

written independently of his social context, a context which
concerned itself chiefly with the obscure questions of church
dogma. I t is misleading to read the Essay i n this manner.
I would suggest that Locke was being facetious and argu
mentative i n protesting to Stillingfleet so extensively his
innocence and aloofness from these religious disputes. Locke
did, without a doubt, make certain outstanding contributions
to the problem of knowledge; and I would not wish to suggest
that these aspects of the Essay were an accidental product of
his own religious speculations. What I am suggesting is that
the Essay had at least some of its major origins i n the theo
logical discussions of the seventeenth century, and that no
one of the doctrines advanced in that work can legitimately
be considered i n abstraction from this context. Nevertheless,
I am not essentially concerned here with assessing and un
covering the motives which lay behind the writing of the
Essay concerning Human Understanding. M y objective is
rather to present the role this work played in the minds and
discussions of Locke's contemporaries. I n this light, the
epistemological doctrines of his system can be seen to have
challenging implications.
Apart from the negative polemic of the first book, and the
general scepticism entailed by the representative theory of
perception and the definition of knowledge i n Books Two and
Four, the clergy found the Essay objectionable primarily for
its reduction of knowledge to ideas, for its doctrine of real
and nominal essences, its doctrine of substance as unknow
able, and the suggestion that God could annex to matter a
power of thinking. Not all of these objectionable doctrines are
epistemological i n character, although all but the last are
immediate consequences of Locke's cognitive orientation.
His contemporaries regarded all these doctrines as results of
the basic epistemological scepticism of his empiricism. The
inevitable consequence of accepting any of these doctrines
was, i n the minds of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
orthodox men of religion, religious scepticism and disbelief.
n8 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
§ ι — T h e Role of Ideas in Religious Knowkdge

G. R. Cragg has claimed that with the publication of
Toland's Christianity not Mysterious (1696) 4he deistic
controversy began i n earnest'. Such a claim may lay too
1
much stress upon one book, but there can be no doubt that
Toland's work aroused an enormous reaction which led most
of the prominent religious figures in England to reconsider
their own beliefs and either to attack or to defend the new
movement, which by then was growing in strength. The very
title of Toland's book epitomized the general attitude of the
deistic and other naturalistic sects: the claim that nothing
about the Christian religion was above reason. The attack was
directed upon such doctrines as that of the Trinity and tran-
substantiation, but Toland's main concern was with bring
ing to the front the basic dispute over the reasonableness
or mysteriousness of this religion. Locke's own work in this
field, The Reasonableness ofChristianity, had appeared in 1695
and elicited several prolix rebuttals. But the appeal of Locke
2
in that work was made not from the epistemological principles

set forth in his Essay, but from the standpoint of common
sense and simplicity. The significance of Toland's Christianity
not Mysterious for this study lies in the way in which he took
Locke's epistemological doctrines as the basis from which to
explain his own radical religious beliefs. The appearance of
Locke's principles in this context d i d m u c h to focus attention
upon the role of Locke's epistemology in religious knowledge.
Toland pointed out in the preface to his book that the pre
liminary dissertation upon reason was not of such importance
that the rest of the book could not be understood without
understanding these principles. He inserted this discussion to
'prevent the foreseen Wranglings of certain Men, who study
more \o protract and perplex than to terminate a Contro-
1
From Puritanism to the Age ofReason (1950), p. 139. Cf. Abbey and Overton,
The English Church in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i , p. 182.
z
T h e most vehement of these were those of John Edwards, the same man
who in 1701 maintained the na'ive form of innateness in opposition to Locke.
Cf. his Some Thoughts Concerning the Several Causes and Occasions of Atheism
(1695) and Socinianism Unmask'd(i6g6).
sECT.i I D E A S I N R E L I G I O U S K N O W L E D G E 119
versy' (p. xviii). But i n a work which took as its main tenet
the belief that 'Reason is the only Foundation of all Certitude;
and that nothing reveaPd, whether as to its Manner or Exist¬
ence, is more exempted from its Disquisitions, than the
ordinary Phenomena of Nature' (p. 6), it was not a mere
digression to consider the nature and province of human
reason. The way of ideas played a prominent role in this
discussion.
E v e r y one experiences i n h i m s e l f a P o w e r or F a c u l t y of forming,
v a r i o u s I d e a s or P e r c e p t i o n s of T h i n g s ; O f affirming or d e n y i n g , a c c o r d
i n g as h e sees t h e m to agree or disagree: A n d so of l o v i n g a n d d e s i r i n g
w h a t seems good u n t o h i m ; a n d of h a t i n g a n d a v o i d i n g w h a t h e t h i n k s
evil. T h e right U s e of all these F a c u l t i e s is w h a t w e call C o m m o n S e n s e ,
or Reason i n general. B u t the bare A c t of r e c e i v i n g I d e a s into the M i n d ,
w h e t h e r by the Intromission of the Senses, as C o l o u r s , F i g u r e s , S o u n d s ,
S m e l l s , &c. or b y the Soul's considering its own Operations about what it
thus gets from without, as K n o w i n g , D o u b t i n g , Affirming, D e n y i n g , &c.
t h i s bare A c t , I say, of r e c e i v i n g s u c h I d e a s into the M i n d , is not
strictly Reason, because the S o u l h e r e i n is p u r e l y passive. ( P p . 9 - 1 0 ) .
Reason is later defined as 4hat Faculty every one has ofJudging

of his Idea!s according to their Agreement or Disagreemenf
(p. 57). Ideas are divided into simple and complex, and the
Lockean definition ofknowledge is reproduced almostverbatim.
Toland also draws the distinction between intuitive or self-
evident knowledge and demonstrative or mediate knowledge,
insisting as Locke had done that each step of a demonstration
must be itself self-evident. He limits the term 'reason' more
properly to mediate knowledge, making the ideas of sense and
reflection 'the common Stock of all our Knowledg; nor can
we possibly have Ideas any other way without new Organs
or Faculties' (pp. 14-15). The representative character of
Locke's epistemplogy is fully recognized and accepted
(pp. 16-17) and the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities reappears.
T h e R e a s o n t h e n w h y I believe the I d e a of a R o s e to be evident, is the

true R e p r e s e n t a t i o n it g i v e s m e of that F l o w e r . I k n o w it i s t r u e , because
the R o s e m u s t contain all the P r o p e r t i e s w h i c h its I d e a exhibits, either
i2o R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
really, as the B u l k a n d F o r m , o r occasionally, as t h e C o l o u r , T a s t e , a n d

S m e l l . A n d I c a n n o t doubt of this, because the Properties m u s t b e l o n g
to the e x e m p l a r y C a u s e , or to N o t h i n g , or be the F i g m e n t s o f m y o w n
B r a i n : B u t N o t h i n g c a n h a v e no P r o p e r t i e s ; a n d I cannot m a k e one
single I d e a at m y P l e a s u r e , n o r a v o i d r e c e i v i n g s o m e w h e n O b j e c t s w o r k
o n m y S e n s e s : T h e r e f o r e I c o n c l u d e the P r o p e r t i e s of the R o s e are not
the C r e a t u r e s of m y F a n c y , b u t b e l o n g to the e x e m p l a r y C a u s e , that is,
the O b j e c t ( p . 18).
Faithful representation by ideas of their objects isrequired

by Toland for his basic principle of evidence, which he defines
as 4he exact Conformity of our Ideas or Thoughts with their
Objects, or the Things we think upon' (p. 1 6 ) . So long as we
consult the reports contained i n our ideas, we shall never err.
Thus, the way of ideas, with its representative capacity assured
as valid, becomes the sole guide for all truth and knowledge.
The criterion of clear and distinct ideas enables us to set the
limits to reason: 'what is evidently repugnant to clear anddistinct
Idea's, or to our Common Notions, is contrary to Reason' (p. 23).
However, counter to the charges made by some of Toland's
critics, clarity and distinctness did not constitute the sole
criterion of certainty or intelligibility for him. W i t h Locke's
doctrine of real and nominal essence i n mind, he argued
*Thatnothingcan besaid to be a Mystery, because we have not an
adequate Idea of it, or a distinct View of all its Properties at
once; for then every thing would be a Mystery' (p. 75). The
restrictions inherent in human knowledge do not place any
unnecessary limits to knowledge: 'knowing nothing of Bodies
but their Properties, God has wisely provided we should under
stand no more of these than are meful and necessary for us;
which is all our present Condition needs' (p. 76). The doctrine
of real and nominal essences is developed at length by Toland,
where we find the first open reference to Locke. 'As we know
not all the Properties of things, so we can never conceive the
Essence of any Substance i n the World. T o avoid ambiguity,
I distinguish, after an excellent modern Philosopher, the
Nominal from the Real Essence of a thing' (p. 83). Like
Locke, Toland used the doctrine of a twofold essence, not by
way of excluding all reference to a trans-empirical reality, but
as a means of accepting the doctrine of real essence without

having to admit a mysterious element actively necessary in
our knowledge.
I t follows n o w v e r y p l a i n l y , that nothing can be said to be a Mystery,
because we are ignorant of its real Essence, since it is not more knowable in
one thing than in another, and is never conceiv'd or included in the Ideas we
have of things, or the Names we give y
em ( p . 8 5 ) .
Clarity and distinctness are made consistent with inadequacy

and obscurity i n virtue of the doctrine that, though limited i n
scope, man's knowledge is nevertheless sufficient for his
needs. But though we lack a precise knowledge of the real
essence of material or immaterial substances, we are not
thereby given licence to deny their reality.
T h e r e is n o t h i n g m o r e e v i d e n t t h a n the M o d e s o r P r o p e r t i e s o f
BODY, as to be e x t e n d e d , s o l i d , d i v i s i b l e , s m o o t h , r o u g h , soft, h a r d ,
&c. B u t w e k n o w as little of t h e i n t e r n a l C o n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h is the
S u p p o r t of these sensible Q u a l i t i e s , as w e do of that w h e r e i n the O p e r a
tions o f the SOUL reside. A n d , as the great M a n I j u s t n o w m e n t i o n ' d
observes, we may as well deny the Existence of B o d y , because we have not
an Idea ofits real Essence, as call the Being ofthe S o u l in questionfor the
same reason (p. 87).
Immediately after the publication of Toland's book, a great

outcry was made against it and its author. I t was the subject
of a court action i n Dublin, where Toland was residing, and
Toland was advised to leave the city. I t was also the object of
a censure issued by the Grand Jury of Middlesex. A l l over 1
England and Ireland replies to the doctrines of Toland began

to appear. More than half of these directed a large portion
of their attack against the epistemological principles i n
voked in the first part, the principles borrowed from Locke.
Thomas Beverley, i n Christianity The Great Mystery (1696),
objected to the restriction of the term 'reason' to 'the
singling out of that compare, and ballancing of the Idea's
of the M i n d , and Arguing from them . . .' (p. 13). Fear of the
scepticism of the way of ideas was expressed by the same
writer i n a charge similar to that made by Sergeant one
1
Cf. Gailhard's account of the edict, in his The Epistle and Preface To the Book
against the Blasphemous Socinian Heresie (1698), p. 82.
122 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M CH. IV
year later: 'Any pretended Idea's that are not according to

Things, are Fantoms, and not Idea's; all other Apprehen
sions, Conceptions, Notions, Conclusions, that Created
Understandings can Form, are nothing, i f taken out of the
Understandings that Formed them; . . (p. 17). A n anony
mous critic writing i n 1697 Reflexions upon Mr. Toland's
Book, insisted that clear and distinct ideas can, i n reference
1
to revealed truth, only tell us that things are possible. The only
ground we have for believing, for example, i n the flood, is that
God tells us about it (pp. 4-5). 'Now I have as little Prejudice
against clear Ideas as I have against an infallible judge; but I
am afraid that in many cases these are as hard to be found as
the other' (p. 13). The question of what constitutes being
'above reason' was bound up with the criterion of clarity and
distinctness as a basis for knowledge.
I t was, however, i n the hands of Peter Browne and the
bishop of Worcester that these epistemological principles
invoked by Toland found their ablest opponents. Browne, i n
A Letter in Answer to a Book Entituled, Christianity not
Mysterious (1697), admitted that Toland was correct i n saying
that Christianity was not mysterious, since it was meant for
the plainest men in the world; but he insisted that this asser
tion does not mean that there are no mysteries in Christianity.
He agreed that there is nothing contrary to reason in the
Gospels and nothing above reason, i n the sense of being
beyond our comprehension. 'But if by not being above reason,
be meant that there is nothing spoke of in it, but what we have
as compleat and perfect knowledge of, as we have of any
object of our Senses, it is absolutely false; . . (p. 8). Toland's
doctrine of evidence as the only ground of persuasion is
criticized as overlooking the basis of authority i n religious
knowledge: 'all natural Truths which do not necessarily
require Revelation, need no other ground of perswasion, but
Evidence and Authority' (p. 19). Browne agrees that 'Clear
and distinct Idea's are the foundation of all our knowledge and
assent', but insists t h a t i t is false to say 'we can believe nothing
1
First published in The Occasional Papcr, as no. 3 (1697).
but what we have a clear and distinct Idea of' (pp. 27-28).
His point is that we believe some things of which we do not
have clear and distinct ideas, on the strength of some clear
and distinct ideas which we do have. He insists that, though
we do not have any clear and distinct idea of the things of the
other world, we are bound to believe i n these things on the
authority of the Scriptures, which provide the base of clear
and distinct ideas. I t w as typical of Browne that while object
T
ing to the doctrines of Toland and Locke, he nevertheless

showed a strong proclivity towards the doctrines he was
arguing against. Thus, he did not reject outright the doctrine
of clarity and distinctness as criteria for certain knowledge.
Toland and Locke had, of course, accepted the existence of
real substances despite the obscurity of our knowledge of
them—an assumption of no less weight than Browne's insist
ence upon Christian dogma. But this non-empirical assump
tion on the part of Toland and Locke was missed by Browne,
as well as by most other critics of the century. Browne went
on, by way of supporting his case for the necessity of accepting
notions lacking clarity and distinctness, to distinguish
between immediate ideas, 'a conception or notion of the thing
as it is in itself\ and mediate ideas, a notion weform of any (
thing in our Minds by Analogy or Similitude' (p. 31). This

distinction was developed at great length i n his later work,
The Procedure, Extent, and Limits of Human Understanding
(1728). Here it constitutes the necessary division between
knowledge and faith: 'we have no proper Idea's of the things
of another World, but frame to ourselves conceptions of them
from those things i n this World whereof we have clear and
distinct Idea's'. I n this way, ' i t is plain that though we may
1
be said to have Ideas of God and Divine things, yet they are
not immediate or proper ones, but a sort of composition we
make up from, our Idea's of Worldly Objects; which at the
utmost amounts to no more than a Type or Figure, by which
something in another world is signified'. 2
1
A Letter in Answer to . . . Christianity not Mysterious, p. 32.
2
Ibid., p. 41.
i24 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
Browne went on to attack the doctrine of substance and

essence in Toland's book, but more importantly, like many
of his contemporaries, he attacked the way of ideas as i t
appeared in the service of religion, his main argument being
that this way to knowledge did not do justice to religious
beliefs. Scepticism and the limitation of knowledge to the
natural or physical realm were the feared consequences of this
method. Stillingfleet expressed the same reaction to Toland
and Locke as did Browne, but his first attack unfortunately
overemphasized the role of the criterion of clarity and dis
tinctness in the two systems. The erection of all knowledge
upon such a criterion excludes, he insisted,
all certainty of F a i t h o r R e a s o n , w h e r e w e cannot have s u c h clear and
distinct Ideas. B u t i f there are m a n y things of w h i c h w e m a y be c e r t a i n ,
a n d yet c a n have no clear and distinct Ideas of t h e m ; i f those Ideas we
have, are too imperfect a n d o b s c u r e to f o r m o u r J u d g m e n t s b y ; i f w e
cannot find out sufficient intermediate I d e a s ; t h e n t h i s cannot be the
Means o f Certainty, or the Foundation of Reason.1
After discussing the doctrine of substance, Stillingfleet con

cludes: T o r I take it, that the main Debate in point of Reason
depends upon this, whether we can be certain of the Being
of a Thing, of which we can have no clear and distinct Idea ?
I f we may, then it can be no Objection in point of Revelation,
that we can have no clear and distinct Idea of the Matter
revealed; . . .' But in the answer to Locke's Reply to . . . the
2
Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his Letter, Stillingfleet shifted

his attack to the more important and accurate charge that
the certainty to be had by the way of ideas was inadequate for
religious knowledge. He insisted that certainty by ideas refers
to certainty by means of propositions and is to be distin
guished from certainty by sense. Furthermore, he distin
guishes these two ways of certainty from a third, certainty by
reason, 'When from the Existence of some things evident to
Sense, we inferr the Existence of another thing not evident
to Sense.' The latter is demonstrated by an example of the
3
inference to substance from sensible qualities. Finally

1
A Discourse in Vindication of The... Trinity (1697), p. 233. 2
Ibid., p. 280.
3
The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter (1697), Ρ· Ι Χ
·
Stillingfleet distinguished a certainty by remembrance. I n all

cases he argued that some clear and distinct ideas are necessary
for certainty, although the final knowledge we reach may
involve obscure ideas. He expresses doubts concerning the
ability of the way of ideas to furnish certainty of God's exist
ence and certainty of the immateriality of the human soul.
Like Berkeley, Stillingfleet suggested that there is no criterion
provided by Locke for knowing when we have clear and
distinct ideas. 'But suppose an Idea happen to be thought by
some to be clear and distinct, and others should think the
contrary to be so, what hopes of Demonstration by clear and
distinct Ideas then?' 1
Toland had, of course, gone beyond the bounds of Locke's

principles in laying such stress upon clarity and distinctness
as the criteria of certainty, but we have seen that even for
him this was not the sole basis in terms of which certainty and
rationality were weighed. Locke was quick to call Stilling-
fleet's attention to the subordinate role this criterion played
in his own system.
W h o y o u r l o r d s h i p h e r e argues against, u n d e r the title o f t h i s n e w
h y p o t h e s i s about reason, I confess I do not k n o w . F o r I do not r e m e m b e r
that I have a n y w h e r e p l a c e d c e r t a i n t y o n l y i n clear a n d distinct ideas,
b u t i n the clear a n d v i s i b l e c o n n e x i o n of a n y of o u r ideas, be those ideas
w h a t they w i l l ; as w i l l appear to a n y one w h o w i l l look into B . iv. c. 4, n o .
18, a n d B . iv, c. 6, no. 3, o f m y E s s a y , . . . 2
Locke admitted that the clearer and more distinct the ideas
involved are, the more clear and distinct would be our reason
ing about them, but he readily pointed out that he recognized
that we may have certainty about obscure ideas:
b y the clear ideas of t h i n k i n g i n m e , I find the agreement of the clear i d e a
of existence, a n d the o b s c u r e idea of a substance i n m e , because I p e r
ceive the necessary idea of t h i n k i n g , a n d the relative idea of a s u p p o r t ;
w h i c h support, w i t h o u t h a v i n g a n y clear a n d d i s t i n c t idea o f w h a t it i s ,
b e y o n d t h i s relative one of a support, I call s u b s t a n c e . 3
Locke was loud in his protestations that he had been falsely

coupled with Toland. He accordingly sought to dissociate his
1
Ibid., p. 141.
2
Letter to the ... Bishop of Worcester, in Works t vol. iv, p. 29. 3
I b i d . , p. 42.
824331 K
120 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M C H . IV
way of ideas from that used by such men as Toland. But three
major factors led Locke's contemporaries to find justice i n
Stillingfleet's insistence that, even though some men used his
ideas to bad purposes, Locke should feel a duty and com
pulsion to explain his system and to show how it did not
undermine the fundamental articles of the Christian religion:
( i ) the newness of the application of the way of ideas i n the
Essay, a factor which we have already examined; (2) the
doctrine of substance and essence which was not distorted by
Toland and which occupied the minds of so many men in the
century; and (3) the many rephrasings of various parts of the
Essay in the deistical tracts of the period, a factor which I shall
examine at length in the next chapter. I t is the second factor
which we must now examine, bearing i n mind that although
Stillingfleet and others may have falsely supposed that Locke
placed the criterion of certainty in clear and distinct ideas,
their reaction against the doctrines of the Essay was motivated
by the disbelief which they all shared in the fruitfulness of
the way of ideas in religious knowledge. I f the way of ideas
placed its emphasis upon an empirical, naturalistic foundation
for all knowledge, if the radical new sects i n religion could
draw support so easily from the Essay, and i f the way of ideas
pursued by Locke discounted (if not discarded) the doctrine
of real substances, that book was open to suspicion from all
the tradition-directed members of society.
§ 2—The Doctrine of Substance

As I have already remarked, Locke was the heir of two
traditions which he tried to combine in the Essay. The
phenomenalism of Burthogge's way of ideas found for the most
part a consistent elaboration i n the first twenty-two chapters
of Book Two of the Essay. Even in the doctrine of substance
expounded in chapter twenty-three, the phenomenalistic
doctrine of Boyle and More concerning substance and the
classification of physical objects into genera is clearly i n 1
1
Boyle, R. The Origine of Formes and Qualities, pp. 59, 61-62; More, H .
The Immortality of the Soul, pp. 11, 51.
SECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 127
evidence. The scholastic doctrine of substance had earlier

(bk. i i , ch. xiii, nos. 18-20) been ridiculed by Locke i n terms
which would lead the reader to think he was encountering
another attack upon tradition. Such ridicule brought its own
share of criticism from Locke's readers, but it was the more
positive doctrine of substance as the underlying core of
physical and immaterial objects which aroused the more
heated debates. Locke was concerned to limit the discussion
of substance to the idea of substance w hich men can be said T
to have. As with the problem of the physical genesis of per

ception, where he wished to avoid all questions of the physio
logical components of this sensitive act, so with the problem
of substance, he ostensibly proclaimed himself uninterested
in the problem of the ontological nature of substance, insisting
that the idea which we can have of substance is at most only
an obscure and indefinite conception. That he did not doubt
the ontological reality of substance as commonly conceived
in his century may be construed from his protestation to
Stillingfleet that he was not among those thinkers who wished
to read substance out of the world. Moreover, it seems clear 1
enough from the Essay itself that Locke thought of substance

as the locus of thereal essence and as the principle of indi
viduation of physical and immaterial objects. But it is equally
clear, I think, that Locke was working towards a new con
ception of substance i n keeping with the phenomenalism of
men like Burthogge, a doctrine which defines substance i n
terms of the collection of qualities composing a given object.
However, the expansion of this latter novel conception proved
too difficult for Locke. He was not as indifferent to onto
logical questions as his statements sometimes imply. He was
concerned to explain the individual identity of objects and
found that he could not do so, to his satisfaction at least,
without some recourse to non-phenomenalistic categories,
although he was able to find satisfaction i n accounting for
personal identity without appeal to such categories. When we
pass to this aspect of Locke's concept of substance, two
1
Letter to the . . . Bishop of Worcester, in Works, vol. iv, pp. 6-7.
alternatives present themselves. Either we can interpret him

in the most sympathetic manner possible as appealing to a
mental category of substance as the unifying principle in the
diversity of experience, or we can read him as holding reluc
tantly to a clear ontological doctrine of substance as a pre
requisite for explaining knowledge and reality. The latter, the
actual approach Locke took in controversy with the Bishop of
Worcester, is very close to the traditional doctrine of substance.
The discussion of substance in the Essay was concerned
with the epistemological problems related to our knowledge
of substarice, and not with the ontological nature of this
important term. I t was the epistemological restrictions de
fended by Locke that attracted the attention of his readers.
But the reception of this aspect of Locke's doctrine was not
entirely critical; the doctrine and the terminology employed
by Locke appear in some of the theological tracts of the
century. William Sherlock was probably one of the very first
of the theologians openly to adopt the language and concepts of
the Essay. Writing in 1690 to defend his particularversion
of the doctrine of the Trinity, Sherlock, the same man who
was to attack Locke so vigorously in 1704 on the question of
innate ideas, asserted that 'all Men must confess, that they
have not a clear and comprehensive Notion of the Nature and
Essential Properties of a Spirit'. He went on to affirm that
1
I t is agreed b y all M e n , w h o ever considered this matter, that the

essences of things cannot be k n o w n , b u t o n l y their properties a n d
q u a l i t i e s : T h e W o r l d is d i v i d e d into M a t t e r , a n d S p i r i t , a n d w e k n o w
no m o r e , w h a t the substance of M a t t e r , t h a n w h a t the substance o f
S p i r i t is, t h o u g h w e t h i n k w e k n o w one, m u c h better t h a n the o t h e r : W e
k n o w t h u s m u c h o f M a t t e r , that it is a n extended substance, w h i c h
fills a space, a n d has distinct parts, w h i c h m a y be separated f r o m e a c h
other, that it is susceptible of v e r y different qualities, that it is hot o r
cold, h a r d or soft, &c. b u t w h a t the substance of M a t t e r is, w e k n o w n o t :
A n d t h u s w e k n o w the essential properties of a S p i r i t ; that it is a t h i n k
i n g substance, w i t h the F a c u l t i e s of U n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d W i l l . . . b u t
w h a t the substance of a S p i r i t is, w e k n o w no m o r e t h a n w h a t the s u b
stance of matter i s . 2
1
A Vindication of the Doctrine ofthe . . . Trinity (1690), p. 4.
2
Ibid., pp. 7-8.
sECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 129
Abstracted from its properties, neither matter nor spirit can

have any meaning.
F o r w h a t the E s s e n c e a n d S u b s t a n c e of a S p i r i t i s , w h e n w e d i s
t i n g u i s h it f r o m U n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d W i l l , w h i c h w e call the P o w e r s a n d
F a c u l t i e s of a S p i r i t ; for m y part, I k n o w not, no m o r e t h a n I do, w h a t
the n a k e d E s s e n c e a n d S u b s t a n c e of M a t t e r is, stript of all its Q u a l i t i e s
and Accidents A n d therefore as w e frame the N o t i o n of B o d i e s f r o m
t h e i r external a n d sensible Q u a l i t i e s , so w e m u s t frame the N o t i o n of a
S p i r i t f r o m its intellectual P o w e r s , o f W i l l , a n d U n d e r s t a n d i n g , & c . 1
Even as late as 1697, Sherlock was appealing to this Lockean

doctrine as a defence against some Socinian attackers. There 2
is never any open reference to Locke in Sherlock's early

works, but it would seem clear that he exemplifies the i m
mediate absorption of Lockean doctrines even by those who
attacked Locke on other grounds. Sherlock's use of such
principles, just like Toland's similar borrowings later, did not
go unchallenged. Robert South, a believer in the naive form
of innateness, in his Animadversions upon Dr. Sherlock's Book
(1693), attacked the theoretical structure upon which Sher
lock's doctrine of the Trinity was built. Setting up the 3
familiar substance-accident ontology as a counter-division

to Sherlock's matter-spirit dichotomy, South argued as
follows against the Lockean doctrine of substance:
N o w , if b y knowing, he m e a n s the knowledge of a t h i n g , b y a d i r e c t
Apprehension, a n d Intuition of it, so as to have a n exact I d e a , or r e s e m b
lance of it thereby i m p r i n t e d u p o n the m i n d : I p r e t e n d not that the
Essences 0/ things are b y any H u m a n I n t e l l e c t so k n o w n . B u t t h e n , t h i s is
still b u t one w a y of k n o w l e d g e ; . . . B u t i f o n the other side, b y knowing
a thing be meant, the k n o w i n g it to be of s u c h , or s u c h a N a t u r e , b y s u c h
p e c u l i a r Properties, s u c h peculiar Effects, a n d O p e r a t i o n s , as d i s c r i m i n
ate it f r o m other things, a n d that, to k n o w it t h u s , be t r u l y to k n o w i t :
T h e n I affirm That the Natures, or Essences of things may be truly and
(one w a y at least) perfectly known (p. 15).
South did not intend to acquiesce in the Lockean doctrine of

nominal essence, whereas Sherlock apparently was ready to
1
Ibid., pp. 73-74.
2
Sherlock, A Vindication qfDr. Sherlock's Sermon (1697), pp. 29-30.
3
T h i s doctrine came to be styled Тп-Тгткапап18т because Sherlock
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>
sought to give each of the three figures in the traditional doctrine a separate and
unique reality.
i o
3 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
accept it without seeing the dangerous consequences for

religion of such an acceptance. South was convinced that the
real nature of an object is revealed through its effects. Accept
ing the traditional ontology, South argued that we can gain
an adequate idea of the nature of substance from reflection
and definitions. Sherlock's limitation of the idea of substance
to that which can be derived from matter and sensation was
thereby rejected. 'Essence' is that by which a thing is what it
is and this is never hidden from us: it is provided by the
metaphysical postulates of the system which South and his
countrymen inherited. Any doctrine which denied these
postulates not only disrupted tradition and hence came under
the censure of orthodoxy; but, by making the real essence of
substance unknowable, the Lockean doctrine exposed the
doctrine of the Trinity to attacks. For i f we cannot know
the real nature of substance, how can we be expected to
understand or even find intelligible the doctrine which pro
claims that three distinct personalities inhere i n the same
substance ?
Sherlock's peculiar version of the doctrine of the Trinity
aroused many criticisms in the century, but very few besides
South sought to undermine the doctrine of substance at its
base. This early absorption of Lockean principles by the
defenders of orthodoxy against the new radical sects of the
day went unnoticed. Locke's name was not even mentioned
in the controversy. Sherlock's departure from orthodoxy was
1
not as radical as that of Toland, though the disputes it aroused

were no less vehement. But it was not until Toland's employ
ment of it that Locke's doctrine of substance was brought out
mto the open and proclaimed inimical to traditional religion.
For all of the critics of Toland's work who looked to the
theoretical structure of his position, the complaint against
the doctrine of substance was the same; by denying man a
T h a t Sherlock was familiar with thc Essay is attested by the fact that in one
1
of his replies to South, he cites Locke as an authority for the doctrine of personal
identity, another doctrine which Sherlock borrowed and adapted from Locke.
(Cf. his A Defence ofDr. Sherlock's Notion (1694), p. 6.) So far as I know, Locke
was never mentioned by Sherlock in relation to the doctrine of substance.
knowledge of the essence of substance, the doctrine of the

Trinity was endangered. Oliver H i l l (A Rodfor the Back of
Fools, 1702) interpreted Toland as arguing that Christianity
is not mysterious because all things are equally mysterious in
their real essence. 'A rare way it is to prove that there is no
Mystery, by making every thing a Mystery to Mankind; and
to make Reason capable to apprehend Mysteries, by shewing
it knows nothing' (p. 19). H i l l had no doubts concerning our
knowledge of the real essences of things. 'That Mankind hath
some knowledge of the true Essence of things, and adequate
Ideas, appears to me very plain from Adam in Paradise,
giving names to all the Beasts according to their Nature.'
(Ibid.) The same line of attack is found in the anonymous reply
to Toland, Reflexions upon Mr. Toland's Book (1697). Peter 1
Browne (A Letter in Answer to a Book Entituled, Christianity

not Mysterious, 1697) did not find the distinction between real
and nominal essence quite so disturbing as did some other
writers, but only because, by reducing it to a common-sense
recognition of the limitations of human knowledge, he took
most of the sting out of Locke's doctrine. He argued that
it is absurd to say there are two essences in one thing, con
fessing that he does not think the doctrine in its original
application (he recognized Toland's borrowing) meant to
assert such absurdities.
I f it h a d b e e n said i n p l a i n language, that there is s o m e t h i n g i n n a t u r a l
t h i n g s we do apprehend, a n d s o m e t h i n g we do not; w h i c h is all t h a t ' s
m e a n t i n that d i s t i n c t i o n : T h i s w o u ' d have b e e n P h i l o s o p h y for the
V u l g a r ; a n d therefore to m a k e a M y s t e r y o f it, it m u s t be c a l P d the
Nominal a n d Real Essence of a t h i n g : t h o u g h it c a r r y a flat c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n
Physicks, a n d a m o n s t r o u s c o n s e q u e n c e i n Morality, a n d lays a f o u n d a
t i o n for E t e r n a l S c e p t i c i s m (p. 110).
But Locke was not merely saying that w e know some things r
about natural objects and are ignorant of others: he was cast

ing doubt upon man's ability to grasp the real essence of those
objects. I t was this challenge to tradition which disturbed his
contemporaries.
1
Cf. pp. 27-28, no. 3 of The Occasional Paper.
The longest and most sustained attack against Locke's

concept of substance came from Stillingfleet's pen. Briefly,
Stillingfleet wrote to show that the idea of substance does not
come from sense or reflection; that the new way of reasoning
introduced by Locke had almost discarded substance from
the world; and that Locke was wrong in claiming that nothing
is meant by the term 'substance' except a supposition of
T know not what'. He argues that, although we cannot have
1
a clear idea of substance, we can still have some more definite

conception than Locke allows. Such a conception is formed
from the general idea of substance 'which the mind doth form,
not by meer comparing those Ideas it has got by Sense or Reflec
tion; but by forming distinct general Notions of things from
particular Ideas' (p. 235). Like Locke he argues that this
general idea of substance is a rational idea demanded by
consideration of the modes and accidents, but he objects to
Locke's founding this supposition upon such a tenuous basis
as a necessity of thought, insisting that the idea is founded
upon 'true reason'. The way of ideas is attacked generally as
not being able to provide an idea of a spiritual substance which
could, with complete certainty, exclude all possibility of
matter being given a power of thought. Against the doctrine
of real and nominal essence he argued that either we can
know from the idea-effects that real beings do exist as their
cause, or it is impossible 'to have any certainty at all of any
thing without ourselves' (p. 256). Stillingfleet held to the
former alternative, claiming that although we may not 'com
prehend the internal Frame, or Constitution of things, nor i n
which manner they do flow from the Substance; yet by them
we certainly know that there are such Essences, and that they
are distinguished from each other by their Powers and
Properties' (p. 257). He was, in other words, content with the
assertion, necessitated by his religious metaphysics, that there
are real essences.
I n his Letter to the Right Reverend Edward, Lord Bishop of
Worcester (1697), Locke was anxious to deny Stillingfleet's
1
A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, pp. 233-4.
charge that he had discarded substance, claiming that Book

Two, Chapter Twenty-three was designed precisely to show
that he recognized the ontological reality of this entity. I n 1
this letter he tried to dissociate the idea of substance from

substance itself, insisting that his discussion had been con
cerned with showing the obscurity of the idea, and even that
Stillingfleet's conception was no more definite than his own.
'Nay, as long as there is any simple idea or sensible quality
left, according to my way of arguing, substance cannot be
discarded; because all simple ideas, all sensible qualities,
carry with them a supposition of a substratum to exist i n ,
and of a substance wherein they inhere.' But it was this very
2
supposition to which Locke appealed that seemed to Stilling

fleet to poise the doctrine of substance upon so precarious a
foundation. I n his reply to Locke's letter, Stillingfleet pointed
out that the issue between them was not whether Locke
recognized substance as an ontological ingredient in the
world, but whether from his principles we can obtain any
certainty of reason about substance. I f not, we cannot say
what it is that distinguishes one person from another. More
over, he objected to Locke's entire doctrine of personal
identity, since Locke made the identity of persons completely
distinct from any relation to substance. Finally, ' i f Nature3
and Person be abstract, and complex Ideas, as you say, and such
are only Acts of the M i n d , I do not see how it is possible for
you to reconcile these Notions with the Articles of the Trinity
and Incarnation'* Even i f Locke does admit a belief in real
substance, his principles will not allow us to gain knowledge
of its nature. Arbitrary classification is substituted for natural
or real sorting by God. Stillingfleet's description of our idea
of substance is, of course, identical with Locke's except that
he prefers to call it a necessary or rational idea, 'because it is
a Repugnance to our first conception of Things that Modes or
1
I n Works, vol. iv, p. 5. Cf. p. 18. Ibid., p. 7.
2
3
Mathew T i n d a l had in 1695 invoked both Locke's doctrine of substance and
his doctrine of identity in his interpretation of the Trinity. Cf. his Reflexions on
the XXVIII Propositions touching the Doctrine of the Trinity, pp. 22-24.
4
Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter (1698), p. 55.
Accidents should subsist by themselves'. The repugnance for

1
him, the necessity of thought compelling us to posit or think

of something over and above the sensible qualities, was de
rived from 'Reason and Consideration of the true Nature of
things.' Locke's contention i n the face of all such assertions
2
was simply that he had found no one as yet who could show
how such knowledge of natural kinds was derived. But one
of the main merits of Stillingfleet's criticism was toshow that
Locke could not derive even the obscure idea of substance,
which he claimed, from his own principles. On Locke's
avowed principle of deriving all knowledge from ideas of
sensation and reflection, we can have no idea of substance
except as a complication or collection of simple qualities.
Locke admitted to Stillingfleet that the idea of substance was
never meant to arise out of sensation or reflection alone, but
was a manufactured idea constructed by the mind from the
general notion of substance abstracted from each particular
idea of substance, and from the relative idea of a support.
But Locke nowhere explains i n terms ofhis general empirical
scheme for all ideas, merely from a consideration of the sensible
ideas of qualities collected into wholes, how the mind can
derive the non-empirical concept of a real ontological sub
stance supporting these qualities. The transcendence of his
own empirical phenomenalism was made possible only by a
bold rationalism grafted on to his earlier attempts at con
structing an empirical epistemology. Locke's idea of sub
stance as an addition to the sensible qualities, as the locus of
the real essence, is not derivable from simple ideas of sense
but is an hypothesis of reason. That the impetus for form
ing the concept arose i n part from experience is, as Aaron
has suggested, very probable; for sensible qualities are
experienced in unity, not as isolated factors. 'There is an
awareness of ideas as going together. The mind has not ideas
of isolated qualities, but of qualities together i n one unity.
Now here, surely, is the empirical basis of the concept of
1
Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter (1697), Ρ· 4·Γ
2
A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 258.
thing' I t was to account for such concomitance of qualities

1
that Locke seems to have formulated his non-phenomenalist

concept of substance, but it hardly seems correct to say that
this concomitance supplies the empirical basis for the con
cept. A t most, it provides an empirical foundation for a
phenomenalist concept of 'thing* or 'substance', since the
togetherness refers to qualities and nothing more. Where is
the empirical justification for going beyond the association of
qualities to seek a non-empirical explanation o f t h i s phenor
menon ? As Stillingfleet queried: 'How came we to know that
these Accidents were such feeble things ? What simple Ideas in-
form'd you of it ? I f none, then it is to be hoped there is some
other way to attain Knowledge and Certainty i n this matter.' 2
I n book i i , ch. xxiii, Locke calls the primary qualities 'acci

dents' and insists that the mind feels constrained to think a
substratum for them to inhere i n . But i n book ii, ch. viii he
claims that the primary qualities are combined into atoms or
particles to constitute the real qualities of physical objects.
Locke was unable to remain satisfied with this phenomenalist
definition. He felt the need of a unifying principle for the
primary qualities themselves, a principle or category to unite
the various atoms comprising a given object into one whole.
But i f the primary qualities are the irreducible elements of the
physical world, and i f they form spatial relations between
themselves, where is substance to be located? I f atoms are
material particles which cannot be penetrated, i n what sort of
stuff could they inhere or be combined, save a material stuff?
If, on the other hand, substance is not material, what else
could i t be save a mental category enabling us to view ex
perience as unified? Locke was perhaps working towards
some such Kantian position, but the force of the traditional
categories was, even for him, too strong to permit such a
radical departure. He was convinced of the necessity of some
thing over and above 'the extension, figure, solidity, motion,
thinking, or other observable idea' of objects, but he main
tained that we can form no determinate idea of this unifying
1
Aaron, op. cit., p. 171. 2
Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter, p. 17.
i 6
3 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cn.iv
factor. Stillingfleet held the troublesome aspect of this

1
doctrine to be Locke's candid recognition of the indeter

minate character of our idea of this rational conception.
Nothing i n Locke's empiricism, nothing in the doctrine of
ideas as expressed i n the early portions of Book Two, permits
the introduction of this complex idea of substance. Just as
Stillingfleet claimed, the supposition is made by our reason
without any legitimate empirical grounds i n sensation or
reflection. Stillingfleet was correct too i n calling attention to
the pernicious character of Locke's recognition of the i n
determinate character of our knowledge i n this respect, for
a certainty of real substance was, as he argued against Locke,
required for the defence of important religious doctrines.
Locke did not succeed in showing how his principles were
consistent with these doctrines. He made his general system
harmonious with Christianity, however, by a tour deforce, by
resorting to postulates of reason. I t was to Stillingfleet's
credit to have seen the crucial split i n Locke's avowed pro
cedures ; but their controversy, so pregnant with possibilities
of clarifying the position, terminated without his eliciting
from Locke anything more than rephrasings of his doctrines
and a constant plea to be dissociated from the Deists and the
Socinian thinkers.
The Toland-Stillingfleet controversy concerning the nature
and role of substance in religious knowledge did not constitute
the sole attack upon the doctrine of substance. Pierre Bayle
in France criticized the doctrine from the perspective of its
incompatibility with the immateriality of mind or spirit.
Bayle credits the indeterminate character of our knowledge
of substance in Locke's Essay to the difficulty of conceiving
how mind and matter interact: 'la dificulte de concilier
Pimmaterialite des ämes humaines avec leur situation dans des
corps organisez a contraint d'habiles gens ä soutenir . . . que
ce qui constitue la substance d'un esprit, & la substance d'un
corps nous est entierement inconu . . . .' He interpreted 2
1
Letter to the . . . Bishop of Worcester, in Works, vol. iv, p. 7.
2
Reponse aux Questions d'un Provincial (1704-7), t. iv, p. 219.
Locke as saying that extension, impenetrability, and motion

are properties of matter or material substance but not the
essence of that substance, showing his recognition of the non-
phenomenalistic doctrine of substance in the Essay. These
properties of matter subsist i n an unknown subject, a doctrine
which Bayle holds as equivalent to saying that impenetrability
and extension are accidents of matter and not its defining
characteristics. But such a position is incongruous with the doc
trine of transubstantiation, for Locke's doctrinethus understood
claims that matter, considered as essential and substantial, is
able to exist without extension. The same argument applies
to thought in reference to mind, mind being able to exist
without thought i f thought is only an accidental property
distinct from the essential nature of mind. Moreover, i f our
knowledge of the real essence is so obscure and incomplete
as Locke claims, we cannot say that mind cannot be extended
or that matter cannot think. The most that we can say is that
experience reveals that the one is susceptible of thought, the
other of extension. We may perhaps say i n addition, Bayle
suggests, that there is something in the substance of matter
which makes it more susceptible to extension than to thought,
and likewise that there is something in spirit more receptive
to thought than to extension, but we could not explain this
tendency. Thus, 'on ne pourra plus conclurre que si une
substance pense elle est immaterielle', an inference which
Bayle, like many other men of the period, wished to assert
with the utmost force. Finally, Bayle believed that the
1
doctrine of substance in the Essay could lead only to Tancien

Chaos des Scholastiques, ä l'eduction des formes, ä la distinc
tion reelle entre la substance & ses accidens, & ä tels autres
dogmes absolument inexplicables'. 2
Locke found his defender against Bayle in LeClerc, who,

in his long review of the fifth edition of the Essay i n his
Bibliotheque Choisie, sought to show that Bayle had mis
interpreted Locke's doctrine of substance. For LeClerc, Bayle
was a man 'peu propre ä penetrer & ä developper une matiere;
1
Ibid., p. 222. 2
Ibid., p. 223.
i 8
mais trfes-propre ä faire des difficultez sans fin, contre ce

qu'il n'entendoit pas'. But LeClerc failed to appreciate the
1
acuteness of Bayle's insights. The criticism of substance

in Bayle's Reponse is, like Stillingfleet's criticism, religiously
oriented and designed to show the sceptical consequences of
following out the doctrine of the Essay i n all its implications;
and like Stillingfleet, Bayle hit upon a crucial difficulty i n the
doctrine. The difficulty can be formulated as an alternative:
either Locke must keep his doctrine of substance restricted
to the phenomenalistic level and reduce substance to a col
lection of qualities, or he has to be interpreted as claiming
(what seems clearly to have been his intention) that substance
is something over and above the known properties. He did
not, it is true, wish to hold that substance can exist without
its accidents, without its primary qualities; but, however
essential these qualities may be for the real essence of sub
stance, the non-phenomenalistic concept of substance entails
the admission that the real essence comprises more than these
qualities. Thus, Bayle was correct i n seeing i n the doctrine
of the Essay the problem of relating the accidental qualities
of material and immaterial substance to the real, hidden
essence. LeClerc objected to Bayle's interpretation, which
split substance into essence and accidents, on the ground
that 'ce que nous appellons la Matiere, ou le Corps, est aussi
essentiellement compose de l'Etendue & de la Divisibilite,
que de cette Substance inconnue, qui leur sert de sujet'. 2
Locke's doctrine was that the known qualities flow from or

can be deduced from the hidden part of the real essence: but
it is never clear from the Essay whether hfc really did mean
to say that the accidental qualities are a part of that essence.
I n his letter, occasioned by the bishop of Worcester's A
Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity, Locke
speaks of the real essences themselves as being the 'internal
constitution, or frame, or modification' of substances, but he
does not clarify, either here or in a later reply, the relation
1
Bibliotheque Choisie, t. 12, 1707, art. iii, p. 105.
2
Ibid., p. 107.
between this internal constitution and the known primary

qualities. He did not wish to say that substance can exist
1
without its major properties of extension or thought, but the

limitations of human knowledge prevented any specification
of this relation.
Physical objects as well as immaterial minds were for Locke
divided into perceivable and imperceivable components. The
real essence of either is to some extent at least hidden away
in the unknowable but necessary substratum. Had Locke
pursued this distinction between real and nominal essence,
or between that aspect of the object which is sensible and that
which is not, to the point where he would convince himself
that the only profitable knowledge is that requiring a knowledge
of the real essence, he would have been driven into the most
stultifying of sceptical positions. Metaphysics would then
have blurred the clear empirical direction of most parts of the
Essay. But Locke did not allow himself to become trapped i n
this morass. The distinction between real and nominal
essence, between unsensed substance and sensible qualities,
was theoretically important for him, but, practically, of
relative unimportance. Human knowledge is limited, but its
limitations are not such as to hamper action or hinder man
in attaining happiness. The doctrine of substance, in other
words, entails only a theoretical scepticism. But it was pre
cisely this dichotomy of theoretical and practical and his
greater concern with the practical which led many of his
readers to find more scepticism in the Essay than Locke could
have ever seen or admitted. While the majority of his critics
found the doctrines theoretically offensive because of the
importance of their relevance to theology and the foundations
of morality, Locke could only reaffirm, i n the face of their
charges of scepticism, his essential and good-natured common-
sense convictions in the usefulness of knowledge. We find i n
this attitude, I believe, another piece of evidence i n support of
interpreting Locke as concerned with solving epistemological
problems for the sake of practical difficulties encountered i n
1
I n Works, vol. iv, p. 82.
i o
reflectionsupon moral and religious issues. Where the solu

tions of such difficulties carried the discussion into the intri
cacies of theoretical implications, Locke was always prone
to drop the discussion and assert his own convictions. Three
notable instances of this attitude are found i n his discussion of
the physical basis of perception and of the reality of our repre
sentative knowledge, and in the non-phenomenalistic concept
of substance. At every juncture, it is the theoretical aspects of
his epistemological doctrines which are left insufficiently
discussed and developed and which are taken up by his con
temporary readers for criticism. Not a little of his reluctance
to enter into free and open debate with his critics on these
issues can be put down to his disinterestedness in and
perhaps inability to discuss these important theoretical
issues.
Stillingfleet and Bayle discerned crucial theoretical fissures
in the doctrine of substance. Sergeant's and William Carroll's
criticisms against substance were less acute although repre
sentative of the general reaction. Sergeant saw in the doctrine
of substance a threat to natural science. He equates 'substance'
with 4hing'. Hence, i f Locke is correct about the unknowable-
ness of substance, 4ve must bid Adieu to all Philosophy,
which is the Knowledge of Things . . . .' But Sergeant's con
1
ception of a 'thing' is not Locke's. Substance in general is

defined as 'a capacity to exist' and individual substances are
nothing more than all of the accidents taken collectively.
'This Discourse is built on this Principle, that all our Ideas
or Notions (and amongst them the Notion of Substance or
Thing) are but so many Conceptions of the T h i n g ; or which
. . . is the same, the Thing thus or thus conceiv'd. . . .' Even 2
though man can never know all of these accidents and hence
can never know the actual substance in its entirety, Sergeant's
position entails an entirely different definition of substance
from that employed by Locke. Substance is the most essential
part of objects for Locke, but by no means that object in its
completeness. Existence and substance are practically identical
1
SolidPhilosophy Asserted, p. 238. 2
Ibid., p. 240.
for Sergeant. Hence, it is impossible not to know the meaning

of the term substance.
F o r , e v e r y one m u s t needs k n o w w h a t it is to be; since w i t h o u t k n o w
i n g this, w e c o u l d not u n d e r s t a n d a n y t h i n g another says, not w h a t o u r
selves think; for all this is p e r f o r m ' d b y Affirming or Denying, express'd
b y 'is' or 4s nof, w h i c h speak Actual Being, or not Being. 1
When we descend to the level of individual substances,

Sergeant admits that there is a great deal of confusion i n our
knowledge through the complexity and number of modes
which go to make up the individual substance. But there is
only one notion which is the notion of substance proper: that
which is capable of being. The essential nature of substance
is made actual only by its modes, and thus the modes are the
how while the substance itself is the what. The quiddity for
Sergeant is not a complex substratum containing the hidden
essence of the thing: it is only the possibility of being some
thing. Sergeant does not specify the what any more than did
Locke or Stillingfleet, but his failure to do so was a result of
his belief that substance is nothing more than the capacity of
being this or that. Sergeant denied that substance as supporter
of accidents is the primary meaning of the term, although he
did recognize this as one meaning then i n use. Locke's
doctrine of substance, then, was faulty from his point of view r
because it used a secondary meaning of the term and made

substance unknowable. However, Sergeant's own definition
does not fare much better when examined. As Locke wisely
remarked of the definition of substance as a capacity to exist:
'A11 which amounts to noe more but this, that Substance is
some thing which is what M r . L says.' (Locke, Notes, no. 40,
p. 241.) Besides, Locke did not see how Sergeant could make
a distinction between accidents and substances on this
definition.
I f the I d e a of S u b s t a n c e be capacity to exist t h e n A c c i d e n t s are s u b
stances for they are capable to exist. I f it be as J . S . p u t s it here & also
w h e r a t h i n g capable to exist, t h e n h i s I d e a of substance or thing, w i l l be
this, that a T h i n g is a T h i n g capable to exist. W h i c h as m u c h clears t h e
1
Ibid., pp. 240-1.
824331 L
i42 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cn.iv
point as i f h e s h o u l d say a n [accident] is a n accident capable to exist. O r

a m a n is a m a n capable to exist. ( I b i d . , n o . 41, p . 244.)
T o Sergeant's charge that the Essay makes objects unin

telligible because their essence is unknowable, Locke responds
with the terse but taunting comment: 'We may know that
they exist though we can not explain all their properties &
qualities.' (Ibid., no. 45, p. 250.) Sergeant's attack upon
the doctrine of substance might have made Locke explain
in more detail just how we can know that bodies i n their
substantial natures exist without knowing all their proper
ties. Unfortunately, i t did not have this effect. What we
have i n place of such a possible explanation is a reaffirmation
of the main lines of the Essay on this point. There were
several different views of substance current at the end of the
seventeenth century, views which were frequently confused.
The Essay itself embodied two such concepts of substance,
and neither their connexion nor their distinction is made
clear by Locke. I n the writings of Sergeant and Locke we find a
representative of the Aristotelian concept of potentiality as the
defining characteristic of substance, and a representative of the
scholastic concept of substance as the supporter of qualities,
but the nature of the substratum for Locke is unknown.
Neither Locke nor Sergeant recognized the difference i n each
other's concept on this issue, and neither man saw the full
implications of the position he defended. Sergeant's position
on the definition of physical objects comes very close to a
phenomenalistic definition i n which the object as i t exists
actually.is nothing more than the sum of all its qualities. Since
he accepts the Aristotelian doctrine of causality i n which all
actual events must have arisen from a potential condition,
he includes i n his definition the idea of the capacity to exist.
Locke, with his decidedly dualistic bent, could not find i n this
description an adequate account of physical objects. A sub
stance, substratum, or matter (these words are used inter
changeably by both Locke and Sergeant) which is nothing
more than a mere capacity of being, violated the most
essential aspect of physical objects for Locke. 'Matter is a
solid substance & not a power', a solid substance defined by

impenetrability. (Ibid., no. 87, p. 375.) Impenetrability and
extension for Sergeant were just attributes of body. Matter
for him was the power of bodies to become altered. Thus, he
criticized Descartes for making extension the only notion of
body, and Locke for making extension and solidity (as he
thought) the nature of body. Both men, i n Sergeant's eyes,
omitted the essential nature of bodies, namely, potentiality.
Such an omission was tantamount to a failure to consider
matter at all. Misled by the difference i n their conceptions of
matter, Sergeant read Locke as making this omission and
charged him with failing to consider the nature of matter.
One of Locke's longest notes concerns itself with clarifying
this misinterpretation, while criticizing the false conception
of matter which he found i n Sergeant.
H e r e J . S . falls u n d e r the s a m e r e b u k e w h i c h he bestows o n M r . L o c k e
for a m i s u n d e r s t o o d e x p r e s s i o n & not for a n y m i s t a k e i n h i s m e a n i n g ,
for that b y b o d y he m e a n s a n e x t e n d e d s o l i d s u b s t a n c e & not the m o d e s
of E x t e n s i o n & S o l i d i t y w i t h o u t s u b s t a n c e m a y be seen, В. I I , C . ίΧΙΙΙ,
§ i 2 , В. I I I , C . X , § 15. T h e r e a r g u e i n g against C a r t e s ' s use of the w o r d
B o d y h e t h o u g h t it sufficient to m e n t i o n those m o d e s w h i c h i n the
p r o p e r u s e o f the w o r d B o d y are different f r o m that sole m o d e w h i c h
D e s C a r t e s uses it for, w i t h o u t m e n t i o n i n g of substance. A n d therefore
to u s e h i s o w n e x p r e s s i o n M e e r p o w e r is noe m o r e the n o t i o n o f m a t t e r
t h a n a n H o r s - s h o e is a p a n c a k e . ( I b i d . , n o . 87, p p . 3 7 5 - 6 . )
Sergeant, Stillingfleet, and Browne found inadequate the

doctrine of substance Locke advanced because of its stress
upoh the arbitrariness of the formation of the concept of
substance, and because of man's inability to know its real
nature or essence. A l l three were writing from a religious
perspective and saw the dangers of such a doctrine for the
dogmas they were dedicated to defend. Distrust of the positive
doctrines of the Essay was growing as the seventeenth century
drew to a close. Theologians were beginning to charge Locke
with maliciously seeking to undermine religion, instead, as
Stillingfleet had only urged, of offering principles which were
inconsistent with tradition. The concentrated attacks upon
his book of which Locke had complained to Molyneux and
Burnet were becoming more contentious. Locke was being

1
aligned more and more with the members of the radical non
conformist religious sects. One of the more vehement of such
attacks against Locke's doctrine of substance appeared after
his death, in the writings of William Carroll. I n a series of
tracts Carroll strove to show that Locke's doctrine of sub
stance was an expansion of Spinoza's pantheism, of the
doctrine that there is only one substance in the world and that
this is material. Writing in 1705 against Samuel Clarke's
Boyle lectures, Carroll calls attention to Clarke's acceptance
2
of the Lockean doctrine of the nature of substance.

T h o ' this Sceptical Hypothesis is absolutely false, a n d b o r r o w ' d f r o m
M r . L . as other things i n these S e r m o n s a r e ; yet it s h e w s u s , that as M r .
C . neither has nor can have, a n y I d e a of the Substance of God, so likewise,
he neither has, nor can have, a n y I d e a o f the Substance of Matter*
Clarke had written expressly to refute all atheistical systems

such as those of Hobbes and Spinoza, but Carroll argues that
in order to refute these men, Clarke has to show that the
substance of God is not the substance of matter. W i t h the
essence of substance unknowable, neither Clarke nor Locke
can meet this charge. 'This Atheistical shopkeeper [Spinoza]
is the First that ever reduced Atheism into a System, and
M r . Locke is the Second; with this Difference, that the latter
has only copied the former as to the main . . ,' Locke, 4
Carroll believed, was intent on showing that all things in the

world differ not as to substance but only i n a bare difference
of modifications of substance.
I n e e d not to quote m o r e out of h i m , for b y far the greatest p a r t of h i s
three last B o o k s are i m p l o y e d i n d e p r i v i n g u s of the m e a n s to difference,
or d i s t i n g u i s h , or prove, that there is m o r e t h a n O n e real S u b s t a n c e ,
a n d to establish Spinoza's Sceptical Hypothesis, w h o s e Basis is this, We
neither have, n o r c a n have, the I d e a o f Substance by Sensation or Reflec
tion. 5
Carroll's longest attack upon the Lockean doctrine of sub

stance is found in his Dissertation upon the Tenth Chapter of
1
Cf. above, pp. 7-10.
2
A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God.
3
Remarks upon Mr. Clarke's Sermons (1705), p. 5.
4
Ib1d.,p.9. 5
I b i d . , p p . 10-11.
SECT.ii T H E D O C T R I N E O F S U B S T A N C E 145
the Fourth Book of Mr. Locke's Essay (1706). I n this work,

he charges Locke with striving to hide his chief aim by draw
ing out his work to four books, but Carroll asserts that one
can see that amidst this 'Wood of Words' Locke has
carefully divested o f t h e i r o r d i n a r y settled Significations, the m o s t i m
portant T e r m s i m p l o y ' d b y h i m , s u c h as God, Spirit, Man, Matter,
Substance, Essence, Sort, &c, a n d afterwards b y u s i n g those T e r m s as
S i g n s or M a r k s of I d e a s , different f r o m those w h e r e o f the c o m m o n
C u s t o m of the English L a n g u a g e m a d e t h e m S i g n s , that i s , i n a S e n s e
w h e r e i n the R e a d e r s w e r e not a c c u s t o m e d to take t h e m ; h e r e a l l y e s t a b -
l i s h ' d Spinoza's H y p o t h e s i s , a n d m a d e s o m e R e a d e r s believe, that h e
e s t a b l i s h ' d the T r u t h quite opposite to it, b u t w h i c h i n d e e d , he r e a l l y
a n d f u n d a m e n t a l l y s u b v e r t e d (p. 2 ) .
He discerned two uses of 'substance' i n the Essay: substance

in a singular sense, as a supposed something, and in a plural
sense, as a collection of modifications. The first use is de
signed to support his doctrine of one single substance. When
Locke argues (bk. i i , ch. xiii, no. 18) that many people seek to
apply the confused notion of substance to God, to finite beings,
and to material objects, Carroll claims that they either apply
it in the same sense to all three or else in three distinct mean
ings. Carroll states that one can easily see that by using the
term 'substance' i n the singular, Locke is seeking to establish
his Spinozistic thesis.
I f it be i n the s a m e Sense or Signification that the W o r d Substance, is
t a k e n , a n d stands for the s a m e Idea, w h e n 'tis s a i d , T h a t God is a Sub
stance, that 2.finite Spirit is a Substance a n d that Body is so; it w i l l t h e n c e
follow, T h a t God, finite Spirits, a n d Body, agreeing i n the s a m e common
Nature of Substance, differ not any otherwise, than in a bare different
Modification ofthat Substance', . . . (pp. 2 8 - 2 9 ) .
W i t h the real essence of substance unknowable, Locke is

committed to the doctrine that so far as man can know with
certainty, material and immaterial substance may be the same
substantially, differing only accidentally. The charge of
materialism against Locke was commonly made by his con
temporaries on the ground of his suggestion that God might
be able to add to matter a power of thinking. Carroll arrived
i 6
at the same conclusion in a different way, by an analysis of the

doctrine of substance. Carroll was fully aware that Locke
wished to commit himself to talking only about the idea of
substance and not directly about substance itself, but he
pointed out quite validly that Locke proceeds, i n Book Four,
to demonstrate the real existence of God and to deny that he
intends to make the substance of God material. But, Carroll
argued, on Locke's principles, all our knowledge of God
should be restricted to modifications and could never extend
t o H i s real nature.
F o r instance, h e says i n the S e c t i o n , w e e x a m i n e , that Matter, cannot
think, that a Cogitative Being cannot be Matter, a n d the l i k e ; w h e r e b y
the sober R e a d e r is apt to t h i n k he separates two real distinct S u b s t a n c e s
one f r o m a n o t h e r ; a n d that he r e m o v e s all M a t t e r w h a t e v e r f r o m G o d ,
w h e n he says i n the C l o s e of t h i s S e c t i o n , it necessarily follows, that the
first eternal Being, cannot be Matter; w h i l s t M r . L . i n the p r e c e d i n g
A s s e r t i o n s , separates one f r o m the other, b u t two different C o l l e c t i o n s of
M o d i f i c a t i o n s o n l y ; a n d i n h i s C o n c l u s i o n , r e m o v e s n o t h i n g else f r o m
b e i n g h i s first eternal B e i n g , b u t one of those C o l l e c t i o n s of M o d i f i c a
tions, as w e have s e e n before (p. 109).
Not only had Locke denied innate ideas, by means of which

Carroll believed man to gain his knowledge of God, but Locke
had reduced the nature of God to matter.
Locke had, of course, excepted our knowledge of God
from his general dictum concerning the unknowableness of
substance, believing that he had firmly established the
immateriality of God, in accordance with the demands of
religion. Carroll was much too extravagant i n his charge that
Locke had borrowed his doctrine of substance from Spinoza
or that Locke consciously meant to establish anything
like the Spinozistic universe; but like many other critics
contemporary with Locke, Carroll had detected the ten
dencies inherent i n the general doctrine which Locke sought
to defend. Scepticism as to the natureof God, His incarnation,
the relation of the incarnate God to the two other persons i n
the Trinity, and scepticism concerning the nature of the
human soul, were inextricable ingredients i n this doctrine.
Both the phenomenalistic and the non-phenomenalistic concept
of substance gave rise, i n the minds of Locke's contem

poraries, to doubts and uncertainties about basic religious
dogmas, although it was the latter which caused most of the
stir. But in the phenomenalistic concept, Locke was not far
removed from Hume's view of the self as the collection of
functions and properties known through experience. As early
as 1710, Berkeley drew these conclusions from the Essay i n
his analysis of substance as applied to physical objects. 1
Isaac Watts continued this tendency by arguing that gram

matical usage of our terms had led men i n the past to ascribe
to objects a substance over and above the sensible qualities.
I t m u s t be confest, w h e n w e say, Spirit is a thinking Substance, and
Matter is an extended solid Substance, w e are s o m e t i m e s r e a d y to i m a g i n e
that Extension a n d Solidity are b u t m e e r Modes a n d Properties o f a certain
u n k n o w n Substance or S u b j e c t w h i c h s u p p o r t s t h e m , a n d w h i c h w e c a l l
Body. . . . B u t I rather t h i n k t h i s to be a m e e r M i s t a k e , w h i c h w e are
l e d into b y the grammatical F o r m a n d U s e of W o r d s ; a n d o u r logical
W a y of t h i n k i n g b y Substances a n d Modes, as w e l l as o u r grammatical
W a y of t a l k i n g b y Substantives a n d Adjectives, d e l u d e u s into t h i s s u p
position. 2
I n his Philosophical Essays (1733) he explicitly credits Locke

with having swept such invalid concepts from our philosophy:
' M r . Locke has happily refuted that unreasonable Notion of
Substance i n general, which makes it to be some real thing i n
Nature, different from all the united Qualities, the supposed
Properties and Powers of Body and Spirit. . . .' (p. 47). The
so-called properties of matter and spirit are sufficient i n them
selves for the concept of substance. 'Why then may we not
suppose that solid Extension and a Thinking Power may be
the very Substances themselves, tho' the Namesgrammatically
taken may seem to denote Property and Quality ?' (pp. 53-54).
Moreover, like Carroll, Watts saw the dangers of materialism
in Locke's non-phenomenalist concept, arguing that i f we
allow a further unknown support or substance, this supposi
tion can lead, as it does i n Locke, to the supposition of matter
being able to think in virtue of the same common substance
1
A Treatise Concerning the Principles ofHuman Knowledge (1710).
2
Logick (1726), p. 13, footnote.
i 8
underlying matter and thought. Despite Locke's protestations

in his letter occasioned by Stillingfleet's attack, Watts was
able to discredit the non-phenomenalistic concept of substance
in the Essay as an inconsistency due to Locke's not having
fully grasped the direction of his own thought. But there were
men in the service of religion who, even in the middle of the
eighteenth century, insisted upon this aspect of the doctrine
of substance as expressive of the true meaning Locke wished
to attach to the term. Andrew Baxter was one such individual
who sought to counteract Watts's radical interpretation.
M r . Locke allows that the i n t e r n a l , u n k n o w n constitution of t h i n g s
is something; since their discoverable qualities are o w n e d to d e p e n d
o n t h i s ; . . . T h i s is taken notice of because sceptical m e n b e g i n to s u p
pose t h e y have M r . Locke's authority for i n s i n u a t i n g that the u n k n o w n
constitution of things is i n itself n o t h i n g ; a n d that substance, o r w h a t he
calls substratum is b u t e m p t y s o u n d . 1
Baxter, however, w as not fully satisfied with the Lockean

r
doctrine, b u t s a w in it the same tendency to separate the

properties of substances from their real essences as did
Bayle. 2
§ 3—The Controversy on Thinking Matter

The doctrine of substance elaborated by Locke thus served
as the natural predecessor for the discussions of epistemology
and ontology by the philosophers and theologians of the
eighteenth century. This doctrine, as we havejust seen, served
also to arouse the clergy of Locke's own day to varying reac
tions. Those of Stillingfleet, Bayle, and Sergeant concerned
chiefly the nature of the ontological distinction of real and
nominal essence and the definition of substance. I n the minds of
these and the other theologians who criticized the doctrine, it
was the doctrine of the Trinity which functioned as the standard
in terms of which all doctrines of substance were measured;
for a theory of substance which failed to render justice to the
1
An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul (1733), p. 144, note r.
2
Ibid., pp. 152-3.
sECT. i n C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 149
complications of this Christian dogma could not be tolerated

by the orthodox men of religion. But these same men also
saw i n Locke's twofold doctrine of substance, and especially
in the non-phenomenalistic concept, a threat to the doctrine
of the immateriality of the human soul. Locke's doctrine of
substance, with its emphasis upon the hidden nature of the
real essence of substance, both material and immaterial,
opened the way, it was feared, for a Hobbesian materialistic
universe. Seventeenth-century Cartesianism had stimulated
many speculations, both in France and in England, upon the
rationality of animals, whether brutes had souls or were mere
machines. Locke must have been well acquainted with these
discussions. There are frequent references throughout the
Essay to rational parrots, the status of monsters, the lack of
abstractive powers in brutes, &c., which clearly reflect interest
in this problem. Although his suggestion that God might be
1
able to add to matter a power of thinking was only incidental

to the development of his doctrine of substance, within the
context of such discussions as those concerning the rationality
of brutes and the necessary condition for immortality as
consisting i n the immateriality of the soul, it could not have
failed to fan the flames of this particular controversy. The full
origins of the controversy over the ability of matter to think
have not as yet been satisfactorily uncovered. I t very definitely
seems to be an offshoot of the Cartesian discussions on the
nature of animals' minds and their possible souls; but the
discussion i n England of the early part of the century suggests
that its relation to the doctrine of immortality is no less
important. I t is i n this latter relation that the controversy
takes on a relevance to Locke's Essay and to his doctrine of
substance.
The passage in book iv, ch. iii, no. 6 of the Essay wherein the
suggestion is made that matter might be given thepower of
thinking by God is introduced as a digression, illustrating the
limitations of human knowledge. Locke is there concerned to
argue that however much human knowledge may be extended
1
See bk. ii, ch. xi, nos. 11-13, c n
- xxvii, no. 9; and bk. iv, ch. iv, nos. 14-16.
by diligence and care, knowledge 'would never reach to all

we might desire to know concerning those ideas we have; nor
be able to surmount all the difficulties, and resolve all the
questions that might arise concerning any of them'. We have
the ideas of a square, a circle, and equality, but Locke
doubts whether we shall ever Ъе able to find a circle equal
to a square, and certainly know that it is so\ Similarly, 4ve
have the ideas of matter and of thinking, but possibly shall
never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks
or no', sinceit is beyond the powers of human knowledge to
determine, by the analysis of our ideas, 'whether Omni-
potency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly dis
posed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed
to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance'.
Locke's digression on this point is clearly directed towards
the many discussions of the relation between matter and
thought and the relation between immortality and immateri
ality current in his own day. He is not concerned to doubt the
immateriality of the human soul, but only to argue that, since
our knowledge does not permit us to have certainty on this
matter, we should recognize our limitations and admit that
immateriality is not necessary for the doctrine of the soul's
immortality.
A l l the great e n d s o f m o r a l i t y a n d religion are w e l l e n o u g h s e c u r e d
w i t h o u t p h i l o s o p h i c a l proofs of the s o u l ' s i m m a t e r i a l i t y ; s i n c e it i s
evident, that he w h o m a d e u s at the b e g i n n i n g to subsist here, sensible
intelligent beings, a n d for several years c o n t i n u e d u s i n s u c h a state, c a n
a n d w i l l restore u s to the like state o f sensibility i n another w o r l d , a n d
m a k e u s capable there to receive the r e t r i b u t i o n he has designed to m e n ,
a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r doings i n t h i s life.
Thus, it is not of such great importance 'as some, over-

zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul, have been
forward to make the world believe', to demonstrate or estab
lish beyond doubt that the soul is immaterial. 'He that con
siders how hardly sensation is, in our thoughts, reconcilable
to extended matter; or existence to anything that has no
extension at all, will confess that he is very far from certainly
sECT. i n C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 151
knowingwhat his soul is.' I t is beyond doubt, Locke believed

with Descartes, that there is something i n us which thinks.
I t makes no difference whether, besides the property of think
ing, this something has also the property of being solid and
extended. As he remarked to Stillingfleet, 4he general idea
of substance being the same every where, the modification
of thinking, or the power of thinking joined to it, makes it a
spirit, without considering what other modifications it has,
as whether it has the modification of solidity or no'. Similarly, 1
'The idea of matter is an extended solid substance; wherever

there is such a substance, there is matter, and the essence of
matter, whatever other qualities, not contained in that essence,
it shall please God to superadd to i t . ' Writing to Collins late
2
in life, Locke sought to clarify the issue once again.

B u t not to waste y o u r t i m e , i n p l a y i n g w i t h the a r g u m e n t s of m e n ,
that e x a m i n e not strictly the m e a n i n g of the w o r d s they u s e ; I w i l l s h o w
y o u the fallacy w h e r e b y they i m p o s e o n t h e m s e l v e s ; for s u c h talkers
c o m m o n l y c o z e n themselves, as w e l l as others. Cogitation, say they,
'is not c o m p r e h e n d e d i n the i d e a of extension a n d s o l i d i t y ' ; for that is it
w h i c h they m e a n , w h e n t h e y s a y , the 'idea of m a t t e r ' ; f r o m w h e n c e they
c o n c l u d e right, that 'cogitation belongs not to extension or solidity; or is
not i n c l u d e d i n either of t h e m , or b o t h together'; b u t this is not the
c o n s e q u e n c e that they d r a w , b u t infer a c o n c l u s i o n that is not contained
i n the p r e m i s e s . . . . E x t e n s i o n a n d solidity, w e have the ideas of; a n d see,
that cogitation has no necessary c o n n e x i o n w i t h t h e m , n o r has any c o n
sequential result f r o m t h e m ; a n d therefore is not a p r o p e r affection of
extension a n d solidity, n o r d o t h n a t u r a l l y b e l o n g to t h e m ; b u t h o w
d o t h it follow f r o m h e n c e , that it m a y not be m a d e a n affection of, o r
be a n n e x e d to that substance, w h i c h is vested w i t h solidity a n d e x t e n
sion ? 3
The context for this digression of Locke's is to be found i n

the many treatises in England which dealt with the immor
tality and immateriality of the human soul. Of the works
written about this question exclusively, those of Henry More,
Walter Charleton, and Samuel Haworth are typical repre
sentatives of the more astute treatments of the subject prior
1
A Letter to the ... Bishop of Worcester, Works, vol. iv, p. 33.
2
Mr. Locke's Reply to ... Worcester's Answer to his SecondLetter, ibid., p. 460.
3
Locke to Collins, 21 March 1703/4, Works, vol. x, p. 284.
to 1690. Richard Bentley's Boyle lectures of 1692 tended to

1
summarize and epitomize this issue, for, like his many pre
decessors, Bentley directed his attack against the Epicureans
and sought to demonstrate the existence of an immaterial,
thinking soul. I t is, he declared, the Opinion of every
Atheist, and counterfeit Deist of these times, that believes
there is no Substance but Matter.' Thus, atheism was directly 2
linked to the doctrine of materialism and to the suggestion

that matter might be able to think. The opposing doctrine
could only be the immateriality of the soul, for only by show
ing that thought and extension are incompatible and that the
soul which thinks is immaterial did these men think they
could properly refute materialism and establish the legiti
macy of the theory of human immortality. Locke's doctrine
which allowed God the power of annexing to matter the power
of thought, played into the hands of the materialists and
atheists. As Peter Browne observed while writing against
Toland:
M r . Lock's N o t i o n o f the Soul is o n l y that of a thinking substance with
out a n y regard either to the materiality or immateriality of i t ; t h o u g h one
w o u ' d t h i n k he i n c l i n e s to the former, w h e n he s h e w s t h i s to be t h e
sense of the w o r d Spirit both i n Prophane and Divine Authors. H o w e v e r
he says afterwards that the u t m o s t Proof w e c a n have for the i m m a t e r i
ality o f it w i l l a m o u n t o n l y to a Probability; a n d this m u c h c o n c e r n i n g it
he t h i n k s d e d u c i b l e f r o m h i s P r i n c i p l e s ; a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y f r o m h i s s u p
position of a System ofmatter; a n d adds that h e w o u l d gladly see a better
p r o o f of it either f r o m the B i s h o p of Worcester or a n y one e l s e . 3
Browne professed to be able to give Locke the required proof,

but he did not do so in this or, as far as I can determine, i n
any later work. I n the minds ofBrowne, Stillingfleet, and many
other theologians of the period, the immortality of the soul
could not be accepted or demonstrated until the immateriality
of the soul had first been established. Locke's readers could
More, H . The Immortality of the Soul (1659); Charleton, W . The
1
Immortality
of the Human Soul (1657); Haworth, S. Άνθροπωλογία, Or, A Philosophic Discourse
Concerning Man (1680).
г
Matter and Motion cannot Think, 3rd edition, 1694, p. 14. T h i s quotation
only occurs in this edition.
3
A Letter in Answer to a Book Entituled, Christianity not Mysterious, p. 106.
sECT.iii C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 153
not understand his contention that immateriality was irrele

vant to the doctrine of immortality.
Reaction to this digression on immateriality and immor
tality came soon after the Essay's appearance, although no
public objections appeared until later. Molyneux, in his copy
of the first edition of the Essay, has a marginal note indicating
the early disturbance Locke's digression occasioned. Writing
on bk. iv, ch. χ, nos. 9-13, he says:
I h a v e h e a r d it objected b y some, that o u r A u t h o r , i n these S e c t i o n s
C o n c e r n i n g G o d s I m m a t e r i a l i t y , seems to C o n t r a d i c t H i m s e l f i n w h a t
h e asserts pag. 270. § 6 C o n c e r n i n g the possibility of M a t t e r s T h i n k i n g .
B u t I C o n c e i v e o u r A u t h o r h e r e i n is v e r y C o n s i s t e n t w i t h H i m s e l f . F o r
i n this P l a c e h e o n l y A s s e r t s (for the R e a s o n s here alledged) that tis
I m p o s s i b l e that a n Infinite O m n i p o t e n t Cogitative Being should Be
M a t e r i a l . B u t granting (for the R e a s o n s here alledged) a n O m n i p o t e n t
Cogitative I m m a t e r i a l B e i n g ; T h e n ( F o r the R e a s o n s i n pag. 270. S e c . 6)
it is I m p o s s i b l e for u s , w i t h o u t R e v e l a t i o n , to D i s c o v e r w h e t h e r t h i s
O m n i p o t e n t Cogitative I m m a t e r i a l B e i n g has not g i v e n to M a t t e r (fitly
D i s p o s e d ) a P o w e r to perceive a n d T h i n k . F o r granting, that he has so
done, it w i l l not thence follow, that tis possible, that this Infinite C o g i t a
tive B e i n g m a y H i m s e l f be M a t e r i a l . 1
The disputes which Locke's digression aroused mostly

originated in the early eighteenth century, for, besides Browne
and Stillingfleet, very few critics of the Essay i n the seven
teenth century noticed this important challenge to Christian
dogma. Early in the eighteenth century, Henry Lee expressed
the common fear, when he saw in Locke's self-drawn impli
cations of the limitations of knowledge a tendency towards
Hobbism. I f God has the power of adding to matter the
property of thought,
M a n m a y be o n l y a S p e c i e s of M a c h i n s ; a n d that w e c a l l o u r S o u l s ,
m a y be n o t h i n g b u t the C o n t e x t u r e of several parts of o u r B o d i e s to
p e r f o r m those feats of M o t i o n , w h i c h for a n h o n o u r a b l e k i n d of D i s
t i n c t i o n w e c a l l T h o u g h t s , tho really they are o n l y the O p e r a t i o n s of
M a t t e r , qualified w i t h the k n a c k of t h i n k i n g . 2
1
p. 315. Molyneux left numerous marginal summaries of Locke's arguments
but only one or two critical observations of his own in these notes. H i s copy of
the Essay is in the Bodleian Library.
2
Anti-Scepticism, p. 246.
The most extended defence of the immateriality of the soul

against Locke's suggestion was written by John Broughton,
Psychologia; Or, An Account of the Nature of the Rational Soul
(1703). Broughton began from the assumption that reason is
the 'self-moving Power of the Soul', while spirit is 'the
Principle of Life and Sensation', opposed to body which is the
principle of 'Mechanism and Local Motion' (pref., p. [5]).
Spirit and body are separate from one another, spirit
being utterly incapable of local motion, and body equally
incapable of life and sensation. He agrees with Locke's con
tention
that 'tis possible to conceive a Spirit devested of the O p e r a t i o n o f
Thought, a n d barely, i n h i s o w n Term, as a n unsolid Substance; b u t it is
sufficient that w e place the D i s t i n c t i o n u p o n the Capacity and Incapacity
of Thought; for the other [of solid a n d u n s o l i d ] is no w a y serviceable to
u s ; because w e d i d not c o m e b y the K n o w l e d g e of Spirit, as really e x i s t
ing, b y o u r Idea of s o m e t h i n g unsolid, but o n l y b y o u r I d e a of s o m e t h i n g
that t h i n k s : S o that o u r I d e a of a n unsolid Substance, is not f o r m ' d f r o m
the C o n t e m p l a t i o n of any t h i n g w i t h o u t u s , as that of Solidity i s ; b u t is a
bare Hypothesis to solve the P h a e n o m e n o n of T h o u g h t (pref., p p . [ 6 - 7 ] ) .
The supposition that body can think reduces all phenomena

to body and embraces corporealism and atheism. But the
curious aspect of Broughton's discussion is that he accepts
the Lockean definition of substance: 'That, to us, unknown
Nature, upon which all that we know of the Nature of anything
depends, as to its Being; and which is, as to its Essence in
general, independent on every thing but God' (p. 2). Similarly,
his definition of 'attribute' could come from either Spinoza
or Locke: all that belongs to a Substance, and is not the Sub
6
stance it self; or, all of the Substance that falls under our
Knowledge and Apprehension' (p. 2).
Once having given these definitions, he proceeds to argue
as if he ignored them, using in his argument the usual defini
tion of substance as that which can exist by itself, and the
definition of mode or attribute as that which cannot so exist.
Like Stillingfleet, he urges that, for one who seeks to make all
knowledge come from sensation and reflection, the idea of
substance will turn out to be, as it was for Locke, an absurd
idea (p. 8). Substance, Broughton insisted, becomes the

object of our understanding neither by sensation nor by
reflection. He claimed that we have some knowledge of
substance i n terms of its accidents, invoking the principle
that there is a proportional difference i n substance where
there is a difference i n attribute, i n order to argue that we
know of at least two distinct substances, i.e., material and
immaterial. He could not envisage the theoretical possibility
offered by Locke of matter being able to think.
I t seems t h e n there is a fit Disposition r e q u i r ' d o n M a t t e r ' s side, as
w e l l as a n o m n i p o t e n t P o w e r f r o m w i t h o u t , to m a k e it think. If I
s h o u ' d ask t h i s G r e a t T h i n k e r , i n w h a t P a r t of M a t t e r , or u n d e r w h a t
C i r c u m s t a n c e s he ever f o u n d t h i s D i s p o s i t i o n , I c o u ' d not r e a s o n a b l y
expect a p r o m p t A n s w e r . I a m s u r e , that i n h i s I d e a s of Matter and
Thinking, there is n o s u c h t h i n g to be f o u n d : A n d therefore, i f h e i s
M a s t e r of the S e c r e t , h i s Knowledge is far larger t h a n h i s Ideas; whereas
it is t r u e , a n d the S u b j e c t of t h i s v e r y S e c t i o n , That our Knowledge is
narrower than our Ideas (p. 20).
Broughton called Locke's supposition of a thinking matter

'the most Modern objection . . . to evade the Necessity of
owning an Immaterial Substance in Human Nature' (p. 52).
He admitted that Locke proved that the first existent being
could not have been material; but he held that Locke's sup
position left the way open for the atheist's saying that the
essentially cogitative matter may replace God. Once we grant
the possibility of matter thinking, Broughton believed that
all Locke's efforts to show that the first being could not be
material are irrelevant. T o r when the Possibility of the Thing
is once really granted i n Principle, these Absurdities following
upon it, will quickly resolve into so many unconceivable
Ways of Omnipotence exerting it self (p. 55). Like Stilling
fleet, Broughton thought this particular doctrine of Locke's
to be dangerous in the hands of those less perspicacious or
those avowedly antagonistic to religion.
B u t i f t h e y s h o u ' d g a i n n o real A d v a n t a g e b y t h i s C o n c e s s i o n , b e c a u s e
still the S u p p o s i t i o n of a G o d , E t e r n a l , a n d the C r e a t o r of all t h i n g s ,
s e e m s to r e m a i n u n t o u c h ' d ; yet, as M r . L v e r y w e l l observes, they
letting slide out oftheir Minds, or the Discourse, the Demonstration whereby
an eternal knowing Being was proved necessary to exist; wou'd argue all to
be Matter, and so deny a God; T h e D a n g e r of granting these M e n w h a t ,
over a n d above, it is a b s u r d to grant to a n y M a n , is to m e a good W a r r a n t
why I s h o u ' d . . . d e n y the general Possibility of Matter's Thinking
(p. 56).
Broughton was obviously motivated by the necessities of

belief to deny what Locke, from different motives, could
grasp as a theoretical possibility beyond the scope of human
knowledge.
Locke found his defender against Broughton in Samuel
Bold, who sought to counter Broughton's fears by repeating
in detail the steps of Locke's digression, explaining as Locke
had done that the supposition in question was a theoretical
possibility resulting from the limitations of human know
ledge. He, too, was ready to accept immortality without
1
immateriality. I t was Locke's friend, Collins, who had given

Broughton's book to Bold and elicited Bold's defence.
T o give y o u m y o p i n i o n of the book it is to m e a D i s c o u r s e u p o n
nothing, or w h i c h is all one, o n s o m e t h i n g that n o body k n o w s a n y t h i n g
of, o r i f a n y one d i d , w o u l d k n o w less f r o m r e a d i n g h i s book. I h a v e
given it to M r . B o l d f r o m w h o s e better j u d g m e n t y o u m a y have farther
satisfaction about i t . 2
Locke himself had looked into Broughton's book and con

curred in Collins's judgement.
T h e other book, y o u m e n t i o n e d , I have s e e n ; a n d a m so w e l l satisfied,
b y h i s 5th section, w h a t a doughty ' s q u i r e he is like to prove i n the rest,
that I t h i n k not to trouble m y s e l f to look farther into h i m . H e has there
argued v e r y w e a k l y against h i s adversary, b u t v e r y strongly against h i m
self. 3
But Locke was genuinely alarmed to learn from Collins that

Bold not only had written something against Broughton but
that he was going to publish his remarks. Locke urged Collins
to stop Bold from sending them to the press. Locke and 4
1
A Discourse Concerning the Resurrection of the Same Body (1705).
2
Collins to Locke, 30 June, 1703. M S . Locke, C . 7, f. 2.
3
Locke to Collins, 9 July 1703, in Works, vol. x, p. 266.
4
Cf. Locke to Collins, 21 February 1703/4 and 24 February 1703/4, in
Works, vol. χ, pp. 276, 278.
Bold, however, were not the only figures i n the period who
were defending the position which Broughton had attacked.
Broughton, in fact, was writing not only to refute Locke's
suggestion of matter being given a power of thought; he wrote
as well against William Coward's Second Thoughts Concerning
Human Soul (1702), in which Coward not only took up the
suggestion made by Locke, but actually maintained that the
human soul is just such a power of life and movement super
added to the physical body. Whether or not Coward was
actually directly influenced in this belief by Locke cannot be
determined; but it is curious that a few years after Locke's
suggestion had caught the attention of the critics, a serious
writer should champion the precise view suggested i n the
Essay. I t is, however, indicative of Locke's own views that
neither he nor his friend Collins found the arguments of
Coward's later work, The Grand Essay (1704), convincing.
Thus it is clear that Locke did not mean to accept the view-
as actual fact which he had suggested i n his digression as a
possibility. 1
Coward was opposed to analysing man into a material and

an immaterial component. The soul of man, he maintained,
is the life of man. There is no such thing as a spiritual
substance. Moreover, the attempt to adhere to the traditional
doctrine of an immaterial soul leads, he asserted paradoxically,
into atheism and scepticism. Succinctly stated, his startling
doctrine claimed that
all those Operations of Reason, Motion, &c. may be and areperform'd by
an extraordinary or superminent Power; First at the Creation implanted by
God, in Matter or Material Man . . . which Power ceases to be, when the
Body dies, and will not be renew'd again, or Reimplanted in the same Matter,
until the Day ofthe Resurrection; . . .2
Thus, Coward actually defined the soul as a power inherent

1
Cf. Collins to Locke, 16 February 1703/4. ' D r . Coward has publish'd a
Book to show that no such thing as Immaterial substance exists in nature & that
all matter has originally a principle of selfmotion in it. his arguments are very
far from proving either & are too mean to give you any account of.' M S . Locke,
C . 7, f. 16. Also, Locke to Collins, 28 February 1703/4, where Locke indicates
that he had seen some of Coward's earlier works. ( I n Works, vol. x, p. 279.)
2
Second Thoughts, pp. 22-23.
M
824331
iS8 R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
in matter. Man became a kind of thinking matter. He did not

find it at all strange that God 'should make Matter capabk of
performing all Acts ofRatiocination or Reasoning'. Likewise, 1
he did not see why we should not credit rationality to brutes. 2
He even cited Hobbes as authority, with full recognition of

the condemnation such authority would bring down upon
him. But he was no blind follower of Hobbes; he merely
accepted him as one person who had seen the dispensability
of the hypothesis of an immaterial soul, but in so doing, he
took a much more radical step than Locke ever intended. I n
his later work, The Grand Essay, Coward sought to reply to
Broughton's criticisms, asserting that Broughton's Lockean
definition of substance, which Broughton, as we have seen,
did not really use i n his major arguments, was a 'Meta
physical complex of Words' (p. 41). Coward reaffirmed, i n
all its strength, his doctrine of matter being able to think and
of the uselessness of the hypothesis of an immaterial soul.
Nay w h e n w e have f r a m e d to o u r selves a n i m a g i n a r y E x i s t e n c e o f
that Substance, c a l P d Immaterial, yet w e find it as u n c o n c e i v a b l e o r
m o r e to e x p l a i n how it Thinks as M a t t e r itself. T h e r e f o r e to say Matter
Thinks by the Power of God, c a n neither t e n d to a t h e i s m , o r I r r e l i g i o n ,
and c o n s e q u e n t l y m a y be a P h i l o s o p h y no sober M a n ought to be
a s h a m e d of; . . . ( p . 147).
Like the many critics who found Locke's doctrine of non-

phenomenalistic substance conducive to scepticism, Coward
accused Broughton, by his use of this doctrine, of leading
'head-long into down-right Sce*pticisme'. He did not wish to 2,
minimize the difficulties attached to the doctrine of thinking

matter, but he sought to show that it was consistent with
Christian theology and contained no contradiction i n itself.
I aver it to be very difficult to conceive hozv M a t t e r m a y think, b u t not
so difficult as it is to conceive how I m m a t e r i a l S u b s t a n c e s c a n t h i n k ;
neither d o t h it i m p l y a C o n t r a d i c t i o n for G o d to' m a k e M a t t e r able to
t h i n k : I m e a n , w e do not conceive a C o n t r a d i c t o r y or i m p o s s i b l e I d e a
i n o u r M i n d s , b y c o n c e i v i n g thinking Matter*
1
Second Thoughts,p. 163. 2
Ibid.,p. 165.
3
p. 189 ofhis ' A Brief Answer to M r . Broughton' (included at the end of The
Grand Essay as pp. 177-248). Ibid., p. 194. 4
The same sort of doctrine as Coward was advocating was

also being defended by Henry Layton i n a series of tracts.
I n Observations upon a Treatise intit4ed Psychologia (1703),
Layton attacked Broughton's Lockean doctrine of substance,
in the same terms as did Coward. Neither Bentley nor
Broughton had shown, Layton argued, that thought cannot
be i n material things, but had instead pronounced 'magis
terially and ex Cathedra, that the Idea of Matter and Thought
are absolutely incompatible' (p. 91). He explained his
positive doctrine in another tract published i n the same year,
Arguments and Replies, in a Dispute concerning the Nature
of the Humane SouL
T h e S p i r i t o f L i f e a n d I n t e l l e c t i n M a n , d o t h m o s t p r o b a b l y arise
f r o m the B r e a t h of L i f e , a n d the B l o o d of o u r L i f e . . . . S o as these t w o
P r i n c i p l e s of B r e a t h a n d B l o o d ( M a t e r i a l a n d U n i n t e l l i g e n t , t h o ' t h e y
be) s e e m to effect a n d p r o d u c e i n the C r e a t u r e , b o t h L i f e it self, a n d a l l
the F a c u l t i e s t h e r e - u n t o b e l o n g i n g , a n d that a l l t h i s Compositum is
m o r t a l a n d dies w i t h the P e r s o n ( p . 7 ) .
He urged that it was the duty of his objector to prove the

existence of an immaterial soul, and not his to offer proofs for
his doctrine. Like Coward, he sought support for his doctrine
from the Scriptures, insisting that he had not sought to
demonstrate his conclusion but that he had 'made the opinion
of the Soul's Materiality to be more probable, and come
nearer the T r u t h , than that of the Soul's Spirituality, and
separate Subsistence hath been, or can be prov'd to be'
(p. 14). He denied accepting a mechanical explanation of
thought, referring all such activities ultimately to the
intervention of God. There was never any intention i n
Layton's mind of undermining the doctrines of his own
Christian faith, as Locke had so frequently been charged with
doing. Layton was himself a member of the Church of
England, but he explained, in the growing fashion of the day,
that he did not accept blindly the dogmas of the Church.
Y o u m e n t i o n i n two P l a c e s m y b e i n g a M e m b e r of the C h u r c h of
England, w h i c h I a m r e a d y so far to o w n for m y M o t h e r . . . p r o f e s s i n g
to t h i n k . T h a t she is the purest C h u r c h w h i c h I k n o w to be i n the W o r l d
at t h i s D a y ; B u t I do not profess to m a k e h e r O p i n i o n s the R u l e s o f m y

B e l i e f ; or to follow a n y of h e r O p i n i o n s i m p l i c i t l y . . . T h e G u i d e s a n d
P o w e r s to w h i c h I profess a n absolute s u b j e c t i o n are but two, Viz.
Scripture a n d Reason; . . . (pp. 6 9 - 7 0 ) .
Most of Layton's numerous and desultory tracts in defence

of his thesis were buttressed by voluminous references to the
Scriptures and to ancient authors whom he interpreted as
supporting his doctrine. Even while discussing Broughton's
attack upon Locke, Layton does not take Locke as the out
standing authority. Once, while writing against Timothy
Manlove's The Immortality of the Soul Asserted (1697),
Layton does directly claim Locke as an authority, but this is
not usual in his tracts. As we shall see i n the next chapter,
1
not only did he and Coward take up the suggestion of matter

being able to think, they also incorporated into their writings
several major doctrines of the way of ideas as found i n Locke's
Essay. Locke's epistemology was beginning to be used by the
followers of the new radical religious sects; but it was also
found in many traditional tracts. Samuel Clarke and John
Witty belong to this latter category. Both of these men were
concerned to defend the traditional doctrine of the immateria
lity of the soul against the beliefs of Locke, Coward, and
Layton. Both Clarke (A Second Defense of an Argument . . .
in a Letter to Mr. Dodwell, 1707) and Witty (The First
Principles of Modern Deism Confuted, 1707) accepted the
Lockean doctrine of the unknowability of the essence of
substance, as Sherlock had also done much earlier; but both
sought to bring this into consistency with the doctrine of the
immateriality of the soul. Witty explains that his book was
o c c a s i o n ' d b y the late p e r n i c i o u s A t t e m p t s of s e v e r a l P e r s o n s , w h o
t a k i n g advantage of o u r C o n c e s s i o n , of o u r utter I g n o r a n c e of the i n
t r i n s i c N a t u r e s of the S u b s t a n c e s or E s s e n c e s of S p i r i t u a l a n d M a t e r i a l
B e i n g s , have t h e n c e attempted to invalidate o u r E v i d e n c e for the E x i s
tence of a n y t h i n g I m m a t e r i a l , a n d to i n t r o d u c e the B e l i e f of U n i v e r s a l
M a t e r i a l i s m into the M i n d s of M e n ; . . . ( p p . 7 - 8 ) .
I n a clear reference to Carroll's attacks, Witty denies his

acquiescence i n Carroll's charge of Spinozism against Locke.
1
Observations upon a Short Treatise, Written byMr. Timothy Manlove (1698 ?).
sECT. πι C O N T R O V E R S Y O N T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 161
W h a t w a s the D e s i g n o f M r . Locke, who denys all K n o w l e d g e of

S u b s t a n c e s , i n h i s famous Essay concerning Human Understanding;
I w o n ' t e x a m i n e : W h e t h e r it w a s w r i t w i t h a n i n t e n t i o n to e s t a b l i s h
Spinoza's Material Deity; o r w h e t h e r a l l h e a i m ' d at i n it w a s to
e n q u i r e after the F u n d a m e n t a l s a n d E x t e n t o f H u m a n K n o w l e d g e ; . . .
(p. I I ) .
But he is firm in his denunciation of the implication which

Locke drew from the doctrine of the unknowability of the
essence of substance. Even though we cannot gain a knowledge
of the real essence of spirit or matter, we can, he believed;
see that the essential attributes of each, thought and extension,
are incompatible (p. 157). T o the suggestion that God may
be able to annex thought to some system of matter, Witty says
that those who argue in this way argue from the fact that 'we
know nothing to the contrary' to the conclusion that it is
possible (pp. 244-5). But the inconsistency between thought
and extension strikes him as too obvious for this suggestion
to be tolerable. Hence,
i f the Inconsistency in Nature 'twixt the k n o w n A t t r i b u t e s of a n y two
S u b s t a n c e s c a n be d e m o n s t r a t e d ; w h a t e v e r t h e i r E s s e n c e s be, 'tis c e r
t a i n they m u s t be i n their i n t r i n s i c N a t u r e s Incommunicably different;
a n d O m n i p o t e n c e it self can't m a k e those inconsistent Attributes co
exist i n the s a m e S u b j e c t (p. 2 4 5 ) .
Most of the defenders of the immateriality of the soul

against the suggestion of matter being made to think through
divine intervention argued, as Witty did, from the inconsistency
of thought and extension to the denial of thinking matter.
Charles Gildon, author of A DeisVs Manual (1705) and
another close follower of Locke's epistemology, urged the
same considerations. The faculty of understanding and
extension have nothing in common.
T h i s is the R e a s o n , that none w a s ever so w i l d as to suspect, Thought
to be i n a n y t h i n g , i n w h i c h w e c a n discover n o t h i n g b u t Extension,
D i v i s i b i l i t y , S o l i d i t y , v a r i o u s F i g u r e s , a n d M o t i o n . W h o , for E x a m p l e ,
that sees a W o o d e n B o w l i n the G r e e n , d i d ever fancy, that it w a s i n d u ' d
w i t h T h o u g h t , or U n d e r s t a n d i n g ? W e m a y w e l l therefore deny, that
B o d i e s c a n t h i n k , since w e c a n m a k e no D i s c o v e r y o f a n y t h i n g i n t h e i r
N a t u r e , that h o l d s a n y A n a l o g y w i t h T h o u g h t (p. 170).
i6a R E L I G I O U S S C E P T I C I S M cH.iv
Gildon wrote with Coward's Second Thoughts expressly i n

mind and unquestionably also Locke's digression in the Essay.
From the admitted fact that no one has ever found evidence
of thought being in matter, he concluded that the suggestion
of matter being given a power of thought is absurd. Benjamin
Hampton, i n his The Existence of Human Soul After Death
(1711), attacked the same two books, alleging openly that
D r . Coward has g r o u n d e d h i s D o c t r i n e , that the S o u l has no E x i s t e n c e
after D e a t h , u p o n a S a y i n g of M r . Locke, i n h i s Essay of Human Under¬
standing, viz. T h a t w e do not k n o w b u t that it is i n the P o w e r of G o d to
dispose of M a t t e r so, as to endiie it w i t h U n d e r s t a n d i n g . I m u s t confess,
w h e n I read that Book, w h e r e i n M r . Locke discourses so excellently of
the N a t u r e of a S p i r i t , or H u m a n S o u l , telling u s , T h a t w e k n o w that
o u r S o u l s are S p i r i t u a l S u b s t a n c e s , because w e t h i n k , a n d that w e c a n
have as clear a n I d e a or N o t i o n of a S p i r i t , as w e c a n have of M a t t e r , or
a C o r p o r e a l S u b s t a n c e . I a d m i r ' d to find s u c h a n o d d C o n c e i t as G o d ' s
giving U n d e r s t a n d i n g to M a t t e r , a n d that a M a n of h i s great Thought
s h o u l d o v e r - t h i n k h i m s e l f so far as to p u t h i m s e l f i n doubt, a n d other
M e n too . . . w h e t h e r M e n have a n y S o u l s at a l l , or o n l y a little U n d e r
standing put i n their H e a d s . . . ( p p . 4 - 5 ) .
Hampton was convinced that the 'conceit' was entirely wrong.

T h o ' M r . Locke is so fond of this C h i l d of h i s B r a i n , that h e w o u l d
needs set it d o w n for fear of losing it, I suppose for no other R e a s o n , b u t
because it w a s h i s o w n ; yet this C h i l d of h i s is a M o n s t e r , for as 'tis
certain that G o d ' s P o w e r is infinite, a n d surpasses all U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
so 'tis as certain that G o d is the G o d of O r d e r a n d N a t u r e , a n d it cannot
be f o u n d i n the U n i v e r s e that he ever gave the F a c u l t y of one B e i n g , to
any other B e i n g to w h o m that F a c u l t y does not n a t u r a l l y belong . . .
(PP· 5 - 6 ) .
God must act in accord with natural law. Even his infinite
power cannot transgress the order of nature. For Hampton,
Locke was less culpable than Coward, since the latter openly
declared that man isjust the same as a beast, in that both man
and animals think and reason.
M r . Locke i n h i s E s s a y of h u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g confest, that t h o '
w e don't k n o w b u t that it w a s i n the P o w e r of G o d to have given U n d e r
s t a n d i n g to M a t t e r , yet h e w a s most i n c l i n a b l e t o b e l i e v e , that h u m a n
S o u l is a s p i r i t u a l i m m o r t a l S u b s t a n c e ; a n d yet w h i l e it is clog'd w i t h
the B o d y , does not always think. . . . N o w D r . Coward c o n c l u d e s , that
sECT. πι C O N T R O V E R S Y ON T H I N K I N G M A T T E R 163
since w h a t w e call h u m a n S o u I , does not a l w a y s t h i n k , it i s not a s p i r i t u a l

i m m o r t a l S u b s t a n c e , b u t o n l y U n d e r s t a n d i n g g i v e n to M a t t e r . . .
(pp. 2 4 - 2 5 ) .
But like Witty and Samuel Clarke, Hampton accepted in toto

the Lockean doctrine of the unknowability of substance.
A s w e have no compleat I d e a of i m m a t e r i a l S u b s t a n c e , w e have no
I d e a o f M a t t e r , stript of all Q u a l i t i e s a n d A c c i d e n t s . A l l P h i l o s o p h e r s
o w n , that the S u b s t a n c e of all m a t e r i a l t h i n g s is the same, diversified
by different A c c i d e n t s a n d Q u a l i t i e s , as b y different Magnitudes,
F i g u r e s , M o t i o n &c. a n d yet no M a n c a n tell w h a t p u r e n a k e d M a t t e r i s ;
. . . W e k n o w n o t h i n g of a n y m a t e r i a l B e i n g s b u t t h e i r n a t u r a l V i r t u e s ,
P o w e r s , O p e r a t i o n s , or sensible Q u a l i t i e s ; b u t w h a t that S u b s t a n c e is
w h i c h w e call M a t t e r , a n d is the S u b j e c t of a l l these different P o w e r s a n d
Q u a l i t i e s , w e k n o w not ( p p . 3 3 - 3 4 ) .
The controversy between Locke and Stillingfleet over

substance had laid down the two alternatives which were
followed by most of the subsequent disputants in this dis
cussion of the nature of the human soul. Stillingfleet had
agreed in principle to the doctrine of substance advanced in
the Essay; but, instead of drawing the conclusion concerning
the limitations of human knowledge which Locke drew, he
preferred to turn to those metaphysical beliefs required by
his theology and declare that the existence of immaterial
substances was a dictum of reason. Hampton and Witty
clearly aligned themselves with this side of the debate, but
their acceptance of the Lockean doctrine was even more
pronounced than Stillingfleet's. On the other side of the con
troversy, we find men who accepted boththe Lockean doctrine
of substance and the suggestion that matter might be able to
think, a suggestion that Coward and Layton particularized
into a doctrine of the soul as the activating power of the
material body. W i t h the idea fixed in the minds of the eigh
teenth-century writers that any form of materialism entailed
atheism, together with their linking of the new Deism to natural
istic doctrines, the way was open for men like Humphrey
Ditton, i n A Discourse Concerning the Resurrection of Jesm
Christ (1712), to argue that the doctrine of thinking matter
was a deist doctrine, designed to undermine the traditional
beliefs i n a future state of rewards and punishments. 'Nor are

we to imagine, that the Modern Deists have cultivated and
set about this Notion of Matter's Thinking, with any other
Design or View, than that of undermining the very Founda
tions of Christianity' (p. 474). The digression which consti
1
tuted Locke's brief pronouncement upon the long discussion

over the relation between immateriality and immortality, a
digression whose conclusions arose out of the epistemological
doctrine of the limitation of knowledge to the nominal
essence, was magnified and carried forward i n the debates of
the first half of the eighteenth century. Samuel Clarke and
Anthony Collins, the friend and follower of Locke, carried on
the most extended exchange of tracts on this subject: Clarke
maintained against Dodwell that matter is utterly incapable
of thought, while Collins sought to show that it w as possible r
for matter to think, and that the immortality of the soul did
not depend upon its immateriality. Locke's name appears
2
frequently i n this long exchange. Likewise, the radical

elaboration of Locke's suggestion by Coward and Layton did
not lack its supporters i n the eighteenth century. Samuel
Strutt, in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Physical Spring
of Human Actions (1732), argued for this position from four
basic premisses: (1) 'that we have no Ideas of Substance,
but those which have been receiv'd by our Senses from ex
ternal Objects'; (2) that 'the only Ideas which we have so
receiv'd, are of Matter, or material Substance only'; (3) that
V e have no Reason to conclude, that any part of the human
Composition consists of Immaterial Substance; because we
have no Ideas of any other Substance than Matter, and
because there is nothing (that we know of) in the Nature of
Matter, which is incompatible with Thinking'; and (4) that
'it appears most evidently from the Nature of Cogitation, that
1
L e C l e r c gave a long review of Ditton's book, in which he devoted several
pages to Ditton's views on thinking matter. Cf. Bibliotheque Choisie, t. xxv, pt.
ii, pp. 450-2 (art. v i ; 1712).
2
Cf. esp., Collins's An Answer to Mr. Clark's Third Defence of his Letter to
Mr. Dodwell (1708), and Clarke's A Second Defense ofan Argument Made use ofin
a Letter to Mr Dodwel (1707).
Matter is the Subject of i t ' (pp. 3-4). Andrew Baxter, i n

An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul (1733), de
fended the traditional doctrine, taking Locke to task and
alleging that Locke's suggestion was based upon 'what
M r . Locke elsewhere endeavours to maintain, That our ideas
are only arbitrary combinations, without connexion to any
thing i n nature' (p. 86, note r). Baxter went on to give a
careful account of the controversy from Bentley and Locke
to Collins and Clarke, finding i n Peter Browne a sympathetic
supporter. The controversy, so far as Locke was involved
1
in it, was brought to a dubious conclusion by John Jackson,

who, i n his A Dissertation on Matter and Spirit (1735), cham
pioned Lockean doctrines and put aside the new hypotheses
of Berkeley and Watts.
I have t a k e n no notice o f a n e w H y p o t h e s i s i n P h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h
h a t h b e e n lately a d v a n c ' d , viz. that there is no s u c h T h i n g really e x i s t i n g
i n N a t u r e as Substance, either Material or Spiritual', a n d that w h a t i s so
c a l l ' d is o n l y a n Aggregate of Properties w i t h o u t a n y existent Subject:...
(p. v i i , note).
Jackson believed that God was the only truly immaterial

substance and argued stoutly for the necessary union and even
identity of the human soul and body.
This complex and tedious controversy lies to one side i n
the reception of Locke's epistemological principles, but it has
a relevance, as we have seen, to the doctrine of substance and
to the belief i n the limitations of human knowledge. Perhaps
also the general mind-body problem found its reflection i n this
debate. But even though this controversy and Locke's involve
ment i n itwas subsidiary to the major problem of scepticism
which concerned his many critics, it took on a great importance
in the eyes of Locke's religious contemporaries because it dealt
with another doctrine accepted and defended bythe believers i n
natural religion. The doctrine of materialism in its Spinozistic
2
1
See Browne's Procedure, pp. 362-70.
2
L i k e many other of Locke's doctrines, this entire controversy was reflected
by L e C l e r c in various reviews in his Bibliotheque Choisie. Cf. t. ii, pp. 352ff.,
art. xiii; t. viii, pp. 58 ff., art. i i ; t. xxi, p. 217, art. v i i ; t. xxiv, pp. 191 ff.; and t.
xxvi, pp. 280 ff., art. iii.
form was, we have seen, forced upon the Essay by Carroll, but
many another writer credited the doctrine of thinking matter
to the deists and to other radical thinkers of the day. I n the list
of principles underlying deism, a list which was more than
once drawn up at the turn of the century, this doctrine takes
a prominent place. M y concern, however, is more with the
epistemological doctrines proper of the Essay, their reception,
rejection, and absorption by Locke's contemporaries, than i t
is with the various subsidiary problems engendered by these
principles. W i t h the close of the seventeenth century and the
beginning of the eighteenth, these epistemological principles
—the resting of all knowledge upon ideas, the representative
theory of perception, the pretended reduction of knowledge
to an empirical basis and the consequent rejection of all innate
sources of knowledge, the confusing, semi-phenomenalistic
doctrine of substance—found more and more favour among
the new deistical sects. No evaluation of Locke's influence
upon his countrymen can be complete which does not recog
nize the role which his epistemology played i n the service
of these new religious movements. The very fact that many of
these principles were absorbed by the orthodox defenders of
tradition enabled the new naturalistic movement, in great
measure, to catch and spread even while it was being most
bitterly attacked.
V
EPISTEMOLOGY AND RELIGION
T
H E Cartesian development of the logic of ideas together
with its English adaptations early i n the seventeenth
century provided the context from which Locke's episte
mology emerged. His epistemology was also rooted i n the
1
religious and moral debates of the period. One of the main

contentions of the previous chapters has been that Locke's
theory of knowledge was developed primarily for application
to these debates: that it was accordingly considered by his
contemporaries from the point of view of its effects upon
religion and morality, and hence commands an evaluation
within this context. W i t h very few exceptions, the Lockean
doctrines examined i n this study elicited response from
the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century writers who
were vitally concerned with the problems of man's rela
tion with God, of man's knowledge of God, of the beliefs and
dogmas required of the Christian, and fundamentally, of the
grounds and doctrines necessary for the moral life. Locke's
Essay found a place i n these contemporary discussions not
equalled by any other work i n the period which concerned
itself with the theoretical questions of human understanding.
Its popularity was not solely the result of its literary quality
but was i n great measure due to the manner i n which its
doctrines were intimatelyrelated to the religious andmoral
problems ofthe day. So far as one can validly make inferences
to Locke's personality from the few scattered remarks he has
left behind, I have suggested that his attitude towärds his
critics was anything but receptive: he did not show himself
ready to learn through debate or prone to believe that his
readers could have an insight into these problems which he
1
F o r a detailed account of this background, see my 'Locke and the Seven
teenth-Century Logic of Ideas', Journal of the History ofIdeas> October 1955.
i68 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N сн.у
himself lacked. W i t h his own interests so firmly rooted i n the

advances of the period—in the logic of ideas, in the pheno-
menological-empirical analysis of the problems of knowledge
and science, i n the naturalization of religion—Locke may
actually have been unable to anticipate or to appreciate the
disturbance which his careful critique of many of the tradi
tional presuppositions of religion and morality would cause.
But we have seen that the first book of his Essay, even though
its polemic had been amply anticipated by other men i n the
century (More, Culverwel, Parker, Burthogge), disrupted a
long tradition of morality's dependence upon the doctrine
of innate sources of knowledge; that even the most basic
objectives of that work—the empirical foundation for all
knowledge, the representative and symbolic role of ideas—
were criticized because of their implicit and far-reaching
epistemological scepticism; and that the more positive episte
mological doctrines of the Essay were discovered to lead
inevitably to religious scepticism. Had the story of the
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century reception of Locke's
epistemology ended at this point, we should have at best a
negative, destructive tale, of interest to the historian and to
the philosopher concerned with placing the Essay i n its own
context, but not a narrative dealing with any positive applica
tions of the doctrines under examination. One of the more
interesting aspects of the analysis of the subject here con
sidered is that not only did the doctrines of knowledge de
veloped by Locke receive careful destructive criticism by his
contemporaries, but, at the same time as they were attacked
by some, they were knowingly or unknowingly being applied
to the immediate problems of religion and morality con
fronting the men of the period. This positive approach to
Locke's theory of knowledge, the ability of his contemporaries
to find an application of his doctrines to their practical
problems, helps to support the contention that the theory of
the Essay had its genesis and objective within this area of
human conduct. The actual application of Locke's episte
mology to religion and morality was begun i n the very year
cH.v E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N 169
that the Essay appeared and continued into the middle of the
eighteenth ceritury. Both the members of the new religious
sects (Deists, Unitarians, Free-Thinkers) and the adherents
to the older tradition found ample use for these doctrines.
But the epistemology of the Essay found its most ready
application within the ranks of the Deists and other naturalistic
theologians. Where it is adopted by the traditional theologians
it is usually for the purpose of combating some criticism by the
new sects which had invoked Lockean doctrines, or as a means
of modifying tradition less radically than the Deists demanded.
The absorption within tradition of these principles led to the
general dissemination of the new epistemology of Locke,
making it easier for these doctrines to be accepted finally even
by those most opposed to the growing naturalism i n religion.
The epistemology of the Essay became so familiar through this
double application, that the theoretical framework of Deism
was given a most favourable impetus and support.
§ ι — T h e Charge of Deism Against Locke

The various sects of Socinianism, Unitarianism, and Deism
were all instances i n the seventeenth century of the desire to
rationalize religion by bringing its dictates into conformity
with reason. Leslie Stephen has remarked that it was initially
the strong intermixture of philosophy and religion in the early
part of this century which accounted for the open opposition
between the old and the new forms of religion. When the 1
analytic tools of philosophy, shaped i n the seventeenth century

through the advances made by the sciences, were turned to the
service of religion, the confidence shown i n science, that no
important secrets of nature could fail to come under the
control of human reason, was injected into religion.
T h e c a l m attitude of the m e n of science w h o h a d b e e n steadily
a d v a n c i n g i n the k n o w l e d g e o f the n a t u r a l w o r l d , a n d b y each fresh d i s
c o v e r y h a d g i v e n fresh proofs of the p o w e r , a n d w i s d o m , a n d goodness
of G o d , stood forth i n painful contrast w i t h the profitless w r a n g l -
i n g s a n d bitter animosities of D i v i n e s . M e n m i g h t w e l l b e g i n to ask
1
History ofEnglish Thought in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i , pp. 82-85.
i7o E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N сн.у
themselves w h e t h e r t h e y c o u l d not find rest f r o m theological strife i n

n a t u r a l religion ? a n d the real object o f the D e i s t s w a s to demonstrate
thatthey could. 1
Chillingworth's formulation of the contributory role of reason

in religion i n his The Religion ofProtestants (1638) was only
the first of the many statements of this theme in the century.
A l l the subsequent attempts at making religion rational,
at dispensing with internal sanctions for morality and the
knowledge of God, at finding God i n nature and moral rules
through reason, were met by the orthodox with the various
labels of slander which had accrued to terms like 'Socinian',
'Unitarian', or 'Deist'—labels which were meant and under
stood as synonymous with 'atheist'. I n the tracts which sought
to defend orthodoxy, the arch-enemy was first Socianism, i n
its revival in the second half of the century, then Unitarianism,
which appeared at about the same time, and finally, i n the 2
early years of the eighteenth century, Deism became the

dominant foe to be defeated. Deism was in effect the natural
issue of the growing concern to establish religion upon
natural, as opposed to revealed, grounds. The movement i n
religion from the middle of the seventeenth to the middle of
the eighteenth centuries was steady and in one direction.
What Stephen says of the years 1690-6, 'Locke, t h e U n i -
tarians, Toland, form a genuine series, in which Christianity
is being gradually transmuted by largerinfusions of rational
ism', holds equally well of the period from Toland to
3
Wollaston or Collins.
Although the various non-orthodox sects which appeared
in England between 1690 and 1704 (the period from the Essay
to Locke's death) differed from one another in virtue of
certain minor doctrinal points, i n studying any one of them
we are in effect learning most of the characteristics of all the
others. I t depends on where one enters the period to decide
1
Abbey and Overton, The English Church in the Eighteenth Century, vol. i ,
p. 181.
2
T h e name of Stephen Nye is most often associated with this movement. Cf.
his A BriefHistory ofthe Unitarians (1687).
3
Stephen, vol. i , p. 111.
sECT.i C H A R G E O F D E I S M A G A I N S T L O C K E 171
which aspect of the general religious movement shall be

examined. T o study the positive application of Locke's
doctrines takes us towards the end of this period and hence
leads us into an examination of Deism, the then dominant
radical religious sect. While Locke was called a 'Socinian'
soon after the publication of the Essay, towards the end of the
seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century his
opponents commonly labelled him a 'Deist'. I n both cases,
what was being objected to was his emphasis upon a rational
religion and the restriction of knowledge to the phenomenal
or familiar world. What has come to be called 'Deism' by the
historians of religious thought has usually meant those
doctrines held by that group of late seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century writers (e.g. Chubb, Blount, Tindal,
Toland) who were concerned to deny revealed truth and to set
religion upon the foundation of nature. But Overton has
correctly pointed out that the Deists did not constitute any
organized body of men writing in unison.
T h e y f o r m e d no sect, p r o p e r l y s o - c a l l e d , a n d w e r e b o u n d b y no
creed. I n this sense at least t h e y w e r e g e n u i n e ' f r e e - t h i n k e r s ' , i n that
they freely e x p r e s s e d their t h o u g h t s w i t h o u t the slightest regard to
w h a t h a d b e e n s a i d o r m i g h t be s a i d b y t h e i r friends or foes. I t w a s the
fashion a m o n g their contemporaries to speak of the D e i s t s as i f they w e r e
as distinct a sect as the Q u a k e r s , the S o c i n i a n s , the P r e s b y t e r i a n s , or a n y
other religious d e n o m i n a t i o n . B u t w e look i n v a i n for a n y c o m m o n
d o c t r i n e — a n y c o m m o n f o r m of w o r s h i p w h i c h b e l o n g e d to the D e i s t s
as D e i s t s . 1
Overton recognizes that those who usually pass under this

name did subscribe to a few common negative tenets, such
as the denial of revealed religion, the belief that the Scriptures
must be examined critically like any other book, that Jesus
Christ is not co-equal with the one God. What the Deists did
was to give expression, 'often a very coarse and inadequate
expression—to thoughts which the circumstances of the times
could scarcely fail to suggest'. 2
The first reference to a sect of Deists is usually credited to
Abbey and Overton, vol. i , p. 178 2

Ibid., vol. i , p. 190.
i72 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cn.v
the French writer, Pierre Viret, who, in his Instruction

Chrestienne (1564) says:
Г а у e n t e d u q u ' i l y e n a de ceste bäde, q u i s'appelent D e i s t e s , d V n
m o t tout n e u v e a u , l e q u e l ils veulent opposer ä Atheiste. C a r p o u r autant
qu'atheiste signifie celuy q u i est sans D i e u . ils veulent döner ä entendre
q u ' i l ne sont pas d u tout sans D i e u , ä cause q u ' i l s croyet b i e n q u ' i l y a
q u e l q u e D i e u , lequel ils recognoissent m e s m e p o u r createur d u ciel &
de la terre, c o m m e les T u r c s : m a i s de I e s u s C h r i s t , ils ne sauent que
c'est, & ne tiennent r i e n ne de l u y ne de s a doctrine (vol. i i , p. [8] o f
Epistre).
The persons whom Viret had in mind in this comment have

not been clearly specified, but the characterization which he
gives of them could be ascribed to manyindividuals in England
and on the Continent from the earliest years of the seventeenth
century. Socinus himself could almost fit this description.
Richard Bentley, who gave the first of the Boyle lectures,
characterized the Deists as being the same as infidels and
atheists in much the same fashion as did Viret.
T h e r e are some Infidels a m o n g u s , that not o n l y disbelieve the
Christian R e l i g i o n ; but i m p u g n the assertion o f a Providence, of the Im
mortality o f the S o u l , of a n U n i v e r s a l Judgment to come, a n d o f a n y
Incorporeal E s s e n c e : a n d yet to a v o i d the odious n a m e of Atheists,
w o u l d shelter a n d s k r e e n t h e m s e l v e s u n d e r a n e w one of Deists, which
is not quite so o b n o x i o u s . 1
Bentley's description of Deism includes many of the doctrines

for which the Essay later became famous. By far the more
common mark of Deism was the rejection of revealed religion
as a separate source of knowledge, exempt from the ordinary
tests of validity, a mark which Leland singled out in his 2
extended analysis of certain leading Deists» Stillingfleet found

it necessary to write A Letter to a Deist (1677) in which he
attacks a particular unnamed person 'who owned the Being
and Providence of God, but expressed a mean Esteem of the
Scriptures, and the Christian Religion' (pref.). The principles
which he and the deist held in common involved the existence
of God, the concept of God as the creator, that God should
1
The Folly ofAtheism (1692), p. 6. T h i s was the first sermon in his series.
2
A View of the Principal Deistical Writers (1754-55), vol. i , p. 3.
be worshipped, that there is a future state of rewards and

punishments in another world, and that the New Testament
contains many principles 'inducing to Humility and Self-
denyal, and to the Honour of God' (pp. 10-11). What was
debated was whether the matters of fact reported in the Bible,
especially the miracles, were true or no. Similarly, William
Stephens published anonymously his AnAccountofthe Growth
of Deism in England (1696), in which he equated Deism with
the denial of all revealed religion (p. 4). He adds to the list of
principles accepted by the Deists, or reasons for men turning
towards Deism, the dislike of those dogmas which areirrational
or above reason, especially that of the T r i n i t y (pp. 19-20).
Another anonymous writer confirmed Stephens's general
account. 1
The object of attack i n this last-mentioned pamphlet was

Humphrey Prideaux, whom the author had credited with
championing Locke's reduction of the necessary articles for
belief to the one of Christ as the Messiah. The author of this 2
tract had replied by, among other things, calling attention to

a person he had known who had returned to revealed religion
after reading Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity. Leland
also considered this work of Locke's an antidote against Deism
and natural religion. But Locke's precise relations to Deism
3
are complex. On the one hand there can be little doubt that
he never seriously considered himself as an opponent of
revealed religion. I n the preface to his Second Vindication of
his Reasonableness of Christianity, he wrote:
But, w h e n I h a d gone t h r o u g h the w h o l e , a n d s a w w h a t a p l a i n ,
s i m p l e , reasonable t h i n g C h r i s t i a n i t y w a s , s u i t e d to a l l c o n d i t i o n s a n d
c a p a c i t i e s ; a n d i n the m o r a l i t y o f it n o w , w i t h d i v i n e a u t h o r i t y , e s t a b
l i s h e d into a legible law, so far s u r p a s s i n g a l l that p h i l o s o p h y a n d h u m a n
reason h a d attained to, or c o u l d p o s s i b l y m a k e effectual to a l l degrees o f
m a n k i n d , I w a s flattered to t h i n k it m i g h t be of s o m e u s e i n the w o r l d ;
especially to those, w h o t h o u g h t either that there w a s no n e e d of r e v e l a
t i o n at a l l , or that t h e revelation o f o u r S a v i o u r r e q u i r e d the belief o f
1
'Some Reflections on a Book, Entituled, A Letter to the Deists\ no. 1 of The
Occasional Paper (1697), p. 10.
2
See his A Letter to the Deists (1697). 3
Op. cit., vol. i , p, 37.
824331 N
s u c h articles for salvation, w h i c h the settled notions, a n d t h e i r w a y o f

r e a s o n i n g i n some, a n d w a n t of u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n others, m a d e i m p o s s i b l e
to t h e m . U p o n these t w o topics the objections s e e m e d to t u r n , w h i c h
w e r e w i t h m o s t assurance m a d e b y D e i s t s against C h r i s t i a n i t y ; b u t
against Christianity misunderstood. I t seemed to m e , that there
n e e d e d n o m o r e to s h o w t h e m the weakness o f their exceptions, b u t to
lay p l a i n l y before t h e m the doctrine of o u r S a v i o u r a n d h i s apostles, as
d e l i v e r e d i n the S c r i p t u r e s , a n d not as taught b y the several sects of
Christians. 1
Thus he was not an opponent of revelation, even though he

held reason i n high esteem and had i n common with many
men of the period the belief that religion could be made con
sistent with the demands of reason. But, on the other hand, it
is true, as Overton has observed, that Locke had close personal
relations with some of the principal deistical writers (e.g.
Collins and Tindal) and 'most of the rest show unmistakable
signs of having studied his works and followed more or less
his line of thought'. I t seems to be true that many of the
2
epistemological doctrines of the Essay provided material

around which the deistical writers could construct their
arguments.
Socinianism was much in the minds of Locke's contempora
ries ; it was a religious movement which did not differ radic
ally from the general deistical temper. Being called a 'Socinian'
was in many respects just a prelude to being classed with the
Deists. Peter Browne wrote in 1728: O u r modern Deists, and
Freethinkers, and Atheists of all sorts and sizes are likewise
the natural Growth and Offspring of Socinianism.' John 3
Milner, in An Account of Mr. Lock's Religion, had associated

Locke with the Unitarians and the Socinians in virtue of his
silence upon the doctrine of the Trinity, and concluded his
book by comparing the doctrines of Socinus with those of
Locke. John Edwards, who attacked Locke's Reasonableness
of Christianity, had been one of the more vehement of Locke's
slanderers, employing all the damaging epithets of the day.
1
Treface to the Reader', in Works, vol. vii, p. 188.
2
Op. cit., vol. i , pp. 223-4.
3
Procedure, Extent, andLimits of Human Understanding, p. 40.
I t is significant that after completing a long attack against

what he took to be the Lockean doctrine of clear and distinct
ideas as the foundations for all certainty Edwards remarks:
I h a d not s a i d so m u c h u n l e s s the present A g e w e live i n h a d r e q u i r e d
it, for n o w Deism is every w h e r e r a m p a n t , w h i c h is no other t h e n a n
excessive extolling of N a t u r a l R e l i g i o n , abstract f r o m a l l R e v e l a t i o n . A
Deist is one that o w n s no S c r i p t u r e s , no R e v e a l ' d or I n s t i t u t e d R e l i g i o n . 1
Pairing Toland with Locke, Edwards complained that neither

of them stops at 'Exploding an Assertion because it is Com
mon and Vulgar, and because they are willing to broach
a new one of their own.' I n addition they introduce an
2
entirely new terminology for the purpose of confusing the

reader. Locke in particular has made a great advance in this
way,
b y h i s setting u p o n l y O n e F u n d a m e n t a l A r t i c l e of C h r i s t i a n R e l i g i o n ,
b y h i s r i d i c u l i n g the R e s u r r e c t i o n of the same B o d y , b y h i s S c r u p l e s
about the S o u l s I m m a t e r i a l i t y , b y h i s N o t i o n of T h i n k i n g M a t t e r , by
h i s N 0 N a t u r a l C o n s c i e n c e , or a n y s u c h O r i g i n a l P r i n c i p l e i n M e n s
M i n d s . A n d b o t h of t h e m have e n d e a v o u r ' d to shake the F u n d a m e n t a l s
of R e l i g i o n b y a N e w S e t of N o t i o n s about Reason a n d Clear Ideas, and
the rise of these f r o m Sensation a n d Reflection only, a n d their p a r t i c u l a r
C o n c e i t s about Substances and Essences. 3
A l l the troublesome epistemological and ontological doc

trines of the Essay were thus introduced into Edwards's sum
mary of the particular doctrines of Deism and Socinianism
so detrimental to traditional religion. Just how easy was the
transfer from Socinian to Deist in the minds of Locke's con
temporaries is amply illustrated by John Witty's The Reason
ableness of Assenting to the Mysteries of Christianity (1707).
Lockean principles again figure prominently in his accusa
tions.
A n d w h e r e a s the D e i s t s w o u l d t e a c h u s to infer, that because Ideas
are the sole Foundation of our Knowledge and Assent, therefore we can't
assent to any thing which we have notan immediate Idea of, a n d w o u l d
t h e n c e invalidate the reasonableness of o u r assent to Christian Mysteries
•••(P-34). y..
1
A Free Discourse concerning Truth and Error (1701), p. 87.
2
Ibid., p. 423. 3
Ibid., pp. 423-4.
176 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N сн.у
Not only did Witty consider the basing of all knowledge upon
the way of ideas essential to Deism, but the doctrine of the
unknowability of substance is evidenced as an example of the
type of vague inferences from ideas allowed by the Deists.
A n d t h u s h a v i n g I d e a s of the i n h e r e n t A t t r i b u t e s o f Matter, and
thinking Substances, a n d of t h e i r necessary d e p e n d e n c e o n something as
a s u p p o r t of their E x i s t e n c e , w e infer a n d assent to the E x i s t e n c e of the
Substances w h i c h s u p p o r t t h e m ; t h o u g h w h a t those Substances are i n
t h e i r i n t r i n s i c N a t u r e s w e are entirely ignorant. ( I b i d . )
Witty had very little sympathy for this kind of guarded i n

ference.
F o r the Socinians a n d Deists to c o m e o v e r u s here w i t h t h e i r d a r l i n g
S o p h i s m , that because Ideas are the sole Foundation of our Knowledge
and assent, therefore we can know, or assent to nothing which we havenot an
immediate Idea of, is o n l y to s h e w t h e i r a s s u r a n c e ; for y o u see clearly
that w e h a v e K n o w l e d g e o f the E x i s t e n c e a n d different N a t u r e s o f
things, w h o s e i n t r i n s i c N a t u r e s , or the real manner ofExistence we have
no I d e a s of at a l l ; . . . ( p . 3 7 ) .
The doctrines which Witty attacked as being both Socinian

and deistic were some of the more crucial epistemological
doctrines of Locke's Essay. One of the opponents W i t t y
had i n mind i n this attack was Anthony Collins, the friend
and follower of Locke. Charles Leslie, writing anonymously
in 1707, said that Collins was a champion of the Deists and
desired 'no better a Character, than to be thought a true
Disciple and Follower of M r . Lock i n all his Notions, how
erroneous soever they may be thought by some People'. 1
Collins was avowedly a defender of free-thinking, his name

for what commonly went under the label of Deism, and a
champion of many Lockean principles. One of his earliest
works, An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason (1707), laid
down the basic pattern of theory for his thinking. I n that
work, he defined reason as 'that faculty of the Mind whereby
it perceives the Truth, Falsehood, Probability or Improbability
of Propositions', asserting after Locke that all Tropositions
whatever consist of Terms or Words which stand for Ideas
1
The Second Part of The Wolf Stript of His Shepherds Cloathing, p. 25.
SECT.i C H A R G E O F D E I S M A G A I N S T L O C K E 177
concerning which some agreement is affirm'd or deny'd . .

(pp. 3-4). He proceeded to prescribe the general distinctions
between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge which Locke
had made in his Essay. 'There are some Ideas join'd in Pro
positions which the M i n d perceives to agree or disagree
immediately or intuitively without the use of Proof or inter
mediate Ideas to discover that agreement or disagreement..
(p. 4). Demonstrative knowledge demands intermediate ideas
in order to find the agreement or lack of agreement which
exists between the propositions and the terms which are
involved in the deduction. Collins also recognized a category
of probable agreement, paralleling Locke's discussions of
probability. His main concern in this work was with establish
ing the rational grounds upon which knowledge through
testimony could be accepted, since he was concerned with the
validity of the Scriptures and of the facts which they claimed
to report. The general dictum covering assent is once more
taken from the Essay of Locke.
U p o n the M i n d ' s p e r c e i v i n g the agreement or disagreement o f I d e a s
i m m e d i a t e l y or b y the i n t e r v e n t i o n o f I d e a s , w h i c h have a necessary o r
p r o b a b l e agreement, or b y the h e l p o f T e s t i m o n y , there follows a n
A s s e n t of the M i n d , w h i c h is different a c c o r d i n g to the different nature
of the E v i d e n c e , w h e r e b y the I d e a s j o i n ' d i n a P r o p o s i t i o n s e e m to agree
or disagree (p. 6 ) .
He distinguishes science, opinion, and faith as degrees of

assent. Besides a trustworthy witness, several other conditions
are required for rational assent to knowledge given by
testimony.
T h a t the w o r d s m a d e use of i n the Relation s t a n d for k n o w n I d e a s , o r
I d e a s that w e are capable of f o r m i n g ; for i f they s t a n d for I d e a s that w e
k n o w not, or w a n t F a c u l t i e s to perceive, there are t h e n no objects for the
M i n d to exert it self u p o n ( p . 8 ) .
Moreover, the correlation of words and ideas must occur as

far as possible in accordance with normal usage. Finally, there
cannot be any contradiction between the ideas thus joined
by the person giving the testimony. T must not only have
Ideas to the words, but the Ideas must not be repugnant to
178 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cH.v
one another when put into Propositions nor to what we know

to be true by the use of our Faculties' (p. i i ) . Throughout
all this discussion, perception is made the criterion of truth.
I f there is a Criterion, I desire to k n o w w h a t it is ? I k n o w no other b u t
Perception: for tho T r u t h abstractly c o n s i d e r ' d consists i n the relations
of agreement b e t w e e n I d e a s ; yet b e i n g here c o n s i d e r ' d relatively to
h u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g , it i s not m y T r u t h till I perceive it, n o r c a n I
k n o w it to be true b u t b y m y o w n P e r c e p t i o n (p. 12).
Witty had complained against Collins's definition of know

ledge and then proceeded to attack several other Lockean
principles as deistical. Collins had attempted to defend
against Clarke Locke's suggestion of matter being able to be
given the power of thought, another doctrine considered
deistical. I n the same year as his previously mentioned book,
Witty published another, The First Principles ofModern Deism
Confuted (1707), i n which he sought to show, i n opposition
to those whom he considered Deists, the immateriality,
natural eternity, and immortality of thinking substances, even
granting the Deists' assumption that the internal essence of
substances is unknown. I t is significant, too, that Witty
claims in his preface to have had most of this book written
before the Clarke-Collins dispute on this question appeared.
Thus, he was ascribing these principles to the Deists inde
pendently of Collins's application of them. William Carroll
had, i n the previous year, strongly insisted that both Toland
and Tindal were directly inspired by Locke.
H e r e are the T i t l e s of some of t h e m [the books b y L o c k e a n d h i s
followers], viz. The Reasonableness ofChristianity: a n d Christianity not
Mysterious. T h o s e t w o T i t l e s are different i n S o u n d , b u t agree i n S e n s e ;
. . . A n o t h e r B o o k is lately p u b l i s h ' d , I n t i t u l e d , The Rights of the Chris
tian Church, &c. 1
The last-named book was written by Mathew Tindal, in

1706, a work which, Carroll charged, 'has been writ by a
Gentleman, or a Set of Gentlemen mislead by the Principles
establish'd in the Essay of Human Understanding.' Tindal 2
1
A Dissertation upon the Tenth Chapter ofthe Fourth Book ofMr. Locke's Essay
1706), p. 276. 2
Ibid., p. 277.
had corresponded with Locke concerning an earlier work of

his, probably his Essay Concerning the Power of the Magistrate
and The Rights of Mankind in Matters of Religion (1697), a
book concerned with matters of toleration. Tindal sent Locke
a copy of this work, expressing his indebtedness to Locke's
writings on the same subject. But the only Lockean doctrines
1
present in TindaPs The Rights of the Christian Church are the

doctrines of a social contract and of a state of nature, neither
of which stems from the Essay. Collins had pointed out in
his A Discourse of Free-Thinking (1713) that 'the Reverend
Dr. Clarke, and the Reverend M r . Samuel Bold, and M r . John
Locke are charg'd with Atheism by the Reverend M r . CarroP
(p. 85), on the ground that they had made the material
universe to be the eternal Being or God. I t was against such
'Men of Matter and Modification' that George Hickes wrote
in his preface to Carroll's Spinoza Reviv'd(1jo9); he described
the doctrine of thinking matter as deistical, along with many
other principles of the Essay. Praising Milner's attack upon
Locke, Hickes said:
T h e P e r s o n w h o w r o t e this little B o o k , w a s one o f the first M a g n i t u d e
for L e a r n i n g , m u c h exceeding M r . Lock i n Intellectual Acquirements,
a n d not inferior to h i m i n a n y I n t e l l e c t u a l A b i l i t i e s ; a n d h a d it b e e n
M r . Lock's good F o r t u n e b u t to have h a d a good share of h i s L e a r n i n g ,
he h a d n e v e r w r i t t e n those B o o k s , a n d L e t t e r s , for w h i c h , to h i s E v e r
lasting D i s h o n o u r , the Deists, as it w e r e , C a n o n i z e h i s M e m o r y (p. [35]
of P r e l i m . Discourse).
Lee's Anti-Scepticism received similar praise from Hickes in

the same preface.
W h i l e I a m speaking o f B o o k s w r i t t e n against M r . Lock, I should
be u n j u s t to the M e r i t s of another P r i e s t , the R e v . M r . Lee, should I
forbear to m e n t i o n h i s A n t i s c e p t i c i s m . . . . I a m p e r s w a d e d , h a d M r .
Lock foreseen, that s u c h a B o o k w o u l d h a v e b e e n w r i t t e n against h i s
E s s a y , he w o u l d n e v e r have wrote that, a n d i f he r e a d it before he d y e d ,
it m u s t needs h a v e b e e n M a t t e r of G r i e f , i f not o f H u m i l i a t i o n to h i m , to
see his B o o k , w h i c h a l l the Atheists, a n d Deists, a n d Scepticks of the A g e
c r i e d u p for a P e r f o r m a n c e above w h a t e v e r h a d b e e n done b y any
P h i l o s o p h e r , so perfectly d e m o l i s h e d f r o m part to p a r t ; . . . ( p . [36]).
1
See T i n d a l to Locke, io January 1696/7, M S . Locke, C . 20, f. 207.
i8o E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N c H . v
Tindal's The Rights of the Christian Church is called deistical,

and Hickes makes the charge, repeated by Carroll, that Locke
had seen this work i n manuscript, a charge for which there
seems to be no further evidence. I n his preface to his own
Three Short Treatises (1709), Hickes repeated many of the
same accusations: this time tracing the growth of Deism i n
England to Spinoza. Toland's book and Locke's Reasonabk-
ness of Christianity are listed among the ten most important
deistical books.
Locke was not entirely without his defenders against these
various charges of being a Deist or being influential among the
Deists. I n his review of Spinoza Reviv'd, LeClerc scorned to
reply to Carroll's ill-mannered attacks upon Locke, pointing
to Locke's works as sufficient refutation of these malicious
remarks. Especially in relation to Carroll and Hickes, it is
1
wise to keep i n mind a point which Jessop has recently made,

namely, that there were i n general two main sources of dis
semination for the deist doctrine i n the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries: i n the serious books and pamphlets of
the day and i n the drawing-rooms, coffee-houses, and taverns.
I n the latter ' i t was less decent than i t was i n books'. Jessop 2
writes to prevent the reader of Berkeley's Alciphron from

concluding that Berkeley has caricatured the Deists i n that
work. Undoubtedly some of the more vehement attacks
upon the Deists arose from the extravagances of the coffee
house discussions. The mistake which men like Carroll and
Hickes made was to write as i f the serious writers, such as
Locke and Tindal, were advocates of frivolous doctrines like
those held by the coffee-house frequenters. LeClerc was
certainly just in his condemnation of the method of polemic
followed by Hickes and Carroll, insisting that even i f Deism
was so rampant as these men believed, ' i l vaudroit mieux les
refuter, avec plus de calme'. William Whiston also sought
3
to protect Locke from the chargesof Deism.
1
Bibliotheque Choisie, t. xxi, pt. i , art. i i , pp. 38-39.
2
Berkeley's Works, vol. iii, Editor's introduction to Alciphron, p. 6.
3
Op. cit., p. 39.
S i n c e M r . Lock is h e r e a n d e v e r y w h e r e e s t e e m ' d a n e m i n e n t Free¬

Thinker; a n d that not s e l d o m i n t h e i r r e l i g i o u s sense o f the W o r d s ;
n a y h a s b e e n v e r y often e s t e e m ' d n o better t h a n a Deist; I shall here, b y
w a y of V i n d i c a t i o n o f h i s M e m o r y , a n d i n H o p e s that h i s A u t h o r i t y m a y
m a k e s o m e I m p r e s s i o n o n all o f u s , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y o n the real i r r e l i g i o u s
Free Thinkers themselves, produce unquestionable E v i d e n c e of his
fixed a n d last S e n t i m e n t s about s u c h M a t t e r s , f r o m h i s o w n W o r d s i n
t w o L e t t e r s to two of h i s i n t i m a t e F r i e n d s . 1
He then quotes from two letters of Locke, the one so briefly

as to preclude identification, the other to Collins. But 2
Whiston found little evidence for vindicating Locke from the

charges of Deism since the most these quoted passages reveal
is that Locke died with a firm conviction in immortality, a
doctrine which very few of the Deists ever denied. Edmund
Gibson, the Bishop of London, later i n the century tried to
defend Locke in a similar fashion, but an anonymous writer 3
as late as 1742 published a strong invective, A Dissertation on

Deistical and Arian Corruption, in which Lockean doctrines
once more appear as the foundation for Deism. Part of the blame
for the development of Deism, Socinianism, and Arianism,
this writer claimed, stems from their inability to distinguish
mind from matter, having in mind the Lockean doctrine of
substance. The doctrine of ideas as advanced in the Essay is
taken in a sensualist sense and is then described as a funda
mental tenet of the Deists andArians. John Jackson, an ardent
follower of Locke, and Whiston, oddly enough, are charged
with being the main leaders of Deism. I t was this writer also
who defended the doctrine of innate ideas against Jackson
and Locke. 4
§ 2—The Orthodox Application of Locke's Epistemology

There can be no doubt that Locke was charged directly
with being a Deist by many, and by others with at least
being a sympathiser with Deism, and that his doctrines were
1
Reflexions on an Anonymous Pamphlet, Entituled, A Discourse qfFree Thinking
(1713)> Ρ- 55.
2
Locke to Collins, 23 August 1704. Reprinted in Works, vol. x, p. 298.
3
SecondPastoralLetter (1730), pp. 5, 6, 35.
4
Cf. above, p. 71.
i82 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N C H .v
considered by most theologians as fundamental to this new

movement. The digression concerning the possibility of matter
being given a power of thought; the doctrine of substance so
carefully circumscribed by the limitations of human know
ledge: the entire way of ideas or the method of the ideists
insinuated itself into the naturalistic tendencies i n religion
and found a fertile soil i n which to thrive. But the growth of
the way of ideas within orthodoxy was no less luxuriant than
among the Deists, even though in the case of orthodoxy it
worked towards more gradual modifications. W i t h Deism, re
ligion found its anarchists, its advocates for quick and radical
changes; the epistemological tools of the Essay provided, often
unconsciously, means to effect a more gradual revolution in
the same direction for many traditional thinkers. I n fact, the
most careful applications of the Lockean epistemology are to
be found among the theologians who were seeking to under
mine Deism and Socinianism in the name of tradition. Some
of these orthodox writers employed Lockean principles as a
means of granting certain doctrines invoked by the Deists, in
order, as Witty attempted to show, to derive conclusions
antithetical to Deism. Berkeley's modification of Locke's
epistemology is the best-known instance of the way of
ideas being put to the service of tradition, but many lesser-
known writers offer even more interesting examples, since
these men often accepted the Lockean position without
modification. Locke's doctrines were so much invoked by
1
deistical writers that the defenders of tradition were forced

to argue that these doctrines need not be taken as premisses
for the deistical conclusions. I t was most often the men who
were opposing Deism the most vociferously who adopted in
detail other Lockean doctrines which, i n different contexts,
they would have considered deistical. But many men of the
period employed Locke's doctrines i n the service of tradition
quite directly, apparently finding i n the way of ideas an estab-
1
Berkeley will not be examined in any detail in this study, but it is useful to
recall that, besides the Alciphron, which was written explicitly with the Deists
as the object of attack, his epistemological treatises were written to combat
scepticism and atheism and to establish the incorporeal nature of the human soul.
sECT.ii L O C K E ' S E P I S T E M O L O G Y A P P L I E D 183
lished approach convenient to their beliefs. I have already

indicated in some detail the extent to which William Sherlock
absorbed the doctrine of substance and that of personal
identity in the very year that the Essay first appeared. The
doctrine of substance was used by Sherlock to defend his
version of the doctrine of the Trinity. James Lowde, who
attacked Locke's rejection of innate sources of knowledge i n
his A Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man (1694), also
sought to combat the suggestion that immateriality is not
necessary for the immortality of the soul. But like so many
who attacked this digression, Lowde took over without
question the non-phenomenalistic doctrine of substance of
the Essay.
B u t the E s s e n c e s of things b e i n g u n k n o w n , the N o t i o n of a S p i r i t
s e e m s as obvious a n d intelligible, as that of m a t t e r : for w e m a y as easily
conceive of one t h i n g , to w h i c h w e attribute cogitation, as its i m m e d i a t e
p r o p e r t y ; as w e do of another, to w h i c h w e ascribe extension a n d i m
penetrability ( p . 15).
I n his defence of the Christian mysteries against Toland,

William Payne, The Mystery of the Christian Faith (1697), not
only accepted the Lockean doctrine of substance, but adopted
as well the terminology of ideas and Locke's belief in the
limitations of human knowledge. 1
N o w n o t h i n g i n o u r o w n m i n d s , or i n visible N a t u r e is perfectly like
these [the three parts of the T r i n i t y ] or to w h i c h w e c a n c o m p a r e t h e m ,
or f r o m w h e n c e w e c a n d r a w a S i m i l i t u d e , R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , or I d e a o f
t h e m , a n d therefore they are I n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , a n d U n c o n c e i v a b l e b y
u s , for 'tis b y C o m p a r i s o n , a n d likeness w e chiefly k n o w , a n d conceive
things, a n d 'tis h a r d to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n K n o w l e d g e , Conception,
a n d I m a g i n a t i o n ; so that w h a t some persons cännot imagine, or cannot
have a p i c t u r e or likeness of i n their F a n c y , a n d I m a g i n a t i o n , they say
t h e y cannot conceive, a n d therefore some p r e t e n d they c a n h a v e n o C o n
ceptions of a S p i r i t u a l S u b s t a n c e , a n d others no I d e a of the T r i n i t y , n o r
e v e n of G o d , b y w h i c h they m e a n they cannot have a P i c t u r e or I d e a , o r
likeness of these things i n t h e i r I m a g i n a t i o n ( p p . 3 3 - 3 4 ; cf. p p . 1 8 - 2 3 ) .
Among the theologians who adopted the terminology of ideas,

it was common to interpret the term 'idea' as Sergeant and
Peter Browne did, as 'image'. Hence, Payne can argue i n
defence of religion and its mysteries by saying that an image

is not necessary for a concept or idea taken in its proper sense.
Knowledge and imagination are sharply distinguished. He
argues that the doctrine of the Trinity is above reason in the
sense that it is incomprehensible in its entirety even after
revelation: it is a ' T r u t h and an object by it self, made known
to us purely by Revelation, and such a Complex Idaea or Con
nexion of Idaeas that we have no other Idaea, Similitude or
Representation that exactly answers or comes perfectly up to'
this idea or conception of the Trinity (p. 40). As in the writings
of Sherlock, the man whom Payne defended against Robert
South, Locke's doctrines here again appear in the context of
strictly religious issues. Against South's attempts to make the
intrinsic nature of matter accessible to human knowledge,
Payne pleaded for the unknowability of its nature or its real
essence, saying that
w e k n o w n o t h i n g of that b u t its o u t w a r d accidents a n d a few of its q u a l i
ties, its colour a n d figure, a n d h a r d n e s s or softness, or the like, b u t its i n
w a r d substance, a n d w h a t is the subject a n d Substratum of these accidents
a n d qualities w e k n o w n o t h i n g of. H o w the parts of M a t t e r are u n i t e d ,
w h a t m a k e s t h e m so close a n d inseparable i n a s o l i d S t o n e . . . is u n k n o w n
to u s ; . . . ( p p . 4 3 - 4 4 ) .
Indeed, Payne did not profess to be able to account for much

of the perceptual process which is ancillary to knowledge:
h o w a n y of o u r S e n s e s perceive these Objects, a n d h o w w e have s u c h
C o n c e p t i o n s a n d P h a n t a s m s r a i s e d i n u s b y t h e m , w h i c h are not i n
the Objects themselves, (for B i t t e r a n d Sweet, P a i n a n d P l e a s u r e , H e a t
a n d C o l d is not i n a n y o f t h e m , n o r a n y t h i n g like t h e m , b u t o n l y i n o u r
selves) a n d b y w h a t secret P o w e r s they excite those S e n t i m e n t s is as
u n a c c o u n t a b l e as it is obvious (pp. 4 4 - 4 5 ) .
Throughout Payne's long defence of tradition, even though

it was a tradition modified in the direction of Sherlock's
'Tri-Trinitarianism', there is no mention of Locke. But the
stamp of Locke's epistemology is clearly visible on many pages
of his work. The same phenomenon appears in Francis
Gastrell's Some Considerations Concerning the Trinity (1696),
in large part a reply to Toland's Christianity not Mysterioix.
Toland caused many theologians to reassess their own doc

trines and to meet the challenge he had thrown out, a challenge
which could not be answered merely by repeating the old
verbiage and the customary ambiguous statements concern
ing the Trinity. Browne developed his doctrine of analogy,
as applied to our knowledge of trans-empirical objects, i n
order to meet Toland's challenge. Gastrell absorbed an un
usually large amount of Locke's terminology and doctrines
in his attempt to meet Toland's attack and to conciliate
the opposing groups. One of the basic distinctions Gastrell
invoked for this purpose was that between what can be
distinctly conceived and what must be taken on faith. Regard
ing the latter, he says there are two general conditions
requisite: 'That we know the Terms of what we are to assent
to' and 'That i t imply no contradiction to our former Know
ledge' (p. 10), conditions which Collins was to accept later,
in his account of the prerequisites for accepting testimony.
Gastrell defines truth as 'nothing else but the agreement or
disagreement of its [a proposition's] Terms, or the Ideas ex
pressed by them' (p. 11). Certainty of knowledge and belief
is correlated with clarity of the understanding of the terms of
the propositions involved. 'From whence it follows, that
Terms and simpk Idea's must be ckarly and distinctly under
stood first, before we can believe any thing particular of the
respects and relations they bear to one another, which is the
onlyproper Object ofFaith' (p. 12). Like Locke, he accepts
the doctrine of simple and complex ideas, the former being
defined as those 'which are so clear of themselves, that
I cannot find clearer to explain them by' (p. 15), or as
those'notdistinguishableintodifferentAppearances' (p. 17).
Complex ideas are taken in the same strict fashion: 'When I
have any Thought or Perception, which is resolvable into
several Idea's, I call this a complex or compounded Notion'
(Ibid.) The way of ideas is writ large throughout his treatise.
F o r this is certain, that every M a n i s c o n s c i o u s to himself, that h e h a s
a p o w e r of perceiving a n d comparing his Perceptions, a n d consequently
m u s t k n o w , w h e n a n y t h i n g i s p r e s e n t e d to h i s M i n d , w h e t h e r it be
i86 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N
perceivable at one entire view, a n d w h e t h e r the Object have one uniform

appearance or n o t : H e m u s t be also sensible i n a s u c c e s s i o n of Idea's,
w h e n the same A p p e a r a n c e s are repeated again, a n d h o w often the R e p r e
sentation is varied (p. 15).
He goes on in this context to argue that one cannot infer from

the variety of ideas to a variety of things without us, or from
the sameness of ideas to the sameness of things. The doctrine
of nominal essence, the theory of sorting, and the limitations
of knowledge to the phenomenalist level are made integral
to GastreIPs argument.
W h e t h e r my Idea's are agreeable to the real Natures of things, or those
Original Patterns i n the M i n d of G o d , I cannot certainly k n o w ; b u t
w h e n they are the same, a n d w h e n they differ f r o m one another, I p l a i n l y
perceive, tho' I cannot always j u d g e of the Identity or Distinction of
T h i n g s , a c c o r d i n g as they are represented to m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g , u n d e r
the same or different A p p e a r a n c e s (pp. 1 7 - 1 8 ) .
A 'spirit' is defined as being indivisible, without extension,

but he agrees that we can have no idea of the real nature of
spirit: 'for all that I conceive, is only several Idea's of different
particular Actions, w h i c h n o more express the Idea of that
Principle from whence they spring, than the Idea'soi several
particular Lines express the Idea of that Point they are drawn
from'. (Ibid.) The concept of substance which we are able to
form is constructed from our experiences, a constructionwhich
he feels enables us to approximate to the real essence of the
substance in question.
O n the other side, the real Natures, a n d Essences of Things, w h i c h are
a l l o w e d to consist i n a simple undivided Unity, are not conceivable b y u s
at once, b u t at different Views, b y differentpartial Conceptions, w h i c h the
S o u l afterwards c o m p o u n d s a n d calls b y one Name. T h u s when we
endeavour to c o m p r e h e n d the N a t u r e a n d E s s e n c e of w h a t w e call M a n ,
w e f o r m , at different times, several confused N o t i o n s of Substance,
Body, Life, Sense, a n d Reason; every one of w h i c h is a complicated Idea,
a n d to be resolved into a great m a n y others m o r e s i m p l e a n d distinct
(p. 16).
The emphasis upon such approximation to real essences

through experiental construction is not strong: he is content
to rest upon Locke's nominal essence.
W i t h these Lockean doctrines as his fundamental theo

retical framework, Gastrell deals with the problem of the
Trinity, suggesting that in the doctrine of the Trinity we are
merely conceiving of the same idea, i.e. of God, in three
different ways. A t the same time Gastrell confessed that there
is more in this concept than the human mind is able to
comprehend; thereby he avoided a direct denial of the more tra
ditional interpretations. The twofold analysis of a phenome-
nalistic and a non-phenomenalistic aspect of substance is thus
applied to the Trinitarian controversy as a means of resolving
the opposing arguments. As in the work of Payne, so i n
GastrelPs writing there is no mention of Locke. I t is accord
ingly difficult to determine whether these two men were
aware that they were using Locke's epistemology, although
it would be equally difficult to believe that they could have
incorporated so much of the Essay into their writings un
consciously. The three men most immediately involved i n this
application of Lockean principles—Sherlock, Payne, and
Gastrell—presented within tradition a definite modification,
but a modification which was still made in opposition to
Deism, Socinianism, and Unitarianism. Gastrell could very
easily have been one of the new men of ideas about whom
Stillingfleet and Sergeant complained, although he is never
explicitly mentioned. Carroll and Hickes, however, came to
consider him as belonging to Locke's camp, in league with
the Deists and Socinians. I n a later work, The Certainty and
1
Necessity ofReligion in General ( 1 6 9 7 ) , his Boyle lectures for

that year, Gastrell argued at length against the doctrine of
matter being able to move itself or to think, adding several
other Lockean doctrines to his long list. 1
Now o u r Existence b e i n g granted, the s a m e C o n s c i o u s n e s s that satis
fied us of this, i f w e carefully attend to w h a t passes w i t h i n u s , w i l l farther
i n f o r m u s , that w e are capable of Thinking, Perceiving, and Knowing;
w h i c h C a p a c i t y is u s u a l l y stiled Understanding; a n d that w e have a
P o w e r of determining o u r selves to Think a n d not to Think, or P e r c e i v e
a n d not P e r c e i v e certain O b j e c t s or I d e a s . . . ( p . 9 ) .
1
Cf. Hickes's Preliminary Discourse to Carroll's Spinoza Reviv'd. 1
i88 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N
On intuitive knowledge he also clearly follows Locke: 4here

are some Ideas or Notions that appear with that Light and
Clearness to our Understandings, that we immediately per
ceive them in all their Extent, and a necessary Agreement or
Disagreement betwixt them, and afterwards the Dependance
or Independance of others upon them; . . .' (p. 13; cf. p. 43).
The corpuscular theory of perception, elaborated by Boyle
and Locke alike, was also accepted by Gastrell. A l l sensible
appearances of body are said to suppose a substance and to
come from bulk, number, figure, motion and rest of matter.
Solidity, Extension, a n d Figure, I do not only perceive to be constantly
united, b u t necessarily a n d inseparably to co-exist together i n the same
Subject, w h i c h I call Matter or Body; so that, w h e r e v e r a n y one of these
is f o u n d , I certainly c o n c l u d e f r o m thence, that there are the other two
a l s o ; . . . (p. 6 0 ) .
Gastrell furnishes one of the more interesting examples of a

positive application of Locke's epistemology made by theo
logians, both in the clarity and in the extent of his adaptation.
But there were other men appearing in the first years of the
eighteenth century who borrowed from Locke. As we have
already seen, Charles Gildon, in The Deisfs Manual (1705),
sought to combat the materialism of Coward; but the twofold
source of knowledge, which Locke had made basic in his
philosophy, was accepted by Gildon. I n the dialogue form in
which he presents his ideas, Gildon made oneof his characters
inquire: 'Whence came you by the knowledge of its [the
soul's] Immortality} From outward Sensation, or inward
RefiectionV (p. 146). He went on to develop this distinction
in some detail.
T h e r e are different w a y s , b y w h i c h the K n o w l e d g e of T h i n g s is c o n -
v e y ' d to u s , for w e k n o w not every t h i n g i n the s a m e M a n n e r , or b y the
s a m e M e a n s . S o m e w e k n o w b y the M e d i a t i o n or I n t e r v e n t i o n of the
S e n s e s : S u c h are all C o r p o r e a l Objects, w h i c h m a k e t h e i r A p p r o a c h
to the U n d e r s t a n d i n g , b y s t r i k i n g o n o u r S e n s e s . O t h e r s w e k n o w b y the
A b s t r a c t i o n of the M i n d ; w h e n w e C o n t e m p l a t e a n d consider the I d e a s ,
that are p l a c ' d i n the V i e w of the M i n d , w i t h o u t a n y E x t e r n a l A r c h i t y p e
w h i c h t h e y are l i k e ; . . . (p. 155).
Tdea' is sometimes made equivalent to 'image'- The know-

ledge of self is said to be direct, without the intervention of

ideas.
T h u s that Thinking Substance w i t h i n u s , w h i c h w e call the Soul or t h e
Mind, finds m a n y t h i n g s E x t r i n s i c k to it self, w h i c h , as certain Objects,
it c a n consider, s u r v e y , a n d contemplate as it p l e a s e s : A n d besides these,
it observes w h a t passes w i t h i n it self, or i s , i n other W o r d s , Conscious of
itself(p. 156).
'SouP is defined as 'a Being, or Substance, that has Perception,

Thought, Will, Reasoning, is Free, and the like' (p. 157). The
definition of knowledge, made famous by Locke, reappears
here also; and, like Collins, Gildon concerns himself with the
problem of psychological assent: 'When we enquire into the
T r u t h by a Comparison of various Ideas, while they remain
so obscure, that we cannot plainly discover their Relation to
one another, we sometimes keep them longer under our
Consideration' (p. 159). The objective of such deliberation
is to gain time in order to discover, i f possible, the precise
connexion which obtains between these ideas, since assent
depends upon the apprehension of the connexion of ideas.
'We must observe, That when our M i n d considers Ideas,
where Relations to each other have attain'd the highest
Perspicuity, we cannot deny our Assent to the Propositions the
M i n d f o r m s o u t o f t h e m ' (p. 161). Therepresentativefunction
of ideas was not developed in much detail by Gildon, although
he indicates that he accepted this much of the Lockean
epistemology with confidence.
As a champion of traditional religion, John Witty offers a
more detailed analysis of the representative nature of ideas.
He opens his The First Principles of Modern Deism Confuted
(1707) with the observation that there are two possible ways i n
which man can gain knowledge of things: either by knowing the
essences of objects and being able a priori to deduce their
properties, or a posteriori by knowing their properties and
being able to infer their causes (pp. 1-4). Both ways are
concerned with ideas. T o r not the Things themselves, but
their Ideas in us, are the immediate Objects of Human Under
standing in its search after T r u t h ' (p. 4). He briefly develops,
824331 Ο
i o
9 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cH.v
in this opening section, the other aspects of the Lockean

theory of knowledge: its extension through the combining,
separating, comparing, &c., of ideas, distinguishing also
intuitive from demonstrative knowledge. Ideas are divided
into simple and complex; simple ideas enter the mind through
sensation, from which we gain our knowledge of the outside
world, and through reflection, from which we gain knowledge
of the 'little world within'.
T h e s e simple Ideas of whatever N a t u r e , a n d w h e t h e r a c q u i r ' d f r o m
Sensation, or Reflection, or both; w h e t h e r f r o m one S e n s e , or m o r e t h a n
o n e ; or f r o m Sensation a n d Reflection i n composition, I reduce u n d e r the
first Class of the Objects of H u m a n K n o w l e d g e (p. 17).
Complex ideas comprise the second class of objects of know

ledge, while those inferred objects of which we have no
immediate ideas (e.g. substance and God) constitute a sub
class of complex ideas. He proceeds to develop the entire
epistemological structure of Locke's work: the definition of
knowledge, the four kinds of agreement and disagreement,
&c. Like Gastrell and Browne, Witty sought to make the re
striction of analysis to the phenomenalist or nominal level
consistent with the necessary inferences of religion concerning
non-empirical objects. Accordingly, he had to support the
doctrine that causal inferences could be made from known
phenomena, taken as effects, to unknown causes.
F r o m Effects of w h i c h w e have I d e a s , w e infer Causes of w h i c h w e
have often no I d e a s , a n d that demonstratively; h a v i n g n o l e s s certain a
F o u n d a t i o n for their E x i s t e n c e t h a n this uncontrovertible a x i o m ; T h a t
nothing can't be the Foundation of the Existence or O p e r a t i o n s of a n y
t h i n g : F r o m Gravitation, w h i c h effects M a t t e r u n i v e r s a l l y as s u c h , w e
infer a C a u s e f r o m w h e n c e this Effect proceeds, a n d that as infallibly as
w e are a s s u r ' d b y i m m e d i a t e I d e a s from Sensation, that M a t t e r does
actually gravitate; . . . (pp. 2 5 - 2 6 ) .
I n other words,
F r o m E x t e n s i o n , Solidity, F i g u r e , C o l o u r , &c. u n i t e d i n one S u b j e c t ,
w e infer the Subject i n w h i c h they are u n i t e d ; a n d that unexceptionably,
w i t h o u t a n y necessity of h a v i n g a n I d e a of M a t t e r as it is i n it self, or of
the i n m o s t N a t u r e of the Substance of Corporeal Being (p. 27).
But in accepting this doctrine, and in employing the entire

theory of representative perception as well, Witty had to meet,

as Locke did, the objection that our knowledge by means of
ideas might not be real. By seeking to show that our ideas cor
rectly represent their originals, his intention was to be able to
infer from the inconsistency of the ideas of thought and ex
tension to the inconsistency of their existing in reality together;
but in trying to illuminate this aspect of the way of ideas, Witty
actually modified his previous contention that causal inferences
from effects to causes can be made i n the absence of any
specific information concerning the nature of the cause. The
inferences are not made i n such a vacuum as he led his readers
at first to suppose, but are conducted within a presuppositional
context which, if true, lends a large degree of determinateness
to the inferred cause. The presupposition involved, i f capable
of verification, would also lend credence to his belief i n the
inconsistency between thought and extension. His argument
is twofold. (1) Since 'everythingacts necessarilyaccordingto
its respective Nature', that of which I am conscious in reflec
tion, namely, thinking, self-activity, &c., must correctly
represent the act (p. 122). That 'Thought which makes me
conscious,or gives me a reflex Idea of my Thinking, must
make me conscious, or give me a reflex Idea of what I am
doing when I think; . . (p. 123). (2) I n the second place,
the Cartesian assumption is invoked: 'we can't suppose, that
the primary Attributes of Things are otherwise i n our Ideas,
than they are in the Things themselves without admitting
at the same time, that God has put an invincible deceit upon
our Facultys . . .' (Ibid.) Witty did not feel constrained to
prove the presupposition of the second argument, but he did
seek to support the first. The support which is offered,
however, only invokes another series of similarly unsupported
presuppositions.
F o r as n o t h i n g c a n give w h a t it has not, a n y m o r e t h a n a n EfFect c a n

be p r o d u c ' d w i t h o u t a C a u s e , a c c o r d i n g l y n o t h i n g c a n do w h a t is out of
its Power; b u t w h a t Power a n y t h i n g has it receives f r o m its r e s p e c t i v e
Essence a n d Nature, therefore n o t h i n g c a n act otherwise t h a n a c c o r d i n g
to its respective Nature:. . . ( p . 125).
igz E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N c .v
H
Not only does everything refrain from doing what is not in its
power, but everything does all that is i n its power. T o the
objection that objects appear to be different under different
conditions, and that therefore we have no basis from which
to infer the nature of object's in themselves, Witty replies that,
though the specific extension may vary, the fact of extension
itself never varies. This invariance shows the constancy of the
basic qualities of objects (pp. 131-2). To the objection that
secondary qualities show that bodies do not always reveal
their true natures, Witty argues that bodies reveal themselves
through qualities in so far as they can, thus reverting once
more to the presupposition of the first argument noted above.
He was determined to adhere to the representative theory,
while avoiding the scepticism which Locke's earlier critics
had disclosed as implicit in that position.
I grant that Light a n d other secondary Q u a l i t y s have n o t h i n g i n B o d y s
i n any M e a s u r e c o r r e s p o n d i n g to o u r Sensations of ' e m ; a n d it m u s t be
granted b y all, that the Specific P o w e r s a n d P r o p e r t y s of B o d y s are,
generally speaking, infinitely too subtile a n d fine to represent themselves
as they are in themselves to u s b y the Mediation o f o u r gross O r g a n s : B u t
t h e n does it hence follow that, because they can't represent themselves to
u s at all, therefore they don't necessarily represent themselves, as far as
they c a n c o m e w i t h i n the V e r g e of the finest S e n s e s , a c c o r d i n g to their
N a t u r e s , to s u c h C r e a t u r e s w h o s e organs are fine e n o u g h to be affected
w i t h their O p e r a t i o n s ? N 0 s u c h M a t t e r ( p . 141).
Witty did not agree with those who held what he called the
'inherent quality' doctrine, which is in reality the position of
na'ive realism. He may have had men like Sergeant in mind at
this point.
A n d a s for those w h o h o l d the inherent-quality Doctrin, and accord
ingly m a i n t a i n that there is heat i n the F i r e , light i n the S u n , &c.
adaequately the same as i n o u r S e n s a t i o n s ; these M e n can't m a k e the O b
j e c t i o n I have n o w a n s w e r ' d , n o r a n y at a l l : I n a s m u c h as they a s s u m e
not o n l y w h a t I c o n t e n d for, but m u c h m o r e ; not o n l y that the Primary
b u t the Specific P r o p e r t y s of T h i n g s are i n B o d y s w h a t they appear i n
o u r Sensations a n d Ideas; m e a n i n g b y those Specific P r o p e r t y s those
v e r y Sensations, or s o m e t h i n g of the like N a t u r e w i t h ' e m , w h i c h i n d e e d
the secondary A t t r i b u t e s of B o d y s are only the occasional C a u s e s of
(p. 147).
The same wholesale acceptance of the way of ideas and of

the representative theory of perception is found in Joshua
Oldfield's An Essay towards the Improvement ofReason (1707).
This work is a rambling attempt at a comprehensive programme
for the advancement of learning, from an analysis of logic and
grammar to the examination of the meanings of many terms
used in common discourse. The Lockean epistemology is
found throughout, sometimes in a slightly garbled language
but nevertheless, when it is untangled, clearly borrowed from
Locke. Oldfield begins much in the fashion of Witty, by
declaring that T t is very certain, that we know nothing of
Things, but as we consciously Perceive, Imagine, or Conceive
them', insisting that even in the case of touch and taste, what
we immediately attend to is the sensible perception and not
the thing itself (pp. 2-3). The word 'tho't' occurs in many
places as a substitution for 'idea', e.g. 'Tho't may be con-
sider'd, either absolutely in it self, as what is consciously
known, or relatively, as what is understood to refer to some
what else, whereof it brings the Representations or Report to
our M i n d s : . . . ' (p. 3). The representative theory of perception
is made one of the basic principles of his system. I n fact,
Oldfield takes great care to warn his readers against mistaking
'tho'ts' for things.
W e c o m m o n l y overlook the T h o ' t s , a n d o u r M i n d s r u n directly to
the T h i n g s , w h e r e o f w e t h i n k , so that T h o ' t s are generally to o u r C o n
sideration i n s t e a d of the T h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s ; a n d w e suppose o u r selves
to c o n s i d e r t h i s or that T h i n g i n it self i m m e d i a t e l y a n d directly, w h e n
as w e cannot p o s s i b l y take a n y C o g n i z a n c e thereof, b u t u n d e r those
sensible P e r c e p t i o n s , imaginative R e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , or i n t e l l e c t u a l C o n
ceptions, w h i c h are to u s the N a t u r a l a n d I n t e r n a l S i g n s of T h i n g s , as
t h e y are, some w a y or other objected to o u r M i n d s , a n d sometimes, only,
by the O p e r a t i o n of the P h a n s i e , or b y the I n t e l l e c t , conjoining,
d i v i d i n g , a n d v a r i o u s l y disposing, w h a t h a s b e e n otherwise t a k e n i n
(P-4)-
Perceptions or thoughts are not always resemblances of things,

but they are always notices of something in things. Seeking
to overcome some of the opposition to Locke's rejection of
innate ideas, Oldfield argues that
i94 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N c .v
H
T h o ' it appears not that w e have a n y innate I d e a s , or f o r m e d N o t i o n s

or P r i n c i p l e s laid i n b y N a t u r e , antecedently to the exercise of o u r
Senses a n d U n d e r s t a n d i n g s ; yet it m u s t be granted, that w e w e r e b o r n
w i t h the N a t u r a l F a c u l t y , w h e r e b y w e actually d i s c e r n the agreement
or disagreement of some N o t i o n s , so soon as w e have the N o t i o n s t h e m -
selves;...(p.5.Cf.p.7).
He divides his analysis, after the manner of Witty, into a con

sideration of the ideal or intellectual world, under which he
discusses such questions as 'what our Notions or Ideas in
themselves are; to what object they refer', and the objective
or real world. The ultimate goal of his essay is to lead man to a
knowledge of God. Throughout, apprehension, notions, or ideas
are made the medium of all thought and of all knowledge.
That other Things cannot be th'ot of b y u s , b u t as they are inwardly
presented i n some or other I d e a , v i z . A s p e r c e i v ' d i m a g i n ' d or c o n c e i v ' d :
S o that the m o r e i m m e d i a t e Object of o u r C o n s i d e r a t i o n is not p r o p e r l y
the v e r y T h i n g it self w i t h o u t u s , but the i n w a r d A p p r e h e n s i o n w e have
o f i t : . . . ( p . 8).
The reality of knowledge is advanced (1) by the coherence of

various sensations and (2) by invoking the principle that
something in the cause was fitted to lead to the idea-effect.
Like many other men of the period, Oldfield accepts the
Lockean doctrine of substance in its non-phenomenalistic
aspect, finding in this doctrine no antithesis to religion nor to
the reality of knowledge.
A n d w h e r e a s o u r I d e a of the S u b s t a n c e , i n it self c o n s i d e r ' d , is v e r y
dark a n d i n d i s t i n c t , b e i n g only, that general one of T h i n g or S o m e w h a t ,
a n d this a m o u n t i n g to no m o r e t h a n that it is a n Object o f T h o ' t ; t h e r e
fore to h e l p out the I d e a , as w e c a n , w e consider, that w h a t e v e r the Sub
stance be i n it self, it has u n q u e s t i o n a b l y these general C h a r a c t e r s ,
viz. (1) T h a t it stands . . . not subjected i n another . . . a n d (2) T h a t it
sustains the F o r m or M a k e , w h e r e b y it is a B e i n g of s u c h a k i n d , or sort
. . . (p. 51).
He recognized the commitments this theory implied for him

because of the indirectness of our knowledge.
R e a s o n c a n tell u s somewhat about o u r sensible P e r c e p t i o n s , as ( E .
G r . ) that m a n y of t h e m are to be accounted the Effect of some u n k n o w n
M a k e a n d T e x t u r e of the sensible Objects, together w i t h some i m
p r e s s e d F o r c e , rather t h a n that t h i s s h o u l d be generally taken for the
Representations or R e s e m b l a n c e s of w h a t i s subjected i n the T h i n g p e r

c e i v e d . . . a n d yet that some of t h e m , especially the I d e a s taken i n b y t h e
E y e , m a y w e l l be tho't i n some sort to represent the Object, p a r t i c u l a r l y
as to the E x t e r n a l F i g u r e a n d S h a p e of the visible B o d y (p. 160).
He saw the need for developing a theory of signs: 'The matter

of every Sign, is always the Subject of a Relation to the Thing
Signify'd; and all our common Ideas (which are Internal
Signs) are plainly so mzmyAbstractionsiromtht distinguishing
Forms and Characters of Things' (p. 89). He proceeded to
develop a fairly detailed theory of meaning, taking into account
the expressive character of signs and recognizing many
different types of signs, including gestures and music. Oldfield
also discusses ideas under the headings of adequate and i n
adequate, clear and distinct, simple and complex.
Of the two men, Witty and Oldfield, the former was by far
the better student of Locke's doctrines. Oldfield's work is
poorly written and organized, attempting too much i n its
comprehension. But both men put the Lockean epistemology
to work i n the service of religion: Oldfield i n a rather nebulous
manner and for no specified sectarian purposes, Witty quite
openly in his defence of traditionagainst Deism. Gastrell and
Payne had similarly applied the same epistemology in attempts
to conciliate the two sides i n the dispute overthe nature or
necessity of the doctrine of the Trinity in religious belief.
Peter Browne was perhaps more critical than positive in his
approach to Locke's Essay, but his The Procedure, Extent,
and Limits of Human Understanding (1728) constitutes a
careful development of one side of the Lockean position, i.e.
its sensationalist side. This work was an extension, in its
logical details, of his earlier attack against Toland, an attack
which presaged his later distinction between ideas and notions,
as well as the doctrine that non-empirical knowledge proceeds
by analogy. He makes it clear i n the opening sections that he
and other theologians of his acquaintance had found the
doctrine of analogy, as applied to non-empirical knowledge,
useful in combating Arians, Socinians, and Deists, (p. 8). He
describes his design in this work as follows: 1
i 6
9 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cn.v
I p u r p o s e rightly to state the w h o l e E x t e n t a n d L i m i t s of h u m a n

U n d e r s t a n d i n g ; to trace out the several steps a n d degrees of its P r o
cedure f r o m o u r first a n d s i m p l e P e r c e p t i o n of sensible Objects, t h r o '
the several operations of the p u r e Intellect u p o n t h e m ; till it grows u p
to its full P r o p o r t i o n of N a t u r e : A n d to shew, h o w all o u r C o n c e p t i o n s
of things s u p e r n a t u r a l are t h e n grafted o n it b y A n a l o g y ; a n d h o w f r o m
thence it extends it self i m m e n s e l y into all the B r a n c h e s of D i v i n e a n d
H e a v e n l y K n o w l e d g e (p. 33).
He holds that all knowledge is limited to what is obtained

through our senses and our reason. I t is through the senses
that the 'Ideas of external sensible Objects are first con
veyed into the Imagination' (p. 53). He shows the tendency,
common in the early eighteenth century, of equating 'idea'
with 'image', a tendency of interpreters of Locke which very
likely arose out of the opposition which his emphasis upon
efnpirical foundations for know4edge was believed to have to
religion. A growing fashion admitted the value and legitimacy
of the way of ideas in the restricted realm of sensitive know
ledge, reserving for religion the more intellectual provinces
of non-sensible knowledge. Browne agreed that the mind first
thinks when it begins to sense; but the impressions that are
made in this way, whatever be their exact relations with the
objects external to the mind, are termed 'ideas'. He illustrates
the meaning for the term 'idea' by asking the reader to direct
his eyes towards a tree and try to ascertain, after he has closed
his eyes, 'whether he retains any Similitude or Resemblance
of what he saw; and if he finds any such within him, let him
call that an Idea, till a better Word be found' (pp. 58-59).
His emphasis on the imaginal character of ideas is lessened
when he says that the only relationship required between idea
and object is a representative one, that this relation 'answers
all the Ends of Knowledge in this life' (p. 60). Moreover, he
offers the following arguments, which could have been taken
from Witty, in favour of the conclusion that the relation of
'belonging to' is one of similarity or resemblance: (1) it is in
keeping with the wisdom of God to reveal to us the real
natures of objects rather than the imaginary natures (pp. 61¬
62); (2) objects must operate on our senses 'according to their
own intrinsick Qualities' or their 'respective Nature' (p. 62);

and (3) all objects have the same effects upon the senses of all
men (p. 63). I t is integral for Browne's central doctrine of
knowledge of divine things by analogy to limit the term 'idea'
to 'our simple Sensations only, and to the various Alterations
and Combinations of them by the pure Intellect'. (Ibid.) He
takes issue, i n other words, with Locke's twofold origin of
ideas. 'Thus the laying down the Ideas of Sensation and Re
flection to be Alike the Original Sources and Foundation of all
our Knowledge, is one great and fundamental Error which
runs thro' most of the Discourses and Essays of our modern
Writers of Logicks and Metaphysicks' (p. 64). He recognizes
thinking and willing to be the two chief operations of the
mind, arguing that we cannot have any 'ideas' of these opera
tions : 'it is plain that Thinking and Willing . . . are not Ideas;
but theActions and Workings of the Intellect upon Ideas 9
(p. 65). Not only are the actions of the mind separate from the
conceptions we form of them, but they are not able to be the
subject of 'ideas' proper, since these are interpreted in sensual
ist terms. Much i n the fashion of Malebranche, he argues that
we can have ideas only of objects external to us, preferring
to call our knowledge of the operations of our minds 'con
ceptions' or, in the fashion of Berkeley, 'notions'. The use of
the term 'idea' as applied to self-knowledge constitutes for
Browne the first step along the erroneous and misleading
road of useless distinctions: those of compound ideas, ideas
of simple modes, of power, of cause, &c.
Referring indirectly (as was his practice) to Locke as 'the
Standard and Oracle of Ideas in our Age' (p. 73), Browne
proceeds to argue (1) that the idea of a thinking matter is
absurd and shameful; (2) that we have more knowledge of
body than we have of spirit; (3) that we have no direct know
ledge of spirits at all and especially of God; and (4) that we
do know something of the essential nature of such things as
man and stones. He makes a threefold distinction between
the ideas of sense, the necessary material for all thought,
which enter the mind at first without any intellectual activity;
i 8
9 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cn.v
innate ideas, which he rejects because they are absurd and not
necessary; and the so-called ideas of reflection. The only way
we come to self-knowledge is by 'an immediate Consciousness
of the several different ways of its [the mind's] own working
upon those Ideas of Sensation lodged in the Imagination'
(p. 97). Knowledge of self is thus indirect. 'We have not even
the least Direct Idea or Perception of the purely spiritual part
of us; nor do we discern any more of its Real Substance than
we do that of an Angel'. (Ibid.) But the necessity of avoiding
the second use of the representative theory of perception, that
of self-knowledge, in order to be able to maintain his doctrine
of an indirect but valid knowledge of divine and non-empirical
objects, leads him into a doctrine of the knowledge of the
nature of the self strikingly akin to Locke's phenomenalistic
doctrine of substance. 'We have no Knowledge of our own
Spirit, or of any of its Faculties, but from a conscious Ex
perience of its several Ways of acting upon the Ideas of
Sensation' (p. 109). Moreover, when he starts elaborating the
details of his doctrine of. indirect or non-imaginal knowledge
of self and spiritual substances, he finds it necessary to modify
the indirectness i n a fashion which comes close to destroying
his fundamental distinction.
F o r o u r Conceptions a n d N o t i o n s m a y be Direct or Indirect, as w e l l as
o u r Ideas. W h e n they stand i n the M i n d for their p r o p e r a n d Original
O b j e c t s , a n d w h e n the W o r d s that express t h e m are taken Literally for
s u c h Objects, t h e y are Direct.. . . B u t w h e n t h e y are Substituted to c o n
ceive, a n d do Standfor D i v i n e Immaterial T h i n g s , then they become
Indirect a n d Analogical (pp. 110-11).
Thus, he.seems to have altered his position as stated earlier,

now limiting the indirectness of spiritual knowledge to divine
immaterial things, and placing the knowledge of self on a par
with that of physical objects. When the indirectness of our
knowledge of things divine is accomplished by means of words
and ideas substituted for the objects themselves, our ideas
function for Browne in a way not unlike the divine language
of Berkeley's philosophy. Indeed, the ways i n which Browne
and Berkeley strove to meet Toland's challenge are not
so different as historians have been led to believe, despite the

controversy these two men had over the doctrine of analogy.
The way of ideas was modified by both men so as to draw a
firm distinction between ordinary knowledge of common-
sense objects and the special knowledge, demanded by
religion, of God and angels. Berkeley was much more success
ful in applying this distinction to knowledge of self as well as
to knowledge of God than was Browne; but on the knowledge
of divine objects, the essentials of the two points of view are
more or less the same. Browne went on to try to meet the
challenge of clear and distinct ideas contained i n the Toland-
Locke position, defining 'clarity' of ideas as follows: 'an Idea
is at the Height of Perspicuity when it is so evidently and
plainly discerned by the M i n d , that it can be distinguished
from all other Ideas at one View of the Intellect' (p. 119). He
argues that on this definition even our idea of particular
substances is clear and distinct, since 'the Idea comprehends
all that the Object is naturally disposed to Impress upon the
Sense at once; and all that either theSense or the Imagination
is capable of receiving from one single View' (p. 120). The
acts of the pure spirit or mind are divided into (1) a 'simple
view', or simple apprehension, the 'Survey of those Ideas of
Sensation, in the very Order and Condition they lie in the
Imagination, without Altering the Nature or Situation of any
one of them; without passing any Judgment or making any
Inferences with Relation to them' (p. 155); (2) judgement, i n
which the mind divides, separates, compounds, &c.; and
(3) abstraction. Under the last-named activity, Browne attacks
Locke's doctrine of abstract general ideas along Berkeleian
lines, insisting that 'mankind', for example, 'signifies the Idea
of One Individual, which is no otherwise made general, than
by our conceiving all the rest of the same K i n d By that one;
so that in truth it is the single Idea of any oneIndividual
which is made to standfor and represent the whole Species'
(p. 187).
Browne was in many ways more of a sensationalist than is
shown by his interpretation of Locke. He recognized the
20ö E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N
reality of the various faculties of the mind, but like Locke

subscribed to the tabula rasa doctrine.
A t o u r B i r t h the I m a g i n a t i o n is intirely a Tabula Rasa o r perfect
Blank, w i t h o u t a n y Materials_either for a Simple View or a n y Other
O p e r a t i o n of the Intellect. W e are not f u r n i s h e d w i t h a n y Innate Ideas
of things m a t e r i a l or i m m a t e r i a l ; n o r are w e e n d u e d w i t h a F a c u l t y or
D i s p o s i t i o n of f o r m i n g Purely Intellectual I d e a s or C o n c e p t i o n s i n d e
pendent of all S e n s a t i o n : M u c h less has the h u m a n S o u l a P o w e r of
raising u p to itself I d e a s out of Nothing, w h i c h is a k i n d of Creation; or
of attaining a n y First Principles exclusive of a l l Illation or consequential
D e d u c t i o n f r o m Ideas of Material O b j e c t s ; w i t h o u t w h i c h the M i n d of
M a n , d u r i n g its U n i o n w i t h the B o d y , c o u l d never have a r r i v e d e v e n to
a C o n s c i o u s n e s s of its o w n Operations or Existence (pp. 3 8 2 - 3 ) .
Browne never moves very far from this core of sensation, for
knowledge of divine things is acquired or constructed only
by finding analogies within experience. Such constructions
are valid sources of knowledge; but Browne wishes his readers
to recognize the nature of this knowledge, that it involves
close dependence upon experience. I n general, he was con
vinced of the limitations of man's knowledge, limitations
which both Glanville and Locke had voiced before him. A l l
three men were convinced, however, that though knowledge
is severely restricted it is sufficient for our needs. Browne's
expression of this conviction parallels closely that of Locke.
T h u s short a n d imperfect is all o u r boasted K n o w l e d g e of N a t u r e ;
w e are i n t i r e l y i n the dark as to the i n w a r d S t r u c t u r e a n d C o m p o s i t i o n of
the m i n u t e Particles of all B o d i e s ; a n d c a n w i t h no degree of C e r t a i n t y
j u d g e or determine a n y t h i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e m , b u t f r o m their o u t w a r d
A p p e a r a n c e s a n d sensible Effects; w h e n w e attempt a n y t h i n g b e y o n d
this, all our R e a s o n i n g s are full of C o n f u s i o n a n d U n c e r t a i n t y . A n d yet
e v e n this p u r e l y Experimental K n o w l e d g e of N a t u r e is h o w e v e r a D e g r e e
o f it aptly suited to o u r present State a n d C o n d i t i o n i n this L i f e ; it
a n s w e r s all the Reasonable E n d s of o u r W e l l - b e i n g a n d P r e s e r v a t i o n
(p. 2 0 9 ) .
I n the same year that Browne's Procedure appeared,

Zachary Mayne published Two Dissertations concerning Sense
and The Imagination (1728), in which he defends the tradi
tional view of the immateriality of the soul. Here, we note the
same sensationalist tendencies as are found in Browne; but
sECT.ii L O C K E ' S E P I S T E M O L O G Y A P P L I E D
Mayne was more conscious of the contributions made by

reason in the acquisition of knowledge than was Browne.
Sense is made entirely subservient to reason, and intelligence
is said to make its own notions of objects. Many Lockean
doctrines appear i n this work, such as the representative
character of sense perception and the unknowableness of the
real essences of objects.
A s for the Properties o r Q u a l i t i e s of B o d i e s , w e u n d e r s t a n d v e r y few
o f t h e m , because w e do not discover h o w or b y w h a t t h e y are signified;
because the C o n s t i t u t i o n of B o d i e s , o n w h i c h t h e y d e p e n d , are u n k n o w n
to u s , o r not sufficiently d i s c e r n e d b y o u r Senses. B u t w e r e these
t h o r o u g h l y a n d exactly p e r c e i v e d b y u s , t h e y w o u l d n o d o u b t appear
significative a n d expressive o f the several Properties a n d Q u a l i t i e s w h i c h
flow f r o m t h e m , as their n a t u r a l a n d i m m e d i a t e C o n s e q u e n c e s ; a n d t h e y
w o u l d , as it w e r e , declare a n d notify t h e m to u s ( p p . 3 3 - 3 4 ) .
I n his essay on the imagination, Mayne equates 'idea' with

'image'. W i t h such an interpretation, he then proceeds to
refute the claim that all knowledge comes from ideas (pp.
93 ff.). Perception is distinguished from understanding
(p. 103), the latter of which operates, i n the manner Sergeant
described, with notions. Locke is given credit for propagating
the way of ideas, so current in the thinking of men. Mayne
undoubtedly wrote with Isaac Watts in mind, for it was Watts
who two years previously had given such a strong formulation
of the Lockean way of ideas; but he may also have been
writing against Berkeley, for Berkeley's Principks of Human
Knowkdge (1710) and his Three Dialogues (1713) had also
carried forward the logic of ideas, even though these works
embodied some fundamental alterations of Locke's theories.
As we have already seen, Watts followed Berkeley's elimina
tion of substance, but in the other essentials of the way of
ideas he followed Locke more than he did Berkeley. I n his
Logick (1726), he had defined perception, conception, or
apprehension as 'the meer simple Contemplation of Things
offered to our Minds, without affirming or denying any Thing
concerning them' (p. 5). Judgement was taken as that
Operation of the M i n d , whereby we join two or more Ideas
together by one Affirmation or Negation.' (Ibid.) Ideas

became the material of all knowledge and were given their
Lockean, rather than their Berkeleian, definition: 'a Repre
sentation of a Thing in the Mind. . . . That Notion or Form of
a Horse, a Tree, or a Man which is i n the M i n d , is call'd the
Idea of a Horse, a Tree, or a Man' (p. 8). He insisted like
Gastrell and Oldfield that
I t is not the o u t w a r d Object, o r Thing which is perceived . . . n o r is it
the v e r y Perception or Sense, a n d Feeling . . . w h i c h is called the Idea;
b u t it is the Thing as it exists in the Mind by Way of Conception or Repre
sentation, that is p r o p e r l y called the Idea, w h e t h e r the Object be present
or absent ( p p . 8 - 9 ) .
Watts also distinguishes between outward and inward arche

types and their corresponding ideas, by calling the ideas of the
latter type pure or mental ideas, and those of the former images.
The general divisions of the Essay concerning ideas are re
peated, with sensation as the source of our knowledge of
external objects, and reflection the source of our knowledge
of the self and its operations (p. 30). The categories of simple,
complex, compound, collective, real, imaginary, clear, dis
tinct, obscure, &c., reappear, and a careful account of words
and their functions as signs is given. He defines judgement as
the comparing of ideas together (p. 142). I n a later work,
Philosophical Essays (1733), he accepts and develops the
distinction between primary and secondary qualities, agreeing
that the representation proper occurs only between primary
ideas and their physical causes (p. 83). Watts, however, was
strongly inclined to accept some version of the doctrine of
innate knowledge, a doctrine for which he was attacked by
1
another follower of Locke, John Jackson, i n his A Disserta

tion on Matter and Spirit (1735).
§ 3—General Conclimon
Once more the study of the reception which Locke's episte
mological doctrines received from his contemporaries has
carried us into the middle of the eighteenth century. Not only
1
Cf. above, p. 70.
sECT.iii G E N E R A L C O N C L U S I O N 203
did the various controversies instigated by Locke's doctrines

continue into this century: the positive application of these
conceptions also became more common. Serious thinkers like
the young Berkeley could not avoid analysis and discussion of
theseprevalent doctrines. Indeed i t is not extravagant to claim
that Locke's epistemology, with its roots deep i n seventeenth-
century theology, determined the context and the structure of
similar discussions within England throughout the eighteenth
and perhaps later centuries. What Aaron says of the whole of
Locke's writings is equally true of the epistemological
principles of the Essay: with these Locke 'secured for posterity
the advances which had been made by the most radical and
progressive elements of society i n the seventeenth century'. 1
The same can be said of his religious views, for here too he
was foremost i n the ranks of those considered radical and
revolutionary. What has not always been appreciated, and
never to its fullest extent, is the intimate relation which
existed in the minds of Locke's contemporaries between his
epistemology and the new movements within religion. I t is
not very difficult to discern the pervasive influence of Locke's
epistemology upon subsequent English and Scottish philo
sophers, for the very structure and orientation of the writings
of men like Berkeley, Reid, or Hume duplicate those of the
Essay. I t is less obvious that the way of ideas was effective i n
bringing to fruition those radical movements in religion which
culminated i n the eighteenth century under the single name
of 'Deist'. The general tendency i n religion throughout
Locke's lifetime was towards the natural religion of Collins
and Wollaston. I n the hands of those who openly pro
fessed themselves antithetical to revealed religion and to
the many complex mysteries required by traditional re
ligious beliefs, Locke's clear-cut jettisoning of much of the
traditional verbiage and the strong direction towards em
pirical, phenomenalist analysis exemplified i n the Essay
became tools to be exploited. But the religious scene in this
period of criticism and growth is complicated by three
1
John Locke, pp. 307-8.
distinct movements. Opposed to the radical detractors of

revealed religion, to the rationalizers of mysteries, was a large
band of strict fundamentalists who suspected the least modi
fication of their beliefs and dogmas. These men were busy
attaching slanderous labels to their opponents, and were con
cerned with maintaining the doctrine of the Trinity as i n
explicable but necessary for Christianity (Stillingfleet,
Edwards). They were the defenders of Athanasianism, the
doctrine that ' "there is but one living and true God", but
that " i n the Unity of this Godhead there are three Persons,
of one substance, power, and eternity".' They were also the
1
men who objected most strongly to the introduction of new

terminology or new modes of analysis. But aligned with tradi
tion were also other men of a less tenacious and more open
temperament who, either consciously or unconsciously,
effected modifications in religion of a less radical and more
gradual nature than those called for by the Deists. These were
the men who gave Locke's epistemology its most extensive
application. Some of these writers applied only small portions
of the Lockean doctrines, while rejecting other aspects of the
Essay, as Sherlock accepted the Lockean doctrine of sub
stance but rejected the whole of Book One. Others, such
as Witty, Gastrell, or Oldfield, took over almost all of the
essentials of the Lockean theory of knowledge. I t was in the
hands of these men, even more than in those of the Deists who
appealed to Locke's epistemology, that the new tendencies
within religion were most aided and abetted by the theoretical
structure of the Essay. The application by the Deists was
flashy and superficial; that of the traditionalists much more
penetrating, perceptive, and positive.
What the application of the various epistemological doc
trines of Locke's Essay accomplished under the guidance of
the less rigid traditionalists was an alteration in the presupposi
tions felt to be necessary for religion. The change taking place
in religion during this period was from the presupposition of
an innate source of morality to an external, critical construc-
1
Abbey and Overton, op. cit., vol. i, p. 481.
sECT.iii G E N E R A L C O N C L U S I O N 205
tion of moral rules and precepts; from the belief that, in order
to understand the Trinity and human personal identity, an
intimate knowledge of substance was required, to the realiza
tion that the required beliefs could be retained while relin
quishing the confused and difficult notions which they
formerly seemed to entail. A major shift i n the intellectual
temper of the country was under way. The new science, the
new emphasis upon observation in medicine, the rationalism
within religion, the empiricism within philosophy, all served
to propel this reorientation of thought. The seventeenth
century introduces the forces which lead to a movement away
from metaphysics towards empiricism; from scholastic
reliance upon definitions and predetermined schemes of
thought, to an impartial phenomenological analysis of know
ledge; from a simple, direct form of realism to a complex,
representative position embodied in the generally accepted
way of ideas; from making theory of knowledge harmonize
with the requirements of religious beliefs and theological
dogma, to the reverse: to making theology keep in step with
the demands of the phenomenological analysis of knowledge.
The emphasis on clarity and distinctness raised to promi
nence by Toland's and Locke's writings served to lead men to
revise their conceptions, to discard many obscure notions.
Some of the intricacies of the new epistemology formulated
by Locke could not be absorbed even by the more pliable
traditionalists, such as his suggestion that matter might be
able to acquire a power of thought. The necessity of i m
materiality for immortality was a belief not easily shaken,
although there were men ready to champion this suggestion
and to develop it to lengths not conceived of nor tolerated
by Locke (e.g. Coward, Layton). Likewise, the denial of
innate sources of knowledge proved difficult for more than
one otherwise resilient follower of tradition to accept. There
were undoubtedly many among these receptive men of tradi
tion who perceived the dangers of these radical rejections and
innovations, who trusted more to a tradition which did
not conform to the current standards than they did to the
824331 P
2o6 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cn.v
clarifications of the deist and naturalist theologians. But by

the middle of the eighteenth century the general result of the
religious controversies was a definite modification of tradition
in the direction of naturalism and a simplification such as
Locke had demanded in his Reasonableness of Christianity.
The indirectness of knowledge necessitated by the way of
ideaswas no longer viewed as a hindrance to religion, and the
limitations of knowledge circumscribed by Locke were
accepted as consistent with religious belief innon-empirical
objects. On the one hand, the spheres of religion and science,
of theology and ordinary experience, were drawn farther apart
through these restrictions; for men like Browne saw the need
of defending religion by conceding to the Lockean analysis of
ideas its sphere of legitimacy, while reserving for religion the
area of analogical representation. But, on the other hand,
religion had been brought closer to the confines of experience
and observation. I t lost some of its former loftiness and
mystery, but it had become more a part of the ordinary world.
Experience and observation were generally accepted as the
point of departure for any theological speculation.
Within the area of secular thought, the logic of ideas had
won the day by the mid-years of the eighteenth century. The
terminology and concepts of the Essay were widely diffused
throughout theological as well as secular writings. Logical
treatises of the eighteenth century, such as those of Oldfield
and Watts, incorporated large parts of the Essay almost
verbatim. The corpuscular analysis of perception championed
by Boyle and Cudworth, together with the distinction of
primary and secondary qualities, had acquired respectability
by the eighteenth century. The importance of close attention
to the meaning of words, and to the way in which words carry
meanings and serve as signs for non-linguistic events, had also
gained some prestige by the time Oldfield and Watts began
writing, despite the indifference to this aspect of the Essay
evidenced as late as 1702 by Henry Lee. But not all of the
epistemological difficulties posed by the seventeenth-century
exponents of the way of ideas had been resolved by the m i d -
SECT.iii G E N E R A L C O N C L U S I O N 207
eighteenth century. Even within religious discussions, the

problems of the reality of knowledge and the adequacy of
the representative character of ideas were seriously questioned
and considered. The important problem—faced by Hobbes,
Digby, and Burthogge, and most of the other men writing
upon problems of knowledge—of accounting for the i m
material principles and ingredients in knowledge had by no
means been solved. This particular aspect of the epistemo
logical problem was lost i n the maze of the dispute over the
immateriality of the human soul. These more subtle and
theoretical aspects of the way of ideas were left for the more
specialized thinkers of the eighteenth century to deal w i t h :
the theologians concerned to find practical application for
Locke's epistemology had to accept, as Locke had likewise
done, the common-sense convictions about the reality of
knowledge and the adequacy of our representations, invoking
well-known axioms i n their support.
Thus, the epistemology which Locke inherited from his
predecessors, and to which he turned initially because of
certain unspecified difficulties encountered i n religious dis
cussions, played a major role i n the controversies which
troubled his contemporaries, stimulating first violent reaction
and condemnation and then gradual acceptance and applica
tion by radicals and conservatives alike. The duality of this
tradition which taught simultaneously the phenomenalistic
restriction of human knowledge and the necessity of positing
real essences i n nature, led to some confusions; but, like those
unsolved issues of real knowledge and representation, this
aspect of the new way of ideas was pushed to one side. Locke
did not himself belong to the Deists, although he found many
of their beliefs quite sympathetic; but he was clearly a member
of that group of theologians and laymen who worked within
tradition towards the modifications in theory and dogma
which became actual later i n the eighteenth century. He
belonged to this group not only i n virtue of his specifically
religious convictions and statements, but more importantly
because the epistemology which he formulated i n his Essay
2o8 E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D R E L I G I O N cH.v
concerning Human Understanding moved in the same direc

tion as the theological tendencies of the less rigid tradi
tionalists. Locke may not have consciously co-ordinated these
two sides of his thought; but what he failed to unite, his
contemporaries were quick to join together. Product of his
society and its controversies, Locke's doctrines received their
critical scrutiny andtheir practical application from the theo
logians of his country. What he failed to clarify through the
purifying air of debate with his contemporaries continued, for
the most part, unclarified into the eighteenth century. The
problems of epistemology raised by Locke were not solved by
his contemporaries, but the general theory of knowledge, as
well as the terminology i n which he expressed that theory,
constituted the foundations of the important shiftings i n the
intellectual—religious, moral, and logical—temper of the
succeeding century.
I
I
BIBLIOGRAPHY |
C O N T E M P O R A R Y S O U R C E S |
A. Manuscript Material
L o v e l a c e Collection of L o c k e manuscript material i n the Bodleian L i b r a r y ,
Oxford.
The c o l l e c t i o n c o m p r i s e s a l a r g e n u m b e r o f l e t t e r s to a n d f r o m L o c k e , together
w i t h important philosophical a n d religious papers, a n d most of his journals. T h e
collection has been arranged a n d catalogued by Prof. W . v o n L e y d e n , of D u r h a m
U n i v e r s i t y . I t i s to h i s p a i n s t a k i n g c a r e t h a t a l l s u b s e q u e n t r e s e a r c h e r s o n L o c k e o w e
a great debt of gratitude. F o r h i s o w n d e s c r i p t i o n of this collection, see his articles
' J o h n L o c k e ' s U n p u b l i s h e d P a p e r s ' ( i n Sophia, anno xvii, n. i ; gennaio-marzo
1949; pp. 73-80), 'Notes concerning Papers of J o h n L o c k e i n the L o v e l a c e Col
l e c t i o n ' ( i n The Philosophical Quarterly, J a n u a r y 1952, p p . 6 3 - 6 9 ) , a n d p p . 1-7 in
John Locke: Essays on the Law of Nature, e d i t e d b y W . v o n L e y d e n . R e f e r e n c e s to
this collection i n this s t u d y are i n d i c a t e d as ' M S . L o c k e ' .
L e t t e r of Jacques B e r n a r d to Pierre Desmaizeaux, dated 6 M a y 1705.

B r i t i s h M u s e u m A d d . Sloane M S . 4281, fol. 144.
L e t t e r of A . H o u d a r t de la M o t t e to Desmaizeaux, dated 16 J u l y 1720.
B r i t i s h M u s e u m A d d . Sloane M S . 4286, fol. 242.
The above two letters are p a r t of a collection of P i e r r e D e s m a i z e a u x ' s c o r r e s p o n
dence, B r i t i s h M u s e u m A d d . S l o a n e M S . 4 2 8 1 - 9 . T h e s e t w o letters are c o n c e r n e d
with a paper w h i c h Desmaizeaux had apparently written i n criticism of Locke.
T h r o u g h the persuasion of L a M o t t e a n d B e r n a r d , he desisted f r o m p u b l i s h i n g it.
L e t t e r s from the A b b 6 D u Bos to Nicholas T h o y n a r d (or T o i n a r d )

d O r l e a n s . Bibliotheque Nationale M S . F r . n.a. 560.
M a n y o f t h e s e letters h a v e r e f e r e n c e to L o c k e . T h e y a r e r e p r i n t e d i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y
b y P a u l D e n i s , i n h i s Lettres Autographes de la Collection de Troussures Classoes
& Annoties, p u b l i s h e d at B e a u v a i s i n 1912.
B. Books
ANONYMOUS. A Dissertation on D e i s t i c a l a n d A r i a n C o r r u p t i o n : O r ,
P l a i n Proof, that the Principles and Practices of A r i a n s and Deists are
founded u p o n spiritual Blindness, a n d resolve into A t h e i s m ; and have
contributed greatly to the Infidelity and Profaneness of the present
Age. W h e r e M r . j A C K — N ' s Dissertation on M a t t e r a n d Spirit, M r .
L o c k e s ' s E s s a y , &c. are particularlyexamined, &c. L o n d o n , G . S t r a h a n ,
1708. 8°. 6 8 p p .
F i d e s et Ratio collatae, ac suo utraque loco reddittae, adversus
P r i n c i p i a J . L o c k i i . . . C u m accessione triplici 1. D e fide implicita. . . .
2. D e S S . S c r i p t u r a r u m certitudine ac sensu. 3. D e perfectione et
felicitate i n hac vita. E d i d i t et praefatus est P [ i e r r e ] Poiret. A m s t e l a e -
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Faith&Reason C o m p a r e d . . . InAnswerto certainTheses (drawnfrom
M r . L o c k ' s Principles) C o n c e r n i n g F a n c y & Reason. W i t h a N e w Preface
concerning Reason, Philosophy, Morality & Religion. L o n d o n , 1713.
A t r a n s l a t i o n o f Fides et Ratio collatae; the British M u s e u m copy has a note: Ex
dono a u t h o r i s — D . C . H . , possiblya M r s . Hungerford.
210 B I B L I O G R A P H Y
A N O N Y M O U S . T h e M i s c h i e f of Persecution E x e m p l i f i e d ; B y a T r u e
Narrative of the L i f e a n d Deplorable E n d of M r . J o h n C h i l d . . . A l s o
A D i s c o u r s e of the N a t u r e a n d Office of Conscience [on pp. i - 8 ] . . .
Attested b y us, T h o . Plant, Benj. D e n n i s . M a y 7, 1688. . . . L o n d o n ,
T h o . F a b i a n , 1688. 4 . 46 pp, 0
A Philosophick E s s a y concerning Ideas, A c c o r d i n g to D r . Sherlock's

Principles. W h e r e i n H i s N o t i o n of t h e m is Stated, and his Reasonings
thereupon E x a m i n ' d . I n a L e t t e r to a F r i e n d . L o n d o n , B . Bragg, 1705.
4 . 24pp.
0
T h i s t r a c t is a m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a t t e m p t at a s u m m a r y a n d s y n t h e s i s o f t h e dispute
of the n a t u r e a n d role of ideas i n k n o w l e d g e at the t u r n of the c e n t u r y . I t is clearly
and concisely written a n d reveals an intimate knowledge of the doctrines of M a l e ¬
branche, N o r r i s , Sherlock, a n d L o c k e . I n composition the author has employed a
d e d u c t i v e m a n n e r o f e x p o s i t i o n w o r k i n g f r o m a x i o m s a n d d e f i n i t i o n s to c o n c l u s i o n s .
T h e t r a c t s e r v e s as a n a t u r a l b r i d g e b e t w e e n s e v e n t e e n t h - a n d eighteenth-century
developments of the w a y of ideas, that is, between L o c k e and Berkeley. It would
be valuable to l e a r n w h o the author was. I h a v e b e e n a b l e to u n c o v e r nothing
definitive i n this respect, b u t two possible candidates m a y be cited. I n the auction
catalogue m a d e for the sale of A n t h o n y Collins's library by T h o m a s Ballard for
18 J a n u a r y 1 7 3 0 / 1 , t h i s t r a c t i s c r e d i t e d t o ' T h o . B u r n e t ' . T h i s m a y have been
T h o m a s B u r n e t , D . D . , s o m e t i m e p r e b e n d a r y of S a l i s b u r y a n d B o y l e l e c t u r e r for
1726. I n h i s An Essay upon Government ( 1 7 1 6 ) a n d i n h i s The Argument Setforth
in a late Book, Entitled Christianity as old as the Creation (1730-2), he employs
and praises the deductive m a n n e r of w r i t i n g from definitions, axioms, corollaries,
& c . H o w e v e r , t h i s B u r n e t d o e s n o t s e e m to h a v e w r i t t e n a n y t h i n g p r i o r to 1716,
and I h a v e f o u n d n o o t h e r a u t h o r i t y for a s c r i b i n g t h e a b o v e t r a c t to h i m . A n o t h e r
possibility is that it w a s w r i t t e n b y R o b e r t S o u t h , b u t m y o n l y basis for this sugges
t i o n i s t h a t i n a letter to L o c k e , d a t e d 18 J y l y 1 7 0 4 ( M S . L o c k e C . 1 8 , fT. 1 7 5 - 6 )
S o u t h tells L o c k e that he has d r a w n u p s o m e r e m a r k s u p o n S h e r l o c k ' s ' D i g r e s s i o n ' .
However, he confesses that he thinks his remarks unworthy of publication (a
s e n t i m e n t o f h u m i l i t y also f o u n d i n t h i s t r a c t ) , a n d u r g e s L o c k e to r e p l y to S h e r l o c k .
AjRNAULD, A N T O i N E . L a L o g i q u e ou L ' A r t de P e n s e r : Contenant, Outre

les Regies communes, Plusieurs Observations nouvelles, propres ä former
le jugement. 3. ed., reveue & augmentee. Paris, C . Savreux, 1668.
i 2 . 473 [6] pp.
m o
B . , F . A F r e e but M o d e s t C e n s u r e O n the late Controversial W r i t i n g s

and Debates of T h e L o r d Bishop of Worcester and M r . L o c k e ; M r .
E d w a r d s and M r . L o c k e ; T h e H o n C h a r l e s Boyle, E s q ; and D r .
b l e
Bently. T o g e t h e r w i t h B r i e f R e m a r k s on M o n s i e u r L e C l e r c ' s A r s C r i t i c a .
B y F . B . , M.A. of C a m b r i d g . L o n d o n , A . B a l d w i n , 1698. 4 . 31 pp. 0
According to t h e D.N.B. (article o n J o h n E d w a r d s ) the section on the debate

between E d w a r d s and L o c k e was written by E d w a r d s ; there is, however, no authority
given for this statement a n d I have f o u n d n o i n t i m a t i o n of the a u t h o r s h i p for the
other sections.
B A T E S , W i L L i A M , D . D . Considerations of the Existence of G o d , and of

the Immortality of the S o u l , W i t h the Recompences of the future
state: F o r the C u r e of Infidelity, the H e c k t i c k E v i l of the T i m e s .
L o n d o n , J . D . for B r a b a z o n A y l m e r , 1676. 8°. 8 p.l., 292 pp., 6 1.
[ B A X T E R , A N D R E w ] A n E n q u i r y into the N a t u r e of the H u m a n S o u l ;
W h e r e i n the Immateriality of the S o u l I s evinced from the Principles
of R e a s o n and Philosophy. L o n d o n , James Bettenham [ca. 1733]. 4 . 0
6 p . l . , 376 pp.
B A Y L E , P i E R R E . CEuvres D i v e r s e s de М . Pierre Bayle . . . Contenant tout

г
ce que cet A u t e u r a publie s u r des matieres de Theologie, de P h i l o

sophie, de C r i t i q u e , d'Histoire, & de L i t t e r a t u r e ; excepte son D i c t i o n -
naire H i s t o r i q u e et C r i t i q u e . L a H a y e , C h e z P . H u s s o n [et al.] 1727-31. y
folio. 4 vols.
D i c t i o n n a i r e H i s t o r i q u e et C r i t i q u e . Seconde E d i t i o n , R e v u e , cor-
rigee & augmentee par l ' A u t e u r . R o t t e r d a m , R e i n i e r L e e r s , 1702. folio.
3 vols.
Reponse aux Questions d ' u n P r o v i n c i a l . R o t t e r d a m , R e i n i e r L e e r s ,
1704-7. i 2 . 5 vols.
m o
B E C C O N S A L L , T n o M A S , B . D . , F e l l o w of Brasenose College, O x f o r d . T h e
G r o u n d s a n d F o u n d a t i o n of N a t u r a l Religion, D i s c o v e r ' d , I n the
P r i n c i p a l B r a n c h e s of it, i n Opposition to the Prevailing Notions of the
M o d e r n Scepticks and Latitudinarians. W i t h A n Introduction con
cerning the Necessity of R e v e a l e d R e l i g i o n . L o n d o n , W . O . for A .
R o p e r , 1698. 8°. x i , v i , [44] 256 pp.
B E N T L E Y , R i C H A R D . T h e Folly and Unreasonablenessof Atheism D e m o n
strated from T h e Advantage and Pleasure of a Religious L i f e , T h e
Faculties of H u m a n Souls, T h e Structure of A n i m a t e Bodies, & T h e
O r i g i n and F r a m e of the W o r l d : I n E i g h t S e r m o n s P r e a c h e d at
the L e c t u r e F o u n d e d b y T h e H o n — . R o b e r t Boyle, E s q u i r e ; I n the
F i r s t Y e a r M D C X C I I . L o n d o n , J . H . for H . Mortlock, 1693. 4 . 0
8 nos. i n ι vol.
All e i g h t s e r m o n s w e r e first i s s u e d s e p a r a t e l y w i t h s e p a r a t e t i t l e - p a g e s ; t h e second
s e r m o n g o i n g i n t o s e v e r a l e d i t i o n s . I n o t e h e r e o n l y t h e first t w o , a n d m o s t impor
tant sermons of this series.
T h e F o l l y of A t h e i s m , A n d (what is n o w called) D e i s m ; E v e n w i t h
Respect to the Present L i f e . . . Preached, B e i n g the F i r s t of the
L e c t u r e . . . M a r c h the V I I 1691/92. L o n d o n , for T . Parkhurst, 1692.
4°. 4 o p p .
Matter and M o t i o n cannot T h i n k : O r , A Confutation of A t h e i s m
from the Faculties of the S o u l . A S e r m o n P r e a c h e d A p r i l 4, 1692.
B e i n g the S e c o n d of the L e c t u r e . . . L o n d o n , for T . Parkhurst, 1692.
4°· 39 PP·
T h e S e c o n d E d i t i o n . L o n d o n , for T h o . Parkhurst, 1692. 4 . 40 pp. 0
A n e w typesetting of the first edition.
T h e T h i r d E d i t i o n . L o n d o n , J . H . for H e n r y Mortlock, 1694. 4 . 0
33 PP- I
S o m e m i n o r textual changes occur i n this edition.
[ B E V E R L E Y , T H O M A s ] . C h r i s t i a n i t y T h e G r e a t M y s t e r y . I n A n s w e r to a
late T r e a t i s e , C h r i s t i a n i t y not M y s t e r i o u s [by J o h n T o l a n d ] : T h a t is
N o t A b o v e , N o t C o n t r a r y to R e a s o n . I n Opposition to w h i c h is
A s s e r t e d C h r i s t i a n i t y is above C r e a t e d R e a s o n , i n its pure Estate. A n d
contrary to H u m a n e R e a s o n , as F a l l e n and c o r r u p t e d : and, therefore
in proper senses, M y s t e r y . T o g e t h e r w i t h a Postscript L e t t e r to the
A u t h o r , on his S e c o n d E d i t i o n E n l a r g ' d . B y T . B . L o n d o n , for W .
M a r s h a l , 1696. 4 . 2 p . l . , 13-44, 4 5 ^ pp.
0 I _
B L O U N T , C H A R L E S . T h e Oracles of R e a s o n : C o n s i s t i n g of [16 articles] . . .

I n several L e t t e r s to M r . Hobbs and other Persons . . . B y Char. Blount,
E s q ; M r . Gildon a n d others. L o n d o n , P r i n t e d 1693. i 2 . 12 p . l . , m o
226 pp.
T h e sixth article is O f I m m o r t a l i t y of the S o u l ' a n d the fifteenth is entitled 'That
the S o u l is Matter'.
[ B o L D , S A M U E L ] . A D i s c o u r s e C o n c e r n i n g the R e s u r r e c t i o n of the S a m e
B o d y : W i t h T w o L e t t e r s C o n c e r n i n g the Necessary Immateriality
of C r e a t e d T h i n k i n g Substance. L o n d o n , S . H o l t f o r A . a n d J . C h u r c h i l l ,
1705. 8°. 6 p . l . , 206 pp.
D a t e d at e n d 10 S e p t . 1703.
Some Considerations O n the P r i n c i p a l Objections and A r g u m e n t s

W h i c h have been P u b l i s h ' d against M r . L o c k ' s E s s a y of H u m a n e
U n d e r s t a n d i n g . L o n d o n , for A . & J . C h u r c h i l l , 1699. 8°. 1 p . l . , 6 o p p .
R e p r i n t e d i n h i s : A Collection of T r a c t s , P u b l i s h e d i n V i n d i c a t i o n of M r . L o c k ' s
Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y . . . A n d of his E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g H u m a n e U n d e r
standing. London, A. & J . Churchill, 1706. 8°. 5 nos. i n 1 vol.
[ B O Y L E , R o B E R T ] . T h e C h r i s t i a n V i r t u o s o : Shewing, T h a t by being
addicted to Experimental Philosophy, a M a n is rather Assisted, than
Indisposed, to be a Good C h r i s t i a n . T h e F i r s t Part. B y T . H . R . B .
F e l l o w of the R o y a l Society. I n the Savoy, E d w . Jones, 1690. 8°. 9 p.l.,
120 pp.
- E x p e r i m e n t s , Notes, &c. about the M e c h a n i c a l Origine or P r o d u c
tion of D i v e r s particular Qualities. L o n d o n , E . F l e s h e r , 1675. 8°. 3 p . l . ,
21 pp.
'Advertisements R e l a t i n g to t h e f o l l o w i n g Treatises', followed by 12 separately
paged treatises.
T h e Origine of F o r m e s and Qualities, ( A c c o r d i n g to the Corpuscular

Philosophy,) Illustrated by Considerations and E x p e r i m e n t s , (Written
formerly b y w a y o f Notes upon an Essay about N i t r e ) . Oxford, H . H a l l ,
1666. small 8°. [54], 433 pp.
B R O U G H T O N , J o H N , M.A., C h a p l a i n to D u k e of M a r l b o r o u g h . Psychologia:
O r , A n A c c o u n t of the N a t u r e of the Rational S o u l . I n T w o Parts.
T h e F i r s t , A n E s s a y concerning the N a t u r e of the H u m a n S o u l .
L o n d o n , W . B . for T . Bennet, 1703. 8°. 7 p.l., [23], 418 pp., 7 1.
T h e s e c o n d p a r t , p a g e d c o n t i n u o u s l y w i t h t h e first, h a s a s e p a r a t e t i t l e : A V i n d i c a
tion of the N a t u r e of the H u m a n S o u l , &c.
B R O W N E , P E T E R , Senior F e l l o w of T r i n i t y College, D u b l i n . A L e t t e r i n
A n s w e r to a Book E n t i t u l e d , Christianity not Mysterious [by T o l a n d ] A s
also T o all T h o s e w h o Set u p for R e a s o n and E v i d e n c e I n opposition
to Revelation and Mysteries. L o n d o n , for R o b e r t C l a v e l l , 1697. 8°.
ι p . l . , 180 pp.
[ ] T h e Procedure, E x t e n t , and L i m i t s of H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g .
L o n d o n , for W . I n n y s , 1728. 8°. 4 p . l . , 477 pp.
[ B u L L O K A R , J o H N ] lexicographer. A n E n g l i s h E x p o s i t o r : T e a c h i n g the
Interpretation of the hardest words used in our Language. W i t h S u n d r y
Explications, Descriptions, a n d D i s c o u r s e s . B y I . B . , D o c t o r of Physicke.

L o n d o n , J o h n Legatt, 1616. small 8°. Signatures: A - P . 4
B u R N E T , G i L B E R T , B i s h o p of Salisbury. A n E x p o s i t i o n of the T h i r t y - n i n e
Articles of the Church ofEngland. W r i t t e n by G i l b e r t , B i s h o p of S a r u m .
L o n d o n , b y R . Roberts for R i . C h i s w e l l , 1699. folio. 4 p . l . , xxiv, 396 pp.
[ B u R N E T , T H O M A S ] M a s t e r of the Charterhouse. R e m a r k s u p o n an E s s a y
concerning H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g : I n a L e t t e r A d d r e s s ' d to the
A u t h o r . L o n d o n , M . Wootton, 1697. 4 . 15 pp. 0
Second R e m a r k s u p o n an E s s a y concerning H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
I n a L e t t e r address'd to the Author. B e i n g a V i n d i c a t i o n of the F i r s t
R e m a r k s , Against the A n s w e r of M r . L o c k , A t the E n d of H i s R e p l y to
the L o r d Bishop ofWorcester. L o n d o n , M . Wootton, 1697. 4 . 30 pp. 0
L o c k e ' s copy is i n the Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y Library.
T h i r d R e m a r k s u p o n an E s s a y concerning H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g :
I n a L e t t e r A d d r e s s ' d to the Author. L o n d o n , M . Wootton, 1699. 4 . 0
27 pp.
Locke's c o p y is i n the Y a l e University L i b r a r y . I t has m a n y of his manuscript
notes i n the margins.
B u R T H O G G E , R i C H A R D , M . D . T h e Philosophical W r i t i n g s of R i c h a r d
Burthogge. E d i t e d w i t h introduction a n d notes by Margaret W .
L a n d e s . C h i c a g o , O p e n C o u r t P u b . C o . , 1921. xxiv, 245 pp.
Contains his Organum Vetus & Novum, reprinted i n full; his An Essay upon
Reason ( a s h o r t e n e d v e r s i o n ) a n d Of the Soul of the World, i n full.
C a u s a D e i , O r A n Apology for G o d . W h e r e i n T h e Perpetuity of

Infernal T o r m e n t s is E v i n c e d , and D i v i n e both Goodness and Justice
(that notwithstanding) Defended . . . L o n d o n , L e w i s P u n c h a r d , 1675.
8°. 10 p l . , 422 pp.
A n E s s a y u p o n Reason, and the N a t u r e of Spirits. L o n d o n , J . D u n -
ton, 1694. 8°. 3 p . l . , 280 pp.
Dedicated ' T o the L e a r n e d M r . J o h n Lock'.
[ ] O f the S o u l of the W o r l d ; a n d of Particular Souls. I n a L e t t e r to

M r . L o c k , occasioned by M r . K e i l ' s Reflections u p o n an E s s a y lately
published concerning R e a s o n . B y the A u t h o r of that E s s a y . L o n d o n ,
. D a n i e l B r o w n , 1699. 8°. 46 pp.
O r g a n u m V e t u s & N o v u m . O r , A D i s c o u r s e of Reason and T r u t h .
W h e r e i n the N a t u r a l L o g i c k c o m m o n to M a n k i n d e is briefly and
plainly described. I n a L e t t e r to the most H o n o u r e d A n d r e w T r e v i l l ,
E s q . L o n d o n , for S a m . C r o u c h , 1678. 8°. 73 pp.
[ B u R T O N , R o B E R T ] . T h e A n a t o m y of Melancholy. W h a t it is, W i t h all the
kindes, causes, symptoms, prognostickes, & severall cures of it. B y
D e m o c r i t u s I u n i o r . Oxford, I o h n L i c h f i e l d , 1621. 4 . 2 p.l., 783 0
[ 7 8 4 H 7 9 1 ] PP-
C A R P E N T E R , R i C H A R D , D . D . , & Pastor of S h e r w e l l i n D e v o n . T h e C o n -
scionable C h r i s t i a n : O r , T h e I n d e v o u r of Saint P a u l , to have and
discharge a good conscience alwayes towards G o d , and m e n : laid open
a n d a p p l y e d i n three S e r m o n s . L o n d o n , F . K . f o r J o h n Bartlett, 1623. 4 . 0
3 p . l . , [4] 119 p p .
CARROLL (or C A R O L L or C A R R O L ) , W i L L i A M . A Dissertation upon the
T e n t h C h a p t e r o f t h e F o u r t h Book of M r . L o c k e ' s E s s a y . . . W h e r e i n
the A u t h o r ' s E n d e a v o u r s to E s t a b l i s h Spinoza's Atheistical Hypothesis,
more especially i n that T e r i t h C h a p t e r , are D i s c o v e r ' d a n d Confuted.
L o n d o n , J . Matthews, 1706. 8°. 4 p . l . , xv, 292 p p .
A L e t t e r to the R e v e r e n d D r . B e n j a m i n P r a t . W h e r e i n T h e D a n
gerous E r r o r s i n a late Book, Intituled, A n E s s a y concerning the U s e of
R e a s o n i n Propositions [by A n t h o n y C o l l i n s ] are D e t e c t ' d , Confuted,
and gradually D e d u c ' d from the very Basis of all Atheism, u p o n w h i c h
alone they are Bottom'd. B y W i l l i a m C a r o l l . L o n d o n , for R i c h a r d Sare,
1707. 4 . 2 4 p p .
0
R e m a r k s u p o n M r . C l a r k e ' s S e r m o n s , P r e a c h e d at S t . P a u l ' s against

Hobbs, Spinoza, a n d other Atheists. . . . L o n d o n , Jonathan R o b i n s o n ,
1705· 4°. ι P-1-, 42 p p .
[ ] S p i n o z a R e v i v ' d . T o w h i c h is added A P r e l i m i n a r y D i s c o u r s e . . .
b y the R e v e r e n d D r . G e o r g e H i c k s . L o n d o n , J . M o r p h e w , 1709. 8°.
ι P-1., [57] PP·, 6 1., 179 p p .
T h e u n n u m b e r e d 57 pages constitute Hickes's Preface.
S p i n o z a R e v i v ' d . P a r t the Second. O r , A L e t t e r to M o n s i e u r Le

Clerc, O c c a s i o n ' d B y his Bibliotheque Choisie, Tom. 21. B y W i l l i a m
C a r r o l . L o n d o n , J o h n M o r p h e w , 1711. 8°. 1 p . l . , 76, [2] p p .
CHAMBERS, E p H R A i M . Cyclopaedia: O r , A n U n i v e r s a l D i c t i o n a r y o f Arts
and Sciences. . . . T h e W h o l e intended as a C o u r s e of Antient and
M o d e r n L e a r n i n g . L o n d o n , J . & J . K n a p t o n , 1728. folio. 2 vols.
C H A R L E T O N , W A L T E R . T h e D a r k n e s s of A t h e i s m D i s p e l l e d b y the L i g h t
of Nature. A P h y s i c o - T h e o l o g i c a l l T r e a t i s e . L o n d o n , J . F . for W m .
L e e , 1652. 4 . 25 p . l . , 335 p p .
0
[ ] E p i c v r v s ' s M o r a l s , Collected Partly out of his owne G r e e k T e x t ,

i n Diogines L a e r t i u s , A n d Partly out of the Rhapsodies of M a r c u s
A n t o n i n u s , Plvtarch, C i c e r o , & Seneca. A n d faithfully E n g l i s h e d .
L o n d o n , H e n r y H e r r i n g m a n , 1656. 4 . 2 p . l . [37] p., 1 1., 184 p p .
0
[ ] T h e I m m o r t a l i t y o f the H u m a n S o u l , Demonstrated b y t h e L i g h t of
Nature. I n T w o D i a l o g u e s . L o n d o n , W m . W i l s o n , 1657. 4 . 7 p . l . , 188pp.
0
[ ] N a t u r a l H i s t o r y of the Passions. I n the Savoy, T . N . for James

M a g n e s , 1674. 8°. 24 p . l . , 188 p p .
Largely a n adaptation o f J e a n - F r a n 9 0 i s S e n a u l t ' s De VUsage des Passions (Paris,
1641).
Physiologia E p i c u r o - G a s s e n d o - C h a r l e t o n i a n a : or, A F a b r i c k of
Science N a t u r a l , u p o n the hypothesis of A t o m s . . . T h e first part.
L o n d o n , T h o m a s H e a t h , 1654. folio. 475 p p .
C H i L L i N G W O R T H , W i L L i A M , M.A. O x o n . T h e Religion of Protestants A
Safe W a y to Salvation. O r A n A n s w e r to a Booke E n t i t l e d M e r c y and
T r v t h , O r , C h a r i t y m a i n t a i n ' d b y Catholiques, W h i c h pretends to
prove the Contrary. O x f o r d , P r i n t e d b y L e o n a r d L i c h f i e l d , 1638. large
4 . 1 6 p . l . , 4 1 3 , [1] p p .
0
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 2iS
C L A R K E , S A M U E L , M . A . , R e c t o r of St. James, Westminster. A D e m o n s t r a
tion of the B e i n g and Attributes of G o d : M o r e Particularly i n A n s w e r
to M r . Hobbs, Spinoza, A n d their F o l l o w e r s : W h e r e i n the N o t i o n of
Liberty is Stated, a n d the Possibility a n d Certainty of it Proved, i n
Opposition to Necessity a n d Fate, 2 d ed., corrected. B e i n g the S u b
stance of E i g h t S e r m o n s P r e a c h ' d i n the Y e a r 1704, the Boyle L e c t u r e s .
L o n d o n , W i l l B o t h a m , 1706. 8°. 8 p.l., 206 pp.
A S e c o n d Defense of an A r g u m e n t M a d e use of i n a L e t t e r to M r .
Dodwel, T o Prove the Immateriality a n d Natural Immortality of the
S o u l . I n a L e t t e r to the A u t h o r of A Reply to Mr. C l a r k e ' s Defense,
&c. [i.e. A n t h o n y C o l l i n s ] . L o n d o n , W . B . for James K n a p t o n , 1707.
8°. ι p . l . , 54 p p .
[CocKBURN, MRS. CATHARINE TROTTER] A Defence of the Essay of
H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g , W r i t t e n b y M r . Lock. W h e r e i n its Principles
w i t h reference to Morality, ReveaVd Religion, and the Immortality
of the Soul, are consider'd a n d J u s t i f y ' d : I n A n s w e r to S o m e R e m a r k s
on that E s s a y [by T . B u r n e t ] . L o n d o n , W i l l T u r n e r , 1702. 8°. 4 p . l . ,
70 pp.
[ C o L L i N S , A N T H O N Y ] A D i s c o u r s e of F r e e - T h i n k i n g , O c c a s i o n ' d by T h e
R i s e and G r o w t h of a Sect call'd F r e e - T h i n k e r s . L o n d o n [ J . , J . , & P .
K n a p t o n ] 1713. 8°. v i , 178 pp.
[ ] A n E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g the U s e of R e a s o n i n Propositions, T h e
E v i d e n c e whereof depends u p o n H u m a n T e s t i m o n y . L o n d o n , P r i n t e d
i n the Y e a r 1707. 8°. 56 pp.
[ ] A L e t t e r to the L e a r n e d M r . H e n r y D o d w e l l ; Containing S o m e
R e m a r k s on a (pretended) Demonstration of the Immateriality and
N a t u r a l I m m o r t a l i t y of the S o u l , I n M r . C l a r k ' s A n s w e r to his late
Epistolary Discourse, &c. L o n d o n , for A . B a l d w i n , 1707. 8°. 16 pp.
[ ] A R e p l y to M r . C l a r k ' s Defence O f his L e t t e r to M r . Dodwell.
W i t h a Postscript relating to M r . Milles's A n s w e r to M r . DodwelVs
Epistolary D i s c o u r s e . L o n d o n , P r i n t e d i n the Y e a r 1707. 8°. 48 pp.
[ ] Reflections on M r . C l a r k ' s S e c o n d Defence of his L e t t e r to M r .
Dodwell. L o n d o n , b y J . D a r b y , 1707. 8°. 61 pp.
[ ] A n A n s w e r to M r . C l a r k ' s T h i r d Defence O f his L e t t e r to M r .
D o d w e l l . L o n d o n , for A . B a l d w i n , 1708. 8°. 94 pp.
[ ] A Philosophical I n q u i r y C o n c e r n i n g H u m a n L i b e r t y . L o n d o n , for
R . R o b i n s o n , 1717. 8°. v i , 115 pp.
[ C o w A R D , W i L L i A M ] M . D . T h e G r a n d E s s a y : O r , A V i n d i c a t i o n of
R e a s o n , and Religion, against Impostures of Philosophy. P r o v i n g
according to those Ideas and Conceptions of T h i n g s H u m a n U n d e r
standing is capable of forming to it self. 1. T h a t the E x i s t e n c e of any
Immaterial Substance is a Philosophic Imposture, and impossible to be
conceived. 2. T h a t all Matter has Originally created i n it, a principle
of I n t e r n a l , or S e l f - M o t i o n . 3. T h a t Matter & M o t i o n must be the
F o u n d a t i o n of Thought i n M e n and Brutes. T o w h i c h is A d d e d ,
A B r i e f A n s w e r to M r . Broughton's Psycholo. &c. B y W. C. м. D .
c . M . L . c . L o n d o n , for P . G . , 1704. 8°. v i , 197, 177-248 pp.
2l6 B I B L I O G R A P H Y
[ C o W A R D , W i L L i A M ] T h e J u s t S c r u t i n y : O r , a Serious E n q u i r y into the

Modern Notions of the S o u l . I , C o n s i d e r ' d as Breath ofLife, or a P o w e r
(not immaterial Substance) united to Body, according to the H . S c r i p
tures. I I , A s a Principle Naturally Mortal, but Immortaliz'dby Its Union
with the Baptismal Spirit, according to Platonisme lately C h r i s t i a n i z ' d .
W i t h a Comparative D i s q u i s i t i o n Between the ScripturalandPhilosophic
State of the D e a d ; a n d some R e m a r k s on the Consequences of s u c h
O p i n i o n s . B y W. C. M . D . L o n d o n , J o h n C h a n t r y [ca. 1703]. 8°. 1 p . l . ,
221 pp.
[ ] S e c o n d T h o u g h t s C o n c e r n i n g H u m a n S o u l , D e m o n s t r a t i n g the
N o t i o n of Human Soul, A s believ'd to be a Spiritual I m m o r t a l S u b
stance, united to Human Body, T o be a P l a i n H e a t h e n i s h I n v e n t i o n ,
A n d not Consonant to the Principles of Philosophy, Reason, or Religion;
B u t the G r o u n d only of m a n y Absurd, a n d Superstitious Opinions,
Abominable to the R e f o r m e d Churches, A n d Derogatory i n G e n e r a l to
T r u e Christianity. L o n d o n , for R . Basset, 1702. 8°. 12 p . l . , 457 [3] pp.
[ ] F a r t h e r T h o u g h t s concerning H u m a n S o u l , I n Defence of Second
T h o u g h t s ; W h e r e i n T h e weak Efforts of the R e v e r e n d M r . Turner, and
other less significant W r i t e r s are occasionally A n s w e r ' d . B y the A u t h o r
of S e c o n d T h o u g h t s . L o n d o n , f o r R i c h a r d Bassett, 1703. 8°. 12 p . l . ,
155 [3] PP-
C R O U S A Z , J . P . D E , Professeur e n Philosophie & en Mathematique dans
l ' A c a d e m i e de L a u s a n n e . L a L o g i q u e , ou Systeme de Reflexions, Q u i
peuvent contribuer ä la nettete & ä l'etendue de nos Connoissances.
Seconde E d i t i o n , revue, corrigee & augmentee considerablement.
A m s t e r d a m , L ' H o n o r e & Chatelain, 1720. i2 m o
. 3 vols.
C u D W O R T H , R A L P H , D . D . , M a s t e r of C h r i s t ' s College C a m b r i d g e . A
T r e a t i s e concerning E t e r n a l a n d I m m u t a b l e Morality. L o n d o n , J . &
J . K n a p t o n , 1731. 8°. x i i p p . , 4 1., 303 pp.
T h e T r u e Intellectual S y s t e m of the U n i v e r s e : T h e F i r s t P a r t ;
W h e r e i n , A l l the R e a s o n a n d Philosophy of A t h e i s m is C o n f u t e d ; and
Its Impossibility Demonstrated. L o n d o n , R . R o y s t o n , 1678. large 4 . 0
10 p . l . , 899 pp., 46 1.
C u L V E R W E L , N A T H A N A E L , M.A. A n E l e g a n t a n d L e a r n e d D i s c o u r s e of
the L i g h t of N a t u r e , W i t h severall other T r e a t i s e s . L o n d o n , T . R . and
E . M . , 1654 . 4 . 7 p . l . , 183, 207 pp.
0
D e d i c a t i o n a n d 'To the Reader' dated 10 A u g . 1652.
T h e same. L o n d o n , b y T h o . Roycroft for M a r y R o t h w e l l , 1661.

4 . 8 p . l . , 175, 212 pp.
0
S u b s t a n t i a l l y the s a m e as the 1654 edition, except for the a d d i t i o n of italicization

and capitalization throughout.
D i G B Y , S i R K E N E L M . T w o T r e a t i s e s , i n the one of w h i c h , T h e Nature of

B o d i e s ; i n the other; T h e Nature of M a n s S o u l e ; is looked i n t o : i n
w a y of discovery, of T h e Immortality of Reasonable Soules. Paris,
G i l l e s Blaizot, 1644. folio. 22 p . l . , 466 pp.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 2k7
D i T T O N , H u M P H R E Y , M a s t e r of the N e w M a t h e m a t i c a l S c h o o l i n C h r i s t V
H o s p i t a l . A D i s c o u r s e C o n c e r n i n g the R e s u r r e c t i o n of Jesus C h r i s t . I n
T h r e e Parts . . . T o g e t h e r w i t h A n A p p e n d i x concerning the Impossible
P r o d u c t i o n of Thought, f r o m Matter and Motion: T h e Nature of
Humane Souls, a n d of Brutes: T h e Anima Mundi, a n d the H y p o t h e s i s
of the To Παν; as also, concerning Divine Providence, the Origin of Evil,
a n d t h e C 7 m z ; e r s e i n G e n e r a l . L o n d o n , b y J . D a r b y , i 7 i 2 . 8°. x v i , 5 6 8 p p .
E A R B E R Y , M A T T H i A S . A n A n s w e r to a Book intitled, T r a c t a t u s T h e o l o g i c o
Politicus [of S p i n o z a ] . L o n d o n , for C h a r l e s B r o m e , 1697. 8°. 8 p . l . ,
189pp.
E D W A R D S , J o H N , B . D . A B r i e f V i n d i c a t i o n of the Fundamental Articles
of the C h r i s t i a n F a i t h , A s also O f the Clergy, Universities a n d Publick
Schools, from M r . Lock's Reflections u p o n t h e m i n his Book of Education,
&c. W i t h some A n i m a d v e r s i o n s on two other late Pamphlets, viz. O f M r .
B o l d and a N a m e l e s s Socinian W r i t e r [ S t e p h e n N y e a n d his Agreement
of the Unitarians]. L o n d o n , for J . R o b i n s o n , 1697. 8°. 4 p . l . , 125 pp.
A F r e e D i s c o u r s e concerning T r u t h and E r r o r , E s p e c i a l l y i n Matters
of Religion . . . A l s o A Preface containing some B r i e f R e m a r k s on the
late Reflections on Humane Learning. L o n d o n , for Jonathan R o b i n s o n ,
1701. 8°. xlviii, 483 pp.
In the Preface E d w a r d s tells u s that this w o r k h a d its origins i n a sermon he
p r e a c h e d before K i n g C h a r l e s I I at N e w m a r k e t o n the text J o h n x v i i i . 38, i n a n s w e r
to P i l a t e ' s q u e s t i o n 'What i s t r u t h ? ' ( F i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1 6 9 8 i n h i s Sermons on
Several Occasions and Subjects.) T h e only similarity i n content is a v a g u e reference
i n t h e s e r m o n to ' e t e r n a l l a w s o f r e a s o n ' a n d ' n a t u r a l n o t i o n s ' w h i c h m a y indicate
some belief i n innate ideas, developed i n the above work.
T h e S o c i n i a n C r e e d : O r , A B r i e f A c c o u n t O f the Professed Tenets

and Doctrines of the F o r e i g n and E n g l i s h Socinians. W h e r e i n is s h e w ' d
T h e T e n d e n c y of t h e m T o Irreligion and Atheism. W i t h Proper Anti
dotes against t h e m . L o n d o n , J . R o b i n s o n , 1697. 8°. 12 p . l . , 264 pp.
S o c i n i a n i s m U n m a s k ' d . A D i s c o u r s e S h e w i n g the Unreasonableness
O f a L a t e W r i t e r ' s O p i n i o n C o n c e r n i n g the Necessity of only One
Article of Christian Faith; A n d of his other Assertions i n his late Book,
E n t i t u l e d , T h e Reasonableness of C h r i s t i a n i t y . . . and i n his Vindica
tion of it. W i t h a B r i e f R e p l y to another (professed) S o c i n i a n W r i t e r .
L o n d o n , for J . R o b i n s o n , 1696. 8°. 8 p . l . , 142 pp.
S o m e T h o u g h t s C o n c e r n i n g the Several C a u s e s and Occasions of
A t h e i s m , E s p e c i a l l y i n the Present Age. W i t h some B r i e f Reflections
on Socinianism: A n d on a L a t e Book E n t i t u l e d T h e Reasonableness of
Christianity. . . . L o n d o n , for J . R o b i n s o n , 1695. 8°. 4 p . l . , 126 p p .
F E R G U S O N , R o B E R T . T h e Interest of R e a s o n i n R e l i g i o n ; W i t h the I m p o r t
& U s e of S c r i p t u r e - M e t a p h o r s ; A n d T h e N a t u r e of the U n i o n Betwixt
C h r i s t & Believers. . . . L o n d o n , D o r m a n N e w m a n , 1675. 8°. 11 p . l . ,
657 PP·
[ F o w L E R , E D W A R D ] B i s h o p of Gloucester. T h e Principles and Practices,
O f certain Moderate D i v i n e s of the C h u r c h of E n g l a n d , (greatly m i s
understood) T r u l y Represented and D e f e n d e d ; W h e r e i n (by the w a y )
S o m e Controversies, of no m e a n Importance, are succinctly d i s c u s s e d :
2l8 B I B L I O G R A P H Y
I n A F r e e D i s c o u r s e between two Intimate F r i e n d s . I n I I I Parts.

L o n d o n , L o d o w i c k L l o y d , 1670. 8°. xxvi, 348 pp.
G A i L H A R D , j E A N , G e n t . T h e E p i s t l e and Preface T o the Book against the
Blasphemous Socinian Heresie V i n d i c a t e d ; A n d the C h a r g e therein
against S o c i n i a n i s m , made G o o d . I n A n s w e r to T w o L e t t e r s . L o n d o n ,
J . H a r t l e y , 1698. 8°. 9 0 p p . "
T h e Blasphemous S o c i n i a n H e r e s i e D i s p r o v e d a n d Confuted . . .
W i t h Animadversions u p o n a late Book called, C h r i s t i a n i t y not M y s
terious [by T o l a n d ] . L o n d o n , R . Wellington, 1697. 8°. 21 p . l . , 3 4 4 p p .
G A S T R E L L , F R A N C i s , Student of C h r i s t C h u r c h , O x o n . T h e Certainty and
Necessity of Religion i n G e n e r a l : O r , T h e F i r s t G r o u n d s & Principles
of H u m a n e D u t y E s t a b l i s h ' d ; I n E i g h t S e r m o n s P r e a c h e d . . . at the
L e c t u r e for the Y e a r 1697, founded by the Honorable Robert Boyle,
E s q u i r e . L o n d o n , for T h o . Bennet, 1697. 8°. 2 p . l . , x i , 257 pp.
[ ] Some Considerations C o n c e r n i n g the T r i n i t y : A n d T h e W a y s of
M a n a g i n g that Controversie. L o n d o n , Printed, a n d S o l d by E . W h i t -
lock, 1696. 4 . 6 p . l . , 52 pp.
0
[ ] A Defence O f some Considerations C o n c e r n i n g the T r i n i t y , &c.

I n A n s w e r to the Reflections made u p o n t h e m , i n a late Pamphlet,
E n t i t u l e d , An Essay concerning the use of Reason, &c. [by A n t h o n y
C o l l i n s ] I n a L e t t e r to the A u t h o r . L o n d o n , for H e n r y C l e m e n t s , 1707.
8°. ι p . l . , 35 pp.
G i B S O N , E D M U N D , Bishop of L o n d o n . T h e Bishop of London's Second
Pastoral L e t t e r to the People of his Diocese; Particularly, to those of
the two great Cities of London and Westminster. O c c a s i o n ' d by some
late W r i t i n g s , i n w h i c h it is asserted, ' T h a t R e a s o n is a sufficient
G u i d e i n Matters of Religion, without the H e l p of Revelation*. L o n d o n ,
for S a m . Buckley, 1730. s m . 4 . 1 p . l . , 80 pp. 0
G i L D O N , C H A R L E S . T h e D e i s t ' s M a n u a l : O r , A Rational E n q u i r y into the

C h r i s t i a n Religion. W i t h some Considerations on M r . H o b b s , Spinosa,
the Oracles of R e a s o n [by C h a r l e s B l o u n t ] , S e c o n d T h o u g h t s [by W m .
C o w a r d ] , etc. T o w h i c h is prefix'd a L e t t e r , from the A u t h o r of T h e
M e t h o d w i t h the D e i s t s [Charles L e s l i e ] . L o n d o n , A . R o p e r , 1705. 8°.
15 p . l . , xvi, 36, 301 pp.
G L A N V i L L , J o s E P H , F . R . s . E s s a y s on several Important Subjects i n
Philosophy and Religion. L o n d o n , b y J . D . for J o h n B a k e r & H . M o r t
lock, 1676. 4 . 7 nos. i n ι vol.
0
Contents: I . Against Confidence i n Philosophy (pp. 1 - 3 3 ) — I I . O f Scepticism and

Certainty (pp. 3 5 - 6 6 ) — I I I . M o d e r n Improvements o f U s e f u l K n o w l e d g e (56 pp.)
—IV. T h e U s e f u l n e s s o f R e a l P h i l o s o p h y to R e l i g i o n (43 p p . ) — V . T h e Agreement
of R e a s o n a n d R e l i g i o n (28 p p . ) — V I . Against M o d e r n S a d d u c i s m i n the Matter
of Witches and Apparitions (61 p p . ) — V I I . Anti-fanatical Religion and Free
Philosophy. I n A Continuation of the N e w Atlantis (58 pp.)·
P l u s U l t r a : O r , T h e Progress and A d v a n c e m e n t of K n o w l e d g e
Since the D a y s of Aristotle. I n an A c c o u n t of some of the most R e
markable L a t e Improvements of Practical, U s e f u l L e a r n i n g : T o E n
courage Philosophical E n d e a v o u r s . Occasioned B y a Conference w i t h
one of the Notional W a y . L o n d o n , James C o l l i n s , 1668. 8°. 6 p . l . ,
[24], 149 pp.
G L A N V i L L , J o s E P H . Scepsis Scientifica: O r , Confest Ignorance, the w a y to

Science; I n an E s s a y of T h e V a n i t y of D o g m a t i z i n g , a n d Confident
O p i n i o n . W i t h a R e p l y to the E x c e p t i o n s of the L e a r n e d T h o m a s A l b i u s
[i.e., T h o m a s W h i t e ] . L o n d o n , E . Cotes, for H e n r y E v e r s d e n , 1665. 4 . 0
1 7 p . l . , 184 p p .
'Imprimatur Octob. 18. 1664'. ' T h e " V a n i t y of D o g m a t i z i n g " recast and some
passages o m i t t e d ' . — D . N . B . , vol. vii, p. 1288.
S C I R ? t u u m n i h i l est: O r , T h e A u t h o r s Defence of T h e V a n i t y
of D o g m a t i z i n g ; Against the E x c e p t i o n s of T h e L e a r n e d T h o . A l b i u s
I n his L a t e S c i r i . L o n d o n , E . C . for H e n r y E v e r s d e n , 1665. 4 . 0
8 p . l . , 92 pp.
T h e V a n i t y of D o g m a t i z i n g : O r Confidence i n O p i n i o n s Manifested
i n a D i s c o u r s e of the Shortness a n d U n c e r t a i n t y of our K n o w l e d g e
A n d its C a u s e s ; W i t h some Reflexions o n P e r i p a t e t i c i s m ; a n d A n
Apology for Philosophy. L o n d o n , b y E . C . for H e n r y E v e r s d e n , 1661.
8°. 16 p . l . , 250 p p .
H A L E , S i R M A T T H E W , C h i e f Justice. T h e P r i m i t i v e Origination of M a n
k i n d , C o n s i d e r e d a n d E x a m i n e d A c c o r d i n g to T h e L i g h t of N a t u r e .
L o n d o n , W m . G o d b i d , 1677. folio. 5 p . l . , 380 p p .
H A M P T O N , B E N j A M i N , of the M i d d l e T e m p l e . T h e E x i s t e n c e of H u m a n
S o u l After D e a t h : P r o v e d from Scripture, Reason and Philosophy.
W h e r e i n M r . Lock's N o t i o n t h a t U n d e r s t a n d i n g m a y b e given to Matter,
M r . Hobb's Assertion that there is no s u c h t h i n g as an I m m a t e r i a l
Substance . . . a n d all s u c h other Books a n d O p i n i o n s , are briefly a n d
plainly confuted . . . L o n d o n , for S . Popping, 1711. 8°. 1 p . l . , i i , 44 p p .
H A R R i s , J o H N , M.A., F . R . s . L e x i c o n T e c h n i c u m : O r , A n Universal
E n g l i s h D i c t i o n a r y of A r t s a n d Sciences E x p l a i n i n g not only T h e Terms
of Art, B u t the A r t s T h e m s e l v e s . L o n d o n , D a n . B r o w n , 1704. folio.
V o l . i i . L o n d o n , D a n . B r o w n , 1710.
A n e w edition a n d revision of the 1704 v o l u m e .
H A R T C L i F F E , J o H N , B . D . , F e l l o w o f K i n g ' s C o l l e g e , Cambridge. A T r e a t i s e
of M o r a l a n d Intellectual V i r t u e s ; W h e r e i n their N a t u r e is fully e x
plained, a n d their Usefulness proved, as being T h e best R u l e s of
L i f e . . . . L o n d o n , C . H a r p e r , 1691. 8°. 23 p . l . , 414 pp.
' I m p r i m a t u r . N o v . 20. 1690.'
[ H A W O R T H , S A M U E L ] M . D . Άνθροπωλογία, O r , A Philosophic Discourse

C o n c e r n i n g M a n . B e i n g the A n a t o m y B o t h of his Soul a n d Body.
W h e r e i n T h e Nature, Origin, Union, Immateriality, Immortality,
Extension, a n d Faculties of the one, A n d T h e Parts, Humours, Tempera
ments, Complexions, Functions, Sexes, a n d Ages, respecting the other, are
concisely delineated. B y S. H. Student i n Physic. L o n d o n , for S t e p h e n
F o s t e r , 1680. 8°. 18 p . l . , 211 p p .
H E A R N E , T H O M A S . R e m a r k s a n d Collections of T h o m a s H e a r n e . O x f o r d ,
C l a r e n d o n Press for O x f o r d H i s t o r i c a l Society, 1885-1921. 11 vols.
H E R B E R T , E D W A R D , i s t B a r o n H e r b e r t of C h e r b u r y . D e Veritate. P r o v t
D i s t i n g v i t u r A Revelatione, A V e r i s i m i l i , A P o s s i b i l i , E t A F a l s o .
H o c O p v s condidit E d . H e r b e r t , M i l e s O r d . B a l . et L e g . S . R e g i s m i
M . Brittaniae i n G a l l i a . E t V n i v e r s o H v m a n o G e n e r i D i c a v i t .
1624. 4°· Ρ·1·> 7 ΡΡ·
1
2 2
H i C K E S , G E O R G E . T h r e e S h o r t T r e a t i s e s . . . F o r m e r l y P r i n t e d , A n d now
again P u b l i s h e d . . . I n Defense of the Priesthood, and True Rights of
the C h u r c h , against the Slanderous and R e p r o a c h f u l T r e a t m e n t of the
C l e r g y , i n a late Book of Pernicious and Blasphemous D o c t r i n e s ,
falsely Intituled, The Rights of the C h r i s t i a n C h u r c h [by M a t t h e w
T i n d a l ] . L o n d o n , f o r W . T a y l o r , 1709. 8°. 43 p . l . , 17 pp. and% separately
paged numbers.
T w o T r e a t i s e s , O n e of the C h r i s t i a n Priesthood, T h e O t h e r of the
D i g n i t y of T h e E p i s c o p a l O r d e r . F i r s t W r i t t e n , and Afterwards P u b
lished to obviate the E r r o n e o u s O p i n i o n s . . . i n a late Book E n t i t u l e d ,
T h e R i g h t s of the C h r i s t i a n C h u r c h . W i t h a large Prefatory D i s c o u r s e
I n A n s w e r to the said Book. 3d ed. enlarged. L o n d o n , W . B . for R i c h a r d
Sare, 1711. 8°. 2 vols.
H i L L , O L i V E R . A R o d for the B a c k of F o o l s : I n A n s w e r to M r . J o h n
T o l a n d ' s Book, W h i c h he calleth, Christianity not Mysterious. . . .
L o n d o n , at E d . E v e t s , 1702. 8°. 34 pp.
j A C K S O N , J O H N , M . A . , R e c t o r of Rossington ( Y o r k s h i r e ) A Dissertation
on M a t t e r and S p i r i t : W i t h Some R e m a r k s on a Book, E n t i t l e d , An
Enquiry into the Nature of the humane Soul [of A n d r e w B a x t e r ] . L o n d o n ,
for J . N o o n , 1735. 4 . viii, 56 p p .
0
K i N G , W i L L i A M , A r c h b i s h o p of D u b l i n . D e Origine m a l i . A u t h o r e
G u i l i e l m o K i n g , s. τ . D . E p i s c o p o D e r e n s i . L o n d i n i , B e n j . T o o k e ,
1702. 8°. 2 p . l . , 214, [26] p p .
A n E s s a y on the O r i g i n of E v i l . T r a n s l a t e d f r o m the Latin, with
large Notes; tending to explain and vindicate some of the A u t h o r ' s
Principles Against the Objections of Bayle, L e i b n i t z , the A u t h o r of a
Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty [i.e. A n t h o n y C o l l i n s ] ;
and others. T o w h i c h is prefix'd A Dissertation concerning the F u n d a
mental Principle and immediate C r i t e r i o n of V i r t u e . . . W i t h some
account of T h e O r i g i n of the Passions and Affections. L o n d o n , W .
T h u r l b o u r n , 1731. large 4 . lvi, 330 p., 1 1.
0
[ L A Y T O N , H E N R Y ] A r g u m e n t s and Replies, I n a D i s p u t e concerning the

N a t u r e of t h e H u m a n e S o u l . V i z . W h e t h e r t h e same be Immaterial, Separ
ately Subsisting, and Intelligent: O r be Material, Unintelligent andExtin-
guishableattheDeathoitheTerson. L o n d o n [ n . p . ] 1703. 4 . 1 1 2 p p .
0
[ ] Observations u p o n a S e r m o n Intituled, A Confutation of Atheism

from the Faculties of the Soul alias, Matter and Motion cannot think:
Preached A p r i l 4. 1692 [by R i c h a r d Bentley]. B y w a y of Refutation,
[n.p., n.d.] 4 . 19 pp.
0
The date w h i c h appears as p a r t o f t h e title o f L a y t o n ' s n u m e r o u s anonymous

O b s e r v a t i o n s ' is the date o f the publication o f t h e w o r k h e is attacking. W i t h o n e
exception a l l his O b s e r v a t i o n s ' areu n d a t e d w i t h reference to their o w n publication,
and w e r e a l l i s s u e d w i t h o u t a title-page.
[ ] Observations u p o n a T r e a t i s e intit'led Psychologia: O r , A n

A c c o u n t of the N a t u r e of the Rational soul [by J o h n Broughton]
[n.p., 1703] 4 . 132 p p .0
[ L A Y T O N , H E N R Y ] Observations u p o n a Short T r e a t i s e , W r i t t e n b y M r .
Timothy Manlove: Intituled, The Immortality of the Soul Asserted; and
P r i n t e d i n Octavo at L o n d o n . 1697. [n.p., n.d.] 4 . 128 pp. 0
[ ] Observations u p o n a T r e a t i s e Intituled, A D i s c o u r s e concerning

the H a p p i n e s s of G o o d M e n i n the next W o r l d . . . B y D r . Sherlock.
P r i n t e d at L o n d o n , 1704. [n.p., n . d.] 4 . 115 p p .
0
L E C L E R C , j E A N . L o g i c a : Sive, A r s ratiocinandi. A u t o r e , Joanne C l e r i c o .

L o n d i n i , A w n s h a m & J o h a n . C h u r c h i l l , 1692. i 2 . 6 p . l . , 182 p p .
m 0
D e d i c a t e d to R o b e r t B o y l e .
— Ontologia: Sive D e E n t e i n genere. LoncHni, A w n s h a m & J o h a n .

C h u r c h i l l , 1692. i 2 . 4 p . l . , 70 pp.
m o
D e d i c a t e d to L o c k e .
L E E , H E N R Y , D.D. A n t i - S c e p t i c i s m : O r , Notes u p o n each C h a p t e r of M n

L o c k ' s E s s a y concerning H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g . W i t h an E x p l i c a t i o n
of all the Particulars of w h i c h he T r e a t s , a n d i n the same O r d e r . I n
F o u r Books. L o n d o n , for R . C l a v e l & C . H a r p e r , 1702. folio. 3 p . l . , 5 1„
[of Preface], 7 1., 342 pp.
L E i B N i z , G o T T F R i E D W i L H E L M . D i e philosophischen Schriften v o n G o t t
fried W i l h e l m L e i b n i z . H r s g . v o n C . J . G e r h a r d t . B e r l i n , W e i d m a n n ,
1875-90. 7 vols.
[ L E S L i E , C H A R L E S ] T h e S e c o n d P a r t of T h e W o l f Stript of H i s Shepherds
C l o a t h i n g : I n Answer to a L a t e Celebrated Book Intituled T h e R i g h t s
of the C h r i s t i a n C h u r c h Asserted [by M a t t h e w T i n d a l ] . W h e r e i n T h e
D e s i g n s of the Atheists, Deists, Whigs y Commonwealths-Men, &c. a n d
all sorts of Sectarists against the C h u r c h , are plainly laid O p e n a n d
E x p o s ' d . H u m b l y ofTer'd to the Consideration of H e r M a j e s t y A n d the
High-Court of Parliament. B y one call'd A n H i g h - C h u r c h - M a n . W i t h
m y Service to D r . Tindall and M r . Collins, &c. S o l d b y the Booksellers
of L o n d o n and Westminster, 1707. 4 . 2 p . l . , 75 pp.
0
[ ] A S h o r t a n d E a s i e M e t h o d w i t h the D e i s t s . W h e r e i n , T h e C e r
tainty of the C h r i s t i a n F a i t h is D e m o n s t r a t e d . . . I n a L e t t e r to a
F r i e n d . T h e S e c o n d E d i t i o n . T o w h i c h is A d d e d , a S e c o n d P a r t T o
t h e J e w s . . . . L o n d o n , for C . B r o m e , 1699. 8°. xxiv, 4 2 4 p p . , 8 1.
L o c K E , J o H N . T h e W o r k s of J o h n L o c k e . A new edition, corrected.
L o n d o n , T . T e g g , 1823. 10 vols.
E x t r a i t d'un L i v r e Anglois qui n'est pas encore publie, intitule
Essai Philosophique concernant UEntendement, ou l'on montre quelle
est l ' e t e n d ü e de nos connoissances certaines, & la maniere dont nous
y parvenons. C o m m u n i q u e par M o n s i e u r L o c k e . (In Bibliotheque
U n i v e r s e l l e et H i s t o r i q u e de l'Annee 1688, t. viii, p p . 4 9 - 1 4 2 . )
[ ] A n E s s a y C o n c e r n i n g H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n F o u r Books.
L o n d o n , P r i n t e d for T h o m a s Basset, and sold b y E d w . M o r y , 1690.
large 4 . 6 p . l . , 362 pp., 11 1.
0
The first edition, first issue.
E s s a i philosophique concernant l ' E n t e n d e m e n t H u m a i n , o u Γ ο η

montre quelle est l'etendue de nos connoissances certaines, et la maniere
824331 Q
dont nous y parvenons. T r a d u i t de l'Anglois de M r . L o c k e , P a r Pierre

Coste, S u r la Quatrieme E d i t i o n , revue, corrigee & augmentee par
T A u t e u r . A m s t e r d a m , H e n r i Schelte, 1700. 4 . 29 p . l . , 936 pp., 11 1.
0
L o c K E , J o H N . A n early draft of L o c k e ' s E s s a y , together w i t h excerpts

f r o m his journals. E d i t e d b y R . I . A a r o n a n d J o c e l y n G i b b . O x f o r d ,
C l a r e n d o n Press, 1936. x x v i i i , -132 p p .
A n E s s a y concerning H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g , B y J o h n L o c k e . C o l
lated and Annotated, w i t h Prolegomena, Biographical, C r i t i c a l , a n d
H i s t o r i c a l . B y Alexander C a m p b e l l F r a s e r . O x f o r d , C l a r e n d o n Press,
1894. 2 vols.
E s s a y s on the L a w of N a t u r e ; the L a t i n text w i t h a translation, intro
duction, and notes, together w i t h transcripts of L o c k e ' s shorthand i n
his J o u r n a l for 1676. E d i t e d b y W . v o n L e y d e n . O x f o r d , C l a r e n d o n
Press, 1954. x i , 292 pp.
[ ] T h e Reasonableness of Christianity, A s delivered i n the Scriptures.
L o n d o n , for A w n s h a m a n d J o h n C h u r c h i l l , 1695. 8°. 2 p . l . , 304 pp.
L o w D E , j A M E S . A D i s c o u r s e C o n c e r n i n g the N a t u r e of M a n , B o t h i n
his N a t u r a l and Political C a p a c i t y B o t h as he is a Rational C r e a t u r e ,
and M e m b e r of a C i v i l Society. W i t h an E x a m i n a t i o n of some of M r .
H o b b s ' s O p i n i o n s relating hereunto. L o n d o n , T . W a r r e n , 1694. 8°.
13 p . l . , 243 pp.
r
M o r a l E s s a y s ; W h e r e i n some of M r . L o c k ' s a n d M o n s i M a l b r a n c h ' s
O p i n i o n s are briefly examin'd. T o g e t h e r w i t h an answer to some
chapters i n the Oracles of R e a s o n [by C h a r l e s B l o u n t ] , concerning
D e i s m . L o n d o n , J . W h i t e , 1699. i 2 . m o
[ M A L E B R A N C H E , N i c o L A s ] D e la R e c h e r c h e de la V e r i t e . O u Γ ο η traitte
de la N a t u r e de l'esprit de l'homme, & de l'usage qu'il en doit faire
p o u r eviter l'erreur dans les Sciences. Paris, A n d r e P r a l a r d , 1674-8.
8°. 3 vols.
M A N L O V E , T i M O T H Y . T h e I m m o r t a l i t y of the S o u l Asserted, and P r a c t i
cally I m p r o v e d . . . . L o n d o n , b y R . Roberts for N e v i l l S i m m o n s , 1697.
8°. 160 p p .
[ M A Y N E , Z A C H A R Y ] T w o Dissertations concerning Sense a n d T h e
Imagination. W i t h an E s s a y on Consciousness. L o n d o n , for J . T o n s o n ,
1728. 8°. ι p . l . , v i , 231 p p .
[ M i L N E R , J o H N ] B . D . A n A c c o u n t of M r . L o c k ' s Religion, O u t of his
O w n W r i t i n g s , and i n his O w n W o r d s . T o g e t h e r w i t h some O b s e r v a
tions u p o n it, and a T w o f o l d A p p e n d i x . I . A S p e c i m e n of M r . L o c k ' s
W a y of A n s w e r i n g A u t h o r s I I . A brief E n q u i r y w h e t h e r S o c i n i a n i s m
be j u s t l y C h a r g e d u p o n M r . L o c k . L o n d o n , J . N u t t , 1700. 8°. 2 p . l . ,
188 pp.
M o L Y N E U X , W i L L i A M , M . p . , F . R . s . D i o p t r i c a N o v a . A T r e a t i s e of
D i o p t r i c k s , I n T w o Parts. L o n d o n , B e n j . T o o k e , 1692. 4 . 7 p . l . ,
0
301 pp. and 43 folded plates.

M o R E , H E N R Y . A n Antidote against Atheisme, O r , A n A p p e a l to the
N a t u r a l Faculties of the M i n d e of M a n , whether there be not a G o d .
L o n d o n , R o g e r D a n i e l , 1653. 8°. 16 p . l . , 164 pp., 3 1.
M o R E , HENRY. T h e I m m o r t a l i t y of the S o u l , S o farre forth as it is

demonstrable from the K n o w l e d g e of N a t u r e a n d the L i g h t of Reason.
L o n d o n , J . F l e s h e r , 1659. 8°. 18 p . l . , 549 pp., 9 1.
M o R N A Y , P H i L i P P E , seigneur d u P l e s s i s - M a r l y . T h e Soule's O w n E v i
dence, for its O w n I m m o r t a l i t y . . . F i r s t compiled i n F r e n c h . . . after
w a r d t u r n e d into E n g l i s h . . . A n d now re-published B y J o h n Bachiler,
M.A. L o n d o n , M . S . for H e n r y O v e r t o n , 1646. 4 . 0
N A B B E S , T H O M A S . M i c r o c o s m u s . A M o r a l l M a s k e , presented w i t h generali
liking at the private house i n S a l i s b u r y C o u r t , and heere set d o w n
according to the intention of the A u t h o u r T h o m a s N a b b e s . L o n d o n ,
R i c h a r d O u l t o n , 1637. 4 . 3 p . l . ; signatures: B - G 4 .
0
N i C H O L L S , W i L L i A M , M.A., D . D . A Conference w i t h a T h e i s t . C o n t a i n
ing A n A n s w e r to all the most U s u a l Objections of the Infidels A g a i n s t
the C h r i s t i a n Religion. I n F o u r Parts. L o n d o n , T . W . for F r a n c i s
Saunders [et aL], 1698, 1697-9. 8°. 4 vols.
N o R R i s , J o H N , R e c t o r of B e m e r t o n , near S a r u m . C u r s o r y Reflections u p o n
a Book c a i r d , A n E s s a y concerning H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g . 44 pp., 1 1.
I n c l u d e d a t t h e e n d o f h i s Christian Blessedness . . . L o n d o n , S . Manship, 1690.
A n E s s a y T o w a r d s the T h e o r y of the I d e a l or Intelligible W o r l d .

D e s i g n e d for T w o Parts. T h e F i r s t considering it Absolutely i n it self,
and the S e c o n d i n Relation to H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g . L o n d o n ,
S. M a n s h i p , 1701-4. 8°. 2 vols.
[ N Y E , S T E P H E N ] T h e Agreement of the U n i t a r i a n s , w i t h the C a t h o l i c k
C h u r c h . B e i n g also A full A n s w e r , to the Infamations of M r . Edwards;
and the needless E x c e p t i o n s , of m y L o r d s T h e Bishops of Chichester,
Worcester and Sarum . . . P a r t I . . . P r i n t e d i n the Y e a r M D C X C I I .
4 . 64pp.
0
[ ] A B r i e f H i s t o r y of the U n i t a r i a n s , C a l l e d also Socinians. I n four

L e t t e r s , W r i t t e n to A F r i e n d [i.e. to T h o m a s F i r m i n ] . P r i n t e d i n the
Y e a r 1687. 8°. 184 pp.
[- ] A D i s c o u r s e of N a t u r a l a n d R e v e a l ' d R e l i g i o n i n Several E s s a y s :
O r , T h e L i g h t o f N a t u r e , A G u i d e to D i v i n e T r u t h . L o n d o n , J . N e w t o n ,
1691. 8°. 2 p . l . , 363 pp.
O L D F i E L D , J o s H U A . A n E s s a y towards the I m p r o v e m e n t of R e a s o n ; i n
the P u r s u i t of L e a r n i n g and C o n d u c t of L i f e . L o n d o n , for T . P a r k h u r s t ,
1707. 8°. 25 p . l . , viii, 424 pp., 6 1.
P A R K E R , S A M U E L , D . D . , B i s h o p of O x f o r d . A D e m o n s t r a t i o n of the
D i v i n e A u t h o r i t y of the L a w of N a t u r e , A n d of the C h r i s t i a n R e l i g i o n .
I n T w o Parts. L o n d o n , M . F l e s h e r , 1681. 4 . 3 p . l . , xlii p p . , 4 1 . , 427 p p .
0
A F r e e and I m p a r t i a l C e n s u r e O f T h e Platonick Philosophie, B e i n g

a L e t t e r W r i t t e n to his m u c h H o n o u r e d F r i e n d M r . N . B [ a t h u r s t ] .
O x f o r d , W . H a l l , 1666. 4 . 3 p.l., 112 pp.
0
T e n t a m i n a P h y s i c o - T h e o l o g i c a D e D e o : Sive T h e o l o g i a Scholastica
. . . D u o b u s L i b r i s comprehensa: Q u o r u m A l t e r o D e D e i E x i s t e n t i ä
adversus Atheos & E p i c u r e o s ex ipsis I p s o r u m P r i n c i p i i s disputatur.
A l t e r o D e E j u s d e m E s s e n t i a & Attributis . . . L o n d i n i , A . M . venales
a p u d Jo. Sherley, 1665. 4 . 12 p . l . , 418 pp. 0
P A Y N E , W i L L i A M , D . D . T h e M y s t e r y of the C h r i s t i a n F a i t h a n d of the
Blessed Trinity V i n d i c a t e d , a n d the Divinity of Christ Proved. I n T h r e e
S e r m o n s . . . I n the Press before his D e a t h , a n d b y h i m s e l f ordered to be
published. L o n d o n , for R i c h a r d C u m b e r l a n d , 1697. 8°. 1 p . l . , 103 p p .
P E A R S O N , J o H N , B i s h o p of C h e s t e r . A n E x p o s i t i o n of the C r e e d . L o n d o n ,
R o g e r D a n i e l , 1659. 4 . 8 p.l.,-785 p p .
0
P E R R O N E T , V i N C E N T , A . M . A V i n d i c a t i o n of M r . Locke, from the C h a r g e

of giving encouragement to S c e p t i c i s m a n d Infidelity, a n d f r o m several
other Mistakes a n d Objections of the L e a r n e d A u t h o r of the P r o c e d u r e ,
E x t e n t , and L i m i t s of H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g [i.e. Peter B r o w n e ] . I n
S i x Dialogues. W h e r e i n is likewise E n q u i r e d , W h e t h e r M r . Locke's
T r u e O p i n i o n of the Soul's I m m a t e r i a l i t y was not mistaken b y the
late L e a r n e d M o n s . L e i b n i t z . L o n d o n , for J . , J . , a n d P . K n a p t o n ,
1736. 8°. 6 p . l . , 124 pp.
A S e c o n d V i n d i c a t i o n of M r . Locke, W h e r e i n his Sentiments relating
to Personal Identity A r e clear'd f r o m some Mistakes of the R e v . D r .
Butler, i n his Dissertation on that Subject. A n d the various Objections
rais'd against M r . Locke, b y t h e late learned A u t h o r [ i . e . A n d r e w Baxter]
of An E n q u i r y into the N a t u r e of the H u m a n S o u l , are consider'd. T o
w h i c h are added Reflections on some passages of D r . Watt's Philoso
p h i c a l E s s a y s . . . L o n d o n , for F l e t c h e r G y l e s , 1738. 8°. 8 p . l . , 132 p p .
P R i D E A U X , H u M P H R E Y , D . D . A L e t t e r to the D e i s t s : S h e w i n g , That the
Gospel of Jesus Christ is no I m p o s t u r e ; but the Sacred Truth of God.
L o n d o n , by J . H . for W . Rogers, 1697. 8°. 1 p . l . , 152 p p .
R A Y , J o H N , F . R . s . Miscellaneous D i s c o u r s e s C o n c e r n i n g the D i s s o l u t i o n
' a n d C h a n g e s of the W o r l d . W h e r e i n T h e P r i m i t i v e C h a o s and C r e a t i o n ,
the G e n e r a l D e l u g e . . . [&c., & c ] are largely D i s c u s s e d a n d E x a m i n e d .
L o n d o n , S a m u e l S m i t h , 1692. s m a l l 8°. 13 p . l . , 259 pp.
S., M . A Philosophical D i s c o u r s e of the N a t u r e of R a t i o n a l a n d I r r a t i o n a l
Souls. B y M . S . L o n d o n , R i c h a r d B a l d w i n , 1695. 4 . 3 p . l . , 34 p p .
0
S c L A T E R , W i L L i A M , B . D . A K e y to the K e y of S c r i p t v r e : Or A n E x p o s i t i o n
w i t h Notes, v p o n the E p i s t l e to the R o m a n e s . . . . L o n d o n , P r i n t e d b y
T. S. for George N o r t o n , 1611. 4 . 3 p . l . , 388 p., 1 1.
0
[ S E R G E A N T , J o H N ] T h e M e t h o d to Science. B y J . S . L o n d o n , P r i n t e d b y
W . R e d m a y n e , 1696. 8°. 4 p . l . , [62] 429 pp.
[ ] S o l i d Philosophy Asserted, Against the F a n c i e s of the I d e i s t s : O r ,
T h e M e t h o d to Science F a r t h e r Illustrated. W i t h Reflexions on M r .
L o c k e ' s Essay concerning Human Understanding. B y J . S. L o n d o n ,
P r i n t e d for R o g e r C l e v i l , 1697. 8°. 1 p . l . , [14 p. of ' E p i s t l e ' ] , [xxxvi p.
of Preface], 460 p p . , 12 1.
Locke's copy of this book, w i t h his n u m e r o u s manuscript notes, is i n the library
of S t . J o h n ' s C o l l e g e , C a m b r i d g e .
[ ] T r a n s n a t u r a l Philosophy, or M e t a p h y s i c k s : D e m o n s t r a t i n g the
E s s e n c e s a n d Operations of all Beings whatever, w h i c h gives the
Principles to all other Sciences. A n d S h e w i n g the Perfect C o n f o r m i t y of
Christian Faith to Right Reason, a n d the Unreasonableness of Atheists,
Deists, A n t i - t r i n i t a r i a n s , a n d other Sectaries. W i t h an A p p e n d i x ,
G i v i n g a Rational Explication of the M y s t e r y of the most B . T r i n i t y .

B y J . S . L o n d o n , P r i n t e d b y the A u t h o r , 1700. 8°. 484 p p . , 1 1.
S H E R L O C K , W i L L i A M , D . D . , D e a n of S t . Paul's, W e s t m i n s t e r . A D i g r e s s i o n
concerning C o n n a t e Ideas, or I n b r e d K n o w l e d g e , p p . 124-164 in his
A D i s c o u r s e C o n c e r n i n g the H a p p i n e s s of G o o d M e n , P a r t I . L o n d o n ,
W . Rogers, 1704. 8°.
A V i n d i c a t i o n of D r . Sherlock's S e r m o n concerning T h e D a n g e r o f
C o r r u p t i n g the F a i t h b y Philosophy. I n A n s w e r to some S o c i n i a n
R e m a r k s . L o n d o n , for W . Rogers, 1697. 4 . 2 p . l . , 40 p p . 0
A V i n d i c a t i o n of the D o c t r i n e of the H o l y a n d E v e r Blessed T r i n i t y ,

and the I n c a r n a t i o n of T h e S o n of G o d . O c c a s i o n e d B y the B r i e f N o t e s
on the creed of S t . Athanasius [anonymous] a n d the B r i e f H i s t o r y o f
the U n i t a r i a n s , O r Socinians [by Stephen N y e ] , a n d containing a n
A n s w e r to both. L o n d o n , for W . Rogers, 1690. 4 . 4 p . l . , 272 p p . 0
'Imprimatur, J u n . 9. 1 6 9 0 /
A D e f e n c e of D r . Sherlock's N o t i o n of A T r i n i t y i n U n i t y » I n
A n s w e r to the A n i m a d v e r s i o n s u p o n his V i n d i c a t i o n of the D o c t r i n e
of the H o l y and E v e r Blessed T r i n i t y . W i t h a P o s t - S c r i p t R e l a t i n g t o
the C a l m D i s c o u r s e of a T r i n i t y i n the G o d h e a d . I n A L e t t e r to a
F r i e n d . L o n d o n , W . Rogers, 1694. 4 . 1 p . l . , 112 pp. 0
[ S o u T H , R o B E R T ] A n i m a d v e r s i o n s u p o n D r . Sherlock's Book, E n t i t u l e d
A V i n d i c a t i o n of the H o l y a n d E v e r - B l e s s e d T r i n i t y , &c. B y a D i v i n e
of the C h u r c h of E n g l a n d . T h e S e c o n d E d i t i o n w i t h some A d d i t i o n s .
L o n d o n , for R a n d a l T a y l o r , 1693. 4 . 1 p . l . , xix, [3] 382 pp.
0
[ ] T r i t h e i s m charged u p o n D Sherlock's r
N e w N o t i o n of the T r i n i t y .
A n d the C h a r g e made good, i n an A n s w e r to the Defense of the said
N o t i o n against T h e Animadversions u p o n D r . Sherlock's Book, E n t i t u l e d ,
A V i n d i c a t i o n of the D o c t r i n e of the . . . T r i n i t y . B y a D i v i n e of t h e
C h u r c h o f E n g l a n d . L o n d o n , f o r J o h n W h i t l o c k , 1695.4 . 12p.l., 316pp. 0
• T w e l v e S e r m o n s P r e a c h e d u p o n Several Occasions. S i x of t h e m
never before P r i n t e d . L o n d o n , J . H . for T h o m a s Bennet, 1692. 8°.
4 P-1., 639 p p .
S p R A T , T H O M A S , D . D . , F . R . s . , B i s h o p of Rochester. T h e H i s t o r y o f T h e
R o y a l Society of L o n d o n , F o r the I m p r o v i n g of N a t u r a l K n o w l e d g e .
L o n d o n , T . R . f o r J . M a r t y n , 1667. 4 . 8 p . l . , 438 p p . 0
[ S T E P H E N S , W i L L i A M ] B . D . , R e c t o r of Sutton, S u r r e y . A n A c c o u n t of t h e
G r o w t h of D e i s m i n E n g l a n d . L o n d o n , f o r t h e A u t h o r , 1696. 4 . 32 p p . 0
S T i L L i N G F L E E T , E D W A R D , B i s h o p of Worcester. T h e W o r k s of T h a t M o s t
E m i n e n t and L e a r n e d Prelate, D r . E d w . Stillingfleet, L a t e L o r d B i s h o p
of Worcester. T o g e t h e r w i t h H i s L i f e a n d C h a r a c t e r . I n S i x V o l u m e s .
L o n d o n , J . H e p t i n s t a l l for H e n r y & George M o r t l o c k , 1710-13. folio.
6 vols.
Stillingfleet's biography c o n t a i n e d i n t h e first v o l u m e w a s also i s s u e d separately
u n d e r the title: T h e L i f e a n d C h a r a c t e r o f T h a t E m i n e n t a n d L e a r n e d Prelate,
T h e L a t e D r . E d w . Stillingfleet. . . . ( L o n d o n , J . H e p t i n s t a l l , 1 7 1 0 . 8°. 149 p p . )
According to T h o m a s H e a r n e ' s note i n his copy (now i n the Bodleian L i b r a r y )
its a u t h o r w a s T i m o t h y G o o d w i n , o r G o d w i n . T h i s e d i t i o n o f h i s W o r k s , h o w e v e r ,
w,as m a d e b y R i c h a r d B e n t l e y , S t i l l i n g f l e e t ' s chaplain.
[ S T i L L i N G F L E E T , EüWARö] A L e t t e r to a D e i s t , I n A n s w e r to several
Objections against the Truth and Authority of the Scriptures. L o n d o n ,
b y W . G . , 1677. 8°. 3 p . l . , 135 p p .
Origines Sacrae, O r A Rational A c c o u n t of the G r o u n d s of C h r i s t i a n
F a i t h , as to the T r u t h and D i v i n e A u t h o r i t y of the Scriptures, A n d
the matters therein c o n t a i n e d / L o n d o n , R . W . for H e n r y M o r t l o c k ,
1662. 4 . 18 p . l . , 619 p p .
0
A D i s c o u r s e i n V i n d i c a t i o n of the D o c t r i n e of the T r i n i t y : W i t h A n
A n s w e r to the L a t e Socinian Objections Against it f r o m Scripture,
Antiquity and Reason. A n d A Preface concerning the different Explica
tions of the Trinity, a n d the T e n d e n c y of the present S o c i n i a n C o n -
troversie. T h e S e c o n d E d i t i o n . L o n d o n , J . H . for H e n r y M o r t l o c k ,
1697. 8°. ι p . l . , l x i i , [3] 292 p p .
T h e B i s h o p ofWorcester's A n s w e r t o M r . L o c k e ' s L e t t e r concerning
Some Passages Relating to his E s s a y of H u m a n e U n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
M e n t i o n ' d i n the L a t e D i s c o u r s e i n V i n d i c a t i o n of the T r i n i t y . W i t h
a Postscript i n answer to some Reflections made u p o n that T r e a t i s e i n
a late Socinian Pamphlet. L o n d o n , J . H . for H e n r y Mortlock, 1697.
8°. 154 pp.
T h e B i s h o p of Worcester's A n s w e r to M r . Locke's Second Letter;
W h e r e i n his N o t i o n of Ideas I s prov'd to be Inconsistent w i t h it setf,
A n d w i t h the Articles of the C h r i s t i a n F a i t h . L o n d o n , J . H . for H e n r y
Mortlock, 1698. 8°. 178 p p .
[ S T R U T T , S A M U E L ] A Philosophical E n q u i r y into the P h y s i c a l S p r i n g of
H u m a n A c t i o n s , a n d the Immediate C a u s e of T h i n k i n g . L o n d o n , for
J . Peele, 1732. 8°. 1 p . l . , 53 p p .
[ T i N D A L or T i N D A L L , M A T T H E w ] T h e Reflexions on the X X V I I I P r o
positions touching the D o c t r i n e of the T r i n i t y , I n a L e t t e r to the
C l e r g y , &c, [n.p.] P r i n t e d i n the Y e a r M D C X C V . 4 . 36 p p . 0
[ T o L A N D , J o H N ] Christianity not Mysterious: O r , A Treatise Shewing

T h a t there is nothing i n the G o s p e l C o n t r a r y to R e a s o n , N o r A b o v e
i t : A n d that no C h r i s t i a n D o c t r i n e can be properly call'd a M y s t e r y .
L o n d o n , P r i n t e d i n the Y e a r 1696. 8°. xxxii, 176 p p .
L e t t e r s to S e r e n a : C o n t a i n i n g 1. T h e O r i g i n and F o r c e of Prejudices.
I I . T h e H i s t o r y of the Soul's Immortality among the Heathens. 111.
T h e O r i g i n of Idolatry, and the Reasons of H e a t h e n i s m . A s also, i v .
A L e t t e r . . . showing Spinosa's S y s t e m of Philosophy to be without
any Principle or F o u n d a t i o n , v. Motion Essential to Matter; in Answer
to some remarks b y a N o b l e F r i e n d on the Confutation of Spinosa.
L o n d o n , B e r n a r d L i n t o t , 1704. 8°. 1 p . l . , [48] 239 p p .
[ ] Pantheisticon. Sive, F o r m u l a Celebrandae Sodalitatis Socraticae,
I n T r e s Particulas D i v i s a ; Quae Pantheistarum, sive S o d a l i u m , C o n
tinent I , M o r e s et A x i o m a t a : I I , N u m e n et P h i l o s o p h i a m : 111, L i b e r -
tatem, et n o n fallentem L e g e m , N e q u e fallendam . . . C o s m o p o l i ,
M D C C X X . 8°. 3 p . l . , 89 pp.
V i R E T , P i E R R E . I n s t r u c t i o n Chrestienne en la D o c t r i n e de la L o y et de
l ' E v a n g i l e : & en la vraye philosophie & theologie tant naturelle que
supernaturelle des C h r e s t i e n s : & en la contemplation d u temple &
des images & oeuures de l a providence de D i e u e n tout T u n i v e r s . 0 . .

G e n e v e , l e a n R i v e r y , 1564. folio. 2 vols.
Vol. 2 h a s title: E x p o s i t i o n d e l a D o c t r i n e d e l a F o y C h r e s t i e n n e , touchant l a
vraye cognoissance & levray service d eD i e u . . . .
[ W A R D , S E T H ] B i s h o p of S a l i s b u r y . A Philosophicall E s s a y T o w a r d s a n
Eviction
(B e i n g a n d Attributes of G o d .
I m m o r t a l i t y of the souls of m e n .
T o g e t h e r w i t h a n I n d e x of the H e a d s of every particular P a r t . O x f o r d ,

b y L . L i c h f i e l d , 1652. s m a l l 8°. 8 p . l . , 152 p p .
W A T T S , ISAAC. L o g i c k : O r , T h e R i g h t U s e of R e a s o n i n the E n q u i r y after
T r u t h , W i t h A V a r i e t y of R u l e s to guard against Error, i n the Afiairs
of Religion a n d H u m a n L i f e , as w e l l as i n the Sciences. T h e S e c o n d
E d i t i o n , C o r r e c t e d . L o n d o n , J o h n C l a r k , 1726. 8°. 3 p . l . , 365, [5] p p .
[ ] Philosophical E s s a y s o n V a r i o u s Subjects, v i z . Space, Substance,
B o d y , S p i r i t , T h e Operations of the S o u l i n U n i o n w i t h the B o d y ,
Innate Ideas, Perpetual Consciousness, Place a n d M o t i o n o f S p i r i t s ,
the departing S o u l , the R e s u r r e c t i o n of the B o d y , the P r o d u c t i o n a n d
Operations of Plants a n d A n i m a l s ; W i t h some R e m a r k s o n M r . L o c k e ' s
E s s a y o n the H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g . T o w h i c h is subjointed A B r i e f
S c h e m e of Ontology, O r T h e Science of B e i n g i n general w i t h its
AfTections. B y I . W . L o n d o n , R i c h a r d F o r d , 1733. 8°. x i i p p . , 2 1.,
403 PP-
W H i C H C O T E (also W H i C H C O T a n d W H i T C H C O T E ) , B E N J A M I N . S e l e c t S e r
m o n s of D r . W h i c h c o t . I n T w o Parts. L o n d o n , A w n s h a m & J o h n
C h u r c h i l l , 1698. 8°. 10 p . l . , 452 p p .
W H i s T O N , W i L L i A M , M . A . Reflexions o n a n A n o n y m o u s Pamphlet,
E n t i t u l e d , a D i s c o u r s e of F r e e T h i n k i n g [by A n t h o n y C o l l i n s ] . L o n d o n ,
for the A u t h o r , 1713. 8°. 55 p p .
W i L K i N S , J o H N , B i s h o p of C h e s t e r . O f the Principles a n d D u t i e s of N a t u r a l
R e l i g i o n : T w o Books. L o n d o n , A . M a x w e l l , 1675. 8°. 9 p . l . , 4 1 0 p p .
W i T T Y , J o H N , M . A . , of S t . John's College, C a m b r i d g e . T h e F i r s t P r i n
ciples of M o d e r n D e i s m Confuted. I n A D e m o n s t r a t i o n of the Im
materiality, N a t u r a l Eternity, Immortality of Thinking Substances i n
general; and i n particular of H u m a n Souls. E v e n u p o n the Supposition
that w e are intirely ignorant of the Intrinsic Nature of the Essences of
Things. L o n d o n , for J o h n W y a t , 1707. 8°. 2 p . l . , xxix, [6] 301 p p .
[ ] T h e Reasonableness O f Assenting to the Mysteries of Christianity
A s s e r t e d a n d V i n d i c a t e d . W i t h some R e m a r k s U p o n a Book E n t i t u l ' d
An Essay concerning the Use of Reason . . . [by A n t h o n y C o l l i n s ] I n a
L e t t e r to a F r i e n d . L o n d o n , for J o h n W y a t , 1707. 8°. 81, [1] p p e
[ W o L L A S T O N , W i L L i A M , М.А.] T h e R e l i g i o n of N a t u r e Delineated, [n.p.]

P r i n t e d i n the Y e a r M D C C X X I I . 4 . 158 p p . , 1 1.
0
W o T T O N , W i L L i A M , B . D . , C h a p l a i n to the E a r l of N o t t i n g h a m . Reflec
tions u p o n Ancient a n d Modern L e a r n i n g . L o n d o n , b y J . L e a k e , for
Peter B u c k , 1694. 8°. [32] 359 p p .
C. Periodicals
A c t a E r u d i t o r u m anno 1682-1731 publicata. L i p s i a e , J . G r o s s i u m [etal.],

1682-1731. 4 . 50 vols, monthly.
0
T h e A t h e n i a n G a z e t t e : or C a s u i s t i c a l M e r c u r y , R e s o l v i n g all the most

N i c e a n d C u r i o u s Questions proposed b y the Ingenious, vols. 1-14,
no. 2 9 ; 17 M a r c h 1691-8 A u g u s t 1694. L o n d o n , J . D u n t o n , 1691-4. 4 . 0
R u n n i n g title: T h e A t h e n i a n Mercury.
ATHENIAN S o c i E T Y , L o n d o n . T h e Young-Students-Library. Containing

E x t r a c t s a n d A b r i d g m e n t s of the M o s t V a l u a b l e Books P r i n t e d i n
E n g l a n d , a n d i n the F o r r e i g n Journals, F r o m the Y e a r S i x t y - F i v e , to
T h i s T i m e . T o w h i c h is A d d e d , A N e w E s s a y u p o n all sorts of L e a r n i n g ;
W h e r e i n the U s e of the Sciences I s D i s t i n c t l y T r e a t e d on . . . P r i n t e d
i n the Y e a r 1691. L o n d o n , J o h n D u n t o n , 1692. folio. 3 p . l . , x v i i i ,
479 P P .
Bibliotheque U n i v e r s e l l e et H i s t o r i q u e de 1 6 8 6 - 1 6 9 3 . 1 . 1 - 2 6 . A m s t e r d a m ,
Wolfgang, Waeberge, [et aL] 1686-94.
Edited by Jean L e Clerc, J . C o r n a n d de la Crose, and Jacques Bernard. Continued
as Biblioth&que Choisie.
Biblioth&que C h o i s i e , p o u r servir de suite ä la Biblioth&que universelle.

P a r J e a n L e C l e r c . t. 1-28. A m s t e r d a m , H . Schelte, 1 7 0 3 - 1 3 .
C o n t i n u e d as Bibliotheque ancienne & rnoderne.
C e n s u r a T e m p o r u m . T h e good or i l l tendencies of Books, S e r m o n s ,

Pamphlets, &c. impartially considered [by S a m u e l P a r k e r ] , i n a dialogue
between E u b u l u s a n d S o p h r o n i u s . vols. 1 - 2 ; vol. 3, nos. 1-3. [Jan.]
1 7 0 8 - [ M a r c h ] 1710. L o n d o n , for H . C l e m e n t s , 1708-10. 4 . 0
T h e C o m p l e a t L i b r a r y : O r , N e w s for the Ingenious. C o n t a i n i n g several

original pieces, w i t h an historical account of the choicest books n e w l y
printed i n E n g l a n d a n d i n the forreign j o u r n a l s . A s also, the State of
L e a r n i n g i n the W o r l d . B y a L o n d o n divine [ R i c h a r d W o l l e y ] vols.
[ 1 ] - 2 ; vol. 3, nos. 1 - 4 ; M a y 1 6 9 2 - A p r i l 1694. L o n d o n , for J . D u n t o n ,
1692-4. 4 . 0
' A continuation o f t h e Y o u n g Student's L i b r a r y a n d a perfecting of that Under

taking.'
G e n t l e m a n ' s J o u r n a l , or, T h e M o n t h l y M i s c e l l a n y . E d i t e d b y P . A .
Motteux. vols. 1-3. J a n . 1 6 9 2 - N o v . 1694. L o n d o n , 1692-4. s m a l l 4 . 0
Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans, par H e n r i Basnage de B e a u v a l . t. 1 - 2 4 .

sept. 1 6 8 7 - j u i n 1709. R o t t e r d a m , R e i n i e r L e e r s , 1687-1709. 8°.
A sequel to Nouvelles d e l a R e p u b l i q u e d e s L e t t r e s .
L o n d o n Gazette. N o s . 1-23, as O x f o r d Gazette, 1665-6. folio. O x f o r d ,

1665-6. nos. 2 4 - 4 1 0 7 , as L o n d o n Gazette. 5 F e b . 1 6 6 6 - 2 2 M a r c h 1705.
L o n d o n 1666-1705. folio.
M 6 m o i r e s p o u r T H i s t o i r e D e s Sciences. & D e s beaux A r t s . J a n v i e r /
F e v r i e r 1701^75. t.[1]-265. T r 6 v o u x , L ' I m p r i m e r i e de S . A . S . ,
1701^75. I 2 . m o
Also k n o w n as 'M6moires d e Tr6voux*. Absorbed b y Journal des Savants.

M 6 m o i r e s pour s e r v i r ä T H i s t o i r e des H o m m e s Illustres dans la r6publique

des lettres. A v e c u n catalogue raisonne de leurs Ouvrages. [ E d i t e d b y
P . N i c e r o n ] Paris, Briasson, 1729-45. small 8°. 43 vols.
M e m o i r s for the Ingenious. . . . I n Miscellaneous L e t t e r s . B y J . C o r n a n d
de la C r o s e . vol. 1, nos. 1-12. J a n . - D e c . 1693. L o n d o n , H . R h o d e s ,
1693. small 4 . 0
Continued as M e m o i r s for the Ingenious, or, T h e Universal Mercury, V o l . i ,

no. I. Jan. 1694.
M e r c u r i u s E r u d i t o r u m , or N e w s for the learned W o r l d . 1691 ( 5 - 1 2

August).
Miscellaneous L e t t e r s , G i v i n g an A c c o u n t of the W o r k s of the L e a r n e d ,
B o t h at H o m e a n d A b r o a d . . . 17 O c t . 1694-19 D e c . 1 6 9 4 ; J a n . -
M a r c h 1696. V o l . ι , nos. 1 - 1 0 ; vol. 2, nos. 1-3, L o n d o n , 1694-6.
Weekly.
Nouvelles de l a R 6 p u b l i q u e des L e t t r e s . m a r s 1 6 8 4 - m a i / j u i n 1718.
A m s t e r d a m , H . D e s b o r d e s [et aL], 1684-1718. 8°. 40 vols.
F o u n d e d b y Pierre Bayle, a n d edited b y h i m to F e b . 1687; continued b y D . d e
L a r r o q u e , J . B a r r i n , a n d others to A p r i l 1689; f r o m J a n . 1699 o n , edited b y J a c q u e s
Bernard.
T h e Occasional Paper . . . nos. I - X . L o n d o n , 1697-8. 4 . 0
T h e following three numbers are of special interest:

I. c o n t a i n s ' S o m e r e f l e x i o n s o n a B o o k E n t i t u l e d , A Letter to the D e i s t s ' .
III. Reflexions u p o n M r . Toland's Book, Called Christianity not Mysterious:
with some Considerations about the use of Reason i n Matters of Religion.
VII. ' S h e w i n g t h e U s e f u l n e s s o f H u m a n L e a r n i n g i n Matters ofReligion; Con
trary to t h e Suggestions o f s o m e Sceptical M e n , i n their late Pamphlets.'
S E C O N D A R Y SOURCES
A A R O N , R . I . J o h n L o c k e . L o n d o n , O x f o r d U n i v . Press, 1937. ix, 328 pp.

2 n d ed. O x f o r d , C l a r e n d o n Press, 1955. x, 323 pp.
A B B E Y , C H A R L E S J . , and JoHN H . OvERTON. The English C h u r c h in the
Eighteenth C e n t u r y . L o n d o n , L o n g m a n s , G r e e n a n d C o . , 1878. 2 vols.
A s c o L i , G E O R G E S . L a G r a n d e - B r e t a g n e devant l'opinion francaise au
x v i i siecle. T h e s e pour le doctorat . . . Paris, J . G a m b e r , 1930.
e
2 vols.
A s P E L i N , G u N N A R . L o c k e and S y d e n h a m . (In Theoria> vol. xv, 1949.
L u n d [1949] pp. 2 9 - 3 7 . )
B A R N E S , A N N i E . Jean L e C l e r c (1657-1736) et la R 6 p u b l i q u e des L e t t r e s .
Paris, E . D r o z , 1938. 280 p p . , 2 1.
B A S T i D E , C H A R L E S . Anglais et F r a n c a i s au x v n siecle. Paris, F . A l c a n ,
e
1912. x i i , 362 pp.

J o h n L o c k e , ses theories politiques et leur influence en Angleterre.
L e s L i b e r t e s politiques—L'eglise et l'etat—la T o l e r a n c e . Th&se pour
le doctorat . . . P a r i s , E . L e r o u x , 1906. 3 p . l . , 397 pp.
B R A N D T , F R i T H i O F . T h o m a s H o b b e s ' mechanical conception of nature.
Copenhagen . L e v i n & M u n k s g a a r d , 1927. 399 p p .
T r a n s l a t e d f r o m t h e D a n i s h e d i t i o n o f 1921 b y V a u g h a n Maxwell and Annie I .
Fausb0ll.
BREDVOLD, L o u i s I . T h e Intellectual M i l i e u of J o h n D r y d e n , Studies i n

S o m e A s p e c t s of S e v e n t e e n t h - C e n t u r y T h o u g h t . A n n A r b o r , U n i v e r
sity of M i c h i g a n Press, 1934. v i i i , 189 p p .
C A S S i R E R , E R N S T . D a s E r k e n n t n i s p r o b l e m i n der Philosophie u n d W i s s e n
schaft d e r n e u e r e n Z e i t . 3 A u f l . B e r l i n , B r u n o C a s s i r e r , 1922-3. 3 vols.
C H R I S T O P H E R S E N , H . O . A Bibliographical I n t r o d u c t i o n to the S t u d y of
J o h n L o c k e . O s l o , J . D y b w a d , 1930. 134 p p . (Skrifter utgitt av det
N o r s k e V i d e n s k a p s - A k a d e m i i O s l o . 11. H i s t . - F i l o s . K l a s s e . 1930.
no. 8.)
C o u R T i N E S , L E O P i E R R E . Bayle's Relations w i t h E n g l a n d and the E n g l i s h .
N e w Y o r k , C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1938. x p p . , 1 1., 253 p p .
C R A G G , G . R . F r o m P u r i t a n i s m to the A g e of R e a s o n . A S t u d y of Changes
i n Religious T h o u g h t w i t h i n the C h u r c h of E n g l a n d , 1660 to 1700.
C a m b r i d g e , U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950. v i , 247 p p .
D E N i s , P A U L . L e t t r e s Autographes de la Collection de T r o u s s u r e s Class6es
& Annotees. Beauvais, I m p r i m e r i e d u D e p t . de l O i s e , 1912. xv,
665 p p . (Publications de la Societe A c a d e m i q u e d e T O i s e , t. 3.)
Abbe" D u B o s ' s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o c c u r s o n p p . 1-225.
D u M A S , G u s T A V E . Histoire d u J o u r n a l de T r e v o u x depuis 1701 j u s q u ' e n

1762. T h e s e pour le doctorat de l ' U n i v e r s i t e . . . P a r i s , B o i v i n & c , i e
1936. 210 p p .
F 0 x - B 0 u R N E , H . R . T h e L i f e of J o h n L o c k e . L o n d o n , H e n r y S . K i n g ,
1876. 2 vols.
G i B S O N , j A M E S . L o c k e ' s T h e o r y o f K n o w l e d g e and its H i s t o r i c a l Relations.
C a m b r i d g e , U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1931. xiv, 338 p p .
G R A H A M , W A L T E R j A M E S . T h e Beginnings of E n g l i s h L i t e r a r y Periodicals.
A S t u d y of Periodical L i t e r a t u r e 1665-1715. N e w Y o r k , O x f o r d
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1926. iv p p . , 2 1., 92 p p .
GRÜNBAUM, j A C O B . D i e Philosophie R i c h a r d Burthogges (1637-1698).
Inaugural-Dissertation. . . . B e r n , J . K l e i n e r , 1939. v, 93 p p .
H A L L A M , H E N R Y , F . R . A . s . Introduction to the L i t e r a t u r e of E u r o p e , i n
the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, a n d Seventeenth C e n t u r i e s . 4 t h ed. L o n d o n ,
J o h n M u r r a y , 1854. 3 vols.
H E F E L B O W E R , S A M U E L G R i N G . T h e relation of J o h n L o c k e to E n g l i s h
deism. C h i c a g o , I11., T h e U n i v e r s i t y of C h i c a g o Press [1918]. v i i , 188
PP·
HöFFDiNG, H A R A L D . G e s c h i c h t e der neueren Philosophie. E i n e D a r s t e l
l u n g der G e s c h i c h t e der Philosophie v o n d e m E n d e der Renaissance
bis z u unseren T a g e n . L e i p z i g , O . R . R e i s l a n d , 1895-6. 2 vols.
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INDEX
(References in bold-face figures are to the more important discusdons)
I
Aaron, R . I . , 28, 134-5» 203. Cambridge Platonists, 26-27, 40.

Abbey, C . J . , 118 n., 170 n., 204. Carpenter, R . , 31-ЗЗ» 39·
Acta Eruditorum, 14-15. Carroll, W . , 10, 13, 3 0 n . , 70, 9 0 n . ,
Arianism, 11, 181, 195. 99-100, 140, 1 4 4 ^ , 160, 166, 178¬
Aristotelianism, 42, 77, 103, 109-10, 80, 187.
142. Cartesian, 4, 28, 30, 52, 76, 9 1 , 103,
Aristotle, 38, 8 1 . 106, i n , 149, 167.
Ashe, D r . , 4. Cassirer, E . , 20 n., 28.
Athanasianism, 204. Chambers, E . , 69.
atheism, 8, 11, 42, 6 o n . , 65, 144, 152, Charleton, W . , 38, 4 2 - 4 3 , 151, 152 n.
154-5, 163, 170, 172, 174,179. Chillingworth, W . , 170.
Athenian Gazette, 20, 22. Chubb, T . , 171.
Cicero, 37.
Bachiler, J . , 35. Clarke, S., 25, 144, 160, 163-5, 178¬
Bacon, 78-79. 9·
Basnage de Beauval, H . , 22-23. Cockburn, M r s . C . T . , 17, 19, 2 0 n .
Bates, W . , 36. Collins, A . , 6, I I , 25, 57, 6 o n . , 65, 93,
Baxter, A . , 148, 165. 95, 151, 156, 1 5 7 n . , 164-5, 170,
Bayle, P., 19 n., 2 3 - 2 4 , 6 9 , 1 3 6 - 8 , 1 4 0 , 174, 1 7 6 - 9 , 181, 185, 189, 203.
148. conscience, 14, 3*-33> 55·
Becconsall, T . , 54-55· Coste, P., 22-24, 69 n.
Bentley, R . , 49, 152, 165, 172. Coward, W . , 1 5 7 - 6 0 , 162, 164, 188,
Berkeley, 25, 98, 113, 125, 147, 165, 205.
180, 182, 197-9, 2 0 1 , 203. Cragg, G . R . , 29 n., 118.
Bernard, J . , 23. Crousaz, J . P. de, 4 n.
Beverley, T . , 121-2. Cudworth, R . , 27, 206.
BiblioMque Choisie, 137, 1 6 4 n . , 165 n. Culverwel, N . , 41-43, 46, 48, 168.
Bibliotheque Universelle, 1, 22, 50. Cunningham, M r . , 8 n., 14.
Blount, C . , 171.
Bold, S., 4, 9, 19, 1 0 0 - 1 , 156-7, Deism, 11, 25, 64, 69, 99, 115, 136,
179. 152, 163, 166, 1 6 9 - 8 2 , 187, 195,
Boyle, R . , 188, 206. 204, 206-7.
Boyle Lectures, 49, 144, 152, 172, 187. Descartes, 4, 26-27, 30, 43, 51 n., 52,
Broughton, J . , 1 5 4 - 8 , 160. 90, 104, 107-9, 112-13, 143, 151.
Browne, P., 18, 25, 88-89, 1 2 2 - 4 , 131, Desmaizeaux, P., 93.
143, 152-3, 165, 174, 183, 185, 190, Digby, Sir K . , 77, 109, 207.
1 9 5 - 2 0 0 , 206. direct realism, 104, 106, 110, 2050
brutes, 74, 149. Dissertation on Deistical and Arian
BuUokar, J . , 31-32. Corruption, 71, 181.
Burnet, T . , of the Charterhouse, 10, Ditton, H . , 163-4.
14-17, 19, 5 5 - 5 7 , 77 n., 86, 144. Dodwell, H . , 160, 164.
Burnet, T . , of Kemnay, 8, 1 0 n . , 14, D u Bos, АЪЪа, 24.
15n.
Burthogge, R . , 5, 2 0 - 2 2 , 4 6 - 4 8 , 7 1 , Edwards, J . , 13, 6 2 - 6 4 , 1 1 8 n . , 174¬
98, 113, 126-7, 168, 207, 5, 204.
Burton, R . , 32. epicrisis, 34, 35 n.
234 INDEX
Epicureans, 152. Lamprecht, S. P., 27-28.
essence, 9 0 n . , 96-97, 1 2 0 - 1 , 1 2 9 - 3 2 , Lancaster, W . , 12-13.
138-9, 148, 184, 186. Latitudinarians, 54.
Layton, H . , 69, 1 5 9 - 6 0 , 163-4, 205.
L e C l e r c , J . , 1, 4 - 5 , 9, 11, 15, 19, 22,
F . B . , I i n., 89 η .
5 0 - 5 1 , 70, 1 3 7 - 8 , 1 6 4 n . , 1 6 5 n . ,
Ferguson, R . , 43·
180.
F i r m i n , T . , 115.
L e e , H . , 18-19, 5 7 - 6 i , 7 3 - 7 5 , 85¬
Fowler, E . , 36.
89, 1 0 1 - 3 , 113, 153, 179, 206.
Fraser, A . C . , 27-28.
Leenhof, F . van, 1, 3, 5 1 , 68.
Free-Thinkers, 169, i74> i 7 ° , 181.
Leibniz, 8, 14-16, 22-23, 28, 36, 5 8 ¬
59, 66, 7 3 , 7 5 - 7 6 , 85-86, 115.
Gailhard, J . , 11 n., 121 η . Leland, J . , 172-3.
Gastrell, F . , 1 8 4 - 8 , 190, 195» 202, Leslie, C . , 176.
204. Limborch, P., 2.
Gibson, E . , 181. Lowde, J . , 7-8, 52-5З, 57, 86, 183.
Gibson, J . , 27-28. L y o n , G . , 20 n.
Gildon, C . , 1 6 1 - 2 , 1 8 8 - 9 .
Glanvill, J . , 20, 200.
Malebranche, N . , 4, 19 n., 2 1 , 92-96,
Goodwin, T . , 89.
Grand Jury of Middlesex, 11, 121. 9 8 - 9 9 , 197.
Guenellon, P., 2-3, 51 n. Manlove, T . , 160.
Guise, L a d y E . , 1-2, 6, 10-11. Masham, L a d y , 15 n.
materialism, 145, 149-65.
Mayne, Z . , 2 0 0 - 1 .
Hale, Sir M . , 27, 33-35· Memoires de Trevoux, 23.
Hampton, B . , 162-3. Memoires pour servir a VHistoire des
H a r r i s , J . , 69. Hommes Illustres, 21 n.
HartclifIe, J . , 48-49. Middlesex Grand Jury, 11, 121.
Haworth, S., 151, 1 5 2 n . Milner, J . , 5 7 - 5 8 , 89-90, 174, 179.
Hearne, T . , 4 n., 12-13. MischiefofPersecution Exemplified, 35.
Herbert of Cherbury, 27, 57, 113. Molyneux, W . , 3-9, 1 4 n . , 15-16, 49,
Hickes, G . , 30, 90, 1 7 9 - 8 0 , 187.
143, 153·
H i l l , O . , 131. Monatlicher Auszug, 23.
Histoire des Ouvrages des Savans, 22 n. More, H . , 27, 40-4З, 46, 48, 151,
Hobbes, 60, 113, 144, 149, 153, 158, 152n., 168.
207. Mornay, P. de, 35.
Hoffding, H . , 27.
Hume, 25, 147, 203.
Nabbes, T . , 32.
naturalism, 64, 163, 166, 169, 182,
idealism, 99, 113. 206.
innate ideas, 7-8, 13-14, 25, 2 6 - 7 2 , Niceron, P., 2 1 .
81, 102, 168. Nicholls, W . , 49.
Norris, J . , 9, 16-18, 22, 6 5 - 6 7 , 72,
Jackson, J . , 165, 181, 202. 9 1 - 9 5 , 97, 9 9 - i o i , 103.
Jackson, T . , 36 n. Nouvelles de la Republique des Lettres,
Jessop, T . E . , 180. 23·
Nye, S., 170 n.
Kant, 20.
K i n g , P., I I n., 13 n., 93. Occasionalists, 93, 95, 99·
K i n g , W . , 3, 5 - 7 , l b 19, 4 9 - 5 0 . Oldfield, J . , 1 9 3 - 5 , 202, 204, 206.
K n o r r von Rosenroth, C . , 1, 50¬ Overton, J . H . , 1 1 8 n . , 1 7 0 n . , 171,
52. 174, 2 0 4 n .
INDEX 235
pantheism, 144. Stephen, L . , 169-70.
Parker, S., 4 4 - 4 6 , 47"48, 53, 54, 7 Ь Stephens, W . , 173.
168. Stillingfleet, E . , 8, 10, 15 n . , 18-19,
Payne, W . , 1 8 3 - 4 , 187, 195. 23, 2 4 n . , 3 6 - 4 1 , 8 8 - 8 9 , !OQ, I i i ,
Pearson, J . , 44. 116-17, 1 2 4 - 8 , 1 3 2 - 4 0 , 143, 148,
phenomenalism, 20, 99, 113, 135, 142, 151-3, 163, 172-3, 187, 204.
146^7, 183, 186-7, 194, 198, 203, Stoics, 36-37.
207. Strutt, S., 164.
phenomenological analysis, 168, 205. substance, 13, 24-25, 9 1 - 9 2 , 96¬
Philosophick Essay concerning Ideas, 97, 1 1 3 , 117, 120, 124-5, 1 2 6 - 4 8 ,
6 7 - 6 8 , 9 5 - 9 7 , 100, 210. 149, 155, 164, 1 8 3 - 4 , 186, 194.
Plato, 32, 42, 44- syneidesis, 34.
Porter, N . , 19 n., 56 n. synteresis, 31-35·
Prat, B., 13 n.
Prideaux, H . , 173. Thomas Aquinas, 3 4 n . , 77, 103, 110.
Pringle-Pattison, A . S., 27. Thoynard, N . , 24.
prolepsis, 34 n., 3 ^ 3 7 , 43, 45- Tindal, M . , 12, 133 n., 171, 174, 178¬
80.
Ray, J . , 36 n. Toland, J . , 19, 25, 88, 116, 1 1 8 - 2 6 ,
Reid, T . , 203. 129-31, 136, 152, 170-1, 175, 178,
Rivaud, A . , 27, 36-37. 180, 183-5, 195, 198-9, 205.
Rosenroth, C . K n o r r von, 1, 50¬ Tri-Trinitarianism, 129 n., 184.
52. T y r r e l l , J . , 3 - 4 , 6, и , 13, 19n., 52, 54,
60 n.
scepticism, 18-19, 25, 65, 72-166
passim, 168. Unitarianism, 64, 169-70, 174, 187.
Sclater, W . , 33, 39.
Senault, J . F . , 43 n. Viret, P., 172.
Sergeant, J . , 4 n., 8 , 1 8 - 1 9 , 73, 7 6 - 8 7 , Voltaire, 28.
8 9 ^ 1 , 1 0 3 - 1 3 , 121, 1 4 0 - 3 , 148,
183, 187, 192, 201. Watts, I . , 25, 64, 70, 1 4 7 - 8 , 1 6 5 , 2©i-
Sherlock, W . , 8, 20, 6 0 ^ 1 , 65, 68, 2, 206.
1 2 8 - 3 0 , 160, 183-4, 187, 204. Whichcote, B., 63.
Sidney, Sir P., 35 n. Whiston, W . , 180-1.
socinianism, 10-11, 60, 62, 129, 136, Wilkins, J . , 38.
169-72, 174-6, 181-2, 187, 195. Windelband, W . , 27.
Socinus, 172, 174. Witty, J . , 25, 99, 1 6 0 - 1 , 163, i 7 5 - 8 ,
South, R., 19 n., 24 n., 3 8 - 3 9 , 60 n., 182, 1 8 9 - 9 3 , 195-6, 204.
62, 1 2 9 - 3 0 , 184. WoUaston, W . , 35 n., 69-70, 170, 203.
Spinoza, 51 n., 1 4 4 - 6 , 161, 179-80. Wotton, W . , 4.
Spinozism, 13, 70, 107, 160, 165. Wynne, J . , 4 n., 12.

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J O H N LOCKE

Oxford Classical and Philosophical Monographs

us that the need for such an analysis as the Essay makes

Sergeant. I am greatly indebted to Professor R. I . Aaron of

§ I . The Doctrine ofInnate Knowkdge Prior to 1688 30

§ 2. The Critics of Locke's Polemic 48

§ 2. The Nature ofIdeas 86

§ 3 . Idealism in Knowledge and Truth 98

§ I . The Role ofIdeas in Religious Knowledge 118

§2. TheDoctrineofSubstance 126

§ 3. The Controversy on Thinking Matter 148

§ I . The Charge ofDeism against Locke 169

§ 2. The Orthodox Application ofLocke's Epistemology 181

§ 3. General Conclusion 202

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE

AN examination of the contemporary scene surrounding

Knorr von Rosenroth and Fredericus van Leenhof preserved in

soe c o n c e r n e d for t r u t h & religion as becomes sober m e n , they w i l l

I n her letter of i o May 1688 to Locke, Lady Guise had re­

the 1688 abridgement which she fully enjoyed and claimed to

Lady Guise's praisemay have been elicited by the good opinion

ment of the Essay was much discussed by Locke's friends i n

Locke's discussions were followed with interest by members

and transmitted the latter's criticisms to Locke. I t was typical

in Locke's confidence since the early days of the inception of

onlythe epistle and part of the preface of the published version.

in the universities of Cambridge and Oxford and was exerting

Samuel Bold,one who was outside t h e o r b i t of intimate

Adapted of any I know, to serve the Interest of T r u t h , Natural,

William Wotton i n his Reflections upon Ancient and Modern

fications of the Cartesiati way of ideas into France. Richard 5

Burthogge also dedicated his Essay upon Reason (1694) to Locke,

After the correspondence had begun between Molyneux and

wrote to Molyneux that the copies of the first edition were

asked Molyneux for his suggestions of deletions, additions, or

and later Archbishop of Dublin—brief remarks running from

mological doctrines, but Locke did not consider them valid.

King admitted that his remarks were written i n a hurry and

he made, as we shall see i n a later chapter, hardly merit the

comments of his own on the Essay in December 1692, but his

The critic in this case was James Lowde, author of A Discourse

to Lowde i n 'Epistle to the Reader', i n the second and sub­

Moreover, Locke had by this time received Leibniz's com­

Catholic priest, had written his long and detailed criticism,

(1697); John Norris, who had published the first criticism of

his objections. I t is no wonder that Locke wrote to Molyneux

neux thought he could place his finger upon the disturbing

He considered it ridiculous that anyone could find the doc­

Before a n y t h i n g c a m e out against m y E s s a y c o n c e r n i n g Human

I have found no evidence to indicate that the doctrines of the

Guise showing his readiness to dismiss criticism from the men

similar censure to the tutors of Oxford in 1703. About this

Tyrrell referred to the incident in his letter of 28 February

Life ofJohn Locke ( 1 8 3 0 ) , vol. i, pp. 357-9.

not successful, those opposing the book were able to give it a

champions of Locke were described by Hearne as 'a set of men

Wynne himself was criticized by Lancaster as being a Lockist. 3

Hearne reports on the Convocation House incident as follows:

William Carroll, who charged Locke with holding a Spino-

I f Lancaster did in fact recommend Carroll's book i n pre­

Locke did not receive criticism well. When Tyrrell wrote to

long reply to the arguments used by Tyrrell and his friends. 4

When Burnet wrote a mild, inquisitive letter to Locke {Remarks

I n her letter of i o May 1688 to Locke, Lady Guise had re

to Lowde i n 'Epistle to the Reader', i n the second and sub

Moreover, Locke had by this time received Leibniz's com

He considered it ridiculous that anyone could find the doc

I f Lancaster did in fact recommend Carroll's book i n pre

Similarly, Leibniz's critical comments were completely re

first still preserved in the Lovelace Collection, the second pub

these replies, the frequent attacks relevant to his epistemo

by translating the Essay into French. The Latin edition fur

many followers i n the pulpits of England, and the older schol

I t was to Cicero's formulation of the doctrine that Stilling