A.M. No.

1608 August 14, 1981

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant, 


vs.

SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

Facts:

In 1970, Arciga was a medical technology student and Maniwang was a law student. The
two acquainted and had a sexual relationship. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant.

In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar exams. After which, he stopped communicating with
Arciga. Arciga then found out that Maniwang married another woman. She confronted the
wife and this irked Maniwang to inflict physical injuries upon Arciga.

Arciga filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral conduct.
Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry
Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because
apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

Issue:

W/N Maniwang should be disbarred and be held liable for gross immoral conduct.

Arguments of the Parties:

Arciga, complainant said that Maniwang reassured he many times that he would marry
her once he passed the bar examinations.

She reported that Maniwang inflicted physical injuries upon herr and secured medical
treatment in a hospital

Maniwang, respondent contended that the cohabitation with the complainant and his
reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.

Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to marry
Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past because
apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang was born.

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs
Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited. Maniwang’s refusal to marry
Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment. But the Supreme
Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to
what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what
appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as “that conduct
which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”. The complaint for
disbarment against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

Relevance to the subject (Legal Profession)

The case of Arciga vs Maniwang is important in determining whether the act that the
lawyer has done was immoral or grounds of disbarment. It is very crucial for a lawyer
especially in his profession to maintain his/ her etiquette in order to become an example to
the other citizens of the Philippines. A litigator must be the first one that the people must
look up to. Legal profession does not only apply to the duties of a lawyer to the bar and to
his clients but also to the people surrounding him.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 492 September 5, 1967

OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, respondent.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain
that way back in April, 1955, respondent volunteered to help them in their respective
pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both P.C. soldiers, and for
this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their
signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since then, respondent
had lost interest in the progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return of
their papers six years later, respondent refused to surrender them.

Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raña to whom this case was
referred by the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. He
admitted having received the documents from complainants but explainer that it was for
photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them, he said, was due to
complainants' refusal to hand him the money to pay for the photostating costs which
prevented him from withdrawing said documents from the Photostat service. Anyway, he
had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over, on December 13, 1961, the
documents, their respective photostats and the photostat
service receipt to the fiscal.

Finding respondent's explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged

complainants nothing for his services, Fiscal Raña recommended the former's
exoneration, or at most, that he be reprimanded only. The Solicitor General, however, feels
that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to attend
to complainants' pension claims for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the
documents despite repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to return to
complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.

At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru
counsel, appeared. In lieu of oral arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his
memorandum, annexing therewith an affidavit executed by Olegaria Blanza asking for the
dismissal of the administrative case.

Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants' pension claims
since there was no agreement for his compensation as their counsel. Respondent,
however, overlooks the fact that he volunteered his professional services and thus was not
legally entitled to recover fees. But having established the attorney-client relationship
voluntarily, he was bound to attend to complainants' claims with all due diligence.

Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of

disciplinary action against respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of
evidence substantiating the accusations against him.

Respondent's explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents
has not been controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted that
respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating expenses but they did not give him
any money therefor. Moreover, the documents and their photostats were actually returned
by respondent during the fiscal's investigation with him paying for the photostating costs
himself. And the condition of the photostats themselves — they appear to have been in
existence for quite some time — supports respondent's allegation that they remained in
possession of the photostat service for the failure of the owners (respondents and/or
complainants), to withdraw the same upon payment of the corresponding costs. Hence,
complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing their respective claims.

As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant Pasion,
the former denies this. Fiscal Raña made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Mrs.
Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice complainant Pasion because res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet. Still, there is equiponderance of evidence which must
necessarily redound to respondent's benefit. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity
to substantiate her charges in the hearing set for October 21, 1963 but she let it go.
Neither she nor her counsel of record appeared.
But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent for being legally
insufficient, yet We cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A
lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than merely complying with
the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par
excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services.
Respondent here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have
complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal
to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith terminated their professional relationship
instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. And although We voted that he not be
reprimanded, in a legal sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high
standards of his chosen profession require of him.

Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles
and Fernando, JJ., concur.

CASE DIGEST

Facts:

1. On April, 1955, Atty. Agustin Arcangel (respondent) volunteered to the them (petitioners)
in their respective pension claims in connection with the death of their husbands, both P.C.
soldiers.

a. They handed Arcangel pertinent documents and also affixed their signatures on
blank papers.

b. Respondent seemed to have lost his interest and no progress was made. After 6
years, the respondent refused to return to petitioners the documents when the latter
asked for them.

c. Upon questioning by Fiscal Raña to whom the case was referred by the Solicitor
General respondent admitted having received the documents but explained that it
was for photostating purposes only.

d. His failure to immediately return them was due to complainants’ refusal to hand
him money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him from withdrawing
the documents.

e. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses himself and turned over the
documents to the fiscal.
2. Fiscal found respondents explanation satisfactory and recommended the respondents
exoneration. However, the Solicitor General feels that respondent deserves at least a
severe reprimand considering: (1) his failure to attend to complainants pension claims for 6
years; (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite repeated demands upon
him, and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.

Issue: WON respondent Atty. Arcangel can be held liable for professional non-feasance.

Held: No.

1. Respondent’s explanation for the delay in filing the claims in returning the
documents was not controverted by complainants.

2. Complainants admitted that respondent asked them to shoulder the photostating

expenses but they did not give him any money. Hence, complainants are partly to
blame.

3. The documents and their photostats were actually returned by respondent during
the fiscal’s investigation with him paying for the photostating costs himself. 4. As for
the alleged failure of the respondent to all her documents to complainant Pasion,
the former denies this the affidavit of Mrs. Blanza.

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A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000 PARTIES: LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS
BONIFACIO, respondent.

FACTS:

The respondent Atty. Bonifacio met Carlos Ui believing him to be single. She fell in love
with him and they got married and gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowing the
true civil status of Carlos Ui, they parted ways.

On the other hand, the complainant, legal wife of Carlos Ui, filed a compalaint for
disbarment against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on the ground of immoralityfor carrying on an illicit relationship
with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui.

In the proceedings, complainant filed a Motion to cite Respondent in Contempt of the

Commission wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer
and for submitting a supporting document which was changed. The answer of respondent
was that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of
Marriage to substantiate her averment.

However, the Certificate of Marriage certified by the State Registrar in the Hawaii State
Department of Health, and authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Hawaii,
revealed that the true date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent was October
22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has conducted herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.

CONTENTIONS:

Complainant:

1. In the Memorandum filed by complainant, she wanted the disbarment of respondent on

the ground that the respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a
married man.

2. Complainant argued that respondent’s mother knew the complainant and her husband
since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where the mother was the
Branch Manager. The respondent who was living with her parents as of 1986 could have
been informed by her mother that Carlos Ui was a married man.

Repondent:

1. Respondent argued that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui
because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of
this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui.

2. Respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate
because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy
because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate
in her possession. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and
admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage
certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the
testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter.

3. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that
such information was made known to respondent.

4. Complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, with
Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, and portion of the house and ground does not
prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to
her.

DECISION:

Commission on Bar Discipline Reports and Recommends the following:

The Commission does not find it difficult to believe that the time respondent was courted
by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. When a married man courts a
single woman, he surely represents himself to be single.

The records will show that respondent after knowing the true satus of Carlos Ui, cut her
ties with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, Carlos Ui and
respondent only talked about the children regarding visitation.

The Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as
disgraceful to a high degree. She was more of a victim because this issue destroyed her
normal and family life.
The complaint for disbarment against respondent for alleged immorality, is hereby
dismissed However, respondent is reprimamnded for attaching to her Answer an altered
date of marrgiage in her photocopy of Marriage Certificate with a warning that any
repetition of the same offense will result to a more severe sanction.

RELEVANCE:

As indicated in the case, “the practice of law is a privilege”. A bar candidate have the right
to enjoy the practice of the legal profession but this privilege can be revoked subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the legal ethics. The
requirements for admission to the practice of law are:

a. a citizen of the Philippines;


b. a resident of the Philkppines;

c. at least twenty-one years of age;

d. of good moral character;

e. no charges against him involving moral turpitude are filed or pending in court; f. the
required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations.

According to the case, one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an
applicant must have good moral character. It is the duty of lawyers to obey unwaveringly to
the highest standards of morality. Lawyers must safeguard the integrity of the Bar free
from immoralities constitutive of malpractice. Their positions as officers of the court
demand the highest degree of morality.

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A. C. No. 5534. January 17, 2005


PARTIES: JAYNE Y. YU, complainant, vs. RENATO LAZARO BONDAL, respondent.

FACTS:

The respondent was charged in a complaint filed by the complainant for gross negligence
and violation of Canon 16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility due
to his failure to attend to the five cases the complainant referred to him and to return the
amount of Php 51,716.54 paid to the respondent.

Complainant engaged the services of respondent as counsel of a five cases. In the

Retainer Agreement, complainant agreed to pay respondent the amount of P200,000.00
as Acceptance Fee for the five cases with an Appearance Fee of P1,500.00 pesos per
hearing. And in the event that damages are recovered, she would pay respondent 10% as
success fee. Complainant issued two checks in the amount of P30,000.00 and
P21,716.54.

Respondent demanded from respondent for the return of all the records she had entrusted
him bearing on the subject cases. Respondent returned only the records bearing on the
estafa case and the B.P. Blg. 22 case.
Complainant through counsel demanded the return of the rest of the files and the refund of
the amounts covered by the above-said two Checks, intended to represent payment of
filing fees for the first case which respondent failed to file.

Because respondent failed to comply with complainants demands, she filed the present
complaint charging him with flagrant violation of Canon 16 and Canon 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF

HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly
thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 16 and 16.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

CONTENTION:

Complainant:

1. Complainant argued that the case against Julie Enriquez-Teh was dismissed because
respondent failed to present the original checks subject of the case. The estafa case was
dismissed and was never appealed. And that she was prodded by respondent to settle the
two cases for B.P. Blg. 22 even if she was not satisfied with the terms.

DECISION:

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommends the dismissal of the complaint for failure of
complainant to substantiate it.

1. Except for the case against a Swire Development Corporation, the other 4 cases
referred by

complainant to respondent were filed in court but were dismissed for causes not related to
the respondent.

2. As for the alleged compulsion in the settlement of her two complaints for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 upon the promise of respondent that he would waive the 10% success fee in the
complaint to be filed against Swire Development, assuming the truthfulness of her
allegation that respondent compelled her to settle, what the terms were as alleged to have
been dictated by respondents of that case.

Moreover, the complainant failed to show the promise by the respondent that he would
waive the 10% success fee was for the purpose of defrauding her or depriving her of
freedom of choice. It appears that complainant never raised any objection to the terms of
the compromise. As a rule, when a client, upon becoming aware of the compromise and
the judgment, fails to promptly repudiate the action of his attorney, he will not be heard to
complain about it.

3. The amount of P51,716.54 was the only amount on record that complainant paid for
respondents legal services intended for the filing fees in the complaint against Swire
Development Corporation, the same was not substantiated as in fact the retainer
agreement does not confirm. If it is the only payment given to complainant by respondent
then complainant still owes respondent more because the respondent rendered his legal
services in 4 out of the 5 cases.

As a result of this issue, respondent had been advised by complainant want to terminate
his services but then he was obliged under Rule 22.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz:

Rule 22.02 A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall
cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information
necessary for the proper handling of the matter

Wherefore, the complainant failed to establish the guilt of respondent by clear, convincing
and satisfactory proof. The complaint is hereby dismissed. Respondent is, however,
hereby directed to return all the records in his possession relative to the cases he handled
for complainant.

RELEVANCE:

According to the case, an acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee
arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his efforts regardless of the outcome of
the litigation. The dissatosfaction of the compalinant with the outcome of the four cases
does not render invalid the above retainer agreement for respondent. Litigants need to be
reminded that lawyers are magicians who can always win their cases for their clients no
matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about
their cause.

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AGUIRRE V. RANA

The Case

The parties of the case are Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) who alleges that
Edwin Rana (respondent) engaged in unauthorized practice of law and committed
acts in violation of law, grave misconduct and grave misrepresentation when he
appeared as legal counsel of a vice mayoralty candidate even before undertaking
the lawyer’s oath on May 22, 2001.

The complainant contends that the respondent, without being a lawyer yet,
appeared before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers during the May 2001
elections of Mandaon, Masbate. Furthermore, respondent filed a pleading on May
19, 2001 and represented himself as a counsel for vice mayor candidate George
 Bunan. Regarding the charge of violation of law, the complainant claims that the
respondent while being a municipal government employee ( a secretary of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate) allowed himself to be a counsel for a
client in any court or administrative body. On the other hand, the charges of grave
misconduct and misrepresentation were based on complainant’s accusing that the
respondent acted as George Bunan’s counsel without the latter engaging his
services.

For his part, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to
represent him before the MBEC and "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not
as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." He further admits signing the May
19, 2001 pleading explaining that he did not represent himself as an “attorney” in
the pleading. Respondent also stated his resignation on May 11, 2001 as secretary
of the Sangguniang Bayan which was also accepted on the same day.

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Office of the Bar Confidant that
respondent engaged in unauthorized practice of the law by appearing as counsel
for George Bunan even before his lawyer’s oath and does not deserve admission to
the Philippine Bar.

He was dismissed of charges of violation of law, grave misconduct and grave

representation. On the former, it was proven that he indeed resigned on May 11,
2001 thereby no longer making him a secretary to the Sangguniang Bayan. On the
latter two charges, he was asked by George Bunan himself to be his counsel and
so no grave representation was committed.

Relevance to the Subject

According to the Supreme Court, being a lawyer is not a constitutional right but is a
privilege that ought to be exercised with moral fitness. The legal profession is after
all a vocation that needs to be accorded with respect and dignity and the violation of
something as crucial as a lawyer’s oath can tarnish the eligibility of anyone who
aspires to be part of the Philippine Bar. As officers in court or as persons afforded
with legal mindset, lawyers must consider that they are not only legally
knowledgeable but must also possess the integrity required in the practice.

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IN RE ATTY. FELIZARDO DE GUZMAN

The Case

The case involves respondent Atty Felizardo de Guzman’s actions in Civil Case
165187 where he represents Vicente Floro as his counsel in an ejectment suit filed
against Lagrimas Lapatha. On December 29, 1967, Lapatha appeared without
counsel and approached Atty. De Guzman, begged for a five-day postponement of
the trial to which the former agreed to asking her to affix her signature on a court
 “expediente” which Lapatha complied with. Lapatha then gave Atty. De Guzman a
check for Php 50.00 in partial payment of her arrears in the rentals however much
to her surprise, she received a copy of decision from the City Court stating she
confessed judgment when she asked for postponement of initial hearing from Atty.
De Guzman. Upon discovery that the lawyer had later written “CONFESS
JUDGMENT” after her affixed signature without her knowledge and consent,
Lapatha filed for a Petition for Relief.

However, when the Office of the Solicitor General investigated the matter, with the
clerk of the City Court of Manila as witness, it was found that Lapatha upon trial
Judge’s question if she admitted to the indebtedness in the complaint, answered in
the affirmative which was then translated in the court’s “expediente”.

Decision of the Court

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Solicitor General wherein Lapatha
failed to present evidence that would prove Atty. De Guzman’s inappropriate actions
in court. The lack of evidence dismissed the case of Lapatha against Atty. De
Guzman since the burden of proof in disbarment rests on the complainant.

Relevance to the Subject

Lawyers are legally presumed to be innocent. This is in line with the belief that they
acted in virtue of the lawyer’s oath. Unless the contrary is proven, the presumption
exists and in cases involving disbarment or suspension, can only be overruled by a
strong preponderance of evidence.

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CASE DIGEST

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue:

1. WON the respondent possessed the qualification of having practiced law for at least 10
years.

2. WON the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in

confirming respondent’s appointment.

Held:

1. YES. Supreme Court adhered to the liberal definition and interpretation of the concept of
‘practice of law’. Hence, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer- negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman
by the president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially
within the discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee
should possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion
for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the CA.

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EN BANC [B.M. No. 553 . June 17, 1993.]

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

FACTS:

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Firm’s aim,
according to Nogales, was to provide clients who cannot afford the legal services of big
law firms and move toward specialization. Now, Atty. Mauricio C. Ulep filed a complaint
against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements. The petitioner contends
that the advertisements reproduced by the respondents are unethical, demeaning of the
law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar.

The Legal Clinic’s advertisements contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041

8:30am – 6:00pm

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota

Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.

Call Marivic.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy

Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

Petitioner prays this Court to order the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of their
advertisements and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law.

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal
Problems” in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal
Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of
law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use
of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising
these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R.
Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977. And that besides, the advertisement is
merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the advertised services offered by the Legal Clinic, Inc., constitutes
practice of law and whether the same are in violation of the Code of Professional
responsibility

RULING:

The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law but such practice is not allowed.
The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The legal services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. It is allowed that some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been permitted with a limited representation in behalf of another
or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by
the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefore. Only a person duly admitted as
a member of the bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
The advertisement of the respondent is covered in the term practice of law as defined in
the case of Cayetano vs. Monsod. There is a restricted concept and limited acceptance of
paralegal services in the Philippines.
 About the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall
use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The
standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A
lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of
Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other
circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is extremely unacceptable.

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. Good
and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal
by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme
Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card

3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

DECISION OF THE COURT:

The Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of
the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from
conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or
the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

RELEVANCE TO THE COURSE:

The case aids in defining and limiting paralegal services. The case mainly focuses
on the proper legal advertisements. In advertising, the legal firm or the practicing lawyer is
not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass media
in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business (Canon 3.04). The
Canons of Professional Ethics, before the adoption of the CPR, had also warned that
lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment, such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published
in connection with causes in which the lawyer have been engaged of concerning the
manner of the conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation.

*******************************************************************************************************

G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,

ROMULO CUI, intervenor-appellant

FACTS:

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Doña Benigna Cui(deceased) “for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent
invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by Act
No. 3239 and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of
donations, principally the deed of donation. When the spouses died, administration
eventually passed to Dr. Teodoro Cui. Section 2 of the Act (in Spanish) gave the initial
management to the founders jointly and, in case of therein capacity or death, to “such
persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them.” Jesus Ma.
Cui and Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews
of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. Incumbent administrator, Dr.
Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into
between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, Antonio Ma. Cui took
his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of
his brother’s assumption of the position. When Dr. Teodoro Cui died, the plaintiff wrote a
letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him. When it was not
complied with, he filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming
a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews
mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation. As between Jesus
and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of
administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would
be preferred pursuant to section2. However, before the test of age may be, applied the
deed of donation provides for a lawyer. If not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor
or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. The specific point in dispute is the
meaning of the term “titulo de abogado.” Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor
of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a
member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court, was reinstated by resolution,
about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jesus Ma. Chui is entitled to the office of administrator

RULING:

NO. The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degr
ee of Bachelor of Laws butmembership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying
one for the practice of law. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of
law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule138 such admission
requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawye’s oath and receiving a certificate
from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the
prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.
DECISION OF THE COURT:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from

is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are
dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

RELEVANCE TO THE COURSE:

A Bachelor’s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain

academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The
English equivalent of “abogado” is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and
general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers
of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar
duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

*******************************************************************************************************

A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.

SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.

BENGZON, C.J.:

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao
was

admitted to the Bar.

About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in
his
application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications.
The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to
be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be
erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for
examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially,
in the following particulars:

(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and

(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom

— which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for

examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-
legal education".

Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first
charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian
life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and
4th year high school.

We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to
exhibit any certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials.
However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious.
Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now,
asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says
he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in
his school records.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.

This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was
obviously of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from
Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby
showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take
the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must
affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due
to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter
admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be,
and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;
taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential..

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A.
Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon,
Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

*******************************************************************************************************

Khan vs. Simbillo

AC No. 5299
August 19, 2003

Facts: Respondent Atty. Rizalino Simbillo advertised himself as “Annulment of Marriage

Specialist” in 3 major newspapers, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Manila Bulletin, and The
Philippine Star. He claimed to be an expert in handling annulment cases and guaranteed a
court decree within 4 to 6 months, provided the case will not involve separation of property
or custody of children, for a fee of P48,000.

Petitioner Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr. filed administrative charges against the respondent for
improper advertising and soliciting legal business. Respondent admitted the acts imputed
to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline found the
respondent guilty.

Issue: Whether or not advertising as a specialist in Annulment of Marriage is in violation of

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27
of the Rules of Court.

Held: Yes. Atty. Simbillo violated Rule 2.03, concerning any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business, and Rule 3.01, pertaining to a statement or claim regarding the
qualifications or legal services, of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court on the grounds for disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not
money, is the primary consideration. Moreover, in advertising himself as a self-styled
“Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” Atty. Simbillo eroded and undermined not only the
stability but also the sanctity of marriage.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the
bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and
residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data, are permissible. The use of calling cards and publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canon, of brief biographical and informative data is allowable.

*******************************************************************************************************

Occeña vs. Marquez

60 SCRA 38
September 30, 1974

Facts: Petitioners, Atty. Jesus V. Occeña and Atty. Samuel C. Occeña, are the lawyers for
the estate executrix, Mrs. Necitas Ogan Occeña since 1963. Petitioners filed two motions
for Payment of Partial Attorney’s Fees for P30,000 dated November 18, 1965 and July 5,
1966, respectively. The second motion was filed while the first was still unresolved and the
action for the second was deferred.

On November 2, 1966, respondent Judge, Hon. Paulino S. Marquez, issued an order fixing
the total fees of petitioners for the period March, 1963 to December, 1965 at P20,000. On
January 12, 1967, respondent issued an order not only denying petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration but also modifying the original order by fixing petitioners' fees for the
entire testate proceedings at P20,000.

Since petitioners are the husband and the father-in-law of the executrix, the latter cannot
be expected to oppose petitioners' claims for attorney's fees, thus leaving the co-executor
as the lone party to represent and defend the interests of the estate. Atty. I. V. Binamira,
who claims to be co-executor of the Ogan estate, filed with this Court on July, 1967, a
Motion for Leave to Intervene, which was granted in a resolution of August 9, 1967.

Issues:

1. Whether or not respondent Judge Marquez acted with a grave abuse of discretion
or in excess of jurisdiction in modifying the attorney’s fees.

2. Whether or not Intervenor, Atty. Binamira, made false averments before the court.
Held:

1. Yes. Respondent Judge Marquez committed a grave abuse of discretion in

prescribing or modifying the attorney’s face. This error is correctable by certiorari. In
addition, such fees could not be adequately fixed on the basis of the record alone,
considering that there are other factors necessary in assessing the fee of a lawyer,
such as: (1) the amount and character of the services rendered; (2) the labor, time
and trouble involved; (3) the nature and importance of the litigation in business in
which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of
money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the
employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the
services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the attorney; and (8)
the results secured. It is also a recognized rule that an attorney may properly
charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.

2. Yes. Atty. Binamira, in having deliberately made these false allegations in his
pleadings, has been recreant to his oath. The conduct of the lawyer before the court
and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is neither
candid nor fair for a lawyer to knowingly make false allegations in a judicial pleading
or to misquote the contents of a document, the testimony of a witness, the
argument of opposing counsel or the contents of a decision. Before his admission to
the practice of law, he took the solemn oath that he will do no falsehood nor consent
to the doing of any in court, nor wittingly or willingly promote or sue any false,
groundless or unlawful suit, and conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to
courts as well as to his clients.

*******************************************************************************************************

Pedro Oparel Sr. Vs Atty. Dominador Abaria

Facts:

Petitioner herein filed a complaint against the respondent, a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. He alleged that the latter have rendered a dishonest assistance to him
with regards to the recovery of the damages from his employer. He alleged that the
amount given was P500, where in fact the respondent have received a total amount of
P5000. The respondent admitted that he have received the said amount, but explained to
the petitioner that the amount that was not given to the latte was used for the payment of
his bills and support on his family. The petitioner eventually prayed for the dismissal of the
case on the grounds of misunderstanding.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent have failed to disclose all the information with regards to
the recovery of damages to the petitioner.
Ruling:

While it would appear that under the circumstances no case lies against respondent
Dominador Abaria, it is not amiss to impress on members of the Bar that the utmost care
be taken to minimize occasions for any misunderstanding between them and their clients.
The relationship being one of confidence, there is ever present the need for the latter
being adequately and fully informed of the mode and manner in which their interest is
defended. They should not be left in the dark. They are entitled to the fullest disclosure of
why certain steps are taken and why certain matters are either included or excluded from
the documents they are made to sign. It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain
unimpaired. WHEREFORE, the administrative case filed by Pedro Oparel, Sr. Against
respondent Dominador Abaria is dismissed.

Relevance to the course:

Members of the IBP should not fail on disclosing all information of the case, no matter how
small it is, to their clients in order to avoid misunderstanding between them that might
result on future filing of complaints and further expenses.

*******************************************************************************************************

Philippine Lawyer’s Association vs Celedonio Agrava

Facts:

Petitioner filed a prohibition and injunction against the respondent on the ground that the
latter have exceeded the definition of the law with regards to the admittance of an
applicant to the Patent Office, where the law only requires that a member of Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and of good standing can be admitted to the said office. But the
respondent have further requires that an applicant, in order to be admitted to the office,
should be able to pass an examination since the function of the said office, according to
him, was more than just on the application of the law, but requires more knowledge and
skills.

Issue:

Whether or not the function of the Patent Office is more than just a practice of law.

Ruling:

The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation
of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for
patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the
first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and
application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to
be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules
and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law.

We hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other
laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that
part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that
appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. For
the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is
hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an
examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice
before the Patent Office.

Relevance to the course:

That on the exercise of legal profession, or other functions which requires the application
of the law, it is enough that those to be admitted are members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since they have been fully prepared for the practice of law.

*******************************************************************************************************

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE

FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J.
ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES,
J E S U S S . J . S AY O C , E D U A R D O D E L O S A N G E L E S , a n d J O S E F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
This petition filed before the court by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who
died on February 14, 1976, praying that they will be authorized to continue using the
name, in the name of their firms, the name of the partner who passed away.

Petitioners argued that the use of the name of a deceased partner in a partnership is not
prohibited as stated in the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code, “The use by the
person or partnership continuing the business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property of the
deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership.”

They also stated that no local customs prohibits the continued use of the deceased
partner’s name in a professional firm’s name in so far as Greater Manila Area is
concerned. Furthermore, they stated that the continued use use of a deceased partner’s
name in the firm name of law partnerships
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal prof
ession of most countries in the world.
On the contrary, the court argues that the petition they are seeking will run counter to
Article 1815 the Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or may not
include the name of one or more of the partners. Those who, not being members of the
partnership, include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a
partner.”
The partners cannot subject the heirs of the deceased to liability where they are non-
lawyers. Furthermore, the court emphasized that partnership for the practice of law cannot
be likened partnerships formed by other professionals or for business.
No local custom permits or allows the use of a deceased or a former partner’s name in the
firm names of law partnerships. Under Philippines customs, firm names signify the more
active or senior lawyers in a firm. The possibility of deception upon the public, real or
consequential, where the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be
ruled out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a
distinguished name appearing in a firm title. The petition filed herein is denied and was
advised to drop the name “OZAETA” from their firm name.
Relevance to our course:
It was mentioned in the case the relevance of Canon 33 of the Canon of Professional
Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association stating that:
“The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.”
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice is
permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use. But for a custom to be applied in the
Philippines, it must be proven first as a fact. And the custom being practiced here in the
Philippines is that the named bearing the name of the firm are the senior and active staff of
the said firm. If they will bear the name of the deceased partner, it will cause deception to
the public.
It is also important to note the emphasis given for different standards of conduct being
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business. Primary characteristics
which distinguish the legal profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in which one
may attain the highest eminence without making much money.

2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving thorough

sincerity, integrity, and reliability. library
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary. law library
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness
to resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.
These standards of conduct must be bore in every lawyers mind as it is our duty and
responsibility to observe sincerity, integrity, reliability.

*******************************************************************************************************

DR. GIL Y. GAMILLA, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, IRMA E. POTENCIANO, EDITHA

OCAMPO, LUZ DE GUZMAN, GLICERIA BALDRES, FERDINAND LIMOS, MA.
LOURDES C. MEDINA, HIDELITA GABO, CORAZON CUI, REMEDIOS T. GARCIA,
RENE ARNEJO, RENE LUIS TADLE, LAURA ABARA, PHILIP AGUINALDO,
BENEDICTA ALAVA, LEONCIO CASAL, CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA FAMORCA,
C E L S O N I E R A , C E S A R R E Y E S , N AT I V I D A D S A N T O S a n d M A F E L
YSRAEL, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO J. MARIO JR., respondent.
 Complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mariño accusing
him of (a) compromising their entitlements under the 1986 CBA without the knowledge,
consent or ratification of the union members, and worse, for only P2,000,000.00 when they
could have received more than P9,000,000.00; (b) failing to account for the P7,000,000.00
received by him and other officers and directors in the UST Faculty Union under the 1990
compromise agreement; (c) lack of transparency in the administration and distribution of
the remaining balance of the P42,000,000.00 package under the 1992 memorandum of
agreement; (d) refusal to remit and account for the P4,200,000.00 in favor of the faculty
members although the amount was denominated as attorney's fees.
Atty. Mario filed his comment on the complaint. He alleged that the issues raised
therein were the same issues involved in the two (2) complaints before the Bureau of
Labor Relations and therefore constituted forum-shopping, and further explained that he
had adequately accounted for the disbursement of the money demanded by complainants.
Although the record shows that the Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as
having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the funds which the UST Faculty
Union received through the series of agreements with the management of UST, this Court
believes that Atty. Mario failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the
compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union
attorney and interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own
restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attorneys fees of P4,200,000.00 without
full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the UST
Faculty Union.
Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety
including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing candor,
fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his client. The court ruled that respondent Atty.
Eduardo J. Mario Jr. is REPRIMANDED for his misconduct with warning that a more
drastic punishment will be imposed on him upon a repetition of the same act.

Relevance to our course:

Atty. Mario violated Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requiring

every lawyer to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions
with his clients. Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion of justice so they are without doubt
expected to have a bigger dose of service-oriented conscience and a little less of self-
interest.
As indispensable part of the system of administering justice, attorneys must comply
strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics - a duty more than
imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are hurled at
the practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the simple act
of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards
the ideal that a lawyers vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition
but a serious matter of public interest.
There are ethical lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño Jr. in the
manner by which he secured the P7M by virtue of the compromise agreement and the
P4.2 attorney's fees under the memorandum of agreement. Although the record shows
that the Bureau of Labor Relations found respondent as having adequately accounted for
the disbursement of the funds which the UST Faculty Union received through the series of
agreements with the management of UST, the Court believes that Atty. Mariño failed to
avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein
he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and interested party being
one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he
obtained the attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure of the

circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union. As one of
the sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking compensation from the University of
Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in obvious conflict of
interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer and president of the UST
Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement. The test of conflict of interest among
lawyers is "whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof."
In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put
himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less
than his best for his client.
Thus it has been held that an attorney or any other person occupying fiduciary relations
respecting property or persons is utterly disabled from acquiring for his own benefit the
property committed to his custody for management. This rule is entirely independent of
whether fraud has intervened as in fact no fraud need be shown; no excuse will be heard
from an attorney because the rule stands on the moral obligation to refrain from placing
oneself in positions that ordinarily excite conflict between self-interest and integrity.
Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding
against a party even with the client's consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf
against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the defendant will be able to satisfy
both judgments. No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the
subject matter of the suit brought in behalf of his client.

*******************************************************************************************************

[G.R. No. L-19450. May 27, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA,
defendant-appellant
FACTS: The Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the
crime of Malicious Mischief, before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality.

Assistant City Attorney Ariston D. Fule, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice, was allowed to appear as private-prosecutor of the complainant, who
was his relative, on the condition that that every time he would appear at the trial of the
case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive
any payment for his services
 The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the
counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al., vs. Blanco, et al., 79 Phil. 647
wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to
engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling.

Counsel for the accused later on also presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from
Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 127, now
Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, which provides that "no judge or other official or
employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims
that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was engaging in
private practice.

MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not City Attorney Fule should be allowed to appear as private
prosecutor in the case at bar.

DECISION OF THE COURTS: The Justice of Peace Court ruled, on both times, that Fule
had the right to appear as private prosecutor of the complainant and further stated that he
(Fule) was not actually engaged in private law practice.

The Court of First Instance, after accused filed an appeal on the JPC’s ruling,
likewise held that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the
Peace Court in Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or
a friend of the offended party. The CFI also noted that it did not appear that Fule was being
paid for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity and that the
case at bar does not provide any possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney
Fule as Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, dismissed the appeal and conformed with the
decision of both lower courts stating that the appearance as counsel on one occasion, is
not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law and that the
permission that Asst. City Attorney Fule had received from his immediate superior, the
Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative, was
never refuted. The Court also believed that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule
did not constitute private practice, within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Private practice of law would imply that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services.

RELEVANCE TO THE COURSE: Attorneys-at-law employed in the government are

prohibited to engage in private practice. An isolated appearance as counsel on one
occasion though, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice
of law. The word “private practice of law” contemplated in Section 32, Rule 127, now
Section 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules, that bars certain attorneys from practicing should be
understood as frequent, active and continued practice of legal profession and that this
professional services are made available to the public for a compensation as a source of
the legal practitioner’s livelihood or as consideration of the said services.

WILLIAM S. UY vs. ATTY. FERMIN L. GONZALES I. Parties of the Case

William S. Uy (petitioner) engaged the services of Atty. Gonzales (respondent) to prepare

and file a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title.

After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding the lost title and discussing
the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him a petition to be
filed before the Regional Trial Court. When the petition was about to be filed, respondent
went to complainant’s office demanding a certain amount other than what was previously
agreed upon. Respondent left his office after reasoning with him. Expecting that said
petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that instead of filing the petition for
the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter- complaint against him
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public Documents. The
letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer certificate of
title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to have
filed.

II. Main Issue

Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

III. Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner claimed that the respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and grossly
disregarded his duty to preserve the secrets of his clients.

Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that
he is withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer
to file the petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainant; that there was no longer any professional relationship between the two of
them when he filed the letter-complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts
and allegations contained in the letter-complaint for falsification were culled from public
documents procured from the Office of the Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.

!
IV. Decision of the Court

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation. IBP found respondent that he violated Canon 21 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which expressly provides that “A lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated”;
and that the respondent cannot argue that there was no lawyer-client relationship because
the duty to maintain inviolate the client’s confidences and secrets is not temporary but
permanent.

It is in effect perpetual for "it outlasts the lawyer's employment" (Canon 37, Code of
Professional Responsibility) which means even after the relationship has been terminated,
the duty to preserve the client's confidences and secrets remains effective.

Likewise Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility provides that "A
lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of
employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with the full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto."

V. Decision of the Supreme Court

Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to
his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the
issuance of the certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly,
there was no attorney-client relationship between respondent and complainant. The
preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their personal
transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by

respondent in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally
owned by his deceased son and therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa
against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute
estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can
equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that
is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or that renders him
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be precluding any
lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary
interests.

Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

VI. Relevance to the Course

The High Court discusses practice of law which is part of the discussion in the academic
course.

Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for
legal knowledge, training and experience. While it is true that a lawyer may be
disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good
demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, complainant failed to prove
any of the circumstances enumerated above that would warrant the disbarment or
suspension of herein respondent.

That, as a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily

permits or acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or
trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or
assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any
previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for,
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is
sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession.
*******************************************************************************************************

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA vs. SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG I. Parties of the Case

In 1970, when Segundino Maniwang was still a law student, he had a relationship with
Magdalena Arciga, then a medical technology student. They started having a sexual
relationship in 1971. In 1973, Arciga got pregnant.

The two then went to Arciga’s hometown to tell the latter’s parent about the pregnancy.
They also made Arciga’s parents believe that they were already married but they would
have to have the church wedding in abeyance until Maniwang passes the bar exams.
Maniwang secured a copy of his birth certificate in preparation of securing a marriage
license. In 1975, Maniwang passed the bar. But after his oath taking, he stopped
communicating with Arciga. Arciga located his whereabouts and there she found out that
Maniwang married another woman. Arciga confronted Maniwang’s wife and this irked
Maniwang so he inflicted physical injuries upon Arciga.

II. Main Issue

Whether or not Segundino Maniwang should be disbarred.

III. Arguments of the Parties

Arciga then filed a disbarment case against Maniwang grounded on gross immoral
conduct. Maniwang admitted that he is the father of Arciga’s child; that he did promise to
marry Arciga many times; that he broke those promises because of Arciga’s shady past
because apparently Arciga had an illegitimate child even before her son with Maniwang
was born.

IV. Decision of the Supreme Court

!
The Supreme Court ruled that Maniwang’s case is different from the cases of Mortel vs
Aspiras and Almirez vs Lopez, and other cases therein cited.

Maniwang’s refusal to marry Arciga was not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant
disbarment (although not much discussion was provided by the ponente as to why). But
the Supreme Court did say that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is “grossly immoral conduct” or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.

The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may
not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined
as “that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community”.

V. Relevance to the Course

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the
continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining
membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a
lawyer ceases to have good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A
member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

The High Court explained that it is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible
standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and
obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule
implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless,
and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members
of the community"

There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be in consonance with the canons of
the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or
deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a
lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises.
Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will depend on the
surrounding circumstances.

*******************************************************************************************************

LAPUT vs. REMOTIGUE [A.C. no. 434]

Facts:

Complainants charge the respondent with malice, bad faith, and misrepresentation when
the latter allegedly filed motions in court without notice to complainant, thereby committing
unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty, all to the prejudice of said
complainant.

Complainant alleges That the respondent, without notice to complainant, filed with the
probate court motions praying that complainant be directed to surrender the aforesaid
certificates of title, and another motion, without notice, praying that he be issued owner's
duplicate copies of the certificates of title on the ground that the same were lost, the
respondent knowing all along that complainant is in lawful possession of said certificates of
title; and that with the duplicate titles, respondent and his client Mrs. Nieves Rillas Vda. de
Barrera (formerly the client of complainant) sold without notice the lots covered thereby, all
of which, aside from being unfair and unethical, were prejudicial to complainant's recorded
lien to the said lots and titles in question.

Respondent denied any knowledge of the recorded lien of complainant and his retention
of records and transfer certificates of title. Respondent also denied that he was the author
of the first motion complained of;

The Solicitor General also found that after complainant was discharged by the
administratrix, his claim for attorney's fees in the sum of P26,561.48 out of a total of
P31,329.15, was already collected by him from the estate during his incumbency as the
lawyer for the administratrix; that the Court of First Instance of Cebu had fixed, as early as
December 19, 1955, the amount of P4,767.67 as the balance to be paid to Attorney Laput,
later on increased to P5,699.66, and that in spite of such fixing by the court of his
attorney's fees and the order of payment to him of the balance of P5,699.66 by the estate,
as early as December 27, 1955, which order was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
complainant Laput pretended that all throughout the years following 1955 of the date of his
filing the present complaint, he (Atty. Laput) believed that he had still the right to retain the
certificates of title in question.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent acted with malice, bad faith, and misrepresentation when the
latter allegedly filed motions in court without notice to complainant, thereby committing
unfair and unethical practices bordering on dishonesty.

Ruling:
An examination of the motions complained of by Atty. Laput shows that respondent's
answers are correct; and it is therefore clear from all the foregoing that respondent did not
act with malice or bad faith. Hence, the recommendation of the Solicitor General for
respondent's complete exoneration should be, as it hereby, is approved.

*******************************************************************************************************

MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO [G.R. No. L-30894]

FACTS:

Major Eduardo Martelino, and the officers and men under him of the Armed forces
of the Philippines are charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a
result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing
commando training on the island of Corregidor.

On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the
general court-martial after he read the newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident.
Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity in the press
and the media that it was already being exploited for political purposes in connection with
the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to endanger his right to a fair trial. After
the deliberation, the military court denied the challenge.

Respondents contend that despite the publicity that was received, proof was
presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been
impaired. They claim that the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in
the integrity, experience and background of the members of the court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair trial?

RULING:

No. The publicity in the case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but on the
responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a carnage of Muslim trainees.

If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the
Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused
from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either
by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or
to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed, we
cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did
not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to
be identified with due process.

Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners
here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that
they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial
proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause,
by postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere
has since been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far
abated that we believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.

*******************************************************************************************************

Lothar Schulz vs Atty. Marcelo G. Flores

[A.C. No. 4219. December 8, 2003]

FACTS:

The petitioner is a German national who filed a verified complaint for disbarment against
the respondent. The respondent was a lawyer of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental
charged of breaching his avowed duty as a lawyer and ethical standards he was strictly
bound to observe.

The petitioner alleged that he engaged the services of respondent for purposes of filing a
complaint against Wilson Ong. Respondent advised him that there was no need to refer
his complaint for barangay election yet 3 months later, petitioner was instructed by
respondent to file his complaint with the Lupon Tagapayapa. Wilson Ong did not appear at
the conciliation hearings arguing that he is a resident of another barangay thus, not subject
to the jurisdiction of the barangay where petitioner filed his complaint. Accordingly,
complainant has now filed to the barangay where Wilson Ong is a resident of but then a
case against him was already filed by the latter before the RTC of Negros Oriental. Upon
this occurrence, petitioner alleged that it was respondent’s fault causing him of being
defendant rather than a complainant against Wilson Ong. He also charged respondent
with collecting excessive and unreasonable fees and of unjustifiably refusing to return his
files. In his Answer, respondent contend the amount of his attorney’s fees and appearance
fee per hearing. In the same way, he also explained that it was Wilson Ong who will be
made to pay the side fees.

The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline submitted a report recommending the respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for 6 months with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will merit a more severe penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent performed his duty as expected and required of being a lawyer

RULING:

The court ruled in the negative. It is dismaying to note that respondent patently violated his
duty as a lawyer in this case. The breach of respondent’s sworn duty as a lawyer and of

ethical standards he was strictly to honor and observe has been sufficiently established.
Respondent has fallen short of the competence and diligence required of every member of
the Bar. He committed a serious transgression when he failed to exert his utmost learning
and ability to give entire devotion to his client’s cause.
A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a
manner that is beyond reproach. Therefore, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the
IBP-CBD and finds that respondent’s acts warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions
against him.

*******************************************************************************************************

Concepcion Bolivar vs Abelardo Simbol y Manuel

[A.C. No. 377. April 29, 1966]

FACTS:

Complainant was the sole witness at an investigation on disbarment proceedings. The

court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his repost, the Solicitor General stated that complainant made a
sworn withdrawal and desistance. However, he recommended that respondent be
disciplined, and then simultaneously filed the corresponding complaint asking for his
suspension “for a period of at least 5 years”. The Clerk of Court sent by registered mail to
respondent thru his counsel a letter with a copy of the foregoing complaint, requiring
answer thereto in 15 days. In his answer, the counsel of the respondent requested that the
copy of the complaint be sent directly to said respondent since he reportedly had changed
address. Accordingly, a copy of the complaint was sent by registered mail direct to the
respondent’s reported address but it was returned to court noting that said respondent was
no longer in that address. A hearing was set where the Solicitor General and counsel for
the complainant appeared. They
submitted the case for decision without
oral argument since there was no appearance of respondent.
ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not respondent waived his right the opportunity to defend himself

2. Whether or not respondent has “failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar”

RULING:

1. Yes. The court holds that respondent has had full opportunity to defend himself, and
that he has waived his right to be heard. Respondent knew that the disbarment
proceedings against him were pending. His right to practice his profession was at
stake. It was his duty to inquire as to his fate. He was hidebound by his obligation to
inform the Court of his whereabouts, to the end that notices could reach him. In all
 these, he failed. A copy of the Solicitor General’s complaint and notice of hearing
were sent both to his 2 addresses yet there was no action taken on his part. Thus,
the respondent gave the Court ample reason to believe that he purposely stayed
away. 


2. Yes. The Court is persuaded to say that respondent “failed to maintain the highest
degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar”. Convinced by
respondent’s promise to marry her, complainant and respondent had lived as
husband and wife for 4 years and bore a child. However, the 2 separated for
complainant learned that respondent was already married to another woman. All
along, respondent fed complainant with assurances that he would marry her. To
ward off celebration of marriage, respondent offered varied excuses. Those avowals
nevertheless, respondent turned around and married another. He even concealed
the fact of his marriage from complainant not until the latter discovered the bitter
truth. Therefore, respondent is guilty of “grossly immoral conduct” within the
meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.