REYNIERE M.

ALO
ATTY: BRENDA TANGARORANG
SUCCESSION (Monday (6:30-9:00 – Tuesday (8:00 – 9:30))

1. CARMEN LINART Y PAVIA vs. MARIA JUANA UGARTE Y ITURRALDE

G.R. No. 2599. October 27, 1905

FACTS:
Ramon Iturralde y Gonzalez died intestate on the 28th of December, 1900, and Maria
Juana Ugarte y Iturralde asked that she be judicially declared the legitimate heir of the deceased.

There being no legitimate heirs to the estate either in the direct ascendant line of
succession, the petitioner presented herself as a collateral descendant, as the legitimate niece of
the deceased. Her mother, Maria Juana Iturralde y Gonzalez, as well as the deceased, Ramon
Iturralde y Gonzalez, were children of Manuel Iturralde and Josefa Gonzalez. Consequently,
Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde, was declared in an order made on the 31st of January, 1901,
without prejudice to third parties, to be the heir of the deceased.
In the month of December, 1904, however, Carmen Linart, through her guardian, Rafaela
Pavia, claimed one-half of all the estate of the deceased and asked Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde
to render an account of the property of the estate. Carmen Linart was a grandniece of the
deceased because her father, Pablo Linart, was the son of the deceased’ another sister, Maria
Josefa Iturralde y Gonzalez.
The petitioner claims that by representation through her father, Pablo Linart, she is
entitled to the same share in the estate as the direct niece, Maria Juana Ugarte e Iturralde.
The court entered a judgment on the 24th of February, 1905, that the petitioner had the
same right to participate in the inheritance as had Maria Juana e Iturralde, and ordered the latter
to render an account of the estate, enjoining her, at the same time, from disposing of any part
thereof until such accounting had been made and the estate distributed. Maria Juana Ugarte
excepted to the judgment
and has brought the case to this court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, through representation, is entitled to a share in the estate

RULING:
No, the petitioner, through representation, is not entitled to a share in the estate

The court finds that: (1) the relative nearest in degree excludes those more distant, with
the exception of the right of representation in proper cases (art. 921, par. 1 of the Civil Code);
and (2) the right of representation in the collateral line shall take place only in favor of children
of brothers or sisters whether they be of whole or half blood (art. 925, par. 2).

In intestate successions, reference should only be had to the provisions of the law under
which it is evident that the rights of representation in the collateral line do not obtain beyond the
sons and daughters of brothers or sisters. The petitioner in this case is not a daughter of one of
the sisters of the deceased but the daughter of a son of a sister of the deceased. Had Pablo Linart,
petitioner’s father, survived the deceased, he would have succeeded to the estate with his cousin,
Maria Juana Ugarte, and then, by representation, the petitioner might have inherited the portion
of the estate corresponding to her father's. Hence, petitioner, being the grandniece of the
deceased, could not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter, being a nearer
relative, excluded the petitioner who was the more distant grandniece.

2. SALAO VS SALAO, G.R. No. L-26699. March 16, 1976

FACTS:
The spouses Manuel Salao and Valentina Ignacio of Barrio Dampalit, Malabon, Rizal
begot four children named Patricio, Alejandra, Juan (Banli) and Ambrosia. Manuel Salao died in
1885. His eldest son, Patricio, died in 1886 survived by his only child. Valentin Salao.
After Valentina’s death, her estate was administered by her daughter Ambrosia. The
documentary evidence proves that in 1911 or prior to the death of Valentina Ignacio her two
children, Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao, secured a Torrens title, OCT No. 185 of the
Registry of Deeds of Pampanga, in their names.The property in question is the forty-seven-
hectare fishpond located at Sitio Calunuran, Lubao, Pampanga, wherein Benita Salao-Marcelo
daughter of Valentin Salao claimed 1/3 interest on the said fishpond.
The defendant Juan Y. Salao Jr. inherited from his father Juan Y. Salao, Sr. ½ of the
fishpond and the other half from the donation of his auntie Ambrosia Salao.It was alleged in the
said case that Juan Y. Salao, Sr and Ambrosia Salao had engaged in the fishpond business.
Where they obtained the capital and that Valentin Salao and Alejandra Salao were included in
that joint venture, that the funds used were the earnings of the properties supposedly inherited
from Manuel Salao, and that those earnings were used in the acquisition of the Calunuran
fishpond. There is no documentary evidence to support that theory.
The lawyer of Benita Salao and the Children of Victorina Salao in a letter dated January
26, 1951 informed Juan S. Salao, Jr. that his clients had a one-third share in the two fishponds
and that when Juani took possession thereof in 1945, in which he refused to give Benita and
Victorina’s children their one-third share of the net fruits which allegedly amounted to P200,000.
However, there was no mention on the deeds as to the share of Valentin and Alejandra.
Juan S. Salao, Jr. in his answer dated February 6, 1951 categorically stated that Valentin
Salao did not have any interest in the two fishponds and that the sole owners thereof his father
Banli and his aunt Ambrosia, as shown in the Torrens titles issued in 1911 and 1917, and that he
Juani was the donee of Ambrosia’s one-half share.
Benita Salao and her nephews and niece asked for the annulment of the donation to Juan
S. Salao, Jr. and for the reconveyance to them of the Calunuran fishpond as Valentin Salao’s
supposed one-third share in the 145 hectares of fishpond registered in the names of Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Calunuran fishpond was held in trust for Valentin Salao by
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs’ action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
RULING:
1. No, the Calunuran fishpond was not held in trust for Valentin Salao by Juan Y.
Salao, Sr. and Ambrosia Salao.
There was no resulting trust in this case because there never was any intention on the part
of Juan Y. Salao, Sr., Ambrosia Salao and Valentin Salao to create any trust. There was no
constructive trust because the registration of the two fishponds in the names of Juan and
Ambrosia was not vitiated by fraud or mistake. This is not a case where to satisfy the demands of
justice it is necessary to consider the Calunuran fishpond ” being held in trust by the heirs of
Juan Y. Salao, Sr. for the heirs of Valentin Salao.
A Torrens Title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred
to therein. (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles were regularly
issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as to the
fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing.The plaintiffs utterly failed to prove
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. It cannot rest on vague and uncertain evidence or
on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations.
Trust and trustee; establishment of trust by parol evidence; certainty of proof. — Where a
trust is to be established by oral proof, the testimony supporting it must be sufficiently strong to
prove the right of the alleged beneficiary with as much certainty as if a document proving the
trust were shown. A trust cannot be established, contrary to the recitals of a Torrens title, upon
vague and inconclusive proof.
Trusts; evidence needed to establish trust on parol testimony. — In order to establish a
trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof should be as fully convincing as if the act
giving rise to the trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. Such a trust cannot be
established upon testimony consisting in large part of insecure surmises based on ancient
hearsay. (Syllabus, Santa Juana vs. Del Rosario 50 Phil. 110).
The foregoing rulings are good under article 1457 of the Civil Code which, as already
noted, allows an implied trust to be proven by oral evidence. Trustworthy oral evidence is
required to prove an implied trust because, oral evidence can be easily fabricated.
On the other hand, a Torrens title is generally a conclusive of the ownership of the land
referred to therein (Sec. 47, Act 496). A strong presumption exists. that Torrens titles were
regularly issued and that they are valid. In order to maintain an action for reconveyance, proof as
to the fiduciary relation of the parties must be clear and convincing.
The real purpose of the Torrens system is, to quiet title to land. “Once a title is registered, the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in
the mirador de su casa, to avoid the possibility of losing his land”.
2. Yes, plaintiffs’ action for reconveyance had already prescribed.
Under Act No. 190, whose statute of limitation would apply if there were an implied trust
in this case, the longest period of extinctive prescription was only ten year.The Calunuran
fishpond was registered in 1911. The written extrajudicial demand for its reconveyance was
made by the plaintiffs in 1951. Their action was filed in 1952 or after the lapse of more than
forty years from the date of registration. The plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-interest, Valentin
Salao, slept on their rights if they had any rights at all. Vigilanti prospiciunt jura or the law
protects him who is watchful of his rights (92 C.J.S. 1011, citing Esguerra vs. Tecson, 21 Phil.
518, 521).“Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of a lack of merit in
the claim, since it is human nature for a person to assert his rights most strongly when they are
threatened or invaded”. “Laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to
enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances,
be destructive of the right itself.”
Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the reconveyance of
the Calunuran fishpond, it is no longer to Pass upon the validity of the donation made by
Ambrosia Salao to Juan S. Salao, Jr. of her one-half share in the two fishponds The plaintiffs
have no right and personality to assil that donation.
Even if the donation were declared void, the plaintiffs would not have any successional
rights to Ambrosia’s share. The sole legal heir of Ambrosia was her nephew, Juan, Jr., her
nearest relative within the third degree. Valentin Salao, if living in 1945 when Ambrosia died,
would have been also her legal heir, together with his first cousin, Juan, Jr. (Juani). Benita Salao,
the daughter of Valentin, could not represent him in the succession to the estate of Ambrosia
since in the collateral line, representation takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or
sisters whether they be of the full or half blood is (Art 972, Civil Code). The nephew excludes a
grandniece like Benita Salao or great-gandnephews.

3. LAURO G. VIZCONDE, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 118449., February

11, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioner Lauro G. Vizconde and his wife Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde had two children,
Carmela and Jennifer. Petitioner's wife, Estrellita, is one of the five siblings of spouses Rafael
Nicolas and Salud Gonzales-Nicolas. The other children of Rafael and Salud are Antonio (who
predeceased their parents), Ramon, Teresita, and Ricardo, an incompetent.
In 1979, Estrellita purchased from Rafael a parcel of land which she sold in 1990 and
used the proceeds to purchase from Premier Homes, Inc., a parcel of land with improvements
situated at Vinzon St., BF Homes, Parañaque (hereafter Parañaque property).
 Estrellita and her two daughters, Carmela and Jennifer, were killed on June 30, 1991, an
incident popularly known as the "Vizconde Massacre". The findings of the investigation
conducted by the NBI reveal that Estrellita died ahead of her daughters. Accordingly, Carmela,
Jennifer and herein petitioner succeeded Estrellita and, with the subsequent death of Carmela and
Jennifer, petitioner was left as the sole heir of his daughters. Nevertheless, petitioner entered into
an "Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde With Waiver
of Shares", which provided for the division of the properties of Estrellita and her two daughters
between petitioner and spouses Rafael and Salud.
In 1992, Rafael died and an intestate estate proceeding was instituted by Teresita. Private
respondent, Ramon, in his oetition, averred among all others, that herein petitioner shall be
impleaded as one of Rafael's children "by right of representation as the widower of deceased
legitimate daughter of Estrellita." Petitioner filed a Manifestation stressing that he was neither a
compulsory heir nor an intestate heir of Rafael and he has no interest to participate in the
proceedings but despite the Manifestation, Ramon, through a motion, moved to include
petitioner in the intestate estate proceeding and asked that the Parañaque property, as well as the
car and the balance of the proceeds of the sale of the Valenzuela property, be collated, which the
court granted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate proceeding regarding
Rafael’s estate is proper

RULING:

No, the inclusion of petitioner Vizconde in the intestate proceeding regarding Rafael’s
estate is proper

Petitioner, a son-in-law of Rafael, is not one of Rafael's compulsory heirs on the basis of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
"Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(2) In default of the following, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and ascendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
"Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2;
neither do they exclude one another.
"In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. "The father or
mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the
manner and to the extent established by this Code."
With respect to Rafael's estate, therefore, petitioner who was not even shown to be a
creditor of Rafael is considered a third person or a stranger. As such, petitioner may not be
dragged into the intestate estate proceeding. Neither may he be permitted or allowed to intervene
as he has no personality or interest in the said proceeding, which petitioner correctly argued in
his manifestation.
Furthermore, Article 1061 of the Civil Code provides that: Art. 1061. Every compulsory
heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any
property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter,
by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition."
Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsory heirs
and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title during the lifetime of the
decedent. The attendant facts herein do not make a case of collation.
The order of the probate court presupposes that the Parañaque property was gratuitously
conveyed but was actually conveyed for and in consideration of P900,000.00, by Premier
Homes, Inc., to Estrellita. The petitioner who inherited the property is now the present owner of
the Parañaque property is not one of Rafael's heirs. Thus, the probate court's order of collation
against petitioner is unwarranted for the obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir,
and not to herein petitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael's estate. As it stands,
collation of the Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only properties
gratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs which fact does
not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property.

4 ANSELMA DIAZ, VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. L-

66574. June 17, 1987

FACTS:
Spouses Felipe Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion had two legitimate children, Juliana and
Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born
Felisa Pamuti Jardin and another child who died during infancy. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
is the widow of Pascual Santero and their only legitimate son was Pablo Sentero.
Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976. Pablo
Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six minor
natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa.
In 1976, Judge Jose Raval declared Felisa Pamuti Jardin as the sole legitimate heir of
Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero. In 1980, Anselma Diaz filed an “Opposition and Motion to
Exclude Felisa Pamuti” from further taking part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate
estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero, as well as in the intestate estate of Pascual Santero
and Pablo Santero. Felixberta Pacursa also filed subsequently her Manifestation adopting the
same opposition and motion.
Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza issued an order excluding Felisa Jardin "from further taking
part or intervening in the settlement of the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, as
well as in the intestate estates of Pascual Santero and Pablo Santero and declared her not an heir
of the deceased Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero."
 Felisa Jardin filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court and
on appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s ruling, declared the
petitioner as the sole heir of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero and ordered oppositors-appellees
not to interfere in the proceeding for the declaration of heirship in the estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the natural children (illegitimate) of Pablo Santero could inherit from
Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero by right of representation

RULING:
No, the natural children (illegitimate) of Pablo Santero could not inherit from Simona
Pamuti Vda. De Santero by right of representation

Since the hereditary conflict refers solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, who is the legitimate mother of Pablo Santero, the applicable law is the provision of
Art. 992 of the Civil Code which provides that:ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a).

Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and
relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child.

The record shows that from the commencement of this case the only parties who claimed
to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and
the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred
by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit
any error in holding Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of
the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero.

6. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON,

CLARO SANTILLON, VS. PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and
ROSARIO CORRALES, G.R. NO. 19281, June 30, 1965.

FACTS:
Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son,
Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of
land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the
spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the
properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta
Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two
documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the
petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not
necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at
all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It
appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.
Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of
the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil
Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of
Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor
Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art.
996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed
3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of Claro is correct.
RULING:
No, the contention of Claro is not correct.
In intestate proceedings under the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or intestate
succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996.
One child Surviving. — If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the spouse,
since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and the other half goes to the
surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children or descendants," the rule in statutory
construction that the plural can be understood to include the singular is applicable in this case

6. DANILO I. SUAREZ, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 94918. September 2,
1992

FACTS:
Herein petitioners are brothers and sisters. Their father died in 1955 and since then his
estate consisting of several valuable parcels of land has been liquidated or partitioned. In 1977,
petitioners' widowed mother and Rizal Realty Corporation lost in the consolidated cases for
rescission of contract and for damages, and were ordered by the Regional Trial Court to pay,
jointly and severally, herein respondents the aggregate principal amount of about P70,000 as
damages.

The judgment against petitioners' mother and Rizal Realty Corporation, having become
final and executory, caused the levy of the five (5) valuable parcel of land (worth in millions)
and were sold on June 24, 1983 at a public auction in favor of the private respondents being the
highest bidder for the amount of P94,170.000. Private respondents were then issued a certificate
of sale which was subsequently registered or August 1, 1983.

Before the expiration of the redemption period, petitioners filed a reivindicatory action
alleging that being strangers to the case decided against their mother, they cannot be held liable
therefor and that the five (5) parcels of land, of which they are co-owners, can neither be levied
nor sold on execution.

Teofista Suarez, joined by herein petitioners, filed with the regional trial court a Motion
for Reconsideration claiming that the parcels of land are co-owned by them and further
informing the Court the filing and pendency of an action to annul the auction sale (Civil Case
No. 51203), which motion was denied.

The trial court directed Teofista Suarez and all persons claiming right under her to vacate
the lots
subject of the judicial sale; to desist from removing or alienating improvements thereon; and to
surrender to private respondents the owner's duplicate copy of the torrens title and
other pertinent documents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents can validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-
owned by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioners' deceased father, Marcelo Suarez,
whose estate has not been partitioned or liquidated

RULING:

No, private respondents cannot validly acquire all the five (5) parcels of land co-owned
by petitioners and registered in the name of petitioners' deceased father, Marcelo Suarez, whose
estate has not been partitioned or liquidated
The law applicable at the time of the institution of the case is Article 777 of the Civil
Code which provides that, "The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the
decedent."

Article 892, par. 2 likewise provides:"If there are two or more legitimate children or
descendants, the surviving spouse shall be entitled to a portion equal to the legitime of each of
the legitimate children or descendants."From the foregoing, the legitime of the surviving spouse
is equal to the legitime of each child.However, the proprietary interest of petitioners in the levied
and auctioned property is different from and adverse to that of their mother. Petitioners became
co-owners of the property not because of their mother but through their own right as children of
their deceased father, consequently, they have acquired rights over the property. The auction
sale, thus, was invalid.

Lastly, petitioners are not barred in any in any way from instituting the action to annul the
auction sale to protect their own interest.
7. CELESTINO RODRIGUEZ, VS. LUISA RAVILAN, G.R. No. L-5343.
SEPTEMBER 16, 1910

FACTS
JorgiaBarte and Donato Mendoza, in representation of their son, Nicolas Mendoza, filed
a written amended complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Luisa Ravilan, the
guardian of their daughters Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima, all surnamed Barte. The
complaint recites, among other things, that many years ago Javier Barte and Eulalia Seno died in
the pueblo of Mandaue, leaving property and, as heirs, Espiridion, Feliciana, Telesfora, Juana,
Carmelo, Casimira, Jorgia, Matea, and Pedro, surnamed Barte, and that, although five of them
divided among themselves the said property, consisting of lands situated in the said pueblo and
several carabaos, the legal portions which pertained to four of them, Epiridion, Jorgia, Matea,
and Pedro, remained undivided, and these latter continued to possess, in common, the property
that fell to their shares, and were also associated in business separately from their other coheirs.
The said property, as aforesaid, was administered by EspiridionBarte, in common accord
with the others, and, he having died without leaving heirs, by force of law the part that pertained
to him passed to his brother Pedro and his sisters Jorgia and Matea, as the heirs nearest of kin of
the said Espiridion, and, by common agreement, the said brother and sisters continued their
partnership organization and appointed the brother Pedro as administrator; that during the latter's
administration, MateaBarte also died, leaving as her heir Nicolas Mendoza, represented by his
father Donato, one of the plaintiffs; that at the death of Pedro Barte, JorgiaBarte and Donato
Mendoza, in the name of their son Nicolas decided upon the distribution of the property
mentioned and so stated, in February, 1902, to Luisa Ravilan, the guardian of the heirs of Pedro
Barte, but that Ravilan would not agree to the partition, on the pretext that, as the administratix
of that property, she had to pay debts of the deceased.
That three years having elapsed, up to the time of the complaint, and the debts having
been settled, as admitted by the defendant herself, the latter was requested to present the
accounts, which she absolutely refused to do, and that she continued in the possession and to
enjoy the usufruct of the said property, without the consent or intervention of the plaintiffs; that
JorgiaBarte, Nicolas Mendoza, the heir of MateaBarte, and the heirs of Pedro Barte, named
Maximina, Paulina, Pelagia, and Maxima Barte, were then entitled to the property in question,
which should be divided among them in three equal parts, one to be allotted to JorgiaBarte,
another to Nicolas Mendoza, and the other to the heirs of Pedro Barte.
ISSUE:
Whether or not partition should be granted.
RULING:
 No, partition should not be granted.
Section 181 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: "A person having or holding real estate
with others, in any form of joint tenancy or tenancy in common, may compel partition thereof in
the manner hereinafter prescribed."
Section 183 of the same code also prescribes: "The complaint in an action for partition
shall set forth the nature and extent of the plaintiff's title and contain an adequate description of
the real estate of which partition is demanded, and name each tenant in common, coparcener, or
other person interested therein, as defendants."
So that he who demands or claims a partition of the property must have the status of a
coproprietor or coowner of the property the partition of which is asked for; and notwithstanding
the fact that JorgiaBarte and the son of MateaBarte, through his representative, aver that they are
the coowners of the said Mandaue lands of others situated in the municipalities of Bogo and
Tabogon, they have not proved their averment by titles which establish the common ownership
alleged. A mere affirmation without proofs is insufficient, since the defendant party, representing
the four daughters of the deceased Pedro Barte, absolutely denied all the allegations of the
complaint.
In actions for the partition of property held in common it is assumed that the parties are
all coowners or coproprietors of the undivided property to be partitioned. The question of
common ownership need not be gone into at the time of the trial, but only how, in what manner,
and in what proportion the said property of common ownership shall be distributed among the
interested parties by order of court.
Moreover, for the purposes of the partition demanded, it must be remembered that the
hereditary succession of the deceased EspiridionBarte, who it is said left no legitimate
descendants at his death, should be divided among his eight brothers and sisters who may have
survived him, and in case any of these have died, the children of his deceased brother or sister,
that is, his nephews and nieces per stirpes, are entitled to share in his inheritance, according to
the provisions of articles 946, 947, and 948 of the Civil Code, the last cited of which prescribes:
"Should brothers survive with nephews, children of brothers of the whole blood, the former shall
inherit per capita and the latter per stirpes," representing their respective fathers or mothers,
brothers or sisters of the deceased.
The record does not show whether JorgiaBarte left any legitimate heir at her death, and if
she did not, her collateral relatives succeed her in the manner provided by law.
It is to be noted that the partnership contract entered into by the four brothers and sisters
can not affect the hereditary rights which belong to the relatives of the deceased predecessor in
interest successions.
For the foregoing reasons, it is proper, in our opinion, with a reversal of the judgment appealed
from, to declare and we do hereby declare, that the partition prayed for be denied