PEOPLE V.
FIELDAD can be no treachery in the case since the jail guards were all issued
G.R. NO. 196005, OCTOBER 1, 2014
PONENTE: CARPIO, ACTING C.J.
FACTS: Accused-appellants Charlie Fieldad, Ryan Cornista, and
Edgar Pimentel are detention prisoners who are charged with the
murder of two jail guards and for carnapping. The RTC and the CA
found petitioners guilty of the crimes charged.
Records show that Julius Chan went to the nipa hut to ask JO2
Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for that day.
JO2 Niturada answered the telephone in the administration
building and upon returning, he saw Chan place an arm on the
shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and Chan shot the latter
with a short firearm.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of an Armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back
of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed
with JO2 Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal took
the Armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2
Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and
Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep belonging to Benjamin
Bauzon, without the latter’s knowledge and consent. They picked
up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. The group
then transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. Eventually, they
abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane field where they
were arrested.
Appellants deny any criminal liability. Anent the crime of
carnapping, they allege that they were under the influence of
uncontrollable fear from Leal, who forced them to take the
Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail. With regards to the
crime of murder, accused-appellants allege that the prosecution
failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that there
with firearms to protect themselves from danger.
The evidence of the prosecution sufficiently established Fieldad’s
active participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards through
the following: “ x x x 7) Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid
testified that the paraffin test done on Fieldad’s hands was positive
for the presence of gun powder nitrates, as contained in her report.
In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence. We
note that Fieldad’s counsel manifested during trial that the paraffin
casting was performed without the assistance of counsel, contrary to
the right of the accused. However, all the exhibits offered by the
prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test results, were
admitted in the Order dated 3 March 2000.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of paraffin casts does not violate
the right of the accused against self-incrimination.
RULING: The taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of
the accused against self-incrimination.
In People v. Gamboa, we held: “As to the paraffin test to which the
appellant was subjected to, he raises the question, under the sixth
assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his
lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may
not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His
right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to
testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test
proved positively that he just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind
of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.”
The guilt of the petitioners is proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argued that there can be no treachery since “the jail
guards were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from
danger and to maintain peace and order within the compound.”
This argument is untenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might take.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not
afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without warning,
Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers.
Chan held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter.
Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor
of his Armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2
Gamboa’s gun and shot JO1 Bacolor. Hence, there is treachery.
Anent the crime of carnapping, the prosecution likewise proved all
the elements of the offense in this case. The elements of the crime
of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
(2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3)
the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it
was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the
first place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad voluntarily
followed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked.
The vehicle stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan;
and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. The circumstances
under which appellants participated in the commission of the
carnapping would not justify in any way their claim that they acted
under an uncontrollable fear of being killed by their fellow
carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the fact that
appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously concurred with the
other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of
its owner.
Hence, with all the foregoing, the accused-appellants are guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and of
carnapping.

All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both

appellants admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and
drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, Benjamin Bauzon,
testified that he did not consent to the taking of his vehicle by
appellants.

The defense of uncontrollable fear is likewise untenable. A person

invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was
such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only
without will but against his will as well. It is necessary that the
compulsion be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to
escape or self-defense in equal combat.
DELA CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 200748, JULY 23, 2014
PONENTE: SERENO, C.J.
FACTS: Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation
of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman – Visayas.
The NBI received a complaint from Corazon Absin and Charito
Escobido that Ariel, the live-in partner of Corazon and Charito was
picked up by unknown male persons believed to be police officers
for allegedly selling drugs. An errand boy gave a number to the
complainants, and when the latter gave the number a ring, they
were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo Police Office located
along Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. In the said police office, they
met “James” who demanded from them P100,000, later lowered to
P40,000, in exchange for the release of Ariel. The special
investigators at the NBI-CEVRO verified the text messages
received by the complainants. A team was immediately formed to
implement an entrapment operation, which took place inside a
Jollibee branch at the corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo
Avenues, Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime dela Cruz
by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted with fluorescent powder,
which was made part of the amount demanded by "James" and
handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later brought to the forensic
laboratory of the NBI-CEVRO where forensic examination was
done by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan. Petitioner was
required to submit his urine for drug testing.
It later yielded a positive result for presence of dangerous drugs as
indicated in the confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology
(Dangerous Drugs) Report. The version of the defense stated
otherwise, petitioner claims that he was at the NBI Office, he was
required to extract urine for drug examination, but he refused
saying he wanted it to be done by the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was,
however, denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer
prior to the taking of his urine sample, to no avail.
The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not
less than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the Ultimate
Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu
City.
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of
the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the urine drug test of the petitioner
arrested of extortion be used against him without violating his
right against self-incrimination.
RULING: NO.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-
incrimination proscribes the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not
the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as
the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the
assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required.
The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through
a testimonial act.
In Gutang vs. People, the Court considered the taking of a urine
sample as a mechanical act of the accused since this was material,
in relation, to his drug case. The situation in Gutang was
categorized as falling among the exemptions under the freedom
from testimonial compulsion since what was sought to be
examined came from the body of the accused.
In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion,
the Court failed to see how urine sample could be material to the
charge of extortion. It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to
have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He also asked for a
lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his
rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances. Therefore, the drug test was a violation of
petitioners right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
ESTRADA V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN Estrada’s constitutional right to due process. (such as the right to
G.R. NOS. 212140-41, JANUARY 21, 2015 confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at trial)
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.
RULING: First, there is no law or rule which requires the
FACTS: The Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada copies of the two
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-
criminal complaints for plunder against him. Eighteen of Sen.
affidavits of his co-respondents. The Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their
as well as the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
counter-affidavits.
do not provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (“Request”).
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is
Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a
not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the
can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to
complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b],
confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
Office of the Ombudsman).”

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding

The Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution which found probable
for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground
cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents with plunder
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
and violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019.
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. The
Sen. Estrada filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying for the
quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is
issuance of a new resolution dismissing the charges against him.
such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s
Order denying his Request, Sen. Estrada filed the present Petition
probable guilt thereof.
for Certiorari under Rule 65 and sought to annul and set aside the
latter Order.
A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman’s denial of Sen. Estrada’s
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-
Request constituted grave abuse of discretion and violated Sen.
grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.

Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on

the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as

long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a
preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely
preliminary and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations
of parties.
GO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 185527, JULY 18, 2012
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
FACTS: The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases
recognizes the prosecution's right to preserve testimonial
evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its
witness. It cannot, however, give license to prosecutorial
indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness'
absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the
accused of his fundamental right to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.
Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were
charged before the MeTC of Manila for Other Deceits under Article
318 of the RPC. The information filed against the accused stated
that they defrauded Highdone Company Ltd., represented by Li
Luen Ping, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations.
The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old
businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home
country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held
on September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently
postponed due to his unavailability.
The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral
Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for
lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia
and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel
to the Philippines by reason of ill health.
Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the
motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit
a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its
reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to
file a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC.
Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration
through an Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated
the case to the CA. the CA denied petitioners' motion for
Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in sustaining the judicial
legislation committed by the MeTC in applying the ruled on
deposition-taking in civil case to criminal cases.
RULING: We rule in favor of the petitioners.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge
in open court. This is true especially in criminal cases where the
Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to
meet the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the
“safest and most satisfactory method of investigating facts” as it
enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his
manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without
exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the
conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court
testimony.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the
taking of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or
written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person
authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the
Philippines; or before any Philippine consular official,
commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in
a foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except
reasonable notice in writing to the other party.
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would foreseeably be
unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent
provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it

satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick
or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court or has to
leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused,
or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination
has been served on him shall be conducted in the same manner as
an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to
attend the examination after notice shall be considered a waiver.
The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness

elsewhere and not before the very same court where the case is
pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to
attend the proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the
opportunity to observe the prosecution witness' deportment and
properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable
when the witness' testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case
against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda.
de Manguerra where we further declared that – “while we
recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its
witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules
which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the
general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of
the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.”
VICTORIANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NOS. 171322-24, NOVEMBER 30, 2006
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan finds accused Marianito Victoriano
and Raymond Ilustre, both GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, for
violation of Sec.3 (e) of R.A. 3019. (Corrupt Practices of Public
Officers)
Marianito Victoriano, a public officer being then the Manager of
the Philippine National Bank, Mati, Davao Oriental Branch,
conspired with accused Raymund Ilustre, a private individual, to
cause undue injury against Vicente L. Esteves, Jr., and give
unwarranted benefits to accused Raymund Ilustre by allowing the
latter to encash checks payable to Esteves Enterprises owned by
said Vicente L. Esteves, Jr., on the basis of a falsified indorsement.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner of the charge of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents. However, he was found liable for violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) asserts that petitioner
was not denied due process as he was actually accorded an
opportunity to be heard. He even took the witness stand and
testified for himself on November 29, 1994, after which he was
given the chance to file a memorandum. The OSP also maintains
that petitioner was not denied his right to cross-examine the
witnesses because he was given a chance to do so but his counsel
waived the conduct of such cross-examination because he was not
prepared allegedly due to petitioner's uncooperative attitude.
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that he was denied his
right to due process and that he did not waive his right to
participate in the trial or to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the prosecution. He also claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred when it denied the introduction of the
Affidavit of Desistance subsequently executed by Esteves which
amounted to newly discovered evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to due
process.
RULING: The consolidated petitions are without merit.
Records show that petitioner was properly accorded his right to
due process. During the pre-trial held on February 3, 1994,
petitioner was present together with his counsel, but the latter
waived the conduct of pre-trial. Petitioner did not question the
waiver hence, he is deemed to have impliedly approved the same.
We see nothing irregular in the Sandiganbayan's holding of a trial
on June 29, 1994. Petitioner was duly notified of said hearing, but
he failed to appear.
As regards the right to confront and cross-examine the opposing
party's witnesses, the same is indeed a fundamental right which is
part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which
may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party
has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine
and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will
be received or allowed to remain in the record. In the instant case,
petitioner's counsel did not cross-examine the opposing party's
witnesses due to his failure to cooperate in preparing his defense.
In fact, records show that it was petitioner's counsel who
suggested to the court to cite him in contempt and to cancel his
bail bond for failure to attend the hearings. Thus, he could not
complain at this stage of the proceedings that he was denied the
right to confront the witnesses against him.