G.R. No.

127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN
PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories;
that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates
to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to
adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order,
as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and
local circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of Article
VI,7Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition is a
copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which
consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the
following proposition?
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF
ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed
by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules with the COMELEC.
of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of
scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through
the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
the original proponent1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3)
Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional
convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this
petition. At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete
Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA);
intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on
counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK),
Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same
Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly
order
cognizable by the COMELEC.

1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners and
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented
by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An
6
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, a group Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator
of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the members Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Amendments.
Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall
be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the country, with the
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on
the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II
and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the
law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which
can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing
provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only
upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct of initiative on
the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar
as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide
rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending
or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any
other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail
expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million, not
to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the
initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised
demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of
procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding
with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a signature
drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition. They
argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE
COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY
DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING
THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION.
SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE
ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO
REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26,
1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND
RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC.
12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A
FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT
IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory
Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend the
Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On the
substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day
of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b)
Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because
it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which
lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180 million
as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite it will
be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will be a
priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that
nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a
revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A.
No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private respondents
through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for private
respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas; and (c)
granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed him to file
his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on 23 January
1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of Attorneys
for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention. Attached to the
motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended Petition in Intervention
wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because,
in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated
one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local
elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open up the political arena to as many as
there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and
economic powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in
policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify
the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition,
(d) the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide
and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the
signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the
petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the
appropriation of funds for such people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC
has no jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a people's initiative under Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 does not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for
a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is
the enabling law that implements the people's right to initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a
consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even
delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that the COMELEC was empowered under
Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the
respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its
publication because the said petition is not the initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution,
Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC
in an initiative on the Constitution is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required
number of registered voters. He also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail
of the authority and resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures,
as the COMELEC's role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency
of the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative
to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or
a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the
DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five days
their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file
its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the respondents to
comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which the
Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the
Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws)
regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in
the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft "Petition
for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to
obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election
officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or
causing the publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the deliberations
on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of the
House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the transcripts of
stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee on Suffrage and
Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears
to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE
DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e.,
whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin.
This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules
of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction
and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a
jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an
urgent necessity, in view of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic
of the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs
for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of
man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their memoranda
or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave due course to
the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached
Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The
COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered
ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion,
set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides for its
implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) Directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section ___of the
Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is
now covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to
this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the legislature.
Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the
provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the
legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to the
budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed
it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification
of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this
initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the
National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on how this is to be carried out — is
it possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature
rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in
order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification
through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent
power in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing
popular participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot
of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that
in the hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution
is source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting
and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate article
in the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to
the legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution
by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all
the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came
about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes
of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of
initiative should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation
of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms
of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate
section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and
(b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given
to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G. Davide,
Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod,
Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2
will now read as follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED
VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS
SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense
contained in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that it
was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth
certain procedures to carry out the initiative . . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another
body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right
would be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be
legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to
the Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by
a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover,
just to submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is
required, the import being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than
probably initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by
way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on
a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version, which
the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT
TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986. 41Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to introduce an
amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the Article was again
approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
"percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second
paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the exercise
of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No.
6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through the
passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment by the
Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. With The Congress
shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules implementing
the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former
was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of Representatives on the
basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt with the initiative and
referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article
X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate
Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill
No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the
House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local
laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed
out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit the
proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the contents
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other things,
statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case
may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought
to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
C.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;
C.2 the proposition;
C.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
C.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
C.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
C.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" only
strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and referendum
on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the implementation of
the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering
that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly
propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle II
(National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room for
doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national
law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or
enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the
autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification of
initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and
clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
A.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; (c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;

A.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and (d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, (e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied). circulation in the Philippines; and

Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on (f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
amendments to the Constitution. 53
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
Section 9, which reads:

(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of
initiative as a consequence thereof;
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for
the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission.
(Emphasis supplied). (d) The formulation of the proposition;

(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies (e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
of local governments; thus:
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. . . .
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of sufficiency
or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both national and
local initiative and referendum. (h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for
their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;

Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and (i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
referendum. It reads:
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or (k) The limitations on local initiative; and
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its twenty-
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following: three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on the
Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c) speaks of
"plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be approved or
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition; rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should
sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of initiative.
RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every
case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if
the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one
which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to
apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed
to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is
then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS
ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein
are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a
law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient
standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC
the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has not
yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his drive to
gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the total
number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission must
have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That petition was
nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December
1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of
elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no longer
be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not tarry any
longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right of the
people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
LAMBINO VS. COMELEC AND A FUCKTON OF INTERVENORS:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
(“COMELEC”) denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
(“Lambino Group”), with other groups[1] and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c)[2] and Section 7[3] of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act (“RA 6735”).
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group’s initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-
7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)[4] and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)[5] and by
adding Article XVIII entitled “Transitory Provisions.”[6] These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition
in a plebiscite for the voters’ ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL
TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of
their initiative.[7]
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group’s
petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court’s ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections[8] declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.[9]
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to
set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course
to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively,
the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
cognizance as an expression of the “will of the sovereign people.”
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners (“Binay Group”) pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC’s verification
of signatures and for “entertaining” the Lambino Group’s petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group’s petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group’s petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners,
urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the
Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules “as temporary devises to implement the system of
initiative.”
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino
Group’s petition. The supporting intervenors[10] uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors[11] hold the
contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also
challenged (1) the Lambino Group’s standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering
and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group’s compliance with the minimum requirement for the
percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;[12] (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group’s compliance with the
requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving
the parties’ memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group’s petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people’s initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group’s glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court’s ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commission on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people’s
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x
x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that “before they sign there is already a draft shown to them.” The framers also
“envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must “prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature.”
The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is
that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign
on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the
people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a
petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of
the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before
signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the
millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed [14] the concept of people’s initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States [15] which allow
initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
Moreover, “an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that
which is proposed” and failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.[19]
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly
show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people’s initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended
that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735,
the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must
sign the “petition x x x as signatories.”
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the signatures
in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties who can
impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the people. The
proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments against their
proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures – which the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment,
the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet [20] after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11 October
2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet attached [21] to
the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group’s proposed changes in
the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is
attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court
on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show
to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the “petition” that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full
text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the
proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can be
re-elected indefinitely; [26]
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all the
present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the
interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office; [27]
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall convene to
propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. [28]
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group’s signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred
or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature sheets.
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people’s initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not
to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative x x x.

3. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group’s
Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group’s initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court’s
ruling in Santiago and People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.[52] For following this Court’s ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the
public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it only
complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.

SO ORDERED.

Tolentino vs COMELEC GR No 34150 16 October 1971
Facts: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 approved on 28 September 1971 Organic Resolution No 1,
amending Section 1 Article V of the Constitution so as to lower the voting age to 18 and that the plebiscite
for partial amendment to take place with the local elections on November 1971. President Diosdado
Macapagal called upon the COMELEC to help the Convention implement the said resolution. On 30
September 1971 COMELEC resolved to inform the Convention that it will hold the plebiscite. Succeeding
resolutions on campaigning and confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to implement
the Organic Resolution were approved. Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino contended that under Section 1 Article
XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for
ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the
Convention.
Issue: Whether or not the Convention may call for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in Organic
Resolution 1 pursuant to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution.
Decision: Petition is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the
Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on 08 November 1971, as well as the
resolution of the respondent COMELEC complying therewith are declared null and void.
The condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be
submitted to the people in a single plebiscite pursuant to Section 1 Article XV of the Constitution. The part
that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more
or less they can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its
entirety. When an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like
fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing
constitution and or any of its parts
Banat vs COMELEC
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 — Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT) — in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 assails the Resolution2 promulgated on 3 August
2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELEC’s resolution
in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed
before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat
Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 — Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) — in a petition for certiorari
with mandamus and prohibition,3 assails NBC Resolution No. 07-604 promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC
No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two
percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each
winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC5 (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a
motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national
papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply
the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."7 There were no intervenors in BANAT’s petition
before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay
Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s
Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan!
Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network
Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-
Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a
total of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes
under the Party-List System of Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers
reveals that the projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven
hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following
statistical data: 5 APEC 538,971

6 A TEACHER 476,036
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections
7 AKBAYAN 470,872

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659 8 ALAGAD 423,076

ii. 1,337,032 9 BUTIL 405,052

Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e.
canvass deferred) 10 COOP-NATCO 390,029

iii. 102,430 11 BATAS 386,361

Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas not
yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del 12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
13 ARC 338,194

Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121 14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive
two percent (2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-
two (334,462)votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC,
reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional
seats of each party, organization or coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating
that the same shall be determined only after all party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against
which an URGENT PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining
Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the parties, organizations
and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under the party-
list system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission
on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY
PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below, the following parties, organizations and
coalitions participating under the Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan BUHAY
Yumabong

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred
thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
3 Citizens Battle CIBAC
Against
Corruption
RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES
COALITION RECEIVED 4 Gabriela GABRIELA
Women’s
1 BUHAY 1,163,218 Party
2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730 5 Association of APEC
Philippine
3 CIBAC 760,260 Electric
Cooperatives
4 GABRIELA 610,451
 SO ORDERED.8 (Emphasis in the original)
6 Advocacy for A TEACHER
Teacher
Empowerment Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
Through 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the
Action, COMELEC’s interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
Cooperation
and Harmony
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of
Towards
Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the
Educational
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of
Reforms, Inc.
party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
7 Akbayan! AKBAYAN
Citizen’s WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of
Action Party Canvassers, the projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually
canvassed, votes canvassed but not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and
8 Alagad ALAGAD maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total
votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are as follows:
9 Luzon BUTIL
Farmers Party
Party-List Projected total number of votes
10 Cooperative- COOP-
Natco NATCCO 1 BUHAY 1,178,747
Network Party
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
3 CIBAC 755,964
12 Alliance of ARC
Rural 4 GABRIELA 621,718
Concerns
5 APEC 622,489
13 Abono ABONO
6 A TEACHER 492,369

7 AKBAYAN 462,674
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later
on be established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party- 8 ALAGAD 423,190
List System.
9 BUTIL 409,298
The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant
to Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list 10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
results.
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby 12 ARC 375,846
deferred until final resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and
academic. 13 ABONO 340,151

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Philippines.
WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number
of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the "first party" in
accordance with Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizen’s Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of
representation that have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based Party List Percentage Additional Seat
on the formula prescribed by the Supreme Court in Veterans;
BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the "first party", the correct formula as expressed
in Veterans, is: CIBAC 1.28 1

GABRIELA 1.05 1
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first
= party relative to total votes for APEC 1.05 1
Total votes for party-list system party-list system
A TEACHER 0.83 0

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional AKBAYAN 0.78 0
seats:
ALAGAD 0.71 0
Proportion of votes received Additional seats
by the first party BUTIL 0.69 0

COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
ARC 0.63 0
Less than 4% No additional seat
ABONO 0.57 0
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:
NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission
1,178,747 on Elections en bancsitting as the National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby
= 0.07248 or 7.2% RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to
16,261,369 wit:

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

Party List Additional Seats

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, BUHAY 2
the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
BAYAN MUNA 1

No. of votes of CIBAC 1

concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for GABRIELA 1
= x seats allocated
a concerned party
No. of votes of to first party
first party APEC 1

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows: This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later
on be established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list
system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to
one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending
disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.9
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which
reads as follows:
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N:
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the
Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under
the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that
the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to
the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list
results."1awphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal
Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for being moot and academic.

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
(BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted
his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:
SO ORDERED.10
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the
following reliefs, to wit: On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider
its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because
the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the
1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by
same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. 11
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System:
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA
Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), 12 Anak Mindanao (AMIN),13 and An
7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted
Waray.14 Per the certification15by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been proclaimed
on the basis of their initial/first ranking.
as of 19 May 2008:

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

Party-List No. of Seat(s)
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of 1.1 Buhay 3
the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12
of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in 1.2 Bayan Muna 2
relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the
corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the 1.3 CIBAC 2
formula/procedure prescribed in the "ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX "A"
of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June 1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of 1.4 Gabriela 2
determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
1.5 APEC 2
representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].
1.6 A Teacher 1
5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that
1.7 Akbayan 1
the procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA
7941 shall be followed. 1.8 Alagad 1
 1.9 Butil 1 2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1 from those required under RA 7941;
1.13 Abono 1 C. Violates the "Four Inviolable Parameters" of the Philippine party-list system as
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1 II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion
The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against
which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list
Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was
deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?16
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified
party-list organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.
B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional
seats for the "First Party" violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.
the "First Party" and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section
11(b) of RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different
provided for under the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the same being merely in consonance
with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a
justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct
interpretation and implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our
nation.17
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we
defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for
one seat constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating
in the party-list elections?18
The Ruling of the Court
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
 Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually Number of seats
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional available to legislative districts Number of seats available to
seats; x .20 = party-list representatives
.80
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional
seats to party-list organizations.
220
Number of Party-List Representatives: x .20 = 55
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution .80

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. and the Three-Seat Cap

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution,
one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection
or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such
other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under
the party-list.
xxx
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the "House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law." The House of Representatives
shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the
legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.1avvphi1.zw+
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives
to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives
from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans,
thus:
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List
System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at
least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions
of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the Party-List System. Veterans produced
the First Party Rule,20 and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s dissent in Veterans presented Germany’s
Niemeyer formula21 as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of
which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. — x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,22 the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering
more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes:Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The COMELEC shall tally all
the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the
number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage
of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the
party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list
representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified party
by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed
by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second percentage. There will be a first round of
seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the
concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is
conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the
remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the seats are filled up. 26
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the
the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No.
2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District Representatives in the 14th Congress, there
shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed. Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
garnered during the elections.27
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of
the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than
three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941). Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding
to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups 2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2% threshold rule, in accordance
with Section 12 of RA 7941.23 3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541

4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
(a) Shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis; 8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544

(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and, 9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220

10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993

(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes
obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for 11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
the party-list system.24
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the
votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is "by making the 13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of
seats."25 Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation. 14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846

15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELEC’s original 2-4-6
formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. 16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722 43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915

18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837 44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471

19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478 45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612 46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221

21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624 47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that "parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282 at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each."
This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512 for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number
of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835

26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098 Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total
CITIZENS votes for the party-list.28

27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938

Votes
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903 Garnered
over
Votes Guaranteed
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691 Rank Party Total
Garnered Seat
Votes for
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896 Party-
List, in %
31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
KASANGGA 1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1

32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130 2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1

PILIPINO MUNA

33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271 3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1

34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781 4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1

35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946 5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1

36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744 6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1

37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916 7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1

38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729 8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1

39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421 9 COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1

NATCCO
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
11 BATAS29 385,810 2.42% 1
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
 the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 Representatives."30
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 following procedure shall be observed:

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
Total 17

18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 seats are allocated.

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the
party-list candidates that are "entitled to one seat each," or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat
allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation
as "additional seats" are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off
of fractional seats.

The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." This
is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the
clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion to the votes of the first party.
This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A.
No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party
list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in
Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived
at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer
of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the
remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all
available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round
of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-
list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, Votes
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties Garner
get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this (B)
ed over Addition
situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase Guarante plus Applyi
Total al
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for Votes ed Seat (C), in ng the
Ran Votes Seats
every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as Party Garner (First whole three
k for (Second
the two percent threshold is present. ed Round) intege seat cap
Party Round)
(B) rs (E)
List, in (C)
(D)
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats %
as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an (A)
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
 1,169,23 KABATAA
1 BUHAY 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A. 23 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
4 N

BAYAN 24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
SENIOR
26 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A. CITIZENS

5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A. 27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.

6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A. 28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.

7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A. 29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.

8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A. 30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.

COOP- ANG
931 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A. 31 KASANGG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
NATCCO
A
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
ANAKPAW
13 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A. 35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
IS

14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A. 36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.

15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A. Tota

17 55
l
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list
AN
17 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A. representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The
WARAY
additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to
exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.

19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A. Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to
participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A. out, thus:

22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A. MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x
x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is
why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single
party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My
question is this: Are we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it
only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field
candidates for the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating
under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only
sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a
farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly
minority political parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove
that they are also organized along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is
precisely the contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors
are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will
dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang
party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized
sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner
Villacorta and probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone,
UNIDO may be allowed to register for the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations
to seek common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they
should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these
parties can be transformed through the participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the
administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed.
There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to
which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so that with their participation,
the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will create conditions that
will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party list
system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter
in the roll of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So
that we may, in time, develop this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian
Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies
and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic
Party. But the businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no
reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and
interact with each other so that the very objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation
are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-
Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives later on through a party list
system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the
wider constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x 32 (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section
3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election
of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they
form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a
majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the
geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and
concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-
list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-
list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional
Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the
party-list system to the sectoral groups.33In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either
"a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly
against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from
the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major
political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or
political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-
list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major
political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk
wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the
urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. — No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless
he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of
not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding
the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30)
years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30)
during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s nominee "wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity"34 as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors,35 that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee
represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left
the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House
of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation
to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall
thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue
disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his
separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
this ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in
NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution of additional
party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with
the procedure used in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in
party-list elections. This Decision is immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE
ISSUE:

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a HELD:

contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services The communications are covered by executive privilege

for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately

P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when

Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of

push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one

hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power

tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.

informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning,

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to

invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on: these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the

communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs President.

Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and

detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a

showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the

unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground that The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:

the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official

the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process” and, records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to

that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such

the People’s Republic of China.” Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and limitations as may be provided by law.

executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777) - Digest

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
Facts:
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a

“quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
This case is regarding the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,

the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials

test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a

there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to “afford

the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better

enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive privilege violates
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that
the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We
“all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec. Ermita
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours.
communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the meeting
Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the
since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court martial for such The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight

attendance. function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the

statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.

The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department
Issue:
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.

In aid of Legislation:

Ruling:
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,

section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions of

the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
question hour.
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing

in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”

Question Hour:

The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
Constitution, which reads:
is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite

“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.

request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the
Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance.
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized only
Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the
to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry, the
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance
only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are
shall be conducted in executive session.”
not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted from this Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear

power -- the President. before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.

Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure the Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section 1(a)

consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In are however valid.

view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such invocation must

be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President,

has determined that the requested information is privileged. The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to

Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are

being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their

absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464,

they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information that is

covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers

the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized

head of office, has determined that it is so.

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not

asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely

invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.

When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered

by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive

Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the President or the

Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of

executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host
of environmental tragedies.
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology.
Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested
upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to
cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short,
the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain
from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary
government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development
and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially
re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code
of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect
or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which
PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE CO. v. REPUBLIC unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal,
the verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental
postulate of constitutional law.
Providence Washington Insurance Co. filed, on October 21, 1966, its brief as appellant against an order of
the lower court dismissing its suit for the non-delivery of thirty cases of steel files, which cargo was insured WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the lower court of May 23, 1966 is affirmed. With costs against
by it against loss and damage, naming as defendants the Republic of the Philippines and the Bureau of plaintiff-appellant.
Customs as the operator of the arrastre service, thus rendering unavoidable the invocation of the well-settled
doctrine of non-suability of the government. Less than two months later, on December 17, 1966, our
decision in Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service was promulgated.[1] We there
Fontanilla vs Maliaman
explicitly held: "The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the national government in the
operation of the arrastre service, pursuant to express legislative mandate and as a necessary incident of its
prime governmental function, is immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary."
FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially by its regular
As of this date, thirty-six subsequent cases, certainly a figure far from unimpressive, have been similarly driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, which resulted in the latter's death.
decided, expressly reaffirming the above ruling of governmental immunity from suit without its The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After
consent.[2] The futility of this appeal is quite apparent. We affirm the lower court order of dismissal. trial, the court awarded actual, moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The
Solicitor General contends that the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions but is
The doctrine of non-suability thus holds undisputed sway. Its primacy appears to be undeniable. For a suit
an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious
of this character to prosper, there must be a showing of consent either in express terms or by implication
act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent.
through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. Its absence being obvious, the lower
court acted correctly.

Nor did the Mobil decision blaze a new trail. So it has been from the time the Constitution took effect in ISSUE:
1935. Bull v. Yatco, a 1939 decision during the Commonwealth, spoke to that effect. [3] Adherence to such
a view is reflected in the various cases decided after independence before the Mobil Exploration case.[4] The
classic formulation of Holmes of this doctrine of non-suability thus bears restatement: "A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right was not its special agent?
depends."[5]

This is not to deny that while indeed logical and far from impractical the doctrine does give rise to problems
considering how widely immersed in matters hitherto deemed outside its sphere the government is at HELD:
present. Nor is it likely considering its expanding role, demanded by the times and warranted by the
Constitution, that a halt would be called to many of its activities, at times unavoidably adversely affecting
private rights. Nonetheless, a continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for
as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It
obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore,
abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent.
on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to
defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle,
could very well be imagined.

At any rate, in case of a money claim arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis
for civil action between private parties, such a consent has been given by a statute enacted by the Philippine
legislature, even before the Constitution took effect and still applicable at present. [6] The procedure provided
for in such a statute[7] was made more expeditious by a Commonwealth Act, enabling the party or entity,
who feels aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General required to decide the claim within sixty
days, having the right to go to this Court for final adjudication.[8] It is worthy of note likewise that in the
pursuit of its activities affecting business, the government has increasingly relied on private corporations
possessing the power to sue and be sued.[9]

Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government without its consent, as it has operated in practice,
hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-
widening scope of state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants
may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so
 budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.
Belgica vs. Ochoa

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that
the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided
for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and
the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave
abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which
the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for
any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond
the purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO
SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH
ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed
and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES
THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW
DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE
THE SAME.

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad
from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere
oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation
of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.

FACTS: Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy
an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the
the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and
December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because
marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the
underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector "marginalized and underrepresented."
they intend to represent in Congress.
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified,
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have
denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether the criteria for participating remaining qualified nominee.
in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
two aforestated cases.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
Political Law- Party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields
candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties.
The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
"For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
designate in this Constitution." peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system women, and the youth.
prescribed in the Constitution.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition of underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
provides that a"political partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
principles and policies for the general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must
their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
they are separate and distinct from each other.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should be
remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers – Fund Realignment – Constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio
“Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive
to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s
appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken
slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once
withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to
other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other
Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of
then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was
disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the
Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the
CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front),
P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by
the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation
made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were
merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s
power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government
budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because
what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even
the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus,
no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-
Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects
are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they
were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal
basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the
definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory
definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further,
savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that
the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured
before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared
as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the
economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP,
then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the
DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP.
However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that
they have not acted in good faith.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, plaintiff vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS, defendant
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with
the COMELEC alleging that Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. March 29, 1995, Marcos filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing the entry “seven”
months to “since childhood”. The COMELEC en banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
declaring her not qualified to run for the position of the member of the House of Representatives for the
First District of Leyte. In a supplemental petition, Marcos averred that she was the overwhelming winner of
the election.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of
one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
Held:
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for
actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for
the election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. An individual does not
lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly
argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Having determined that Marcos possess the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS POEA
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo,
Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable
not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance
Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties
ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for
burial expenses.
The petitioner immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Ordinarily, the decisions of the POEA should first be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission,
on the theory inter alia that the agency should be given an opportunity to correct the errors, if any, of its
subordinates. This case comes under one of the exceptions, however, as the questions the petitioner is raising
are essentially questions of law. 1 Moreover, the private respondent himself has not objected to the
petitioner's direct resort to this Court, observing that the usual procedure would delay the disposition of the
case to her prejudice.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No. 797,
promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect
their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in
1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer relations arising out of
or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract workers, including seamen." These cases,
according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment issued by the POEA, include "claims
for death, disability and other benefits" arising out of such employment. 2
The petitioner does not contend that Saco was not its employee or that the claim of his widow is not
compensable. What it does urge is that he was not an overseas worker but a 'domestic employee and
consequently his widow's claim should have been filed with Social Security System, subject to appeal to the
Employees Compensation Commission.
We see no reason to disturb the factual finding of the POEA that Vitaliano Saco was an overseas employee
of the petitioner at the time he met with the fatal accident in Japan in 1985.
Under the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment, overseas employment is defined as
"employment of a worker outside the Philippines, including employment on board vessels plying
international waters, covered by a valid contract. 3 A contract worker is described as "any person working
or who has worked overseas under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen" 4 or "any person
working overseas or who has been employed by another which may be a local employer, foreign employer,
principal or partner under a valid employment contract and shall include seamen." 5 These definitions clearly
apply to Vitaliano Saco for it is not disputed that he died while under a contract of employment with the
petitioner and alongside the petitioner's vessel, the M/V Eastern Polaris, while berthed in a foreign country. 6
It is worth observing that the petitioner performed at least two acts which constitute implied or tacit
recognition of the nature of Saco's employment at the time of his death in 1985. The first is its submission
of its shipping articles to the POEA for processing, formalization and approval in the exercise of its
regulatory power over overseas employment under Executive Order NO. 797. 7 The second is its
payment 8 of the contributions mandated by law and regulations to the Welfare Fund for Overseas Workers,
which was created by P.D. No. 1694 "for the purpose of providing social and welfare services to Filipino
overseas workers."
Significantly, the office administering this fund, in the receipt it prepared for the private respondent's
signature, described the subject of the burial benefits as "overseas contract worker Vitaliano Saco." 9 While
this receipt is certainly not controlling, it does indicate, in the light of the petitioner's own previous acts, that
the petitioner and the Fund to which it had made contributions considered Saco to be an overseas employee.
The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine Air
Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas workers. If this
be so, the petitioner should not have found it necessary to submit its shipping articles to the POEA for
processing, formalization and approval or to contribute to the Welfare Fund which is available only to
overseas workers. Moreover, the analogy is hardly appropriate as the employees of the PAL cannot under
the definitions given be considered seamen nor are their appointments coursed through the POEA.
The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA
pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular
prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring
of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. A similar contract had earlier been required by the National
Seamen Board and had been sustained in a number of cases by this Court. 10 The petitioner claims that it
had never entered into such a contract with the deceased Saco, but that is hardly a serious argument. In the
first place, it should have done so as required by the circular, which specifically declared that "all parties to
the employment of any Filipino seamen on board any ocean-going vessel are advised to adopt and use this
employment contract effective 01 February 1984 and to desist from using any other format of employment
contract effective that date." In the second place, even if it had not done so, the provisions of the said circular
are nevertheless deemed written into the contract with Saco as a postulate of the police power of the State. 11
But the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle
of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate
the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative
discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797,
reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).
Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself
prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.
The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of
the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be
enforced, not whatthe law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. Thus, in Ynot v.
Intermediate Apellate Court 12 which annulled Executive Order No. 626, this Court held:
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the
confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there
authorized that the seized property shall be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabaos.' (Italics supplied.) The phrase "may
see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden
with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still,
the limitations that the officers must observe when they make their distribution. There
is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate
beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the
officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as
they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a 'roving
commission a wide and sweeping authority that is not canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing,' in short a clearly profligate and therefore invalid
delegation of legislative powers.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot. 14
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not
allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The principle of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but
is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when its delegation
is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the
authorities to which they legally certain. In the case of the legislative power, however, such occasions have
become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of
legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception.
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature
to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its
activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably
to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct
and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to
administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems,
the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the
authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling
in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected
by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of
law.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby
has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the
POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there
is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable
employment practices."
Parenthetically, it is recalled that this Court has accepted as sufficient standards "Public interest" in People
v. Rosenthal 15 "justice and equity" in Antamok Gold Fields v. CIR 16 "public convenience and welfare"
in Calalang v. Williams 17 and "simplicity, economy and efficiency" in Cervantes v. Auditor General, 18 to
mention only a few cases. In the United States, the "sense and experience of men" was accepted in Mutual
Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 and "national security" in Hirabayashi v. United States. 20
It is not denied that the private respondent has been receiving a monthly death benefit pension of P514.42
since March 1985 and that she was also paid a P1,000.00 funeral benefit by the Social Security System. In
addition, as already observed, she also received a P5,000.00 burial gratuity from the Welfare Fund for
Overseas Workers. These payments will not preclude allowance of the private respondent's claim against
the petitioner because it is specifically reserved in the standard contract of employment for Filipino seamen
under Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1984, that—
Section C. Compensation and Benefits.—
1. In case of death of the seamen during the term of his Contract, the employer shall
pay his beneficiaries the amount of:
a. P220,000.00 for master and chief engineers
it is an uninformed criticism of administrative law itself. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic
powers, the quasi-legislative and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules
and regulations, and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Examples abound: the
Bureau of Internal Revenue adjudicates on its own revenue regulations, the Central Bank on its own
circulars, the Securities and Exchange Commission on its own rules, as so too do the Philippine Patent
Office and the Videogram Regulatory Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Department
of Natural Resources and so on ad infinitum on their respective administrative regulations. Such an
arrangement has been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative
of due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case of Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations 21 are observed.
Whatever doubts may still remain regarding the rights of the parties in this case are resolved in favor of the
private respondent, in line with the express mandate of the Labor Code and the principle that those with less
in life should have more in law.

b. P180,000.00 for other officers, including radio operators When the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier
and master electrician influence of the latter must be counter-balanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker. This is only fair if he is to be given the opportunity and the right to assert and
defend his cause not as a subordinate but as a peer of management, with which he can negotiate on even
c. P 130,000.00 for ratings.
plane. Labor is not a mere employee of capital but its active and equal partner.

2. It is understood and agreed that the benefits mentioned above shall be separate and WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining
distinct from, and will be in addition to whatever benefits which the seaman is entitled
order dated December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.
to under Philippine laws. ...

3. ...

c. If the remains of the seaman is buried in the Philippines, the

owners shall pay the beneficiaries of the seaman an amount
not exceeding P18,000.00 for burial expenses.

The underscored portion is merely a reiteration of Memorandum Circular No. 22, issued by the National
Seamen Board on July 12,1976, providing an follows:

Income Benefits under this Rule Shall be Considered Additional Benefits.—

All compensation benefits under Title II, Book Four of the Labor Code of the
Philippines (Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund) shall be granted,
in addition to whatever benefits, gratuities or allowances that the seaman or his
beneficiaries may be entitled to under the employment contract approved by the NSB.
If applicable, all benefits under the Social Security Law and the Philippine Medicare
Law shall be enjoyed by the seaman or his beneficiaries in accordance with such
laws.

The above provisions are manifestations of the concern of the State for the working class, consistently with
the social justice policy and the specific provisions in the Constitution for the protection of the working
class and the promotion of its interest.

One last challenge of the petitioner must be dealt with to close t case. Its argument that it has been denied
due process because the same POEA that issued Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the
Doctrine: Social Justice promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
LAUREL, J.: personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may be subject to
all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State.
To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a
Facts: blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither
should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal- preserving.
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the
promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
2) Along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to

Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as
a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public to the greatest number.”
Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwe
alth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made
by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works
approved the recommendations on August 10, 1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police
of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-
drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of
Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged
the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?

2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding
the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national
roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was