AGRARIAN REFORM means the redistribution of lands  For the purpose of production through labor of the

Regardless of crops or fruits produced, to farmers and regular tenant and of the members of his immediate farm
farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenural household
arrangement, which includes:  In consideration of which, the landholder agrees:
 The totality of factors & support services designed to o To share the harvest with the tenant, or
life the economic status of the beneficiaries o To pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in
 All other arrangements alternative to physical produce, in money, or both.
redistribution of lands
Purpose:
The DAR carries out the principal aspects/components of the  The establishment of owner-cultivator relationship and
CARP: the economic family sized farm as the basis of
 Land Tenure Improvement—seeks to secure the Philippine agriculture, and as a consequence, divert the
tenurial status of the farmers and farmworkers through landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development
Land Acquisition and Distribution or Non-land Transfer  To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers
schemes free from pernicious industrial restraints and practices
 Program Beneficiary Development—support  To make the small farmers more independent, self-
services delivery component of CARP, aids the reliant and responsible citizens and a source of genuine
beneficiaries by providing them necessary support strength in our democratic society
services to make their lands more productive and
enable them to venture in income generating livelihood TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL TENANCY:
projects, in accordance with Sec. 37, RA 6657 Share Tenancy Leasehold Tenancy
 Agrarian Justice Delivery—legal assistance and 2 persons agree on a joint A person who, either
oversees the adjudication of cases undertaking for agricultural personally, or with the aid of
production wherein: labor available from
The mere fact that the land is agricultural does not 1) One party furnishes the members of his immediate
ipso facto make one an agricultural lessee. The law land and the other furnishes farm household:
provides conditions or requisites to qualify, and the land being labor; 1) Undertakes to cultivate a
agricultural is only one of them. Among others, the tenant and 2) Either or both contributes piece of agricultural land
his immediate family are required to work the land. any one or several items of susceptible of cultivation by
production; a single person, together
Definition of Agricultural Tenancy: 3) The tenant cultivates the with members of his
 The physical possession by a person of land devoted to land personally with the aid immediate farm household;
agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, of labor available from belong to or legally
another [landholder] members of the immediate possessed by another;
farm household 2) The consideration of
which is a price which is
 certain or ascertainable to per hectare hectare
be paid by the person Consideration is not more Consideration is not more
cultivating the land than 25% of the average than 20% of the average
Produce is divided between The price is either a gross produce gross produce
the landholder and the percentage of the production The amount of palay used as seed, and the costs of
tenant in proportion to their or in a fixed amount of harvesting and threshing of the past 3 normal harvests
contributions money or both. should first be deducted before determining the
Contrary to public policy Legal consideration.
Yield is computed upon the normal average harvest for the
 RA 1199 is a remedial legislation, pursuant to social past 3 preceding years
justice in the exercise of police power of the state
 Sec. 46(a) fixes the consideration for use of the
ricelands:  Consideration declared by law, under Sec. 46(a) as
First Class Land Second Class Land rentals for the use of ricelands is computed on the
Yields more than 40 cavans Yields 40 cavans or less per basis of the past 3 normal harvests, without any
qualification
GELOS v. CA this action was declared "not proper for trial" by the Ministry
208 SCRA 608 May 8, 1992 of Agrarian Reform because of the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties
FACTS: The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dismissing
situated in Laguna, and belonging originally to private the complaint. The RTC found Gelos to be a tenant of the
respondent Ernesto Alzona and his parents in equal shares. subject property and entitled to remain thereon.
In 1970, they (land owners) entered into a written The CA reversed the decision of the RTC, it held that
contract with petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as their Gelos was not a tenant of the land in question and ordered
laborer on the land at the stipulated daily wage of P5.00. him to surrender it to Alzona.
In 1973, after Alzona had bought his parents' share and
acquired full ownership of the land, he wrote Gelos to inform ISSUE: Is there tenancy relations between the parties?
him of the termination of his services and to demand that he
vacate the property. HELD: No. it was clear that the petitioner were not
Gelos refused and continued working on the land. Gelos intended to be tenant but a mere employee of the private
went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and asked for the respondent as shown in the contract. The petitioner was paid
fixing of the agricultural lease rental on the property. He later for specific kind of work. The court stressed in many cases
withdrew the case and went to the Ministry of Agrarian that:
Reform, which granted his petition. "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent
Private respondent (Alzona) filed a complaint for illegal on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is
detainer against Gelos in the Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the
 understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in
this case, their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are even
more important."
A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic
Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household cultivates
(personal cultivation) the land belonging to or possessed by
TRINIDAD GABRIEL v. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN
GR No. L-27797, Aug 26, 1974
FACTS: Trinidad Gabriel filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga against Eusebio Pangilinan
alleging that she is the owner of a fishpond situated in
barrio Sta. Ursula, Betis, Pampanga and measuring about
169,507 square meters.
That sometime during the last war she entered into
an oral contract of lease thereof with the defendant
(Pangilinan) on a year to year basis.
Desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond by
herself, she notified the defendant in a letter dated June
26, 1957 that she was terminating the contract as of
December 31, 1957; that upon request of the defendant,
she extended the lease for another year.
Defendant moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case which properly pertains to the
Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural
leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties.
The RTC held that there was no tenancy relationship
since the lease contract is manifestly a civil lease governed by
the Civil Code, and not by RA 1199 (Tenancy Law).
Considering the area of the fishpond, 16 hectares, more
or less, the fact that neither the defendant, who is
physically incapacitated, or his daughter is
another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or
ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the
leasehold tenancy system.
In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant
of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon,
cannot qualify as a de jure tenant.
personally cultivating the fishpond or through the
employment of mechanical farm implements, and
the further fact that the persons named above are
not members of the immediate farm household of
the defendant, the conclusion is that no tenancy
relationship exists between the plaintiff and the
defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended.
ISSUE: W/N there is an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff? –No.
RULING: There is no doubt that the land in question is
agricultural land. The mere fact, however, that a person
works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him
a leasehold tenant within the purview of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law
lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated
are complied with.
The law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land. Thus Section 5 (a) of
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, defines a "tenant"
as a person who, himself and with the aid available
from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the
latter's consent for purposes of production sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold
tenancy system. Section 8 of the same Act limits the
relation of landholder and tenant to the person who
furnishes the land and to the person who actually works
the land himself with the aid of labor available from
within his immediate farm household. Finally, Section 4
of the same Act requires for the existence of leasehold
tenancy that the tenant and his immediate farm
household work the land.
BEJASA v. CA
FACTS: Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement
over the land [2 parcels of land of 16 and 6 hectares each,
situated in Brgy. Del Pilar, Mindoro] with Pio Malabanan. In the
contract, Malabanan agreed among other things: "to clear,
clean and cultivate the land, to purchase or procure
calamansi,... citrus and rambutan seeds or seedlings, to
attend and care for whatever plants are thereon existing, to
make the necessary harvest of fruits, etc."
Sometime in 1973 - Malabanan hired the Bejasas to
plant on the land and to clear it. The Bejasas claim that they
planted citrus, calamansi, rambutan and banana trees on the
land and shouldered all expenses of production.
Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over
the land, modifying their first agreement. As per the
agreement, Malabanan was under no obligation to share the
harvests with Candelaria.
Sometime in 1983 - Malabanan died. October 26, 1984
- Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land
with Victoria Dinglasan. The contract had a term of one year.
December 30, 1984 - the Bejasas agreed to pay
Victoria rent of P15,000.00 in consideration of an
"aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" agreement, with a term
of one year. During the first week of December 1984, the
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a
quo that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad
Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a
leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence,
this case was not within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations
We accordingly rule that the Court of First
Instance correctly assumed jurisdiction over the
case at bar, this being a case of civil law lease.
Bejasas paid Victoria P7,000.00 as agreed. The balance of
P8,000.00 was not fully paid. Only the amount of P4,000.00
was paid on January 11, 1985.
After the aryenduhan expired, despite Victoria's
demand to vacate the land, the Bejasas continued to stay on
the land and did not give any consideration for its use, be it in
the form of rent or a shared harvest.
April 7, 1987 - Candelaria and the Dinglasans again
entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land.
On April 30, 1987, Jaime, husband of Victoria, filed a
complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems ("COSLAP"), Calapan, Oriental Mindoro seeking
ejectment of the Bejasas. COSLAP - DISMISSED THE
COMPLAINT
Jaime filed a complaint with the RTC Calapan Oriental,
Mindoro against the Bejasas for "Recovery of possession with
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages." The case
was referred to the Department of Agrarian Reform ("DAR").
DAR - CERTIFIED NOT PROPER FOR TRIAL.
RTC - DISMISSED PETITION.
On February 15, 1988, the Bejasas filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro a complaint
for "confirmation of leasehold and home lot with recovery of
damages." against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan. RTC
- RULED IN FAVOR OF BEJASA. First, they reasoned that a
tenancy relationship was established. This relationship can be
created by and between a "person who furnishes the...
landholding as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal
possessor and the person who personally cultivates the
same." Second, as bona-fide tenant-tillers, the Bejasas have
security of tenure.
CA - REVERSED.
ISSUE: W/N there is a tenancy relationship in favor of the
Bejasas—None.
RULING: While it is true that as usufructuary, Malabanan
allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land, there
was no proof that harvests were shared between Malabanan
and the Bejasas. Reynaldo Bejasa testified that as
consideration for the possession of the land, he agreed to
deliver the landowners share (1/5 of the harvest) to
Malabanan, but there was no other evidence other than his
testimony. In Chico v. Court of Appeals, we faulted private
respondents for failing to prove sharing of harvests since "no
VICTORIO v. CA & Fernandez
FACTS: Sometime in 1967, a lease contract over a
fishpond located in Brgy. Balangobong, Lingayen, Pangasinan,
was entered into by Alfredo Victorio (as lessee) and Tomas
Fernandez (as lessor), the fathers of herein petitioner
Anastacio Victorio and private respondent Dominador
Fernandez, respectively. The contract was for a period of 10
years.
After said contract expired in 1977, the same was
renewed, albeit verbally, for another 10 years or until 1987,
adopting the terms and conditions of the original contract.
The original parties to the contract were substituted by
their heirs, Anastacio Victorio and Dominador Fernandez as
lessee and lessor, respectively.
receipt, or any other evidence was presented." We added that
"Self serving statements ... are inadequate;... proof must be
adduced."
Candelaria and the Bejasas - NO TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP. Only a mere civil law lease. Candelaria as
landowner never gave her consent. The Bejasas admit that
prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They
acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not
know of Malabanan's arrangement with them. True enough
Candelaria disavowed any knowledge... that the Bejasas
during Malabanan's lease possessed the land. However, the
Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria
agreed to lease the land to the Bejasas for P20,000.00 per
annum, when Malabanan died in 1983.
We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement,
consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing.
Dinglasan and the Bejasas - NO TENANCY
RELATIONSHIP. Again, there was no agreement as to harvest
sharing. Not all the elements of tenancy being met, we deny
the petition.
When the second contract expired in 1987, private
respondent repeatedly asked petitioner to vacate the
premises but the latter adamantly refused. Consequently,
private respondent filed a case for ejectment against
petitioner, which was, however, dismissed by the trial court on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On appeal, the regional trial court reversed, holding
that the lease contract is a civil law lease agreement and
ordering petitioner to vacate the fishpond in question, and
thereafter, to surrender peaceful possession and occupation
thereof to respondent. The yearly lease rental was set at
P450.00 commencing from June 16, 1987 up to the time the
property is vacated (p. 5, RTC Decision, January 26, 1990).
The appellate court affirm the RTC decision. Aggrieved,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee
under Republic Act No. 3844 and thus entitled to security of
tenure over the fishpond in question, or a mere civil lessee
whose right over the subject premises ceased upon the
expiration of the contract of lease. –No.
RULING: In the case under review, the first, third, and
fourth requisites were absent in the agreement,
leading to the conclusion that no tenancy relationship
existed between petitioner and private respondent.
The record is bereft of any evidence showing that
Dominador Femandez consented to having petitioner
Anastacio Victorio as his tenant in the fishpond subject of the
controversy.
Later, what was agreed upon was for petitioner Victorio
to continue leasing the subject premises under the terms and
conditions of the original lease. Petitioner's right to the
fishpond emanated from the lease contract between his father
and private respondent's father wherein petitioner's father
was designated as a "lessee" and not as a "tenant".
Petitioner cannot, therefore, be more than a lessee like
his father because "the spring cannot rise higher than
its source".
Elements of Tenancy Relations:
 Parties are the landowner and the tenant
 Subject is agricultural land
 There is consent (only applies if the land is untenanted)
 Purpose is agricultural production
 There is sharing of harvests
FIDEL TEODORO, petitioner, vs. FELIX MACARAEG,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-20700, February 27, 1969, Leasehold
Tenancy
Secondly, there was no stipulation regarding the
sharing of the harvest, whether explicitly or implicitly. One
of the essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy
relationship is sharing by the landowner and tenant of the
produce, and no proof of this fact has been shown in this case.
What the parties agreed upon, as established by the evidence,
was for petitioner to pay private respondent a yearly lease
rental, with an advance payment of 3 years' rental.
This is not the case obtaining in a tenancy relationship
where the parties share in the produce of the land as this falls
due, or as it becomes available, during harvest time. It is also
significant to note that, as shown by the evidentiary record,
private respondent and his father, as lessor, bore all the
expenses for the repair and improvement of the dikes
whenever the fishpond was destroyed due to floods and other
natural calamities.
All of the above are hallmarks of a civil law lease
contract and, as correctly found by both the appellate
court and the regional trial court, they belie the existence
of a tenancy relationship between petitioner and private
respondent. We find no reason to deviate from these findings,
correct and founded as they are on the law and evidence on
record.
FACTS: A petition for certiorari ordering the petitioner Fidel
Teodoro to reinstate the respondent Felix Macaraeg (the
petitioner in the agrarian court) to his "former landholding and
to keep him as the true and lawful tenant in accordance with
law"
March 2, 1961 Macaraeg received a letter from Teodoro
and his wife advising him that the aforesaid landholding will
be given to another tenant Jose Niegos. Niegos repeatedly
forbade Macaraeg from working on said Riceland.
June 7, 1961 Macaraeg filed a petition with the Court of
Agrarian Relations praying, inter alia, that (1) an interlocutory
order be issued to restrain Teodoro and Jose Niegos, from
ejecting him from his landholding pending resolution of his
petition; and (2) after due trial, he be maintained as the lawful
tenant in the disputed landholding.
Macaraeg alleged that he is a leasehold tenant of
Teodoro cultivating a farmholding situated in the municipality
of Talugtug, Nueva Ecija, of an area of four (4) hectares
devoted to rice culture, and that he has worked said land "as
a tenant for the last seven years".
June 19, 1961, Teodoro categorically denied that
Macaraeg was his tenant, claiming that "ever since he
became the owner of around 39 hectares of Riceland, he had
always leased all of it under civil lease.
Teodoro alleged that after the expiration of his lease
contract with Macaraeg in January, 1961, his wife twice
notified Macaraeg to renew his contract, but the latter
"verbally told Mrs. Teodoro that he was no longer interested.
Teodoro also claims that it was only after Macaraeg had
abandoned the farmland that he decided to lease it to Niegos.
Niegos seasonably answered, disclaming any
knowledge that Macaraeg is the tenant of Teodoro, and
averring that he entered the landholding in good faith clothed
with the proper authority from the other respondent.
September 7, 1962 judgment rendered in favor of
petitioner Felix Macaraeg and against respondents Fidel
Teodoro and Jose Niegos.
ISSUE: (1) W/N Macaraeg became a tenant of Teodoro by
virtue of the Contract of Lease
(2) W/N Macaraeg is guilty of abandonment which terminated
tenancy relation—No.
HELD:
1. SC held that in the face of the principal features and
stipulations of the contract in controversy and the
pertinent provisions of existing law on leasehold tenancy. It
bears emphasis that the title, label or rubric given to a
contract cannot be used to camouflage the real import of
an agreement as evinced by its main provisions. We have
no doubt that the leasehold tenancy contract entered into
between Macaraeg and Teodoro is a pure and simple
leasehold tenancy contract as the term is understood
under our tenancy laws.
Agricultural Tenancy Act. Thus, section 4 of Rep. Act
1199, as amended by Rep. Act 2263, provides that
Leasehold tenancy exists when a person who, either
personally or with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household,
undertaken to cultivate a piece of agricultural land
susceptible of cultivation by a single person together
with members of his immediate farm household,
belonging to a legally possessed by another in
consideration of a fixed amount in money or in
produced or in both.
Section 42 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act defines a landlord-
lessor as
Any person, natural or judicial, either as owner, lessee,
usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land,
who lets, leases or rents to another said property for
purposes of agricultural production and for a price
certain of ascertainable either in amount of money or
produced.
The landholding in dispute is unmistakably an agricultural land
devoted to agricultural production. The parties stipulated that
"the property leased shall be used or utilized for agricultural
enterprise only". The parties also agreed that the farmland
must be used for rice production as could be inferred from the
stipulation that "the rental of nine (9) cavans of palay per
hectare for one agricultural year ... must be of the same
variety (of palay) as that produced by the LESSEE".
It can reasonably be inferred that the intention of the
parties was that Macaraeg personally work the land, which he
did as found by the Agrarian Court, thus: "In the instant case,
petitioner (Macaraeg) cultivated the landholding belonging to
said respondent (Teodoro) for the agricultural year 1960-61 in
consideration of a fixed annual rental."
There is no evidence that Macaraeg did not personally
cultivate the land in dispute. Neither did Teodoro allege, much
less prove, that Macaraeg availed of outside assistance in the
cultivation of the said riceland. Teodoro is the registered
owner of the disputed landholding and he delivered the
possession thereof to Macaraeg in consideration of a rental
certain to be paid in produce. Evidently, there was a valid
leasehold tenancy agreement.
The mere fact that the parties fixed and limited the
duration of their lease contract to only one agricultural year,
does not remove the relationship which they created from the
purview of leasehold tenancy, considering the general import
of their agreement which irreversibly leads to and clearly
justifies tenancy coverage.
VALENCIA v. CA; GR 122363; April 29, 2003; J. Bellosillo
FACTS: Victor Valencia owned 2 parcels of land situated in
Brgy. Linothangan, Negros Oriental, covered by TCT H-T-137,
with an area of 23.7279 hectares, and by Homestead
Application No. HA-231601. Valencia acquired the 1 st parcel of
land from Bonifacio Supnet. The only tenant at the time was
Digoy Besario who was succeeded by his son Jesus Besario.
Valencia and Jesus terminated their landlord-tenant
relationship through a public instrument voluntarily executed
by them, thus reverting the actual physical possession of the
property to Valencia.
Valencia entered into a 10-year civil law lease
agreement over his 2 parcels of land with Gilcerio Henson.
Before the 10-year lease expired, without objection from
Henson, Valencia leased the property for 5 years to Fr. Andres
Flores under a civil law lease concept from August 21, 1970-
June 30, 1975. After which the lease was cancelled and
inscribed as Entry No. 1579 in TCT No. H-T-137. The lease
2. Macaraeg merely intended to vacate his leasehold
possession on the condition that a certain Claus be taken
as his successor. Hence, his act did not constitute
desertion of his leasehold as it was a mere intended
surrender of the same. The said act of Macaraeg was not
an absolute renunciation of his leasehold possession, as it
was in fact clearly conditional.
The only times that the tenant herein did not work the
land were (1) during the time it was undergoing its regular dry
season fallow, and, ... (2) after he was prohibited from plowing
the land by a certain Niegos, an agent of petitioner. Failure to
cultivate during the dry season fallow definitely does not
amount to abandonment. Failure to cultivate the land by
reason of the forcible prohibition to do so by a third party
cannot also amount to abandonment.
between Valencia and Fr. Flores was subject to a prohibition
against subleasing or encumbering the land without Valencia’s
written consent. This was admitted by the parties as reflected
in the DAR Investigation Report and Recommendations. The
prohibition against subleasing or encumbering of the land
apparently included the prohibition against installing a
leasehold tenant thereon. In the prior lease agreement with
Henson had no such prohibition stipulated.
During Henson’s lease, Henson instituted Cresenciano
Frias and Marciano Frias to work on the property, although
only Cresenciano remained on the land. During Fr. Flores’
lease, he designated Francisco Obang as overseer, and
several others (now private respondents) to cultivate the land.
The farmhands shared their produce with Fr. Flores.
When Fr. Flores’ lease expired, Valencia demanded that
he and the private respondents to vacate the lot. They refused
and continued cultivating the land despite the demand for
them to vacate. Valencia eventually filed a letter of protest
with the Minister of Agrarian Reform to take back the actual
possession of his property.
Meanwhile, without his knowledge nor consent, private
respondents applied for Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs)
under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of PD 27
claiming they were bona fide tenants of the property. They
were issued the CLTs, prompting Valencia to file a second
letter of protest and request for investigation and subsequent
cancellation of the CLTs.
Valencia and Catalino Mantac, one of the private
respondents, went into a leasehold contract undertaking to
have a profit-sharing agreement. No other respondent entered
into any agreement or tenancy contract, whether written or
verbal, with Valencia, Henson or Fr. Flores.
Upon investigation of the DAR, 12 years after the first
letter or protest, they recommended that the CLTs issued be
cancelled. However, the DAR Regional Office still dismissed
Valencia’s protest and held that private respondents had the
right to continue on the land. Valencia appealed this to the
Office of the President that his right of retention under RA
6657 (CARL) was not recognized. The case was then brought
to the CA who dismissed it on the technical ground that his
appeal was filed out of time.
ISSUE: W/N private respondents can be considered tenants
under a civil law lease agreement? No
(In the case: Can a contract of civil law lease prohibit a civil
law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject
matter of a lease agreement? Yes)
RULING: No. Sec. 6 of RA 3844, as amended, does not
automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant
without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so
specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is
basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be
provided by law. Nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law
lessee is automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon.
This would create a perverse and absurd situation where a
person who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of
this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third person to
become a civil law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this
tenant would technically have a better right over the property
than the landowner himself. This tenant would then gain
security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land
by operation of law. This is most unfair to the hapless and
unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease
agreement in good faith only to realize later that he can no
longer regain possession of his property due to the installation
of a tenant by the civil law lessee.
Under Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot
assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary. Not only was there no
stipulation to the contrary, but the lessee was expressly
prohibited from subleasing the land, which includes installing
a leasehold tenant, since the right to do so is an attribute of
ownership. So yes, a civil law lease can prohibit a lessee from
employing a tenant on the land.
It must be noted that Valencia never extended the term
of the civil law lease, nor did he negotiate with the
respondents for “better terms” upon the expiration of the
lease. He wanted precisely to recover possession of the
property upon the expiration of the contract, except from
Mantac with whom he already entered into a tenancy
contract.
The following essential requisites must concur in order
to establish a tenancy relationship:
(a) the parties being landowner and tenant;
(b) the subject matter is agricultural land;
(c) there is consent by the landowner;
(d) the purpose is agricultural production;
(e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and,
(f) there is sharing of harvests between the parties.
 An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land
in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute.
Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to
security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be
proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. A
tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be
evidence to prove this allegation. The principal factor in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.
The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer
is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are
complied with and are not contrary to law, are more
important.
Unless a person has established his status as a de jure
tenant he is not entitled to security of tenure. The fact alone
Leopoldo Jeremias v. Estate of Mariano
G.R. No. 174649. September 26, 2008; Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS: Irene P. Mariano (Irene), a widow, owned two parcels
of land located at Barangay Balatas, Naga City, Camarines
Sur, with an aggregate area of a little more than 27 hectares.
In 1972, the 2 parcels of land were placed under the
Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27. The tenanted portion of the landholdings were
subdivided among identified tenant-beneficiaries, and a
subdivision plan was made. Santiago Jeremias (father of
petitioner Leopoldo) was one the 40 tenant-beneficiaries.
On June 26, 1988, Irene died intestate who was
succeeded by his two children, Jose P. Mariano and Erlinda M.
Villanueva. On 14 May 1989, Helen Mariano, Jose's wife,
allegedly instituted Ruben Viñas (Ruben) as a tenant, through
an unsigned handwritten letter, despite the estate of the late
Irene still unpartitioned and under intestate proceedings.
In 1991, Danilo Mariano was appointed as
administrator of the estate of Irene Mariano. He lodged before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) separate
complaints of ejectment and damages against both Ruben
of working on another’s landholding does not raise a
presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. There
must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to
prove elements of sharing.
The prohibition against subleasing the property
between Valencia and Fr. Flores must be upheld. There is no
tenurial security for private respondents, except for Mantac.
With the exception of Mantac, all other private respondents
are not entitled to the CLTs, and are considered unlawful
occupants of the property, and are ordered to immediately
vacate the property.
Viñas and Leopoldo Jeremias for their refusal to vacate despite
oral and formal demands. Ruben's basis for saying he was a
tenant is the unsigned letter by Helen Mariano, while on the
other hand, Leopoldo claims that by virtue of succession, he
lawfully acquired right to cultivate granted by Irene to his
father Santiago Jeremias.
ISSUE: Whether or not Leopoldo Jeremias and Ruben Viñas
are tenants of the lands belonging to the late Irene Mariano
which entitles them to security of tenure
RULING: No. The Court ruled that they are not considered
tenants entitle to security of tenure under the law.
Claims by one of the existence tenancy do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure. In this case, there
is no substantial evidence that the petitioners were installed
by the owner of the lots in question as agricultural tenants on
the property. There is, likewise, no evidence that the
petitioners shared with the landowner the harvest and/or
produce from the landholding. Hence, the Court reinstated the
decision of the PARAD.
WELFREDO CENEZE, Petitioner, vs. FELICIANA RAMOS,
Respondent
G.R. No. 172287, January 15, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner Welfredo Ceneze filed an action for
declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of two parcels of
agricultural land (12,000 sqm.) located in Manaoag,
Pangasinan which are owned by respondent Feliciana Ramos.
Petitioner alleged that in 1981, Julian Ceneze, Sr.
(Julian, Sr.), petitioner’s father, transferred his tenurial rights
over the landholding to him with the consent and approval of
respondent and that, since then, petitioner had been in actual
and peaceful possession of the landholding until April 12,
1991, when respondent forcibly entered and cultivated the
land for the purpose of dispossessing petitioner of his right as
tenant.
Respondent asserted that she had never instituted
petitioner as a tenant in any of her landholdings. She averred
that petitioner had never been in possession of the
landholding, but admitted that it was Julian, Sr. who was the
tenant of the landholding. When Julian, Sr. migrated to the
United States of America (USA) in 1985, respondent allowed
Julian, Sr.’s wife to cultivate the land, but she herself migrated
to the USA in June 1988. Respondent later allowed Julian, Sr.’s
son, Julian Ceneze, Jr. (Julian, Jr.), to cultivate the landholding,
but he likewise migrated to the USA in 1991 without informing
respondent. From then on, she took possession of the
landholding, cultivated it and appropriated for herself the
harvest therefrom.
On December 19, 1997, the Provincial Adjudicator
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The Provincial
Adjudicator relied on the following documents:
(a) Certification issued by Perfecto Dacasin,
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC)
Chairman of Barangay Lelemaan, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, that petitioner is a bona fide tenant of the
subject landholding and that he was ejected from it
sometime in April 1991;
(b) Affidavit executed by Julian, Sr., stating that,
with respondent’s consent and approval, he transferred
his tenurial rights to petitioner before he migrated to
the United States in 1981;
(c) Joint Affidavit of Epifanio Castillo, Romulo
Camesario and Maximo Caquin, tenants of adjacent
landholdings, attesting that petitioner was a tenant of
the landholding since 1988, and that they helped in
harvesting palay products and delivering to respondent
her share in the harvest.
On April 21, 2004, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) affirmed the decision.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA through a
petition for review. On December 29, 2005, the CA resolved
the petition in favor of respondent landowner and dismissed
petitioner’s complaint. It held that petitioner failed to establish
that he had a tenancy relationship with respondent. MR was
denied for lack of merit.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review.
ISSUE: W/N there is a tenancy relationship—no.
RULING: In resolving this petition, the Court is guided by the
principle that tenancy is not purely a factual relationship
dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land; it
is also a legal relationship. A tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed. There must be evidence to prove the presence of
all its indispensable elements
To prove a tenancy relationship, the requisite quantum
of evidence is substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.15 The Certification of the BARC Chairman and the
affidavits of Julian, Sr. and of the tenants of the adjacent
landholdings certainly do not suffice. By themselves, they do
not show that the elements of consent of the landowner and
of sharing of harvests are present.
To establish consent, petitioner presented the Affidavit
executed by Julian, Sr. However, the affidavit —which was not
notarized— cannot be given credence considering that it was
not authenticated. It is self-serving and unreliable.
The other tenants’ Joint Affidavit, likewise, fails to prove
that petitioner is a tenant, more particularly, that there was
personal cultivation and sharing of the harvest. Moreover, as
noted by the CA, the affiants’ averment that petitioner
ZAMORAS VS. ROQUE SU, ANITA SU AND NLRC
*The Petitioner, Zamoras died during the pendency of the
case.
FACTS: The petitioner, Victoriano Zamoras, was hired by the
respondent, Roque Su, Jr. as overseer of his coconut land in
Dapitan City. Zamoras was charged to transfer the land title to
Su’s name, and to assign portions to be worked by tenants,
supervising the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the
land, the harvesting and selling of copra. As compensation, Su
paid Zamoras P2,400 per month plus one-third (1/3) of the
proceeds of the sales of copra every two months. Another
one-third of the proceeds went to the tenants and the other
third to Su.
Su informed Zamoras in writing that he obtained a loan
from Anita Su, and that he authorized her to harvest the
coconuts from his property "while the loan was outstanding".
Su sent Zamoras a letter dated May 29, 1981 informing him
that he was suspended until Su could obtain a loan from the
Bank with which to pay Anita and Zamoras was not allowed
anymore to work as overseer of the plantation. Without his
knowledge and consent, Anita harvested the coconuts without
giving him his one-third share of the copra sales.
Zamoras filed a Complaint before the Ministry of Labor
against Su for illegal dismissal and damages. The Labor issued
became a tenant of the landholding since 1988 runs counter
to petitioner’s allegation that he became a tenant in 1981.
In any case, the fact alone of working on a landholding
does not give rise to a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy. Substantial evidence requires more than
a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing
can be established; there must be concrete evidence on
record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. To
prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence
must be presented, because self-serving statements are
inadequate.
a decision in favour of Zamoras. Roque Su appealed the
decision to NLRC. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s
Decision saying that what exists between the parties is a
landlord-tenant relationship" because such functions as
introducing permanent improvements on the land, assigning
portions to tenants, supervising the cleaning, planting, care
and cultivation of the plants, and deciding where and to whom
to sell the copra are attributes of a landlord-tenant
relationship, hence, jurisdiction over the case rests with the
Court of Agrarian Relations.
HELD: In the case at bar, the element of “Personal Cultivation
of Land” is lacking in this case and the following
circumstances which are present in this particular case is
indicative of employer-employee relationship such as the fixed
monthly compensation, selection and hiring, specified duties,
and Su controlled and supervised the performance of his
duties, thus, Zamoras is an employee not a tenant and the
NLRC and not the Court of Agrarian Relations has the
jurisdiction in this case.
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Heirs of
Zamoras on behalf of the Petitioner.
GRACIANO BERNAS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and NATIVIDAD BITO-ON DEITA,
respondents.
G.R. No. 85041 August 5, 1993; PADILLA, J.:
FACTS: Natividad is the owner of Lots Nos. 794, 801, 840 and
848 of the Cadastral Survey of Panay, Capiz, with a total area
of 5,831 square meters.
Out of liberality, Natividad entrusted the lots by way of
"dugo" to her brother, Benigno Bito-on, so that he could use
the fruits thereof to defray the cost of financing his children's
schooling in Manila.
Prior to April 1978, these agricultural lots had been
leased by one Anselmo Billones but following the latter's
death and consequent termination of the lease, petitioner
Graciano Bernas took over and worked on the land.
Benigno and Bernas worked out a production-sharing
arrangement whereby the first provided for all the expenses
and the second worked the land, and after harvest, the two
(2) deducted said expenses and divided the balance of the
harvest between the two of them.
In 1985, the lots were returned by Benigno to his sister
Natividad, as all his children had by then finished their
schooling.
When Natividad, and her husband sought to take over
possession of the lots, Bernas refused to relinquish, claiming
that he was an agricultural leasehold lessee instituted on the
land, by Benigno and, as such, he is entitled to security of
tenure under the law.
Faced with this opposition from Bernas, Natividad filed
an action with the RTC for Recovery of Possession, Ownership
and Injunction with Damages.
Issue: Whether or not Bernas was leasehold lessee.
RTC RULING: The court a quo held in favor of the defendant
(Bernas) and dismissed the complaint, ruling that from the
record and the evidence presented, notably the testimony of
the plaintiff's own brother Benigno, Bernas was indeed a
leasehold tenant under the provisions of Republic Act No.
1199 and an agricultural leasehold lessee under Republic Act
No. 3844, having been so instituted by the usufructuary of the
land (Benigno). As such, according to the trial court, his
tenurial rights cannot be disturbed save for causes provided
by law.
Plaintiff (Natividad) appealed to the Court of Appeals,
Issue: Whether or not the Benigno and Bernas agreement
was binding upon Natividad.
NATIVIDAD’S CONTENTION: That the "dugo" arrangement
between her and her brother Benigno was not in the nature of
a usufruct (as held by the court a quo), but actually a contract
of commodatum.
CA RULING: That having only derived his rights from the
usufructuary/bailee, Bernas had no better right to the property
than the latter who admittedly was entrusted with the
property only for a limited period. Further, according to the
appellate court, there being no privity of contract between
Natividad and Bernas, the former cannot be expected to be
bound by or to honor the relationship or tie between Benigno
and the latter (Bernas).
Hence, this petition by Bernas.
MAIN Issue: Whether the agricultural leasehold established
by Benigno in favor of Bernas is binding upon the owner of the
land, Natividad, who disclaims any knowledge of, or
participation in the same.
HELD: YES. Benigno Bito-on was granted possession of the
property in question by reason of the liberality of his sister,
Natividad (the private respondent). In short, he (Benigno) was
the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the property and, as such, he had
the authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural
leasehold relation with Bernas.
 Bernas is vested by law with the rights accruing
thereto, including the right to continue working the
landholding until such lease is legally extinguished, and the
right to be protected in his tenure i. e., not to be ejected from
the land, save for the causes provided by law, and as
appropriately determined by the courts.
In this connection, there is no clear indication in the
record that the circumstances or conditions envisioned in
Section 36 of Republic Act. No. 3844, as amended, for
termination of the agricultural lease relation, have
supervened, and therefore Bernas' right to the possession of
the property remains indisputable. This conclusion is
buttressed by Sec. 37 of the Code which provides that:
Sec. 37. Burden of Proof. — The burden of proof to
show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an
agricultural lessee shall rest upon the agricultural lessor.
We have previously held that "courts of justice have no
jurisdiction or power to decide question not in issue" and that
a judgment going outside the issues and purporting to
BONIFACIO HILARO and EDUARDA M. BUENCAMINO v.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Facts: This case involves two parcels of land covering 4,000
square meters (2,000 hectares each). Salvador Baltazar
alleged that he had been in continuous possession of the first
land in Bulacan which was previously owned by Socorro Vda.
de Balagtas. Spouses Hilario threatened him to desist from
entering and cultivating a portion of the land. Baltazar claims
that he became a tenant of Socorro by virtue of a kasunduan
executed by them wherein he erected his house and planted
halaman. When Socorro died, Baltazar alleged that he gave
the share pertaining to Socorro to her daughter, Corazon
Pengzon. Salvador filed a complaint with the Court of
Agrarian Relations. Corazon Pengzon explained that she did
not receive any share from the produce of the land and that
even if there is, she would not have accepted any share from
adjudicate something upon which the parties were not heard
is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid. The rule
is based on the fundamental tenets of fair play and, in the
present case, the Court is properly compelled not to go
beyond the issue litigated in the court a quo and in the Court
of Appeals of whether or not the petitioner, Graciano Bernas,
is an agricultural leasehold lessee by virtue of his installation
as such by Benigno Bito-on, the legal possessor of the
landholding at the time Bernas was so installed and,
consequently entitled to security of tenure on the land. Should
grounds for the dispossession of Bernas, as an agricultural
leasehold lessee, subsequently arise, then and only then can
the private respondent (land owner) initiate a separate action
to dispossess the lessee, and in that separate action, she
must allege and prove compliance with Sec. 36(1) of the Code
which consist of, among others, a one year advance notice to
the agricultural leasehold lessee (the land involved being less
than 5 hectares) and readiness to pay him the damages
required also by the Code.
the produce of the land because she knew that she was no
longer the owner of the lot since it was foreclosed by the bank
and later on purchased by Sps. Hilario. Petitioners aver that
they acquired the land from PNB after it had been foreclosed
by virtue of a deed of sale executed between Bonifacio Hlario
and PNB and that the lots were owned by Ruben Ocampo and
Juan Mendoza.
Court of Agrarian Relations – there was no tenancy
relationship existing between Baltazar and former owner,
Corazon Pengzon.
IAC – reversed decision of CAR.
Issue: WON there exists a tenancy relationship between
Baltazar and Pengzon.
Held: No, Baltazar is not a tenant for failure to meet the
requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship.
 The law accords the landholder the right to initially
choose his tenant to work on his land. For this reason, tenancy
relationship can only be created with the consent of the true
and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by
imposition or usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the land
by usurper cannot confer upon him any legal right to work the
land as tenant and enjoy the protection of security of tenure
of the law.
It is clear that Corazon Pengzon did not give her
consent to Baltazar to work on her land.
The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy
relationship, to wit:
(1) The parties are the landholder and tenant;
(2) The subject is agricultural land;
(3) The purpose is agricultural production; and
(4) There is consideration; (this has not been met by private
respondent Baltazar)
The key factor in ascertaining whether or not there is a
landowner-tenant relationship is the nature of the disputed
property.
The disputed property (the one Baltazar held in
possession) is located in Poblacion of San Miguel, Bulacan
which is not far from the municipal building and the church.
Tiongson v CA
GR No. L-62626; July 18, 1984; Gutierrez, Jr., J:
Facts: In 1946, late Severino Manotok and transferred to his 8
children and 2 grandchildren a 34-hectare untenanted lot
located in Payong, Old Balara, Quezon City. He was appointed
as juidicial guardian for his minor children.
Teodoro Macaya together with Vicente Herrera, the
overseer of the property, went to the house of Severino asked
of they can be allowed to live on the said property so that he
could be at the same time guard the property.
Macaya was allowed to use 3 hectares with conditions
that at any time that the owners of the property needed or
The other lot were acquired at a foreclosure sale from PNB
which was described in the deed of sale as “residential”. The
owner states that the land has only bananas and pomelos on
it but this does not covert residential land into agricultural
land.
A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed
residential or commercial or non-agricultural unless there is
clearly preponderant evidence to show that it is agricultural.
The disputed property fails to meet the second requisite it
being a residential or commercial land.
Baltazar made allegations that he shared 70-30 and 50-50 of
the produce, however, Corazon denied that she ever received
anything from him. Therefore, there was no consideration.
All these requisites are necessary in order to create
tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of
one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de
facto tenant as contra-distinguished from a de jure tenant.
This is so because unless a person has established his status
as a dejure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor
is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government
under existing tenancy laws.
Petition is granted.
wanted to take over the property, Macaya and his family
should vacate the property immediately; that he only could
raise animals and plant on the property, he could do so only
for his personal needs; and that the owners would have no
responsibility or liability for said activities of Macaya.
In 1950, the owners organized themselves into a
corporation known as Manotok Realty, Inc and transferred the
34-hectare land to the corporation.
From 1946-1956 Macaya did not pay anything for
occupying the land, when the real property tax increased
Macaya was requested by the owners to help remitting 10
cavans of palay every year as his contribution for the
payment of RPT from 1957.
 In 1964, the owners requested to increase his
contribution to 20 cavans of palay. However, Macaya informed
them that he could not afford to deliver, the owners agreed
not to deiver anymore.
On 1974 Manotok Realty executed a “Unilateral Deed
of Conveyance” in favor or the petitioners and informed
Macaya that they needed the property, however Macaya
refused to vacate and instead expanded the area he’s working
on to 6 hectares.
Macaya brought the matter to Department of Agrarian
Reform, which found that Macaya is not and has never been a
share or leasehold tenant of the owners over the property but
he was only been hired as a watchman.
CA – reversed.
Issue: W/N tenancy relationship exists between the parties.
Held: NO. RA 1199, as amended by RA 2263 defined the
agricultural tenancy as the physical possession by a person of
land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed
by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of
the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household, in consideration of which the former agrees to
share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain,
either in produce or in money, or in both.
The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1)
the parties are the landholder and the tenant; 2) the subject is
agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is
agricultural production; and 5) there is consideration.
1st– the nature of the disputed property is a residential
lot. From the year 1948 up to the present, the tax
declarations of real property and the annual receipts for real
estate taxes paid have always classified the land as
"residential".
The entire 34 hectares is rolling forestal land without
any flat portions except the small area which could be planted
to palay. The photographs of the disputed area show that flush
to the plantings of the private respondent are adobe walls
separating expensive looking houses and residential lots from
the palay and newly plowed soil. Alongside the plowed or
narrowed soil are concrete culverts for the drainage of
residential subdivisions.
2nd– Owners and Macaya are not landholder and
tenant, respectively within the meaning of RA 1199as follows:
Sec. 5(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or
juridical, who, either as an owner, lessee, usufructuary, or
legal possessor, lets or grants to another the use or cultivation
of his land for a consideration either in shares under the share
tenancy system, or a price certain under the leasehold
tenancy system.
On the other hand, a tenant is defined as —
Sec. 5(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself
and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by,
another with the latter's consent for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share
tenancy system or paying to the landholder a price certain in
produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system.
The parties have not agreed as to their contributions of
the several items of productions such as expenses for
transplanting, fertilizers, weeding and application of
insecticides, etc.
It should be noted, however, that from 1967 to the
present, Macaya did not deliver any cavans of palay to the
petitioners as the latter felt that if Macaya could no longer
deliver the twenty (20) cavans of palay, he might as well not
deliver any. The decision of the petitioners not to ask for
anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that there was no
tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither
can such relationship be implied from the facts as there was
no agreed system of sharing the produce of the property.
3rd and 4th– consent is not present and the purpose is
not for agricultural land.
The property in question prior to 1946 had never been
tenanted. During that year, Vicente Herrera was the overseer.
Under these circumstances, coupled by the fact that the land
is forested and rolling, the lower court could not see its way
clear to sustain Macaya's contention that Manotok had given
his consent to enter into a verbal tenancy contract with him.
The lot was taxed as residential land in a metropolitan area.
There was clearly no intention on the part of the owners to
devote the property for agricultural production but only for
residential purposes.
Endaya v CA
FACTS: The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego
owned a piece of agricultural land (Malvar, Batangas) devoted
to rice and corn.
Since 1934, private respondent Fideli has been
cultivating this land as a tenant of the Spouses under a fifty-
fifty (50-50) sharing agreement.
On May 2, 1974, a lease contract was executed
between the Spouses San Diego and one Regino Cassanova
for an amount of P400.00 per hectare per annum (4 years)
and gave him the authority to oversee the planting of crops
on the land. Private respondent signed this lease contract as
one of two witnesses. This lease was renewed with higher
rental than before (P600). Private respondent signed again as
witness.
During the entire duration of the lease contract
between the Spouses San Diego and Cassanova, private
respondent continuously cultivated the land, sharing equally
with Cassanova the net produce of the harvests.
Last – there was no consideration.
It bears re-emphasizing that from 1946 to 1956, there
was no agreement as to any system of sharing the produce of
the land. The petitioners did not get anything from the harvest
and private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the
land free from any charge or expense.
It appears that the payment of the cavans of palay was
Macaya's contribution for the payment of the real estate
taxes; that the nature of the work of Macaya is that of a
watchman or guard (bantay); and, that the services ofMacaya
as such watchman or guard (bantay) shall continue until the
property shall be converted into a subdivision for residential
purposes.
On January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the
land to petitioners for the sum of P26,000.00.
Private respondent continued to farm the land although
petitioners claim that private respondent was told
immediately after the sale to vacate the land. It is important
to note that private respondent deposited with the Luzon
Development Bank an amount of about P8,000.00 as partial
payment of the landowner's share in the harvest for the years
1980 until 1985.
Due to petitioners’ persistent demand for private
respondent to vacate the land, private respondent filed in
April 1985 a complaint praying that he be declared the
agricultural tenant of petitioners.
TRIAL COURT: In favor of petitioners - private respondent is
not an agricultural lessee of the land now owned by
petitioners.
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC; private
respondent to be the agricultural lessee of the subject
landholding.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent has a right over
the subject property as agricultural lessee? YES.
Petitioner’s Argument 1:
Petitioners impugn the Court of Appeals' declaration
that private respondent is an agricultural lessee of the subject
landholding contending that when the original landowners,
the Spouses San Diego, entered into a lease contract with
Regino Cassanova, the agricultural leasehold relationship
between the Spouses San Diego and private respondent, the
existence of which petitioners do not dispute, was thereby
terminated.
Petitioners argue that a landowner cannot have a civil
law lease contract with one person and at the same time have
an agricultural leasehold agreement with another over the
same land.
SUPREME COURT:
R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839
(1971), abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines
from 1971 and established the agricultural leasehold system
by operation of law. Section 7 of the said law gave agricultural
lessees security of tenure by providing the following: "The
agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer
upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on
the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished.
The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure
on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided." The fact
that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the
subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to
oversee the farming of the land, as was done in this case, is
not among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment
of the agricultural leasehold relation. 13 On the contrary,
Section 10 of the law provides:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc. — The agricultural
leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by
mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract
nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession
of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding,
the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural
lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over
which an agricultural leasehold subsists resulting in change of
ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such as
lease, will not terminate the right of the agricultural lessee
who is given protection by the law by making such rights
enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's
successor in interest.
In the instant case, private respondent has been
cultivating the subject farm landholding with a fifty-fifty (50-
50) sharing arrangement with the Spouses San Diego,
petitioners' predecessors-in-interest. The passage of R.A. 6839
in 1971, amending R.A. 3844 (1963), secured to private
respondent all the rights pertaining to an agricultural lessee.
The execution of a lease agreement between the
Spouses San Diego and Regino Cassanova in 1974 did not
terminate private respondent's status as an agricultural
lessee. The fact that private respondent knew of, and
consented to, the said lease contract by signing as witness to
the agreement may not be construed as a waiver of his rights
as an agricultural lessee.
On the contrary, it was his right to know about the
lease contract since, as a result of the agreement, he had to
deal with a new person instead of with the owners directly as
he used to. No provision may be found in the lease contract
and the renewal contract even intimating that private
respondent has waived his rights as an agricultural lessee.
Petitioner’s Argument 2:
Private respondent can no longer be considered the
agricultural lessee of their farm land because after they
purchased the land from the Spouses San Diego in 1980,
private respondent did not secure their permission to cultivate
the land as agricultural lessee.
SUPREME COURT:
(General rule) It is true that the Court has ruled that
agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent the true
and lawful owners is absent. (Exception) But this doctrine
Loreto Reyes petitioner v. Spouses Honorio and
Josefina Joson, Dominador Masangkay and Renato
Robles, respondents
523 SCRA 365 JUNE 7, 2007
FACTS: In 1962, Hilarion Caragay hired Loreto Reyes as
caretaker/ watcher of a fishpond and lot 1482 in Bataan which
he leased from Apolonio Aguire.
The contract of lease between Caragay and Aguire
expired in 1973. Later on, Tomas Aguire, son of Apolonio
leased to Honorio Joson the same fishpond until it expires in
1982.
Tomas Aguire appointed Joson as administrator while
Loreto Reyes continued to work as fishpond/watcher.
Joson as administrator leased the fishpond to Felizardo
Maliboran for five years. Reyes as bantay palaisdaan signed
the contract as witness. Soon enough, same contract of lease,
expired. Joson reverted to the possession of the fishpond.
In 1989, Caragay, the former lessee, re-entered the
fishpond and proceed to harvest bangus and prawn with the
assistance of Reyes. Joson requested Caragay to vacate the
premise, but Caragay refused to that prompted Joson to file
contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm land is
cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her
will or although permission to work on the farm was given,
there was no intention to constitute the worker as the
agricultural lessee of the farm land.
The rule finds no application in the case at bar where
the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a tenanted land
over which an agricultural leasehold has long been
established. The consent given by the original owners to
constitute private respondent as the agricultural lessee of the
subject landholding binds private respondents whom as
successors-in-interest of the Spouses San Diego, step into the
latter's shows, acquiring not only their rights but also their
obligations.
forcible entry in MTC Balanga Bataan. They entered in a
compromise agreement approved by the MTC that Caragay
and workers will vacate the property but Caragay failed to
comply. MTC issued writ of execution. With this, Reyes filed
TRO in RTC Brach 3, Balanga, Bataan enjoining MTC from
implementing the writ.
RTC dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of
jurisdiction and conferring upon the DAR primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate Agrarian Reform matters. MTC
issued writ of execution, ejectment of petitioner.
Petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAB), San Fernando, Pampanga a
complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession. Reyes
alleged that he is agricultural tenant on the fishpond, entitled
to security of tenure and cannot be summarily ejected from
property. Additionally, he invoked that Caragay hired him as
fishpond cultivator and he is an industial partner, hence his
share consist of 50% of the harvest. He also raised that when
Caragay’s contract of lease expired, Thomas Aguire hired him
as caretaker-industrial partner and that his status for 14
years ripened into bona fide tenant by operation of law.
 Respondent Honorio Joson denied the allegations,
contending that petitioner is a mere fishpond.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB)
rendered its decision, that Reyes is lawful owner the TRO is
permanent and awarded peaceful possession and actual
occupation to Reyes. Joson appealed in DARAB but of no avail.
DARAB affirmed the decision of PARAB and reinstate
back Reyes as tenant-tiller to the fishpond in question
immediately without further delay. The motion for
reconsideration of Joson was denied.
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting
respondents’ petition and setting aside the DARAB’s
challenged Decision.
Issue: Whether or not Reyes is an agricultural tenant and
therefore enjoys security of tenure.
Held: No, Petitioner is a mere fishpond caretaker. He was
never instituted by the owner as an agricultural tenant over
the subject property.
Intent is the principal factor in determining whether a
tenancy relationship exists. Tenancy Relationship is not purely
factual relationship but legal relationship.
The requisites to establish tenancy relationship are the
following:
Loreto Reyes petitioner v. Spouses Honorio and
Josefina Joson, Dominador Masangkay and Renato
Robles, respondents
FACTS: In 1962, Hilarion Caragay hired Loreto Reyes as
caretaker/ watcher of a fishpond and lot 1482 in Bataan which
he leased from Apolonio Aguire.
The contract of lease between Caragay and Aguire expired in
1973. Later on, Tomas Aguire, son of Apolonio leased to
Honorio Joson the same fishpond until it expires in 1982.
(1) that the parties are landowner and tenant and
agricultural lessee
(2) subject matter of relationship is agricultural land
(3) consent between parties to relationship
(4) purpose of relationship is to bring about agricultural
production
(5) personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant/agricultural lessee
(6) harvest is shared between the landowner and
tenant/agricultural lessee.
Absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel
of land, a de jure tenant, only when established, he is entitled
to security of tenure.
Consent of the landowner to a tenancy arrangement is
clearly absent. No proof that Aguirre hired petitioner as
tenant.
Crop sharing is not enough to establish tenancy as it is
unusual for the landowner to receive the production of the
land from caretaker who sows.
Mere occupation of an agrarian landowner does not
automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an
agricultural tenant recognized under the agrarian law.
Tenancy status only arises if an occupant has been
given possession of an agricultural landholding for primary
purpose of agricultural production.
Tomas Aguire appointed Joson as administrator while
Loreto Reyes continued to work as fishpond/watcher.
Joson as administrator leased the fishpond to Felizardo
Maliboran for five years. Reyes as bantay palaisdaan signed
the contract as witness. Soon enough, same contract of lease,
expired. Joson reverted to the possession of the fishpond.
In 1989, Caragay, the former lessee, re-entered the
fishpond and proceed to harvest bangus and prawn with the
assistance of Reyes. Joson requested Caragay to vacate the
premise, but Caragay refused to that prompted Joson to file
forcible entry in MTC Balanga Bataan. They entered in a
compromise agreement approved by the MTC that Caragay
and workers will vacate the property but Caragay failed to
comply. MTC issued writ of execution. With this, Reyes filed
TRO in RTC Brach 3, Balanga, Bataan enjoining MTC from
implementing the writ.
RTC dismissed the petition for injunction for lack of
jurisdiction and conferring upon the DAR primary jurisdiction
to determine and adjudicate Agrarian Reform matters. MTC
issued writ of execution, ejectment of petitioner.
Petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAB), San Fernando, Pampanga a
complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession. Reyes
alleged that he is agricultural tenant on the fishpond, entitled
to security of tenure and cannot be summarily ejected from
property. Additionally, he invoked that Caragay hired him as
fishpond cultivator and he is an industial partner, hence his
share consist of 50% of the harvest. He also raised that when
Caragay’s contract of lease expired, Thomas Aguire hired him
as caretaker-industrial partner and that his status for 14
years ripened into bona fide tenant by operation of law.
Respondent Honorio Joson denied the allegations,
contending that petitioner is a mere fishpond.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB)
rendered its decision, that Reyes is lawful owner the TRO is
permanent and awarded peaceful possession and actual
occupation to Reyes. Joson appealed in DARAB but of no avail.
DARAB affirmed the decision of PARAB and reinstate
back Reyes as tenant-tiller to the fishpond in question
immediately without further delay. The motion for
reconsideration of Joson was denied.
VICENTE ADRIANO v. ALICE TANCO
GR No. 168164, Jul 05, 2010
FACTS: Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a
letter [6] dated January 16, 1995 informing him that
subject landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision granting
respondents’ petition and setting aside the DARAB’s
challenged Decision.
Issue: Whether or not Reyes is an agricultural tenant and
therefore enjoys security of tenure.
Held: No, Petitioner is a mere fishpond caretaker. He
was never instituted by the owner as an agricultural
tenant over the subject property.
Intent is the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy
relationship exists. Tenancy Relationship is not purely factual
relationship but legal relationship.
Absence of one element does not make an occupant of
a parcel of land, a de jure tenant, only when established, he is
entitled to security of tenure.
Consent of the landowner to a tenancy arrangement is
clearly absent. No proof that Aguirre hired petitioner as
tenant.
Crop sharing is not enough to establish tenancy as it is
unusual for the landowner to receive the production of the
land from caretaker who sows.
Mere occupation of an agrarian landowner does not
automatically convert a tiller or farm worker into an
agricultural tenant recognized under the agrarian law.
Tenancy status only arises if an occupant has been
given possession of an agricultural landholding for primary
purpose of agricultural production.
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). She asked him to
vacate the property as soon as possible.
Plaintiff’s argument:
a) He averred that in 1970, Arsenio Tanco
(Arsenio), ] the husband of Alice, instituted him as
tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation.
 b) He has been performing all phases of farm
works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and
spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were
then divided equally between them.
c) He also alleged that he was allowed to improve
and establish his home at the old building left by
Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the
plantation.
d) Presently, he is in actual possession of and
continues to cultivate the land.
Defendant’s Argument:
a) Respondents denied having instituted any tenant
on their property.
b) Vicente never worked and has no employer-
employee relationship with Geraldine, Ronald, and
Patrick (children of respondent)
c) Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm
worker. He was hired for the specific purpose of
spraying the mango trees
d) Alice also agreed to pay Vicente an amount
equivalent to 50% of the produce, which was then
the prevailing practice in Bulacan.
PARAD’S (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator)
decision: Declared and recoginized plaintiff Vicente Adriano
as tenant/lessee of subject landholding
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB): affirmed PARAD’s decision. It held that since the
landholding is an agricultural land, that respondents
allowed Vicente to take care of the mango trees, and
that they divided the fruits equally between them, then
an implied tenancy was created.
CA: Respondent being a mere employee or hired
caretaker/overseer/worker of petitioner Alice K. Tanco with
respect to her property in question, covering 7.4692 hectares,
and thus respondent is NOT entitled to security of tenure
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Republic Act
No. 6657)
ISSUE: W/N there is tenancy relationship between Vicente and
Tanco. NONE
RATIO:
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be
presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not
automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy
relationship to exist, the essential requisites must be
present. All the requisites must concur in order to
establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the
absence of one or more requisites is fatal
After a thorough evaluation of the records of this
case, we affirm the findings of the CA that the essential
requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.
The essential element of consent is sorely missing
because there is no proof that the landowners recognized
Vicente, or that they hired him, as their legitimate
tenant. And, although Vicente claims that he is a
tenant of respondents' agricultural lot in Norzagaray,
Bulacan, and that he has continuously cultivated and
openly occupied it, no evidence was presented to
establish the presence of consent other than his self-
serving statements. These cannot suffice because
independent and concrete evidence is needed to prove
consent of the landowner.
Likewise, the essential requisite of sharing of
harvests is lacking.
Neither can we agree with the DARAB's theory of
implied tenancy because the landowner never acquiesced
to Vicente's cultivating the land. Besides, for implied
tenancy to arise it is necessary that all the essential
requisites of tenancy must be present.
Caballes v DAR
FACTS: Macario Alicaba & Millenes family, predecessors-in-
interest of petitioner, agreed to lease to private respondent
Abajon a portion of subject land to construct the latter’s house
& to plant corns & bananas. They agreed to a monthly rental
of PHP2.00 & 50-50 share of crops.
Petitioner Caballes & her husband acquired, through a
deed of sale, the whole land which includes the portion
occupied by private respondent. They informed private
respondent of their intention to build a poultry close to his
house & persuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the
opposite or southern portion of the land. On his part, private
respondent offered to pay rent on the land occupied by his
house, but such offer was not accepted.
Later, the spouses asked private respondent to vacate
the premises, saying that they needed the property. But he
refused. Despite the confrontation before the Brgy. Captain,
the parties failed to reach an agreement. All efforts by the
landowners to oust private respondent were in vain as the
latter simply refused to budge.
Petitioner then filed a criminal case for malicious
mischief against private respondent, alleging that the latter
maliciously cut down the banana plants worth P50.00, (note:
all banana plants, were planted by Abajon).
Pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral
of the case to the regional office of Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (MAR) to determine the relationship of the parties. As
a result, MAR issued an order declaring the existence of a
tenancy relationship between Caballes & Abajon. It also
declared the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by
petitioner against private respondent as not proper for trial;
since such case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the
tenant from his farm.
On appeal, then DAR Minister Conrado Estrella reversed
the certification and declared the criminal case as proper for
trial, since the land involved is a residential lot consisting only
of 60-sq. m.
On motion for reconsideration, herein respondent and
new Minister of DAR, Heherson Alvarez issued an order finding
the criminal case as not proper for trial due to the existence of
tenancy relations between the parties.
Private respondent invoked Sec. 10 of RA 3844, which
provided that new owners are bound to respect the tenancy
regardless of the size of the land being tilled.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abajon is a tenant of spouses
Caballes.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that Abajon only
occupied a miniscule portion of the lot. RA 3844, as amended.
The 60-sq. m. cannot be considered as an economic family-
size farm protected by the aforementioned law. Planting
camote, bananas, & corn on a 60-sq. m. land cannot produce
an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to
meet the farm family’s basic needs.
All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy
relationship between the parties. The absence of one does not
make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof,
or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because
unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant,
he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.
Sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy
relationship. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a
parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary
purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this
case indicate that the private respondent’s status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence
ANTONIO EVANGELISTA Y LISING, Petitioner, v. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, LUZ CASTAÑEDA and HEIRS OF
BENEDICTO SANCHEZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. L-37736. February 23, 1988.
FACTS: Rosario Mendoza Sanchez (Sanchez, for short), the
private respondents’ predecessor-in-interest, was the owner of
a parcel of land with an area of 5 hectares, more or less,
situated at Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan.
On 11 September 1963, petitioner and Sanchez
executed a new "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" which provided for
the same terms and conditions stated in their previous
"Kasulatan ng Buwisan, dated 13 February 1960, except as to
the period of the contract and the amounts of rental and
deposit. (The contract was for a period of one agricultural
year, 1963-64, and expired on February, 1964, The rental for
the use of the landholding was reduced to 90 cavans of palay
a year.)
And petitioner deposited with Sanchez the sum of
P2,250.00 without interest, which was to be returned to the
petitioner after the period of the contract shall have expired.
On 30 March 1965, following the expiration of the
period provided in the last "Kasulatan ng Buwisan" executed
by petitioner and Sanchez, the latter executed another
"Kasulatan ng Buwisan" over the land in question, effective for
the agricultural year 1965-66, with Felipe Domingo.
On 24 May 1965, the petitioner filed a complaint for
reinstatement, with damages, in the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) in Bulacan against Sanchez and Felipe
Domingo, on the strength of his claim that he was the
occupant of the landholding of Sanchez.
or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of
some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the
said portion.
Petitioner alleged that since 1953, he was the tenant of
Sanchez over the aforesaid landholding, until he was illegally
ejected from the same on 15 April 1965, for having informed
Sanchez of his desire to fix the amount of the rental in
accordance with Republic Act No. 3844 as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Reform Code.
The private respondents denied the alleged forcible
eviction of the petitioner from the landholding.
They claimed that petitioner occupied the land in
question as a lessee under a contract of civil lease, and not as
an agricultural lessee under Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended: and that he (petitioner) voluntarily surrendered the
land to them (private respondents) sometime in March, 1965.
The defense of the private respondents was anchored
on three (3) written contracts executed by Sanchez and the
petitioner, one entitled "Kasulatang Option" and the other
two, "Kasulatan ng Buwisan." [The contract entitled
"Kasulatang Option," executed on 14 June 1956, contained the
following terms and conditions: (see at the end of digest)]
Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) declared the
petitioner to be the agricultural lessee on the land in question.
Court of Appeals reversed CAR’s decision. Hence, the
petitioner’s present recourse to SC.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee
under Rep. Act No. 3844, and therefore entitled to security of
tenure over the landholding, in question, or a mere civil law
lessee, who does not enjoy security of tenure in the sense that
he may he ejected from the landholding upon the expiration
of the term provided in the contract of lease.
Held: A share tenant (under Rep. Act No. 1199) or an
agricultural lessee (under Rep. Act No. 3844) is entitled to
security of tenure over the landholding he works at. Not even
the expiration of any term or period fixed in the leasehold
contract, in the case of an agricultural lessee, will cause the
lessee’s ejectment from the land.
On the other hand, a civil lessee, under a contract of
civil lease, 11 does not enjoy security of tenure over the land
object of the contract. A civil lessee can be ejected from the
land after the expiration of the term provided for in the
contract.
The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals that the
petitioner was not a bona fide tenant-farmer on the land in
question, which are based on the evidence on record, is final
and conclusive.
The salient characteristic which would make the
relationship between the petitioner and Sanchez one of
agricultural leasehold, and which is personal cultivation by the
petitioner and the immediate members of his farm household,
is absent in the case at bar.
As cited in the decision of the respondent court,
petitioner’s own witness, Nicolas Maclang, admitted that
petitioner used to hire many plowers, harrowers and planters
as well as farm laborers, who were paid by him, and that he
himself (Maclang) helped the appellee work on the land for 3
years. Even the decision of the trial court showed that
petitioner did not personally cultivate the land in question.
ANACLETO DE JESUS, petitioner, vs.HON.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SOCORRO
CALIMBAS-MIACO, GUILLERMO CALIMBAS-RODRIGUEZ
and TIRSO CALIMBAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 72282 July 24, 1989, Civil Law Lessee
Facts: Respondents are owners of some 7.162 hectares of
land in Pilar, Bataan. About four (4) hectares of the above lot
As held in Carag v. Court of Appeals, 14 absent the
requisite of personal cultivation, by the alleged tenant, no
tenancy relationship can be said to exist between him and the
landowner. Hence, the petitioner cannot be said to be an
agricultural lessee. He has not personally or by his farm
household, cultivated the land in question.
The fact that the contracts of lease signed by the
parties did not stipulate that the land holding should be
personally cultivated by the petitioner and the immediate
members of his farm household, indicates the intent of the
parties to establish only a civil lease relationship.
A person who signed for three consecutive times a
contract of lease (Kasulatang Option and Kasulatan ng
Buwisan), with the intent of establishing a civil lease contract,
cannot later be heard to claim that he is a tenant or an
agricultural lessee.
This Court is aware of the practice of many landowners,
as a way of evading the provisions of tenancy laws, to have
their tenants sign contracts or agreements intended to
camouflage the real import of their relationship. But in the
case at bar, the grounds cited in the decision of the
respondent court indicate that the contracts entered into were
bona fide civil lease in nature, and that they were entered into
by the petitioner voluntarily.
is a fishpond possession of which has been in petitioner since
1962 as a lessee.
April 22, 1972, Respondents, as heirs of Spouses
Eustacio Calimbas and Modesta Paguio who in their lifetime
were the registered owners of the land, entered into a civil law
contract of lease, with petitioner de Jesus and one Felicisima
Rodriguez.
Contract was to be effective for 2-1/2 years starting
January 1, 1972 to July 1, 1974.
 Petitioner de Jesus and Felicisima Rodriguez formed a
partnership over the fishpond with de Jesus as the industrial
partner and Rodriguez as the capitalist. Upon the expiration of
the civil law lease contract on July 1, 1974, Felicisima
Rodriguez gave up the lease but petitioner de Jesus refused to
vacate the leased premises despite repeated demands.
December 5, 1975, respondents filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Possession with Damages" against the petitioner
before the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of
Bataan.
July 20, 1979, the Court of First Instance ruled in favor
of petitioner and dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. CFI also held that petitioner is an agricultural
lessee and not a civil law lessee, therefore jurisdiction over
the dispute belongs to the Court of Agrarian Relations and not
to the Court of First Instance.
Intermediate Appellate Court, reversed the resolution
of February 23, 1985, holding that petitioner is not an
agricultural lessee but a civil law lessee and further ordered
the latter to vacate the land.
Issue: Whether or not Petitioner is an agricultural lessee or a
civil law lessee.
Held: SC held that the mere fact that the land is agricultural
does not ipso facto make him an agricultural lessee. The law
provides conditions or requisites before he can qualify as one
and the land being agricultural is only one of them. Among
BONIFACIO v. DIZON; GR 79416; September 5, 1989;
C.J. Fernan
FACTS: Olimpio Bonifacio filed a complaint seeking the
ejectment of private respondent Pastora San Miguel from
Bonifacio’s 2-hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig,
Marilao, Bulacan (TCT T-27298). Bonifacio was seeking the
ejectment on the ground of personal cultivation under Sec.
36(1) of RA 3844.
others, the law is explicit in requiring the tenant and his
immediate family to work the land. His obligation to work on
the land by himself or with the aid of his immediate farm
household. By "immediate farm household", the law means
the members of the family of the lessee or lessor and other
persons who are dependent upon him for support and who
usually help him in his activities.
On review by the Court of Appeals these allegations
gave way to a much stronger evidence-the judicial admissions
of petitioner himself, that he hired many persons to help him
cultivate the fishpond. Absent the requisite of personal
cultivation, petitioner de Jesus cannot be considered an
agricultural lessee. In the case of Evangelista v. Court of
Appeals, 12 this Court held that one cannot be said to be an
agricultural lessee if he has not personally or by his farm
household cultivated the land in question. It is an undisputed
fact that petitioner is cultivating an adjacent fishpond with a
size of 11-1/2 hectares which further proves that he is not a
small farmer but a businessman. First and foremost, the law is
meant to assist and help the small farmers as enunciated in
its Declaration of Policy. In the case at bar, petitioner de Jesus
is not a small farmer but a businessman. To consider him an
agricultural lessee despite the fact that he is cultivating
another fishpond with an area of 11-1/2 hectares, and
furthermore despite the fact that he does not cultivate the
fishpond personally and/ or with the help of his immediate
farm household as defined by law, would render nugatory the
letter and intent of the Agricultural Reform Code.
The Court of Agrarian Reform decided in favor of
Bonifacio, leading Pastora San Miguel to file an appeal with
the CA. The CA affirmed but modified the judgment of the CAR
by ordering Bonifacio to pay San Miguel P1,376. San Miguel
then sought a relief with the SC. During the pendency of this
petition, Bonifacio died. As no notice of such death was given
to the Court, no order for the substitution of his heirs was
made. The Court En Banc resolved to deny San Miguel’s
petition for lack of merit and to affirm the decision of the CA.
Petitioners, the wife and children as heirs of Olimpio
Bonifacio, moved for the execution of the CAR’s decision
before the RTC. A writ of execution was issued and the Deputy
Sheriff submitted his Report (Partial Delivery of Possession),
stating in part that except for a portion thereof occupied by
the house of Pastora San Miguel which the latter refused to
vacate, he had delivered the land subject matter of the action
to Rosalina Bonifacio as surviving wife of Olimpio.
Private respondent moved to quash the writ of
execution. This was opposed by petitioners who in turn sought
the issuance of a writ of demolition and an order declaring
Pastora in contempt of court for allegedly re-entering the
subject land. The RTC then ordered the implementation of the
writ of execution null and void; the Motion for Demolition
denied; and the Petition for Contempt likewise denied.
Petitioners are assailing this resolution in the petition
for certiorari filed before the CA pursuant to Sec. 9(3) of BP
129 in relation to Sec. 5(2)[e]. Petitioners contend that the
RTC had no jurisdiction as the decision can no longer be
executed as said action is purely personal in character and
therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacio’s death, be inherited
by his heirs. They assert that the CAR case, being an
ejectment case and not one of those specifically provided by
law to be purely personal, survives the death of a party.
Furthermore, under Rule 39, Sec. 49(b) of the Rules of Court, a
judgment is binding not only upon the parties but also on their
successors-in-interest, petitioners are entitled to enforce the
decision of the CAR.
Private respondent places stress on the fact that the
action under consideration is not an ordinary ejectment case
but an agrarian case for the ejectment of an agricultural
ZACARIAS OARDE and PRESENTACION MOLAR vs. CA,
SPOUSES WILFREDO and LOURDES GUERRERO and
SPOUSES ROGELIO and VILMA MOLAR – Panganiban
lessee. She believes the right being asserted is personal to
Olimpio which necessarily died with him. She contends that
the non-substitution of Olimpio by his heirs rendered the
proceedings taken after his death null and void.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioners as heirs of Olimpio have the right
to have the CAR decision implemented
RULING: Yes. San Miguel is correct in that the CAR case is
more than an ordinary ejectment case. It is an agrarian case
for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee, which is more
closely and strictly regulated by the State. This factor,
however, does not operate to bar and application to the
instant case of the general rule that an ejectment case
survives the death of a party.
Much of the problem is in the term “personal
cultivation” as a ground for ejectment. This gave the
impression that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was
allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor and no other
opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving rise to a
bigger misconception that the right of cultivation pertained
exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his personal
right alone. A reading of Sec. 36(1), RA 3844 shows that
ejectment is not only authorized when the landowner-lessor
desires to cultivate their landholding, but also when a member
of his immediate family so desired. Clearly then, the right of
cultivation as a ground for ejectment is not a right exclusive
and personal to the landowner-lessor. Petitioners are not only
the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family
members of the deceased landowner Olimpio as well. They
are therefore entitled to the enforcement of the judgment in
the CAR Case.
FACTS: Oarde and Molar sought to enjoin spouses Guerrero
and spouses Molar from removing them as tenant-tillers of the
land subject of the case. Oarde and Molar alleged that they
are tenant-tillers of the land in question. Oarde testified that
he began to till the land in question on April 29, 1964 when he
got married to the daughter of Francisco Molar, and to
substantiate his claim, he presented as one of his witnesses
Gregorio Magnaye, an employee of the Bureau of Lands. He
was the Chief of a Survey Team that conducted the survey in
Gotob. The other members were technicians from the DAR.
On the other hand, Presentacion Molar alleged that she
is a tenant-lessee of the land in question previously owned by
Atty. Wilfredo Guerrero. She started tilling the land in 1965.
Before, she owned a carabao but sold it. She caused the land
to be worked on "Pakyaw" basis, hiring different persons for
different work. She actually does not till the land. According to
Zacarias Oarde who testified on her behalf, she began tilling
in 1968. She is not married and she only hires laborers to till
the land. It was Francisco Molar who distributed to his children
the land they are farming. Presentacion hires laborers to
prepare and plant the land. She does not actually till the land.
Meanwhile, the spouses Molar and Guerrero claimed
that both Molar and Oarde are not tenant-tillers of the land in
question. One of their witnesses testified that Atty. Wilfredo
Guerrero owns only one parcel of land in Gotob and this was
previously farmed by his father Francisco Molar. After
Francisco Molar's death, the land was tilled by witness Basilio
Molar. Presentacion Molar and Zacarias Oarde are only
helpers. From the share of the tenant-tiller Francisco Molar,
Presentacion and Zacarias get their share. Another witness
was Ernesto Nares. He was one of the buyers of the property
together with Rogelio Molar.
Trial court held that Molar and Oarde were not lawful
tenants of the spouses. CA modified the ruling and held that
Oarde is a tenant. Hence, this petition by Molar praying that
she be declared as lawful tenant.
ISSUE: W/N Molar is a lawful tenant of the spouses.
RULING: NO. Molar is not a lawful tenant. Only Oarde.
In the case of Molar, the element of "personal"
cultivation is absent. Both the trial court and CA found that
Molar herself did not actually cultivate the land, nor did her
immediate family or farm household. Instead, she hired other
people to do all phases of farm work. Even Oarde testified that
she did not actually till the land and that she merely paid
laborers to perform such task.
Presentacion made inconsistent answers when asked
when she began tilling the land, before she finally declared
that she started tilling the property way back in 1965.
However, the element of personal cultivation is essential for
an agricultural leasehold; that is, that there should be
personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm
household or members of the family of the lessee or other
persons who are dependent upon him for support or who
usually help him in his activities. The law is explicit in
requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the
land, and the lessee cannot hire many persons to help him
cultivate the land.
In this case, Zacarias Oarde, testifying for Presentacion
Molar, declared that Presentacion "does not actually till the
land but she pays laborers to till the land"; she is single, owns
no working animals, nor farm implements. Presentacion
herself admitted that she has "the property tenanted on
pakyaw basis' meaning that she hires different persons for
harrowing, for plowing, and for harvesting and that she did not
actually till the land, but merely says others "because (I) am a
woman"; she owns a small store.
Both CA and the trial court found that Molar was not a
tenant of Wilfredo Guerrero. Molar is in effect asking this Court
to assess the evidentiary basis of the foregoing factual
conclusion. This the Court cannot do. Only questions of law
could be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. Whether Petitioner Molar was a
tenant-tiller is a question of fact. Molar has not shown that her
case falls under any of the recognized exceptions to the
ironclad rule that only questions of law may be raised before
this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
In any event, she submitted several exhibits to support
her claim that she was a tenant. She adds that she "has been
a registered tenant-tiller of Lot 1 since1977" as evidenced by
certifications from a team leader of the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR). These documents, she argues, show
that she was a tenant of the land in question because "factual
findings of administrative agencies are entitled to great
respect and even accorded finality." Molar prays that the Court
gives credence to these documents in her favor, in the same
way that the lower court did in favor of Oarde.
JOSE MATIENZO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARTIN
SERVIDAD, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-28135 September 10, 1981
FACTS: Defendant Martin Servidad is the owner of a sixteen
hectare agricultural land situated at Barrio Binahian Sipocot,
Camarines Sur. On April 16, 1961, he and plaintiff Jose
Matienzo executed a handwritten private instrument to:
I, Jose Matienzo, Elenita Robles, we
husband wife were instituted head-
overseer in the land of Martin and Feliza
de Servidad who will take care of their
plants. Whoever resides in our land will
have to obey the head-overseer as we
have then authorized to supervise the
landholding. Like borrowing loans needed
if there is no letter from the Head
overseer to us we will not accommodate.
So that whatever need you have you
The Court did not give credence on numerous
certifications of administrative agencies that she was a tenant
of Lot 1. Assessing the evidence in hand, both lower courts
concluded that Molar was not a tenant. The certifications
issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain
person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive
on courts. Furthermore, these documents were based merely
on bare ex parte allegations of different persons. Even worse,
Molar's own witness, Jose Neo, "an employee of DAR," testified
that "he did not in any way participate in the preparation of
the document presented in evidence."
must inform the Headoverseer as the
latter is the one to inform us.
The conditions for clearing the land are
these: With respect to all your plants we
will share no percentage for the land. But
you will have to plant coconut in our
land. We will not pay as this is our
conditions. You are free to clear and plant
the land as long as you wish. We must
help one another for our betterment. Let
us not do anything prejudicial to others.
Let's do the best as it is better. xxx
The area entrusted to plaintiff was seven hectares,
on a portion of which he constructed his house.
Plaintiff planted bananas, bancocan coffee, coconuts,
breadfruits abaca and some auxiliary crops. He also looked
after the coffee and abaca plants of defendant, as well as the
latter's goats entrusted to his care. For clearing the coconut
plantation, he was paid per coconut tree he cleared. For his
labor in making copra, he was paid 1/3 of the copra he made.
On January 30, 1964, defendant wrote plaintiff telling him not
to "interfere with the plants" as they had no agreement yet for
that year, and that being the landowner, he should be the one
to decide in accordance with the "tenancy law". On March 4,
1964, defendant sent another letter to plaintiff prohibiting him
from planting and clearing the land for the same reason.
Plaintiff sought the assistance of the Office of the Agrarian
Counsel in Naga City. Efforts to settle the case amicably failed,
as a consequence of which, plaintiff brought an action against
defendant in the Court of Agrarian Relations of Naga City
praying that defendant be held guilty of illegal ejectment; that
in view of the strained relationship with defendant, he was
waiving his right to reinstatement provided he be paid
reasonable compensation for his improvements; and that
defendant be ordered to pay him actual and moral damages.
Court of Agrarian Relations: Dismissed the suit for lack of
merit. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but this was denied.
In its judgment, the Court a quo specifically made a finding
that plaintiff had expressly waived his right to reinstatement
"on account of his strained relationship with defendant."
CA: Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which Court,
certified the case to the SC on the theory that "where the
issue is the construction or interpretation of contracts, or
where an the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is
the conclusion drawn therefrom the question is one of law
reviewable by the Supreme Court".
ISSUE: Whether under the parties' agreements, plaintiff was
instituted as an overseer or as a tenant by defendant.
SC RULING: To start with, a few basic principles on the
interpretation of contracts should be reiterated. When there is
no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, its
literal meaning shall control. Article 1372 of the New Civil
Code further provides that however general the terms of a
contract may be, they shag not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases that are different from those
upon which the parties intended to agree. Therefore, a
meaning other than that expressed or an interpretation which
would alter its strict and literal significance should not be
given to it. Moreover, the entirety of the contract must be
taken into consideration to ascertain the meaning of its
provisions.
It is clear from Exhibit C that plaintiff was made an overseer
of defendant, not a tenant. lt was likewise expressly stipulated
therein that "the conditions for clearing the land are these:
With respect to all your plants we will share no percentage for
the land." And again, "all those (coconuts) that we are to plant
no share will be taken for the land. The basic element of
sharing in agricultural tenancy, therefore, is absent. The one-
third share plaintiff received from copra-making constituted
payments for the processing of copra. These are evidenced by
receipts 14. Plaintiff also got paid for clearing the coconuts as
shown by Exhibits 7 and 7-A.
A tenant is defined under section 5(a) of Republic Act No.
1199 as a person who, himself, and with the aid available
from within his immediate household, cultivates the land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's
consent for purposes of production, sharing the produce with
the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to
the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in
money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system. From the
above definition of a tenant, it is clear that absent a sharing
arrangement, no tenancy relationship had ever existed
between the parties. What transpired was that plaintiff was
made overseer over a 7-hectare land area; he was to
supervise applications for loans from those residing therein;
he was allowed to build his house thereon and to plant
specified plants without being compensated he was free to
clear and plant the land as long as he wished; he had no
sharing arrangement between him and defendant; and he was
not obligated to pay any price certain to, nor share the
produce with, the latter.
REMEGIO ISIDRO VS COURT OF APPEALS AND
GUTTIERREZ
THE ELEMENTS OF TENANCY RELATIONS AND THE ISSUE
OF JURISDICTION
FACTS: Natividad Gutierrez is the owner of a parcel of land
located in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. Aniceta Garcia, sister of
Natividad and also the overseer of the latter, allowed
petitioner Remigio Isidro to occupy the swampy (wet) portion
of the land. The occupancy of a portion of said land was
subject to the condition that petitioner would vacate the land
upon demand. Petitioner occupied the land without paying
any rental and converted the same into a fishpond.
Eventually, Natividad Gutierrez demanded from petitioner the
return of the land, but the latter refused to vacate and return
possession of said land, claiming that he had spent effort and
invested capital in converting the same into a fishpond.
A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by private
respondent against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Gapan. Petitioner set up the following defenses: (a)
that the complaint was triggered by his refusal to increase his
lease rental (implying tenancy) (b) the subject land is a
fishpond and therefore is agricultural land; and (c) that lack of
Although Exhibit 6 states that plaintiff and his wife were made
"caretakers" of the land, there is a definite provision in both
Exhibits C and 6 that defendant would not share in the
produce of plaintiff's plants. Because of this aspect, the ruling
in Latag vs. Banog, 16 SCRA 88 (1966), which holds that a I
caretaker of an agricultural land is also considered cultivator
of the land", finds no applicability.
Besides, even if we were to rule that plaintiff is a tenant, the
whole exercise would become academic since he has waived
his right to reinstatement.
formal demand to vacate warrants the dismissal of the
complaint.
MTC ruling said that the land is agricultural and
therefore the dispute over it is agrarian which is under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of agrarian
relations and the RTC AFFIRMED the decision.
The CA reversed the Decision saying that the Remegio
failed to prove that there is a tenurial arrangement which is
concerned with the act or manner of putting into proper order
the rights of holding a piece of agricultural land between the
landowner and the farmer or farmworker, between him and
the respondent thus, there is no existing tenancy relationship
and the action of unlawful detainer before the MTC is correct.
HELD: The Petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.
While in possession by tolerance is lawful, such possession
becomes illegal upon demand to vacate is made by the owner
and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with such
demand.
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent
on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding
when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements,
provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law,
are even more important.
The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the
purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation by the tenant; and (6) there is a sharing of
harvests between the parties. All these requisites must concur
in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties
CORNES VS. LEAL REALTY
GR No. 172146; July 30, 2008; CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition traces its origins from four separate
Complaints filed with the Provincial Adjudication Board, Region
III in Tarlac, Tarlac.
DARAB- Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
Facts:
DARAB Case No. 234-T91: Filed by petitioners and their
predecessors-in interest against respondents for maintenance
of peaceful possession and for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Petitioners contended that they had
been farmers and full-fledged tenants for more than 30 years
of an agricultural landholding which was previously owned
and registered in the name of Josefina Roxas Omaa
(JOSEFINA). The subject landholding consists of at least 21
hectares and is principally devoted to rice and sugar.
Petitioners alleged that subject landholding is covered by RA
6657, but was sold by JOSEFINA to respondents in
contravention of the law. Meanwhile, LEAL HAVEN converted a
portion of the subject landholding into a memorial park. It is
petitioners stance that when respondents entered into a
contract of sale with JOSEFINA, they were aware of the
tenancy relationship which existed between petitioners and
JOSEFINA.
The fact remains that the existence of all the requisites
of a tenancy relationship was not proven by the petitioner.
And in the absence of a tenancy relationship, the complaint
for unlawful detainer is properly within the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.
DARAB Case No. 396-T93: Filed by petitioners against
respondent LEAL REALTY and SPS. TUGADI for violation of RA
6657, annulment of documents, title and damages. In
addition, petitioners posited that LEAL REALTY executed a
Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the SPS. TUGADI without
proper conversion of the lot from agricultural to non-
agricultural in breach of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law CARL.
DARAB Case No. 397-T93: Filed by petitioners against
respondent LEAL REALTY and SPS. ALCAZAREN for violation of
Republic Act No. 6657, annulment of documents, title and
damages. Petitioners questioned the subdivision of the subject
landholding into smaller lots as contrary to law.
DARAB Case No. 329-T95: Filed by LEAL REALTY, with the
PARAB (Tarlac) against petitioner Nita Cornes-Valenzuela
(VALENZUELA), injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction. LEAL REALTY
alleged that despite its objection, VALENZUELA constructed a
residential house within the premises of the subject
landholding; hence, it prayed for the removal of the
construction at VALENZUELAs expense.
Provincial Adjudicator Ruling: Dismissed Cases No. 234-
T91, No. 396-T93, and No. 397-T93; Granted DARAB Case No.
329-T95. There was no tenancy relationship which existed
between the parties.
DARAB Ruling: Vacated the appealed Decision, declaring
petitioners as bona fide tenants of the subject landholding.
Right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide
tenants; but also to actual tillers of the land. It also declared
that there was an implied tenancy between the parties. The
DARAB ruled that for more than 30 years, the petitioners were
deemed tenants of the subject landholding.
CA Ruling: Granted respondents Petition for Review. The fact
that petitioners had worked on the subject landholding did not
give rise to the existence of a tenancy relationship. MR
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest are tenants de jure of the subject landholding
HELD: No. In order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is
essential to establish all its indispensable elements, viz: 1) the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) there is consent between the parties to
the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring
about agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation
on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the
harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.
Petitioners failed to adduce substantial evidence to show the
existence of all the indispensable requisites for the
constitution of a tenancy relationship.
While it might have been shown and not contested that
petitioners predecessors-in-interest, namely JACINTO, PABLO,
JUANITO and FRANCISCO occupied the subject landholding as
tillers thereof, the records support the fact that their
occupancy was in the nature of hired laborers of JOSEFINA. As
can be gleaned from the Entry No. E-17-7182 covering the
subject landholding in the name of JOSEFINA, the same was
not tenanted. Moreover, Entry No. E-22-4361, also annotated
on the aforesaid certificate of title, is explicit that the subject
landholding is not tenanted. Further, the records reveal that
petitioners predecesssors-in-interest executed an affidavit
attesting that they were working on the subject landholding as
hired laborers only. The fact alone of working on anothers
landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy.
Neither was it shown to the satisfaction of this Court
that there existed a sharing of harvests in the context of a
tenancy relationship between petitioners and/or their
predecessors-in-interest and JOSEFINA. Jurisprudence is
illuminating to the effect that to prove such sharing of
harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented.
None was shown, except the testimony of petitioner Rodolfo
Cornes, which is self-serving and is without evidentiary value.
The testimony of Araceli Pascua, an employee of the
DAR in Victoria, Tarlac, that the subject landholding was
tenanted cannot overcome substantial evidence to the
contrary. What cannot be ignored is the precedent ruling of
this Court that the findings of or certifications issued by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, or his authorized
representative, in a given locality concerning the presence or
absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending
parties, are merely preliminary or provisional and are not
binding upon the courts.
The element of consent in the creation of the tenancy
relationship was sorely missing. As was seen earlier, even
petitioners predecessors-in-interest were unequivocal in their
admission that they worked as hired laborers on the subject
landholding. The intent, if any, to institute them as tenants of
the landholdings was debunked by their very admission.

One glaring factor that strikes the mind of this Court is the
fact that petitioners did not implead JOSEFINA, who is an
indispensable party.