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in
length, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward, located,
G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally downward, located 2 cm.
medial to the left nipple;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. 7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in
SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-appellant. length, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally, located 2 cm.
medial to the left nipple;
MENDOZA, J.:
8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length,
5.5 cm. in depth directed downward, located at the xiphoid
This is appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Roxas City, finding accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado guilty of murder and area;
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua and to
pay the amounts of P60,000.00 as civil indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral 9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length,
damages, and the costs to the heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado.2 4 cm. in depth, directed medially, located 4 cm. below the left
nipple;
The Information against accused-appellant alleged:
10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length
with [e]visceration of the small intestine;
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1996, in the City of Roxas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill, with Thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, the direct and immediate cause of her death.
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one Mary Ann
Arrojado, on the different parts of the body, to wit: That by reason of the death Mary Ann Arrojado, her heirs incurred
actual and moral damages which may be awarded under the Civil
1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Code of the Philippines.
Located at the supra sternal area;
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm.
depth, directed downward 5 cm. above the left nipple area The information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native
the level of midclavicular line; dialect, after which he pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the merits then ensued.
3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in The evidence for the prosecution shows the following:
length, 5.5 cm. depth, located 4 cm. above the left nipple
area, midclavicular line; Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are
first cousins, their fathers being brothers. The victim's father, Alberto
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, Arrojado, who was living in Canada, suffered a stroke for which reason he
18.53 cm. in depth, directed medially downward, located 3 decided to come home to Roxas City and spend the remainder of his days
cm. above the left nipple, midclavicular line; there. The victim accompanied her father to the Philippines. They eventually
settled in a house in Barangay Tanque, Roxas City, where they lived on the
5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, financial support of the victim's sister Asuncion, who continued to live in
10.5 cm. depth, located 3 cm. medial to the left nipple; Canada, and her brother Buenaventura, who continued to live in Canada,
and her brother Buenaventura, who lived in Manila.
Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her 6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12
father. He helped care for the victim's father, for which he was paid a cm. in depth, directed laterally downward, located, 12 cm. in depth,
P1,000.00 monthly salary.6 directed laterally downward, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house 7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12
cousin, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had cm. in depth, directed laterally, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
committed suicide. In response, Erlinda, together with her husband Romulo
Magdaluyo and her father Teodorico Arrojado, went with accused-appellant 8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm.
to the house in Barangay Tanwue where they found the victim dead. The in depth directed downward, located at the xiphoid area;
victim, who was bloodied, was lying on her left side facing the bedroom door
with her hands clasped together. On her bed was a rosary and a cruifix. Near
9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm.
her was a knife (Exh. C).7 Erlinda recognized it to be the knife kept in the
in depth, directed medially, located 4 cm. below the left nipple;
kitchen. Erlinda also noticed that the electric fan was turned on full blast,
while all the windows were closed except the window on the east side which
was slightly open. As he went to the other room, where the victim's father 10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with
stayed, accused-appellant told Erlinda that he was afraid he might be [e]visceration of the small intestine;12
suspected as the one responsible for the victim's death.8
Dr. Roldan testified that the victim died at around midnight of May 31, 1996
The matter was reported to the police which noticed that the victim's room from wound nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, and 10, which she deemed fatal. 13 Thus, in the
"was very neat as if nothing happened." The police saw no signs of forcible victim's death certificate (Exb. B),14 she listed "HEMORRHAGIC SHOCK as
entry.9 They made a sketch of the victim's position in relation to the whole the victim's immediate cause of death and "multiple stab wounds" as the
house (Exh. D)10 and took pictures of her (Exhs. E-E-3).11 antecedent cause.
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Roldan, of the Roxas City Health Office, conducted the Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim
postmortem examination of the victim at 1:30 p.m. of June 1, 1996. Her and accused-appellant had been strained as the victim constantly picked on
findings revealed that the victim sustained the following stab wounds: accused-appellant even for the slighest mistake. Erlinda remembered the
scolding that the victim gave accused-appellant on May 27, 1996 over the
loss of keys. Accused-appellant was badly hurt by the victim's tonguelashing,
1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Located according to Erlinda, and complained to the victim, "You're too much."
at the supra sternal area;
Erlinda said she offered to take the victim in her house, but the latter refused,
saying that her place was with her father. The victim entrusted, however, her
2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, jewelry and bank book with signed withdrawal slips to Erlinda. Three days
directed downward 5 cm. above the left nipple area the level of later, on May 30, 1996, Erlinda returned the same and told the victim that she
midclavicular line; should no be afraid of accused-appellant because he was taking care of both
her (the victim) and her father. Erlinda said she again met the victim on May
3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 31, 1996 when she reminded the latter of their agreement to go out the
cm. depth, located 4 cm. above the left nipple area, midclavicular following day, June 1, 1996. On that day, however, the victim was found
line; dead.15
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, Another relative of accused-appellant and the victim, Thelma Arrojado,
18.53 cm. in depth, directed medially downward, located 3 cm. above corroborated Erlinda's testimony. The father of Thelma's husband, Roque
the left nipple, midclavicular line; Arrojado, is a brother of the victim's father and that of accused-appellant.
Thelma said that she and her husband lived at one time with the victim, and
5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5 she knew the latter to be a snob ("suplada") and overly strict. Because they
cm. depth, located 3 cm. medial to the left nipple; did not get along with the victim, Thelma and her husband eventually left.
She testified that accused-appellant was angry at the victim and in fact
passed by her store thrice (on May 27, 29, and 31, 1996), complaining to her The accused was the only person in the world who had the strong
of the victim's maltreatment of him.16 motive to eliminate from earthly existence the deceased, who had no
known enemies, as he could no longer endure the verbal abuse to
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He told the court that on June 1, which he was frequently subjected, even on trivial matters, by the
1996, at around 6:00 a.m., Alberto Arrojado asked him for food, so accused- deceased whom he must have perceived as his evil tormetor. Being
appellant went to the kitchen to find out if the victim had already prepared older [but] every now and then scolded, insulted, and humiliated, he
breakfast. When accused-appellant found that the victim was not in the must have felt that the deceased had no respect for him as a person
kitchen, he proceeded to the victim's room. From the doorway, he saw the and elder cousin. Suicide being physically impossible and there
victim lying on her bed, bloodied. He thought that the victim had committed being no shared of evidence showing that an intruder could have
suicide because the victim had told him that she felt tied down taking care of surreptitiously entered the house as all doors and windows were
her father. She in fact once remarked that "It would be better that my father securely closed, the killing could have been done only by someone
and I commit suicide." Accused-appellant said that the victim scolded him who was already inside the house. Certainly it could not have been
only once and that was for buying rotten cabbage. 17 He said that the victim the deceased's old and invalid father who could not stand on his
was the one who was constantly being scolded by her father who often found own, much less walk from his room to the kitchen, get the fatal
fault with her. When presented with the knife found on the victim's bed (Exh. weapon, the kitchen knife, from where it was placed therein, walk to
C), accused-appellant admitted he was familiar with the knife as he saw the his daughter's room, and then stab her. As there were only the three
victim using it in kitchen.1âwphi1.nêt of them inside the house, that leaves no one else, by the process of
elimination, who could have perpetrated the dastardly act but the
accused who had the only motive to do it and who was inside the
On April 21, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads: house at the time of the commission of the crime. Reinforcing this
conclusion is the admission of the accused that when he peeped into
the room of the deceased and allegedly saw for the first time the
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds and lifeless body of the victim, he was already sure, even without going
declares accused Salvador Arrojado GUILTY beyond reasonable near or touching her body and asking aloud what happened to her,
doubt of the heinous crime of murder, defined and penalized by Art. that she was already dead because he stabbed her not only once,
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of but ten (10) times, inflicting five (5) mortal wounds. And he had the
Republic Act 7659, and, there being no aggravating circumstance, gall to attribute his cousin's untimely death to suivide because he
hereby sentences him to imprisonment of thirty (30) years could not concoct any other reason to save himself.19
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnity the heirs of the deceased
Mary Ann Arrojado in the amount of P60,000.00, pay them moral
damages of P80,000.00, and pay the costs of this action. Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants assigns the following errors as
allegedly having been committed by the trial court:
In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MARY
accused, who is a detention prisoner and not otherwise disqualified,
ANN ARROJADO WAS STABBED TEN TIMES AT HER HOME.
shall be credited with the full time of his confinement under
preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MARY
pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. ANN ARROJADO COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED SUICIDE.
Accused-appellant's contention must fail. Accused-appellant admitted that it Anent the testimony of the victim's brother, Buenaventura Arrojado, that the
did not occur to him that an intruder was in the house in the evening of May victim denied having any quarrel with accused-appellant when he called her
31, 1996 because "No person could get inside because the windows were up two weeks before her death,48 it is possible that the victim did not want to
closed and besides the doors were closed."39 bother her brother who was after all too far (since he lived in Manila) to be of
much help. It is only to be expected that Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and
Thelma Arrojdo, who lived near accused-appellant and the victim, have a
Significantly, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that accused-appellant
much more accurate assessment of the real relationship between accused-
also said that no person could get inside the house because the doors and
appellant and the victim. Buenaventura Arrojado testified that it was Erlinda
the windows were closed.40 Accused-appellant never told Erlinda that the
Arrojado Magdaluyo who told him of the alleged quarrel between the victim
kitchen door was open that morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that "it is not
possible that somebody would enter the house as the doors were securely and accused-appellant.49
locked… with additional barrel bolts, and the windows have grills."41
In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the
Third. Accused-appellant contends that Thelma Arrojado's testimony does perpetrator of the crime:
not deserve consideration because, by her own admission, 42 the victim's
sister Asuncion asked her to testify on accused-appellant's complaints 1. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latter’s father were the only
against the victim's treatment of him. He also claims that it was inconsistent ones living in the house in which the crime was committed in the
for Erlinda to testify, on the one hand, that the victim was "loving friendly, and evening of May 31, 1996.50
reasonable" and, on the other to say that she was strict and domineering.
Accused-appellant cites the testimony of the victim's brother, Buenaventura 2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the
Arrojado, that before her death the victim denied having any quarrel with house were locked and the windows had grills.51
accused-appellant.43
3. Accused-appellant had access to the victim’s bedroom because
To be sure, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses will the bedroom doors were left unlocked so that the victim could check
not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts on her father’s condition during the night. Accused-appellant sleeps
or circumstances of substance that, if considered, could have affected the in the same bedroom as the victim’s father.52
outcome of case. This is because the trial court is in a better position to
4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the number and nature of the wounds sustained by the victim lead to no other
occupants of the house.53 As the Solicitor General observed, conclusion thatn that accused-appellant employed means in killong the victim
common sense dictates that if an outsider entered the house with the which tended directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to
intent to kill the victim, he would have brought his own weapon to himself arising from the defense so many wounds, a total 10, half of which
ensure the execution of his purpose.54 were fatal, if he had not deliberately adopted such manner of attack.63 Abuse
of superior strength also attended the killing since accused-appellant, a man
5. None of the victim’s belongings was missing or disturbed, and armed with a knife, attacked the victim, an unarmed and dfenseless
indicating that the motive for the crime was not gain but revenge.55 woman.64 However, since abuse of superior strength is absorbed in
treachery, there is no need to appreciate it separately as an independent
aggravating circumstance.65
6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab
wounds, half of which were fatal),56 the killer felt deep-seated
resentment and anger toward the victim. Accused-appellant had The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation
admitted those feelings to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma since the requisites thereor, to wit, (a) the time when the accused determined
Arrojado.57 to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequence of
7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a
his act,66 have not been established in this case.
grudge against the victim.58
8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellant’s Nor can the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated
against accused-appellant since the latter and the victim lived in the same
behavior in the morning of June 1, 1996 was inconsistent with
house.67
someone who had just found his cousin and employer, a person he
claims to get along with, dead.59 By his testimony, he did not even go
inside the room to check on her condition on the lame excuse that he The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in
was afraid. He also did not inform his neighbors about the incident this case. For this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show
for the equally flimsy reason that he did not know them nor did he go that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal
to the police.60 such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to
commit the criminal act. The condifence must be a means of facilitating the
Under Rule 133, §4 of the Rules on Evidence, cricumstantial evidence is commission of the crim, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's
sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the belied that the former would not abuse said confidence. 68 In this case, while
the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she
facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and (c) the
entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
fears were subsequently allayed as shown by the fact that she took back her
reasonable doubt. As the foregoing discussion shows, these requisites have
personal effects from Erlinda.69 Thinking that accused-appellant would not do
been established in this case.
her any harm, because he was after all her first cousin, the victim allowed
accused-appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and left the
Fourt. With respect to the circumstances attending the commission of the bedroom doors unlocked.70
crime, the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery against accused-appellant. To appreciate treachery, two conditions
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on
must be present: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the
December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion
person attacked np opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate and (2) the
temporal maximum to death to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the
means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. 61 Both requisites
presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in
have been established in this case.
accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should
have imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, on
Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect,
victim was not in a position to fight the assailant and that she might have requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but
been stabbed while she was asleep.62 As regards the second requisite, the also the aggravating circumstances.71 This provision may be given
retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that "statutes regulating
the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent."72 The aggravating circumstance
of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same
therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellant's sentence to
death.1âwphi1.nêt
Consistent with current case law,76 the civil indemnity for the crime of murder
should be reduced from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00, while the award of moral
damages in the amount of P80,000.00 should be reduced to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas
City, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Salvador Arrojado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
its entire duration and to its full extent. Furthermore, he is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and the further sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
As soon as the truck would arrive at the premises of the supplier, the driver Appellant's father, PABLO BAGO, testified that on June 15, 1992, he went to
would ask for appellant. He would then load the materials in the truck and
the NBI to seek protection for his son as they were receiving threats from
would show the receipts covering the materials to the security guard of
Hilo and police officers Balod and Alfaro. Days later, Hilo, Alfaro and Balod
Power Construction Supply for stamping. The materials inside the truck
went to his house in Quezon City looking for appellant. Hilo warned that
would be counterchecked against the quantity and quality stated in the
appellant should admit the crime lest something untoward would happen to
receipts. Appellant would then return to Azkcon usually at about 4:00 p.m. him. 23 Again, after his son's arraignment, a certain Col. Hernandez visited
Thus, he would mainly stay at the supplier's premises to oversee the cutting their house and insisted on taking appellant to Azkcon. Pablo refused,
of the cold rolled sheets. 15
arguing that the case had already been filed in court. 24 On another occasion,
Col. Hernandez and his lady friend dropped by his house and convinced him
Appellant claimed he does not know prosecution witness Jun Gavaran, the and his son to talk to Mr. King, the owner of Azkcon. During their meeting,
security guard of Philippine Construction Supply. He also denied knowing Mr. King allegedly told Pablo that he knew that appellant was innocent but
accused Caparas and Ongseco. Allegedly, he saw them for the first time at asked him to testify against the persons responsible for the crime. Pablo
the police station. He admitted knowing prosecution witnesses Manangan replied that they would think about the proposal. 25 Mr. King's lawyer, Atty.
and Ong. He acknowledged that he had no quarrel with Gavaran, Manangan Capistrano, also gave him the same advice. Atty. Capistrano requested them
and Ong. 16 to go to his office where appellant could execute a statement. Instead of
going there, Pablo and the appellant proceeded to the office of appellant's
lawyer. 26
Allegedly, appellant was maltreated while in the custody of the police. Pablo WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused
claimed that he reported the physical abuse to the NBI. 27 REYNALDO BAGO y MADRID guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of Qualified Theft as defined and penalized
Prosecution's rebuttal witness ATTY. FLORIMUND C. ROUS, free legal aid under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, paragraph 1 and Article
counsel of IBP, testified that on May 22, 1992, appellant was brought to their 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences said accused
office for the execution of his extra-judicial confession. As a matter of to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Twenty
procedure, he first examined the body of appellant to determine any sign of (20) years and One (1) day of Reclusion Perpetua as minimum to
physical abuse or maltreatment while the latter was in police custody. Finding Twenty-Eight (28) years, Ten (10) months and One (1) day
none, he inquired from appellant whether he was willing to confess to the of Reclusion Perpetua as maximum, with the accessory penalties of
commission of the theft. Beforehand, he already informed appellant of the the law and to indemnify the complainant in the sum of P194,865.00,
consequence of his confession, i.e., that it could be used against him. representing the value of the stolen cold rolled sheets, without
Nonetheless, appellant affirmed his willingness to execute a written subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
confession. Thus, the policeman proceeded to take the statement of costs.1âwphi1.nêt
appellant. Appellant signed his extrajudicial confession 28 in his (Atty. Rous')
presence. Accused ARMANDO CAPARAS Y CUENCO and RODOLFO
ONGSECO Y VEGO are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
Rebuttal witness ATTY. MELANIO CAPISTRANO testified that he was evidence.
Azkcon's legal counsel. He confirmed that a conference was held at Azkcon
premises in connection with the theft. Present were appellant, Pablo Bago, SO ORDERED.
Mr. King and a former employee of Azkcon. Due to the complexity of the
modus operandi, Mr. King suspected that appellant had other companions in Appellant moved for reconsideration of the trial court's decision. The motion
committing the theft. Mr. King then informed him that appellant had agreed to was denied for lack of merit, 33 although the dispositive portion of the trial
turn state witness. Appellant confessed that his supervisor William Hilo, a court's decision was amended, thus:
certain Severino Encarnacion and his co-accused Ongseco and Caparas
took part in the heist. Allegedly, Encarnacion was the brains behind the theft;
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing reasons, the Motion for
Hilo took care of the operations on the Azkcon side, while Ongseco and
Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Caparas took care of the procurement of the stolen goods. Atty. Capistrano
expressed reservations about the involvement of Hilo as he was the one who
reported the theft to the management. After the conference, he advised Pursuant to People vs. Conrado Lucas (240 SCRA 66), [the]
appellant to consult his own lawyer and execute a statement so he could dispositive portion of the decision is hereby modified but only insofar
determine if they would use appellant as a state witness. Prior to his as accused Reynaldo Bago is concerned to read as follows:
arraignment, appellant was told that he should decide whether he wanted to
be a state witness. In their next scheduled meeting, appellant and his lawyer, WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused
Atty. Jambora, failed to appear. 29 Reynaldo Bago y Madrid GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal in the crime of Qualified Theft as defined and penalized
On sur-rebuttal, Pablo Bago insisted that on July 1992, Col. Hernandez went under Article 309, paragraph 1 and Article 310 of the Revised Penal
to Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija and took pictures of his house. Col. Hernandez Code, and hereby sentences said accused to the penalty of reclusion
invited him and appellant to go to Azkcon. They refused as appellant had perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify
already posted bail at that time. Atty. Capistrano, on the other hand, insisted the complainant in the sum of P194,865.00, representing the value of
that appellant should name the other employees involved in the theft so that the stolen cold rolled sheets, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
they could be dismissed from the company. 30 of insolvency, with costs.
On April 26, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City 31 convicted SO ORDERED.
appellant of qualified theft. Accused Caparas and Ongseco were acquitted
for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the decision 32 reads: The Appellant's Brief raises two issues, to wit:
I. more credence than Manangan's testimony. Appellant's argument is bereft of
merit for Manangan's testimony is corroborated by another witness, William
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- Hilo, Material Comptroller of Azkcon who kept track of all materials coming in
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT BASED ON and going out of Azkcon's plant. He testified that on April 21, 1992, he
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE received three (3) receipts but only two (2) materials were delivered to
PROSECUTION. Azkcon's premises. The receipt marked as Exhibit "C" covered the missing
materials. Manangan's testimony is further corroborated by two (2) pieces of
II. documentary evidence: first, by Power Construction Supply Co. Gatepass
Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22, 1992 36 which shows that the materials
covered by Exhibit "C" were taken out by appellant from the premises of
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE Power Construction Supply on March 23, 1992, about a month before the
PROSECUTION HAS PROVEN THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED, receipt was stamped; and second, by a document from Power Construction
REYNALDO BAGO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Supply dated March 23, 1992 containing information about the truck used in
pulling out the materials from Power Construction Supply on said date. The
We affirm with modification. truck bore license plate no. PRC-513 and was not owned by Azkcon. The
truck belonged to a certain Ruel Fernando who had no contractual relation
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove even by with Azkcon and said vehicle was not to be used to take out materials from
circumstantial evidence that he asported the cold rolled sheets in question. Power Construction Supply. In view of these corroborations, we hold that the
He asserts that these materials were delivered to Azkcon as evidenced by trial court did not err in giving credence to Manangan's testimony despite the
the receipt 34 duly stamped by the guard on duty. He states: receipt.
. . . [T]he best evidence that the materials were actually delivered at Appellant can not rely on the best evidence rule which states:
Azkcon Metal Industries is the receipt duly stamped by the guard on
duty. Res ipsa loquitor. To receive the testimony of the security Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When
guard, that he stamped the receipt even without the goods because the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
he trusted the accused, would set a precedent that will eventually shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in
convict an innocent person. After duly stamping the receipt, it is very the following cases:
easy for the security guard to claim otherwise to avoid liability. 35
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
Appellant also contends that his task was to oversee the delivery of the produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
materials from their supplier to Azkcon. Allegedly, it was erroneous to
conclude that he stole the materials just because they could not be found in (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
its premises as he was not responsible for any material lost therein. party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
Lastly, appellant belittles the documents showing that the truck he used in
taking out the materials from Power Construction on March 23, 1992 did not (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
belong to Azkcon. He claims that said documents had no bearing on his documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of
culpability. time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and
We reject these contentions.
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
First. Appellant, in effect, assails the testimony of Ruben Manangan, the officer or is recorded in a public office. 37
security guard who stamped the receipt marked as Exhibit "C", on the ground
that the receipt itself shows that the materials were delivered to Azkcon. The rule cannot be invoked unless the content of a writing is the subject of
Appellant argues that the receipt is the best evidence and should be given judicial inquiry, in which case, the best evidence is the original writing itself.
The rule pertains to the admissibility of secondary evidence to prove the latter replied that they had long been delivered. Nevertheless,
contents of a document. In the case at bar, no secondary evidence is offered Security Guard Manangan stamped this last receipt because he
to prove the content of a document. What is being questioned by appellant is trusted that accused would not do anything bad;
the weight given by the trial court to the testimony of Manangan over the
receipt which on its face shows that the materials in question were delivered 4. On April 21, 1992, William Hilo, the material controller of Azkcon,
to Azkcon's premises. Clearly, the best evidence rule finds no application on discovered that there were three (3) receipts which came in, but only
this issue. two materials were delivered inside the company compound. The
materials covered by the two (2) receipts were delivered but the
Second. It is well settled that before conviction can be based on materials covered by the third receipt were not. Hilo conducted an
circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an inventory and asked accused Bago the whereabouts of the materials
unbroken chain of events which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion in question. Accused Bago insisted that the materials had long been
pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of others, as the author of the delivered. Hilo proceeded with his investigation and was able to
crime. 38 Thus, the following requisites must be met: 1) there must be more secure from the Power Construction Supply Company Gatepass
than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22, 1992 (Exh. "D") which shows that
are proven; 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce the materials covered by the third receipt were taken out by accused
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 39 Bago from the premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23,
1992;
In the case at bar, the trial court convicted the appellant based on this chain
of events: 5. Hilo was able to secure from Power Construction Supply a
document dated March 23, 1992 (Exh. "E") which contained
1. Azkcon Metal Industries is engaged in metal business and for this information on the truck used in pulling out the materials from Power
purpose contracted a business arrangement with Power Construction Construction Supply on March 22, 1992 (sic). The truck bears Plate
Supply whereby Azkcon purchases the cold rolled sheets from the No. PRC-513 and is not owned by Azkcon. As per copy of the
latter and the cold rolled sheets are cut by Power Construction certificate of registration secured from the Land Transportation
Supply; Office, the truck is owned by a certain Ruel Fernando who has no
contractual relations with Azkcon. Said vehicle is likewise not
authorized to pull out materials from the Power Construction Supply.
2. Accused Bago is a trusted employee of Azkcon and detailed with
Power Construction Supply Company in charge of the Cutting
Department; and that as such he was authorized by Mr. William Hilo, The trial court concluded that the foregoing circumstances lead to a
Controller Manager of Azkcon, to pull out from the Power reasonable conclusion that appellant asported the materials covered by
Construction Supply the cut materials and to deliver the same to Exhibit "C".
Azkcon;
We agree.
3. On April 21, 1992, accused Bago, together with his co-employees,
Danilo Baylosis and Candido Querobin entered the Azkcon premises Appellant cannot rely on the fact that the third receipt was duly stamped by
with deliveries of two cold rolled sheets loaded in the truck. Security security guard Ruben Manangan on April 21, 1992. Manangan explained well
Guard Manangan inspected the materials in the truck and after why he stamped the receipt. He said: 40
confirming that the materials were loaded in the truck, he stamped
the receipts upon request of accused Bago. Thereafter, accused Q: On April 21, 1992, did you report for work as security guard at
Bago brought out another receipt and requested Security Guard AZKCON Metal Industries?
Manangan to likewise stamp the same. Security Guard Manangan
checked the goods covered by the third receipt and found there were
A: Yes, sir.
no cold rolled sheets for the third receipt. The third receipt carried a
different date. Security Guard Manangan asked accused Bago as to
the whereabouts of the materials covered by the third receipt and the Q: And was there any unusual incident that transpired on that day, if
you recall?
A: There was a truck which was carrying two (2) cold rolled sheets. Q: And what did he tell you, if he told you anything about this
receipt?
xxx xxx xxx
A: He said "please put a stamp on this receipt".
Q: By the way, who were with (sic) the truck which carried the (2)
cold rolled sheets which you mentioned? Q: Did you?
xxx xxx xxx Q: And did you also check whether the goods covered by this 3rd
receipt was (sic) in the truck unloaded?
Q: Now, when this truck came [in], with Reynaldo Bago with Bailosis
and Querubin, carrying deliveries of two (2) cold rolled sheets, what A: Sir there was no cold rolled sheet for that receipt.
happened after that, if anything happened?
Q: And why did you stamp this receipt for cold rolled sheets for that
A: After I inspected the two (2) cold rolled sheets, I stamped the receipt? (sic)
receipts for them.
A: Because I trusted him that he would not do anything bad.
Q: Before you stamped the receipts for these two (2) cold rolled
sheets, did you make sure that the goods were there? xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes sir. Q: Now, in spite of the fact that your personal knowledge of the
person Reynaldo Bago was in the course of your performance of
Q: What happened after that? your duty, including Reynaldo Bago (sic), you would like to impress
upon us that in spite of that you trusted him?
A: After I stamped the two (2) receipts, he brought out another
receipt which they asked me to stamp also. ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Q: By the way, who asked you to stamp the two (2) receipts covering Argumentative, your Honor.
the two (2) cold rolled sheets loaded in the truck?
COURT:
A: Bago sir.
Witness may answer.
xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes sir.
COURT
Q: In spite of the fact that the 3rd receipt according to you, when you
xxx xxx xxx inspected it, there was no cold rolled sheets covering "Exhibit "C"?
Q: And who was the one who brought out this other receipt for A: No material sir.
stamping?
A: Bago sir.
Q: In spite of the fact that you did not find any Cold Rolled Sheets Q: How did you come to know this, Mr. Witness?
material you still honored the receipt by affixing you signature after
you stamped it, correct? A: It was reported by the OIC of the Security Guard, sir.
A: Yes sir, but when I saw the receipt it had a different date. Q: You spoke of three (3) receipts, did you come to see these
receipts?
Q: . . . [D]id you ask Reynaldo Bago "why is it a different date" and
"why are there no Cold Rolled Sheets is (sic) the 3rd receipt"? A: Yes, sir.
A: I asked him "where these materials are" and he told me that it has Q: If I will show you them again (sic), will you be able to identify the
(sic) long been delivered. same?
Q: Now did you ask him where it was (sic) delivered and what place A: Yes, sir.
of AZKCON did he deposit these Cold Rolled Sheets which are (sic)
covered by this 3rd receipt? Q: I am showing to you these receipts which was (sic) previously
marked as Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", are these the three (3) receipts
A: No, sir. which you mentioned a while ago?
Q: Now with regards (sic) to your duty as security guard, did you call A: Yes, sir.
the attention of the management about this 3rd receipt with no Cold
Rolled Sheets and you stamped the receipt knowing that there was Q: Would you kindly take a look at these receipts and tell the
(sic) no materials inside. Did you ask the management, the
Honorable Court, which particular receipt is controversial in the
president, the manager, the foreman or whoever it is (sic) on duty at
sense that the goods described therein did not enter your company
the time?
premises?
A: Chief. 41 COURT:
Q: By the way, at the bottom portion of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", A: Because I am in charge of Reynaldo Bago, and I know his
there appears a signature, can you go over this (sic) and tell the signature.
Honorable Court, whose signatures stated (sic) therein?
Q: If Reynaldo Bago is in Court, can you point to him?
A: This is a signature of Reynaldo Bago.
INTERPRETER:
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a person who identified himself as Reynaldo
Witness is pointing to a signature on Exhibit "A". Madrid Bago.
Which I request, You Honor, to be marked as Exhibit "A-2". Q: You said that this matter was reported to you by the OIC of the
Security Guard, (sic) when this matter was reported to you, what step
or steps did you take, if any?
COURT:
A: The same it was the signature of Reynaldo Bago. A: According to my findings the materials did not reach the company.
The witness may answer, place that on record. Q: What precisely did you check?
When you said that according to your findings that (sic) the materials Q: Did you find these items for the 3rd receipt?
did not arrive, to what particular receipt are (sic) you referring to?
A: None, Sir.
This one, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
INTERPRETER:
Q: Now according to you, on April 21, 1992 you were at AZKCON
Witness is pointing to Exhibit "C". Metal Industries?
Q: You said that you confronted Reynaldo Bago, what transpired A: Yes Sir.
during your confrontation?
Q: And your attention was invited on the first two receipts, containing
A: He told me that the material arrived long before but when I the Cold Rolled Materials?
checked it out, I found out that it didn't arrived" (sic).
ATTY. CAPISTRANO:
Prosecution witness Aflor Ong testified as follows: 43
Q: What time did he make the report? Q: After you inspected, what action did you take, because it was
reported to you by the security guard?
A: Four to Five in the afternoon Sir.
A: I reported it to Mr. William Hilo, the one in-charge of the
Q: And what was the report all about? materials. 44
A: About two (2) cold rolled sheets, Sir. The trial court correctly found that appellant was a trusted employee of
Azkcon. He was in-charge of overseeing the cutting of the materials at Power
Construction and ensuring their delivery to Azkcon. Due to this trust, he
Q: What is it?
succeeded in withdrawing from the said supplier the cold rolled sheets
covered by Exhibits "A" and "B" dated April 21, 1992 and Exhibit "C" (Invoice
A: Only two (2) cold rolled sheets were delivered, one is (sic) No. 51111), dated March 23, 1992. Appellant signed these receipts to signify
missing. that he obtained the materials from the supplier. However, only the materials
covered by Exhibits "A" and "B" were delivered to Azkcon on April 21, 1992.
Q: And, of course, the security guard showed to you the 3rd receipt Those covered by Exhibit "C" were not delivered. Significantly, the materials
which did not cover the materials in the cargo truck? procured on April 21, 1992 were delivered that same day, as shown by the
stamp marks on Exhibits "A" and "B". In contrast, the materials he took from
ATTY. CAPISTRANO: the supplier on March 23, 1992 could not be found in the premises of Azkcon
and there was no evidence that he delivered them on said date or on any
Misleading again, your Honor. other day thereafter. Inexplicably, appellant presented the third receipt
(Invoice No. 51111) dated March 23, 1992 for stamping only on April 21,
1992. The reasonable conclusion is that he asported the materials covered
COURT:
by Exhibit "C".
Q: And you did not find actually the materials? The present case falls under Article 308, in relation to Article 309,
paragraph one (1) and Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, for the
A: I did not find the material covering this Exhibit "C". purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed on appellant. . . . .
Since the lower court found that the value of the thing stolen was within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
P194,865.00, the penalty prescribed in this case, had it been a case provided by law, without considering the incremental penalty
of simple theft, is imprisonment of 20 years corresponding for the amounts in excess of P22,000.00. . . .
to reclusion temporal. Since the offense was committed with grave
abuse of confidence, then the prescribed penalty for qualified theft Based on the foregoing considerations, the penalty imposed on
proven in this case is death, which is the penalty next higher by two appellant should fall within the minimum range of prision
degrees than the given penalty for simple theft above mentioned. In correccional in its medium and maximum periods, with a duration of
which event, this case is subject further to the rules provided in two (2) years, four (4) months and (1) day to six (6) years, and
Article 74, in relation to Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. They twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties
provide: of death, as maximum. It is respectfully recommended that appellant
be sentenced to the penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as
Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal with the
cases — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty accessory penalties of death as maximum.
higher than another given penalty, without specifically
designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty We disagree.
should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory
penalties of article 40, shall be considered as the next higher
Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty for simple theft. It
penalty.
reads:
xxx xxx xxx 1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does
Art. 40. Death — Its accessory penalties — The death not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed
penalty, when it is not executed by reason of commutation or the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the
pardon, shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional
disqualification and that of civil interdiction during the thirty ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be
years following the date of the sentence, unless such imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in
accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and
pardon. for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
Consequently, the penalty actually prescribed in this case for the
crime of qualified theft is twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, The value of the property stolen by appellant was P194,448.00. Under Article
together with the accessory penalties of perpetual absolute 309, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to
disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty (30) years be imposed in the maximum period since the value of the stolen goods
following the date of the sentence. exceeded P22,000.00. To determine the additional years of imprisonment
prescribed in Article 309 (1), we have to deduct the amount of P22,000.00,
Since this case is subject to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the thus leaving the amount of P172,448.00. Next, the net amount should be
determination of the maximum and minimum ranges of the sentence divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount below P10,000.00. Thus,
is governed by rules contained in the analogous case of People seventeen (17) years must be added to the basic penalty of the maximum
v. Pabalan, to wit: period of prision mayor minimum and medium periods. 46 The penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods has a range of six years
Applying the mandate of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, (6) and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Its maximum period is eight (8) years,
the maximum penalty shall therefore be taken from the eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, and the incremental
maximum period of said basic penalty in Article 315 as penalty is seventeen (17) years. Had appellant committed simple theft, the
augmented by the additional years of imprisonment, while penalty should have been twenty years of reclusion temporal, the maximum
the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be
penalty allowable under Article 309, subject to the Indeterminate Sentence 41 of the Revised Penal Code is civil interdiction for life and
Law. perpetual absolute disqualification. As aptly observed by former
Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there seems to be an absurdity
Considering that the theft is qualified by grave abuse of confidence, the under the latter view (Aquino, Comments on the Revised Penal
penalty is two degrees higher than that specified under Article 309. 47 In the Code, supra). On the other hand, Justice Albert is of the firm view
case of People vs. Cañales, 48 we were confronted with the same issue of that:
determining how the penalty under Article 309 should be increased by two
degrees. In said case, we adopted the disquisition of the appellate court, The Code meant to say here that the judgment should
thus: provide that the convict should not be given the benefit of the
provisions of Article 27 until forty years should have elapsed;
. . . . Under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, two degrees higher otherwise, there could be no difference at all
than reclusion temporal is death. This is likewise conformable with between reclusion perpetua when imposed as a penalty next
Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that: higher in degree and when it is imposed as the penalty fixed
by law. (Albert, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, 1932
Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain edition, page 240).
cases. — In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
higher than another given penalty, without specifically to which Justice Luis Reyes subscribes (Reyes, Comments on the
designating the name of the former, if such higher penalty Revised Penal Code, 1981 ed., Vol. 1, page 746). Former Chief
should be that of death, the same penalty and the accessory Justice Ramon C. Aquino likewise is in accord with the opinion of
penalties of Article 40, shall be considered as the next higher Justice Albert.
penalty. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
The provision however, proscribes the imposition of the death
penalty resulting from the graduation of the penalty. It bears Justice Albert believes that the "penalty higher than reclusion
stressing that Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code was based on perpetua" is reclusion perpetua for forty years with the
Article 93 of the old Penal Code which provided that if the penalty accessory penalties of death under Art. 40. Otherwise, as he
is reclusion perpetua, the next higher penalty would be the same said "there could be no difference at all between reclusion
penalty but the convict in such cases cannot be pardoned until forty perpetua, when imposed as the penalty next higher in
years had elapsed (Aquino, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, degree and when it is imposed as the penalty fixed by law."
1987 ed., Volume 1, page 709). This opinion is supported by Art. 93 of the old Penal Code
from which Art. 74 was taken. Art. 93 provides that if the
But there is a pervading divergence of opinion among commentators given penalty is cadena perpetua or reclusion perpetua, the
of the Revised Penal Code as to what the higher penalty referred to next higher penalty shall be these same penalties but the
in Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code should be. Some authors are convict in such case cannot be pardoned "until forty years
of the view that the higher penalty would be reclusion perpetua with have elapsed. (Aquino, Comments on the Revised Penal
the accessory penalties for the said penalty. But then, under Article Code, 1987 ed., Volume 1, pages 708-709)."
74 of the Revised Penal Code, the accessory penalties under Article
40 of the Revised Penal Code should be imposed. Still others, like We are likewise in accord with the opinion of Justice Albert as a
former Senator Ambrosio Padilla, are of the view that the higher logical explanation of Article 74 of the Revised Penal Code.
penalty is reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of death Consequently, Cañales should be meted the penalty of Reclusion
under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code if the death penalty is Perpetua for Forty Years with the accessory penalties of death under
commuted. But then, the accessory penalty under Article 40 of the Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. In fine, Cañales is not entitled
Revised Penal Code is perpetual absolute disqualification and civil to pardon before the lapse of the forty-year period (Reyes,
interdiction during thirty (30) years following the date of sentence, Comments on the Revised Penal Code, 1977 ed., Volume 1, page
whereas, the accessory penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 747).1âwphi1
This reiterated our ruling in People vs. Reyes, 49 where we held:
In accord with the foregoing, we hold that appellant was correctly meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of death under
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code.
Fourth. As regards the grant of actual damages, the rule is that actual
damages cannot be allowed unless supported by evidence in the
record. 51 William Hilo testified that the value of the missing cold rolled sheets
was P192,000.00 and the incurred cutting cost was P2,448.00, for a total
value of P194,448.00. 52 Thus, the award for actual damages must be
reduced by P417.00.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the April 26, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City (Branch 92), in Criminal Case No. Q-92-30833, as amended
by the Order dated August 15, 1995, is AFFIRMED subject to the
modification that the actual damages is reduced to P194,448.00.
SO ORDERED.
Criminal Case 1248 — frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31,
Mendoza; 1966, as having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a
Criminal Case 1249 — murder of Teofilo Mendoza; prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.
Criminal Case 1250 — murder of Marcelo Mendoza. This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.
The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information,
attorney from his investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be either for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the
tested in the crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits. complex crime of robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide?
Or, should the five indictments remain as they are?
The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:
1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Revised Penal Code, as amended, which reads:
Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a declared guilty of four murders."9
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20,
maximum period. June 30, 1955. There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed
by a group of home guards. It was held that there was only one complex
Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a crime. In that case, however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the
single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or killing. In the case at bar, defendants performed several acts. And the
more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an informations charge conspiracy amongst them. Needless to state, the act of
offense is a necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo).1 one is the act of all.10 Not material here, therefore is the finding in Lawas that
"it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and
Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply
results in the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of
this factual setting, the complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.11
finds application.2 A similar rule obtains where one stabbed another and the
weapon pierced the latter's body through and wounded another. The first The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that
died instantaneously; the second, seven days later. This Court convicted the consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of
assailant of double murder.3 So where a person plants a bomb in an airplane obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time,
and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of persons are killed, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the
that single act again produces a complex crime.4 power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent
Judge could easily be remedied.12
A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number
killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly
separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. 5 Thus, presented the five separate informations — four for murder and one for
where the six defendants, with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also frustrated murder.
a submachine gun and Garand rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven
and wounding several others, each of the said accused is "guilty of as many 2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an
crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven). 6 Again, eleven persons affidavit of one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the
were indicted for quadruple murder — with the use of bolos, a pistol, a culprits was to commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and
barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo — of a man, his common-law wife, and frustrated murder complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If
their two children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial true, this would bring the case within the coverage of the second portion of
court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that Article 48, which treats as a complex crime a case where an offense is a
"[t]he four victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts necessary means for committing the other.
committed on different occasions and by different parties"; that such acts
"may not be regarded as constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been
should be held as separate and distinct crimes."7 And a third. At the
regularly performed.13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said
commencement exercises of an elementary school, "a shot suddenly rang
affidavit wherein it is alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio
out" followed by a "series of shots" — from a pistol. Two persons lay dead
and money) were taken away by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to
and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court there
jettison the prosecutor's opinion thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons
ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by for his act. For one thing, there is the grave problem of proving the elements
appellant Juan Mones.8 And finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May
of that offense — robbery. For another, the act could have been but a blind to
10, 1950, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule — who were cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be noted here is that all the
asleep — were killed by one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second
informations charged evident premeditation. With ponderables and
burst of machinegun fire, two of the couple's children — also asleep — were
imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons for the
killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of
Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has
abused his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it
under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not stops enforcement of the said orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the takes his place, is hereby directed to reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247,
evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced, and to take steps towards
possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we the final determination thereof.
must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly
compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino
him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being Borres. So ordered.
unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal
suspect's right to due process — the sporting idea of fair play — may be Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and
transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court
Fernando, JJ., concur.
made the pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part.
attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should
determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off
ended party."14
Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby
granted; the orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966
are hereby set and declared null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of
Republic of the Philippines shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr., and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo,
SUPREME COURT inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds
Manila sustained by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused his death.
FIRST DIVISION That the accused had performed all the acts of execution
(with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito Raquepo) which would
have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but
which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997 independent of his own will.2
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of
vs. Aparri, Cagayan.
MARIO TABACO, accused-appellant.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as
follows:
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 117th PC stationed at
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four
Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James Andres Melad,
counts of Murder for shooting to death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar
sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the
Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Criminal
Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Aparri, Cagayan.
Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat.
Romeo Regunton (Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of
the victims, the informations in these four (4) cases identically read: This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms
were assigned as guards to maintain peace and order at the
cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS
That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of
Roque P. Datugan, both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat.
Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction
Andres Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario
of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco,
Tabaco who was in civilian clothes claims to have been also
armed with a gun, with intent to kill, with evident
assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th PC, to verify
premeditation and with treachery, did then and there
the presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
the cockpit arena, bringing with him his M-14 issued firearm.
shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds
which caused his death.
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1)
1 Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey, Cagayan, who
Contrary to Law.
arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio
Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton
information with the complex crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for (deceased) who was also armed, arrived in company with
shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the wounding of Sgt. Benito the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio
Raquepo: Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC
Paragas.
That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of
Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the
this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco, group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of Buguey, Cagayan,
armed with a gun, with intent to kill, did then and there arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1)
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and Antonio Villasin; (2) Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Loreto Pita,
Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1)
occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. Antonio Chan — injured on his right foot; (2) Salvador
Others seated with the Mayor were: (1) the late Capt. Oscar Berbano — injured on his right forearm and on his right
Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on his Face and right
back of the mayor; (3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints. 3
CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated at
the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for
meters away, (infront and a little bit in the west), from the the Accused-appellant is as follows:
place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at
the 4th row of seats upper portion). During the ocular
Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC
inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be
Company to assist in the maintenance of peace and order at
more than three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan, Aparri,
Cagayan on March 22, 1987, accused Mario Tabaco with his
At about ten (10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of
Tabaco was seated as described above, he suddenly without ammunition went to the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22,
warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer arriving
with his M-14 rifle, followed by several successive burst of thereat at about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly
gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor went inside the cockpit arena to make some observations
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. and found out that there were several persons inside the
Romeo Regunton, although the latter managed to run said cockpit who were in possession of firearms, some short
passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but and some long, and were seen in different places and/or
was chased by accused Tabaco. Regunton was later found corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to
dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the why the said persons were allowed to carry their firearms
Octagon cockpit arena. because of his impressions that if they did not have the
authority, the guards of the main gate of the cockpit would
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the surly have confiscated the same from them. It was his belief
Co's canteen, saw the accused going out rushing from the then that they may have come from other agencies of the
cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a government, assigned to help in the maintenance of peace
relative and neighbor of the accused Tabaco in Buguey, and order in the cockpit. Accused thus seated himself at the
Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling him "what is that lowermost seat (first step) of the slanted bleachers of the
that happened again Mario." Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.
Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to
maintain peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while
was at the canteen taking snacks, heard five (5) successive accused was seated at the lowermost seat of the slanted
gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun
while, he saw the accused Tabaco coming from inside the report fired atop his head. Having been officially assigned to
cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco — "Mario relax ka help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit
lang" — "Mario keep calm." They stood face to face holding and that his presence must be known, his immediate
their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun towards Sgt. reaction upon hearing the gun report was to fire a warning
Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the shot in the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the
gun to disarm Tabaco, and in the process, the gun went off Octagon cockpit arena. After firing a warning shot, his
hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming from
happened to be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot different directions inside the cockpit arena, for which
while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his M-
adequate medical treatment. 14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused)
rushed towards the main gate of the cockpit arena, Mariano
Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974,
(accused) to relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano 61 SCRA 180).
Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax lang, he
all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3)
cockpit arena was nothing to said persons. Accused eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin, Rosario Peneyra
however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of
pressed the gun which he was holding downwards and the deceased victims, Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar
grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the
Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano
Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. That because of Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and three (3)
such incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and
Benito Raquepo and the family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo. So too, the prosecution
the blame on him. The following morning, accused presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana,
surrendered to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who PC Sgt. Jose Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as
happened to pass by, not on account of the death of Ex- corroborative witnesses in both situational cases/incidents.
Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan As well stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution
and Oscar Regunton which he did not know at the time he witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra actually saw
surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the
and the injury sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo.4 lower front row and in port arm position directed his M-14
rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found group at the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired
accused-appellant guilty as charged on all counts. In giving credence to the three successive automatic gun shots that felled Mayor
version of the prosecution over that of accused-appellant, it found that: Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton
and one Felicito Rigunan. This was corroborated by
From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was
prosecution and defense cannot agree on what actually then ten (10) meters away from the accused, which was not
transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon far, considering that the cockpit arena was well lighted at that
Cockpit Arena, Aparri, Cagayan leading to the shooting to time.
death of subject victims. For, while the prosecution maintains
that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who shot the victims, Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic
the defense insists that he is not the assailant, but somebody fire, the accused was seen coming out rushing from inside
else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt.
upwards the roof of the cockpit arena. Raquepo, the former being a relative and neighbor, pacified
accused Tabaco, telling — "what is that happened again
In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of Mario," while the latter told him — "Mario relax ka lang keep
credibility versions. "Where there are directly conflicting calm." After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the
versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for the possession of the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer
truth, perforce has to look for some facts and circumstances when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer got the gun M-14
which can be used as valuable tools in evaluating the and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as
probability or improbability of a testimony for after all, the corroborated by Sgt. Antonio Domingo, while in the process
element of probability is always involved in weighing of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went
testimonial evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS of, hitting the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt.
Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May 17, 1980, 97 Raquepo. 5
SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485,
November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA 461, both citing the case of The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the
cockpit arena was heavily loaded, but when the gun was taken from his
possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the gun's magazine was Q: How many bullets in all?
already empty.
A: Twenty, sir.
The court a quo said further:
Q: You said you heard first seven gun
ATTY. VILLENA: reports?
Q: When you took that M-14 from the A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN,
accused, do you remember if it had a continuation of direct examination, Sgt.
magazine that time? Ferrer, May 14, 1990 session, Stenographer
L. Tamayo).
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent
Q: Do you have the magazine now? shells of bullets were found inside the
cockpit arena (Exh. "R" & "R-l", pp. 157-158,
A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir. record).
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused,
did you examine the rifle?
Q: Showing to you Exh. "R", do you know
A: Yes, sir, I examined it. whose picture is this?
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) 5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the
full length of time, he underwent preventive imprisonment
No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284 (Felicito Rigunan);
and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to
victims, but declared to have been prosecuted in one abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248, prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only four-fifth
Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June
17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38 Phil. 341; People vs. Chavez, all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an
126 SCRA 1). informed and reasoned verdict. 11
SO ORDERED. 7 (Emphasis ours) After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set
aside or disturb the trial court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses
Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still when they testified pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the
interposed the present appeal on the following grounds: shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the 1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the
crime of murder in connection with the deaths of Oscar group of Ex-Mayor Arreola on that fateful night of March 22, 1989,
Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom they positively
Regunton. identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-
mayor and his companions.
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for
homicide on the death of Jorge Siriban and the injury Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:
sustained by Benito Raquepo.
COURT:
(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the
testimony of accused-appellant Tabaco. Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?
The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, A: I saw that he was the one who made the
we have ruled that when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis- gun report, sir.
a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's findings with respect thereto are
generally not disturbed on appeal, 8 unless there appears in the record some ATTY ARRIOLA:
fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or
the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 9 The reason for the rule is Q: Who was that "he" you are referring to?
eloquently stated in the case of People vs. de Guzman, 10 thus:
A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19,
In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on
1990)
the trial court for its evaluation of the witnesses and their
credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the
stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was
line between fact and prevarication that will determine the the one from whom those gun reports come
guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be from?
discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by
the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale A: Because he was the only person from
signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like whom I saw a gun, sir.
the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor
of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant Q: What did you do also upon hearing those
answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will gun reports?
not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down
in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has A: I had to seek shelter, sir.
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears
were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or
Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see
A: He was hit, sir. xxx xxx xxx
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL: Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the
deceased holding a gun when you first
Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor heard gun shot, will you please describe the
Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if stands (position) of the accused?
you know?
A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that
A: M-14, sir. the accused was standing on a forth (port)
arm position).
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the incident (precedent) have you
come to learn what happened to Regunton? Q: What did he do with the gun when you
saw him?
A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.
A: He fired the gun, sir.
Q: Was that all you gathered?
Q: To what the gun was directed when he
A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir. fired the gun?
Q: Who was that? Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard
many more shots after you run, would you
say that these gun shots you heard were
A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
fired from M-14 rifle?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.
COURT:
Q: Where were you at the time when you xxx xxx xxx
heard the automatic gun shot?
Q: And that person according to you was still
A: I was outside the cockpit, sir. 12 there when the late Mayor Arreola was
shot?
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:
A: He was directly behind him when the gun
ATTY. CONSIGNA: reports were made, sir.
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or Q: You mean to say the first gun report?
gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat
downward, is it not? A: Yes, sir.
A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor
seat aiming his gun, sir. Arreola?
Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir. 13
you mean?
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:
A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.
ATTY. ARRIOLA
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Do you remember what particular place
Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was of the cockpit when you go with Mayor
the first gun that you went to hide yourself at Arreola?
the gate of the cockpit, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.
Q: What part of the cockpit?
Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they
were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr. A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.
witness?
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers
A: Yes, sir. were arranged inside the cockpit?
Q: That person who allegedly passed by you Q: How were they arranged?
or infront of you prior to the first gun report,
did you notice if he had a gun with him?
A: In rows, step by step, sir.
Q: And what row did you stay together with Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use
the late Mayor Arreola? in shooting the late Arreola?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was
Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, hit?
sir.
A: Because I saw it, sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay
also? Q: What did you do also?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I
sir. sought cover because I was also wounded.
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton? Q: Do you know what happened also to
Romeo Regunton?
A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor
Arreola, sir. A: Yes, sir.
Q: While you were in that position together A: When I was wounded he also said, "uncle
with your companions, do you remember if I was also wounded."
there was untoward incident that happened?
Q: What did you tell when he told you that?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I told him, "you seek cover also my son".
Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover? Q: How far?
A: He moved slowly by dragging his body A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
along the ground, sir.
Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you
xxx xxx xxx that he was seated on the western part of
the cockpit?
Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario
Tabaco who fired upon the person of Mayor A: A little to the west, sir.
Arreola?
Q: An you together with the late Mayor
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir. 14 Arreola were also on the western part of the
cockpit?
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
A: We were on the northwest.
ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in
Q: When for the first time when you were these cases was not directly in front of you?
already in the cockpit arena did you see the
accused Mario Tabaco? A: A little bit west of us, sir.
Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on
have you seen the accused herein Mario the first row when he allegedly shot on
Tabaco? Mayor Arreola who was on 4th row, is that
what you mean?
A: He sat on the first row of the seats.
A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q: And sitting on the first row of the
bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and
did Mario Tabaco, the accused sit? faced towards the direction where you were
together with the late Mayor Arreola still
Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.
arena?
COURT:
A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
Q: And immediately after you heard the first Q: You don't know the person who shot
shot coming from the accused Mario Tabaco him?
considering that you were right behind the
late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still
your direct examination you immediately firing then, sir.
sought cover?
Q: You do not know the person who shot
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit him?
when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still
xxx xxx xxx firing then, sir. 15
Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant
you did not come to know that Mayor as the assailant in the shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were
Arreola was dead already? corroborated further by the testimony of another eyewitness in the person of
Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as follows:
A: Why not, the first and second shots, I
know him that he was already dead. PROSECUTOR ABAD:
Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard xxx xxx xxx
were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?
Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you
A: Yes, sir, in our place. saw him holding that gun?
Q: And that was the last time you heard Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of
burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena? Ex-Mayor Arreola had a point of entry higher than the point of exit because
he must have already been lying down when his wound was inflicted. 21
A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside
and outside. 17 Well established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's
liability for the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt.
Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of firing the gun, which is by itself
Benito Raquepo and policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is
that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987 while he was equivalent to criminal intent.
taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the gate of
the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if
the cockpit arena. While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw he did not intend the consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of
the accused-appellant coming from inside the cockpit arena. He told the the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed his gun at committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near which he intended.
Mario Tabaco, grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the
gun went off hitting him on the right thigh and the bullet exiting on his left
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder
thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about three meters charges and the penalty of reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on
away from his left side, was hit at his testicles.
him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other the single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:
hand corroborated in part the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at
about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22, 1987, he was at the canteen
Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and
of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from the
317, involving the killings of Oscar Tabulog, Jorge Arreola,
cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should
inside the cockpit arena. He was then about one meter away from accused- have been prosecuted under only one Information.
appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo whom he is acquainted with, and
Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the cockpit arena. Sgt.
Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he The law provides:
heard Sgt. Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant:
"What is that happened again, Mario." When he saw accused-appellant Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
change his gun position from port arm to horizontal position, he got near
accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused When a single act constitutes two or more
appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also grave or less grave felonies, or when an
Jorge Siriban. A certain Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take offense is a necessary means for committing
away the gun from accused-appellant. the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical applied in its maximum period. (as amended
assistance but Siriban was not as lucky. by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised Penal
Code).
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill
Siriban or wound Sgt. Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired Read as it should be, this article provides for two clauses of
in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no apparent reason, not tried to grab crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed; first, where
the gun from him, are without merit. the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (delito compuesto); and second, when the offense is
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because a necessary means for committing the other. (delito
the latter changed his gun from port arm position to horizontal position, and complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs. Pineda, 20
at that instance he thought accused-appellant might harm Sgt. Raquepo. 22 SCRA 748).
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4)
Sgt. Raquepo and the near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence separate Informations of murder, which should have been
otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims
should have been prosecuted under one information, It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. "K", SN
involving four (4) murder victims. No. 1492932, "K-2" — magazine of M-14 and Exh. "L" —
Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED accused, is admittedly an automatic powerful weapon, more
by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive automatic powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the
gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime bullets can penetrate even more than five (5) persons
involving four murdered victims, under the first category, resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven when,
where a single act of shooting constituted two or more grave according to witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even
or less grave felonies (delito compuesto), as decided in the destroyed the cemented rail guard separating the lower and
cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44 O.G. 3339; People upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds
vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July on his face and on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have
21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748. the used/spent empty shells (Exh. "R" and "R-1"). 23
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty
we say — as the deaths of Oscar Tahulug, Jorge Arreola, of reclusion perpetua for all four murder cases. The trial court holding that a
Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases complex crime was committed since "the evidence shows that the four (4)
Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317 respectively, were the result of victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive
one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs. automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours) 24 does not hold
Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty — is the penalty imposed water.
for the more serious offense. The more serious offense is
murder, the killing have been attended by TREACHERY Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the
because the victims were completely taken by surprise and doctrines enunciated in People vs. Pama 25 (not People vs. Dama, as cited
had no means of defending themselves against Mario by the trial court), People vs. Lawas, 26 and People vs. Pineda. 27
Tabaco's sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its
maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil. 515), but The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case,
as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is there was only one bullet which killed two persons. Hence, there was only
hereby reduced to a single Penalty of RECLUSION a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in a specie of complex
PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or
Maghanoy, GR Nos. 67170-72, December 15, 1989). more grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than
one bullet expended by the accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with evidence adduced by the prosecution show that Tabaco entered the cockpit
Frustrated Homicide and it appearing also that the death of with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun. 28 He fired the weapon, which
Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle
result of one single act of the accused Tabaco, the was recovered from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover,
applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the more several spent shells were recovered from the scene of the crime. Hence, the
serious offense. The more serious offense is HOMICIDE, to ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the contrary,
be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion temporal, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People
which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being vs. Desierto. 29 The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson
no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate sub-machine gun, an automatic firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of
Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and firing continuously. As stated therein:
which is hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is
10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the minimum, to 17 In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is
years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, not applicable because the death of each of the five persons
plus P30,000.00 actual damages for medical expenses of who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries
Benito Raquepo. inflicted upon each of the two other persons injured were not
caused by the performance by the accused of one simple
act as provided for by said article. Although it is true that Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas 35 is
several successive shots were fired by the accused in a misplaced. The doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is
short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused by numerous killers. In
consideration is that, to each death caused or physical the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow of a
injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and doubt, to the accused-appellant.
separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself
criminally liable for as many offenses as those resulting from Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot
every single act that produced the same. Although be considered a complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-
apparently he perpetrated a series of offenses successively appellant must therefore be held liable for each and every death he has
in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion perpetua.
person injured by him became the victim, respectively, of a
separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except for
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court
the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of
in finding accused-appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1)
frustrated homicide were committed successively during the count of Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the judgment appealed from
tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that four
connect one of them with its companion offenses. (emphasis sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.
ours)
Costs against accused-appellant.
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act
of pressing the trigger of the Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of
its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep pressing SO ORDERED.
the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not
the act of pressing the trigger which should produce the several Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced them. 30
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda. 31 True, the case
of Pineda provided us with a definition of what a complex crime is. But that is
not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48, was not applied in the said case
because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several homicides
committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have
seen that the Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted . . .
doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes." 32 Clarifying the applicability of Art.
48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated
in Pineda that "to apply the first half of Article 48, . . . there must be
singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the
law." 33 (emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by Tabaco, although
resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each
person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder.
There is no showing that only a single missile passed through the bodies of
all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus separate and distinct from
the other. In People vs. Pardo 34 we held that:
Where the death of two persons does not result from a single
act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and
not a complex crime, are committed.
EN BANC wounds in the head, which directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs.
"That at dawn on the 1st day of January, 1994 and past 12:00 o'clock
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CIPRIANO DE midnight of December 31, 1993, or thereabouts, at barangay Cayambanan,
VERA, SR., @ "AMBOS," accused-appellant. Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
DECISION have in his possession, custody and control one (1) firearm with ammunitions
without authority of law; which firearm he used in shooting Gerardo Valdez y
VITUG, J.:
Torres, a 13-year old boy, and Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno, on the above-cited
date, time and place.
It was a celebration which started with revelry and ended in
tragedy. The fatalities were 13-year old Gerardo Valdez y Torres and 29-
"That accused is indicted in two (2) separate Informations for the crime of
year old Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno. Accused of having killed the two victims
Murder for the fatal shooting of Gerardo Valdez y Torres and Homicide for
was Cipriano De Vera, Sr., an uncle of Gerardo, who was charged in three
the fatal shooting of Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno, before this Honorable Court.
separate informations, inclusive of a charge for illegal possession of firearm,
hereinbelow recited:
"Contrary to P.D. No. 1866."[3]
In Criminal Case No. U-7809 -
After a joint trial that followed the arraignment and the plea of “not guilty”
entered by the accused with the assistance of counsel, Judge Antonio M.
"That at past 12:00 o'clock midnight of December 31, 1993 and at dawn on
Belen of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, found
the 1st day of January, 1994, or thereabouts, at barangay Cayambanan,
the accused guilty as charged and so sentenced him, thusly:
municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a firearm,
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, "Wherefore, in the light of the considerations discussed above, the court
assault and shoot one Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno, inflicting upon the latter fatal hereby, renders judgment in the above-entitled cases as follows:
wounds in the head, which directly caused her death, to the damage and
prejudice of her heirs. "In Criminal Cases Nos. U-7809 and U-7810, the court finds the accused
Cipriano de Vera, Sr. alias Ambos, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
"Contrary to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code."[1] complex crime of Murder with Homicide defined and penalized by Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code and conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. U-7810 -
"The court further orders the accused to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
"That at dawn on the 1st day of January, 1994 and past 12:00 o'clock
Gerardo Valdez, the sum of P20,285.00 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as
midnight of December 31, 1993, or thereabouts, at barangay Cayambanan,
death indemnity and moral damages of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
municipality of Urdaneta, province of Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction
imprisonment in case of insolvency. The court likewise orders the accused
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with a firearm,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Perlita Ferrer the sum of P35,000.00
taking advantage of nighttime and the sporadic burst of firecrackers on New
as actual damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P2,040,000.00 as
Year's day, with evident premeditation, treachery and deliberate intent to kill,
loss of earning capacity of the late Perlita Ferrer without subsidiary
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
shoot Gerardo Valdez y Torres, a 13-year old boy, inflicting upon him fatal
"In Criminal Case No. U-7811, the court likewise finds and holds the own house, she was at the terrace watching Neil and Gerardo explode
accused, Cipriano de Vera, Sr. alias Ambos, guilty beyond reasonable doubt firecrackers when she saw the accused, then under a mango tree, shoot
of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions, penalized Gerardo, using a firearm about 2-1/2 feet long. While she went to succor her
under the provision of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended, and brother, she saw the accused going eastward. She attested to the existence
conformable thereto, pursuant to law, hereby sentences said accused to of a feud between her father and the accused.
suffer the indeterminate prison term of twelve (12) years of prision mayor
as minimum to eighteen (18) years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal SPO1 Asterio Dismaya, a member of the Philippine National Police and
as maximum and to pay the costs of the proceedings. duty investigator, said that their office received in the morning of 01 January
1994 a report on the shooting incident. He proceeded to Cayambanan,
Urdaneta, with one Sgt. Reyes and conducted a “spot investigation.” A
"SO ORDERED."[4] sketch of the surroundings showed that the bullet traveled from the east to
the west direction and that there was no obstruction between Gerardo and
The trial judge briefly narrated the evidence successively presented by Perlita, the fence along the road being only about one meter high. The
the prosecution and the defense. accused was fingered to be the culprit responsible for the shooting
incident. The latter’s wife told the police officers that the accused had
already left for Manila at midnight of 31 December 1993. SPO1 Dismaya
Evidence For the Prosecution. – was later to learn that the accused had "surrendered" to Sgt. Prudencio
Cawagan of the Urdaneta Police.
Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Rural Health Officer of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Neil Valdez, brother of Gerardo, recalled that at around midnight of 31
declared having conducted an autopsy examination on 01 January 1994 and
December 1993, he and Gerardo were exploding firecrackers when he
03 January 1994, respectively, on the remains of Gerardo Valdez and Perlita
noticed his uncle, Cipriano De Vera, Sr., go under a mango tree. Minutes Ferrer. Gerardo had sustained three gunshot wounds; viz: The first wound,
later, he was startled by a gunshot, followed by the falling body of his brother, on the right parietal region, behind the right ear, was rounded, about 8 mm. x
Gerardo, to the ground. When he looked around, he saw the accused, whom 7 mm., directed inwards with a point of entry but no point of exit; the pellet
he clearly recognized, holding a long-barreled gun, about one meter long,
was found on the muscle liner at the left temple of the victim. The second
also locally known as "sumpak." The accused was about 8 to 9 meters away
wound, 17 mm. x 12 mm., at the mid-parietal region, middle part of the lower
from him. Just as he started to assist his brother, Neil heard shouts, about
neck just above the nape, also indicated a point of entry but no point of exit;
40 to 50 meters away, that Perlita was also dead ("aynatay metten ni
the slug was found in the right occipital of the brain. The third wound, 15
Perlita"). He learned moments later that Perlita was shot on the left side of
mm. x 9 mm., in the mid-occipital region, at the back of the neck above the
the forehead above the left eye. The accused tried to flee from the
second wound, likewise had a point of entry and no point of exit; the slug was
scene. Neil proceeded to give chase but he was not able to overtake the
found in the cranial cavity. Dr. Gonzales testified that the distance between
accused. He speculated that the shooting was an offshoot of the land
the first and second wounds was approximately two inches and about an
dispute between his father and the accused.
inch between the second and third wounds. The first slug went through the
Samuel Nicer testified that a few days before the incident, he saw the brain and stopped at the left temple; the second went through the brain and
accused sporting a gun. Around midnight of 31 December 1993, he, caused bleeding; and the third penetrated the skull and entered the
together with Rodrigo Gallardo, Raffy Bustamante and some other friends, brain. According to him, all the wounds were fatal. The slugs were kept in
again chanced upon the accused holding the same one-meter long gun, his office since he was not asked to turn them over to the police. The
which the latter, in fact, pointed at them. At about 12:10 a.m. of 01 January autopsy on Perlita revealed that she had suffered a gunshot wound on the
1994, while on his way home, the witness saw the accused walking towards left eyebrow. It had a point of entry but no point of exit, and the slug was
the east, in front of the Dominguez ricemill, still carrying his "sumpak." found at the right parietal lobe of the brain. The wound was fatal. He said
that the slugs he recovered from Gerardo Valdez were similar to the slugs he
Jesusa Valdez, sister of Gerardo, stated that at about 10:45 p.m. of 31 recovered from Perlita Ferrer which he also kept in his office.
December 1993, she and Gerardo were invited by Mary Ann, daughter of the
accused, to partake of the New Year's meal at the latter's house. While Angelita Ferrer, the mother of Perlita, upon learning that the latter had
thereat, they were warned by the accused not to go out of their house that been shot, repaired at once to the hospital but Perlita had already expired by
night because there would be a traitor (judas) in the vicinity. Later, at their the time she arrived. At the time of her death, Perlita was 29 years old,
single, and earning P8,000.00 a month as the manager of a restaurant in
Quezon City. The witness said that she spent P16,995.00 for her daughter's Romeo Barcelona, a relative of the wife of the accused, stated that in
night vigils and P15,000.00 for the funeral. the evening of 31 December 1993, at about 11:00 p.m., the accused was at
their house in Barangay Paurido, where he helped prepare the food they
Dalia Ferrer stated that she and her sister Perlita were in Cayambanan would partake for the evening celebration. The accused finished cooking at
for the New Year's celebration at the invitation of Julito De Vera. The house 1:00 a.m. of 01 January 1994. After eating, they went to bed and woke up at
of Gerardo was about 40 to 50 meters from where her sister was standing around 6:00 a.m. Shortly thereafter, the accused left for Manila.
when shot. Perlita was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital where Neil
Valdez informed her that the assailant was the accused. The accused, Cipriano De Vera, Sr., asserted that he arrived in
Urdaneta from Manila on 27 December 1993. In the evening of 31
Renato Valdez, the father of Gerardo, confirmed that he and the December 1993, he cooked the food for his family. After taking their supper
accused, a cousin, had a dispute over the land given to Renato's father by at about 8:15 p.m., his children went to the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel while he
their grandfather of which the accused wanted a share. At about 12:05 in the departed for Barangay Paurido, Urdaneta, to cook for his cousin, Felicidad
morning of 01 January 1994, he was at the house of his friend Meni in Barcelona. He arrived in Barangay Paurido at 10:30 p.m., celebrated with
Nancalabasaan, Urdaneta, when informed by his son Neil that Gerardo had his relatives and there spent the night. He woke up at 6:00 a.m., and left for
been shot by the accused. He promptly proceeded to the Sacred Heart Manila after taking a bath and having his breakfast. He arrived in Manila in
Hospital but he was unable to reach his son alive. He spent P2,375.30 for the afternoon of 01 January 1994 and proceeded to work the next
Gerardo's hospitalization, P4,200.00 for the vigil, P4,000.00 for the lompos, day. When he returned from his work that day, he was surprised to find his
P3,000.00 for the tomb, P300.00 for the lapida, P200.00 for the church rites, daughter, Grace, who went to see him about a pending warrant for his
P10.00 for the burial permit and P5,000.00 for the funeral arrest. He was able to return to Urdaneta only on 06 January 1994. After
expenses. Gerardo was in first year of high school when he died. attending a religious service at the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel, he proceeded to
Barangay Paurido. He went to the Urdaneta police station on 08 January
1994 to inquire about a warrant of arrest issued against him on a pending
Evidence For the Defense. – rape charge but he was promptly put to jail.
The accused sought to discredit the testimony of Neil Valdez and
Cipriano De Vera, Jr., a son of the accused, claimed that around 9:00 surmised that the latter had testified against him for his having given
p.m. of 31 December 1993, he was on guard duty at the Iglesia ni Cristo previously a warning against Neil's visits to his daughter and also because
Chapel in Cayambanan with Neil Valdez, Jovito Opinion and Julius De the Valdez family would want him to vacate the lot which he and his family
Vera. Neil left at around 10:00 p.m. after being informed that his brother were occupying. On the other hand, prosecution witness Samuel Nicer, the
Gerardo had been shot. Neil returned at 12:15 a.m. of 01 January 1994 and accused claimed, also held grudges against him (the accused). Nicer
stayed with the group until 2:00 a.m. The witness said that Neil used to be a suspected that Glenda and Grace, daughters of the accused, to be the
member of the church until he was expelled therefrom. persons responsible for the expulsion of Nicer from the Iglesia ni Cristo.
Glenda De Vera testified that on the eve of 31 December 1993, she Neil Valdez and Samuel Nicer were presented on rebuttal. Neil said
celebrated the coming of the New Year with her family, relatives and some that neither Cipriano De Vera, Jr., nor the accused was a member of the
guests. It was her father, the accused, who prepared the food for them. Her Iglesia ni Cristo, either in Cayambanan or in Nancalabasaan,
father, as well as some of the visitors, left the house at around 10:00 Urdaneta. Nicer, for his part, denied having been expelled from the Iglesia ni
p.m. When her father failed to return, her sister looked for him in Barangay Cristo. Also presented at the witness stand was Isagani Pagaduan,
Paurido where she was informed by relatives that he already had left for Cayambanan Secretary of the Iglesia Ni Cristo from 1985 to 1993 who
Manila. She testified that the accused had worked in Manila and would go attested that Neil Valdez had never been expelled from the church. He also
home to Urdaneta only thrice a year. At around 1:00 a.m. of 01 January declared that on 31 December 1993, Neil Valdez stayed at the Iglesia ni
1994, she learned that one of their neighbors had been hit by a stray Cristo chapel only until 10:00 p.m., and that the latter did not come back that
bullet. When she and her sister Grace were informed that their father was night after leaving the place.
being sought by the police, Grace went to Manila to apprise the accused As aforesaid, the court a quo, presided over by Judge Antonio M. Belen,
about it. Her father was not able to return to Pangasinan immediately but found for the prosecution and convicted the accused. Forthwith, the case
later he "surrendered" to the police authorities. was elevated to this Court for automatic review pursuant to Republic Act No.
7659 on account of the imposition by the trial court of the death penalty.
In challenging the decision that has convicted him of all the charges, "V. THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL COURT
accused-appellant contends that - IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL PENALTY AND THUS VOID.
"I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE "A. MURDER AS DEFINED BY R.A. NO. 7659 IS NOT A HEINOUS
EVIDENCE. CRIME.
"A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE "B. THERE IS NO COMPELLING REASON TO REIMPOSE THE DEATH
TESTIMONIES THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES PENALTY FOR MURDER.
"B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE APPELLANT LIABLE "C. THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. ECHEGARAY DESERVES
FOR PERLITA FERRER'S DEATH. REEXAMINATION."[5]
"II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH LAW Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of, including particularly
AND JURISPRUDENCE. the assessment on the credibility of witnesses made by, a trial court are
accorded a great degree of respect and will not, absent strong cogent
"A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT OF A reasons, be disturbed on appeal. In this instance, the Court sees no
COMPLEX CRIME CONSTITUTING CRIMES ALLEGED IN SEPARATE justification to set aside the conclusions arrived at by the trial court and its
INFORMATIONS. holding that accused-appellant indeed is responsible for the death of the two
victims.
"B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING Neil Valdez, testifying before the trial court, categorically pointed to the
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. accused to be the perpetrator of the killings. Neil stated:
"C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DETERMINING MOTIVE AS "Q Do you know Gerardo Valdez y Torres, the victim in Criminal Case
IMPORTANT FOR CASES IN WHICH THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE No. U-7810?
ACCUSED IS DOUBTFUL. "WITNESS:
"D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE APPELLANT'S "A Yes, sir.
DEFENSE OF ALIBI. "Q Where is he now?
"E. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING VOLUNTARY "A Already dead, sir.
SURRENDER AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE. "Q What age when your brother, Gerardo Valdez, died?
"F. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT OF "A He was 13 years old, sir.
VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 1866. "Q Do you know also the accused in these three (3) cases, Cipriano de
Vera?
"G. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT OF
SEPARATE OFFENSES. "A Yes, sir.
"Q Why do you know Cipriano de Vera?
"III. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE AS IT RESOLVED ALL DOUBTS "A He is my uncle and a neighbor, sir.
AGAINST THE APPELLANT. "Q Why is he your uncle?
"IV. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF THE "A Because the father of Cipriano de Vera and the father of my father
APPELLANT TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. are brothers, sir.
"Q How is Cipriano de Vera properly called in your place? "A Bullet of a shotgun, sir.
"A Alias `Ambos,' sir. "Q What did you see the accused do as he was holding that `sumpak'
directed to your brother at the time?
"Q You said you are neighbors, how far is your house to his house?
"A When I lighted firecracker there was a big `bang' and I saw the
"A It is around fifteen (15) meters away, sir. accused pointed direct to my brother and when I looked at my
"Q Now, during the midnight of December 31, 1993, do you know where brother, he fell down, sir.
you were? "Q How far were you from the accused when you saw directed the
"A Yes, sir. firearm towards your brother and shot him?
"Q Where were you? at about midnight of December 31, 1993? "ATTY. EVANGELISTA:
"A I was beside my brother, Gerardo Valdez, lighting firecrackers, sir. We will object, Your Honor. There is not testimony as to the shooting by
the accused to his brother. This witness testified on he light
"Q Why were you lighting firecrackers? firecracker and he heard a big `bang' and saw holding iron bar. He
did not say, he shot, Your Honor.
"A It was eve of New Year or New Year's eve, sir.
"COURT:
"Q At what particular place were you near your brother, Gerardo Valdez,
at that time? "Q How far were you when you saw the accused pointing that `sumpak'
towards your brother?
"A Infront of our house, sir.
"WITNESS:
"Q What barangay?
"A Eight (8) to nine (9) meters away, sir.
"A Cayambanan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir.
"FISCAL:
"Q Now, as you were infront of your house lighting firecracker near your
brother, do you observe any unusual incident that took place "Q Will you demonstrate how the accused held the long firearm
thereat? (sumpak) directed to your brother and heard this loud sound `bang?'
"A I noticed the accused Ambos went to the road and then returned "WITNESS:
under the mango tree and thereafter, he held a shot bang and I saw
my brother, Gerardo Valdez fell down and when I looked around I "A Like this, sir (Witness now demonstrating to the Court extending his
saw Cipriano de Vera holding a long firearm and pointed to the right hand at the right side and the left is extended forward as if
direction of my brother, Gerardo Valdez, sir. holding something).
"Q Kindly describe this long firearm which you saw pointed by the "Q What further action did the accused, if any, while he was holding that
accused at your brother? firearm?
"A One (1) meter long and the barrel is iron pipe, sir. "A I saw the accused pushed something on the `sumpak' and my brother
was hit, sir.
"Q Do you know what is the popular name of that firearm which you saw
in the possession, control and custody of the accused? "Q As the accused has made that motion pushing forward with his right
hand, what did you see as a result of that action made by the
"A They called `sumpak,' sir, or called `Pasoot.' accused on the gun, if any?
"Q What is the ammunition used in that `sumpak' or `palsoot?' "A The gun fired, sir.
"A Gauge 12, sir. "Q Now, when you saw your brother hit by the action of the accused
firing the gun, what more, if any, did you observe?
"Q What is the gauge 12 bullet called for, what kind of firearm?
"ATTY. EVANGELISTA: As part of narration, the answer stay on the record.
We object, Your Honor. There is no such fired the gun. What he said, he "FISCAL:
pushed something. He did not fire any trigger, Your Honor.
"Q How many times did you see the accused made this motion firing the
"COURT: long firearm (sumpak)?
The accused pushed something. "WITNESS:
"Q What else did you observe, if any? "A Only once, sir.
"WITNESS: "Q Now, what happened next when you saw your brother, Gerardo
Valdez hit and nearby he fell down?
"A After the gun fired, I saw my brother fell down and when I embraced
him he was injured on his head, sir. "A Yes, sir. My brother was hit and fell down and I embraced him and I
saw the accused ran, sir.
"FISCAL:
"COURT:
"Q Simultaneously, when you saw your brother was hit, what more did
you observe in the surroundings, if any? "Q Where?
"WITNESS: "WITNESS:
"A Then, I also heard shouts because somebody was hit nearby, sir. "A Towards the East direction, sir. When I tried to chase him he ran
farther, so, I did not continue chasing him.
"Q Can you tell where did these shouts originate in relation to the place
of your brother, Gerardo Valdez was? "FISCAL:
"A On the West direction, sir. "Q How far in meters have you gone in chasing the accused Eastward?
"Q About how many meters did you hear the shout to the place where "WITNESS:
you were?
"A When I saw him he was around seventy (70) meters around because
"A Forty (40) to fifty (50) meters away, sir. it was bright, so, I recognized him because there was moonlight and
it was bright, sir.
"Q Can you tell us what were the shouts about?
"Q How many meters did you take this chase to the accused?
"A They said Perlita died, sir.
"A I chased the accused up to the place where he entered there were
"Q Did you come to know why Perlita died? concrete fence, so, we lighted the place with flashlight and thickly
"A He was also hit on the left side of the forehead just above the left eye, populated and there were thick grasses, sir.
sir. "Q How many meters from the place where you chased the accused to
"Q Do you know the reason why this Perlita was hit on her left forehead? the place where you stopped when the accused entered in that
place?
"A According to the information, I heard that Perlita was facing towards
our direction and perhaps an extra bullet hit her, sir. "A A distance of One Hundred (100) meters, sir, from the place where
we were.
"ATTY. EVANGELISTA:
"Q Now, after you were not able to chase the accused, what transpired
We move to strike out the answer of the witness on the ground that it is next?
hearsay. Aside from being hearsay, it is based on conjection.
"A After he went to the East direction, sir.
"COURT:
"Q By the way, who were your companions in chasing this accused as "A Yes, sir.
you said earlier `we?'
"Q How far was he from you?
"A My uncle Victorino Valdez and no more, sir.
"A Around three (3) meters away, sir.
"Q What more transpired when you went Eastward?
"COURT:
"A I called for my father and told him that my brother died, sir.
Go ahead.
"Q Can you point this Cipriano de Vera, alias `Ambos' whom you saw
that night carrying that `sumpak' aimed at your brother and hit on his "ATTY. EVANGELISTA:
back of his head? "Q And where was he facing at that time?
"A He is there, sir (Witness pointing to the accused)."[6] "WITNESS:
The witness did not waver during the cross-examination. He went on to "A He was facing North towards the road, sir.
respond to questions thusly:
"Q And you say that the accused was allegedly on the Eastern side of
"ATTY. EVANGELISTA: the place where you were?
"Q Mr. Witness, at the time of the incident you testified to here, were you "A Yes, sir.
facing your brother?
"Q At that moment therefore, Mr. Witness, you were facing towards the
"FISCAL" Northeast, direction?
At what particular time? "FISCAL:
"ATTY. EVANGELISTA: What moment?
The alleged shooting. "ATTY. EVANGELISTA:
"FISCAL: At that time of the shooting.
We object, that is misleading. "COURT:
"COURT: Answer.
Answer. "WITNESS:
"WITNESS: "A I was facing the suspect, sir.
"A I was not facing him directly, sir. He was on my side, sir. "ATTY. EVANGELISTA:
"COURT: "Q Mr. Witness, why are you facing the East direction the suspect?
"Q What side? "WITNESS:
"WITNESS: "A I was facing the firecrackers, sir.
On my left side, sir. "Q You mean to say, you are throwing the firecrackers infront of the
"Q To what direction? accused?
"A North direction, sir. "A No, sir, within our compound.
"Q So, your brother was North of you at the time he was shot, correct? "Q But it is towards its direction?
"A It is far from him and those are just small firecrackers, sir. "Q while you were there in your terrace watching your brothers lighting
firecrackers, do you remember having noticed unusual incident that
"Q How far is it from him the firecrackers being thrown to you? happened at that time?
"A Six (6) meters away, sir. "A I saw the accused shot my brother, Gerardo Valdez, while the
"Q Will you point to any particular point that is six (6) meters away? accused was under the mango tree, sir.
"A From here up to the place of the accused where he was sitted, "Q Now, can you describe that weapon used by the accused in shooting
sir. (Estimated to be five (5) meters). your brother, Gerardo Valdez?
"Q Mr. Witness, and how far were you throwing of your firecrackers? "A It is a long firearm about 2 and 1/2 foot long, sir, and it is adjustable
and bullet is like a pipe.
"A About two (2) meters away from me, sir.
"Q Can you demonstrate how the accused shot your brother?
"Q And how far was it from the place of you are standing?
"A The accused pointed his gun towards my brother with his right hand
"A From here up to the stenographer, sir. lower and his left hand about 45 degree by the gun with his right 45
degrees, sir.
"Q Mr. Witness, do you have to throw the firecrackers towards the
direction of the accused? "FISCAL:
"A At the time we throw those firecrackers the accused was not yet To make the demonstration better, this witness be given a long object to
there. There were no persons before he shot my brother, sir. represent.
"Q When you saw your brother allegedly shot, were you lighting a "WITNESS: (continuing)
firecracker at that time?
"A First, the accused held the butt of the gun with his right hand as if
"A I was waiting the last firecracker which I lighted to exploid, sir. pulling something while the left hand holding the middle extended
forward pulled then pushed the gun, sir, the mechanism of the gun.
"Q In other words, your attention was towards the firecracker which you
have just thrown? "FISCAL:
"FISCAL: "Q How far were you from the accused when you saw him shot your
brother?
Misleading, Your Honor.
"WITNESS:
"COURT:
"A More or less, eight (8) meters away, sir.
Answer.
"Q What transpired next after that?
"WITNESS:
"A After the shooting, I approached my brother and I went near him while
"A At the time, I was waiting for the firecracker to exploid. My attention
there I heard shouts coming from the West direction saying that
was on that direction and I saw the accused fire his gun, sir."[7]
someone was shot in that place, sir.
The above testimony of Neil Valdez was bolstered by an account of the
"Q When you went near your brother, Gerardo, who fell down after he
incident given by Jesusa Valdez. Jesusa declared:
was shot, what did you do?
"Q Now, at about 12:05 in the early morning of January 1994, do you still
"A I embraced my brother and I saw the accused going towards the East
recall where you were?
direction, sir."[8]
"A Yes, sir. I was in our terrace and I was watching my brothers,
Cipriano De Vera, Jr., the son of the accused, tried hard to discredit Neil
Gerardo Valdez, and Neil Valdez lighting firecrackers infront of our
Valdez by asserting that the latter was with him on the night of the incident
house, sir.
and left only after he had learned of the death of his brother. This assertion, "Q And Mr. witness, in Manila, do you know what happened?
however, was convincingly rebutted by Isagani Pagaduan, a former secretary
of the Iglesia ni Cristo, who attested to the fact that Neil had left the chapel at "A When I arrived, I worked as a masonry, sir.
around 10:00 p.m. and never returned that evening. "COURT
The Court cannot look with favor at the alibi proffered by the accused for "Q Cementing what?
not only is it considered one of the weakest defenses, obviously due to its
being capable of easy fabrication,[9] but also because it may not prevail over "A I worked as a masonry in a construction of a house, sir.
witnesses' positive identification that points to him as the perpetrator of the
"ATTY. EVANGELISTA
crime.[10] At all events, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that
the accused can prove his being at another place at the time of its "Q After working, what did you do?
commission; it is likewise essential that he can show physical impossibility for
him to be at the locus delicti.[11] Appellant himself has averred that Paurido, "A I went home to the house of my elder sister in Makati, sir.
Urdaneta, Pangasinan, is just about eight to nine kilometers away from "Q And what did you find out when you went home?
Cayambanan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, and could be reached by a tricycle in
just about twenty to thirty minutes. "A I came upon my daughter, Grace, sir.
Neither can the Court agree with appellant that the witnesses for the "Q What day was that?
prosecution have been goaded by improper motives in testifying against
him. Nothing of substance has here been presented to convince the Court "A January 1, 1994 in the afternoon and asked why was she there,
that the prosecution witnesses would deliberately lie, send the wrong man to sir. She told me that I had a warrant of arrest, sir.
jail or even to the gallows, and set the real malefactor scot-free. "Q What else did you inquire regarding the warrant of arrest from your
The trial court has correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of daughter, Grace?
treachery against appellant. Treachery exists when the means of execution "A It was a warrant of arrest regarding my pending case for Rape, sir.
employed by the accused gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate, and the means of execution are deliberately or consciously "Q And what did you tell her, if any?
adopted.[12] It has been amply shown in this instance that the victims have
"A I told her to go home ahead because I will follow since I still have
been totally unprepared for the sudden and unexpected attack. It is also
work to do, sir.
evident that appellant has placed himself at a safe distance in firing at his
victims, indeed hiding behind the noise and merriment of the New Year's "Q Mr. witness, you said you were to follow Grace, where were you to
celebration, to avoid any risk to himself and then to cover up his nefarious follow her?
deed.
"A Here in Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir.
The contention of the defense that the trial court has erred in not
appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of "Q Did you follow Grace in Urdaneta, Pangasinan?
appellant has no merit. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity "A Yes, sir.
and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities either because (1) he acknowledges his "Q What day did you follow her?
guilt, or (2) he would wish to save the State of having to itself effect his
capture and arrest pertinent to the crime with which he is charged and in "A It was in January 6, 1994, sir.
regard to which that mitigating circumstance is invoked. [13] Voluntary "Q And where did you proceed that day?
surrender is not a mitigating circumstance where it appears that the purpose
of the accused in going to the authorities is for an entirely different matter. "A I dropped by the chapel, sir.
In the case at bar, appellant himself said that he had gone to the police "Q What chapel are you referring to?
station in Urdaneta merely to inquire about a warrant of arrest in connection
"A The Church of Christ (INK), sir.
with a pending case against him for rape. Thus:
"Q What time was that? Anent the allegation that appellant could not have been responsible
likewise for the death of Perlita Ferrer, the Court agrees with the
"A I arrived at the INK chapel 2:30 in the afternoon, sir. observations of the trial court that -
"Q And what did you do there? (1) the slug extracted from the right parietal lobe of Perlita's brain is
"A I attended the religious service, sir. similar to the pellets extracted from the head of Gerardo;
"Q And how long did you stay there? (2) the wounds sustained by the two victims were caused by
gunshot and the ammunitions used are pellets, like the ones
"A After the church service, I proceeded to Paurido, Urdaneta, used in a shotgun;
Pangasinan, sir, to sleep there.
(3) Perlita was standing on the same line of direction as Gerardo
"Q The following day, January 7, 1994, what did you do next, if any? when accused-appellant fired his sumpak -
"A I still helped working in Paurido, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir. along with the fact that Perlita would appear to have fallen at just about the
same time as Gerardo did after the shot was delivered, are circumstances
"Q Did you not inquire on the reported warrant of arrest against you, Mr.
that all point just to the contrary.
witness?
The trial court erred, however, in convicting appellant for Illegal
"A I asked them about it but I was the one who personally went to the
Possession of Firearm and Ammunitions. In People vs. Valdez,[17] the Court,
police station of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, sir, on January 8, 1994.
citing People vs. Molina[18] and People vs. Feloteo[19] held that there could be
"Q Upon reaching the police station of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, what no separate conviction for Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential
happened there? Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No.
8294 and that the illegal possession of firearms should thenceforth be taken
"A They informed me that I have a pending case in the police station and as an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Section 1 of the amendatory
told me that I will be incarcerated, sir. law. Nevertheless, the alleged use of an unlicensed firearm as a special
"Q And you were incarcerated? aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-7809 and Criminal Case
No. U-7810 would be improper. While it was established by the testimonies
"A Yes, sir. of Neil and Jesusa Valdez that appellant used a sumpak in shooting the
victims, it was not equally established that appellant had no license to
"Q And do you know why you were incarcerated that day? possess it. The fact that the firearm appeared to be a homemade gun or
"A Because of the Rape case filed against me, sir. illegally manufactured would not dispense with the requirement of proof that
it was unlicensed.[20] Besides, Republic Act No. 8294 took effect only on 06
"Q Mr. witness, did you come to know that incident that transpired in July 1997 and could only be given retroactive effect if favorable to the
Brgy. Cayambanan, Urdaneta, Pangasinan about 12:05 of January accused, such as in its application to Criminal Case No. U-7811, but not
1, 1994? when it would aggravate the criminal liability of the accused.
"A I was only informed when I was already jailed, sir." [14] Finally, appellant raises the issue of whether or not the trial court has
acted rightly or has erred in convicting him for the complex crime of murder
Appellant brings up the alleged violation of his right to preliminary
with homicide. Here, the Court finds for accused-appellant and quotes with
investigation. The right to preliminary investigation, however, may be
approval the observation made by the Office of the Solicitor General, viz:
waived, and it will be deemed to have been waived by failing to invoke it prior
to, or at least at the time of, the arraignment.[15] The question of whether
there has been a preliminary investigation, or whether it has been properly "The record of the case will show that three separate informations were filed
conducted, should be interposed prior to the plea of the accused. [16] The against appellant, one for the murder of Gerardo Valdez, the second for
Office of the Solicitor General is correct in contending that it would now be homicide for the death of Perlita Ferrer, and the third for illegal possession of
late in the day for appellant to raise the issue for the first time in this appeal firearms. This Honorable Court has held that `while the trial court can hold a
before the Court. joint trial of two or more criminal cases and can render a consolidated
decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex crime consisting of the
various crimes alleged on the two informations' (People vs. Legaspi, 246 mathematical computation of annual income times life
SCRA 206, 213). Thus, appellant cannot be held liable for the complex expectancy. Allowances are also made for circumstances which could
crime of murder with homicide but should be held liable separately for these reduce the computed life expectancy of the victim like the nature of his work,
crimes."[21] his lifestyle, age and state of health prior to his death, and the rate of loss
sustained by the heirs of the victim. All taken, the sum of P1,000,000.00 for
In People vs. Legaspi,[22] abovecited by the Solicitor General, the loss of earning capacity of the deceased victim awarded by the trial court
appellants were charged with two separate informations, one for double must be increased to P1,380,000.00. The award of moral damages of
murder (Criminal Case No. C-28760 [87] and the other for violation of R.A. P100,000.00 arising from the mental anguish suffered by the surviving
No. 6539 (Criminal Case No. C-28761 [87]). The Court there held: spouse, Julie Gotanci, and testified to by her, is reasonable.”
"x x x Their conviction can only be limited to the crime alleged or necessarily Angelita Ferrer, mother of Perlita, said that she had spent a total of
included in the allegations in the separate informations. What controls is the P31,995.00 for the vigil and funeral expenses of her daughter. The trial court
description of the offense, as alleged in the information (Santos vs. People, awarded her the sum of P35,000.00. Only the amount of P15,000.00 for
181 SCRA 487 [1990]). While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or funeral expenses, however, was duly receipted. Renato Valdez, father of
more criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot Gerardo, stated that the family had spent a total of P19,085.30 for Gerardo’s
convict the accused of a complex crime constitutive of the various crimes wake and funeral. The trial court awarded him P20,285.00 but the receipted
alleged in the two informations. Thus, the accused were deprived of their amount, however, totaled only P7,785.30. The awards made by the court a
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation quo must thus be reduced correspondingly. Relative to the award of
against them (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14[2])."[23] damages for loss of earning capacity to the heirs of Perlita Ferrer, using the
formula in People vs. Nullan, the entitlement thereto should be modified by
reducing it to the amount of P1,632,000.00 from P2,040,000.00. The award
There is, nevertheless, a need to modify the award of damages
awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victims. In People vs. Alberto of moral damages by the trial court in favor of the heirs of Gerardo, being
Nullan, et al.,[24] the Court had occasion to restate the rules; viz: justified, can be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision, dated 20 April 1995, of the Regional Trial
“With respect to damages, the recovery of actual damages must be premised Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 38, is MODIFIED thusly:
upon competent proof and best evidence obtainable by the injured party
showing the actual expenses incurred in connection with the death, wake or In Criminal Case No. U-7809, accused-appellant Cipriano De Vera, Sr.,
burial of the victim. Courts cannot simply assume that damages are is found GUILTY of Homicide for the death of Perlita Ferrer y Mamorno and
sustained by the injured party, nor can it rely on speculation or guesswork in is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment term of from nine (9)
determining the fact and amount of damages. In the case at bench, the years and one (1) day of prison mayor to fifteen (15) years and six (6)
Court accepts as having been incurred the amount of P52,851.96 for doctor months of reclusion temporal and ordered to pay the heirs of Perlita Ferrer y
fees, hospital bills, funeral cremation, burial services and the cost of the tomb Mamorno civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, actual damages of
of the victim for which supporting receipts are on record. The alleged P15,000.00, and P1,632,000.00 for loss of earning capacity.
reasonable miscellaneous expenses of P40,000.00 are disallowed for not In Criminal Case No. U-7810, accused-appellant Cipriano De Vera, Sr.,
having been sufficiently proved. The actual damages awarded by the trial is found GUILTY of Murder for the death of Gerardo Valdez y Torres and is
court should be thus reduced to only P52,851.96. Relative to the amount of sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the
damages for loss of earnings, the trial court has fixed the amount of heirs of Gerardo Valdez y Torres civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00 and
P1,000,000.00 based on the victim’s life expectancy of 65 years. This Court actual damages of P7,785.30. The award of moral damages decreed by the
has consistently used the formula: [2/3 x (80 - age of victim at time of death)] trial is affirmed.
in determining life expectancy. The victim in this case therefore can be said
to have had a life expectancy of [2/3 x (80 – 46)] 23 years. The trial court Criminal Case No. U-7811 is DISMISSED.
has aptly estimated his annual income to be close to P120,000.00 from
Costs against accused-appellant.
which amount should be deducted the necessary and incidental expenses
which the victim would have incurred if he were alive, estimated at 50%, to SO ORDERED.
about a balance of P60,000.00 net annual income. In computing the loss of
earning capacity of the victim, several factors are considered besides the
FIRST DIVISION neighbors converged. Among them were appellant Radel Gallarde,
Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel
G.R. No. 133025 February 17, 2000 Hernandez, Jaime Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel
Arellaga and Ramil Bargon. Idling by was Editha, 10 year old
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, daughter of spouses Talan. A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as
they partook beer (TSN dated October 13, 1997, pp. 3-4).
vs.
RADEL GALLARDE, accused-appellant.
After a while, Roger stood up and invited Jaime and appellant to dine
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: in the kitchen. As they partook of the meal, appellant suddenly left.
Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to urinate. Outside the house,
he chanced upon appellant and Editha talking to each other. Jaime
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tayug, whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted
Pangasinan, Branch 51, finding accused-appellant Radel Gallarde1 (hereafter towards the road leading to his house (Id., pp. 4-6).
GALLARDE) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in
Criminal Case No. T-1978 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Editha Talan (hereafter Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene
lamp. Jaime followed her and asked where she was going. Editha
EDITHA) the amount of P70,000 as actual damages.2
answered that she would look for appellant. Soon Editha left enroute
to where appellant fled (Id., pp. 7-8).
On 24 June 1997, GALLARDE was charged with the special complex crime
of rape with homicide in an information whose accusatory portion reads as
By 10:00 o'clock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed
follows:
but Jaime, Francisco, Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renato's place
where they talked and relaxed. Moments later, Roger arrived and
That on or about the 6th day of May 1997, in the evening, amidst the informed them that Editha was missing. Roger asked the group to
field located at Brgy. Trenchera, [M]unicipality of Tayug, [P]rovince of help look for her (Id., p. 10).
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, and by means of force, violence
Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario
and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
Fernandez, about her daughter's disappearance. The latter, together
feloniously have sexual intercourse with one EDITHA TALAN, a
minor-10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew Freddie Cortez wasted
no time in joining their neighbors search the houses, dikes and fields
with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor
to look for the missing child. The searchers used a lighted rubber tire
resulting to her death and then bury her in the field, to the damage
(TSN dated Sept. 24, 1997, pp. 8-10 and 24).
and prejudice of the heirs of said EDITHA TALAN.3
During the arraignment on 1 September 1997, GALLARDE, with the When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw
talking to Editha, the searchers went back to the house of appellant.
assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. 4 Trial of the case
About 7 meters away from appellant's house, one of the searchers,
immediately ensued as the defense waived the holding of the pre-trial
Alfredo Cortez, found Editha's left foot slipper (TSN dated October
conference.
22, 1997, pp. 4-6). Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez announced: "Tata,
Radel is here!" pointing to the toilet about 6 meters away from
The witnesses presented by the prosecution were Mario Fernandez, Jaime appellant's house. The searchers found appellant squatting with his
Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Felicisimo Mendoza, Alfredo Cortez, Renato short pants. His hands and knees were covered with soil. When
Fernandez, SPO4 Oscar B. Lopez, and Dr. Perfecto Tebangin. The relevant confronted by ex-kagawad Hernandez why he was there, appellant
and material facts established by their testimonies are faithfully summarized answered he was relieving himself (Id., pp. 11-16).
in the Appellee's Brief as follows:
Asked where Editha was, appellant replied: "I do not know, I did not
In the evening of May 26, 1997, at the house of spouses Eduardo do anything to her." When told — "according to Jimmy, you were with
and Elena Talan in Brgy. Trenchea, Tayug, Pangasinan, their
Editha." appellant responded "I let her go and brought her back to The cause of Editha's death as revealed in the post-
the dike and let her go home." To the next question, "where did you mortem examination showed "suffocation of the lungs as a result
come from since a while a go you were not yet in this toilet?" from powerful covering of the nose and mouth, associated with
appellant answered "I was with Kiko, I was asleep in their house. laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen (Exh. "T", TSN dated
One of the searchers Mario Bado, got angry and countered that Oct. 23, 1997, pp. 22-23).5
appellant's statement was impossible because Kiko was with him
drinking (Id., pp. 16-20). On the other hand, GALLARDE was the lone witness for the defense. He
interposed a denial and the alibi that he was at home with his mother and
After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought brothers at the time the crime occurred. He declared that he is 18 years old,
appellant to Brgy. Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter single, a former construction worker. He knew EDITHA, a neighbor whom he
that appellant was the last person seen talking with the missing child. considered as a sister because she used to come to his house. They never
Fernandez then rejoined the searchers (Id., pp. 21-22). had a quarrel or misunderstanding. He neither raped not killed Editha.6
Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the
reached for her slipper, she saw Editha's right foot slipper (the other court, GALLARDE admitted that he saw Editha on the night of 6 May 1997 in
one was earlier found near the house of appellant) (Id., pp. 23-24). her parent's house, particularly in the kitchen. He was there because he
joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as he was called by Rudio Fernandez.
Around 3 meters farther from Editha's right foot slipper; another He drank and had dinner in the kitchen. After dinner he returned to the
slipper was found. It was old, 8 to 9 inches in length and appellant drinking place and eventually went home because he was then a little drunk.
was seen wearing it in the morning of that day (TSN dated Sept. 25, He knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence he did
1997, pp. 25). not see Kgd. Fernandez anymore. Kgd. Fernandez saw him inside his
(Gallarde's) toilet on the night of May 6; thereafter Fernandez took him to the
barangay captain and later he was turned over to the PNP at Camp Narciso
The searchers, thereafter, noticed disheveled grasses. Along the
way, they saw a wide hole among the disheveled grass. Ex-kagawad Ramos. The police informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and killing
of Editha Talan, and he told them that he did not commit the crime. At the
Fernandez accidentally dropped the lighted rubber tire and as his
Talan residence he was wearing short pants and rubber slippers. Fernandez
nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter exclaimed: "Uncle, look at this
asked him at the police headquarters to pull down his shorts and he
loose soil!" Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth
complied. He was then wearing briefs with a hemline that was a little loose.
aside and then Editha's hand pitted out. The Fernandez screamed in
terror (Id., pp. 5-6). He was informed that a cadaver was recovered near his house. When he
was asked questions while in police custody, he was not represented by any
lawyer.
Meantime, Barangay Captain Mendoza heard shouts saying: "She is
here, she is now here already dead!" Mindful of appellant's safety,
GALLARDE further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the
Brgy. Captain Mendoza decided to bring appellant to the municipal
building. On their way though, they met policemen on board a court that he considered Editha Talan as a sister and her parents also
vehicle. He flagged them down and turned over the person of treated him in a friendly manner. When he came to know that Editha's
parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms with them.
appellant, saying: "Here is the suspect in the disappearance of the
However, he did no go to them to tell them he was innocent because they
little girl. Since you are already here, I am giving him to you" (TSN
brandished a bolo in anger.
dated Oct. 21, 1997, pp. 4-5).
The policemen together with appellant proceeded to where the Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha
died. She was still alive when he was drinking at the back of the Talan house
people found Editha. One of the policemen shoved more soil aside.
and left for home. From the time he arrived, he never left again that night,
The lifeless Editha was completely naked when she was recovered.
(Id., pp. 9-10) and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact.7
On 12 February 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting 2. In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
GALLARDE of the crime of murder only, not of the complex crime of rape doubt that [he] was responsible for the death of Editha Talan.
with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge. It observed:
3. In not acquitting [him] on the ground of notches of proof beyond
Exh. "T" and Dr. Tebangin's testimony thereon show that the late reasonable doubt.12
Editha Talan sustained slit wounds inflicted as a means of
suffocating her to death, a laceration of the lower portion of her We sustain GALLARDE's contention that the trial court erred in convicting
vagina, and a ruptured hymen. What allegedly oozed from her vagina him of murder in an information charging him of rape with homicide. A
was blood, coupled with dirt. Had then been observed the presence reading of the accusatory portion of the information shows that there was no
of even just a drop of seminal fluid in or around her vagina, the Court allegation of any qualifying circumstance. Although it is true that the term
would readily conclude that the laceration and rupture resulted from "homicide" as used in special complex crime of rape with homicide is to be
phallic intrusion. Without such observation, however, "carnal understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical
knowledge" as element of rape would be an open question. injuries committed by reason or on the occasion of rape,13 it is settled in this
jurisdiction that where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to
The trial court did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication support the charge as to one of the component offense, the accused can be
either as a mitigating or aggravating circumstance pursuant to Article 15 of convicted of the other.14 In rape with homicide, in order to be convicted of
the Revised Penal Code because GALLARDE's alleged inebriation on the murder in case the evidence fails to support the charge of rape, the qualifying
night of 6 May 1997, was not satisfactorily proven. circumstance must be sufficiently alleged and proved. Otherwise, it would be
a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature of the offense
As to the civil aspect of the case, the trial court considered the stipulation of with which he is charged.15 It is fundamental that every element of the
the parties on 27 October 1997 fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as offense must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of
actual damages, and leaving the matter of moral damages to the discretion requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to
of the court. The trial court was not inclined to award moral damages enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have
because the "evidence before it tends to disclose that on the night of 6 May no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.16
1997, before she died, Editha was a much-neglected child."
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying
Accordingly, in its decision8 of 12 February 1998, the trial court decreed: circumstance, GALLARDE cannot be convicted of murder. An accused
cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged
WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond a in the complaint or information under which he is tried. It matters not how
conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused
reasonable doubt, the Court hereby convicts the accused RADEL
cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or
GALLARDE Y HERMOSA of the crime of MURDER, and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the information for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is
charged. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which
heirs of the late Editha Talan in the negotiated sum of P70,000.00. 9
he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of a higher
offense than that charged in the complaint or information under which he is
His motion for reconsideration,10 having been denied by the trial court in its tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right.17
Resolution11 of 28 February 1998, GALLARDE seasonably appealed to us.
Nevertheless, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the
We accepted the appeal on 9 September 1998. prosecution, although circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of GALLARDE for the death of EDITHA.
In his Appellant's Brief filed on 16 March 1999, GALLARDE alleges that the
trial court committed the following errors: Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. 18 The
1. In convicting [him] of the crime of murder in an information for rape prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to sustain a
with homicide. judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does not necessarily
absolve an accused from any criminal liability.19 Even in the absence of direct 6. Gallarde wore short pants and rubber slippers at the drinking
evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence, place. Subsequently he was seen wearing shorts in his own toilet.
provided that the established circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
which leads one to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the 7. At past 10:00 in the evening during an intensive search for the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the then missing Editha, her lifeless body was found in a shallow grave
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the situated some distance behind Gallarde's residence.
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
any other hypothesis except that of guilty.20 8. Before Editha's body was discovered, a searcher found a girl's
slipper (Exh. "B"), 5-6 inches long, among thickets seven meters
The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an accused away from Gallarde's house.
through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following requisites are
present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the inference
9. Another searcher saw a second slipper (Exh. B-1), of the same
must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances color and size as the first one. Both slippers were Editha's, the
produces a conviction beyond doubt of the guilt of the accused. 21 searchers recalled.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions It should be noted that the Court's Resolution at bar reaffirms the restrictive
interpretation of preventive detention under section 3 of P.D. 1877 dated July
21, 1983 adopted by it in the Jimenez 6 and Villaber 7 cases, that it will set at
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
liberty persons preventively detained without charges for over one year.
Specifically cited is section 8 of the Defense Minister's implementing rules
I concur in the result, i.e. to dismiss the case for having become moot and and regulations duly approved by the President that "The period of detention
academic. And if I had my way I would set the original decision aside of all persons presently detained by virtue of a Presidential Commitment
because of its slavish tone. Order or its derivatives shall not extend beyond one (1) year from and after
the date of effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended. Upon
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: the effectivity of these rules and regulations, all cases of persons presently
detained under a Presidential Commitment Order or its derivatives shall be
I maintain my original dissent from the decision of April 20, 1983, thus: "I am governed by Presidential Decree No. 1877, as amended, and its
constrained to dissent from the all encompassing scope of the main opinion implementing rules and regulations." The Court's Resolution further
of Mr. Justice de Castro which would overturn the landmark doctrine authoritatively states with the unqualified concurrence of at least ten (10)
of Lansang vs. Garcia1 which upheld the Supreme Court's authority to inquire members that "There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity
into the existence of factual bases for the President's suspension of the of a presidential commitment order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had
privilege of writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the constitutional ceased to have any force and effect," since the detention exceeded the
sufficiency thereof and would revert to the retrogressive and colonial era prescribed one-year limitation and that "pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential
ruling of Barcelon vs. Baker 2 and Montenegro vs. Castañeda 3 that the Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
President's decision to so suspend the privilege of the writ 'is final and Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for reconsideration should have
conclusive upon the courts and all other persons,' and would further deny the been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the
right to bail even after the filing of charges in court to persons detained under detainees covered by such Section 8 issued," but for the release of the
Presidential Commitment Orders," and " 'The continuous flow of petitions for detainees effected earlier, mostly in January this year.
habeas corpus' filed with this Court should not be decried nor discouraged.
The Court stands as the guarantor of the constitutional and human rights of The crucial issues raised in petitioner's motion for reconsideration of June 6,
all persons within its jurisdiction and must see to it that the rights are 1983 8 will have to await determination in pending appropriate cases awaiting
respected and enforced. It is settled in this jurisdiction that once a deprivation the Court's resolution.
of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment or before whom the case is pending is ousted of jurisdiction and
habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
detention. 4 So accused persons deprived of the constitutional right of speedy
trial have been set free. 5 And likewise persons detained indefinitely without
charges so much so that the detention becomes punitive and not merely
preventive in character are entitled to regain their freedom. The spirit and
letter of our Constitution negates as contrary to the basic precepts of human
rights and freedom that a person be detained indefinitely without any
charges."
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978 Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment,
appropriations and funds being available therefore." This is signed by the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, provincial treasurer.
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No.
QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and defendant-appellant. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, reads:
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee, I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same
vs. may be paid in the amount of sixteen thought seven hundred
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. * twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check,
provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.
This is signed by the auditor.
Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee. account mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the
amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the
summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two
part of the voucher.
AQUINO, J.: Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed
by the creditor. As accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's according to the prosecution by Juan Samson, a point which is disputed by
theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of him):
Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a
lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P.
provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan the sum of seven
in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full
P57,048.23. payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify
to be correct. Paid by Check No. .................................
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part
with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN
incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two officials of SAMSON
the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative.
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. six vouchers below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer.
Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein By Juan Samson."
that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were actually and necessarily
incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied that his signatures in
1969, evidences the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Exhibits D and E are his signatures.
Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and hardware materials supposedly
used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-Tayug road (h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office,
in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes denied that his signature on the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).
reference to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances: incontrovertible.
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing
1; Exh. Z). supposed payments of certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply
Co. for lumber and hardware materials supposingly used in the repair of
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the following:
Construction Supply Co The alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company
dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged. (1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the
payment of P14,571.81 for number and hardware materials
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the
delivered by the company to the provincial government Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition (2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the
and issue voucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering payment of P5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware materials
the same lumber and hardware ma the signatures of the following office were allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge at the
forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias, UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer,
and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These (3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the
four office denied that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, payment of P6,290.60 for lumber and hardware materials
are their genuine signatures. allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the
Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the
words "Approved: For and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. (4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the
Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp payment of P9,769.64 for lumber and hardware materials
used in Primicias office. allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at the
Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co.
dated February 18, 1969, containing a description and the prices of the (5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the
lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake because, according to Payment of P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware materials
Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at the
No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).
denied that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature.
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), Primicias declared that their signatures in the said five vouchers are not their
were also forged. Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the said vouchers for
10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the goods sold in the fake processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers
invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited.
allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and Hence, those supporting papers could not be presented in evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer,
Supply Co., testified that the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in to initialled the voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson
the five vouchers were never delivered by his company to the provincial went to the provincial treasurer's office where the amounts covered by the
government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as
cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received
repairs of the bridges were fictitious. the payments on March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date)
as shown on the face of the vouchers.
The company's cashier testified that the company never received the
payments for the lumber and hardware materials. The receipts evidencing The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six
payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official receipts. The cashier vouchers are admittedly authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead
produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the
serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial
transactions with the provincial government. office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited
and approved by the auditor.
Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used
to be an employee of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six
several firms doing business with the provincial government. In 1969 he was vouchers showing that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered
the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented that firm thereby as representative of the lumber and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT)
in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's office
engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those (Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are
provincial officials and the employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's genuine.
brief).
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting were charged with malversation through falsification in three docketed as
papers, were hand-carried by Samson. He delivered the papers to follows:
Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's office, for
recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD). 1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No.
10724 dated February 28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. (Exh. X), L-33252.
Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in that office who performed the chore of
recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers
and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper lefthand Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and
corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69. 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28,
P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P,
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he Q, R and S), now L-33253.
presented them to the provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson
had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought them to Ricardo 3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No.
Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing 11955 dated April 29, 1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh.
and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW). O), now L-33254.
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found
auditor's office. He asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of malversation through falsification of
CC). public or official documents imposing each of the following penalties:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and
of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one-days, as Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107
minimum, to eighteen years, two months and twenty-one Phil. 8).
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of
P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial When the action is for the recovery of money and the
government of Pangasinan in the same amount; defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
perpetua and a fine of P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same
amount; and The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money
judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued
of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one days, as on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October
minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-one days 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81
and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the
Pangasinan in the same amount. funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal
liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court. Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the
was dismissed. Death extinguished his criminal liability remained. The appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal
resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows: liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising
his appeal or before the judgment of conviction rendered from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal
against him by the lower court became final and executory case had been instituted against him, thus making
extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the
serve the personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of
to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of
Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565). P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there is no
specific assignment of error affecting the civil liability fixed by
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed
liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his
after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First
estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
complex crimes of malversation through falsification and
ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23). civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of
Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and
ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo,
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo
instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express (deceased).
waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule
111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's)
aspect by adding thereto the following. Province of control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his Urbiztondo be authorized to examine the prosecution witnesses under his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate supervision and control The trial court granted the motion (155 tsn).
would be liable for which his estate would be liable.
The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's an assistant fiscal were present together with the private prosecutor.
death, it is not necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error,
wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion perpetua as a cruel and Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial
unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of compliance with the rule that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under
malversation through falsification committed by negligence. the direction and control of the fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall
represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in 1683, Revised Administrative Code).
allowing private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case
thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to proceedings marked by undue The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion
publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-interest. perpetua "could have been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment,
bias and political interest which attended the proceedings ", is not well-
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality. The
handled the prosecution of the case from the preliminary investigation, which evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable
started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970. probative value of the documents involved rather than bias and prejudice,
was the decisive factor on which the trial court anchored the judgment of
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the conviction.
accused auditor inquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the
provincial board to act as private prosecutor in representation of the province Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot
of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was a the issue as to the propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as
board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor. will be shown later, reclusion perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases
because the crimes committed were not complex.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the
trial court that he had authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4- The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer
8 tsn June 5, 1969). to the trial court's conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through falsification or, specifically,
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced "malice or
others as private prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two.
of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No. 23350).
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N.
After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual
provincial fiscal of Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after
informations against the accused all dated November 4, 1969. Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure
because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers,
At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial
assistant provincial fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was
areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the
for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the private prosecutor
voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to
that the trial court erred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and
before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After the treasurer had signed Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).
the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3,
1969). Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to
Samson in the treasurers inner office because his table was near the main
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen meters away (18 tsn).
vouchers that the amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash. That Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because
indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the
the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in. cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher
instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (12-13 tsn).
(Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the
payment should be made in cas. There were instances when the treasurer Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the
insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson. treasurer (malversation is a crime which can be committed by means
of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same). This argument
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by the
treasurer where the cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11- prosecution show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted
12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted by the trial court, it was maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers.
unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office when that
was a ministerial chore of the cashier. The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial
court acquitted the auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of matter of course. We see no merit in that contention because the evidence
attorney from the Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence
the payments. The space in the vouchers for the signature of the witness, against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an
who should be present when the payments were received, was blank. The accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor
treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to based his defense on the undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the
require the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate. six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon by
the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the which the auditor apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when
six vouchers would have been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried in truth it was made in bad faith.
Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been made by means of
checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral
the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any evidence and an unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of
payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was established beyond
Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson. reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the
amounts malversed was duly substantial.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a
conspiracy between the provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends
amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to Samson by the cashier in the that the trial court erred in disregarding the expert testimony that his
treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the assistant signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding that he forged the
provincial treasurer. vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on circumstantial
evidence as proof of conspiracy.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how
and where the payments were made. However, Ulanday died before the As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have
preliminary investigation was started. On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies inhibited himself "in fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as
a gesture of delivadeza" because he had conducted the preliminary But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the
investigation. questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand in the writing
thereof.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that
he was prejudiced by the fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine
investigation, was the one who tried the case and convicted him. Judge Bello signatures found in his residence certificates, income tax returns and the
tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an
already prejudged their guilt. arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions
Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from with the provincial government are in angular form; his surname is not
trying the case after it had found probable cause and after the fiscal, as encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate in angular and horizontal
directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule strokes.
assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could
impartially try the case on the merits. Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers
evidenced fictitious transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded signature which is different from his signature in genuine documents. He
insomuch that they would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried
preliminary investigation. Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six
vouchers were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).
preliminary investigation and then tries the case on the merits, is similar to a
situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary investigation of a Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of
grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the denying the same as and when necessary (Mehta, Identification of
Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224;
court after terminating the preliminary investigation is not obligated (por Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First Instance for trial. The
inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in
86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. the six vouchers were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).
196). The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case without any
ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures
of Samson in the vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, 16, 1970).
retired chief of the Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that
his signatures on the vouchers are not his signatures.
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or
collector of the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial engineer,
signatures (exemplars) of Samson have fundamental differences. The expert treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He
concluded that the questioned signatures and the exemplar signatures of actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is
Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20). presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be
evidence and contentions of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the
declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are radical differences presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is
between the questioned and authentic signatures. especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of
to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection Jabanes, the assistant manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the
with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six vouchers were never
Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105
Phil. 1253). And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as
cashier of the carried Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession over to the company the proceeds of the six vouchers which he was
of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six
(Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales
People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). of construction materials.
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no
provincial government and another form of signatures of his valid malversation after Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six
transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications vouchers that he received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of
perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in P57,048.23.
the first voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five to his guilt is based on a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances
forged vouchers, Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S). which wre not proven, is not correct.
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants
his brief, that "the trial court made absolutely no finding of any supposed to base his exculpation on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of
conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is not correct. Samson and the officials in the provincial engineer's office appeared to be
genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers. The
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the
circumstance that Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier,
assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego Carried Construction Co.
and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the
proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers,
instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's denied that he received the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's
brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in office.
cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had in the light of the inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the
received the proceeds of the vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's voucehrs and followed up their processing in the offices of the provicial
finding on that point is based on very strong circumstantial evidence government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and
(assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers). denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in
P57,048. 23 paid under the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He the six receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's
asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although he contends that his pretension of having acted in good faith or having committed an honest
signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the amounts mistake have to be disbelieved.
covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six
vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense
cahoots to defraud the provincial government and to camouflage the impelled by a single criminal impulse.
defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have some genuine
features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six
intrinsically fake. vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-
Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification of public documents were committed in this And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes
case. That assumption is wrong. a separate crimes of malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a
co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses.
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate
crimes of falsification and malversation were committed. These are not cases As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification
where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave because he was in possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in
felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer.
malversation.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court
is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an accountable public
malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People vs.
(People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671; People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre,
Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43). 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the
cases, the municipal treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated commission of parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not
April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons worked as laborers in a certain guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of murder or homicide, as the case
street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts covered may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of the Revised
by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
municipal funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said
street project and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not performed
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished
any labor. in article 172(1) of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not
constitute a complex crime because the falsifications were not necessary For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively
means for the co on of the malversations. Each falsification and each
covered by vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty
malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal Code is prision
separately. mayor minimum and medium.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively
malversations. Four distinct penalties were imposed.
covered by vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty
provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money temporal minimum.
forming part of the road and bridge could have malversed or misappropriated
it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used as a device to For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O),
prevent detection of the malversation. the penalty provided in paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion
temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case
should be added to the imprisonment penalty. No. 23350, L-33253).
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869
since there are no modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised (Exh. P), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years
Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate sentence. of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision
mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350,
document and six crimes of malversation. L-33253).
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872
following penalties: (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years
of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify
For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350,
correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision L-33253).
correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand
pesos. In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit
provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed
(People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the maximum penalty that
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No.
he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
10724 (Exh. K), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil.
P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same 533).
amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252).
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years
(Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs.
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No.
11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58).
(12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the
P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.
amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254).
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art.
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.
(Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion SO ORDERED.
temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
No. 23350, L-33253).
Fernando, J., took no part.
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871
(Exh. R), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to
Separate Opinions unless criminal responsibih"ly is fixed or exists. It has been said that civil
liabilitv under this provision "is rooted in the criminal liability". 1 In this
BARREDO, J., concurring: connection and adjectively, Section 1 of Rule 111 stipulates that "when a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, etc."
While I concur in the judgment finding the accused-appellant Juan Samson
But it must be emphasized that these legal precepts refer exclusively to the
guilty of six separate crimes each of falsification and malversation as
civil liability consequent of the offense in its juridical essence as a crime, it
elucidated in the very well studied and ably prepared main opinion of our
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Aquino, and while I further agree that being elementary on our legal system that the same act my give rise to civil
said appellant and the estate of the deceased Licerio P. Sendaydiego are responsibility independent of that resulting from the commission of the act as
a crime.
lointtv and solidarity liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the amounts
stated ir. the dispositive portion of the decision herein, I have my own legal
basis for holding that the estate of Sendaydiego is indeed liable for the, said Thus it is entirely possible for one to be fee from civil ability directly rooted in
amount& the act viewed as a violation of the penal law and still be liable civilly for it
considered otherwise as an infringement of a right based on a created by
contract or by laws other than the criminal law. A consistent host of
To start with, I find it difficult to share the view that "notwithstanding the
jurisprudence, too to the bench and bar to need particular citation hem exists
dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego (he died during the
upholding the right of a party aggrieved by an act in nature to indemnity,
pendency of this appeal) insofar as his liability is concerned, ...
restitution or reparation, notwithstanding the absence or failure of the usual
Sendaydiego's appeal will (nevertheless) be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate prosecution, in view of the provisions of the pertinent articles of the Civil
is liable." It seems to me that there is some degree of irreconcilable Code on Human Relations and Section 2 of Rule III. Stated the same act or
got Of facts can be the subject of obligations arise at the same time thru the
incontency in dismissing a case, thereby acquitting the accused therein of
different modes contemplated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code providing that
criminal liability because of death or any other cause not amounting to a
"obligations arise from (1) lave, (2) contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) acts or
finding that he had not committed the act complaint of and at the same nine
omissions punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts." Thus, that an act or
holding that he or his estate has in civil liability based on his criminal liability.
It is to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an appml due to death of the omission is punished by law, thereby making the actor civilly liable therefor,
does not exclude simultaneous liability of the for the same act viewed also as
appellant, from a judgment of conviction by a trial court does not result in the
one giving rise to an obligation under the another law, and/or under a
affirmance of sruch conviction contrary to the general rule when an appeal in
contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict, with the sole qualification that the
a case is dismissed but, on the contrary, it amounts to an acquittal of the
aggrieved party cannot recover damages more than once for the same act or
appellant based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence
in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt, something that his omission. (See Art. 2177, Civil Code.)
death prevents the court from making. In a sense, the death of an accused-
appellant has the effect of his total absolution by God from any earthly I am confident that the points I have just discussed are beyond debate. And
responsibility for the offense as such, a divine act of clemency no human as I see it my learned colleagues in the majority and I are agreed that in the
court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. It is an inherent inalienable light of the legal Principles I have stated, there can be no doubt that the
human right of every individual not to be subject to imputation of criminal estate of Sendaydiego could be held liable for the acts of the d that can be
liability in any sense, unless his guilt of the crime charged against him has proven to have damaged the Province of Pangasinan in spite of the of
been duly proven beyond reasonable doubt in a duly held criminal Sendaydiego's appeal by reason of his death. Our possible disagreement
proceeding. The intervention of death of the accused in any case is an relates only to the procedural aspect of the matter.
injunction by fate itself that no criminal liability whatsoever should be
imposed on him, not only because from the very nature of the situation, it is The main opinion justifies the imposition of civil liability upon said estate
impossible to do so but also because it would be a juridical absurdity to within this appeal proceedings, thereby sing with the filing of a separate civil
contemplate such a legal concept. In short, death ex-anguishes the crime, action for the In my view, the dismissal of Sendaydiego's appeal amounts, as
and, corollarily, all its consequences. I have said to his acquittal This acquittal to my mind is different juridically
from one based on liable doubt bemuse as I have only intimated earlier, it is
Indeed, it is but logical to hold that the civil liability resulting from criminal a total absolution by fate itself which carries with it y, exemption from or
liability under Artide 100 of the Revised Penal Code would have no basis extinction of the civil liability as if the Court had hold that the act from which
the civil (action) might arise did not exist (Section 2 (e), Rule 111.) But this is right to institute a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
not to say that the state is already exonerated altogether from another kind of pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code and Sections 2 and 3 (c) of
civil liability for indemnity, restitution or reparation, for under the unbroken Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
line of precedents I have already referred to, the pertinent provisions on
Human Relations of the Civil Code, particularly Article 30, come into play, for All these notwithstanding, for the purposes of the instant case, I am willing to
under this cited provision, the total absolution of Sendaydiego based on his take the position that since the point I am pressing on is more or less
death becomes virtually immaterial, since ths provision contemplates procedural or remedial in nature, and perhaps, the failure of the parties
prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense without the concerned to seriously object to the procedure pursued in the main opinion
need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as could be a sufficient excuse for not following what I feel is the proper way of
such, that is, without having to prove the criminal liability of the defendant so dealing with the civil liability incurred by the estate of the deceased
long as his act causign damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven Sendaydiego, hence my concurrence, in the qualified sense implicit in this
by a preponderance of evidence. This article provides, "when a seperate civil separate opinion, in the dispositive portion of the decision herein.
action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and
no criminal proceedings, are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, May I add here that the foregoing reasons explain why I have always insisted
a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act that when appeals in criminal cases before us have to be dismissed by
complained of."
reason of the death of the appellant, it is not proper to qualify such dismissal
as limited to that of the criminal liability of the appellant. It is my humble view
My reading of the existing jurisprudence is that the civil liability not based on that the dismissal should be unqualified and that the offended parties
the act as crime has to be prosecuted in a te civil action and not within the concerned should be left to pursue their remedies, if they so desire, in the
same criminal proceedings wherein the accused has been acquitted or the appropriate separate civil action contemplated both in the Civil Code and in
case against him is terminated with exonerative consequence. If there is any Rule 111, as explained above. I admit this view might entail the institution of
jurisprudence to the contrary, it is still isolated and is not binding precedent. what is virtually a repetitive proceeding, but I cannot see any way of avoiding
Worse, in my opinion, it is based on what I consider to be the erroneous what the unequivocal language of the pertinent legal provisions mandate,
premise that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not mean literally what it says. unless I make myself a party to judicial legislation, which I believe it is not
Textually, this article states: constitutionally permissible for me to do, no matter how practical the
procedure might be.
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been beyond reasonable Separate Opinions
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a BARREDO, J., concurring:
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant,
the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be While I concur in the judgment finding the accused-appellant Juan Samson
malicious. guilty of six separate crimes each of falsification and malversation as
elucidated in the very well studied and ably prepared main opinion of our
distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Aquino, and while I further agree that
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
said appellant and the estate of the deceased Licerio P. Sendaydiego are
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence
lointtv and solidarity liable to the Province of Pangasinan for the amounts
of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the
stated ir. the dispositive portion of the decision herein, I have my own legal
text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
basis for holding that the estate of Sendaydiego is indeed liable for the, said
ground. amount&
Definitely and unequivocally, what it authorizes is that "a civil action for
To start with, I find it difficult to share the view that "notwithstanding the
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." It does not say that
dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego (he died during the
the civil action joined with the criminal action, as provided for in Section 1 of
pendency of this appeal) insofar as his liability is concerned, ...
Rule 111, shall survive and be the one continued. I reiterate that what is left Sendaydiego's appeal will (nevertheless) be resolved only for the purpose of
to the offended party after the death of an accused before conviction is the
showing his liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate prosecution, in view of the provisions of the pertinent articles of the Civil
is liable." It seems to me that there is some degree of irreconcilable Code on Human Relations and Section 2 of Rule III. Stated the same act or
incontency in dismissing a case, thereby acquitting the accused therein of got Of facts can be the subject of obligations arise at the same time thru the
criminal liability because of death or any other cause not amounting to a different modes contemplated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code providing that
finding that he had not committed the act complaint of and at the same nine "obligations arise from (1) lave, (2) contracts; (3) quasi-contracts; (4) acts or
holding that he or his estate has in civil liability based on his criminal liability. omissions punished by law, and (5) quasi-delicts." Thus, that an act or
It is to me clearly obvious that the dismiss of an appml due to death of the omission is punished by law, thereby making the actor civilly liable therefor,
appellant, from a judgment of conviction by a trial court does not result in the does not exclude simultaneous liability of the for the same act viewed also as
affirmance of sruch conviction contrary to the general rule when an appeal in one giving rise to an obligation under the another law, and/or under a
a case is dismissed but, on the contrary, it amounts to an acquittal of the contract, quasi-contract or quasi-delict, with the sole qualification that the
appellant based on the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence aggrieved party cannot recover damages more than once for the same act or
in his favor that can be overcome only by a finding of guilt, something that his omission. (See Art. 2177, Civil Code.)
death prevents the court from making. In a sense, the death of an accused-
appellant has the effect of his total absolution by God from any earthly I am confident that the points I have just discussed are beyond debate. And
responsibility for the offense as such, a divine act of clemency no human as I see it my learned colleagues in the majority and I are agreed that in the
court can reverse, qualify, much less disregard. It is an inherent inalienable light of the legal Principles I have stated, there can be no doubt that the
human right of every individual not to be subject to imputation of criminal estate of Sendaydiego could be held liable for the acts of the d that can be
liability in any sense, unless his guilt of the crime charged against him has proven to have damaged the Province of Pangasinan in spite of the of
been duly proven beyond reasonable doubt in a duly held criminal Sendaydiego's appeal by reason of his death. Our possible disagreement
proceeding. The intervention of death of the accused in any case is an relates only to the procedural aspect of the matter.
injunction by fate itself that no criminal liability whatsoever should be
imposed on him, not only because from the very nature of the situation, it is
The main opinion justifies the imposition of civil liability upon said estate
impossible to do so but also because it would be a juridical absurdity to
within this appeal proceedings, thereby sing with the filing of a separate civil
contemplate such a legal concept. In short, death ex-anguishes the crime,
action for the In my view, the dismissal of Sendaydiego's appeal amounts, as
and, corollarily, all its consequences. I have said to his acquittal This acquittal to my mind is different juridically
from one based on liable doubt bemuse as I have only intimated earlier, it is
Indeed, it is but logical to hold that the civil liability resulting from criminal a total absolution by fate itself which carries with it y, exemption from or
liability under Artide 100 of the Revised Penal Code would have no basis extinction of the civil liability as if the Court had hold that the act from which
unless criminal responsibih"ly is fixed or exists. It has been said that civil the civil (action) might arise did not exist (Section 2 (e), Rule 111.) But this is
liabilitv under this provision "is rooted in the criminal liability". 1 In this not to say that the state is already exonerated altogether from another kind of
connection and adjectively, Section 1 of Rule 111 stipulates that "when a civil liability for indemnity, restitution or reparation, for under the unbroken
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising line of precedents I have already referred to, the pertinent provisions on
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, etc." Human Relations of the Civil Code, particularly Article 30, come into play, for
But it must be emphasized that these legal precepts refer exclusively to the under this cited provision, the total absolution of Sendaydiego based on his
civil liability consequent of the offense in its juridical essence as a crime, it death becomes virtually immaterial, since ths provision contemplates
being elementary on our legal system that the same act my give rise to civil prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense without the
responsibility independent of that resulting from the commission of the act as need of any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as
a crime. such, that is, without having to prove the criminal liability of the defendant so
long as his act causign damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven
Thus it is entirely possible for one to be fee from civil ability directly rooted in by a preponderance of evidence. This article provides, "when a seperate civil
the act viewed as a violation of the penal law and still be liable civilly for it action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and
considered otherwise as an infringement of a right based on a created by no criminal proceedings, are instituted during the pendency of the civil case,
contract or by laws other than the criminal law. A consistent host of a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
jurisprudence, too to the bench and bar to need particular citation hem exists complained of."
upholding the right of a party aggrieved by an act in nature to indemnity,
restitution or reparation, notwithstanding the absence or failure of the usual
My reading of the existing jurisprudence is that the civil liability not based on as limited to that of the criminal liability of the appellant. It is my humble view
the act as crime has to be prosecuted in a te civil action and not within the that the dismissal should be unqualified and that the offended parties
same criminal proceedings wherein the accused has been acquitted or the concerned should be left to pursue their remedies, if they so desire, in the
case against him is terminated with exonerative consequence. If there is any appropriate separate civil action contemplated both in the Civil Code and in
jurisprudence to the contrary, it is still isolated and is not binding precedent. Rule 111, as explained above. I admit this view might entail the institution of
Worse, in my opinion, it is based on what I consider to be the erroneous what is virtually a repetitive proceeding, but I cannot see any way of avoiding
premise that Article 29 of the Civil Code does not mean literally what it says. what the unequivocal language of the pertinent legal provisions mandate,
Textually, this article states: unless I make myself a party to judicial legislation, which I believe it is not
constitutionally permissible for me to do, no matter how practical the
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on procedure might be
the ground that his guilt has not been beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant,
the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
Definitely and unequivocally, what it authorizes is that "a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." It does not say that
the civil action joined with the criminal action, as provided for in Section 1 of
Rule 111, shall survive and be the one continued. I reiterate that what is left
to the offended party after the death of an accused before conviction is the
right to institute a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
pursuant to Articles 29 and 30 of the Civil Code and Sections 2 and 3 (c) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
All these notwithstanding, for the purposes of the instant case, I am willing to
take the position that since the point I am pressing on is more or less
procedural or remedial in nature, and perhaps, the failure of the parties
concerned to seriously object to the procedure pursued in the main opinion
could be a sufficient excuse for not following what I feel is the proper way of
dealing with the civil liability incurred by the estate of the deceased
Sendaydiego, hence my concurrence, in the qualified sense implicit in this
separate opinion, in the dispositive portion of the decision herein.
May I add here that the foregoing reasons explain why I have always insisted
that when appeals in criminal cases before us have to be dismissed by
reason of the death of the appellant, it is not proper to qualify such dismissal
Republic of the Philippines stated that the check was to replace the dishonored check, the P9,860.16
SUPREME COURT balance being partial payment for Ervine's outstanding account. The check
Manila and the voucher were received by a GARDS messenger, Nolan C. Pena, on
April 15, 1988, but GARDS did not return the dishonored check.
SECOND DIVISION
On April 14, 1988, GARDS Operations Manager Jovito C. Cabusara filed a
criminal complaint against petitioners for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After
preliminary investigation, an information was filed in the Regional Trial Court
G.R. No. 131714 November 16, 1998 of Quezon City (Branch 97). However, the case was dismissed by the court
on May 11, 1989, upon motion of the prosecution, on the ground that Ervine
had already paid the amount of the check.
EDUARDO R. VACA and FERNANDO NIETO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE On September 18, 1989, GARDS, through its Acting Operations Manager
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Eduardo B. Alindaya, filed another complaint for violation of B.P. Bldg. 22
against petitioners. This resulted in the filing of an information against
petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100). After
trial, petitioners were found guilty of the charge and each was sentenced to
suffer one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and the
MENDOZA, J.: costs.
Petitioners seek a review of the decision, dated October 25, 1996, 1 and the On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It subsequently
resolution, dated December 2, 1997, 2 of the Court of Appeals, affirming their denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 100) for Petitioners contend:
violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law."
A. Respondent Court gravely erred in not
The facts are as follows: holding that the prosecution failed to prove
petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Eduardo R. Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine
International, Inc. (Ervine), which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of B. Respondent Court gravely erred in basing
refrigeration equipment, while his son-in-law, petitioner Fernando Nieto, is conviction on the alleged weakness of the
the firm's purchasing manager. On March 10, 1988, petitioners issued a evidence of the defense rather than on the
check for P10,000.00 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection, strength of the evidence of the prosecution.
and Security, Inc. (GARDS) in partial payment of the security services
rendered by GARDS to Ervine. The check was drawn on the China Banking C. Respondent Court erred in not acquitting
Corporation (CBC). When deposited in the Philippine Commercial petitioners on grounds of "mistake of fact"
International Bank (PCIBank) branch at Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, the and "lack of knowledge."
check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Petitioners pray that the case against them be dismissed or, in the
On March 29, 1988, GARDS wrote Ervine a letter in which it demanded alternative, that the decision of the trial court be modified by sentencing each
payment in cash of the amount of the check within seven days from notice. to an increased fine but without imprisonment.
The letter was received by Ervine on the same day, but petitioners did not
pay within the time given.
By supplemental petition, dated January 29, 1998, petitioners submitted an
affidavit of desistance executed by GARDS president Dominador R. Santiago
On April 13, 1988, petitioners issued a check for P19,860.16 to GARDS. The which states that the case arose from a mere "accounting difference"
check was drawn on the Associated Bank. The voucher accompanying it between petitioners and GARDS, that the latter had not really suffered any
damage as a result of the issuance of the check in question and, that the amount of P9,930.08 and another one for the period of March 16 to
GARDS was no longer interested in prosecuting the case. March 31, 1988 in the same amount. But even if such check was intended to
replace the bad one, its issuance on April 13, 1988 — 15 days after
On May 28, 1998, petitioners filed another supplemental petition, this time petitioners had been notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their
invoking the recent decision in Lao v. Court of Appeals,3 in which this Court previous check — cannot negate the presumption that petitioners knew of
reversed a conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 upon a showing that the the insufficiency of funds to cover the amount of their previous check. Sec. 2
accused had no knowledge of the insufficiency of funds. of B.P. Blg. 22 requires that such check be given within five (5) days from the
notice of dishonor to them.
The Solicitor General opposes the appeal. He contends that the facts of Lao
v. Court of Appeals are different from those of the case at bar and that the Petitioners contend that, in accordance with the ruling in Lao v. Court of
affidavit of desistance of Dominador Santiago is of no moment, such affidavit Appeals,6 they should be acquitted because the preparation of checks is the
having been made only after petitioners' conviction. responsibility of the company accountant and all they do is sign the checks.
They claim that they rely on the word of the accountant that there are
After due review of the decision in this case, we find that petitioners' sufficient funds in the bank to pay for the checks.
conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is well founded.
In the Lao case, the accused, as the Court found, had merely been made by
First. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) her employer, Premiere Investment House, to countersign checks in bank.
making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; The accused was a mere employee who did not have anything to do with the
(2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he issuance of checks for the company. She did not know to whom the checks
would be paid as the names of payees were written only later by the head of
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
operations. Moreover, no notice of dishonor was given to her as required by
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent
B.P. Blg. 22 §2. It could thus rightly be concluded that the accused issued
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
checks to apply to account not knowing that at the time of issuance funds
or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop paymnent.4 The maker's knowledge is were insufficient to pay for the checks.
presumed from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. 5 Thus, §2
of B.P. Blg. 22 expressly provides: Petitioners in this case cannot pretend ignorance of the insufficiency of
funds. While it may be true that it was the company's accountant who
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The actually prepared the rubber check, the fact remains that petitioners are the
making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which owners and officers of the company. Sec. 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides that
"Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company, or entity, the person
is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90)
days from the date of the check, shall be prima liable under this Act.
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or
credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof In fact, petitioner Nieto testified that after the check in question was
the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for dishonored, he instructed their company accountant to prepare a
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) replacement check.7 This belies petitioners' claim that they had no hand in
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not the preparation of checks8 and shows that petitioners were in control of the
been paid by the drawee. finances of the company.
In this case, after being notified on March 29, 1988 of the dishonor of their Second. The affidavit of desistance of the GARDS president deserves no
previous check, petitioners gave GARDS a check for P19,860.16. They claim more than passing mention. The claim that this case was simply the result of
that this check had been intended by them to replace the bad check they had a misunderstanding between GARDS and petitioners and that the former did
previously issued to the GARDS. Based on the testimony of a GARDS not really suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check is flimsy. After
accountant, however, the Court of Appeals found that the check was actually prosecuting the case below with tenacity, complainants going so far as to file
payment for two bills, one for the period of January 16 to January 31, 1988 in another complaint after their first one had been dismissed, it is trifling with
this Court for complainants to now assert that the filing of their case was each ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 equivalent to double the amount of
simply a mistake. It is for reasons such as this the affidavit of desistance, like the check.
retractions, are generally disfavored.9 The affidavit in this case, which was
made after petitioners' conviction, is nothing but a last-minute attempt to save SO ORDERED
them from punishment. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of
the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the Melo and Puno, JJ., concur.
banking system cannot be denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of
the crime punished in B.P. Blg. 22.
Martinez, J., is on leave.
Third. Petitioners pray that, in the alternative, the penalty be modified by
deleting the sentence of imprisonment and, in lieu thereof a fine in an
increased amount be imposed on them. In support of their plea, they allege
that they do not have any record of prior conviction; that Eduardo Vaca is of
advanced age (late 60s); and, that they come from good families. Petitioners
claim that "with their family background and social standing there is no
reason why they, will refuse to pay a due and demandable debt of only
P10,000.00. It is precisely because of their founded belief that the subject
obligation has been paid that they refused to be intimidated by a criminal
charge."
B.P. Blg. 22, §1, par. 1 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not less than
thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than, but
not more than double, the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
esceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the Court." Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are
Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy.
Apparently, they brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although
mistakenly, that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Otherwise, they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court
and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the
ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion
allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human
material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social
order.10 In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the
amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of
the petitioners.
G.R. No. 118816 July 10, 1998 Costs against the convicted accused.
Petitioners point out that the fact that neither explosives nor related
Roxas City
paraphernalia were found in their possession is an indication of their
innocence.
1990-05-08
We do not agree. First, it is quite probable that petitioners dumped these
materials into the sea while the raiding party was approaching. Moreover, The Provincial Agricultural Officer
Section 33, Presidential Decree No. 704, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1058, provides: Department of Agriculture
Roxas City 1. External Manifestation
I have the honor to submit to this office the result of the 2. Internal Manifestation
scientific fish examination conducted on the fish samples
taken from the possession of Mr. Johnson Umiten Sucgang, a. Air bladder raptured deeply stained with
38 years old, married and resident of Barangay Basiao, blood;
Ivisan, Capiz and company on May 7, 1990, 6:30 PM by
combined elements of the Department of Agriculture, PC/INP
b. Vertebral column broken with blood stain.
Unit of Ivisan, Capiz and Barangay officials of Basiao, Ivisan,
Capiz conducting sea borne patrol on illegal fishing.
Conclusion:
Source of fish samples : Sea water of Brgy., Basiao, Ivisan,
The fish samples manifested signs that said fish were caught
or killed by the use of explosives.
Capiz
Examined by:
Fish samples taken from : Johnson U. Sucgang, 38 years
old,
(Sgd.)
married, of Brgy., Basiao, Ivisan,
JOEY I. DE LA CRUZ
Capiz, et. al.
(Sgd.)
Date fish samples taken : May 7, 1990 at 6:30 PM
ROLANDO E. AMOROSO
Date fish samples examined : May 7, 1990 at 7:00 PM
Fish Examiners
Name offish samples taken Number Weight Value
Joey de la Cruz affirmed the above findings in his testimony before the trial
court. 12 Said testimony was corroborated by Rolando Amoroso, a co-
Local Name
employee of De la Cruz in the Bureau of Fisheries. The latter further stated
that the fish were killed specifically by dynamite:
Bulawis 2 pcs. 300 gms P 8.00
ATTY. LUMAWAG:
Bulgan 2 pcs. 200 gms 10.00
Q Can you identify whether it was through
Pakol 1 pc. 100 gms 2.00 dynamite or any other means of explosive
the fish was caught?
Bag-angan 1 pc. 150 gms 3.00
A Yes, sir. Because you know when we saw,
Bukod 1 pc. 150 gms 3.00 when we conducted the external
manifestation of the fish, not only blood
Characteristics noted on the fish examined:
oozing from the ears but also from the eyes presented to show that these prosecution witnesses
that were protruding. fabricated their story. There is no ulterior motive which
implied them to testify as they did. Furthermore, no evidence
Q Is it not possible that it be caused also was introduced by the defense to impeach their credibility
through fishing by means of electricity? nor evidence to discredit their persons. Credibility of the
testimonies having remained unimpeached, it shall be given
A No. great weight in the determination of the guilt of the accused.
Besides, being public officers to enforce fishing laws, in the
absence of ill-motive on their part, to impute to the accused a
Q Other kinds of explosives? serious offense of illegal fishing with the use of explosive, the
presumption is that there was regular performance of public
A Yes, explosives. duty on their part. 14
Q For example, what other aside from The presumption that the crime of illegal fishing was committed has,
dynamite? therefore, been clearly established. Such presumption, however, is
merely prima facie, and may be rebutted by the accused. 15
A What explosives aside from dynamite, no
other. 13 Petitioners attempt to overcome said presumption by disputing the findings of
prosecution witnesses Joey de la Cruz and Rolando Amoroso. They claim
The trial court correctly gave credence to these testimonies, thus: that since not all their catch were examined, there can be no conclusive proof
that the fish were killed with the use of explosives. 16
Above three (3) accused would like the Court to believe that
the seven (7) pieces of fish samples taken by the team of They also question the credibility of these witnesses, thus:
fishing law enforcers were the catch of their fish net they
locally called [sic] "patuloy." . . . . If it is true that prosecution witness Joey dela Cruz,
allegedly a technical personnel [sic] of the Bureau of
xxx xxx xxx Fisheries and competent to determine if a fish is killed by
dynamite blast, found the 7 fishes to have been killed by a
With the external and internal examination by Joey de la dynamite blast, it was unnatural for the team not to arrest the
Cruz and Rolando Amoroso showing that these fishes were petitioners on the spot. . . . 17
caught with the use of explosive, bare denial of above three
(3) accused that they caught them by means of a fishing net Petitioners' arguments have no merit.
they locally call "patoloy" is insufficient to disprove such
finding. It is simply a superiority of weight of object evidence It is ridiculous to have expected that all the fish found in the accused's fishing
over testimonies of the accused. boat would be subjected to an examination. It is sufficient that, as in the case
at bar, a random sample of the accused's catch was examined and found to
Joey de la Cruz is an agricultural technologist of their office have been killed with the use of explosives. A patent impracticality would
and a graduate of Bachelor of Science in Fishery. Joey de la result if the law required otherwise.
Cruz and Rolando Amoroso had undergone training course
in fishery laws and implementing regulations as well as The fact that the patrol team did not immediately deliver the accused to the
actual demonstrations in sea to practice what they had municipal jail does not diminish the credibility of the above witnesses.
learned in theory. [As] . . . technical personnel of the Bureau Persinefles U. Oabe, the barangay captain of Basiao, gave a plausible
of Fishery and Aquatic Resources, their finding after an explanation for the accused's release:
internal and external examination of fish samples to prove
they were caught with the use of explosives should be
A We released those six persons because if term "deep sea fishes" arose from the trial court's erroneous translation of
we bring them to the municipality of Ivisan "isda sa bato" or "bottom feeders" which were the terms actually employed
we have no available transportation because by said witness to describe the subject fishes:
they were only riding in a single motor
vehicle. 18 ATTY. LUMAWAG:
The want of available transportation is not surprising. The dearth in law Q What were the species of the fishes that
enforcement facilities, especially in the provinces, is not lost on this Court you recovered from that banca?
and is a matter of judicial notice.
A Bottom feeders.
In fine, we find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court
regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses Joey de la Cruz and COURT:
Rolando Amoroso. Its findings are accorded great respect by appellate
tribunals since trial courts have the advantage of examining the witnesses'
testimonies and observing their demeanor first hand. 19 "Isda sa bato," in English?
Petitioners also argue that they could not have been caught fishing with the A Bottom feeders.
use of dynamite in shallow waters because the fishes used as evidence were
described by the prosecution witnesses as "deep sea fishes." According to COURT:
petitioners:
Deep sea fishes. 21
The seven (7) fishes that the prosecution used as evidence
were described by prosecution witnesses as "deep sea Petitioners next contend that if it is true that they were engaged in illegal
fishes". But it has been shown in the testimony of petitioner fishing, it would be "unnatural" for them to use a boat which would make it
Santiago Argoncillo that he and the other petitioners were difficult for them to escape from the law enforcers riding motorized boats. 22
fishing in shallow waters about 1 1/2 meters deep (TSN,
March 13, 1991, p. 7) and using fishnet 200 armslength long Petitioners' contention is too ludicrous to warrant serious consideration. The
and 1 meter wide (TSN, March 13, 1991, p. 4). This law punishing illegal fishing does not require the use of motorized banca or
testimony was not rebutted by the prosecution. In fact, the 3 boat for the crime to be committed. Concededly, a motorized banca can
accused who were acquitted by the trial court were found by better serve those engaged in illegal fishing for purposes of eluding law
the prosecution witnesses standing on the seashore near enforcers. However, not everyone can financially afford to fit a motor in his
where the petitioners were fishing (TSN, January 23, 1991, banca. Indeed, petitioner Argoncillo admitted that the banca that they were
pp. 5 to 6). That petitioners would engage in dynamite fishing using was leased from a certain Dikoy Odrunia. 23
in shallow waters and near the seashore would be unnatural.
The allegation that the petitioners were fishing with the use
Petitioners likewise aver that they did not flee when the law enforcers arrived,
of explosive is therefore not credible. 20
and even voluntarily reported to the Ivisan Police Station the following
morning. They submit that their alleged non-flight should strengthen their
We are not persuaded. claim of innocence. 24
The fishes caught by petitioners were not actually "deep sea fishes" in the We disagree. There is no established doctrine to the effect that, in every
sense that they came from the deep portions of the sea as distinguished from instance, non-flight is an indication of innocence. 25 Moreover, even if they
shallow waters or waters near or along the shores. The fishes caught were wanted to, petitioners could not have possibly eluded the law enforcers who
locally known as "vulgan," "bulawis," "pacol," and "bag-angan." They are were in two pump boats. Attempts to flee would also have been useless
generally described as "isda sa bato" or "bottom feeders." The following since petitioners were already identified by the barrio captain.
excerpt from the testimony of fish examiner Joey de la Cruz shows that the
Lastly, the fact that the accused were asked by the patrol team whether or e. Habitual delinquents (Art.
not they heard an explosion is not in any way reflective of petitioners' 62, par. 5).
innocence. We deem such inquiry as nothing more than a part of the
investigative process. It is quite common, and in most cases, necessary, for Recidivists are entitled to an indeterminate
law enforcers to ask questions to help them ascertain whether or not there sentence. (People v. Jaramilla, L-28547,
exists probable cause to arrest persons suspected of committing a crime. Feb. 22, 1974). Offender is not disqualified
to avail of the benefits of the law even if the
Having failed to discharge themselves of the burden of disproving that they crime is committed while he is on parole.
have committed illegal fishing, the Court is left with no alternative but to (People v. Calreon, CA 78 O.G. 6701, Nov.
affirm petitioners' conviction. 19, 1982).
The penalty imposed by law 26 for illegal fishing if explosive is actually used is f. Those who escaped from
imprisonment ranging from twenty (20) years to life imprisonment. The confinement or those who
Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that if, as in this case, the offense is evaded sentence.
punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of g. Those granted conditional
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum pardon and who violated the
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. 27 The trial terms of the same (Art.
court therefore erred when it sentenced petitioners to "suffer 159). (People v. Corral, 74
a straight penalty of twenty (20) years imprisonment." 28 In Spouses Jose and Phil. 359).
Trinidad Bacar vs. Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., 29 we held that it was
erroneous to impose a straight penalty of six (6) years imprisonment on the
h. Those whose maximum
accused for homicide. We explained:
period of imprisonment does
not exceed one year.
. . . It is basic law that . . . the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where
Where the penalty actually imposed does
imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the
not exceed one year, the accused cannot
following cases: avail himself of the benefits of the law, the
application of which is based upon the
a. Offenses punished by penalty actually imposed in accordance with
death or life imprisonment. law and not upon that which may be
imposed in the discretion of the Court.
b. Those convicted of (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-
treason (Art. 114), CR, Jan. 22, 1962).
conspiracy or proposal to
commit treason (Art. 115). i. Those who are already
serving final judgment upon
c. Those convicted of the approval of the
misprision of treason (Art. Indeterminate Sentence
116), rebellion (Art. 134), Law.
sedition (Art. 139, or
espionage (Art. 117). The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods
of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary
d. Those convicted of piracy and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the
(Art. 122). economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be
exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon
his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record. The
requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all
criminal offenses whether punishable by the or by special
laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as the
Court deems proper within the legal range of the penalty
specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed
mandatory. 30
SO ORDERED.
Not satisfied with the Decision of the MeTC, and insisting on his innocence,
BELLOSILLO, J.: petitioner elevated his case to the Regional Trial Court.
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified On 5 August 1991 the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br. 59, affirmed his
offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible conviction but appreciated in his favor a mitigating circumstance analogous
convict to immediately admit his liability and save the state of time, effort and to passion or obfuscation. Thus —
expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly requires that an accused
must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation. This
outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on . . . (he) was angry and shouting when he uttered the
defamatory words complained of . . . . he must have been
the result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on
angry and worried "about some missing documents . . . as
appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
well as the letter of the Department of Tourism advising
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus
ASPAC about its delinquent tax of P1.2 million . . . . " the
rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.
Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by said defamatory words must have been uttered in the heat of
anger which is a mitigating circumstance analogous to
convicts who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest
passion or obfuscation.2
spontaneity, contrition and remorse.
As conceptualized, is petitioner entitled to probation within the purview of Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty
P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1257 and P.D. 1990? of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment . . . . "3 After he failed to interpose an
appeal therefrom the decision.of the RTC became final. The case was then
set for execution of judgment by the MeTC which, as a consequence, issued
Petitioner's woes started when as President and General Manager of ASPAC a warrant of arrest. But·before he could be arrested petitioner filed an
Trans. Company he failed to control his outburst and blurted — application for probation which the MeTC denied "in the light of the ruling of
the Supreme Court in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No, 84850, 29 June
You employees in this office are all tanga, son of a bitches 1989, 174 SCRA 566 . . . ."4
(sic), bullshit. Puro kayo walang utak . . . . Mga anak ng
puta . . . . Magkano ba kayo . . . God damn you all. Forthwith he went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari which on 2 July 1992
dismissed his petition on the following grounds —
Thus for humiliating his employees he was accused of multiple grave oral
defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted by five (5) of his Initially, the Court notes that the petitioner has failed to
comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No.
28-91 of September 4, 1991. Violation of the circular is Petitioner is no longer eligible for probation.
sufficient cause for dismissal of the petition.
First. Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. 8 Its benefits cannot extend to
Secondly, the petitioner does not allege anywhere in the those not expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but
petition that he had asked the respondent court to reconsider rather an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which
its above order; in fact, he had failed to give the court may be granted by the court to a seemingly deserving defendant who
an.opportunity to correct itself if it had, in fact, committed any thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the
error on the matter. He is, however, required to move for offense of which he stands convicted. 9 It is a special prerogative granted by
reconsideration of the questioned order before filing a law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by others or by all.
petition for certiorari (Sy It v. Tiangco, 4 SCRA 436). This Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the
failure is fatal to his cause. It is a ground for dismissal of his court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society,
petition (Santos v. Vda. de Cerdenola, 5 SCRA 823; Acquiao and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.10 The Probation Law
v. Estenso, 14 SCRA 18; Del Pilar Transit, Inc. v. Public should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any
Service Commission, 31-SCRA 372). of the latter's prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the
legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit
Thirdly, it is obvious that respondent court did not commit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them.
any capricious, arbitrary, despotic or whimsical exercise of
power in denying the petitioner's application for probation . . . Neither Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, which clearly mandates
. that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction,"
Fourthly, the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner nor Llamado v. Court of Appeals 11 which interprets the quoted provision,
out of time . . . . offers any ambiguity or qualification. As such, the application of the law
should not be subjected to any to suit the case of petitioner. While the
Fifthly, the Court notes that Section 4 of PD 968 allows the trial court to grant proposition that an appeal should not bar the accused from applying for
probation if the appealis solely to reduce the penalty to within the
probation after conviction, upon an application by the defendant within the
probationable limit may be equitable, we are not yet prepared to accept this
period of appeal, upon terms and conditions and period appropriate to each
interpretation under existing law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, we quote
case, but expressly rules out probation where an appeal has been taken . . .
Mr. Justice Feliciano speaking for the Court en banc in Llamado v. Court of
.5
Appeals—
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
. . . we note at the outset that Probation Law is not a penal
statute. We, however, understand petitioner's argument to
In the present recourse, petitioner squirms out of each ground and seeks this be really that any statutory language that appears to favor
Court's compassion in dispensing with the minor technicalities which may the accused in acriminal case should be given.a "liberal
militate against his petition as he now argues before us that he has not yet interpretation." Courts . . . have no authority to invoke "liberal
lost his right to avail of probation notwithstanding his appeal from the MeTC interpretation" or "the spirit of the law" where the words of
to the RTC since "[t]he reason for his appeal was precisely to enable him to the statute themselves, and·as illuminated by the history of
avail himself of the benefits of the Probation Law because the original that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do
Decision of the (Metropolitan) Trial Court was such that he would not then be not believe that "the spirit of·the law" may legitimately be
entitled to probation." 6 He contends that "he appealed from the judgment of invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and
the trial court precisely for the purpose of reducing the penalties imposed definite meaning imparted to them by our procedural law.
upon him by the said court to enable him to qualify for probation." 7 The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by
judges and all others who are charged with the application
The central issue therefore is whether petitioneris still qualified to avail of and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely essential to
probation even after appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the bear in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent
MeTC except with regard to the duration of the penalties imposed. that is to be given effect are derived from the words actually
used by the law-maker, and not from some external, mystical submitted to some court for its interpretation
or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the and construction.
words of the legislature.
The point in this warning may be expected to become
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict sharper as our people's grasp of English is steadily
interpretation" rather than a "liberal" one to Section 4 of the attenuated. 12
Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990.
"Strict" and "liberal" are adjectives which too frequently Therefore, that an appeal should not·bar the accused from applying for
impede a disciplined and principled search for the meaning probation if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty is simply contrary
which the law-making authority projected when it to the clear and express mandate of Sec, 4 of the Probation Law, as
promulgated the language which we must apply. That amended, which opens with a negativeclause, "no application for probation
meaning is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
and unmistakable as the nose on a man's face. The Courtis from the judgment of conviction." In Bersabal v. Salvador, 13 we said —
simply·reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no
need for the involved process of construction that petitioner
By its very language, the Rule is mandatory. Under the rule
invites us to engage in, a process made necessary only
of statutory construction. negative words and phrases are to
because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning which
be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are
shines through the words of the statute. The first duty of the
merely directory. . . . the use of the term "shall" further
judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is
would like·it to be. Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v.
imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be
Court of First Instance warned, confusion and uncertainty will
enforced.
surely follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity
in the law much more difficult to achieve:
And where the law does not distinguish the courts should not distinguish;
where the law does not make exception the court should not except.
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle
refinements which tinge words as to give
them the color of a particular judicial theory Second. At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were already
are not only unnecessary but decidedly probationable. Hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce the
harmful. That which has caused so much penalties to within the probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed
confusion in the law, which has made it so against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not,
difficult for the public to understand and and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the multiple prison terms
know what the law is with respect to a given imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility for,
matter, is in considerable measure the nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct
unwarranted interference by judicial from each other, and if none of the terms exceeds the limit set out in the
tribunals with the English language as found Probation Law,i.e., not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to
in statutes and contracts, cutting the words probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of
here and inserting them there, making them offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately,
fit personal ideas of what the legislature are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as
ought to have done or what parties should amended, uses the word maximum not total when it says that "[t]he benefits
have agreed upon, giving them meanings of this Decree shall not be extended to those . . . . sentenced to serve
which they do not ordinarily have cutting, a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years." Evidently, the law
trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until does not intend to sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty
lawyers themselves are unable to advise separately and distinctly with the others. Consequently, even if petitioner was
their clients as to the meaning of a given supposed to have served his prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day to
statute or contract until it has been one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional sixteen (16)
times as he was sentenced to serve the prison term for "each crime
committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information(s)," and The assertion that the Decision of the RTC should be multiplied only four (4)
in each of the four (4) informations, he was charged with.having defamed the times since there are only four (4) Informations thereby allowing petitioner to
four (4) private complainants on four (4) different, separate days, he was qualify for probation, instead of sixteen (16) times, is quite difficult to
still·eligible for probation, as each prison term imposed on petitioner was understand. The penalties imposed by the MeTC cannot be any clearer —
probationable. "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, in each crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for in the information(s). "Hence, petitioner should suffer the imposed penalties
probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher sixteen (16) times. On the other hand, the RTC affirmed, the judgment of
penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their conviction and merely reduced the duration of each penalty imposed by the
demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity MeTC "in each case to a STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit. 14 The imprisonment" on account of a mitigating circumstance for each case, count
Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been or incident of grave oral defamation·There is no valid reason therefore why
convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of The the penalties imposed by the RTC should be multiplied only four (4) times,
Revised Penal Code, 15 and not necessarily those who have been convicted and not sixteen (16) times, considering that the RTC merely affirmed the
of multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less MeTC as regards the culpability of petitioner in each of the sixteen (16)
perverse. Hence, the basis of the disqualification is principally the gravity of cases and reducing only the duration of the penalties imposed therein. Thus
the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty imposed. —
Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are not
generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of Premises considered, the judgment of conviction rendered
probation. by the trial court is AFFIRMED with modification, as follows:
To demonstrate the point, let ustake for instance one who is convicted in a WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C.
single decision of, say, thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for Francisco GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in each of the
having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one outburst) and sentenced to above entitled cases and appreciating in his favor the
a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has been found mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (l) day of prision obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in
mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (l2) years and one (1) day of reclusion each case to a straight penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS
temporal minimum as maximuin. Obviously, the latter offender is more imprisonment, with the accessory penalties prescribed by
perverse and is disqualified from availing of probation. law; and to pay the costs. 16
Petitioner thus proceeds on an erroneous assumption that under the MeTC Nowhere in the RTC Decision is it stated or even hinted at that the accused
Decision he could not have availed of the benefits of probation. Since he was acquitted or absolved in any of the four (4) counts under each of the four
could have, although he did not, his appeal now precludes him from applying (4) Informatfons, or that any part of thejudgment of conviction was reversed,
for probation. or that any of the cases, counts or incidents was dismissed. Otherwise, we
will have to account for the twelve (12) other penalties imposed by the MeTC.
And, even if we go along with the premise of petitioner, however erroneous it Can we? What is clear is that the judgment of conviction rendered by the was
may be, that the penalties imposed against him should be summed up, still affirmed with the sole modification on the duration of the penalties.
he would not have qualified under the Decision rendered by the RTC since if
the "STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment" imposed by In fine, considering that the multiple prison terms should not be summed up
the RTC is multiplied sixteen (16) times, the total imposable penalty would be but taken separately as the totality of all the penalties is not the test,
ten (10) years and eight (8) months, which is still way beyond the limit of not petitioner should have immediately filed an application for probation as he
more than six (6) years provided for in the Probation Law, as amended. To was already qualified after being convicted by the MeTC, if indeed thereafter
illustrate: 8 months multiplied by 16 cases = 128 months; 128 months divided he felt humbled, was ready to unconditionally accept the verdict of the court
by 12 months (in a year) = 10 years and 8 months, hence, following his and admit his liability. Consequently, in appealing the Decision of the MeTC
argument, petitioner cannot still be eligible for probation as the total of his to the RTC, petitioner lost his right to probation. For, plainly, the law
penalties exceeds six (6) years. considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies. 17
Third. Petitioner appealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct the separate crimes of grave oral defamation, committed on four (4) separate
penalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert his innocence. Nothing more. days. His failure to do so however may now be deemed a waiver under Sec.
The cold fact is that petitioner appealed his conviction to the RTC not for the 8 of the same Rule 21 and he can be validly convicted, as in the instant case,
sole purpose of reducing his penalties to make him eligible for probation — of as many crimes charged in the Information.
since he was already qualified under the MeTC Decision — but rather to
insist on his innocence. The appeal record is wanting of any other purpose. Fourth. The application for probation was filed way beyond the period
Thus, in his Memorandum before the RTC, he raised only three (3) allowed by law. This is vital way beyond the period allowed by law and
statements of error purportedly committed by the MeTC all aimed at his crucial. From the records it is clear that the application for probation was filed
acquittal: (a) in finding that the guilt of the accused has been established "only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been issued . . . (and)
because of his positive identification by the witness for the prosecution; (b) in almost two months after (his) receipt of the Decision" 22 of the RTC. This is a
giving full faith and credence to the bare statements of the private significant fact which militates against the instant petition. We quote with
complainants despite the absence of corroborating testimonies; and, (c)in not affirmance the well-written, albeit assailed, ponencia of now Presiding Justice
acquitting him in all the cases," 18 Consequently, petitioner insisted that the of the Court of Appeals Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., on the specific issue —
trial court committed an error in relying on his positive identification
considering that private complainants could not have missed identifying him . . . the petition for probation was filed by the petitioner out of
who was their President and General Manager with whom they worked for a
time. The law in point, Section 4 of P.D. 968, as amended,
good number of years. Petitioner further argued that although the alleged
provides thus:
defamatory words were uttered in the presence of other persons, mostly
private complainants, co-employees and clients, not one of them was
presented as a witness. Hence, according to petitioner, the trial court could Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the
not have convicted him on the basis of the uncorroborative testimony of provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
private complainants. 19 after it shall have convicted and sentenced a
defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an
Certainly, the protestations of petitioner connote profession of guiltlessness,
appeal. . . . place the defendant on
if not complete innocence, and do not simply put in issue the propriety of the probation . . . .
penalties imposed. For sure, the accused never manifested that he was
appealing only for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to
within the probationable range. Hence, upon interposing an appeal, more so Going to the extreme, and assuming that an application for
after asserting his innocence therein, petitioner should be precluded from probation from one who had appealed the trial court's
seeking probation. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner ipso facto relinquished judgment is allowed by law, the petitioner's plea for probation
his alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law the purpose of which was filed out of time. In the petition is a clear statement that
is simply to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused the petitioner was up for execution of judgment before he
who although already eligible does not at once apply for probation, but doing filed his application for probation. P.D. No. 968 says that the
so only after failing in his appeal. application for probation must be filed "within the period for
perfecting an appeal;" but in this case, such period for
appeal had passed, meaning to say that the Regional Trial
The fact that petitioner did not elevate the affirmance of his conviction by the Court's decision had attained finality, and no appeal
RTC to the Court of Appeals does not necessarily mean that his appeal to
therefrom was possible under the law. Even granting that an
the RTC was solely to reduce his penalties. Conversely, he was afraid that appeal from the appellate court's judgment is contemplated
the Court of Appeals would increase his penalties, which could be worse for
by P.D. 968, in addition to the judgment rendered by the trial
him. Besides, the RTC Decision had already become final and executory
court, that appellate judgment had become final and was, in
because of the negligence, according to him, of his former counsel who failed fact, up for actual execution before the application for
to seek possible remedies within the period allowed by law. probation was attempted by the petitioner. The petitioner did
not file his application for probation before the finality of the
Perhaps it should be mentioned that at the outset petitioner, in accordance said judgment; therefore, the petitioner's attempt at probation
with Sec 3, par. (e), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, 20 should have moved to was filed too late.
quash as each of the four (4) Informations filed against him charged four (4)
Our minds cannot simply rest easy on. the proposition that an application for defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
probation may yet be granted even if it was filed only after judgment has and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no
become final, the conviction already set for execution and a warrant of arrest application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
issued for service of sentence. defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the
MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial court, is to term of imprisonment or a fine only probation shall be filed
stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow with the trial court application shall be deemed a waiver of
probation after an appeal has been perfected. the right to appeal.
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and An order granting or denying probation shall not be
probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his appealable.
conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already
probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not Thus, under § 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or
even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and applying for probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he
finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting opts for probation, he can not appeal. Implicit in the choice, however, is that
an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant the accused is not disqualified for probation under any of the cases
petition for review should be as it is hereby DENIED. mentioned in § 9, to wit:
Separate Opinions (b) convicted of subversion or any crime against the national
security or the public order;
MENDOZA, J., dissenting:
(c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of
I vote to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this case. an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two
Hundred Pesos.
I.
The principal basis for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of Appeals (d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of
denying probation is the fact that petitioner had appealed his sentence before this Decree; and
filing his application for probation. Reliance is placed on the literal application
of § 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 ,as amended, which provides as follows: (e) who are already serving sentence at the time the
substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted
and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, for probation, as when the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the their totality exceeds six (6) years but on appeal the sentence is modified so
that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused should not be denied appeal from the judgment of conviction." The majority opinion, affirming the
the benefit of probation. ruling, states that to allow probation in this case would be to go against the
"clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended." (p.
Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed — even 9)
encouraged — speculation on the outcome of appeals by permitting the
accused to apply for probation after he had appealed and failed to obtain an To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the
acquittal. 1 It was to change this that § 4 was amended by P.D. No. 1990 by accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter is to
expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained or disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law — it is not —
conviction." For an accused, despite the fact that he is eligible for probation, but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA 8, 14
may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an acquittal if he knows (1983)). The niggardly application of the law would defeat its purpose to "help
he can any way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed. 2 the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual"
(Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per Teehankee, J.) or "afford
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in [him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a
limiting the accused to the choice of either appealing from the decision of the prison record, to save government funds that may otherwise be spent for his
trial court or applying for probation, the purpose is to deny him the right to food and maintenance while incarcerated, and to decongest the jails of the
probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible for country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per
probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The purpose of Makasiar, J.)
the amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or
opportunism on the part of an accused who; although eligible for probation, The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140
does not at once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal. SCRA 391, 395 (1985) instead commends itself to me:
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law
petitioner was principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While was never intended to limit the right of an accused person to
acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him, what is clear is that he present all relevant evidence he can avail of in order to
had a reason for appealing because under the sentence given to him he was secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty.
disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally sentenced him to Neither does the law require a plea of guilty on the part of
1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each the accused to enable him to avail of the benefits of
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information[s]." probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the
This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to suffer constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent
the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, until the contrary is proved.
since he was found guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of
four cases. The totality of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8 As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof
months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by § of this is that after the penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been
9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was reduced by the RTC so that he thereby became qualified for probation, he
reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment in each did not appeal further. The majority says that this was because he was afraid
case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases that that if he did the penalty could be increased. That possibility, however, was
petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did not appeal further also there when he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For by appealing
although he could have done so. the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took as much risk that the penalty
would be raised as the chance that he would he acquitted.
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space
not covered by the present law on probation . . . where in its original state, It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his
the petitioner was disqualified from applying for probation under Sec. 9 of the innocence and not simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no
Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under the terms of the judgment more so does an accused who, upon being arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty."
on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the letter of § 4: "No application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is otherwise eligible for The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple
probation. sentences imposed in cases which are jointly tried and decided. For
example, § 9(c) disqualifies from probation persons "who have previously
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
guilty'' in the beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two
after he is found guilty. So does an accused who appeals a sentence Hundred Pesos. It was held in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121 (1985) that
because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the penalty is the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa in five criminal cases, was
reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence and applies qualified for probation because although the crimes had been committed on
for probation. different dates he was found guilty of each crime on the same day. As this
Court noted, "Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (l7)
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal case the sentence was
three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
SCRA 566 (1989), in which it was held that because the petitioner had
appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply for probation. For,
unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could have That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the
applied for probation as his original sentence of one year of prision totality of several penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in
correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the accumulation of penalties.
within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies for probation (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)
must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction."
It is said that the basis of disqualification under § 9 is the gravity of the
II. offense committed and the penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend
that a person who is convicted of multiple grave oral defamation for which the
total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of a graver offense
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the
than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral defamation and
original sentence meted out to him he was not disqualified for probation. The
issue here is whether the multiple prison terms imposed on petitioner are to sentenced to a single penalty of 1 year and 8 months. The relevant
comparison is between an accused convicted of one offense of grave oral
be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose of § 9(a) which
defamation and another one convicted of the same offense, say four or more
disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of
times. The relevant comparison is not, as the majority says, between an
imprisonment of more than six years."
accused found guilty of grave oral defamation four or more times and another
one found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 6
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
imposed on petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year temporal.
and eight (8) months of prision correccional in each crime committed on each
date of each case" and as there are four offenses of grave oral defamation
III.
against petitioner in each of the four cases, the total prison term which he
would have to serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the
probationable maximum allowed by law. Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying
probation in this case and that is that petitioner applied for probation only
after his case had been remanded to the MeTC for the execution of its
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the
decision as modified. But that is because § 4 provides that "an application for
modified sentence imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for
probation because he has to suffer imprisonment of eight months sixteen probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case,
times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said accused in each petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final.
case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment." This
means eight (8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32
months or 2 years and 8 months. The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be
ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's application for probation.
VITUG, J., concurring: Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a
term of imprisonment or a fine only probation shall be filed
While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V. with the trial court application shall be deemed a waiver of
Mendoza in his dissenting opinion that an accused, who originally is not the right to appeal.
qualified for probation because the penalty imposed on him by a court a
quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of probation if on An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit, I am appealable.
unable, however, to second the other proposition that multiple prison terms
imposed by a court should be taken in their totality for purposes of Section 9 Thus, under § 4 the accused is given the choice of appealing his sentence or
(a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo in applying for probation. If he appeals, he cannot later apply for probation. If he
his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or disqualification of an opts for probation, he can not appeal. Implicit in the choice, however, is that
applicant for probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison the accused is not disqualified for probation under any of the cases
terms for, several offenses, "the number of offenses is immaterial as long as mentioned in § 9, to wit:
all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable
period." The use of the word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9,
Sec. 9. Disqualified Offenders. — The benefits of this Decree
paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to reveal that
shall not be extended to those:
such has been the legislative intent.
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of
Thus, I still must vote for the denial of the petition. more than six years;
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of Consequently, if under the sentence given to him an accused is not qualified
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted for probation, as when the penalty imposed on him by the court singly or in
and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said their totality exceeds six (6) years but on appeal the sentence is modified so
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, that he becomes qualified, I believe that the accused should not be denied
suspend the execution of the sentence and place the the benefit of probation.
defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms
and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no Before its amendment by P.D. No. 1990, the law allowed — even
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the encouraged — speculation on the outcome of appeals by permitting the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of accused to apply for probation after he had appealed and failed to obtain an
conviction.
acquittal. 1 It was to change this that § 4 was amended by P.D. No. 1990 by To regard probation, however, as a mere privilege, to be given to the
expressly providing that "no application for probation shall be entertained or accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter is to
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
conviction." For an accused, despite the fact that he is eligible for probation, applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law — it is not —
may be tempted to appeal in the hope of obtaining an acquittal if he knows but to achieve its beneficent purpose. (Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA 8, 14
he can any way apply for probation in the event his conviction is affirmed. 2 (1983)). The niggardly application of the law would defeat its purpose to "help
the probationer develop into a law-abiding and self-respecting individual"
There is, however, nothing in the amendatory Decree to suggest that in (Baclayon v. Mutia, 129 SCRA 148, 149 (1984), per Teehankee, J.) or "afford
limiting the accused to the choice of either appealing from the decision of the [him] a chance to reform and rehabilitate himself without the stigma of a
trial court or applying for probation, the purpose is to deny him the right to prison record, to save government funds that may otherwise be spent for his
probation in cases like the one at bar where he becomes eligible for food and maintenance while incarcerated, and to decongest the jails of the
probation only because on appeal his sentence is reduced. The purpose of country." (Del Rosario v. Rosero, 126 SCRA 228, 232 (1983), per
the amendment, it bears repeating, is simply to prevent speculation or Makasiar, J.)
opportunism on the part of an accused who; although eligible for probation,
does not at once apply for probation, doing so only after failing in his appeal. The approach followed by the Court in Atienza v. Court of Appeals, 140
SCRA 391, 395 (1985) instead commends itself to me:
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that in appealing the decision MeTC
petitioner was principally motivated by a desire to be acquitted. While Regarding this, it suffices to state that the Probation Law
acquittal might have been an alluring prospect for him, what is clear is that he was never intended to limit the right of an accused person to
had a reason for appealing because under the sentence given to him he was present all relevant evidence he can avail of in order to
disqualified to apply for probation. The MeTC had originally sentenced him to secure a verdict of acquittal or a reduction of the penalty.
1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional for "each Neither does the law require a plea of guilty on the part of
crime committed on each date of each case, as alleged in the information[s]." the accused to enable him to avail of the benefits of
This meant, as the majority opinion points out, that petitioner had to suffer probation. A contrary view would certainly negate the
the prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months sixteen times, constitutional right of an accused to be presumed innocent
since he was found guilty of four crimes of grave oral defamation in each of until the contrary is proved.
four cases. The totality of the penalties imposed on petitioner (26 years and 8
months) thus exceeded the limit of six (6) years of imprisonment allowed by § As already stated, petitioner did not appeal primarily to seek acquittal. Proof
9(a) and disqualified him for probation. It was only after this penalty was of this is that after the penalty imposed on him by the MeTC had been
reduced on appeal to a straight penalty of eight months imprisonment in each reduced by the RTC so that he thereby became qualified for probation, he
case or to a total term of 2 years and 8 months in the four cases that did not appeal further. The majority says that this was because he was afraid
petitioner became eligible for probation. Then he did not appeal further that if he did the penalty could be increased. That possibility, however, was
although he could have done so. also there when he appealed from the MeTC to the RTC. For by appealing
the sentence of the MeTC, petitioner took as much risk that the penalty
The Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that "there may be some space would be raised as the chance that he would he acquitted.
not covered by the present law on probation . . . where in its original state,
the petitioner was disqualified from applying for probation under Sec. 9 of the It is true that in appealing the sentence of the MeTC petitioner professed his
Decree, becoming eligible for probation only under the terms of the judgment innocence and not simply questioned the propriety of his sentence, but no
on appeal," nevertheless felt bound by the letter of § 4: "No application for more so does an accused who, upon being arraigned, pleads, "Not Guilty."
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the And yet the latter cannot be denied probation if he is otherwise eligible for
appeal from the judgment of conviction." The majority opinion, affirming the probation.
ruling, states that to allow probation in this case would be to go against the
"clear and express mandate of sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as amended." (p.
It is argued that there is a difference because an accused who pleads "not
9)
guilty'' in the beginning, later acknowledges his guilt and shows contrition
after he is found guilty. So does an accused who appeals a sentence
because under it he is not qualified for probation, but after the penalty is qualified for probation because although the crimes had been committed on
reduced, instead of appealing further, accepts the new sentence and applies different dates he was found guilty of each crime on the same day. As this
for probation. Court noted, "Rura was sentenced to a total prison term of seventeen (l7)
months and twenty-five (25) days. In each criminal case the sentence was
This case is thus distinguishable from Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 three (3) months and fifteen (15) days.
SCRA 566 (1989), in which it was held that because the petitioner had
appealed his sentence, he could not subsequently apply for probation. For, That the duration of a convict's sentence is determined by considering the
unlike petitioner in the case at bar, the accused in that case could have totality of several penalties for different offenses committed is also implicit in
applied for probation as his original sentence of one year of prision the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the accumulation of penalties.
correccional did not disqualify him for probation. That case fell squarely (See e.g., arts. 48 and 70)
within the ambit of the prohibition in § 4 that one who applies for probation
must not "have perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is said that the basis of disqualification under § 9 is the gravity of the
offense committed and the penalty imposed. I agree. That is why I contend
II. that a person who is convicted of multiple grave oral defamation for which the
total prison term is, say, 6 years and 8 months, is guilty of a graver offense
It is contended that petitioner did not have to appeal because under the than another who is guilty of only offense of grave oral defamation and
original sentence meted out to him he was not disqualified for probation. The sentenced to a single penalty of 1 year and 8 months. The relevant
issue here is whether the multiple prison terms imposed on petitioner are to comparison is between an accused convicted of one offense of grave oral
be considered singly or in their totality for the purpose of § 9(a) which defamation and another one convicted of the same offense, say four or more
disqualifies from probation those "sentenced to serve a maximum term of times. The relevant comparison is not, as the majority says, between an
imprisonment of more than six years." accused found guilty of grave oral defamation four or more times and another
one found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
I submit that they should be taken in their totality. As the sentence originally
temporal.
imposed on petitioner was for "one (1) year and one (1) day to one (1) year
and eight (8) months of prision correccional in each crime committed on each
date of each case" and as there are four offenses of grave oral defamation III.
against petitioner in each of the four cases, the total prison term which he
would have to serve was 26 years and 8 months. This is clearly beyond the Finally, it is said that there is a more fundamental reason for denying
probationable maximum allowed by law. probation in this case and that is that petitioner applied for probation only
after his case had been remanded to the MeTC for the execution of its
It is said, however, that even if the totality of the prison terms is the test, the decision as modified. But that is because § 4 provides that "an application for
modified sentence imposed by the RTC would not qualify the petitioner for probation shall be filed with the trial court." In the circumstances of this case,
probation because he has to suffer imprisonment of eight months sixteen petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the MeTC, which
times. That is not so. The RTC only "sentence[d] the said accused in each necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become final.
case to STRAIGHT penalty of EIGHT (8) MONTHS imprisonment." This
means eight (8) months times four (4), since there are four cases, or 32 The decision of the Court of Appeals should be REVERSED and respondent
months or 2 years and 8 months. judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila should be
ORDERED to GRANT petitioner's application for probation.
The policy of the law indeed appears to be to treat as only one multiple
sentences imposed in cases which are jointly tried and decided. For VITUG, J., concurring:
example, § 9(c) disqualifies from probation persons "who have previously
been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of While I subscribe to the observation made by Mr. Justice Vicente V.
not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than Two Mendoza in his dissenting opinion that an accused, who originally is not
Hundred Pesos. It was held in Rura v. Lopena, 137 SCRA 121 (1985) that qualified for probation because the penalty imposed on him by a court a
the accused, who had been found guilty of estafa in five criminal cases, was quo exceeds six (6) years, should not be denied that benefit of probation if on
appeal the sentence is ultimately reduced to within the prescribed limit, I am
unable, however, to second the other proposition that multiple prison terms
imposed by a court should be taken in their totality for purposes of Section 9
(a), P.D. No. 968. In this respect, I concur with Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo in
his ponencia that in determining the eligibility or disqualification of an
applicant for probation charged with, and sentenced to serve multiple prison
terms for, several offenses, "the number of offenses is immaterial as long as
all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable
period." The use of the word maximum instead of the word total in Section 9,
paragraph (a) of P.D. 968, as amended, should be enough to reveal that
such has been the legislative intent.