POLITICAL LAW

I.

Republic Act 5567 was declared unconstitutional, however the implementation of the said law
resulted into the use of saving pooled by the Executive to finance the projects ( roads, bridge,
hospitals, etc.) that were not covered by the GAA, or that did not have proper appropriation covers,
as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments of the Government, should the
government continue these projects, or undo them?

No. The doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and implementation of the
DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences
resulting from the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be
undone. As already mentioned, the implementation of the DAP resulted into the use of savings
pooled by the Executive to finance the PAPs that were not covered in the GAA, or that did not
have proper appropriation covers, as well as to augment items pertaining to other departments
of the Government in clear violation of the Constitution. To declare the implementation of the
DAP unconstitutional without recognizing that its prior implementation constituted an operative
fact that produced consequences in the real as well as juristic worlds of the Government and the
Nation is to be impractical and unfair. Unless the doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the
disburser and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients could be required to undo
everything that they had implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario would be
enormously burdensome for the Government. Equity alleviates such burden. (Maria Carolina
P. Araullo, et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No., 209287, 728 SCRA 1,
July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])

II

The City of Davao enacted Ordinance No. 0309 imposing a ban against aerial spraying as
an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within the city. The Pilipino Banana
Growers Assoc. PBGA filed a petition with the court to challenge being posed against the
ordinance rest on its supposed collision with the Due Process Clause and Equal
Protection Clause, as follows: (1) by prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the
substance or the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied; and (2) by
imposing the 30 meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the
sizes of the landholding. Lastly, it was alleged that such was an ultra vires act by the City
of Davao. Does the ordinance violate the Equal Protection Clause?

Yes. The Equal Protection Clause is violated. Under the Rational Basis Test, a ban against
aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to achieve. In the
process, the ordinance suffers from being “underinclusive” because the classification does not
include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A
classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an
irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.

III
Explain the “pacta sunt servanda” rule.

One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda –
international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty engagement is not a mere
moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A state which has
contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications
as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.” (Tanada v.
Angara, 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 [Panganiban])

IV

Distinguished between Content-based restrictions on free speech, and content-neutral

regulations.

Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the content of the speech and are,
therefore, subject to the clear-and-present danger test. For example, a rule such as that
involved in Sanidad v. Comelec, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and announcers from
campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling reason to
support it, or it will not pass muster under strict scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and
therefore they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition, they will be
tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness. Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand,
like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, which prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time
to political candidates during the campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the
speech. These regulations need only a substantial governmental interest to support them. A
deferential standard of review will suffice to test their validity. The clear-and-present danger rule
is inappropriate as a test for determining the constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, which are not concerned with the content of political ads but only with their
incidents. To apply the clear-and-present danger test to such regulatory measures would be
like using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed. The test
for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of speech is that content-based
restrictions distort public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually imposed because of
fear of how people will react to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie content-neutral
regulations, like regulation of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies under B.P.
Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA 447, March 31,
1998 [Mendoza])
 V

Hazel Perez was found abandoned as a newborn infant in a Parish Church in San Miguel, Bulacan. Her
biological parents are unknown but she has typical Filipino features. She was registered as a foundling
at the Office of the Civil Registrar. Subsequently, she was adopted by the spouses Cochita and
Bernardo Perez, both Filipino Citizens, and was given the name Hazel Perez. If Hazel decides to run for
Senator, considering that she is a foundling, would she be qualified to run as one? Why or why not?

Hazel would be qualified to run. A person with a typical Filipino features is abandoned in
Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly
Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child is born in the province
would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that
Hazel’s parents are Filipinos. To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them
stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of
these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright
discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It just doesn’t make any sense. Given the statistical
certainty 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural-born citizen, a
decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright.

VI

What is the three-step-process in applying the “Compelling State Interest Test”?

a) Plaintiff must show that a law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of his
religious beliefs
b) The government must demonstrate that a law or practice is necessary to the
accomplishment of some important secular objective and that is the least restrictive
means of achieving that objective.
c) If the government was able to prove the burden, then the plaintiff is not entitled to
exemption from the law or practice at issue.

VII

What is the Restrictive Doctrine of State Immunity from Suit?

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can
thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relate to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of
both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.”
(Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993 [Vitug])

VIII

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol of Marawi. Governor Rey Salvador of Marawi declared a state of
emergency thru Proclamation 1 and established implementing guidelines for it. SPO1 Sattal
Jadjuli was instructed to report to office and interviewed whether he was related to the
kidnappers to which he admitted. He was thereafter detained. SPO1 Jadjuli contends that
Proclamation 1 and its implementing guidelines are ultra vires acts and unconstitutional. Decide.

Given the foregoing, Gov. Salvador is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces
at his owned bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Gov. Salvador exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police
and his own civilian emergency force. The calling-out powers contemplated under Art. VII of the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive is ultra vires.

IX

President Cruz decided to allow the burial of the Former President Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. Following this directive from the president, the Secretary of
National Defense issued a memorandum to the public respondent Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines regarding the interment of Marcos. Dissatisfied with the
foregoing issuance, Recio Celso questioned the constitutionality of the memorandum.
Does the President’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB
poses justiciable controversy which may be subject to judicial review?

NO. The President’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a
political issue. The limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
carries the assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branch of
the government. President Cruz decided a question of policy based on the wisdom that it shall
promote national healing and forgiveness.

Enumerate and explain the reasons why the Presidential Pork Barel System declared
unconstitutional in the case of Belgica v. Ochoa.
 The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles
of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as
unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To
recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-
enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by
giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not
textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment
and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted
the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget
execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the
system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators,
who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of
capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again, insofar
as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-
related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the
broad classification of “priority infrastructure development projects,” it has once more
transgressed the principle of non-delegability. (Belgica, et al. v. Exec. Sec. Paquito N.
Ochoa, et al., G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 160-161, Nov. 19, 2013, En Banc [Perlas-
Bernabe])