1.

GR 34431 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

FABIAN MONTERA, defendant-appellant

Facts:

Fabian Montera was convicted of the crime of theft of twelve

phonograph records and one flashlight, and was considered as a habitual

delinquent. Recidivism was also taken as an aggravating circumstance,

independently of the provisions of the Habitual Delinquent Law.

Issue: WON the Habitual Delinquent Law is an ex post facto law

Ruling:

No. The Habitual Delinquent Law is valid as it does not inflict cruel or

unusual punishment for the former crimes but simply impose a

punishment on future crimes, the penalty therefor being enhanced on

account of the criminal propensities of the accused.

There must be a modification of the period of imprisonment, it being

understood that the defendant and appellant is sentenced to two years,

four months, and one day imprisonment, presidio correccional, to

indemnify the offended party in the amount of P30.30, with subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the appropriate accessory

penalties, and with the costs of both instances; and to an additional

penalty of ten years' imprisonment as a habitual delinquent.

2. GR 35194 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

MARCIANO VENTURA, defendant-appellant

Facts:

Ventura was convicted of the crime of estafa when he, with intent to

defraud Adriano Miralles and to embezzle and personally use the money,

falsely represented himself as and pretended to be an agent of I. Beck,

Inc. on May 16, 1930 and collected the sum of P21.70 as first partial

payment for a phonograph case. Ventura was sentenced to a penalty of

two months and one day of arresto mayor, besides the indemnity and

accessory penalties of the law applicable to his case, and, as a habitual

criminal, to the additional penalty of sixteen years.

Issue: WON the six prior convictions of the crime of estafa should all be

taken into account for the imposition of the additional penalty of sixteen

years imprisonment.

Ruling:
Following the doctrine laid down in the Santiago and De la Cruz cases,

supra, these six prior convictions must be considered as equivalent to

only three, because the accused committed the second crime before his

first conviction, and the fourth before his third conviction, and because

the fifth and sixth crimes were committed on the same day.

the judgment appealed from is modified and the accused-appellant is

sentenced to one year and one day of presidio correccional, to indemnify

the offended party in the amount of P21.70, with subsidiary

imprisonment in case of insolvency, the accessory penalties of article 58

of the Penal Code, and to the additional penalty of ten years'

imprisonemnt as an habitual criminal, besides the payment of the costs

of both instances.

3. GR 70713 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

BARTOLOME GALANG, accused-appellant

Facts:

Bartolome Galang was convicted of rape by the then Court of First

Instance of Pampanga and sentenced to suffer "an indeterminate

sentence from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum,

to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; to suffer the accessory penalties as provided by

law and to pay the costs."

Galang appealed his conviction to the then Intermediate Appellate Court

(now Court of Appeals) which found him guilty of the crime charged but

held that the penalty imposed for the crime of rape was reclusion

perpetua.

Issue: WON the penalty to be imposed be modified to reclusion

perpetua as held by the appellate court.

Ruling:

No, the SC does not agree with the appellate court that the penalty that

should be imposed upon the accused is reclusion perpetua despite the

provisions of Articles 63 and 335 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused was sixteen (16) years, nine (9) months and fourteen (14)

days old at the time of the commission of the offense on January 8, 1975;

he was eighteen (18) years when he took the witness stand on April

15,1977 and twenty (20) years old at the time of the promulgation of the

decision.

Thus, the trial court correctly found him not to be entitled to the benefit

of suspension of sentence under Article 192, Chapter III of the Youth and

Welfare Code [Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603]. Instead, the court
pronounced a judgment of conviction after crediting him with the

privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 68 of the Revised Penal

Code and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Verily the accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of

minority. Hence, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its

medium period, absent any other mitigating or aggravating

circumstance.

4. GR L-3215 ALONSO BAGTAS Y ALEJANDRO, petitioner,

vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent

Facts:

On various dates between February 18 and May 14, 1948, the petitioner

was convicted of estafa in seventeen criminal cases and sentenced by

final judgments of the Court of First Instance of Manila to an aggregate

penalty of 6 years, 4 months, and 26 days of imprisonment, to indemnify

the offended parties in various sums aggregating P43,436.45, with

subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in each case, and to pay

the costs. The petitioner contends that the subsidiary imprisonment

should be eliminated because article 70 provides that "no other penalty

to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those

imposed equals the said maximum period."

Issue: WON the subsidiary imprisonment should be eliminated in

accordance with Article 70.

Ruling:

No. Subsidiary imprisonment forms part of the penalty and its imposition

is required by article 39 in case of insolvency of the accused to meet the

pecuniary liabilities mentioned in the first three paragraphs of article 38;

it cannot be eliminated under article 70 so long as the principal penalty

is not higher than 6 years of imprisonment. The provision of article 70

that no other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after

the sum total of those imposed equals the said maximum period, simply

means that the convict shall not severe the excess over the maximum of

threefold the most severe penalty. For instance, if the aggregate of the

principal penalties is six years and that is reduced to two years under the

threefold rule of article 70, he shall not be required to serve the

remaining four years.