Tanada vs.

Tuvera
No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Ponente: Justice Cruz

Facts:
    The petitioners sought the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees, which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government’s contention that the phrase “otherwise provided”
means that a decree will become effective immediately after their
approval. The trial court affirmed the decision of having the necessity for
the publication of the said decrees. The petitioners now sought for the
reconsideration or clarification of the said decision. The prayer
constitutes of ordering the respondents to publish in the Official Gazette
all the unpublished Presidential decrees of general application and
unless published they shall not be binding.

Issue:
    Whether or not the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to
the date of effectivity of laws or to the requirement of publication.

Held:
    The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot
be omitted. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen day period shall
be shortened or extended. The omission of the said publication would
run against the due process clause and would deny the public
knowledge of the laws. The court held that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity. The publication must be in full since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the law.
    Petition granted.
DM Consunji, Inc. Vs CA
Facts: On May 9, 1991, private respondent Maria Juego filed in the
Pasig Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner
for the the death of her husband Jose juego. Jose was employed by
petitioner as a construction worker. While working on November 2,
1990, Jose fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig. He died.
Maria availed of the death benefits form the State Insurance Fund.
Petitioner is claiming that she can no longer recover damages under the
Civil Code because her prior availment of the benefits form the State
Insurance Fund. The trial court and CA decided in favour of maria.
Issue: Whether Maria’s availment of the death benefits provided under
the Labor Code amounts to a waiver of her rights to claim for damages
from petition under the Civil Code?
Held: No because maria was not only ignorant of the fact but of her
rights as well. Maria’s election of the death benefits does not bar any
action inconsistent with the elected remedy.
For a waiver to become valid, there must be an intentional
relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a rights,
there is no basis upon which waiver of its can rest. Waiver requires a
knowledge of the right waived with an awareness of its consequences.
Thus ignorance of material fact negates waiver.
Pilapil VS. Ibay-Somera
G.R No. 80116
June 30, 1989
    On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, marriage
and deaths in Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where they had a
daughter.
    After three and a half years of disharmonic marriage, private
respondent Geiling initiated divorce proceedings against petitioner in his
native Germany. He claimed that there was failure of the marriage and
they had been living apart since 1982.While petitioner filed an action for
Legal separation, support and separation of property before the
Regional Trial Court in Manila.
    On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg local Court of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses.
    On June 27, 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the
City Fiscal of Manila alleging that during the marriage Pilapil had an
affair with a certain William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua.
After corresponding investigation, the assistant fiscal recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
However upon review of the respondent City fiscal a resolution was
approved and the cases were raffled to two branches of the RTC of
Manila.
      On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of
Justice that the cases be dismissed. The Secretary of justice, through
the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed city fiscal to inform the DOJ “if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not, to move to defer further proceedings” and to
elevate the entire record of the cases to his office for review.
Pilapil filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings. As a result, one of the criminal cases was
suspended, while the date of arraignment of the other was merely reset.
    During the arraignment of the criminal case, the William Chia pleaded
not guilty while the petitioner refused not to be arraigned. The petitioner
was then held in contempt and was detained until she submitted herself
for arraignment. She later entered a plea of not guilty.
    On October 27, 1987 petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari
on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to decide and try the
case.
    On March 29, 1988, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution
directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner.
Issue:
    Whether or not the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines and if the
private respondet can file a complaint of adultery against the petitioner.

Ruling:
    Yes, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. In the present
case, the fact that the private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concern in
view of the nationality principle on our civil law on the matter of the
status of persons.
    Under this consideration, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed the suit.
    The allegations of the private respondent that he could not have
brought this case befor the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge even
if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. The
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other.

People vs. Que Po Lay

No. 6791, March 29, 1954
Montemayor, J.

FACTS:
Que Po Lay is accused of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
requiring those who are in possession of foreign currency to sell the
same to the Central Bank. Que Po Lay alleges that said circular was not
published in the Official Gazette before he committed the act and
therefore, it had no force and effect.

ISSUE:  Whether or not Central Bank Circular No. 20 has no force and
effect

HELD:
Yes, the said Circular has no force and effect because it was not
published. Article 2 of the new Civil Code provides that laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless otherwise provided. While Central Bank Circular No. 20 is not of
a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law
authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to
settled jurisprudence. Rules and regulations which prescribe a penalty
for its violation should be published before becoming effective. The
public cannot be held liable for violations of laws or regulations unless
they are informed of its contents and penalties for violation.

  Minciano vs. Brimo

50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924
J. Romualdez

Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of

the estate. Juan  Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left
filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on the fact that
the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s
will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality,
for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the
Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary disposition.

Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that
Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it
must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator.
Therefore, the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with
Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Cui vs. Arellano University (2 SCRA 205)

Facts: Plaintiff Emeterio Cui, studying law, received scholarship grants

for scholastic merit at Arellano University. During his last semester of
his fourth year, he left the defendant university and enrolled at Abad
Santos University, wherein he finished his law degree. After graduating,
he applied for the bar examinations. To secure to take the bar
examinations, he needed the transcript of records from the defendant
university. Defendant refused to give him a transcript until he paid back
the tuition that the university returned when he was granted scholarship.
According to the contract signed by the plaintiff, scholarships are good
only if the student should continue in the same school. This contract
was followed from Memorandum No. 38 made by the Director of Private
Schools.
Issue: Whether or not the contract between plaintiff and defendant,
whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school
without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash
valid or not?

Held:  The contract between plaintiff and defendant is not binding since
the memorandum made by the Director of Private Schools is not a law.
The provisions are only advisory and not mandatory in nature.
Furthermore, the said officer had not authority to issue such
memorandum and that provisions were not published in the Official
Gazette.
Garcia v. Recio
G. R. No. 138322    Oct. 2, 2001
Panganiban, J.

FACTS

    Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married an Australian citizen named

Editha Samson in 1987.  Two years later a decree of divorce was
released by the Australian government.
   
On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a
certain Grace Garcia in 1994 in Cabanatuan City with the former
declaring that he was single and Filipino.

Garcia filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy

alleging that Recio had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he
married her and only had knowledge of it in 1997.

Recio countered wife’s claim asserting that he disclosed the previous

marriage to her in 1993. Moreover, he contended that his first marriage
had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
1989 making him legally capacitated to marry.

ISSUE

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce
decree obtained in Australia by Recio ipso facto terminated his first
marriage to Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second
marriage with Garcia.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree obtained by Recio
does not ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Samson on the
account that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Article 15 and 17 of the Civil Code establish the rule that a marriage
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained
abroad. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article
26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad
by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. The Court
highlights that before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.

Roehr vs. Garcia

GR No. 142820
June 20, 2003

Facts:
    Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina,
Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan,
Negros Oriental.. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a
decree of divorce from the Cout of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father.

Issue:
    Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign
country such as support and custody of the children can be determined
in our courts

Held:
    Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly show
that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so
under the Rules of Civel Procedure. Accoringly, the respondent was not
given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court,
therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. The
court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the
parties as to who has parental costudy