A.

DOMICILE

Romualdez v. RTC et al, Sept. 14, 1993

Facts:

Petitioner Romualdez is a antural-born citizen; the son of Kokoy Romualdez and a niece of Imelda
Marcos. In 1980, he established his residence in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte. However, in 1986, during the
days of People Power, relatives of the deposed President (Marcos), fearing for their personal safety, fled
the country. One of them are the Romuladezes – they left the country and sought asylum in the United
States.

However, in 1991, the U.S. Immigration informed them to depart from the U.S. or else they’ll be
deported. Upon receipt of the information, Romuladez went back to the Philippines and did not delay
his return to his residence in Leyte and immediately registered himself as a voter.

In 1992, herein private respondent Advincula filed a petition to exclude petitioner from the list of the
voters alleging that the latter is a U.S. resident, and residency is a qualification for a registered voter.
However, the MTC denied the petition but when the respondent elevated the petition to the RTC, the
appellate court reversed MTC’s ruling and disqualified Romuldez as a registered voter. Hence, this case.

Issue: Whether petitioner is qualified to be a registered voter in Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte despite his
sudden departure to the U.S?

Ruling:

The Court held that YES, Petitioner is qualified as a registered voter because he is still considered a
resident of Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.

Stating that, the political situation brought about by people’s Power Revolution must have caused great
fear to the Romualdezes, and as having concern over the safety of their families, their self-exile is
understandable. Moreover, their sudden departure cannot be described as ‘voluntary’ or ‘abandonment
of residence’.

It must be emphasized that the right to vote is a most precious political right; a bounden duty of every
citizen enabling them to participate in the government process to ensure the will of the people.

Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995

FACTS:

On March 23,1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC alleging that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. On March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing the entry
“seven” months to “since childhood”. The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for the position of the member of the House of
Representatives for the First District of Leyte. In a supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she
was the overwhelming winner of the election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a
period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

RULING:

Yes, it was determined that the petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications.

“Residence” is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, while “domicile”
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents.

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile or abandonment.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a
new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly
indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.

B. LIVE TOGETHER

Arroyo v Vasquez (1921)

ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)

FACTS:

Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived
together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from
their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled
to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of
separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent
separate maintenance.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring
the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife.

ISSUES:

1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home

2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent
mandatory injunction

HELD:

1. The wife had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff
to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her
husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present.

Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the
wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair
must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband.
She is under obligation to return to the domicile.

“When people understand that they must live together…they learn to soften by mutual accommodation
that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wives…necessity is
a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes…” (Evans v. Evans)

2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one
of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights,
such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the
spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with
much criticism.

Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the defendant absented herself without sufficient cause
and it is her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.

Ilusorio vs Bildner

Facts: This is a consolidated case of the following:

1. Petitioner (P) Erlinda Ilusorio seeks to reverse the Decision of the CA dismissing her
application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio (Respondent, “R” for brevity) and enforce consortium.
2. Potenciano filed a petition to annul the portion of the Decision of the CA giving visitation
rights her wife Erlinda to her.
Potenciano is about 86 years of age, possessed extensive properties valued at millions of
pesos. He was, for many years, the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country
Club.

Erlinda and Potenciano are married couple but they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. They have six (6) children (co-respondents).

On December 30, 1997, Potenciano arrived coming from USA here in the Philippines. He
stayed for five (5) months with Erlinda in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda,
alleged that during such time, Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdosed amount of Zoloft
(instead of 100mg, she gave 200mg); thus, Potenciano’s health deteriorated.

On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Antipolo a petition for Guardianship over
the person and property of Potenciano due to latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment.

On May 31, 1998, After attending a corporate meeting, Potenciano did not return to his wife
in Antipolo but rather he went and lived at Makati with his children.

Because of such event, Erlinda filed a petition with the CA for habeas corpus to have the
custody of her lawyer husband, Potenciano. CA denied such petition.

Issues:
1. Whether habeas corpus may be availed by Erlinda to compel Potenciano to live with her
in conjugal bliss?
2. How about the issue of visitation rights?
Decision:
1. Marital rights including overture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by
the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriffs or by any other means process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

2. CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas
corpus because P never prayed for such right.
In this case, Potenciano was found to be of sound mind and possesses the capacity to make
own choices.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano may not be the
subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right
to privacy.

C. SUPPORT

Goitia v. Campos-Rueda
G.R. No. 11263, 2 November 1916

FACTS:

Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in Manila and thereafter lived together
for about a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home because of the following reasons:
(1) Defendant demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on her genitals; (2) Defendant
made other lewd demands; and (3) Defendant maltreated petitioner by word and by deed on the
ground that the latter refused to do any of defendant’s demands other than legal and valid
cohabitation.

Petitioner filed an action against her husband for support outside their conjugal domicile. The trial
court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support
her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or
divorce from respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

RULING:

Yes. Campos Rueda was held liable to support his wife. The law provides that the husband, who is
obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by
maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given by law is NOT absolute.

This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage
as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such
vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful
acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance
is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of
the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate
of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the
purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the
habit of assaulting her.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and
physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for
separate support is not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so
sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except
in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and morals
may be considered, it does NOT in any respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any
purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.

D. PRIVACY

Zulueta vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
Cecilia Zulueta is the Petitioner who offset the private papers of his husband Dr. Alfredo Martin. Dr. Martin
is a doctor of medicine while he is not in his house His wife took the 157 documents consisting of diaries,
cancelled check, greeting cards, passport and photograph, private respondents between her Wife and his
alleged paramours, by means of forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet. Cecilia Zulueta filed the papers
for the evidence of her case of legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring
him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martin’s Complaint or those
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her
behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review
with the Supreme Court.

Issue:

The papers and other materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are admissible
as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

Ruling/Held:

The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring “the
privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s infidelity, who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.

The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and
wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the
affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other
as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each
one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each
owes to the other.