JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No.

120095, August 5, 1996; 260 SCRA 319

(Labor Standards – Artist Record Book as a requirement for overseas employment contract)

Facts: The deployment of female entertainers to Japan was controlled by the government through
Department Order No. 3, wherein said entertainers were required an Artist Record Book as a
precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. Petitioners
contends that overseas employment is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution and avers
that the alleged deprivation thereof through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates due process
and constitutes an invalid exercise of police power.

Issue: WON an Artist Record Book is a valid requirement for overseas employment.

Held: Yes. The ARB requirement and the questioned Department order related to its issuance were
issued pursuant to a valid exercise of police power which considers the welfare of Filipino performing
artists, particularly the women.

JENNY M. AGABON v. NLRC, GR No. 158693, 2004-11-17

Facts:

Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing
ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as
gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992[2] until February 23, 1999 when they were
dismissed for abandonment of work.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims[3] and on December
28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private
respondent to pay the monetary claims.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter because it found that the petitioners had abandoned
their work, and were not entitled to backwages and separation pay.

Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was not illegal because they had
abandoned their employment but ordered the payment of money claims.

Petitioners also claim that private respondent did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners were not dismissed but had
abandoned their work.
Issues:

whether petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Ruling:

To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid cause but also enjoins
the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.[14]
It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.[15]
For a valid finding... of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-
employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by... overt
acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to work. The intent to
discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified.

an employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from his employer, for
the purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job.

The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to
work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and
instead... argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because
they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse
because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee's last... known address.[21]
Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.

that in cases involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin requirements of notice
and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the

Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing
sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil.

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights

Under the Civil Code, nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has
been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

The violation of the petitioners' right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the
payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.

Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00.
Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is further ORDERED to pay each of the petitioners the amount of
P30,000.00 as nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.

Principles:

Labor Law

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should
not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights.

SERRANO V. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES,INC.

By way of Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA).

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents)
under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with
the following terms and conditions:

Duration of contract 12 months

Position Chief Officer

Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00

Hours of work 48.0 hours per week

Overtime US$700.00 per month

Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused
to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March
19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and
seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23)
days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal
and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73.

The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding
him monetary benefits, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the dismissal of the
complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents
are hereby ordered to pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine Currency,
based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment, the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS (US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three
(3) months of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.

The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months only — rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
petitioner’s employment contract – applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate
of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary, US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed
overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per month.”

Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to question the finding of the
LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded
to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No.
8042 “does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of
the subject clause. The NLRC denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the
subject clause. After initially dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course
to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted the petition for certiorari,filed by
petitioner.

The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted
the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner brings his cause to this Court
on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way not in accord with
applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker
back wages equal to the unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three
(3) months.

Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the Court
of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay
provided in his contract since under the contract they form part of his salary.

The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme importance of the
constitutional question raised therein.

ISSUES:

Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal
dismissal
Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the computation of his
monetary award

The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed.
Likewise not disputed is the salary differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the
monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine
months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the
US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of
US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31

Arguments of the Petitioner

For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’ constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their
contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.

The Arguments of Respondents

Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be entertained, for this was belatedly
interposed by petitioner in his appeal before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was
when he filed an appeal before the NLRC.40

The Arguments of the Solicitor General

The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on July 15, 1995, its provisions
could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998 employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded
petitioner’s contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of petitioner’s
employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this was not stipulated upon by the parties.

The Court’s Ruling:

First Issue

Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and
Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction
as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to
economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar
category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be
denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like
circumstances.

Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the Court in the present case
also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect
classification prejudicial to OFWs.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a
closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious
impact on OFWs

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions
thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal
dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied
by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.

The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of
the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling
out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them
to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or
for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from
such prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of one year.

Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary awards of illegally dismissed
OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable even to local workers with fixed-term
employment.

The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise
reason that the clause violates not just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired
period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior
to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

Third Issue

Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his
contract.

Petitioner is mistaken.

The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner,
DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in
which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses;
whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in excess of the regular eight hours,
and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.

In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion of the contract is
unwarranted since the same is given during the actual service of the seamen.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the
rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26,
1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.
In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without
prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was
told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal
deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner
and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the
National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal
dismissal.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary
should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled
that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all.”
 The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of
Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of
any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws
must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,
the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision.
A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless
circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022,
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the
Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us
to revisit the precedent.

The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
FERNANDO G. MANAYA vs. ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INCORPORATED. G.R. No. 168988. June 19,
2007
December 28, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioner alleged that in 1989 he was initially hired by the respondent as a maintenance helper and was
later designated as a company electrician. He continued to work until 1998 when respondent informed
him that his services were no longer required by the company. Petitioner filed a complaint with the
Labor Arbiter contending that respondent illegally dismissed him without just cause and without due
process. The former further asserted that with his more or less nine years of service with respondent, he
had become a regular employee.

Respondent, on the other hand denied employment of petitioner and contended that the latter was
employed by First Staffing Network Corp. (FSNC) with which the respondent had an existing
memorandum of agreement (MOA). Thus, by virtue of a legitimate job contracting, petitioner, as an
employee of FSNC, came to work with the respondent.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Petitioner and held respondent and FFSNC solidarily liable with the
petitioner. Respondent filed an appeal but dismissed by NLRC for failure to perfect an appeal. In CA, the
latter reversed NLRC's decision and order the latter to give due course to respondent's appeal. Hence
this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent's appeal may be given due course and allows the relaxation of rules of procedure.

RULING:

No, the Court allowed liberal interpretation given the extraordinary circumstances that justify a
deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Absent exceptional circumstances, we adhere to the rule
that certain procedural precepts must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods for perfecting an
appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory
right and one who seeks to avail oneself of that right must comply with the statute or rules.

In this particular case, we adhere to the strict interpretation of the rule for the following reasons:

Firstly, in this case, entry of judgment had already been made which rendered the decision of the LA as
final and executory.

Secondly, it is a basic and irrefragable rule that in carrying out and in interpreting the provisions of the
Labor Code and its implementing regulations, the workingman’s welfare should be the primordial and
paramount consideration. The interpretation herein made gives meaning and substance to the liberal
and compassionate spirit of the law enunciated in Article 4 of the Labor Code that "all doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules
and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor."
In the case of Bunagan v. Sentinel, the court declared that:

The perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only mandatory, but
jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives the
appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgement, much less to entertain the appeal. The
underlying purpose of this principle is to prevent needless delay, a circumstance which would allow the
employer to wear out the efforts and meager resources of the worker to the point that the latter is
constrained to settle for less than what is due him.

The Court is aware that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be
liberal in the interpretation of rules in deciding labor cases. However, such liberality should not be
applied in the instant case as it would render futile the very purpose for which the principle of liberality
is adopted. The liberal interpretation in favor of labor stems from the mandate that the workingman's
welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.

Thirdly, respondent has not shown sufficient justification to reverse the findings of the LA as affirmed by
the NLRC.
PAL vs. NLRC G.R. No. 85985, August 13, 1993

FACTS: On March 15, 1985, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely revised its 1966 Code of
Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented without
notice and prior discussion with the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) by the
Management. Some employees were subjected to the disciplinary measures embodied therein.

On August 20, 1985, PALEA filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
unfair labor practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not the formulation of a Code of Discipline among employees is a shared
responsibility of the employer and the employees.

RULING: To achieve industrial peace, the employees must be granted their just participation in the
discussion of matters affecting their rights. It is the policy of the State to promote the enlightenment of
workers concerning their rights and obligations as employees. The New Code of Discipline containing
disciplinary measures cannot be implemented in the absence of full cooperation of the employees as it
affects their rights, duties and welfare. Management cannot exclude labor in the deliberation and
adoption of rules and regulations that will affect them. Workers have the right to participate in decision
and policy making process affecting their rights, duties and welfare.