Civil Law; Trust; Trust is the legal relationship between one having an
VOL. 504, OCTOBER 9, 67
2006
Estate of Edward Miller Grimm vs. Estate of Charles Parsons and
Patrick C. Parsons
G.R. No. 159810. October 9, 2006.*
ESTATE OF EDWARD MILLER GRIMM, represented by RAMON J.
QUISUMBING and RANDY GLEAVE LAWYER, as Judicial Administrators,
petitioners, vs. ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS and PATRICK C.
PARSONS, G-P AND COMPANY and MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB,
INC., respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; The rule that the Court will not set aside the
factual determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the evaluation of
evidence adduced during trial admits of several exceptions.—The
respondents’ formulation of the grounds for the dismissal of the instant
petition is a statement of the general rule. A resolution of the petition would
doubtless entail a review of the facts and evidentiary matters against which
the appealed decision is cast, a procedure which is ordinarily outside the
province of the Court and the office of a certiorari review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. For, the rule of long standing is that the Court will not set
aside the factual determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the
evaluation of evidence adduced during trial. This rule, however, admits of
several exceptions. Among these are when the factual conclusions of the
CA are manifestly erroneous; are contrary to those of the trial court; when
the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. Decidedly, this case falls
within the recognized exceptions to the rule on the finality of factual findings
or conclusions of the CA.
Same; Evidence; Presumptions; A presumption is prima facie proof of
the fact presumed and to the party against whom it operates rests the
burden of overthrowing by substantial and credible evidence the
presumption.—A party in whose favor a legal presumption exists may rely
on and invoke such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need
not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima
facie proof of the fact presumed and to the party against whom it operates
rests the burden of overthrowing by substantial and credible evidence the
presumption. Under the law on evidence, it is presumed that “there was
sufficient consideration for a contract.”
equitable ownership in property and another person owning the legal title to
such property, the equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the
performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the
latter; Trust relations may be express or implied.—Trust is the legal
relationship between one having an equitable ownership in property and
another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable
ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties
and the exercise of certain powers by the latter. Trust relations between
parties may be express, as when the trust is created by the intention of the
trustor. An express trust is created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed or by words evidencing an intention to
create a trust; the use of the word trust is not required or essential to its
constitution, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly intended. Implied trust
comes into existence by operation of law, either through implication of an
intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the
trust irrespective of, and even contrary to any such intention.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quisumbing, Torres for petitioners.
Manuel O. Chan Law Offices for Manila Golf & Country Club,
Incorporated.
Blanco Law Firm and Feria, Feria, Lao, Tantoco co-counsels for
respondents Estate of Charles Parsons, Patrick Parsons and G-P & Co.
GARCIA, J.:
Because legal and situational ambiguities often lead to disagreements even
between or amongst the most agreeable of persons, it behooves all
concerned to put their financial affairs and proprietary interests in order
before they depart for the great beyond. Leaving legal loose ends hanging
or allowing clouds to remain on property titles when one can do something
about them before the proverbial thief in the night suddenly comes calling
only opens the door to bruising legal fights and similar distracting
inconveniences. So it was here.
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Estate
of Edward Miller Grimm, represented by its judicial administrators, assails
and seeks to set aside the Decision1 dated September 8, 2003 of the Court
1
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69990, reversing an earlier decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in its Civil Case No. 92-2452.
At the core of the controversy is a stock certificate of the Manila Golf &
Country Club, Inc. (“MGCC” or the “Club”, for short) covered
by Membership Certificate (MC) No. 1088 for 100 units, the playing rights
over which the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), the
court-appointed receiver, had, in the meantime, leased out. The Club
issued MC No. 1088 to replace MC No. 590. Asserting clashing ownership
claims over MC No.1088, albeit recorded in the name of Charles Parsons
(“Parsons,” hereinafter) are petitioner Estate of Edward Miller Grimm and
respondent G-P and Company (“G-P & Co.,” hereinafter).
Parsons and Edward Miller Grimm (Grimm), together with Conrado Y.
Simon (Simon), formed in 1952 a partnership for the stated purpose of
engaging in the import/export and real estate business. Per SEC Certificate
#3305,2 the partnership was registered under the name G-P and
Company.
Before September 1964, Parsons and Grimm each owned proprietary
membership share in MGCC,3 as evidenced by MC No. 374 for 100 units in
the name of Parsons, and MC No. 590, also for 100 units, in the name of
Grimm. Per records, the Club issued MC No. 590 to Grimm on May 25,
1960.4
After Grimm’s demise on November 27, 1977, Parsons and Simon
continued with the partnership under the same name, G-P and Company,
as reflected in Articles of Partnership dated December 14, 1977.5 The
articles of the partnership would later undergo another amendment to admit
Parsons’ son, Patrick, in the partnership.6 After Parsons died on May 12,
1988, Amended Articles of Partnership of G-P and Company was executed
on September 23, 1988 by and among Parsons’ heirs, namely, Patrick,
Michael, Peter and Jose, all surnamed Parsons, albeit the amendment
appeared to have been registered with the SEC only on March 18, 1993.7
The herein legal dispute started when brothers Patrick and Jose, both
surnamed Parsons, responding to a letter8 from the Estate of Grimm,
rejected the existence of a trust arrangement between their father and
Grimm involving MC No. 1088. Thus spurned, the Estate of Grimm filed on
August 31, 1992 before the RTC of Makati City, a suit for recovery of MC
No. 1088 with damages against the Estate of Parsons, Patrick Parsons and
MGCC. In its complaint,9 docketed as Civil Case No. 92-2452 and
eventually raffled to Branch 135 of the court, the Estate of Grimm,
represented by its judicial administrator, Ramon J. Quisumbing, alleged,
among other things, the following:
. “1.That on September 7, 1964, Grimm transferred MC No. 590 in
trust to Parsons; on the same day, MGCC cancelled MC No. 590
and issued MC No. 1088 in the name of Parsons;
. 2.That in separate letters dated February 28, 1968 addressed to
MGCC, both Grimm and Parsons stated that the transfer of MC No.
590 was temporary. Enclosed in that Parsons’ letter was MC No.
1088 which he was turning over for safekeeping to the Club, thru
E.C. Von Kauffmann and Romeo Alhambra, then MGCC honorary
secretary and assistant manager, respectively;
. 3.That on June 9, 1978, or after Mr. Kauffman’s death and Mr.
Alhambra’s resignation, MGCC turned over the possession of MC
No. 1088 to Parsons;
. 4.That in 1977, Grimm died; after a protracted proceedings, his
estate was finally settled in 1988, the year Parsons also died;
. 5.That Patrick and Jose Parsons had, when reminded of the trust
arrangement between their late father and Grimm, denied the
existence of a trust over the Club share and refused to return the
same; and
. 6.That MGCC had refused, despite demands, to cancel MC No.
1088 and issue a new certificate in the name of the Estate of
Grimm.”
Attached to the complaint were the demand letters and other
communications which, to the Estate of Grimm, document the
Grimm-Parsons trust arrangement.
In his Answer with counterclaim,10 Patrick Parsons averred that his
father was, with respect to MC No. 1088, a mere trustee of the true owner
thereof, G-P & Co., and alleged, by way of affirmative defense, that the
claim set forth in the complaint is unenforceable, barred inter alia by the
dead man’s statute, prescription or had been waived or abandoned.
Herein respondent G-P & Co., echoing Patrick Parsons’ allegation
respecting the ownership of MC No. 1088, moved to intervene and to
implead Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC), as transfer agent of MGCC,
2
as defendant-in-intervention. Attached to its motion was its COMPLAINT In
Intervention11 therein alleging (a) that on September 1, 1964, Parsons
executed a Letter of Trust, infra, in which he acknowledged the beneficial
ownership of G-P & Co. over MC No. 374 and MC No.1088; (b) that
Parsons, as required by the partnership, endorsed both certificates in blank;
and (c) that G-P & Co. carried said certificates amongst its assets in its
books of accounts and financial statements and paid the monthly dues of
both certificates to the Club when its membership privileges were not
temporarily assigned to others. In the same complaint-in-intervention, G-P
& Co. cited certain tax incidents as reasons why the transfer of MC No. 374
and MC No. 1088 from Parsons to the intervenor-partnership cannot as yet
be accomplished.
After the usual reply and answer to counterclaims had been filed, the
Estate of Grimm filed an amended complaint to include Randy Gleave
Lawyer, the other judicial co-administrator, as representative of the Estate.
On April 28, 1993, the trial court admitted the amended complaint.
After a lengthy trial, the trial court rendered its May 29, 2000
judgment12 finding for the Estate of Grimm, as plaintiff a quo, disposing as
follows:
. “1.Ordering defendants ESTATE OF CHARLES PARSONS and
PATRICK C. PARSONS:
. 1.1to turn over [MC] No. 1088 to plaintiff ESTATE OF EDWARD
MILLER GRIMM;
. 1.2jointly and severally to pay damages to plaintiff ESTATE …in the
amount of P400,000.00 per annum from September 8, 1989 to
November 12, 1998, with legal interest thereon from the date of this
Decision until fully paid;
. 1.3Jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff ESTATE … attorney’s fees
in the amount of P1,000,000.00 and the costs;
. 2.Ordering defendant [MGCC] and defendant-in-intervention
[FEBTC] to cancel [MC] No. 1088 and to issue a new Membership
Certificate in lieu thereof in the name of plaintiff ESTATE ….
. 3.Ordering Receiver RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING
CORPORATION to turn over to plaintiff ESTATE … all income
derived from the lease of the playing rights of [MC] No. 1088, less
Receiver’s fees and charges.
. 4.Ordering the dismissal of the counterclaim of the defendants …
[Parsons]; and
. 5.Ordering the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention and the
supplemental counterclaim of intervenor G-P AND COMPANY.
SO ORDERED.” (Words in bracket added.)
In gist, the trial court predicated its ruling on the postulate that the
temporary transfer of Grimm’s original share in MGCC—covered by MC No.
590 whence MC No. 1088 descended—to Parsons, created a trust
relationship between the two.
Therefrom, only herein respondents G-P & Co., Patrick Parsons and the
Parsons Estate appealed to the CA, albeit MGCC would, in its brief,
reiterate its readiness to issue the corresponding replacement certificate to
whosoever is finally adjudged owner of MC No. 1088.
On September 8, 2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 69990, the appellate court
rendered its herein assailed Decision,13 disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision of the lower court dated May 29, 2000 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one rendered:
. 1.Dismissing the complaint filed by … Estate of Edward Miller
Grimm for lack of merit;
. 2.Ordering … Manila Golf and Country Club, Inc., and
defendant-in-intervention Far East Bank & Trust Company, as
transfer agent, to immediately effect the reconveyance of [MC] No.
1088 to Intervenor-appellant G-P and Company;
. 3.Ordering Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation, as receiver, to
immediately turn over to intervenor-appellant G-P and Company all
income derived from the lease of the playing rights of said
Membership Certificate, less receiver’s fees;
3
 . 4.Ordering [the] … Estate of Edward Miller Grimm to pay appellants
the amount of P800,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
. 5.Ordering … Estate of Edward Miller Grimm to pay appellants the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.” (Words in bracket added.)
Hence, this petition for review on the lone submission that the CA erred
in finding that respondent G-P & Co. is the beneficial owner of MC No.
1088.
In their comment to the petition, the respondents urge the outright
dismissal thereof on the ground that it raises only purely factual and
evidentiary issues which are beyond the office of an appeal by certiorari. As
argued further, the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties.
It should be made clear right off that respondent Patrick Parsons, in his
individual capacity, and the Estate of Parsons (collectively, the Parsons)
are not claiming beneficial ownership over MC No. 1088. The same goes
for respondent MGCC which went to state on record that “[T]he ownership
of [MC] No. 1088 (previously No. 590) does not belong to the Club and it
does not stand to gain … from the determination of its real owner.”14
We GRANT the petition.
The respondents’ formulation of the grounds for the dismissal of the instant
petition is a statement of the general rule. A resolution of the petition would
doubtless entail a review of the facts and evidentiary matters against which
the appealed decision is cast, a procedure which is ordinarily outside the
province of the Court and the office of a certiorari review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. For, the rule of long standing is that the Court will not set
aside the factual determinations of the CA lightly nor will it embark in the
evaluation of evidence adduced during trial. This rule, however, admits of
several exceptions. Among these are when the factual conclusions of the
CA are manifestly erroneous; are contrary to those of the trial court; when
the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.15 Decidedly, this case falls
within the recognized exceptions to the rule on the finality of factual findings
or conclusions of the CA.
The principal issue tendered in this case turns on who between
petitioner Estate of Grimm and respondent G.P. & Co. beneficially owns
MC No. 1088. Corollary thereto - owing to the presentation by respondents
of a LETTER OF TRUST that Parsons allegedly executed in favor of G-P
and Company with respect to MC No. 1088 - is the question of whether or
not the transfer of MC No. 590 effected on September 7, 1964 by Grimm in
favor of Parsons resulted, as the petitioner would have it, in the formation of
a trust relation between the two. Thus formed, the trust relationship would
preclude the trustee from disposing of the trust property, save when
repudiation of the trust had effectively supervened.
The trial court found the September 7, 1964 Grimm- to-Parsons
certificate transfer to be only temporary and without valuable consideration
to accommodate a third person and thus adjudged Grimm to be the real
owner of MC No. 590, as later replaced by MC No. 1088. According to the
trial court, such transfer created a trust, with Parsons, as trustee, and
Grimm, as the beneficial owner of the share thus transferred, adding that
Parsons, as mere trustee, is without right to transfer the replacement
certificate to G-P & Co.
On the other hand, the CA, while eschewing the alternative affirmative
defenses interposed below by respondents, nonetheless ruled for
respondent G—P & Co. Citing Article 1448 of the Civil Code,16 the
appellate court held that respondent G—P & Co. pertains the beneficial
ownership of MC No. 1088, an implied trust in its favor having been created
when MC No. 590 and MC No. 374 were acquired for and placed in the
names of Grimm and Parsons, respectively, albeit the partnership paid for
the price therefor. To the appellate court, the fact that these certificates
were carried, as of December 31, 1974, November 27, 1977 and December
31, 1978 in the books17 of G-P & Co. as investment assets only proves one
thing: the company paid the acquisition costs for the membership
certificates. If Grimm was the real owner of said share, he should have,
according to the appellate court, objected to its inclusion in the partnership
assets during his lifetime. Completing its ratiocination, the CA wrote:
“x x x. A trust, which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes
on another especially between the partners and the company, does not
lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document.
The transfer therefore of Grimm’s [MC] No. 590 on September 7, 1964 in
favor of Charles Parsons resulted merely in the change of the person of
trustee but not of the beneficial owner, the G-P and Company.”
The CA’s ruling does not commend itself for acceptance. As it were, the
assailed decision started on the wrong foot and thus had to limp all along to
arrive at a strained and erroneous conclusion. We shall explain.
4
A party in whose favor a legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce
evidence to prove that fact. For, a presumption is prima facie proof of the
fact presumed and to the party against whom it operates rests the burden of
over-throwing by substantial and credible evidence the
presumption.18 Under the law on evidence, it is presumed that “there was
sufficient consideration for a contract.”19
Inasmuch as Grimm’s name appeared on MC No. 590 as registered
owner thereof, he is deemed to have paid sufficient consideration for it.
The onus of proving otherwise would fall on respondents G-P & Co. and/or
the Parsons. Without so much of an explanation, however, the CA
minimized the value of MC No. 590 as arguably the best evidence of
ownership. Corollarily, the appellate court devalued the rule on legal
presumption and faulted petitioner Estate of Grimm for not presenting
evidence to prove that Grimm paid for his original acquisition of MC No. 590.
Wrote the CA:
“Contrary to the findings of the lower court, [petitioner] failed to establish [its]
right over the said shares. x x x Not a single evidence of proof of payment
for the said shares was ever presented by the [petitioner] to establish
ownership.” (Words in bracket added.)20
Ironically, while the CA held it against the petitioner for failing to adduce
proof of payment by Grimm for his MC No. 590, it nonetheless proceeded to
declare respondent G-P & Co. to be the beneficial owner of said certificate
even if it, too, had not presented proof for such payment. Respondent G-P
& Co., in its complaint-in-intervention (should have been
answer-in-intervention), did not allege paying for MC No. 590. Surely,
payment cannot be validly deduced, as the CA did, from the bare fact of
such membership certificate being listed in the books of respondent G-P &
Co. as partnership investment assets. For one, the self-serving book
entries in question are, as correctly dismissed by the trial court, not
evidentiary of ownership. Else, anyone can lay a claim, or worse, acquire
ownership over a share of stock by the simple expedience of
listing, without more, the same in the partnership or corporate books. The
sheer absurdity of the notion need no belaboring.
For another, what appears or what respondent company uniformly
entered as investments are: “Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. 2 shares.” No
reference was made whatsoever in the books or financial statements about
MC No. 590, (MC. No. 1088) and MC. No. 374. In the absence of the
number reference or other similar identifying details, the CA’s categorical
conclusion that one of the “2 shares” referred to is MC No. 1088 is at best
speculative. This observation becomes all the more valid given that Michael
Parsons had in his name two (2) Club share certificates. Exhibit “X-4,” a
September 21, 1964 letter from Parsons to Mr. Kaufmann made specific
reference to Michael’s shares:
“Under the circumstance, please disregard … the previous letter which
Michael wrote in connection with the shares in his name ….
In the case of the two shares in the name of Michael, please leave the
two in his name . . . .
As matter now stands, in summary, I shall retain my shares in my name
and continue playing under such shares; Michael will retain two shares …
assigning one to Mr. Stoner; and Pete Grimm will assign his playing rights
to Mr. Daikichi Yoshida.”21
And for a significant third, respondent G-P & Co. is not the same G-P & Co.
that Parsons, Grimm and Simon organized in 1952, the former being an
entity that came into existence only on September 23, 1988. It is thus
well-nigh impossible for respondent company to have participated in a
transaction that occurred years before it acquired juridical personality. In
the concrete, it is not physically possible for respondent G-P & Co. to have
paid the price for the purchase of Grimm’s MC No. 590, the same having
been acquired in 1960 or some 28 years
before the respondent company was established by the execution of the
Articles of Partnership on September 23, 1988. The trial court depicted the
incongruity of the situation in the following fashion:
“Intervenor [respondent G-P & Co.] is not the same partnership originally
formed by Grimm, Parsons and Simon. When Grimm died on November 27,
1977, the original partnership was dissolved. The death of a partner causes
dissolution of a partnership [Article 1829, Civil Code]. A new partnership
was formed with Parsons and Simon as partners. Besides this new
partnership formed after the death of Grimm, there were five (5) others
formed [Exhibit “DD,” “EE,” “FF,” “GG,” “HH” and “II”] carrying the name,
G-P and Company.”22 (Words in bracket in the original)
Independent of the cited Article 1829 of the Civil Code on the matter of
partnership dissolution, however, it bears to state that Parsons and Simon
executed on December 13, 1977 a joint affidavit23 wherein they declared
the dissolution of the original 3-man G-P & Co., owing to the death of
Grimm. The registration on December 14, 1977 of a new Articles of
5
Partnership of G-P & Co. followed the execution by Parsons and Simon of
said affidavit.24
It may be, as respondents rationalize, that the succeeding G-P & Co.
partnerships merely continued with the business started by the original G-P
& Co.25 This element of continuity, assuming to be true, does not, however,
detract from the fact that the partnerships of the same name formed after
Grimm’s demise are entities altogether different and with personalities
distinct from the original partnership.
This brings us to the next issue of whether or not the transfer to Parsons
of MC No. 590, as replaced by MC No. 1088, partook of the nature of a trust
transaction.
Trust is the legal relationship between one having an equitable ownership
in property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the
equitable ownership of the former entitling him to the performance of certain
duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter.26 Trust relations
between parties may be express, as when the trust is created by the
intention of the trustor.27 An express trust is created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed or by words evidencing
an intention to create a trust; the use of the word trust is not required or
essential to its constitution, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended.28Implied trust comes into existence by operation of law, either
through implication of an intention to create a trust as a matter of law or
through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to any
such intention.29
Judging from their documented acts immediately before and subsequent
to the actual transfer on September 7, 1964 of MC No. 590, Parsons, as
transferee, and Grimm, as transferor, indubitably contemplated a trust
arrangement. Consider:
There can be no quibbling, owing to the letter exchanges between the Club,
in particular its Honorary Secretary E. C. Von Kauffman, and Parsons, that
the reason Grimm transferred his MC No. 590 to Parsons was because of
the latter’s wish to accommodate one Daikichi Yoshida. Earlier, Parsons
recommended to Club management the approval of Mr. Yoshida’s
“Application For Waiting List Eligible To [Club] Proprietary
Membership.”30 In a letter of August 10, 196431 to the MGCC’s Board of
Directors, Parsons endorsed the application of Yoshida as Club member.
While the Club’s response does not appear in its files, it is quite apparent
that Parsons addressed a letter to Kauffman requesting that Yoshida be
taken in as a Company assignee. In his reply-letter32 of August 29, 1964,
Kauffman explained why he cannot, under Club rules, favorably act on
Parsons’ specific request, but suggested a viable solution, as follows:
Reference to your letter dated August 25th there is a hitch … of assigning
the playing rights to Mr. Daikichi Yoshida, as a company assignee.
xxx xxx xxx
The only solution that I see is that you transfer Pete Grimm’s 100 units to
your name and leave the other 100 units in your name, then you may
assign the playing rights of one of the certificates for 100 units to Mr.
Yoshida. Mr. Yoshida was approved by the Board but not as a Company
assignee. (Emphasis added.)
Parsons’ response to Kauffman’s August 29, 1964 letter partly reads as
follows:
Thank you for your letter of the 29th …. Under the circumstances, please
disregard the previous letter which I wrote with reference to Pete Grimm’s
and my shares ….
xxx xxx xxx
As matter now stands, in summary, I shall retain in my name and
continue playing under such shares …. And Pete Grimm will assign his
playing rights to Mr. Daikichi Yoshida.
The conclusion easily deductible from the foregoing exchanges is that,
given existing Club restrictions, the simplest way to accommodate and
qualify Yoshida for Club membership was for Grimm to transfer his 100-unit
share to Parsons who will then assign the playing rights of that share to
Yoshida.33 The RTC aptly described the relevant factual situation, viz.:
“With these exchanges between Parsons and Kauffman …, it is apparent
that since the shares held by Parsons and Grimm are individual shares and
not company shares, their shares may not be assigned …. The proposal of
Parsons that “Pete Grimm will assign his playing rights to … Yoshida” was
rejected by Kauffman in his letter dated September 5, 1964 [Exhibit X-5/27]
that “Pete Grimm’s assignment to him (Yoshida) cannot be made as the
rules are that only members who holds (sic) 200 units may assign 100 units
to an individual.” A letter of the same date … [Exhibit X-6/28] was sent by
Kauffman to Mr. Yoshida informing him of his election to the Club
apologizing for the delay …. Kauffman wrote further “ … Mr. Charles
6
Parsons has made arrangement for to play (sic) as assignee of extra
membership which he now holds.”
The election of Yoshida as assignee of a proprietary member and the
resignation of Grimm were approved by the Club’s Board… on August 27,
1964. Kauffman and Parsons were still discussing the ways … Mr Yoshida
can be accommodated … as of September 5, 1964, but the resignation of
Grimm and election of Yoshida was already approved … more than a week
before.”34 (Words in bracket in the original; Italics added.)
Even on the above factual perspective alone, it is not difficult to
characterize, as did the trial court, the certificate transfer from Grimm to
Parsons, as temporary, there being no evidence whatsoever that the
transfer was for value. Such transfer was doubtless meant only to
accommodate Yoshida whose stay in the country was obviously temporary.
As it were, Yoshida’s application35for Club membership juxtaposed with
the August 10, 1964 endorsement-letter36 of Parsons, yielded the
information that he (Yoshida) is the manager of the Manila Liaison Office of
Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha desiring to acquire Company membership in the
name of his employer Mitsubishi to enable future representatives to avail
themselves of Club facilities. Since Club membership did not seem possible
at the time, Yoshida had to come in as an assignee of a proprietary
member.
Other compelling evidence attest to the temporary nature of the transfer
in question. The trial court cited two in its Decision. Wrote that court:
Even a witness for the (respondents) intervenor and the Parsons, Celso
Jamias, Chief Accountant of G-P and Company, confirmed that the transfer
of the share to Parsons was temporary. In a letter [Exhibit “7-GG”] dated 10
August 1991 addressed to Atty. Patricia Cecilia B. Bisda, counsel for G-P
and Company, Jamais wrote:
“. . . please be informed that the accommodation for Mr. Yoshida to have
playing rights has not bearing on the ownership of the share. The share
of …Grimm (EMG) was transferred to Mr. Charles Parsons (CP) to
accommodate Mr. Yoshida due to Manila Golf club requirements.
Atty. Patricia Cecilia B. Bisda …echoed the view of Jamias, in a letter
[Exhibit “Y”] dated 30 August 1991 addressed to … (the) then General
Manager of the Club: She wrote:
“Also, we would like to clarify …. That the accommodation of Mr. Yoshida to
enjoy the playing rights has no bearing to the ownership of the shares. The
share of Edward Grimm was transferred to Charles Parsons to
accommodate D. Yoshida due to club requirements.”37
Any lingering doubt, however, as to the temporary nature of the
Grimm-to-Parsons transfer should, in our view, be put to rest by what
MGCC records-file contained and the testimony of its former records
custodian, Romeo Alhambra. In his affidavit of May 12, 1989,38 Alhambra
stated that “[A]ccording to Club records, the transfer of [MC] # 580 was only
temporary, and that Mr. Grimm was and, according to club records, is in
fact the owner of [MC] # 1088” and that after the transfer, “Mr. Charles
Parsons endorsed the share certificate and turned it over to …
Kauffmann … for safekeeping.” Forming parts of the same records were
letters both dated February 28, 1968—the day the share certificate transfer
was effected—separately submitted by Grimm and Parsons, to inform
MGCC of the temporary nature of the transfer. In his letter, Grimm stated
that MC No. 1088 “is still my property and I wish it recorded as such in the
Club’s file.”39 Parsons’ letter40 was just as simple as it was revealing, thus:
“Reference to the transfer of [MC] #590 in the name of Mr. E.M. Grimm to
my name, for which I now have the new Certification No. 1088 …, please
be advised that this transfer was made on a temporary basis and that said
new certificate is still the property of Mr. E.M. Grimm and I enclose the
certificate duly endorsed by me for safekeeping.”
At bottom then, documented events immediately before and after the
February 28, 1968 share certificate conveyance in question veritably
confirm the trust arrangement Parsons had or intended to have with Grimm
and vice versa, vis-á-vis MC No. 1088. If, as herein respondent G-P & Co.
posits at every turn, Parsons was its trustee, then the latter’s act of
endorsing MC No. 1088 in blank and then delivering the same to the Club
for safekeeping instead of directly to the G-P & Co. was without sense.
The trial court correctly described the relationship that was formed
between Grimm and Parsons, and the consequence of such relationship,
as follows:
“Since the transfer of Grimm’s share to Parsons was temporary, a trust was
created with Parsons as the trustee, and Grimm, the beneficial owner of the
share. The duties of trustees have been said, in general terms, to be: “to
protect and preserve the trust property, and to see to it that it is employed
solely for the benefit of the cestui que trust.” x x x Parsons as a mere
trustee, it is not within his rights to transfer the share to G-P and Company
(sic).
7
The Court has, to be sure, considered the Letter of
Trust41 dated September 1, 1964 largely because, in respondents’ own
words, it “provides the answer to the question of who the real owner of MC
#1088 is.”42 In the Letter he purportedly signed, Parsons declared holding
MC No. 374 and MC No. 1088 as “NOMINEE IN TRUST for and in behalf of
G-P AND COMPANY … or its nominee.” This piece of document is not,
however, a winning card for the respondents. The trial court mentioned two
compelling reasons why not, both reasons bearing on the due execution
and genuineness of the document. Wrote the court:
This “LETTER OF TRUST” was purportedly signed by Parsons
on September 1, 1964. But the transfer of [MC] No. 590 was recorded (and
MC No. 1088 issued) only on September 7, 1964 in the Club’s Proprietary
Membership Card No. 144 [Exhibit “8”]. With the testimony of Celso B.
Jamias, a long time employee of G-P and Company, the doubt as to the
genuineness of the signature of Parsons on the “LETTER OF TRUST” was
brought to light. Jamias was cross-examined on the signatures of Parsons
on several documents including the signature of the LETTER OF TRUST”:
Q: How about the signature appearing on Exhibit “CC-1” …?
A: This is Charles Parsons, sir.
Q: You are familiar with the signature?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I’m showing you Exhibit “I” which is a letter of trust dated
September 1, 1964, comparing those signatures
which you identified above the printed name C. Parsons there are,
two signatures, the signatures you identified earlier and the one
appearing on the letter of trust are similar in the sense that the “s”
of Parsons is elevated and it slopes down, is that correct?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Based on how I see, this doesn’t seem to be the signature of
Parsons, it looks like but it is not, sir. [TSN, May 4, 1999, pp. 5-6].
(Words in parenthesis added.)
And lest it be overlooked, Parsons had previously acknowledged Grimm to
be the owner of MC No. 1088, after his earlier repeated declarations that
the transfer of the replaced MC No. 580 was temporary. Parsons was thus
in contextually in estoppel to deny, thru the Letter of Trust aforementioned,
hypothetically assuming its authenticity, Grimm’s ownership of the
replacement certificate.
Summing up, the Court finds the evidence adduced and admitted by the
trial court more than adequately supporting a conclusion that MC No. 1088
was issued to and held by Parsons as the trustee thereof of Grimm or his
estate. The fact that respondent G-P & Co. may have paid, starting 1992,
as evidence discloses, the membership fees due on MC No. 1088 does not
make Grimm less of a beneficial owner. Such payment, needless to stress,
is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
Parenthetically, the CA is observed to have said that in the settlement of
the estate of Parsons, MC No. 1088 was not included in the list of stocks
owned by him. And from this inconsequential event, the appellate court
would conclude that the estate administrator recognized Parsons to be a
mere trustee of such certificate. While the decision does quite say so, the
implication is that Parsons was the trustee of G-P & Co.
We cannot agree with this non sequitur approach which, at bottom, clearly
tends to lower the evidentiary bar for respondents. Needless to stress, it is
not for the CA and all courts for that matter to compensate for a burden of
proof not discharged or a quantum of evidence not met.
The Court cannot, for two reasons, also lend cogency to the CA’s
observation that the heirs of Grimm may have had waived, abandoned or
denounced their rights to the trust property when, for P100,000.00, they
executed a Deed of Acknowledgment of Satisfaction of Partnership
Interests.43 Firstly, the deed, as a quitclaim instrument, did not mention
any share certificate at all, which is only logical since MC No. 1088 was not
a partnership asset in the first place. Secondly, the intention to waive a
known right must be clear and unequivocal. In this case, the intent to
renounce beneficial ownership of MC No. 1088 cannot reasonably be
drawn from the tenor of the quitclaim document. For perspective, what the
heirs of Grimm stated in the Deed of Acknowledgment is that the amount of
P100,000.00 they received “represents the total liquidation and complete
settlement … of the entire partnership interests pertaining to the late
Edward Miller Grimm as partner in G-P AND COMPANY.” If, to borrow
from Thompson v. Court of Appeals,44 we apply the standard norm on how
a waiver must be formulated, then clearly the general terms of the
aforementioned deed merely indicate a clearance from general
accountability, not specifically an abandonment of ownership of the
disputed share. For:
8
 “x x x. Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and effective must, in
the first place, be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no
doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him. x x x A waiver may not be attributed to a person when the
terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a
right vested in such person. If we apply the standard rule that waiver must
be cast in clear and unequivocal terms, then clearly the general terms of the
cited release and quitclaim indicates merely a clearance from general
accountability, not specifically a waiver of Amcham’s beneficial ownership
of the disputed shares.”45
In all, the facts and circumstances attendant militate against the CA’s
finding pointing to G-P & Co. as the beneficial owner of MC No. 1088. What
the evidence adduced instead proved beyond cavil is that Grimm or his
estate is such owner. We therefore reverse.
WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City in Civil Case No. 92-2452 is REINSTATED.
Costs against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[No. 3636. August 29, 1907.]
FREDERICK GARFIELD WAITE, plaintiff and appellee, vs.JAMES J.
PETERSON ET AL., defendants and appellants.
. 1.WRONGFUL TAKING OF PROPERTY; SALE OR
TRANSFER; ACTION BY THE TRANSFEREE.—When the
property of one person is unlawfully taken by another, the former
has a right of action against the latter for the recovery of the
property or for damages for the taking or retention, and he is
entitled to his choice of these two remedies. This is also a right
which may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property,
and the transferee can maintain either action against the
wrongdoer.
. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SHERIFF.—When,
however, the owner seeks to make the sheriff responsible for such
wrongful act he must, in order to preserve his right against the
sheriff, comply with the provisions of section 451 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
. 3.LEVY UPON PROPERTY; RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
CREDITOR.—If a sheriff levies upon property at the instance of a
creditor and is indemnified by the latter, the creditor is
thenceforward liable for the acts of the sheriff with respect to the
property.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, for appellants.
Frederick Garfield Waite, in his own-behalf.
WILLARD, J.:
The appellant (Kwong We Shing) has not caused the proof in this case to
be brought here. The only question therefore is whether the facts admitted
in the pleadings and those found by the court below in its decision sustain
the judgment appealed from. That court found among other things as
follows:
"From the evidence presented at the trial, the court finds that on
December 8, 1905, one Henry Manheim delivered to L. K. Tiao Eng a
diamond ring on consignment for 800 pesos, to be returned, if not sold, in
sixty days; that on the 22d day of January, 1906, while the ring was in the
possession of L. K. Tiao Eng, the defendant, as sheriff of Manila, levied
upon the said ring; that on the 23d day of January, 1906, the
aforementioned Henry Manheim, for value received, assigned all his right to
and interest in said ring to the said plaintiff herein; that on the 25th day of
January, 1906, the plaintiff made demand upon the sheriff of Manila, who
had made the levy, as before said, for the said ring, and alleged the value
thereof to be 800 pesos; that the sheriff was indemnified by the judgment
creditor, in whose favor the levy had been made, as provided by law, and
retained possession of the ring and sold the same at public sale; that the
said Henry Manheim has never been paid for the said ring, in accordance
with the terms of the contract hereinbefore mentioned or any part thereof;
that at the time of the levy by the sheriff upon the said ring, as before stated,
the said Henry Manheim was the owner of and entitled to possession of the
said ring; that while the ring was in the possession of the sheriff the said
Henry Manheim transferred his ownership and right to possession of said
9
ring to plaintiff herein and that the plaintiff thereupon became the owner and
entitled to possession of said ring."
Judgment was rendered against both of the defendants for the return of
the ring, and, if that could not be had, for the sum of 725 pesos, with
interest, and costs.
I. The appellant claims that by the terms of section 451 of the Code of
Civil Procedure this action can not be maintained by the plaintiff because
he was not the owner of the ring at the time the levy was made. In other
words, as we understand it, his claim is that no action for the value of the
property taken can be maintained except by the person who was the owner
thereof at the time it was seized by the sheriff. We do not think that this
contention can be sustained. Said section 451 is as follows:
"Claims by third persons to property levied on.—Property levied on can
be claimed by a third person as his property, by a written claim, verified by
the oath of such claimant, setting out his title thereto, his right to possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such title, and served upon the governor, or
his deputy, or officer making the levy. The officer in such case is not bound
to keep the property, unless the plaintiff, or the person in whose favor the
writ of execution runs, on demand, indemnify the officer against such claim
by an obligation, signed by the plaintiff, with good and sufficient .surety, and
no claim to such property shall be valid against the officer, or shall be
received or be notice of any rights against him, unless made as herein
provided; but nothing herein contained shall prevent such third person from
vindicating his claim to the property by any proper action."
The vice in the argument of the appellant consists in the fact that be
assumes that section 451 is the only law which gives the plaintiff a right of
action against the sheriff, and that if be is not included within that section,
he can not maintain any action. This is manifestly erroneous. So far from
being the origin of any rights on the part of the owner of property wrongfully
taken by the sheriff, it is rather a limitation upon his rights previously
'existing. If property of a person is taken by the sheriff upon an execution
against another person, the sheriff is liable therefor in the absence of
statute, as any private person would be. When one's property is wrongfully
taken by another, the former has a right of action against the person who
interfered with his property, either for the recovery of the property itself or
for damages for its taking, and he has his choice of these remedies. If
section 451 did not exist, by the general principles of the law the sheriff
would always be responsible for wrongfully taking the property of another
For the purpose of limiting the responsibility of the sheriff in such cases,
and to provide that some notice should be given to him of the claims of third
persons. this section requires such third persons to make such claims in
writing, so that the sheriff, after the notice is given to him, can decide for
himself whether he will proceed with the levy or abandon the property.
The right of action given by the general principles of law to the person
whose property has wrongfully been taken from him, either to recover
damages or the possession of the property, is a right which can be
transferred by him, and his transferee can maintain either one of these
actions against the wrongdoer. On this first claim of the appellant, then, the
only question is whether this section 451 has taken away from the assignee
of the owner his right to maintain an action to recover the value of the
property.
An examination of the section will show that there is no distinct statement
therein, that the claim can only be made by a person who was the owner of
the property at the time the levy was made. As the section is written, we do
not think that it should be so construed. Such a construction would, in case
of the involuntary transfer of rights, deprive the transferee of actions which
might be absolutely necessary to him for the protection of his interests. If
we so construed the section, we should have to hold that if the owner of the
property died the day after the levy his executor or administrator would
have no right to make a claim against the sheriff for the return of the
property and would be deprived of an action against the sheriff for the
recovery of damages for such wrongful taking, The same rule would have
to be made if an order in bankruptcy was passed against the owner of the
property the day after the levy. We do not think that the section requires any
such construction.
II. It is further claimed by the appellant that in no event should judgment
have been entered against him—that is to say, against Kwong We Shing. It
will be noticed that the court found that the sheriff was indemnified by the
judgment creditor. This statement is sufficient to make the judgment
creditor liable for the acts of the sheriff. In the case of Lovejoy vs. Murray (3
Wall. U. S., 1) the court said, at page 9:
"The demand for indemnity, and the giving of it by the defendants,
proceeded upon the supposition that the sheriff would without it go no
further in that direction, but would give up the property to the claimant, the
present plaintiff, and make his peace on the best terms be could. By the
present statute of lowa he had a right to do this, if the plaintiff in attachment
refused to assume the hazard of indemnifying him. And if there were no
such statute, he had a right to deliver the property to the claimant, and risk
a suit by the plaintiff in attachment rather than a contest with a rightful
claimant of the goods.
10
 "The giving of the bond by the present defendants must, therefore, be
held equivalent to a personal interference in the course of the proceeding,
by- directing or requesting the sheriff to hold the goods as if they were the
property of the defendants in attachment. In doing this they assumed the
direction and control of the sheriff's future action, so far as it might
constitute a trespass, and they became to that extent the principals, and he
their agent in the transaction. This made them responsible for the
continuance of the wrongful possession and for the sale and conversion of
the goods; in other words, for all the real damages which plaintiff
sustained."
The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant, Kwong We Shing. So ordered.
G.R. No. 161758. June 8, 2007.*
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its
SCHOOL’S DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, petitioner, vs. CELSO OÑATE,
respondent.
State Immunity; An unincorporated government agency, such as the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports can be sued without its
permission as a result of its being privy to a Deed of Donation over a
disputed property.—We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its
permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of Donation executed
by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it
voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from
it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary
citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It
has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor
of non-suability of the State.
Same; Parties; In a situation involving a contract between a
government department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines
need not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it
is assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter into such
contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be
sued in its name.—The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the
Philippines is likewise resolved in the negative. While it is true that
petitioner is an unincorporated government agency, and as such technically
requires the Republic of the Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against
the former, nonetheless, considering our resolution of the main issue below,
this issue is deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift
such procedural technicality in order to finally resolve the long litigation this
case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said issue,
we will arrive at the same ruling. The Republic of the Philippines need not
be impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that
it impliedly gave its approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the
Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a contract between a government
department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be
impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed
that the authority granted to such department to enter into such contract
carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its
name.
Laches; Elements; Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to
any judicial remedies.—Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which—by the
exercise of due diligence—could or should have been done earlier. Verily,
laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies. Its
elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint
seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the
right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is
not held barred.
Same; Evidence; Laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its
elements must be proved positively—laches is evidentiary in nature which
could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not
be resolved in a motion to dismiss.—In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty
Corporation, 409 SCRA 306 (2003), we held that “[t]hough laches applies
even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively.
Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere
allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss
(emphases supplied).” In the same vein, we explained in Santiago v. Court
of Appeals, 278 SCRA 98 (1997), that there is “no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances.”
Same; Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and
takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing
elementary school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the
owner starts possessing a property.—Respondent testified that he came to
know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when he was 23 years old. He asserted that
11
he took possession of said lot in the same year when his two (2) uncles, the
brothers of his late father, passed on to him the disputed lot as his father’s
share of the inheritance from the late Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños
(his grandparents). However, it is interesting to note that he testified that he
only came to know in 1991 that the elementary school was built on a portion
of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849-A. These assertions are irreconcilable. Common
experience tells us that one who owns a property and takes possession of it
cannot fail to discover and know that an existing elementary school was
built and standing on the lot from the time that the owner starts possessing
a property.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Edgardo R. Raneses for respondent.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
A little neglect may lead to great prejudice.
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 seeking to
reverse and set aside the January 14, 2004 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659, which affirmed the November 3,
1997 Decision3 of the Legaspi City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch I,
declaring as null and void the December 21, 1998 Deed of
Donation4 executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of
petitioner, and directing the latter to return to respondent Celso Oñate the
possession of the portion of land occupied by the school site of the Daraga
North Central Elementary School.
The Facts
Spouses Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños owned Lot No. 6849
(disputed lot) with an area of around 27,907 square meters registered
under the Torrens System of land registration under Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 2563. Claro Oñate had three children, namely: Antonio,
Rafael, and Francisco, all surnamed Oñate. Respondent Celso Oñate is the
grandson of Claro Oñate, being the son of Francisco Oñate.
In 1940, Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed on
a portion of the disputed lot. The school was eventually renamed Daraga
North Central Elementary School. The Municipality of Daraga leveled the
area while petitioner Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS;
now Department of Education [DepEd]) developed and built various school
buildings and facilities on the disputed lot.
Sometime in 1991, respondent filed a reconstitution proceeding of OCT
No. 2563 which was granted by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch V after due
notice, publication, and hearing. Consequently, OCT No. RO-189715 was
issued in the name of spouses Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños.
On August 26, 1991, a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and
Cession was executed by respondent and his three (3) sisters, namely:
Melba O. Napil, Cielo O. Lardizabal, and Maria Visia O. Maldo, who waived
their successional rights in favor of respondent Celso Oñate. Asserting that
the disputed lot was inherited by his father, Francisco Oñate, from the
latter’s father, Claro Oñate, by virtue of a prior partition among the three (3)
sons of Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños, respondent in turn claimed
ownership of said lot through the deed of extrajudicial settlement.
Meanwhile, the issue of whether respondent’s father, Francisco Oñate,
truly acquired the disputed lot through a prior partition among Claro Oñate’s
three (3) children had been passed upon in another case, Civil Case No.
8724 for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages filed by the heirs of Rafael
Oñate before the Legaspi City RTC, Branch IX.6 In said case, respondent
Celso Oñate, the defendant, prevailed and the case was dismissed by the
trial court.
Thereafter, respondent caused Lot No. 6849 to be subdivided into five (5)
lots, all under his name, except Lot No. 6849-B which is under the name of
Mariano M. Lim. On October 26, 1992, the subdivided lots were issued
Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCTs): (1) Lot No. 6849-A (13,072 square
meters) under TCT No. T-83946;7(2) Lot No. 6849-B (3,100 square meters)
under TCT No. T-84049;8(3) Lot No. 6849-C (10,000 square meters) under
TCT No. T-83948;9 (4) Lot No. 6849-D (1,127 square meters) under TCT
No. T-83949;10 and (5) Lot No. 6849-E (608 square meters) under TCT No.
T-83950.11
On December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to
petitioner apprising it about the facts and circumstances affecting the
elementary school and its occupancy of Lot No. 6849-A with an area of
13,072 square meters. Respondent proposed to petitioner DECS that it
purchase Lot No. 6849-A at the Fair Market Value (FMV) of PhP 400 per
12
square meter and also requested for reasonable rentals from 1960.12 The
records show that then DECS Director IV Jovencio Revil subsequently
referred the matter to the DECS Division Superintendent Rizalina D.
Saquido for investigation.13
On February 24, 1993, through his counsel, respondent likewise wrote to
Engr. Orlando Roces, District Engineer, Albay Engineering District about
the on-going construction projects in the school.14Engr. Roces then
informed respondent’s counsel that petitioner DECS is the owner of the
school site having acquired the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation
executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner.15
Consequently, on March 18, 1993, respondent instituted a
Complaint16 for Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title with
Recovery of Possession of Lot No. 6849 located at BarrioBagumbayan,
Daraga, Albay before the Legaspi City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
8715, against petitioner DECS, Division of Albay, represented by the
Division Superintendent of Schools, Mrs. Rizalina D. Saquido; and the
Municipality of Daraga, Albay, represented by the Municipal Mayor,
Honorable Cicero Triunfante.
In its April 28, 1993 Answer,17 the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, through
Mayor Cicero Triunfante, denied respondent’s ownership of the disputed lot
as it alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought said lot from
Claro Oñate, respondent’s grandfather, and since then it had continually
occupied said lot openly and publicly in the concept of an owner until 1988
when the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner DECS; thus
asserting that it could also claim ownership also through adverse
possession. Moreover, it claimed that the disputed lot had been declared in
the name of defendant municipality in the Municipal Assessor’s Office
under Tax Declaration No. 31954 from 1940 until 1988 for purposes of
exemption from real estate taxes. Further, defendant Municipality
contended that respondent was guilty of laches and was estopped from
assailing ownership over the disputed lot.
Similarly, petitioner’s April 29, 1993 Answer18 reiterated in essence the
defenses raised by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay and further contended
that respondent had no cause of action because it acquired ownership over
the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed on December 21,
1988 in its favor; and that respondent’s claim was vague as it was derived
from a void Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession
disposing of the disputed lot which was already sold to the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay in 1940. Petitioner likewise assailed the issuance of a
reconstituted OCT over Lot 6849 when the lower court granted
respondent’s petition for reconstitution without notifying petitioner.
During the ensuing trial where both parties presented documentary and
testimonial evidence, respondent testified that he came to know of the
disputed lot in 1973 when he was 23 years old; that he took possession of
the said lot in the same year; that he came to know that the elementary
school occupied a portion of the said lot only in 1991; and that it was only in
1992 that he came to know of the Deed of Donation executed by the
Municipality of Daraga, Albay.19 Also, Felicito Armenta, a tenant cultivating
a portion of disputed Lot 6849, testified that respondent indeed owned said
lot and the share of the crops cultivated were paid to respondent.20
However, after respondent testified, defendants in said case filed a Joint
Motion to Dismiss21 on the ground that respondent’s suit was against the
State which was prohibited without the latter’s consent. Respondent
countered with his Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss.22 Subsequently,
the trial court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the State had
given implied consent by entering into a contract.23
Aside from the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971, respondent presented
the TCTs covering the five (5) portions of the partitioned Lot 6849, Tax
Declaration No. 04-006-0068124 issued for said lot, and the April 20, 1992
Certification25 from the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay attesting to respondent’s payment of realty taxes for Lot
6849 from 1980 to 1990.
After respondent rested his case, the defense presented and marked their
documentary exhibits of Tax Declaration No. 30235 issued in the name of
the late Claro Oñate, which was cancelled in 1938; Tax Declaration
31954,26 which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 30235, in the name of
Municipality of Daraga with the annotation of Ex Officio Deputy Assessor
Natalio Grageda attesting to the purchase by the Municipality under
Municipal Voucher No. 69, August 1940 accounts and the issuance of TCT
No. 4812 in favor of the Municipality; Tax Declaration No. 892627 in the
name of the Municipality which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 31954; and
the subsequent Tax Declaration Nos. 22184,28 332,29 and
04-006-00068.30
The defense presented the testimony of Mr. Jose Adra,31 the Principal
of Daraga North Central Elementary School, who testified on the
Municipality’s donation of disputed Lot 6849 to petitioner and the
improvements on said lot amounting to more than PhP 11 million; and Mrs.
Toribia Milleza,32 a retired government employee and resident of
13
Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay since 1955, who testified on the Municipality’s
continuous and adverse possession of the disputed lot since 1940.
As mentioned earlier, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition, Reconveyance
and Damages was instituted by the heirs of Rafael Oñate in Legaspi City
RTC, Branch IX against Spouses Celso Oñate and Allem Vellez, involving
the same disputed lot. Petitioner and co-defendant Municipality of Daraga,
Albay were about to file a complaint for intervention in said case, but it was
overtaken by the resolution of the case on August 14, 1995 with the trial
court dismissing the complaint.
The Ruling of the RTC
On November 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of
respondent Celso Oñate. The dispositive portion declared, thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:
. 1.Declaring the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay in favor of the defendant Department of Education
Culture and Sports through the Albay Schools Division as null and
void;
. 2.Declaring the plaintiff as the owner in fee simple of Lots Nos.
6849-A, 6849-C, 6849-D and 6849-E which are registered in his
name;
. 3.Commanding the defendants to return the possession of the
portion of the land occupied by the school site to the herein plaintiff
Celso Oñate;
. 4.Ordering the plaintiff for reason of equity, to pay the defendant
Municipality of Daraga, Albay the amount of Fifty Thousand
(50,000.00) Pesos pursuant to Article 479 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines;
. 5.The defendant Department of Education Culture and Sports being
a builder in good faith, the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines shall be observed by the parties; and
. 6.Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. No attorney’s
fees is hereby adjudged in favor of plaintiff’s counsel.
SO ORDERED.”33
The trial court ratiocinated that it was clear that subject Lot 6849 was
originally registered under the Torrens System in the name of Spouses
Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños as evidenced by OCT No. RO-18971.
The right of respondent Celso Oñate over the disputed lot had not been
proven otherwise or overturned in Civil Case No. 8724, and this was
bolstered by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession,
where respondent’s sister waived their successional rights in his favor.
Thus, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent’s title. Besides, it further
ruled that defendants could not assail the registered title of respondent in a
collateral proceeding.
While the Municipality of Daraga, Albay anchored its prior ownership over
the disputed lot by virtue of a sale in 1940 and mentioned TCT No. 4812
supposedly issued in its name, it however failed to submit any deed of
conveyance in its favor, as well as a copy of the alleged TCT No. 4812.
Hence, the trial court held that its claim over disputed Lot 6849 was based
solely on adverse prescription which could not prevail over respondent’s
registered title.
The trial court concluded that given these factual and evidentiary proofs,
petitioner had no right to occupy Lot 6849-A, and the Deed of Donation
executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner must be
nullified. Finally, the trial court awarded PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay for the cost of landfill and ordered that Article 44834 of the
New Civil Code be followed by the parties as petitioner was a builder in
good faith.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner DECS and Municipality of Daraga, Albay filed their
respective Notices of Appeal35 assailing the trial court’s Decision before
the CA. However, on June 17, 1998, the appellate court declared the
appeals of both petitioners abandoned and dismissed for their failure to pay
the required docket fees within the reglementary period.36 Petitioner then
filed a Motion for Reconsideration37of the said June 17, 1998 Resolution
and its appeal was subsequently reinstated.38 The Municipality of Daraga,
Albay, however, totally lost its appeal due to inaction, and the appellate
court correspondingly issued a Partial Entry of Judgment on July 9, 1998.39
Moreover, the appellate court held that there was no jurisdictional defect
in the reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, and in the issuance of
OCT No. RO-18971 based on the destroyed or lost OCT No. 2563, even if
14
no notice was sent to petitioner. Thus, the CA ruled that respondent’s claim
of ownership over Lot 6849-A occupied by the school is conclusive for
being soundly predicated on TCT No. T-83946 which cancelled the
reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971. Furthermore, it reiterated the trial court’s
holding that petitioner is precluded from attacking collaterally respondent’s
title over the disputed lot in this proceeding.
The CA emphasized that petitioner’s failure to present TCT No.
4812—allegedly issued in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in
1940 in lieu of OCT No. 2563 and the Deed of Conveyance executed by the
original owner, Claro Oñate, in favor of the Municipality—was fatal to the
defense. It reasoned that “all the more had their claim of ownership become
doubtful when defendants-appellants [sic] failed to explain from their
pleadings and the evidence submitted before Us their failure to present the
two documents.”40 The appellate court concluded that given these facts,
no title in the name of the Municipality ever existed and thus it could not
have validly donated the subject property to petitioner.
Anent the issue of the applicability of Amigable v. Cuenca,41 the CA
affirmed the doctrine enunciated in said case that “to uphold the State’s
immunity from suit would subvert the ends of justice.” In fine, the appellate
court pointed out the inconvenience and impossibility of restoring
possession of Lot 6849-A to respondent considering the substantial
improvements built on said lot by the government which amounted to
almost PhP 12 million; and that the only relief available was for the
government to pay just compensation in favor of respondent computed on
the basis of the value of the property at the time of the government’s taking
of the land.
Through its assailed Decision,42 the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal
for lack of merit and affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. It reasoned
that laches does not apply, its application rests on the sound discretion of
the court, and where the court believes that its application would result in
manifest wrong or injustice, it is constrained not to be guided strictly by said
doctrine. Besides, it opined that laches could not defeat the rights of a
registered owner.
The Issues
Hence, we have the instant petition where petitioner raises the following
assignment of errors:
I likewise resolved in the negative. While it is true that petitioner is an
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT’S CAUSE OF ACTION TO RECOVER
POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT YET BARRED BY
LACHES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ACCORDING GREAT WEIGHT
ON RESPONDENT’S RECONSTITUTED ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 2563 COVERING SUBJECT
PROPERTY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
MAY BE SUED IN VIOLATION OF THE STATE’S IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER
MAY BE SUED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES.43
Petitioner basically raises two issues—the application of laches and the
non-suability of the State.
The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil
Case No. 8715 without its consent. A supplementary issue is whether
petitioner DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the
Philippines.
We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a
result of its being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the
Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it
voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from
it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary
citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It
has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor
of non-suability of the State.44
The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is
unincorporated government agency, and as such technically requires the
15
Republic of the Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against the former,
nonetheless, considering our resolution of the main issue below, this issue
is deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift such
procedural technicality in order to finally resolve the long litigation this case
has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said issue, we will
arrive at the same ruling.
The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a
party-defendant in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its
approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In
a situation involving a contract between a government department and a
third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party
to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority
granted to such department to enter into such contract carries with it the full
responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its name.
Main Issue: Equitable Remedy of Laches
Petitioner strongly asserts that the Municipality of Daraga, Albay had
continuous, open, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner over
the disputed lot since 1940 until December 21, 1988 or for about 48 years.
Significantly, it maintains that Tax Declaration No. 31954 covering the
disputed lot in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay contains an
annotation certifying that said lot was “under voucher No. 69, August, 1940
accounts. The corresponding Transfer Title No. 4812 has been issued by
the Register of Deeds Office of Albay on August 3, 1940.”45
When petitioner received the lot as donation from the Municipality on
December 21, 1988, it possessed the subject lot also in the concept of an
owner and continued to introduce improvements on the lot. Consequently,
when respondent instituted the instant case in 1993, petitioner and its
predecessor-in-interest Municipality of Daraga, Albay had possessed the
subject lot for a combined period of about fifty two (52) years.
Petitioner strongly avers that Claro Oñate, the original owner of subject
lot, sold it to the Municipality. At the very least it asserts that said Claro
Oñate allowed the Municipality to enter, possess, and enjoy the lot without
protest. In fact, Claro Oñate neither protested nor questioned the
cancellation of his Tax Declaration No. 30235 covering the disputed lot and
its substitution by Tax Declaration No. 31954 in the name of the
Municipality on account of his sale of the lot to the latter. In the same vein,
when Claro Oñate and his spouse died, their children Antonio, Rafael, and
Francisco who succeeded them also did not take any steps to question the
ownership and possession by the Municipality of the disputed lot until they
died on June 8, 1990, June 12, 1991, and October 22, 1957, respectively.
Petitioner maintains that significantly, respondent and his
siblings—succeeding their father Francisco as the alleged owners, from his
death on October 22, 1957—also did not take any action to recover the
questioned lot from 1957 until 1993 when the instant suit was commenced.
Petitioner avers that if they were really the owners of said lot, they would
not have waited 52 long years to institute the suit assuming they have a
cause of action against the Municipality or petitioner. Thus, petitioner
submits that the equitable principle of laches has indubitably set in to bar
respondent’s action to recover possession of, and title to, the disputed lot.
Laches and its elements
Indeed, it is settled that rights and actions can be lost by delay and by the
effect of delay as the equitable defense of laches does not concern itself
with the character of the defendant’s title, but only with plaintiff’s long
inaction or inexcusable neglect to bar the latter’s action as it would be
inequitable and unjust to the defendant.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which—by the exercise of due
diligence—could or should have been done earlier.46 Verily, laches serves
to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1)
conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant
claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2)
delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the
defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.47
In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation, we held that
“[t]hough laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements
must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could
not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be
resolved in a motion to dismiss (emphases supplied).”48 In the same vein,
we explained in Santiago v. Court of Appeals that there is “no absolute rule
as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be
determined according to its particular circumstances.”49
Issue of laches not barred by adverse judgment against Daraga, Albay
16
It is unfortunate that defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay lost its appeal
in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 before the CA for its failure to pay the required
docket fees within the reglementary period. As a result, a Partial Entry of
Judgment was made on July 9, 1998 and consequently, the dispositions in
the November 3, 1997 Decision, rendered by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch
I in favor of respondent Celso Oñate, became final and executory as
against defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay.
As an off-shoot, with respect to the Municipality of Daraga, the Deed of
Donation in favor of petitioner DECS was annulled——respondent Oñate
was declared owner in fee simple of the disputed lots and entitled to
possession but was required to pay PhP 50,000 to the Daraga Municipal
Government and the costs of suit. By reason of the finality of the Decision
against the Municipality of Daraga, Tax Declaration Nos. 04-006-00068,
332, 22184, 31954, and 8926 are all cancelled and annulled (if not yet
cancelled).
What are the effects of the final judgment against Municipality of Daraga
on its co-defendant, petitioner DECS?
Generally, it has no impact on the appeal of DECS unless the decision
affects its defenses. In this petition, DECS no longer questions the
declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation over the disputed lot and
hence can be considered as a final resolution of the issue. Likewise, it does
not challenge the ownership of Oñate of the disputed lots, but merely relied
on the defense of laches. The final directive for Municipality of Daraga to
return possession of the land has no significance on DECS’ appeal since
precisely, it is DECS’ position that it should retain possession of the land.
From these considerations, the final RTC November 3, 1997 Decision
against the Municipality of Daraga has no substantial and material effect
upon the DECS’ appeal.
The only remaining issue left is whether laches can inure to the benefit
of petitioner DECS considering the fact that Lot No. 6849-A was devoted to
public education when the elementary school was built in 1940 under the
supervision and control of DECS up to 1993 when Civil Case No. 8715 was
filed by respondent Oñate.
We rule in the affirmative.
Laches has set in
A brief scrutiny of the records does show tell-tale signs of laches. The first
element is undisputed: the then Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga
was constructed in 1940 on a portion of disputed Lot 6849, specifically Lot
No. 6849-A containing 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946.
Moreover, Mrs. Toribia Milleza,50 a retired government employee and
resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga since 1955 pertinently testified, thus:
Q: How long have you been residing in this place, Bagumbayan,
Daraga, Albay?
A: Maybe I stayed there in 1955 until the present.51
xxxx
Q: Now, can you further recall the kind of building that was
constructed in this property?
A: Seva type, building.
Q: At present how many buildings were constructed in this property?
A: Plenty of school buildings.
Q: Now, how many buildings were first constructed in [sic] this
property?
A: In 1955 only one, the Seva type, then there was constructed five
(5) Marcos Type buildings during the Marcos time.52
The devotion of Lot No. 6849-A to education started in 1940 and continued
up to December 21, 1988 when said lot was donated to the DECS. From
then on, DECS built various buildings and introduced improvements on said
lot. Lot No. 6849-A was continuously used for public education until March
18, 1993 when respondent Oñate filed Civil Case No. 8715 and thereafter
up to the present.
Thus, for a total period of more than fifty-two (52) years, Lot No. 6849-A
was exclusively and completely utilized by DECS for public education. This
fact was not successfully challenged nor refuted by respondent.
The second element of laches was likewise proven. No evidence was
presented to show that respondent or his predecessors-in-interest ever
took any action, administrative or judicial, nor either party questioned or
protested the Municipality’s adverse occupation of a portion of Lot 6849. As
petitioner had demonstrated laches by persuasive and credible evidence, it
17
is incumbent upon respondent to show that his predecessors-in-interest
indeed protected their rights of ownership over the lot. Thus, as early as
1940, when the first Seva type school building was constructed over a
portion of the disputed lot, now Lot 6849-A, respondent must prove that his
predecessors-in-interest indeed undertook activities to contest the
occupation of the portion of the lot by the Municipality and subsequently by
petitioner DECS. Unfortunately, respondent failed to substantiate such
defense of ownership and possession of the lot and even skirted this issue.
Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when
he was 23 years old.53 He asserted that he took possession of said lot in
the same year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his late father,
passed on to him the disputed lot as his father’s share of the inheritance
from the late Claro Oñate and Gregoria Los Baños (his grandparents).
However, it is interesting to note that he testified that he only came to know
in 1991 that the elementary school was built on a portion of Lot 6849, now
Lot 6849-A. These assertions are irreconcilable. Common experience tells
us that one who owns a property and takes possession of it cannot fail to
discover and know that an existing elementary school was built and
standing on the lot from the time that the owner starts possessing a
property.
Nonetheless, even granting that respondent indeed only came to know
of such encroachment or occupation in 1991, his rights cannot be better
than that of his predecessors-in-interest, that is, Claro Oñate and his uncles,
Antonio and Rafael, who died in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Since
respondent’s right over the lot originated from his predecessorsin-interest,
then he cannot have better rights over Lot No. 6849-A than the latter. The
spring cannot rise higher than its source. Besides, respondent has not
proffered any explanation why his predecessors-in-interest did not protest
and challenge the Municipality’s occupancy over a portion of their lot. Verily,
with the span of around 52 years afforded respondent and his
predecessors-in-interest, their inaction and delay in protecting their rights
were certainly excessive and unjustified.
In the third element, the records clearly bear out the fact that petitioner
DECS did not know nor anticipate that their possession and occupancy of a
portion of Lot 6849 would later be questioned. In fact, petitioner built
additional school buildings and facilities on the school site amounting to
more than PhP 11 million. Mr. Jose Adra, School Principal of the Daraga
North Central Elementary School, testified on the donation of the disputed
lot to petitioner and the cost of the improvements on it.54After more than
forty-eight (48) years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted
possession by petitioner DECS, it had no knowledge nor reason to believe
that respondent would assert any right over the lot after the lapse of such
long occupation coupled with a tax declaration in the name of the Daraga
Municipality.
Finally, the last element is likewise proven by the antecedent facts that
clearly show grave prejudice to the government, in general, and to
petitioner, in particular, if the instant action is not barred without even
considering the cost of the construction of the school buildings and facilities
and the deleterious effect on the school children and affected school
teachers and personnel if Lot No. 6849-A would be returned to respondent.
Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations. In the
instant case, with the foregoing considerations, we are constrained from
giving approbation to the trial and appellate courts’ ruling that the
application of the principle of laches would subvert the ends of justice.
Indeed, it is unjust for the State and the affected citizenry to suffer after
respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had slept on their rights for 52
years.
Also, the inaction of respondent Oñate and his predecessors-in-interest
for over 50 years has reduced their right to regain possession of Lot 6849-A
to a stale demand.
Laches holds over the actual area possessed and occupied by
petitioner
We, however, make the clear distinction that laches applies in favor of
petitioner only as regards Lot 6849-A which is actually possessed and
occupied by it. Laches does not apply to Lot Nos. 6849-B, 6849-C, 6849-D,
and 6849-E. These portions were never occupied by the Municipality and
petitioner. Agricultural tenant Felicito Armenta testified that his father,
Antonio Armenta, started cultivating portions of Lot 6849 way back in the
1940s and that he took over the tenancy in 1960 when his father stopped
tilling the land. Besides, if the Municipality indeed owned Lot 6849 by virtue
of a purchase, it is likewise guilty of laches in not protecting or contesting
the cultivation by Oñates’ agricultural tenants of said portions of Lot 6849.
Transfer Certificates of Title on portions of Lot 6849 valid
Petitioner contends that the reconstitution of OCT No. 2563—covering
subject lot in 1991 or 52 years after the Municipality owned said lot—does
not in any way affect the latter’s preferential and superior right over the
disputed lot. In the same vein, it maintains that it is inconsequential that
18
petitioner and the Municipality failed to present as evidence the deed of
conveyance in favor of the Municipality, as well as TCT No. 4812 as a
registered land owner may lose the right to recover possession of a
registered property by reason of laches. Petitioner concludes that the long
delayed reconstitution of OCT No. 2563 by respondent was a mere
afterthought and intended to camouflage his and his predecessor’s
unreasonably long inaction which indicates an awareness that they have no
valid claim whatsoever over disputed Lot 6849.
We disagree.
It must be noted that a reconstitution proceeding is one in remand is thus
binding to the whole world. While it is true that laches has set in so far as it
pertains to the portion of Lot 6849, specifically Lot 6849-A where the
Municipality and petitioner DECS had constructed the existing school, such
does not hold true for the totality of Lot 6849 as explained above. Indeed,
the reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, the consequent issuance of
OCT No. RO-18971 in lieu of the lost or destroyed OCT No. 2563 is valid.
Anent the issue of non-notification, we agree with the observation of the
courts a quo that even granting arguendo that petitioner was not notified
about the reconstitution proceeding, such deficiency is not jurisdictional as
to nullify and prevail over the final disposition of the trial court in a
proceeding in rem.
More so, while petitioner strongly asserts that the certification in Tax
Declaration No. 31954 attesting to the payment of the disputed lot under
Municipal Voucher No. 69 and the issuance of TCT No. 4812, which was
never disputed nor controverted by respondent, should have been given
evidentiary weight by the trial and appellate courts as the presumptions of
regularity and validity of such official act have not been overcome, such
documents cannot defeat the registered title of respondent.
Between a clear showing of ownership evidenced by a registered title
and a certification in a tax declaration, albeit done in an official capacity, the
former holds as the latter is only persuasive evidence. Indeed, tax
declarations in land cases per se do not constitute ownership without other
substantial pieces of evidence.
The records do not show and petitioner has not given any cogent
explanation why the Deed of Conveyance in favor of the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay and TCT No. 4812 were not presented. With clear and
affirmative defenses set up by petitioner and Municipality of Daraga, Albay,
it is incumbent for them to present these documents. Therefore, the
unmistakable inference is that there was indeed no sale and conveyance by
Claro Oñate of Lot 6849 in favor of the Municipality. Consequently, the
TCTs cancelling OCT No. RO-18971 covering Lot Nos. 6849-A, 6849-B,
6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E were likewise validly issued.
Thus, notwithstanding valid titles over the portions of Lot 6849, respondent
Oñate cannot now take possession over Lot No. 6849-A for reason of
laches. In the recent case of De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, we reiterated the
principle we have consistently applied in laches:
“The law55 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of
the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Nonetheless, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover
the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.”56
Thus, with our resolution of the principal issue of applicability of the
equitable remedy of laches, the issue of suability of the State has been
mooted.
A final word. Considering our foregoing disquisition and upon grounds of
equity, a modification of the final decision prevailing between respondent
Oñate and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay is in order. It would be grossly
iniquitous for respondent Oñate to pay PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of
Daraga, Albay considering that he is not entitled to recover the possession
and usufruct of Lot No. 6849-A.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the January 14,
2004 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 affirming the November
3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
. 1)Declaring the DepEd (formerly DECS), Division of Albay to have
the rights of possession and usufruct over Lot 6849-A with an area
of 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946 of the Registry of
Deeds of Albay, as a result of laches on the part of respondent
Celso Oñate and his predecessors-in-interest. Respondent Celso
Oñate, his heirs, assigns, and successors-in-interest are prohibited
from selling, mortgaging, or encumbering Lot 6849-A while the said
lot is still being used and occupied by petitioner DECS. However,
the rights of possession and usufruct will be restored to respondent
the moment petitioner DECS no longer needs the said lot. The
Registry of Deeds of Albay is ordered to annotate the
aforementioned restrictions and conditions at the back of TCT No.
19
 T-83946-A in the name of respondent Celso Oñate. Item No. 2 of
the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is modified
accordingly;
. 2)Declaring Celso Oñate as the true and legal owner in fee simple
of the following lots:
. a.Lot 6849-C with an area of 10,000 square meters under TCT No.
T-83948 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay;
. b.Lot 6849-D with an area of 1,127 square meters under TCT No.
T-83949 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; and
. c.Lot 6849-E with an area of 608 square meters under TCT No.
T-83950 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay.
. 3)Declaring Mariano M. Lim as true and legal owner of Lot 6849-B
with an area of 3,100 square meters under TCT No. T-84049 of the
Registry of Deeds of Albay;
. 4)Ordering petitioner DECS and all other persons claiming under
said department to return the possession of Lots 6849-C, 6849-D,
and 6849-E to respondent Celso Oñate and Lot 6849-B to Mariano
M. Lim; and
. 5)Deleting Item No. 4 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the
Legaspi City RTC, which ordered respondent Celso Oñate to pay
Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 50,000) to defendant Municipality of
Daraga, Albay.
The November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED in
all other respects.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 147076. June 17, 2004.*
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM,
petitioner, vs. ACT THEATER, INC., respondent.
Civil Law; Damages; Definition of a Right; The exercise of rights is not
without limitations; Having the right should not be confused with the manner
by which such right is to be exercised.—A right is a power, privilege, or
immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or
recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable
claim of one person against the other. Concededly, the petitioner, as the
owner of the utility providing water supply to certain consumers including
the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without
limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by
which such right is to be exercised. Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely
sets the norms for the exercise of one’s rights: Art. 19. Every person must,
in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Same; Same; Same; When a right is exercised in a manner which
discards the norms set in Article 19 of the Civil Code, resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held
accountable.—When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these
norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which
actor can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with
justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner
unceremoniously cut off the respondent’s water service connection.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s act was arbitrary, injurious and
prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article
19 of the Civil Code.—There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform
findings and conclusion of the court a quo and the appellate court that the
petitioner’s act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the respondent,
justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees may be awarded when
a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by
reason of an unjustified act of the other party.—The award of P5,000 as
attorney’s fees is reasonable and warranted. Attorney’s fees may be
awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect
his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Anabella S. Altuna for petitioner.
20
 Eulogio E. Gatdula for respondent. “WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the four (4) above-named Accused are
CALLEJO, SR., J.: hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.3

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the In Civil Case No. Q-88-768
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated January 31, 2001 of the Court of ...
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581, which affirmed the civil aspect of the
Decision2 dated May 5, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, . 1.Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff actual or compensatory
Branch 77, directing the petitioner MWSS to pay the respondent Act damages in the amount of P25,000.00; and to return the sum of
Theater, Inc. damages and attorney’s fees. P200,000.00 deposited by the plaintiff for the restoration of its water
services after its disconnection on September 23, 1988;
The present case stemmed from the consolidated cases of Criminal Case
No. Q-89-2412 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Tabian, et . 2.Defendant’s counterclaim for undercollection of P530,759.96 is
al., for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401, as amended by dismissed for lack of merit;
Batas Pambansa Blg. 876, and Civil Case No. Q-88-768 entitled Act
Theater, Inc. v. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. The two . 3.Ordering defendant MWSS to pay costs of suit;
cases were jointly tried in the court a quo as they arose from the same
factual circumstances, to wit:
. 4.Ordering defendant MWSS to pay plaintiff the amount of
P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
On September 22, 1988, four employees of the respondent Act Theater,
Inc., namely, Rodolfo Tabian, Armando Aguilar, Arnel Concha and Modesto
Ruales, were apprehended by members of the Quezon City police force for . 5.Making the mandatory injunction earlier issued to plaintiff Act
Theater, Inc. permanent.
allegedly tampering a water meter in violation of P.D. No. 401, as amended
by B.P. Blg. 876. The respondent’s employees were subsequently
SO ORDERED.”4
criminally charged (Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412) before the court a quo.
On account of the incident, the respondent’s water service connection was
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the aforesaid decision
cut off. Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint for injunction with
to the CA. The appellate court, however, dismissed the appeal. According
damages (Civil Case No. Q-88-768) against the petitioner MWSS.
to the CA, the court a quo correctly found that the petitioner’s act of cutting
In the civil case, the respondent alleged in its complaint filed with the off the respondent’s water service connection without prior notice was
arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the latter justifying the award of
court a quo that the petitioner acted arbitrarily, whimsically and capriciously,
damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
in cutting off the respondent’s water service connection without prior notice.
Due to lack of water, the health and sanitation, not only of the respondent’s
Undaunted, the petitioner now comes to this Court alleging as follows:
patrons but in the surrounding premises as well, were adversely affected.
The respondent prayed that the petitioner be directed to pay damages.
I
After due trial, the court a quo rendered its decision, the dispositive
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S] VALIDLY
portion of which reads:
AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN
RESOLVING THE PETITIONER’S APPEAL;
In Criminal Case No. Q-89-2412
II

21
 WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
VALIDLY UPHELD THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEAL[S]
CORRECTLY APPLIED THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE APPLICABLE PROVISION
OF ARTICLE 429 OF THE SAME CODE.5
Preliminarily, the petitioner harps on the fact that, in quoting the decretal
portion of the court a quo’s decision, the CA erroneously typed P500,000
as the attorney’s fees awarded in favor of the respondent when the same
should only be P5,000. In any case, according to the petitioner, whether the
amount is P500,000 or P5,000, the award of attorney’s fees is improper
considering that there was no discussion or statement in the body of the
assailed decision justifying such award. The petitioner insists that in cutting
off the respondent’s water service connection, the petitioner merely
exercised its proprietary right under Article 429 of the Civil Code.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 429 of the Civil Code, relied upon by the petitioner in justifying its
act of disconnecting the water supply of the respondent without prior notice,
reads:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he
may use such force as may be reasonable to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution,
statute or decisional law, or recognized as a result of long
usage,6 constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one person against
the other.7
Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water
supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the
exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be
confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised.8
Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of
one’s rights:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting
in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be
held accountable.9 In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and
give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously
cut off the respondent’s water service connection. As correctly found by the
appellate court:
While it is true that MWSS had sent a notice of investigation to
plaintiff-appellee prior to the disconnection of the latter’s water services,
this was done only a few hours before the actual disconnection. Upon
receipt of the notice and in order to ascertain the matter, Act sent its
assistant manager Teodulo Gumalid, Jr. to the MWSS office but he was
treated badly on the flimsy excuse that he had no authority to represent Act.
Act’s water services were cut at midnight of the day following the
apprehension of the employees. Clearly, the plaintiff-appellee was denied
due process when it was deprived of the water services. As a consequence
thereof, Act had to contract another source to provide water for a number of
days. Plaintiff-appellee was also compelled to deposit with MWSS the sum
of P200,000.00 for the restoration of their water services.10
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and
conclusion of the court a quo and the appellate court that the petitioner’s
act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the
award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
Finally, the amount of P500,000 as attorney’s fees in that portion of the
assailed decision which quoted the fallo of the court a quo’sdecision was
obviously a typographical error. As attorney’s fees, the court a quo awarded
the amount of P5,000 only. It was this amount, as well as actual and
compensatory damages of P25,000 and the reimbursement of P200,000
deposited by the respondent for the restoration of its water supply, that the
CA affirmed, as it expressly stated in its dispositive portion that “finding no
cogent reason to reverse the appealed Decision which is in conformity with
the law and evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED.”11
The award of P5,000 as attorney’s fees is reasonable and warranted.
Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or
incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the
other party.12
22
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated January 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58581 is AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed in toto.
Note.—The power of the courts to grant damages and attorney’s fees
demands factual, legal and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to
speculation or conjecture. (Ranola vs. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA
1 [2000])
G.R. No. 135219. January 17, 2002.*
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and ERNESTO AUSTRIA and LORETO Q. QUINTANA, respondents.
Remedial Law; Foreclosures; Possession; The obligation of a court to
issue an ex-parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that
there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right
adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor.—Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, we held that the obligation of a court to issue
an ex-partewrit of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third
party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of
the debtor/mortgagor. The same principle was inversely applied in a more
recent case, where we ruled that a writ of possession may be issued in an
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, only if the debtor is in
possession and no third party had intervened. Although the factual nuances
of this case may slightly differ from the aforecited cases, the availing
circumstances are undeniably similar—a party in possession of the
foreclosed property is asserting a right adverse to the debtor/mortgagor and
is a stranger to the foreclosure proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of
possession was applied for.
Same; Same; Same; One who claims to be the owner of a property
possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its
physical recovery.—Notably, the Civil Code protects the actual possessor
of a property, to wit: Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership
raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort
to judicial process for the recovery of the property. Under the aforequoted
provision, one who claims to be the owner of a property possessed by
another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery.
The term “judicial process” could mean no less than an ejectment suit or
reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of the contending
parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
Same; Same; Same; An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory
writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial
process”.—An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under
Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as
contemplated above. Even if the same may be considered a judicial
proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in
a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party
“sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong.”
Same; Same; Same; An ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135.—It should be emphasized
that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a
non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike a judicial foreclosure
of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, any property
brought within the ambit of the act is foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not
with any court of justice, but with the office of the sheriff of the province
where the sale is to be made.
Same; Same; Same; The actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal
presumption of just title in his favor.—Besides, as earlier stressed, Article
433 of the Civil Code, cited above, requires nothing less than an action for
ejectment to be brought even by the true owner. After all, the actual
possessor of a property enjoys a legal presumption of just title in his favor,
which must be overcome by the party claiming otherwise.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Carao, Noblejas & Associates for petitioner PNB.
Luz & Advincula for private respondents.
23
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking a reversal of the Court of Appeals’ resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
48660 dated August 25, 1998, which affirmed the order of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 60 in LRC Case No. M-2635.
Sometime during the late 70’s, the spouses Godofredo and Wilma
Monsod obtained a loan in the amount of P120,000.00 from petitioner
Philippine National Bank (PNB). To secure their loan, the Monsods
mortgaged to PNB a parcel of land covered by TCT No. S-84843, located
within the Monte Villa de Monsod Subdivision in Parañaque, Rizal.
Due to Monsods’ failure to pay their loan obligation, PNB extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgage. At the auction sale of the subject real property,
PNB was declared the highest bidder. On December 21, 1981, a certificate
of sale was issued in favor of PNB, and was registered on July 11, 1984.1
Upon expiration of the redemption period on July 12, 1985, ownership of
the property was consolidated in PNB. Thereafter, TCT No. S-84843 was
cancelled and TCT No. 99480 was issued in PNB’s name.2
On June 23, 1992, PNB filed an “Ex-Parte Petition for the Issuance of
Writ of Possession” with Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, docketed as LRC Case No. M-2635. Pursuant to the provisions of Act
No. 3135, as amended, the trial court conducted an ex parte hearing.
PNB’s representative testified that the foreclosed property is occupied by
one Ernesto Austria. According to PNB, Mr. Austria was invited by the bank
to a conference to discuss the ownership of the foreclosed lot, however, he
did not honor the bank’s invitation.3
On August 28, 1992, the trial court granted PNB’s petition and a writ of
possession was issued on October 26, 1992.4
On December 11, 1992, respondents Ernesto and Loreto Quintana
Austria filed a “Motion for Intervention and to Recall and/or Stop the
Enforcement of the Writ of Possession.” The Austrias alleged that they are
the actual occupants of the subject lot, which they purportedly bought from
the Monsods as early as 1974. They claimed that the foreclosed property
was enclosed within a concrete fence and formed part of their family
compound. PNB allegedly knew of this fact even before it granted the loan
to the Monsods, because the bank’s credit investigators were advised of
the same when they inspected the property in the summer of 1976.
Consequently, the Austrias maintained that the issuance of the possessory
writ ex parte was improper, since it will deprive them of their property
without due process.5
Due to the Austrias’ refusal to vacate the premises, the sheriff failed to
enforce the challenged writ.
On July 27, 1993, on motion of PNB, the trial court issued an alias writ of
possession. Again, the writ was not implemented.6
On September 17, 1993, the sheriff sought to enforce the first alias writ
of possession for the second time. The Austrias filed a “Second Motion for
Intervention” seeking to restrain the enforcement of the writ of possession
issued on October 26, 1992.7PNB then filed an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Issuance of Break Open Order”8 and, subsequently, an Opposition to the
Austrias’ Second Motion for Intervention.9
On January 31, 1994, the trial court denied the Austrias’ second motion
and granted PNB’s “Motion for Issuance of Break Open Order.” The trial
court ruled that the Austrias can no longer be permitted to intervene in the
case during said stage of the proceedings and that the remedy of the
Austrias was to file an ordinary civil action to assert their claim of ownership
over the property.10
In the meantime, the first alias writ of possession lapsed. PNB thus filed
an “Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Possession,”11 and on November 29, 1994, a second alias writ was
issued.12
Unfazed, the Austrias filed an Omnibus Motion on January 25, 1995,
seeking a recall of the second alias writ and a reconsideration of the trial
court’s order denying their motion to intervene.13Meanwhile, the second
alias writ had likewise expired.
PNB filed a “Manifestation and Motion for Issuance of Third Alias Writ of
Possession,” which the trial court granted anew in an order dated October
10, 1995.14
However, on December 12, 1995, the Austrias again filed a motion to set
aside the trial court’s order dated October 10, 1995 and to recall the third
alias writ.15
Consequent to the filing of this fourth motion, the sheriff again failed to
implement the third alias writ, which also lapsed. Thus, on February 15,
24
1996, PNB filed another “Motion for Issuance of a Fourth Alias
Writ,”16 which was granted on March 26, 1996.
The trial court, after hearing the Austrias’ fourth motion, issued an order on
October 4, 1996, denying the same, on the ground that the issuance of a
possessory writ for a property sold at public auction pursuant to an
extra-judicial foreclosure proceeding was a ministerial duty on its part. The
Austrias failed to establish any legal ground for recalling the writs, even as
they claimed a superior right to the subject property.17
On February 19, 1997, the fourth alias writ was issued by the trial court.
The writ was partially implemented with the posting of PNB security guards
within the premises of the foreclosed lot.18
On April 17, 1997, the Austrias, for the fifth time, filed a motion to stop
the enforcement of the fourth alias writ and to set aside all prior writs issued
by the trial court.19
In the meantime, the Austrias filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque, an action for cancellation of PNB’s title to the property,
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-0184.20
On October 28, 1997, the trial court denied the Austrias’ fifth motion but
ruled that: “any writ of possession that may be issued in this case, is
declared unenforceable against the MOVANTS ERNESTO AUSTRIA and
the HEIRS OF LORETO AUSTRIA, until the Court declares otherwise.”21
PNB filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on May 20,
1998.22 A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was
filed by PNB before the Court of Appeals. However, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition, stating:
There is no prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge in issuing his assailed Order which the Court finds to be
in accord with law, the pertinent rules and jurisprudence cited therein.
Hence, PNB filed the instant petition, contending that:
I hearings on the numerous motions filed by respondents themselves.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR BY
SIMPLY ADOPTING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT WRIT
OF POSSESSION CANNOT BE ENFORCED AGAINST RESPONDENT
AUSTRIA. SAID FINDINGS ARE UNPROVEN AND UNSUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS IN:
. A)SUPPORTING THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE TRIAL
COURT IN THE OCTOBER 28, 1997 ORDER. THE RULINGS DO
NOT JUSTIFY THE NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE WRIT OF
POSSESSION AGAINST RESPONDENTS. RESPONDENTS
WERE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD BUT NO
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIM;
. B)NOT GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE FACT THAT PNB
HAS THE LEGAL RIGHT TO POSSESS THE PROPERTY AS ITS
REGISTERED OWNER;
. C)LOSING SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT
BELATEDLY ISSUED THE OCTOBER 28, 1997 ORDER
DIRECTING THAT THE WRIT OF POSSESSION CANNOT BE
ENFORCED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS. THE TRIAL
COURT HAD EARLIER ISSUED FOUR (4) POSSESSORY WRITS
ALL OF WHICH WERE DIRECTED AGAINST RESPONDENTS
AUSTRIA & QUINTANA.23
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not
an ex-parte writ of possession issued pursuant to Act No. 3135, as
amended, can be enforced against a third person who is in actual
possession of the foreclosed property and who is not in privity with the
debtor/mortgagor.24
Petitioner PNB maintains that the trial court’s order was based on the
unproven allegation that respondents had purchased the property from the
Monsods before the latter mortgaged it to PNB. According to petitioner PNB,
respondents did not adduce any proof to support their claim of ownership,
even as they were repeatedly given the opportunity to do so during the
Petitioner PNB also submits that since it is the registered owner of the
property, it is entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right. The bank
insists that it could rely on the title of the registered land which does not
have any annotation of respondents’ supposed rights.
25
 Petitioner PNB likewise avers that the trial court could not now belatedly
refuse to enforce the writ of possession against respondents. The trial court
had already issued a total of four possessory writs directing the ouster of all
occupants of the lot, including respondents herein.
On the other hand, respondents assert that the trial court correctly held
that the writ of possession can only be implemented against the
debtor/mortgagor and his successors-in-interest. Since respondents
acquired their rights as owners of the property by virtue of a sale made to
them by the Monsods prior to the bank’s mortgage lien, respondents can
not be dispossessed therefrom without due notice and hearing, through the
simple expedient of an ex-parte possessory writ.
We agree with respondents. Under applicable laws and jurisprudence,
they can not be ejected from the property by means of an ex-parte writ of
possession.
The operative provision under Act No. 3135, as amended,25 is Section 6,
which states:
Sec. 6. Redemption.—In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made
under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his
successors in interest or any person having a lien on the property
subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from
and after the date of the sale; and such redemption shall be governed by
the provisions of section four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and
sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (Italics ours) Despite the
evolutionary development of our procedural laws throughout the years, the
pertinent rule in the Code of Civil Procedure26 remains practically
unchanged. Particularly, Rule 39, Section 33, second paragraph, which
relates to the right of possession of a purchaser of property in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale:
Sec. 33. x x x
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest
and claim of the judgment obligor to the property at the time of levy. The
possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Italics ours)
Thus, in Barican v. Intermediate Appellate Court,27 we held that the
obligation of a court to issue an ex-parte writ of possession in favor of the
purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once
it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is
claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. The same principle
was inversely applied in a more recent case,28 where we ruled that a writ of
possession may be issued in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage, only if the debtor is in possession and no third party had
intervened. Although the factual nuances of this case may slightly differ
from the aforecited cases, the availing circumstances are undeniably
similar—a party in possession of the foreclosed property is asserting a right
adverse to the debtor/mortgagor and is a stranger to the foreclosure
proceedings in which the ex-parte writ of possession was applied for. It
should be stressed that the foregoing doctrinal pronouncements are not
without support in substantive law. Notably, the Civil Code protects the
actual possessor of a property, to wit:
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable
presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process
for the recovery of the property.
Under the aforequoted provision, one who claims to be the owner of a
property possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for
its physical recovery. The term “judicial process” could mean no less than
an ejectment suit or reinvindicatory action, in which the ownership claims of
the contending parties may be properly heard and adjudicated.
An ex-parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of
Act No. 3135 is not, strictly speaking, a “judicial process” as contemplated
above. Even if the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the
enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale,
it is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party “sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong.”29
It should be emphasized that an ex-parte petition for issuance of a writ of
possession is a non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage pursuant to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike a
judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court, any property brought within the ambit of the act is foreclosed by the
filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the
sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.30
26
As such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty,
who claims a right superior to that of the original mortgagor, will have no
opportunity to be heard on his claim in a proceeding of this nature. It stands
to reason, therefore, that such third person may not be dispossessed on the
strength of a mere exparte possessory writ, since to do so would be
tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due
process.
Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of the Civil Code, cited above,
requires nothing less than an action for ejectment to be brought even by the
true owner. After all, the actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal
presumption of just title in his favor,31 which must be overcome by the
party claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, petitioner PNB admitted that as early as 1990, it was
aware that the subject lot was occupied by the Austrias. Yet, instead of
bringing an action in court for the ejectment of respondents, it chose to
simply file an ex-parte petition for a writ of possession pursuant to its
alleged right as purchaser in the extra-judicial foreclosure sale. We cannot
sanction this procedural shortcut. To enforce the writ against an unwitting
third party possessor, who took no part in the foreclosure proceedings,
would be tantamount to the taking of real property without the benefit of
proper judicial intervention.
Consequently, it was not a ministerial duty of the trial court under Act No.
3135 to issue a writ of possession for the ouster of respondents from the lot
subject of this instant case. The trial court was without authority to grant
the ex-parte writ, since petitioner PNB’s right of possession under said Act
could be rightfully recognized only against the Monsods and the latter’s
successors-in-interest, but not against respondents who assert a right
adverse to the Monsods. Hence, the trial court cannot be precluded from
correcting itself by refusing to enforce the writs it had previously issued. Its
lack of authority to direct issuance of the writs against respondents assured
that its earlier orders would never attain finality in the first place.
In the same vein, respondents are not obliged to prove their ownership
of the foreclosed lot in the ex-parte proceedings conducted below. The trial
court has no jurisdiction to determine who between the parties is entitled to
ownership and possession of the foreclosed lot.
Likewise, registration of the lot in petitioner PNB’s name does not
automatically entitle the latter to possession thereof. As discussed earlier,
petitioner PNB must resort to the appropriate judicial process for recovery
of the property and cannot simply invoke its title in an ex-parte proceeding
to justify the ouster of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48660 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J., Chairman), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied, resolution affirmed.
Note.—The purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of
the property. (Suico Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA
212 [1999])
G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000.*
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of
ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN,
SAMAR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T. BABALCON,
and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA, respondents.
Criminal Law; Revised Forestry Code; Section 78 of the Revised
Forestry Code makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with
the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles
309-310 of the Revised Penal Code.—This provision makes mere
possession of timber or other forest products without the accompanying
legal documents unlawful and punishable with the penalties imposed for the
crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles 309-310 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the present case, the subject vehicles were loaded with forest products
at the time of the seizure. But admittedly no permit evidencing authority to
possess and transport said load of forest products was duly presented.
These products, in turn, were deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was
a prima facie violation of Section 68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code,
although as found by the trial court, the persons responsible for said
violation were not the ones charged by the public prosecutor.
Same; Same; Seizure and Forfeiture Procedure; Actions; Replevin; It
would be absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing
before a seizure could be effected where the vehicle owner and his driver
immediately went to court and applied for a writ of replevin.—Note further
27
that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in DENR
Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.
Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following
the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly
took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again,
when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the
second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the
DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a
writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon
their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be
absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said
seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there was a violation of the
Revised Forestry Code and the seizure of the vehicles used in transporting
illegally cut timber was in accordance with law, the seized vehicles were
validly deemed in custodia legis, hence they could not be subject to an
action for replevin.—Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry
Code and the seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject
vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process
and considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.
Same; Same; A property that is validly deposited in custodia legis
cannot be the subject of a replevin suit.—Note that property that is validly
deposited in custodia legis cannot be the subject of a replevin suit.
In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we elucidated further: “. . . the
writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs to
retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs
Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from
the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their
execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture
proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of
replevin . . .”
Same; Constitutional Law; State Immunity; A suit against a public
officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose
is to hold the State ultimately liable—thus, a suit against officers who
represent the DENR is a suit against the State and cannot prosper without
the States consent.—Well established is the doctrine that the State may not
be sued without its consent. And a suit against a public officer for his official
acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State
ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this
doctrine generally applies only to activities within the scope of their
authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the
present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account
were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in
question are clearly official in nature. In implementing and enforcing
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out,
petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the
DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice
nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who
represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without
the State’s consent.
Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies;Exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even
before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a
motion to dismiss, otherwise such ground for dismissal would be deemed
waived.—Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the
Office of the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners
concerning exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall
that exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion
to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could
be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try
it.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fiel Marmita for petitioners.
Plaridel Bohol for private respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision1 dated May 27, 1994 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 29191, denying the petition filed by herein petitioners for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in order to annul the Order dated May
27, 1992, by the Regional Trial Court of Catbalogan, Samar. Said Order
had denied petitioners’ (a) Motion to Dismiss the replevin case filed by
herein private respondents, as well as (b) petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of said trial court dated April 24, 1992,
granting an application for a Writ of replevin.2
28
 The pertinent facts of the case, borne by the records, are as follows:
On January 28, 1992, the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team
of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
the DENR apprehended two (2) motor vehicles, described as follows:
. “1.Motor Vehicle with Plate No. HAK-733 loaded with one thousand
and twenty six (1,026) board feet of illegally sourced lumber valued
at P8,544.75, being driven by one Pio Gabon and owned by [a
certain] Jose Vargas.
. 2.Motor Vehicle with Plate No. FCN-143 loaded with one thousand
two hundred twenty four and ninety seven (1,224.97) board feet of
illegally-sourced lumber valued at P9,187.27, being driven by one
Constancio Abuganda and owned by [a certain] Manuela
Babalcon. . . .”3
Constancio Abuganda and Pio Gabon, the drivers of the vehicles, failed to
present proper documents and/or licenses. Thus, the apprehending team
seized and impounded the vehicles and its load of lumber at the
DENR-PENR (Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Provincial Environment and Natural Resources) Office in
Catbalogan.4 Seizure receipts were issued but the drivers refused to
accept the receipts.5 Felipe Calub, Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer, then filed before the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in
Samar, a criminal complaint against Abuganda, in Criminal Case No. 3795,
for violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by
Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.6
On January 31, 1992, the impounded vehicles were forcibly taken by
Gabon and Abuganda from the custody of the DENR, prompting DENR
Officer Calub this time to file a criminal complaint for grave coercion against
Gabon and Abuganda. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the
Public Prosecutor.7
On February 11, 1992, one of the two vehicles, with plate number FCN
143, was again apprehended by a composite team of DENR-CENR in
Catbalogan and Philippine Army elements of the 802nd Infantry Brigade at
Rarangay Buray, Paranas, Samar. It was again loaded with forest products
with an equivalent volume of 1,005.47 board feet, valued at P10,054.70.
Calub duly filed a criminal complaint against Constancio Abuganda, a
certain Abegonia, and several John Does, in Criminal Case No. 3625, for
violation of Section 68 [78], Presidential Decree 705 as amended by
Executive Order 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code.8
In Criminal Cases Nos. 3795 and 3625, however, Abegonia and
Abuganda were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. But note the
trial court ordered that a copy of the decision be furnished the Secretary of
Justice, in order that the necessary criminal action may be filed against Noe
Pagarao and all other persons responsible for violation of the Revised
Forestry Code. For it appeared that it was Pagarao who chartered the
subject vehicle and ordered that cut timber be loaded on it.9
Subsequently, herein private respondents Manuela Babalcon, the
vehicle owner, and Constancio Abuganda, the driver, filed a complaint for
the recovery of possession of the two (2) impounded vehicles with an
application for replevin against herein petitioners before the RTC of
Catbalogan. The trial court granted the application for replevin and issued
the corresponding writ in an Order dated April 24, 1992.10 Petitioners filed
a motion to dismiss which was denied by the trial court.11
Thus, on June 15, 1992, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court the
present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with application
for Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court
issued a TRO, enjoining respondent RTC judge from conducting further
proceedings in the civil case for replevin; and enjoining private respondents
from taking or attempting to take the motor vehicles and forest products
seized from the custody of the petitioners. The Court further instructed the
petitioners to see to it that the motor vehicles and other forest products
seized are kept in a secured place and protected from deterioration, said
property being in custodia legis and subject to the direct order of the
Supreme Court.12 In a Resolution issued on September 28, 1992, the
Court referred said petition to respondent appellate court for appropriate
disposition.13
On May 27, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied said petition for lack of merit.
It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle pursuant to the authority
granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by E.O. No. 277
does not automatically place said conveyance in custodia legis. According
to the appellate court, such authority of the Department Head of the DENR
or his duly authorized representative to order the confiscation and
disposition of illegally obtained forest products and the conveyance used
for that purpose is not absolute and unqualified. It is subject to pertinent
laws, regulations, or policies on that matter, added the appellate court. The
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, is one such regulation,
the appellate court said. For it prescribes the guidelines in the confiscation,
forfeiture and disposition of conveyances used in the commission of
offenses penalized under Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705 as amended by
E.O. No. 277. 14
29
 Additionally, respondent Court of Appeals noted that the petitioners
failed to observe the procedure outlined in DENR Administrative Order No.
59, series of 1990. They were unable to submit a report of the seizure to the
DENR Secretary, to give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle, and to
render a report of their findings and recommendations to the Secretary.
Moreover, petitioners’ failure to comply with the procedure laid down by
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, was confirmed by the
admission of petitioners’ counsel that no confiscation order has been
issued prior to the seizure of the vehicle and the filing of the replevin suit.
Therefore, in failing to follow such procedure, according to the appellate
court, the subject vehicles could not be considered in custodia legis.15
Respondent Court of Appeals also found no merit in peti-tioners’ claim
that private respondents’ complaint for replevin is a suit against the State.
Accordingly, petitioners could not shield themselves under the principle of
state immunity as the property sought to be recovered in the instant suit
had not yet been lawfully adjudged forfeited in favor of the government.
Moreover, according to respondent appellate court, there could be no
pecuniary liability nor loss of property that could ensue against the
government. It reasoned that a suit against a public officer who acted
illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit
against the State; and that a public officer might be sued for illegally seizing
or withholding the possession of the property of another.16
Respondent court brushed aside other grounds raised by petitioners based
on the claim that the subject vehicles were validly seized and held in
custody because they were contradicted by its own findings.17 Their
petition was found without merit.18
Now, before us, the petitioners assign the following errors:19
. (1)THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT MERE
SEIZURE OF A CONVEYANCE PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A
[78-A] OF P.D. NO. 705 AS AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER
277 DOES NOT PLACE SAID CONVEYANCE IN CUSTODIA
LEGIS;
. (2)THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE OPERATIVE ACT GIVING RISE FOR THE SUBJECT
CONVEYANCE TO BE IN CUSTODIA LEGISIS ITS LAWFUL
SEIZURE BY THE DENR PURSUANT TO SECTION 68-A [78-A]
OF P.D. NO. 705, AS AMENDED BY E.O. NO. 277; AND
. (3)THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
COMPLAINT FOR REPLEVIN AGAINST THE PETITIONERS IS
NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE.
In brief, the pertinent issues for our consideration are:
. (1)Whether or not the DENR-seized motor vehicle, with plate
number FCN 143, is in custodia legis.
. (2)Whether or not the complaint for the recovery of possession of
impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, is a suit
against the State.
We will now resolve both issues.
The Revised Forestry Code authorizes the DENR to seize all
conveyances used in the commission of an offense in violation of Section
78. Section 78 states:
Sec. 78. Cutting, Gathering, and or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products without License.—Any person who shall cut, gather, collect,
remove timber or other forest products from any forestland, or timber from
alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any
authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal
documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . . .
The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government
of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools
illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found.
This provision makes mere possession of timber or other forest products
without the accompanying legal documents unlawful and punishable with
the penalties imposed for the crime of theft, as prescribed in Articles
309-310 of the Revised Penal Code. In the present case, the subject
vehicles were loaded with forest products at the time of the seizure. But
admittedly no permit evidencing authority to possess and transport said
load of forest products was duly presented. These products, in turn, were
deemed illegally sourced. Thus there was a prima facie violation of Section
68 [78] of the Revised Forestry Code, although as found by the trial court,
the persons responsible for said violation were not the ones charged by the
public prosecutor.
30
 The corresponding authority of the DENR to seize all conveyances used
in the commission of an offense in violation of Section 78 of the Revised
Forestry Code is pursuant to Sections 78-A and 89 of the same Code. They
read as follows:
Sec. 78-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation.—In all cases of violation
of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department
Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of
any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the
commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with
pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 89. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions.—A forest officer or employee
of the Bureau [Department] or any personnel of the Philippine
Constabulary/Philippine National Police shall arrest even without
warrant any person who has committed or is committing in his presence
any of the offenses defined in this Chapter. He shall also seize and
confiscate, in favor of the Government, the tools and equipment used in
committing the offense . . . [Emphasis supplied.]
Note that DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990, implements
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code, as follows:
Sec. 2. Conveyances Subject to Confiscation and Forfeiture.—All
conveyances used in the transport of any forest product obtained or
gathered illegally whether or not covered with transport documents, found
spurious or irregular in accordance with Sec. 68-A [78-A] of P.D. No. 705,
shall be confiscated in favor of the government or disposed of in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
Sec. 4. Who are Authorized to Seize Conveyance.—The Secretary or
his duly authorized representative such as the forest officers and/or natural
resources officers, or deputized officers of the DENR are authorized to
seizesaid conveyances subject to policies and guidelines pertinent thereto.
Deputized military personnel and officials of other agencies apprehending
illegal logs and other forest products and their conveyances shall notify the
nearest DENR field offices, and turn over said forest products and
conveyances for proper action and disposition. In case where the
apprehension is made by DENR field officer, the conveyance shall be
deposited with the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED Office as the case may
be, for safekeeping wherever it is most convenient and secured. [Emphasis
supplied.]
Upon apprehension of the illegally-cut timber while being transported
without pertinent documents that could evidence title to or right to
possession of said timber, a warrantless seizure of the involved vehicles
and their load was allowed under Sections 78 and 89 of the Revised
Forestry Code.
Note further that petitioners’ failure to observe the procedure outlined in
DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1990 was justifiably explained.
Petitioners did not submit a report of the seizure to the Secretary nor give a
written notice to the owner of the vehicle because on the 3rd day following
the seizure, Gabon and Abuganda, drivers of the seized vehicles, forcibly
took the impounded vehicles from the custody of the DENR. Then again,
when one of the motor vehicles was apprehended and impounded for the
second time, the petitioners, again were not able to report the seizure to the
DENR Secretary nor give a written notice to the owner of the vehicle
because private respondents immediately went to court and applied for a
writ of replevin. The seizure of the vehicles and their load was done upon
their apprehension for a violation of the Revised Forestry Code. It would be
absurd to require a confiscation order or notice and hearing before said
seizure could be effected under the circumstances.
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the
seizure was in accordance with law, in our view the subject vehicles were
validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for
replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law, and not otherwise.20
In Mamanteo, et al. v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, A.M. No. P-98-1264,
promulgated on July 28, 1999, the case involves property to be seized by a
Deputy Sheriff in a replevin suit. But said property were already impounded
by the DENR due to violation of forestry laws and, in fact, already forfeited
in favor of the government by order of the DENR. We said that such
property was deemed in custodia legis. The sheriff could not insist on
seizing the property already subject of a prior warrant of seizure. The
appropriate action should be for the sheriff to inform the trial court of the
situation by way of partial Sheriff’s Return, and wait for the judge’s
instructions on the proper procedure to be observed.
Note that property that is validly deposited in custodia legiscannot be the
subject of a replevin suit. In Mamanteo v. Deputy Sheriff Magumun, we
elucidated further:
“. . . the writ of replevin has been repeatedly used by unscrupulous plaintiffs
to retrieve their chattel earlier taken for violation of the Tariff and Customs
31
Code, tax assessment, attachment or execution. Officers of the court, from
the presiding judge to the sheriff, are implored to be vigilant in their
execution of the law otherwise, as in this case, valid seizure and forfeiture
proceedings could easily be undermined by the simple devise of a writ of
replevin . . .”21
On the second issue, is the complaint for the recovery of possession of the
two impounded vehicles, with an application for replevin, a suit against the
State?
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without
its consent.22 And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in
effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately
liable.23 However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine
generally applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good
faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.24 In the present case,
the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were
performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in
question are clearly official in nature.25 In implementing and enforcing
Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out,
petitioners were performing their duties and functions as officers of the
DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority. There was no malice
nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who
represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without
the State’s consent.
Given the circumstances in this case, we need not pursue the Office of
the Solicitor General’s line for the defense of petitioners concerning
exhaustion of administrative remedies. We ought only to recall that
exhaustion must be raised at the earliest time possible, even before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, by a motion to
dismiss.26 If not invoked at the proper time, this ground for dismissal could
be deemed waived and the court could take cognizance of the case and try
it.27
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
29191 is SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Order issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, dated May 27, 1992, and the Writ of replevin issued in
the Order dated April 24, 1992, are ANNULLED. The Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court of Catbalogan, Branch 29, is directed to take possession of the
subject motor vehicle, with plate number FCN 143, for delivery to the
custody of and appropriate disposition by petitioners. Let a copy of this
decision be provided the Honorable Secretary of Justice for his appropriate
action, against any and all persons responsible for the abovecited violation
of the Revised Forestry Code.
Costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment set aside.
Notes.—In United States of America vs. Ruiz, the Supreme Court
clarified that its pronouncement in Harry Lyons vs. United States of
America, 104 Phil. 593 (1958), with respect to the waiver of State immunity,
was obiter and “has no value as an imperative authority.” (JUSMAG
Philippines vs. National Labor Relations Commission,239 SCRA
224 [1994])
When the State gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby
necessarily consent to an unrestrained execution against it. (Republic vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 263 SCRA 290 [1996])
G.R. No. 169596. March 28, 2007.*
SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,
petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and
PEDRO BALUBAL, respondents.
Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, as a
rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the parties;
Exceptions.—While it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and does
not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented by the
parties, a number of exceptions have nevertheless been recognized by the
Court. These exceptions are enumerated in Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 428 SCRA 79 (2004): It is a settled rule
that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not
a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding
on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several exceptions to this
rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
32
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court
of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. x x x (Italics in
original; underscoring supplied; citations omitted) As will be discussed
below, number 11 of the foregoing enumeration applies in the present case.
Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; In the exercise of the
Court’s equity jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may be disregarded
so that a case may be resolved on its merits.—Respecting the second
procedural issue, as a rule, the failure of a petitioner to comply with any of
the requirements under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court regarding
the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition
constitutes sufficient ground for its dismissal. In the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may be disregarded so that a case
may be resolved on its merits. As held in Durban Apartments Corporation v.
Catacutan, 477 SCRA 801 (2005): It is well to remember that this Court, in
not a few cases, has consistently held that cases shall be determined on
the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes
and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of
cases purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of
procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat
their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict
and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote justice must be avoided.
Actions; Replevin; Words and Phrases; In a complaint for replevin, the
claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly
entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the
defendant, who is in actual or legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains
the same; The term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or
recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or
detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court and
return the goods if defeated in the action.”—On to the substantive
issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 587 (1991), discusses the
term replevin as follows: The term replevin is popularly understood as “the
return to or recovery by a person of goods or chattels claimed to
be wrongfully taken or detained upon the person’s giving security to try the
matter in court and return the goods if defeated in the action”; “the writ by or
the common-law action in which goods and chattels are replevied,” i.e.,
taken or gotten back by a writ for replevin”; and to replevy, means to
recover possession by an action of replevin; to take possession of goods or
chattels under a replevin order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin
as “a form of action which lies to regain the possession of personal chattels
which have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by
virtue of which the sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the
property therein described and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving
pledges which are satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title, or return the
chattels taken if he fail so to do; the same authority states that the term, “to
replevy” means “to redeliver goods which have been distrained to the
original possessor of them, on his giving pledges in an action of replevin.”
The term therefore may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of
personalty, or the provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by
which possession of the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and
retained during the pendency of the action. (Emphasis and italics supplied;
citations omitted) In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly
show that he is either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the
object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or
legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.
Same; Searches and Seizures; The seizures and impounding of a
vehicle involved in an accident, on a policeman’s request, is unquestionably
violative of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the
Constitution.—In upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, the
Court of Appeals held that while “there is no law authorizing the impounding
of a vehicle involved in an accident by the police authorities, x x x neither is
there a law making the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents illegal.”
It added that “the Supreme Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut
policy or rule on the matter.” The appellate court is mistaken. The
Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. Thus, Section
2, Article III provides: The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
33
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. (Italics supplied) The seizure and impounding of
petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request, were unquestionably violative of “the
right to be let alone” by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Same; Same; Custodia Legis; Words and Phrases; The rule that
property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied applies
only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in accordance with
the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted
exceptions; “A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been
and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in
pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only when property is lawfully
taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of the law,
and not otherwise.—That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was
criminally charged for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property
in which the bus could possibly be held as evidence does not affect the
outcome of this case. As explained in Bagalihog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA
614 (1991): It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case
cannot be replevied. But the rule applies only where the property is lawfully
held, that is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless
searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of
litigation is not by that fact alone in custodia legis. As the Court said
in Tamisin v. Odejar, 108 Phil. 560 (1960), “A thing is in custodia legis when
it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a
judicial executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only
when property is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in
the custody of the law, and not otherwise. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; italics in the original; citations omitted) Petitioner’s prayer for
recovery of possession of the bus is, in light of the foregoing discussion,
thus in order.
Same; Same; Same; Where the police authorities have turned over the
vehicle to a third person, a contract of deposit was perfected between them
and the latter.—As for petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds that it
cannot pass upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other police
officer responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The
police authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to
respondents for safekeeping, a contract of deposit was perfected between
them and respondents.
Same; Parties; Pleadings and Practice; Non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.—Petitioner’s failure to
implead indispensable parties is not, of course, fatal to its cause of action,
misjoinder or non-joinder of parties not being a ground for its
dismissal. Domingo v. Scheer, 421 SCRA 468 [2004] elucidates: However,
the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of
an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Glenna Jean R. Organ and Fatima L. Caluya for respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review is the Court of Appeals’ Decision1dated
September 6, 2005 dismissing for lack of merit the appeal of petitioner
Superlines Transportation Company, Inc. (petitioner), docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 61144.
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of providing public
transportation. On December 13, 1990, one of its buses, while traveling
north and approaching the Alabang northbound exit lane, swerved and
crashed into the radio room of respondent Philippine National Construction
Company (PNCC).
The incident was initially investigated by respondent PNCC’s toll way
patrol, Sofronio Salvanera, and respondent Pedro Balubal (Balubal), then
head of traffic control and security department of the South Luzon
tollway.2 The bus3 was thereafter turned over to the Alabang Traffic
Bureau for it to conduct its own investigation of the incident. Because of
lack of adequate space, the bus was, on request of traffic investigator Pat.
Cesar Lopera (Lopera), towed by the PNCC patrol to its compound where it
was stored.4
Subsequently, petitioner made several requests for PNCC to release the
bus, but respondent Balubal denied the same, despite petitioner’s
undertaking to repair the damaged radio room. Respondent Balubal instead
demanded the sum of P40,000.00, or a collateral with the same value,
representing respondent PNCC’s estimate of the cost of reconstruction of
34
the damaged radio room. By petitioner’s estimate, however, the damage
amounted to P10,000.00 only.5
Petitioner thus filed a complaint for recovery of personal property
(replevin) with damages6 against respondents PNCC and Balubal with the
Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, praying as follows:
xxxx
. 2.after trial on the issues, judgment be rendered—
. a)adjudging that plaintiff has the right to the possession of subject
personal property and awarding the material possession of said
property to plaintiff as the sole and absolute owner thereof;
. b)ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the
following:
. (1)the sum of P500,000.00 representing unrealized income as of
the date of the filing of the instant complaint and, thereafter, the
sum of P7,500.00 daily until subject passenger bus shall have been
delivered to and in actual material possession of plaintiff;
. (2)the sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees;
. (3)the sum of P20,000.00 as litis expenses; and
. (4)the cost of suit.7
In view of its inability to put up the bond for the issuance of a writ of replevin,
petitioner opted to forego the same and just wait for the court’s final
judgment.
In respondents’ Answer8 to the complaint, they claimed that they merely
towed the bus to the PNCC compound for safekeeping pursuant to an order
from the police authorities; that respondent Balubal did not release the bus
to petitioner in the absence of an order from the police authorities; that
petitioner, in claiming the bus, failed to present the certificate of registration
and official receipt of payment to establish ownership thereof; and that the
bus subject of the complaint was not the same bus involved in the
December 13, 1990 accident.
By way of Counterclaim, respondents prayed for the award of
P40,326.54 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and
P130,000.00 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
By Decision of December 9, 1997, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s
complaint. On respondents’ Counterclaim, it ordered petitioner to pay
respondent PNCC the amount of P40,320.00 representing actual damages
to the radio room
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals9 which held that the storage
of the bus for safekeeping purposes partakes of the nature of a deposit,
hence, custody or authority over it remained with Lopera who ordered its
safekeeping; and that Lopera acted as respondent PNCC’s agent, hence,
absent any instruction from him, respondent PNCC may not release the
bus.
The appellate court thus concluded that the case should have been
brought against the police authorities instead of respondents.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Before proceeding to the substantive issues raised in the petition, the
Court resolves to dispose first the procedural issues raised by respondents
in their Comment.10
Respondents contend that the petition raises only questions of fact and
suffers from a procedural defect in that it failed to include “such material
portions of the record as would support the petition” as required under
Section 4, Rule 4511 of the Rules of Court, hence, it should be dismissed
outright.
Contrary to respondents’ contention, the petition raises questions of
law foremost of which is whether the owner of a personal property may
initiate an action for replevin against a depositary and recover damages for
illegal distraint.
In any event, while it is settled that this Court is not a trier of facts and
does not, as a rule, undertake a re-examination of the evidence presented
by the parties, a number of exceptions have nevertheless been recognized
by the Court. These exceptions are enumerated in Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals:12
35
“It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of
review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the
re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during
the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are
conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized
several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. x x x” (Italics in original; italics supplied; citations omitted)
As will be discussed below, number 11 of the foregoing enumeration
applies in the present case.
Respecting the second procedural issue, as a rule, the failure of a
petitioner to comply with any of the requirements under Section 4, Rule 45
of the Rules of Court regarding the contents of and the documents which
should accompany the petition constitutes sufficient ground for its
dismissal.13
In the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, however, procedural lapses may
be disregarded so that a case may be resolved on its merits. As held
in Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan:14
“It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently
held that cases shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all
parties for ventilation of their causes and defense, rather than on
technicality or some procedural imperfections. In so doing, the ends of
justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely on technical
grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not
override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed,
rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the resolution of
cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of
the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice must be avoided.
x x x x” (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The facts and circumstances attendant to the case dictate that, in the
interest of substantial justice, this Court resolves it on the merits.
On to the substantive issues. Tillson v. Court of Appeals15discusses the
term replevin as follows:
“The term replevin is popularly understood as “the return to or recovery by a
person of goods or chattels claimed to be wrongfully taken or
detained upon the person’s giving security to try the matter in court and
return the goods if defeated in the action”; “the writ by or the common-law
action in which goods and chattels are replevied,” i.e., taken or gotten back
by a writ for replevin”; and to replevy, means to recover possession by an
action of replevin; to take possession of goods or chattels under a replevin
order. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defines replevin as “a form of action which
lies to regain the possession of personal chattels which have been taken
from the plaintiff unlawfully x x x, (or as) the writ by virtue of which the
sheriff proceeds at once to take possession of the property therein
described and transfer it to the plaintiff upon his giving pledges which are
satisfactory to the sheriff to prove his title, or return the chattels taken if he
fail so to do; the same authority states that the term, “to replevy” means “to
re-deliver goods which have been distrained to the original possessor of
them, on his giving pledges in an action of replevin.” The term therefore
may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of personality, or the
provisional remedy traditionally associated with it, by which possession of
the property may be obtain[ed] by the plaintiff and retained during the
pendency of the action.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted)
In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is
either the owner or clearly entitled to the possession of the object sought to
be recovered,16 and that the defendant, who is in actual or legal
possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same.17
Petitioner’s ownership of the bus being admitted by
respondents,18 consideration of whether respondents have been
wrongfully detaining it is in order.
Following the conduct of an investigation of the accident, the bus was
towed by respondents on the request of Lopera.19
36
 It was thus not distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine
pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis.
In upholding the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint, the Court of Appeals
held that while “there is no law authorizing the impounding of a vehicle
involved in an accident by the police authorities, x x x neither is there a law
making the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents illegal.” It added
that “the Supreme Court is of the view that there is yet no clear-cut policy or
rule on the matter.”20 The appellate court is mistaken.
The Constitution grants the right against unreasonable seizures. Thus,
Section 2, Article III provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” (Italics supplied)
The seizure and impounding of petitioner’s bus, on Lopera’s request, were
unquestionably violative of “the right to be let alone” by the authorities as
guaranteed by the Constitution.21
The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Victory Liner, Inc. v. Bellosillo22 to
justify the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents by police authorities
is misplaced. The Victory Liner case was an administrative case against a
trial court judge. This Court explicitly declined to rule on the legality of such
an order:
“In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to
determine the issue of the legality of respondent’s order requiring VLI to
post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have
raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less
by way of an administrative case. x x x
xxxx
To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon
directly from us through an administrative case would be to countenance a
disregard of the established rules of procedure and of the hierarchy of
courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with the requirements
inherent in the filing of a property petition, including the payment of docket
fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that issue in this
case.”23(Italics supplied)
This Court’s statement in Victory Liner on the lack of a “clear-cut policy”
refers to the practice, rightly or wrongly, of trial court judges of issuing
orders for the impounding of vehicles involved in accidents. It has no
application to the instant case which involves the seizure and distraint
implemented by respondents upon a verbal order by Lopera without the
benefit or color of legality afforded by a court process, writ or order.
That a year after the incident the driver of the bus was criminally charged
for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property in which the bus
could possibly be held as evidence does not affect the outcome of this
case.24 As explained in Bagalihog v. Fernandez:25
“It is true that property held as evidence in a criminal case cannot be
replevied. But the rule applies only where the property is lawfully held, that
is, seized in accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and
seizures or its accepted exceptions. Property subject of litigation is not by
that fact alone in custodia legis. As the Court said in Tamisin v.
Odejar,26 “A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and
is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive officer in
pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.” Only when property
is lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the custody of
the law, and not otherwise.” (Emphasis and italics supplied; italics in the
original; citations omitted)
Petitioner’s prayer for recovery of possession of the bus is, in light of the
foregoing discussion, thus in order.
As for petitioner’s claim for damages, the Court finds that it cannot pass
upon the same without impleading Lopera and any other police officer
responsible for ordering the seizure and distraint of the bus. The police
authorities, through Lopera, having turned over the bus to respondents for
safekeeping, a contract of deposit27 was perfected between them and
respondents.
Petitioner’s failure to implead indispensable parties is not, of course,
fatal to its cause of action, misjoinder or non-joinder of parties not being a
ground for its dismissal.28 Domingo v. Scheer29elucidates: “However, the
non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action. Parties may be added by order of the court on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as
37
are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition
for the petitioner/plaintiff’s failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to
implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.” (Emphasis and italics
supplied; citations omitted)
For petitioner to pursue its claim for damages then, it or the trial court motu
proprio may implead as defendants the indispensable parties—Lopera and
any other responsible police officers.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
The prayer of petitioner, Superlines Transportation Company, Inc., for
recovery of possession of personal property is GRANTED.
The records of the case are REMANDED to the court of origin, the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Gumaca, Quezon, which is DIRECTED to
REINSTATE petitioner’s complaint to its docket if petitioner is still interested
to pursue its claim for damages and to act in accordance with the foregoing
pronouncement of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Assailed decision reversed and set aside.
Notes.—It is error for a court to order a creditor to return the car earlier
seized by virtue of a writ of replevin or to pay its equivalent value when the
debtor has not yet been fully paid the purchase price. (Orosa vs. Court of
Appeals, 329 SCRA 652[2000])
A property that is validly deposited in custodia legis cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit. (Calub vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA
55 [2000])
G.R. No. 187944. March 12, 2014.*
CARMENCITA SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. MR. and MRS. FELIX E. EMBOY,
JR. and MARILOU P. EMBOY-DELANTAR, respondents.
Civil Law; Possession; The registered owner of real property is entitled
to its possession.—“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property
is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest
possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To
recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once
he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Unlawful Detainer; Jurisdictional
Facts That Must Be Alleged and Sufficiently Established in a Complaint for
Unlawful Detainer.—In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key
jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established: (1) initially,
possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within
one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Same; Accion Publiciana; Accion Reivindicatoria; When the complaint
fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where
it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.—This Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to
effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary
that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to
bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes
provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings
are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the
face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either
be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Romeo J. Balili for petitioner.
Steve R. Siclot for respondents.
38
REYES, J.:
For review in the instant Petition1 is the Decision2 rendered on March 19,
2009 and Resolution3 issued on May 5, 2009 by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489. The CA granted the Petition for Review4 filed by
Mr. and Mrs. Felix Emboy, Jr. (Felix) and Marilou Emboy-Delantar (Marilou)
(respondents), seeking to reverse the decisions of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 12,5 and Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
3,6of Cebu City, rendered on February 26, 2008 in Civil Case No.
CEB-33328,7 and on September 25, 2006 in Civil Case No. R-49832,
respectively. The RTC affirmed the MTCC in upholding the claims of
Carmencita Suarez (Carmencita) in her complaint for unlawful detainer
instituted against the respondents.
Antecedents
At the center of the dispute is a 222-square meter parcel of land,
designated as Lot No. 1907-A-2 (subject lot) of the subdivision plan
Psd-165686, situated in Barangay Duljo, Cebu City, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-174880 issued in the name of
Carmencita on February 9, 2005. The subject lot used to be a part of Lot No.
1907-A,8 which was partitioned in the following manner among the heirs of
Spouses Carlos Padilla (Carlos) and Asuncion Pacres (Asuncion):9
A house, which is occupied by respondents Felix and Marilou, stands in
the subject lot. The respondents claim that their mother, Claudia, had
occupied the subject lot during her lifetime and it was earmarked to become
her share in Lot No. 1907-A. They had thereafter stayed in the subject lot
for decades after inheriting the same from Claudia, who had in turn
succeeded her own parents, Carlos and Asuncion.11
In 2004, respondents Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins,
who are the Heirs of Vicente, to vacate the subject lot and to transfer to Lot
No. 1907-A-5, a landlocked portion sans a right of way. They refused to
comply insisting that Claudia’s inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.12
Not long after, the respondents received from Carmencita’s counsel,
Atty. Jufelenito R. Pareja (Atty. Pareja), a demand letter, dated February 23,
2004, requiring them to vacate the subject lot. They were informed that
Carmencita had already purchased on February 12, 2004 the subject lot
from the former’s relatives. However, the respondents did not heed the
demand. Instead, they examined the records pertaining to the subject lot
and uncovered possible anomalies, i.e., forged signatures and alterations,
in the execution of a series of deeds of partition relative to Lot No. 1907-A.
On August 13, 2004, they filed before the RTC of Cebu City a
complaint13 for nullification of the partition and for the issuance of new
TCTs covering the heirs’ respective portions of Lot No. 1907-A.14
On December 8, 2004, Carmencita filed before the MTCC and against
the respondents a complaint for unlawful detainer, the origin of the instant
petition. She alleged that she bought the subject lot from Remedios,
Moreno, Veronica and Dionesia,15 the registered owners thereof and the
persons who allowed the respondents to occupy the same by mere
tolerance. As their successor-in-interest, she claimed her entitlement to
possession of the subject lot and the right to demand from the respondents
to vacate the same.16
The MTCC upheld Carmencita’s claims in its decision rendered on
September 25, 2006. The respondents were ordered to vacate the subject
lot and remove at their expense all the improvements they had built thereon.
They were likewise made solidarily liable to pay Carmencita Php 20,000.00
as attorney’s fees.17
In the Decision dated February 26, 2008, the RTC affirmed in its entirety
the MTCC ruling.18
The respondents challenged the MTCC and RTC judgments through a
Petition for Review19 filed before the CA. The respondents argued that they
have been occupying the subject lot in the concept of owners for several
decades. Carmencita, on the other hand, was a buyer in bad faith for
having purchased the property despite the notice of lis pendens clearly
annotated on the subject lot’s title. Even her complaint for unlawful detainer
was filed on December 8, 2004 subsequent to the respondents’ institution
on August 13, 2004 of a petition for nullification of the partition.
Citing Sarmiento v. CA,20 the respondents emphasized that “even if one is
the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be wrested from
another who had been in the physical or material possession of the same
39
for more than one year by resorting to a summary action of
ejectment.”21 The respondents also invoked the doctrine enunciated
in Amagan v. Marayag22 that the pendency of another action anchored on
the issue of ownership justifies the suspension of an ejectment suit
involving the same real property. The foregoing is especially true in the
case at bar where the issue of possession is so interwoven with that of
ownership. Besides, the resolution of the question of ownership would
necessarily result in the disposition of the issue of possession.
The respondents also stressed that the deed of sale dated April 1, 2004,
which was attached to the complaint for unlawful detainer, bore tell-tale
signs of being spurious. First, Atty. Pareja’s demand letter sent to the
respondents instead referred to a deed of sale dated February 12,
2004. Secondly, Teresita, who now lives in Luzon and has been estranged
from Moreno since the 1980s, was a signatory in the deed of sale. Thirdly, a
certain Veronida Padilla, a fictitious person, also signed the deed of sale as
among the vendors, but she, too, was impleaded as a co-defendant in the
ejectment suit. Fourthly, the deed was only registered the following year
after its supposed execution.
The respondents insisted that the Heirs of Vicente, who had allegedly
sold the subject lot to Carmencita, had never physically occupied the same.
Hence, there was no basis at all for Carmencita’s claim that the
respondents’ possession of the subject lot was by mere tolerance of the
alleged owners.
The respondents also presented before the CA a newly discovered
evidence, which they found in an old wooden chest in their ancestral home.
A duly notarized document captioned as an “Agreement,”23 dated February
23, 1957, showed that Vicente and his spouse, Dionesia, had waived their
hereditary rights to Lot No. 1907-A. The document stated that Vicente
obtained a loan from the Philippine National Bank using Lot No. 1907-A as
a collateral. The loan was paid by Carlos and Asuncion and the waiver must
have been executed in order to be fair to Vicente’s siblings. Prescinding
from the above, the Heirs of Vicente no longer had ownership rights over
the subject lot to convey to Carmencita.
The respondents also averred that Carmencita’s complaint lacked a
cause of action. The certification to file an action was issued by the officials
of Barangay Duljo in the name of James Tan Suarez, Carmencita’s brother,
who had no real rights or interests over the subject lot. Further, while
Carmencita based her claim over the subject lot by virtue of a deed of sale
executed on April 1, 2004, no demand to vacate was made upon the
respondents after that date. The absence of such demand rendered the
complaint fatally defective, as the date of its service should be the
reckoning point of the one-year period within which the suit can be filed.
In support of the respondents’ prayer for the issuance of injunctive reliefs,
they argued that their loss would be irreparable. Moreover, the resolution of
the respondents’ petition for nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A,
in which Carmencita was likewise impleaded as a defendant, would be
rendered useless in the event that the latter’s complaint for unlawful
detainer would be granted and the former’s ancestral house demolished.
The Ruling of the CA
On March 19, 2009, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision
reversing the disquisitions of the courts a quo and dismissing Carmencita’s
complaint for unlawful detainer. The CA explained:
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject
to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived
of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together
with damages and costs.
The distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer was lucidly
explained in Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals:
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions
defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. [In] forcible entry,
one is deprived of physical pos-
685session of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
40
 possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible
entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic
inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful
detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became unlawful
by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the
issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the
defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is
the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in possession.
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s
entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be
filed against the intruder within one (1) year therefrom is forcible
entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which
must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the last demand.
A close perusal of [Carmencita’s] complaint a quo reveals that the action
was neither one of forcible entry nor unlawful detainer but essentially
involved an issue of ownership which must be resolved in an accion
reivindicatoria. It did not characterize [the respondents’] alleged entry into
the land: whether the same was legal or illegal. It did not state how [the
respondents] entered the land and constructed a house thereon. It was also
silent on whether [the respondents’] possession became legal before
[Carmencita] demanded from them to vacate the land. The complaint
merely averred that their relatives previously owned the lot [the
respondents] were occupying and that after [Carmencita] purchased it[,]
she, as its new owner, demanded [for the respondents] to vacate the
686land. Moreover, it is undisputed that [the respondents] and their
ancestors have been occupying the land for several decades already.
There was no averment as to how or when [Carmencita’s] predecessors
tolerated [the respondents’] possession of the land. Consequently, there
was no contract to speak of, whether express or implied, between [the
respondents], on one hand, and [Carmencita] or her predecessors, on the
other, as would qualify [the respondents’] possession of the land as a case
of unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that [the respondents] took
possession of the land through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth
to make out a case of forcible entry. In any event, [Carmencita] cannot
legally assert that [the respondents’] possession of the land was by mere
tolerance. This is because [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest did not
yet own the property when [Claudia] took possession thereof. Take note
that [Carmencita’s] predecessors-in-interest merely stepped into the shoes
of their parents who were also co-heirs of [Claudia]. Finally, to categorize a
cause of action as one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present from the start of the possession
which he later seek[s] to recover. This is clearly wanting in the case at bar.
Indeed, when the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in
the proper RTC. If [Carmencita] is truly the owner of the subject property
and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or
ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the RTC in
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the
municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or
forcible entry.
Munoz vs. Court of Appeals enunciated:
For even if he is the owner, possession of the property cannot be
wrested from another who had been in possession thereof for more
687than twelve (12) years through a summary action for ejectment.
Although admittedly[,] petitioner may validly claim ownership based
on the muniments of title it presented, such evidence does not
responsibly address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a
forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in
time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property
until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.24 (Citations omitted and
underscoring supplied)
In Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration25 filed before the CA, she
alleged that the case of Sarmiento cited by the respondents is not
applicable to the present controversy since it involves a boundary dispute,
which is properly the subject of an accion reivindicatoria and over which the
MTCC has no jurisdiction. She claimed that Rivera v. Rivera26 finds more
relevance in the case at bar. In Rivera, the contending parties were each
other’s relatives and the Court ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, prior
41
physical possession by the complainant is not necessary.27 Instead, what is
required is a better right of possession. Further, the MTCC cannot be
divested of jurisdiction just because the defendants assert ownership over
the disputed property.
In the herein assailed Resolution dated May 5, 2009, the CA denied
Carmencita’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In essence, the instant petition presents the following issues:
I Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally
Whether or not Carmencita’s complaint against the respondents had
sufficiently alleged and proven a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
II
Whether or not the pendency of the respondents’ petition for nullification of
partition of Lot No. 1907-A and for the issuance of new certificates of title
can abate Carmencita’s ejectment suit.
Carmencita’s Allegations
In support of the petition, Carmencita reiterates that she purchased the
subject lot from the Heirs of Vicente, who were then the registered owners
thereof. At the time of the sale, respondents Felix and Marilou were
occupying the subject lot. Thus, Atty. Pareja, in Carmencita’s behalf,
demanded that they vacate the property. The respondents’ refusal to
comply with the demand turned them into deforciants unlawfully withholding
the possession of the subject lot from Carmencita, the new owner, whose
recourse was to file a complaint for unlawful detainer.
Further, Carmencita insists that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
a collateral attack28 and the issue of ownership cannot be resolved in an
action for unlawful detainer. A pending suit involving the question of
ownership of a piece of real property will not abate an ejectment complaint
as the two are not based on the same cause of action and are seeking
different reliefs.29
Additionally, Carmencita invokes the doctrine in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. v. CA30 that the registered owner of a property is entitled to its
possession. In Arcal v. CA,31 the Court also explained that the occupation
of a property not by its registered owner but by others depends on the
former’s tolerance, and the occupants are bound by an implied promise to
vacate upon demand, failing at which, a suit for ejectment would be
proper.32
The Respondents’ Arguments
In their Comment33 to the instant petition, the respondents stress that
inadequate. There was practically no specific averment as to when and how
possession by tolerance of the respondents began. In the complaint,
Carmencita made a general claim that the respondents possessed “the
property by mere tolerance ‘with the understanding that they would
voluntarily vacate the premises and remove their house(s) thereon upon
demand by the owners.’”34 In Spouses Valdez, Jr. v. CA,35 the Court ruled
that the failure of the complainants to allege key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal and deprives the MTCC of
jurisdiction over the action.
In their rejoinder,36 the respondents likewise argue that the issues of
possession and ownership are inseparably linked in the case at bar.
Carmencita’s complaint for ejectment was based solely on her spurious title,
which is already the subject of the respondents’ petition for nullification of
partition of Lot No. 1907-A.
Our Disquisition
The instant petition lacks merit.
Carmencita had not amply alleged
and proven that all the requisites
for unlawful detainer are present
in the case at bar.
“Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its
possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof
from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession,
he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what
42
action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such
action to prosper.”37
In Spouses Valdez, Jr.,38 the Court is instructive anent the three kinds of
actions available to recover possession of real property, viz.:
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,
forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico) [sic]. In
forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by
means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in
unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry,
the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the
issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies
in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions
must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in
case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the
complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal,
the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but
an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action
to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an
ordinary civil proceeding.39 (Citations omitted)
In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts
must be alleged and sufficiently established:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with
or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.40
In the case at bar, the first requisite mentioned above is markedly absent.
Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how and when the
respondents entered the subject lot and constructed a house upon
it.41 Carmencita was likewise conspicuously silent about the details on who
specifically permitted the respondents to occupy the lot, and how and when
such tolerance came about.42 Instead, Carmencita cavalierly formulated a
legal conclusion, sans factual substantiation, that (a) the respondents’ initial
occupation of the subject lot was lawful by virtue of tolerance by the
registered owners, and (b) the respondents became deforciants unlawfully
withholding the subject lot’s possession after Carmencita, as purchaser and
new registered owner, had demanded for the former to vacate the
property.43 It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite assumes
even more importance in the light of the respondents’ claim that for
decades, they have been occupying the subject lot as owners thereof.
Again, this Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the
complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the
party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a
remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face
of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either
be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.44
As an exception to the general rule,
the respondents’ petition for nulli-
fication of the partition of Lot No.
1907-A can abate Carmencita’s suit
for unlawful detainer.
In Amagan, the Court is emphatic that:
43
 As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of
the same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings.
“The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the
Regional Trial Court did not involve physical or de facto possession, and,
on not a few occasions, that the case in the Regional Trial Court was
merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the
issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses
in the ejectment action and there resolved.”
Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the
pending civil action. One such exception is Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño,
wherein the Court declared:
“x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as
distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the plaintiff to
recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a proper judicial
proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of
confusion and disturbance of physical possession, with all its
concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court in which the
issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is
brought to restrain, should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed
with it, the effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer
case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive case
involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has
been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy the right to
physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favor of the
prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might
ultimately be found to have superior claim to the premises involved,
thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possession thru force,
strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts.”
xxxx
Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in
the demolition of the house subject of the ejectment suit; thus, by parity of
reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectment
proceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent’s suit is
one of unlawful detainer and not of forcible entry. And most certainly, the
ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their
695house, a matter that is likely to create the “confusion, disturbance,
inconveniences and expenses” mentioned in the said exceptional case.
Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision would cause the
respondent to go through the whole gamut of enforcing it by physically
removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been
occupying since 1937. (Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land,
not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courts will be
wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the
outcome is at best temporary, but the result of enforcement is permanent,
unjust and probably irreparable.
We should stress that respondent’s claim to physical possession is
based not on an expired or a violated contract of lease, but allegedly on
“mere tolerance.” Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the
quieting of title, we deem it judicious under the present exceptional
circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.45 (Citations omitted)
The Court then quoted with favor the following portion of the Decision
dated July 8, 1997, penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in
CA-G.R. No. 43611-SP, from which the Amagan case sprang:
“ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for
unlawful detainer on the theory that petitioners’ possession of the property
in question was by mere tolerance. However, in answer to his demand
letter dated April 13, 1996 x x x, petitioners categorically denied having any
agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are ‘owners of the
premises we are occupying at 108 J.P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang,
Cavite.’ In other words, it is not merely physical possession but ownership
as well that is involved in this case.[”]
“TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question,
petitioners filed an action for reconveyance, quieting of title and damages
against private respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1682 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is
squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will
be determinative of who is entitled to the possession of the premises in
question.[”]
“THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case will include the removal of the petitioners’ house [from] the lot
in question.[”]
44
 “To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay inequitable, to allow
demolition of petitioners’ house prior to the determination of the question of
ownership [of] the lot on which it stands.”46 (Citation omitted)
We find the doctrines enunciated in Amagan squarely applicable to the
instant petition for reasons discussed hereunder.
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer is anchored upon the
proposition that the respondents have been in possession of the subject lot
by mere tolerance of the owners. The respondents, on the other hand, raise
the defense of ownership of the subject lot and point to the pendency of
Civil Case No. CEB-30548, a petition for nullification of the partition of Lot
No. 1907-A, in which Carmencita and the Heirs of Vicente were impleaded
as parties. Further, should Carmencita’s complaint be granted, the
respondents’ house, which has been standing in the subject lot for decades,
would be subject to demolition. The foregoing circumstances, thus, justify
the exclusion of the instant petition from the purview of the general rule.
All told, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in dismissing
Carmencita’s complaint for unlawful detainer. As discussed above, the
jurisdictional requirement of possession by mere tolerance of the owners
had not been amply alleged and proven. Moreover, circumstances exist
which justify the abatement of the ejectment proceedings. Carmencita can
ventilate her ownership claims in an action more suited for the purpose.
The respondents, on other hand, need not be exposed to the risk of having
their house demolished pending the resolution of their petition for
nullification of the partition of Lot No. 1907-A, where ownership over the
subject lot is likewise presented as an issue.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision rendered on March 19, 2009 and Resolution issued on May 5,
2009 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 03489 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and
Villarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is
entitled to its possession; To recover possession, he must resort to the
proper judicial remedy and once he chooses what action to file, he is
required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
(Carbonilla vs. Abiera, 625 SCRA 461 [2010])
Unlawful detainer involves the person’s withholding from another of the
possession of the real property which the latter is entitled after the
expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the
contract either expressed or implied. (Id.)
G.R. No. 167554. February 26, 2008.*
ROMEO ASIS, OSCAR ASIS and EDUARDO ASIS,
petitioners, vs. CONSUELO ASIS VDA. DE GUEVARRA, respondent.
Ejectments; Jurisdictions; Ownerships; The Chua Peng Hian v. Court
of Appeals (133 SCRA 572 [1984]) doctrine should be taken in light of
Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is
categorical—the issue of ownership raised as a defense will
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
581not oust the MeTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as the
court can rule on the issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has
right to possess the disputed property.—Petitioners cannot negate the
jurisdiction of the MeTC by invoking the Chua Peng Hian case. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, the RTC erred when it was applied to the case at bar.
What was filed therein was an action for specific performance [with the then
Court of First Instance], and it was the defendant there who raised the issue
that the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction, implying that the case
was really an issue of possession. Thus, it was in this context that this
Court held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case, not
only because the issues raised do not only involve the possession of the
land, but also the rights of the parties to the building constructed thereon.
This portion of the Chua Peng Hian decision therefore was taken out of
context by the RTC when it quoted the same to justify its ruling that the
MeTC had no jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, the Chua Peng
Hian doctrine enunciated in the 1984 case should be taken in light of
Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is
categorical. The issue of ownership raised as a defense will not oust the
MeTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as the court can rule on the
issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has right to possess the
disputed property. “When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
45
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Relation to Exercise of
Jurisdiction Over Issues of Ownership in Ejectment Proceedings.—To
ensure that the above policy would be maintained, Refugia also laid down
the following guidelines to be observed in relation to the exercise of
jurisdiction over issues of ownership in ejectment proceedings: 1. The
primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that
ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership
may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under consideration
applies only where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of
evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of possession is dependent
upon the resolution of the question of ownership. 2. It must sufficiently
appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff really and
primarily582seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where
the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly
establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not merely one for the
recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the claim of
material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for
ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal question to be
resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for title to real
property. 3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership
where the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently
established in the ejectment case, unless it is sufficiently established that
there has been a subsequent change in or termination of that relationship
between the parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them. 4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for
unlawful detainer, is that a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner himself. Regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property and whatever may be the
character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right through an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.Corollarily, if prior possession may be
ascertained in some other way, then the inferior court cannot dwell upon or
intrude into the issue of ownership. 5. Where the question of who has prior
possession hinges on the question of who the real owner of the disputed
portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make a
declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the
same vein, where the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a
determination of the validity and interpretation of the document of title or
any other contract on which the claim of possession is premised, the
inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it
must be so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting
ownership of the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as provisional,
hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be effective with respect to the
possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the
land or building.
583
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cesar T. Verano for petitioners.
Celso O. Escobido for respondent.
PUNO, C.J.:
In an action for unlawful detainer, the municipal or metropolitan trial
court has jurisdiction when the plaintiff really and primarily seeks the
restoration of possession; even if there is a need to resolve the ownership
of the disputed property to determine who has prior possession. As long as
the issue of ownership is to be ascertained ONLY for the purpose of
determining the issue of possession, then the court can make a declaration
who among the contending parties is the real owner of the property. Any
such pronouncement is to be regarded merely as provisional, and will not
bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the
disputed property.1
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, filed under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) dated November 26, 2004 issued in CA-G.R. SP No.
76187, and the Resolution dated March 18, 2005 which denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
46
 The facts of the case are simple, and substantially culled from the CA’s
account.2
_______________
1 See Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982; 258 SCRA 347
(1996).
2 CA Decision dated November 26, 2004, CA-G.R. SP No. 76187.
See Rollo, pp. 40-43.
584Respondent Consuelo Asis Vda. de Guevarra, claiming to be the
owner of the apartment units located at 1495, 1497 and 1499 7th Street,
Fabie Subdivision, Paco, Manila, filed separate ejectment cases with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC) against her brothers Romeo,
Oscar and Eduardo, all surnamed Asis, the petitioners herein.3 In her
complaint, respondent admits that the land on which the apartment units
were built are owned in common by her and her siblings, including
petitioners,4 but alleges that she alone owns the apartment units, having
paid for the construction of the same, and that the name of petitioners had
only been included in the title of the property at the instance and
benevolence of respondent.5She then alleges that petitioners, as lessees of
the apartment units, had been paying her for several years monthly rentals
of P500.00, P1,000.00 and P2,000.00 respectively, for their occupation of
the apartment units.6 All of a sudden, and she states that for no justifiable
reason, petitioners stopped paying rent.7 Despite repeated demands, they
failed and refused to pay.8 When the matter could not be settled by
the Barangay Lupon,9 a “Certification to File Action” was issued. The cases
against petitioners were then consolidated, as they involved common
issues and questions of fact and law.
In their respective Answers, petitioners claim that they are co-owners not
only of the lot but also of the apartment units, by virtue of inheritance,
because it was their parents—the original owners of the land—who had
constructed the apartment units by way of loan and mortgage of the land
with the
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 52-67. She filed three ejectment cases, docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 161644-CV, 161645-CV and 161646-CV.
4 Id., at pp. 52, 57 and 62.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 In compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
585Philippine National Bank in 1964.10 They each claimed that they have
never paid any rental for the occupation of the apartment units to
respondent.11 Petitioner Eduardo added that any money he may have given
to respondent was in the form of abuloy (alms), since respondent was their
eldest sister, and a widow without children.12 In their petition with this Court,
they admit to having previously paid the exact amounts specified by
respondent monthly, but averred that these were not rentals but
contributions for the upkeep and maintenance of the premises.13
The records show that petitioners’ claim of co-ownership over the
apartment units is solely based on the principle of accession. They argue
that since they can establish possession of the apartment units during the
lifetime of their parents—who were then owners of the parcel of land and
the buildings/improvements situated thereon,14 then their inheritance as
compulsory heirs must necessarily include ownership not only of the land
but also of the improvements.
The MeTC ruled for respondent, finding sufficient basis for the valid
ejectment of petitioners thus:
_______________
10 Rollo, p. 68. The record also shows that petitioner Romeo Asis
alleged in his answer that respondent was no longer a co-owner or heir of
the lot or the apartment as of February 14, 1988, when their parents during
their lifetime sold the lot in question for P5,000.00 to their five siblings
(Oscar, Cesar, Linda, Alfred and Ramon), and then on the same date,
siblings Romeo, Helen and respondent herself sold their 1/5 share to their
brothers Ruben and Eduardo for P5,000.00, through a Deed of Sale. Id., at
pp. 68-69. A review of the attached deed of sale revealed, however, that the
sale involved the excess share of the siblings, so as to effect a 1/5
ownership of each of the siblings over the lot. Id., at p. 123.
47
 11 Id., at pp. 67, 72, and 79.
12 Id., at p. 79.
13 Id., at p. 13.
14 Id., at p. 21.
586
“On the issue of whether or not [respondent] could validly eject the
[petitioners] from the apartment [units], the Court find[s] basis to sustain the
[respondent].
[Petitioners] claim that they, together with the [respondent] are co-owners
not only of the lot but also of the apartment [units]. They posit this claim by
their mere argument that the accessory follows the principal. But this issue
should not be resolved by a blinded adherence to such legal principle when
evidence shows otherwise.
[Respondent] never denied that the lot upon which the apartment [units
were] erected is owned in common by her and her siblings. She claims
ownership only on the apartment [units]. She support[s] this with the
records of her real property loan with the [Social Security Systems] and the
Tax Declaration which are solely in her name. [Petitioners] have nothing to
refute the authenticity of the said documents other than their naked claim
and stubborn insistence of co-ownership.
[Petitioners] could not also convince this Court that what they were paying
to the [respondent] were not rents but contribution to the upkeep and
maintenance of the premises as well as aid to the [respondent] who is their
elder sister. On the face of this gratuitous allegation[s], [respondent] has
presented several receipts to establish that defendants were paying rental
but stopped doing so[,] prompting her to file the instant case for ejectment.
[Petitioners] submitted no evidence to disprove their authenticity.15
The MeTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent, as follows:
Civil Case No. 161644-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Romeo Asis and all person[s] claiming rights
under him to vacate Apartment No. 1497 located at 7th Street, Fabie
Subdivision, Paco, Manila;
2. Ordering [petitioner Romeo Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing his rental arrearages
from July 1998 up to February, 2000 and the amount of P500.00 a month
from March, 2000 and every month
_______________
15 Id., at p. 100.
587thereafter until he finally vacates the premises, as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises.
Civil Case No. 161645-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Oscar Asis and all person[s] claiming rights
under him to vacate Apartment No. 1495 located at 7th Street, Fabie
Subdivision, Paco, Manila;
2. Ordering [petitioner Oscar Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of
TWENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P22,000.00) representing his rental
arrearages from May, 1998 up to February 2000 and the amount of
P1,000.00 a month from March, 2000 and every month thereafter until he
finally vacates the premises, as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the premises.
Civil Case No. 161646-CV:
1. Ordering [petitioner] Eduardo Asis and all person[s] claiming rights
under him to vacate Apartment No. 1499 located at 7th Street, Fabie
Subdivision, Paco, Manila;
2. Ordering [petitioner Eduardo Asis] to pay [respondent] the sum of
THIRTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P38,000.00) representing his rental
arrearage from August, 1998 up to February, 2000 and the amount of
P2,000.00 a month from March, 2000 and every month thereafter until he
finally vacates the premises, as reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the premises.
Ordering all [petitioners] to pay [respondent], jointly and severally the
sum of P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of suit.
[Petitioners’] counterclaim[s] are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.16
48
 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)17 reversed the Consolidated
Decision of the MeTC on the ground that the latter had no jurisdiction over
the case since it involved not only possession of the lot but of the rights of
the parties on the
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 100-101.
17 Branch 17, Manila.
588building constructed thereon. Relying heavily on the case of Chua Peng
Hian v. CA,18 the RTC ruled:
“On hindsight, and yes, what escaped the attention of the [MeTC] was the
averments of the initiatory pleading, the [petitioners’] formal reaction thereto,
and papers subsequent to the preliminary conference of November 16,
1999, with respect to the controversy as to the matter of exclusive dominion
over the apartment units vis-à-vis the acknowledged co-ownership of the lot.
Indeed, there was no unanimity of thought as to ownership of the lot and
building thereon which thus constrained this Court to equate thecasus
belli at hand to the scenario portrayed by Mr. Justice Aquino in [Chua Peng
Hian vs. Court of Appeals] (133 SCRA 572, 575 [1984]; cited [in] 1
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 8th Revised Edition, 2002, at page
801) which may well apply herein, thusly.
We hold that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case.
Where the issues raised before the inferior court do not only involve
possession of the lot but also the rights of the parties to the building
constructed thereon, the Court of First Instance and not the municipal or
city court has jurisdiction over the case. (citations and emphasis omitted)
Even then, and mindful of the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellate court can hardly render a
categorical disposition based on the entire record in accordance with
Section 7 thereof, relative to the nagging query as to the rights of the
parties over the building, inasmuch as the proviso under Section 8 of the
same Rule was conditional upon ‘. . . reception of evidence on which the
judgment of the lower court was based. . .’ peculiar to a ‘. . . a trial on the
merits by the lower court. . .’, which circumstances are anathema to a civil
suit envisioned by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.”
(citations omitted)19
The RTC ruling was likewise reversed and set aside by the CA,20and the
decision of the MeTC was reinstated. The CA
_______________
18 218 Phil. 544; 133 SCRA 572 (1984).
19 Rollo, pp. 106-107.
20 In the petition for review filed by respondent, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 76187. See CA Decision dated November 26, 2004, id., at pp.
40-43.
589ruled that the Chua Peng Hian case relied upon by the RTC was not
applicable to the case at bar, since the action there was for specific
performance of the stipulations in a lease contract which was filed with the
RTC, whereas the present case is for eviction of tenants through an
unlawful detainer action. The CA thus explained:
“x x x However, it must be stressed that the Chua Peng Hian case involves
the recovery of possession of a leased lot where the lessee bound himself
to transfer to the lessor the building which he erected thereon. It was an
action for specific performance. On the other hand, in the case at bar,
[respondent] sought the eviction of her tenants from her apartment units in
an action for unlawful detainer. The Supreme Court further explained in the
case of Chua Peng Hian that, “the action was for specific performance of
the stipulations of a lease contract. It was not capable of pecuniary
estimation. It was within the [exclusive original jurisdiction] of the Court of
First Instance.” Evidently, the ruling in that case is not applicable to the
case at bar.”21
Further, the CA sustained the jurisdiction of the MeTC to rule on the
issue of ownership for the purpose of determining who had the right of
possession, based on the explicit grant in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thus:
Furthermore, Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.—When the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.”
49
We should emphasize that the only issue involved in ejectment
proceedings is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
premises, that is, possession de facto and not possession de
jure. Moreover, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that in ejectment
proceedings where the question of possession cannot be resolved
_______________
21 Id., at p. 45.
590without deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts have the power
to resolve the issue of ownership but only to determine the issue of
possession. This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Aznar Brothers
Realty vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 359, where the Supreme Court held
that, “In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is possession de
facto. However, when the issue of possession cannot be decided without
resolving the issue, the court may receive evidence upon the question of
title to property but solely for the purpose of determining the issue of
possession.”
It is therefore clear from the foregoing that the [MeTC] has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case. Even if [petitioners] raised the
issue of ownership, the [MeTC] can still determine the validity of their claim
on which they justify their right to possess. “The MeTC acts correctly if it
receives evidence on ownership where the question of possession could
not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership” Paz vs. Reyes,
327 SCRA 605. It is now a well-settled rule that inferior courts are not
divested of jurisdiction over ejectment cases just because the defendants
assert ownership over the litigated property (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 309
SCRA 714).”22
Petitioners now come before this Court arguing that a grave reversible
error was committed by the CA in overturning the decision of the RTC, on
the grounds that (a) Chua Peng Hian23applies to the instant case because
the complaint filed by respondent at the MeTC did not make out an action of
ejectment; and (b) petitioners could not be ejected because they are
co-owners of the apartment units.
The petition must fail.
Petitioners cannot negate the jurisdiction of the MeTC by invoking
the Chua Peng Hian case. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the RTC
erred when it was applied to the case at bar. What was filed therein was an
action for specific performance [with the then Court of First Instance], and it
was the defendant there who raised the issue that the Court of First
Instance had no jurisdiction, implying that the case was
_______________
22 Id., at pp. 45-46.
23 Supra note 18.
591really an issue of possession. Thus, it was in this context that this Court
held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case, not only
because the issues raised do not only involve the possession of the land,
but also the rights of the parties to the building constructed thereon.
This portion of the Chua Peng Hian decision therefore was taken out of
context by the RTC when it quoted the same to justify its ruling that the
MeTC had no jurisdiction in the instant case. Moreover, the Chua Peng
Hian doctrine enunciated in the 1984 case should be taken in light of
Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which is
categorical. The issue of ownership raised as a defense will not oust the
MeTC of its jurisdiction over an ejectment case, as the court can rule on the
issue of ownership provisionally to determine who has right to possess the
disputed property. “When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.”24
Moreover, petitioners’ objections to the MeTC jurisdiction all rest on the
supposed “exception” to the jurisdiction over ejectment cases, anchored on
the proposition that “when the issue of ownership is so necessarily involved
with the issue of physical possession that it cannot be determined without
resolving the issue of ownership, the court loses its jurisdiction.”25
Unfortunately for petitioners, the cases cited in support of this
“exception” were all decided prior to Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.)
129. And this “exception” to the MeTC jurisdiction was removed, and the
rule modified by B.P. Blg. 129, which provides that in ejectment
proceedings where the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, all inferior courts have the power to
_______________
24 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 70, Sec. 16.
50
 25 Rollo, p. 107.
592resolve the issue of ownership but only to determine the issue of
possession (Sec. 33 [2], changing the rule in Sec. 3 [c], R.A. No. 5967,
which was then applicable to City Courts).26 Even more so after the
promulgation of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, with its
clear grant of power under Section 16, Rule 70. It is for this reason that
petitioners are unable to cite jurisprudence to support their cause after the
effectivity of B.P. Blg. 129.
Did the passage of these amendments mean that courts having
jurisdiction over ejectment cases can never be ousted of such jurisdiction?
This was explained in Sps. Refugia v. CA,27 where this Court, speaking
through J. Regalado, held:
“x x x [I]t is clear that prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the
jurisdiction of inferior courts was confined to receiving evidence of
ownership in order to determine only the nature and extent of possession,
by reason of which such jurisdiction was lost the moment it became
apparent that the issue of possession was intricately interwoven with that of
ownership. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on Summary Procedure was
extended to include within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts ejectment
cases which likewise involve the issue of ownership. This does not mean,
however, that blanket authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in
ejectment suits has been thus conferred on the inferior courts.
At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of this particular
issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases where the issue of possession is intimately intertwined with the issue
of ownership. It finds no proper application where it is otherwise, that is,
where ownership is not in issue, or where the principal and main issue
raised in the allegations of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for
make out not a case for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.”
_______________
26 Florenz D. Regalado, I Remedial Law Compendium 782-783 (8th
revised ed. 2002).
27 Supra note 1, at p. 1002; pp. 362-363.
593To ensure that the above policy would be maintained, Refugia also
laid down the following guidelines to be observed in relation to the exercise
of jurisdiction over issues of ownership in ejectment proceedings:
1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession,
and that ownership is merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of
ownership may be resolved but only for the purpose of determining the
issue of possession. Thus, as earlier stated, the legal provision under
consideration applies only where the inferior court believes and the
preponderance of evidence shows that a resolution of the issue of
possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of ownership.
2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that
what the plaintiff really and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession.
Consequently, where the allegations of the complaint as well as the reliefs
prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership, and not
merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments
plead the claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of
such claim for ownership, or where the issue of ownership is the principal
question to be resolved, the action is not one for forcible entry but one for
title to real property.
3. The inferior court cannot adjudicate on the nature of ownership
where the relationship of lessor and lessee has been sufficiently
established in the ejectment case, unless it is sufficiently established that
there has been a subsequent change in or termination of that relationship
between the parties. This is because under Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court, the tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at
the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them.
4. The rule in forcible entry cases, but not in those for unlawful detainer, is
that a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession
even against the owner himself. Regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property and whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that
entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person
having a better right through an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. Corollarily, if prior possession may be ascertained in some
other way, then the594inferior court cannot dwell upon or intrude into the
issue of ownership.
5. Where the question of who has prior possession hinges on the
question of who the real owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court
51
may resolve the issue of ownership and make a declaration as to who
among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where
the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the
validity and interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on
which the claim of possession is premised, the inferior court may likewise
pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be so understood,
that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed
portion is to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind
the title or affect the ownership of the land or building.”28
From the foregoing, it is clear that unless petitioners are able to show
that the real purpose of the action for ejectment is to recover title to the
property, or otherwise show that the issue of ownership is the principal
question to be resolved, then the municipal or metropolitan trial court
retains jurisdiction. This the petitioners failed to prove.
Finally, a careful evaluation of the records of this case also convinces us
that the findings of the MeTC are in order, insofar as to the validity of the
grant of eviction. Again, we stress that the decision of the MeTC finding
respondent as the owner of the apartment units is merely to determine the
right of possession. It will not bar any of the parties from filing a suit with the
proper court to determine conclusively the title to the disputed property.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Consolidated Decision dated March 7, 2000, ren
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Administrative agencies, like the SEC, are tribunals of limited
jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such powers as are specifically
granted to them by their enabling statutes. (Sumndad vs. Harrigan, 381
SCRA 8 [2002])
There are two essential requirements that must be complied with by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) before it may issue a cease
and desist order—first, it must conduct proper investigation or verification,
and, second, there must be a finding that the act or practice, unless
restrained, will operate as a fraud on investors or is otherwise likely to
cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing public.
(Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Performance Foreign Exchange
Corporation, 495 SCRA 579 [2006])
G.R. No. 194880. June 20, 2012.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, both represented by the PRIVATIZATION
MANAGEMENT OFFICE, petitioners, vs. SUNVAR REALTY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Republic v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338,
the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error
under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action
by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.—In Republic
v. Malabanan, 632 SCRA 338 (2010), the Court clarified the three modes of
appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal
by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a
petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. “The first
mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to
the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The
third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.”
Same; Summary Procedure; Under the Rules on Summary Procedure,
a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by
the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading.—Under the
Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against
an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a
prohibited pleading. The prohibition is plain enough, and its further
exposition is unnecessary verbiage. The RTC should have dismissed
outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a
prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this legal
52
bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of the certiorari Petition. Yet,
the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari Petition, but even
proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on the merits.
Unlawful Detainer; Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom
possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right
to hold possession may—by virtue of any express or implied contract, and
within one year after the unlawful deprivation—bring an action in the
municipal trial court against the person unlawfully withholding possession,
for restitution of possession with damages and costs.—Under the Rules of
Court, lessors against whom possession of any land is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration of the right to hold possession may—by virtue of any
express or implied contract, and within one year after the unlawful
deprivation—bring an action in the municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession with
damages and costs. Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor
shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the conditions
of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a written notice
of that demand is served upon the person found on the premises, and the
lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days
in the case of buildings.
Same; Elements of a Cause of Action for Unlawful Detainer.—Hence,
a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it
states the following elements: 1. Initially, the possession of the property by
the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff. 2.
Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the
defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession. 3. Thereafter,
the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment. 4. Within one year from the making of the
last demand on the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted
the Complaint for ejectment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Br. 134.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioners.
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition questioning the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, which ordered the dismissal of the Complaint
for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners herein with the Metropolitan Trial
Court.
Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and National Power
Corporation (NPC) are registered co-owners of several parcels of land
located along Pasong Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and
covered by four Transfer
323
VOL. 674, JUNE 20, 323
2012
Republic vs. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation
Certificates of Title (TCTs).1 The main subject matter of the instant Petition
is one of these four parcels of land covered by TCT No. 458365, with an
area of approximately 22,294 square meters (hereinafter, the subject
property). Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is owned by
petitioner Republic, while the remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to
petitioner NPC.2Petitioners are being represented in this case by the
Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the agency tasked with
the administration and disposal of government assets.3 Meanwhile,
respondent Sunvar Realty Development Corporation (Sunvar) occupied the
subject property by virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the
meantime expired.
The factual antecedents of the case are straightforward. On 26
December 1977,4 petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the
subject property, to the Technology Resource Center Foundation, Inc.,
(TRCFI) for a period of 25 years beginning 01 January 1978 and ending
on 31 December 2002.5 Under the Contract of Lease (the main lease
contract), petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any portion of the
four parcels of land.6
Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a majority of the
subject property to respondent Sunvar through several sublease
agreements (the sublease agreements).7 Although these agreements
commenced on different dates, all of them contained common provisions
on the terms of the sublease and were altogether set to expire on 31
December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFI’s main lease contract with
petitioners, but subject to renewal at the option of respondent:8
53
 “The term of the sublease shall be for an initial period of [variable] years
and [variable] months commencing on [variable], renewable for another
twenty-five (25) years at SUNVAR’s exclusive option.”9
According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements, respondent
Sunvar agreed “to return or surrender the subleased land, without any
delay whatsoever upon the termination or expiration of the sublease
contract or any renewal or extension thereof.”10
During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar introduced useful
improvements, consisting of several commercial buildings, and leased out
the spaces therein.11 It also profitably utilized the other open spaces on the
subject property as parking areas for customers and guests.12
In 1987, following a reorganization of the government, TRCFI was
dissolved. In its stead, the Philippine Development Alternatives Foundation
(PDAF) was created, assuming the functions previously performed by
TRCFI.13
On 26 April 2002, less than a year before the expiration of the main
lease contract and the sublease agreements, respondent Sunvar wrote to
PDAF as successor of TRCFI. Respondent expressed its desire to exercise
the option to renew the sublease over the subject property and proposed an
increased rental rate and a renewal period of another 25 years.14 On even
date, it also wrote to the Office of the President, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources and petitioner NPC. The letters
expressed the same desire to renew the lease over the subject property
under the new rental rate and renewal period.15
On 10 May 2002, PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal of
the lease had already been sent to petitioners, but that it had yet to receive
a response.16 It further explained that the proposal of respondent for the
renewal of the sublease could not yet be acted upon, and neither could the
proposed rental payments be accepted.17 Respondent acknowledged
receipt of the letter and requested PDAF to apprise the former of any
specific actions undertaken with respect to the said lease arrangement over
the subject property.18
On 03 June 2002, six months before the main contract of lease was to
expire, petitioner NPC—through Atty. Rainer B. Butalid, Vice-President and
General Counsel—notified PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the
contract of lease.19 In turn, PDAF notified respondent of NPC’s decision.20
On the other hand, petitioner Republic through then Senior Deputy
Executive Secretary Waldo Q. Flores likewise notified PDAF of the former’s
decision not to renew the lease contract.21 The Republic reasoned that the
parties had earlier agreed to shorten the corporate life of PDAF and to
transfer the latter’s assets to the former for the purpose of selling them to
raise funds.22 On 25 June 2002, PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of
petitioner Republic’s decision not to renew the lease and quoted the
Memorandum of Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Flores.23
On 31 December 2002, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as
its sublease agreements with respondent Sunvar, all expired. Hence,
petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the subject property and
the three other parcels of land. Thereafter, petitioner Republic transferred
the subject property to the PMO for disposition. Nevertheless, respondent
Sunvar continued to occupy the property.
On 22 February 2008, or six years after the main lease contract expired,
petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
advised respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject property within
thirty (30) days.24 The latter duly received the Notice from the OSG through
registered mail,25 but failed to vacate and remained on the property.26
On 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from respondent
OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days.27 When the period lapsed,
respondent Sunvar again refused to vacate the property and continued to
occupy it.
On 02 April 2009, the PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to
determine the fair rental value of the subject property and petitioners’ lost
income—a loss arising from the refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the
property after the expiration of the main lease contract and sublease
agreements.28 Using the market comparison approach, the PMO
determined that the fair rental value of the subject property was
P10,364,000 per month, and that respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a
total of P630,123,700 from 01 January 2002 to 31 March 2009.29
On 23 July 2009, petitioners filed the Complaint dated 26 May 2009 for
unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City.
Petitioners prayed that respondent Sunvar be ordered to vacate the subject
property and to pay damages for the illegal use and lost income owing to
them:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully
prayed that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered:
54
 1. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and all persons, natural and juridical, claiming rights
under it, to vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same,
with the useful improvements therein, to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative; and
2. Ordering defendant SUNVAR REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION to pay plaintiffs damages in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED PESOS (P630,123,700.00) for the illegal and unauthorized use
and occupation of the subject property from January 1, 2003 to March 31,
2009, and the amount of TEN MILLION THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,364,000.00) per month from April 1, 2008 until
the subject property, together with its improvements, are completely
vacated and peacefully surrendered to the plaintiffs or to their authorized
representative.”30
Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint and argued that the
allegations of petitioners in the Complaint did not constitute an action for
unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them.31 In the
alternative, it also argued that petitioners’ cause of action was more
properly an accion publiciana, which fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC,
and not the MeTC, considering that the petitioners’ supposed
dispossession of the subject property by respondent had already lasted for
more than one year.
In its Order dated 16 September 2009, the MeTC denied the Motion to
Dismiss and directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to petitioners’
Complaint.32 The lower court likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration33 filed by respondent.34 Respondent later on filed its
Answer35 to the Complaint.36
Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for
ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorariwith the
RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s Motion
to Dismiss.37
In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in
issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary
Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against
the interlocutory orders of the MeTC.38 Hence, they prayed for the outright
dismissal of the certiorari Petition of respondent Sunvar.
The RTC denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that extraordinary
circumstances called for an exception to the general rule on summary
proceedings.39 Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 which was
subsequently denied by the RTC.41Hence, the hearing on
the certiorari Petition of respondent proceeded, and the parties filed their
respective Memoranda.42
In the assailed Order dated 01 December 2010, which discussed the
merits of the certiorari Petition, the RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and
directed the MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer for lack of
jurisdiction.43 The RTC reasoned that the one-year period for the filing of an
unlawful detainer case was reckoned from the expiration of the main lease
contract and the sublease agreements on 31 December 2002. Petitioners
should have then filed an accion publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead
of an unlawful detainer suit.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.44
I
Petitioners’ Resort to a Rule 45 Petition
Before the Court proceeds with the legal questions in this case, there are
procedural issues that merit preliminary attention.
Respondent Sunvar argued that petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition
for Review on Certiorari before this Court is an improper mode of review of
the assailed RTC Decision. Allegedly, petitioners should have availed
themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since the RTC Decision was an
order of dismissal of the Complaint, from which no appeal can be taken
except by a certiorari petition.
The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of respondent Sunvar and
holds that the resort by petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is
perfectly within the bounds of our procedural rules.
As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be taken from an order
of the RTC dismissing an action without prejudice,45 but the aggrieved party
may file a certiorari petition under Rule 65.46Nevertheless, the Rules do not
prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in
case only questions of law are raised or involved.47 This latter situation
was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant
Petition to raise only questions of law.
55
 In Republic v. Malabanan,48 the Court clarified the three modes of
appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal
by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a
petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for
review on certioraribefore the Supreme Court under Rule 45. “The first
mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to
the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The
third mode of appeal is elevated to the Supreme Court only on
questions of law.”49 (Emphasis supplied.)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth
or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.50 The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.51
In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of law with respect to
the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain a certioraripetition filed against the
interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer suit. At issue in the
present case is the correct application of the Rules on Summary Procedure;
or, more specifically, whether the RTC violated the Rules when it took
cognizance and granted the certiorari petition against the denial by the
MeTC of the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar. This is clearly a
question of law that involves the proper interpretation of the Rules on
Summary Procedure. Therefore, the instant Rule 45 Petition has been
properly lodged with this Court.
II
Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary
Proceedings
Proceeding now to determine that very question of law, the Court finds
that it was erroneous for the RTC to have taken cognizance of the Rule 65
Petition of respondent Sunvar, since the Rules on Summary Procedure
expressly prohibit this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the
MeTC. Consequently, the assailed RTC Decision is annulled.
Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule
65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary
proceeding is a prohibited pleading.52 The prohibition is plain enough, and
its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.53The RTC should have
dismissed outright respondent Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it
is a prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the RTC of this
legal bar and immediately prayed for the dismissal of
the certiorari Petition.54 Yet, the RTC not only refused to dismiss
the certiorari Petition,55 but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition on
the merits.
Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino56 and Go v. Court of
Appeals57 to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to “extraordinary
circumstances” is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and
specific circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited
pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure—conditions
that are not availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.
In Bayog, Alejandro Bayog filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Patnongon-Bugasong-Valderama, Antique an ejectment case
against Alberto Magdato, an agricultural tenant-lessee who had built a
house over his property. When Magdato, an illiterate farmer, received the
Summons from the MCTC to file his answer within 10 days, he was stricken
with pulmonary tuberculosis and was able to consult a lawyer in San Jose,
Antique only after the reglementary period. Hence, when the Answer of
Magdato was filed three days after the lapse of the 10-day period, the
MCTC ruled that it could no longer take cognizance of his Answer and,
hence, ordered his ejectment from Bayog’s land. When his house was
demolished in January 1994, Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the
RTC-San Jose, Antique, claiming that he was a duly instituted tenant in the
agricultural property, and that he was deprived of due process. Bayog, the
landowner, moved to dismiss the Petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC, since a petition for relief from judgment
covering a summary proceeding was a prohibited pleading. The RTC,
however, denied his Motion to Dismiss and remanded the case to the
MCTC for proper disposal.
In resolving the Rule 65 Petition, we ruled that although a petition for
relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the
Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice
and irreparable injury:
56
 “We disagree with the RTC’s holding that a petition for relief from
judgment (Civil Case No. 2708) is not prohibited under the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, in light of the Jakihaca ruling. When Section 19 of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure bars a petition for relief from
judgment, or a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in mind no
other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding petitions for relief from
judgment, and Rule 65 regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus,
or prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively. These petitions are
cognizable by Regional Trial Courts, and not by Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. If Section 19 of the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and Rules 38 and 65 of the Rules of
Court are juxtaposed, the conclusion is inevitable that no petition for relief
from judgment nor a special civil action of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus arising from cases covered by the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure may be filed with a superior court. This is but
consistent with the mandate of Section 36 of B.P. Blg. 129 to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of the cases subject of
summary procedure.
Nevertheless, in view of the unusual and peculiar circumstances of
this case, unless some form of relief is made available to MAGDATO,
the grave injustice and irreparable injury that visited him through no
fault or negligence on his part will only be perpetuated. Thus, the
petition for relief from judgment which he filed may be allowed or
treated, pro hac vice, either as an exception to the rule, or a regular
appeal to the RTC, or even an action to annul the order (decision) of
the MCTC of 20 September 1993. As an exception, the RTC correctly held
that the circumstances alleged therein and the justification pleaded worked
in favor of MAGDATO, and that the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 2708
was without merit. xxx”58 (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, in Go v. Court of Appeals, the Court was confronted
with a procedural void in the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure that
justified the resort to a Rule 65 Petition in the RTC. In that case, the
preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance
by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City until after the
case for specific performance involving the same parties shall have been
finally decided by the RTC. The affected party appealed the suspension
order to the RTC. In response, the adverse party moved to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a summary
proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The RTC denied the
Motion to Dismiss and subsequently directed the MTCC to proceed with the
hearing of the ejectment suit, a ruling that was upheld by the appellate
court.
In affirming the Decisions of the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court
allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in
an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any
recourse to the MTCC’s erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding.
Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban eloquently explained the
procedural void in this wise:
“Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is interlocutory, for “it
does not dispose of the case but leaves something else to be done by the
trial court on the merits of the case.” It is axiomatic that an interlocutory
order cannot be challenged by an appeal. Thus, it has been held that “the
proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse
judgment on the merits incorporating in said appeal the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order. Allowing appeals from interlocutory orders
would result in the ‘sorry spectacle’ of a case being subject of a
counterproductive ping-pong to and from the appellate court as often as a
trial court is perceived to have made an error in any of its interlocutory
rulings. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently
erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.”338
Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order, being interlocutory.
But neither can it file a petition for certiorari, because ejectment suits fall
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of which
considers petitions for certiorari prohibited pleadings:
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the foregoing, private respondent was literally caught
“between Scylla and Charybdis” in the procedural void observed by the
Court of Appeals and the RTC. Under these extraordinary
circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy
consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases.
As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, “the purpose of the
Rules on Summary Procedure is ‘to achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules.’
(Section 36, Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)” Pursuant to this objective, the Rules
prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to
prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases. In
57
this case, however, private respondent challenged the MTCC
order delaying the ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief
envisioned by the Rules.
Thus, this Court holds that in situations wherein a summary
proceeding is suspended indefinitely, a petition for certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion may be allowed. Because of the
extraordinary circumstances in this case, a petition for certiorari, in
fact, gives spirit and life to the Rules on Summary Procedure. A
contrary ruling would unduly delay the disposition of the case and negate
the rationale of the said Rules.”59 (Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the factual circumstances
in these two cases are not comparable with respondents’ situation, and our
rulings therein are inapplicable to its cause of action in the present suit. As
this Court explained in Bayog, the general rule is that no special civil action
for certiorari may be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed
a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before the MeTC. Worse,
the subject matter of the Petition was the denial of respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss, which was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is generally
not the subject of an appeal. No circumstances similar to the situation of the
agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the relaxation of
the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been
deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary
judicial proceeding.
Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go v. Court of
Appeals that would justify respondent’s resort to a certiorari Petition before
the RTC. When confronted with the MeTC’s adverse denial of its Motion to
Dismiss in the ejectment case, the expeditious and proper remedy for
respondent should have been to proceed with the summary hearings and to
file its answer. Indeed, its resort to a certiorari Petition in the RTC over an
interlocutory order in a summary ejectment proceeding was not only
prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on account of
respondent’s having already taken advantage of a speedy and available
remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC.
Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of extraordinary
circumstances that would constrain this Court to apply the exceptions
obtaining in Bayog and Go. The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the
benefits of these two judicial precedents to litigants in summary
proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused and freely availed
of to defeat the very goal of an expeditious and inexpensive determination
of an unlawful detainer suit. If the Court were to relax the interpretation of
the prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, the RTCs may be inundated with similar
prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of the lower
court and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings in
forcible entry or unlawful detainer suits.
III
Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful
Detainer Cases
We now come to another legal issue underlying the present
Petition—whether the Complaint filed by petitioners is properly an action for
unlawful detainer within the jurisdiction of the MeTC or an accion
publiciana lodged with the RTC. At the heart of the controversy is the
reckoning period of the one-year requirement for unlawful detainer suits.
Whether or not petitioners’ action for unlawful detainer was brought
within one year after the unlawful withholding of possession will determine
whether it was properly filed with the MeTC. If, as petitioners argue, the
one-year period should be counted from respondent Sunvar’s receipt on 03
February 2009 of the Final Notice to Vacate, then their Complaint was
timely filed within the one-year period and appropriately taken cognizance
of by the MeTC. However, if the reckoning period is pegged from the
expiration of the main lease contract and/or sublease agreement, then
petitioners’ proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana to be
filed with the RTC.
The Court finds that petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action
for unlawful detainer and, hence, reverses the ruling of the RTC.
Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom possession of any land
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the right to hold possession
may—by virtue of any express or implied contract, and within one year after
the unlawful deprivation—bring an action in the municipal trial court against
the person unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of possession
with damages and costs.60 Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the
lessor shall commence only after a demand to pay or to comply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee; or after a
written notice of that demand is served upon the person found on the
premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith within 15 days in the
case of land or 5 days in the case of buildings.61
58
 In Delos Reyes v. Spouses Odones,62 the Court recently defined the
nature and scope of an unlawful detainer suit, as follows:
“Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property
from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies
with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial court. The action must be
brought up within one year from the date of last demand, and the
issue in the case must be the right to physical possession.” (Emphasis
supplied.)
Hence, a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful
detainer if it states the following elements:
1. Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by
contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff.
2. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice
to the defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the latter’s enjoyment.
4. Within one year from the making of the last demand on the
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the Complaint for
ejectment.63
“On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the
right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial
court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of
the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had
turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had
become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal
detainer, but an accion publiciana.”64
There are no substantial disagreements with respect to the first three
requisites for an action for unlawful detainer. Respondent Sunvar initially
derived its right to possess the subject property from its sublease
agreements with TRCFI and later on with PDAF. However, with the
expiration of the lease agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent lost
possessory rights over the subject property. Nevertheless, it continued
occupying the property for almost seven years thereafter. It was only on 03
February 2009 that petitioners made a final demand upon respondent
Sunvar to turn over the property. What is disputed, however, is the fourth
requisite of an unlawful detainer suit.
The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise availing in this case,
and that the one-year period should be counted from the final demand
made on 03 February 2009.
Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year period to file an
unlawful detainer case is not counted from the expiration of the lease
contract on 31 December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners
to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an
action for unlawful detainer. “Such one year period should be counted from
the date of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the real property,
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become
unlawful.”66
In case several demands to vacate are made, the period is reckoned
from the date of the last demand.67 In Leonin v. Court of Appeals,68 the
Court, speaking through Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, reckoned the
one-year period to file the unlawful detainer Complaint—filed on 25
February 1997—from the latest demand letter dated 24 October 1996, and
not from the earlier demand letter dated 03 July 1995:
“Prospero Leonin (Prospero) and five others were co-owners of a
400-square meter property located at K-J Street, East Kamias, Quezon City
whereon was constructed a two-storey house and a three-door apartment
identified as No. 1-A, B, and C.
Prospero and his co-owners allowed his siblings, herein petitioners, to
occupy Apartment C without paying any rentals.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners further contend that respondent’s remedy is accion
publicianabecause their possession is not de facto, they having been
authorized by the true and lawful owners of the property; and that one year
had elapsed from respondent’s demand given on “July 3, 1995” when
the unlawful detainer complaint was filed.
The petition fails.
59
 Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the allegations in the complaint make
out a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, respondent alleged, inter alia, that
she is the registered owner of the property and that petitioners, who are
tenants by tolerance, refused to vacate the premises despite the notice to
vacate sent to them.
Likewise, contrary to petitioners’ contention, the one-year period for filing
a complaint for unlawful detainer is reckoned from the date of the last
demand, in this case October 24, 1996, the reason being that the lessor
has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let
the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises. Thus, the filing of the
complaint on February 25, 1997 was well within the one year
reglementary period.”69 (Emphasis supplied.)
From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements
expired (01 January 2003), respondent Sunvar no longer had any
possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express contractual
renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it
illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere
tolerance of the registered owners—petitioners herein. Thus, respondent
Sunvar’s possession became unlawful upon service of the final notice on 03
February 2009. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners,
and without any contract between them, respondent is “necessarily bound
by an implied promise” that it “will vacate upon demand, failing which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.”70 Upon
service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have
vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02
February 2010 in which to resort to the summary action for unlawful
detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23
July 2009, which was well within the one-year period.
The Court is aware that petitioners had earlier served a Notice to Vacate
on 22 February 2008, which could have possibly tolled the one-year period
for filing an unlawful detainer suit. Nevertheless, they can be deemed to
have waived their right of action against respondent Sunvar and continued
to tolerate its occupation of the subject property. That they sent a final
Notice to Vacate almost a year later gave respondent another opportunity
to comply with their implied promise as occupants by mere tolerance.
Consequently, the one-year period for filing a summary action for unlawful
detainer with the MeTC must be reckoned from the latest demand to
vacate.
In the past, the Court ruled that subsequent demands that are merely in the
nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the
one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering
that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original
demand.71 If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature of
reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to commence an
ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.72 However,
respondent failed to raise in any of the proceedings below this question of
fact as to the nature of the second demand issued by the OSG. It is now too
late in the proceedings for them to argue that the 2009 Notice to Vacate
was a mere reiteration or reminder of the 2008 Notice to Vacate. In any
event, this factual determination is beyond the scope of the present Rule 45
Petition, which is limited to resolving questions of law.
The Court notes that respondent Sunvar has continued to occupy the
subject property since the expiration of its sublease on 31 December 2002.
The factual issue of whether respondent has paid rentals to petitioners from
the expiration of the sublease to the present was never raised or sufficiently
argued before this Court. Nevertheless, it has not escaped the Court’s
attention that almost a decade has passed without any resolution of this
controversy regarding respondent’s possession of the subject property,
contrary to the aim of expeditious proceedings under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. With the grant of the instant Petition and the remand
of the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court emphasizes the
duty of the lower court to speedily resolve this matter once and for all,
especially since this case involves a prime property of the government
located in the country’s business district and the various opportunities for
petitioners to gain public revenues from the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review
on Certiorari dated 14 February 2011, filed by petitioners Republic and
National Power Corporation, which are represented here by the
Privatization Management Office. The assailed Decision dated 01
December 2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 63, is DIRECTED to proceed with the summary
proceedings for the unlawful detainer case in Civil Case No. 98708.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of exception, permits
only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
60
subject matter but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over
the person. (Victorias Milling Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 622 SCRA 131
[2010])
An action is for unlawful detainer if the complaint sufficiently alleges the
following: (1) initially, the defendant has possession of property by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, however, such
possession became illegal upon plaintiff’s notice to defendant, terminating
the latter’s right of possession; (3) still, the defendant remains in
possession, depriving the plaintiff of the enjoyment of his property; and (4)
within a year from plaintiff’s last demand that defendant vacate the property,
the plaintiff files a complaint for defendant’s ejectment. (Dionisio vs.
Linsangan, 644 SCRA 424 [2011])
G.R. No. 141614. August 14, 2002.*
TERESITA BONGATO, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SEVERO A. MALVAR
and TRINIDAD MALVAR, respondents.
Remedial Law; Ejectment; In forcible entry, one employs force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical
possession of land or building; Plaintiff must prove and allege prior physical
possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the
defendant; Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of
ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto
and undue deprivation thereof.—Before tackling the issue directly, it is
worthwhile to restate three basic legal principles. In forcible entry, one
employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of
physical possession of land or building. Thus, the plaintiff must allege and
prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived
thereof by the defendant. This requirement implies that the possession of
the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning. The sole
question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession
(possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the
defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of the
case. Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership,
and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue
deprivation thereof.
Same; Same; The one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land;
After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of
land may file either an accion publiciana which is a plenary action to
recover the right of possession or an accion reivindicatoria which is an
action to recover ownership as well as possession.—It is wise to be
reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive
time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process.
Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry
is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However,
when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted
from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year
period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or
an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as
possession.
Same; Evidence; Generally courts do not take judicial notice of the
evidence presented in other proceedings even if these have been tried or
are pending in the same court or before the same judge, exceptions.—As a
general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in
other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same
court or before the same judge. There are exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily,
an appellate court cannot refer to the record in another case to ascertain a
fact not shown in the record of the case before it, yet, it has been held that it
may consult decisions in other proceedings, in order to look for the law that
is determinative of or applicable to the case under review. In some
instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other
cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases
“may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke” a
rule of judicial notice.
Same; Same; Factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court,
exceptions.—Factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review
of such findings is not a function that this Court normally undertakes.
However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits of exceptions, such as (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s inference from its factual findings is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of
the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which—if
properly considered—will justify a different conclusion; (5) when there is a
misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based, are
61
premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record.
Same; Rule on Summary Procedure; A motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the
rule on prohibited pleadings.—Pursuant to Section 36 of B.P. 129, the
Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in
Special Cases. Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is a
prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
however, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings.
Same; Same; A court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or
even express consent.—A court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence,
acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction
of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on
appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jesus Chavez for petitioner.
Angeles & Associates and Felino M. Ganal for private respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process that is summary in nature.
It is designed to recover physical possession in speedy proceedings that
are restrictive in nature, scope and time limits. The one-year bar within
which to bring the suit is prescribed to complement its summary nature.
Thus, after the one-year period has lapsed, plaintiffs can no longer avail
themselves of the summary proceedings in the municipal trial court but
must litigate, in the normal course, in the regional trial court in an ordinary
action to recover possession, or to recover both ownership and possession.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, assailing the December 16, 1998 Decision1 and the September 1,
1999 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 34204.
The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner.”3
The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The CA sustained the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Butuan City (Branch 4), which had disposed thus:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby affirms the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2 penned by the
Honorable Santos Rod. Cedro and the Writ of Execution issued on the 24th
day of August 1993 upon order of the Honorable Rosarito F. Dabalos
(Record, p. 42, Folio II) can now be served on the defendant.”4
The Facts
The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the Court of
Appeals as follows:
“The spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint for forcible
entry against petitioner Teresita Bongato, alleging that petitioner Bongato
unlawfully entered a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-16200
belonging to the said spouses and erected thereon a house of light
materials. The petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file an
answer which the MTCC denied; it being proscribed under the Rule on
Summary Procedure, and likewise containing no notice of hearing. With a
new counsel, Atty. Viador C. Viajar, petitioner filed an answer which the
MTCC disregarded, the same having been filed beyond the ten-day
reglementary period. Later, with still another counsel, Atty. Jesus G.
Chavez of the Public Attorney’s Office, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
which the MTCC denied as being contrary to the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
“Thereafter, the MTCC rendered a decision ordering petitioner to vacate
the land in question, and to pay rentals, attorney’s fees, and the costs of the
suit. The decision was affirmed by respondent RTC judge. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration.
62
 “On March 4, 1994, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
motion for reconsideration ‘only insofar as to determine the location of the
houses involved in this civil case so that the Court will know whether they
are located on one and the same lot or a lot different from that involved in
the criminal case for Anti-Squatting.’ In the same order, respondent Judge
disallowed any extension and warned that if the survey is not made, the
court might consider the same abandoned and the writ of execution would
be issued.
“The criminal case for anti-squatting (Crim. Case No. 4659) was filed by
private respondents Malvar against petitioner Bongato. The case is still
pending with the Regional Trial Court, Branch I, Butuan City.
“On March 28, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for extension of the March
29, 1994 deadline for the submission of the relocation survey and to move
the deadline to April 15, 1994, as the engineer concerned, Engr. Lumarda,
could not conduct his survey during the Holy Week, he being a lay minister
and parish council member.
“On April 7, 1994, respondent Judge noted that no survey report was
submitted and ordered the record of the case returned to the court of origin
for disposal.”5 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the lot referred to in the present controversy was different
from that involved in the anti-squatting case.6 It further ruled that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) had jurisdiction, and that it did not err
in rejecting petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. The appellate court reasoned
that the MTCC had passed upon the issue of ownership of the property
merely to determine possession—an action that did not oust the latter of its
jurisdiction.7
Unsatisfied with the CA Decision, petitioner lodged this Petition.8
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s
consideration:
I
“Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in not
finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction since the Complaint was filed
beyond the one-year period from date of alleged entry;
II
“Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
ruling that the Motion to Dismiss was a prohibited pleading.”9
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
MTCC Jurisdiction
Petitioner claims that the MTCC had no jurisdiction, because the Complaint
for forcible entry was filed only in 1992 or beyond the one-year period
provided under the Rules of Civil Procedure.10 She avers that in Criminal
Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting, Respondent Severo Malvar alleged in his
Sworn Statement that petitioner had illegally entered his land “sometime in
the first week of January 1987.”11
On the other hand, respondents contend that the subject of the
anti-squatting case is different from the parcel of land involved here.12
Before tackling the issue directly, it is worthwhile to restate three basic
legal principles. First, in forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land
or building.13 Thus, the plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical
possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the
defendant.14 This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed
land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning.15 The sole question for
resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de
facto) of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession
(possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership16 by the defendant can
outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of the
case.17 Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership,
and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue
deprivation thereof.18
Second, as a general rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence
presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are
pending in the same court or before the same judge.19 There are
63
exceptions to this rule. Ordinarily, an appellate court cannot refer to the
record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown in the record of the
case before it,20 yet, it has been held that it may consult decisions in other
proceedings, in order to look for the law that is determinative of or
applicable to the case under review.21In some instances, courts have also
taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely
connected to the matter in controversy.22 These cases “may be so closely
interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke” a rule of judicial
notice.23
Third, factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. Indeed, the review of
such findings is not a function that this Court normally
undertakes.24 However, this Rule is not absolute; it admits of exceptions,
such as (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when a lower court’s inference from its factual
findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the findings
of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which—if properly considered—will justify a different conclusion; (5) when
there is a misappreciation of facts; (6) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are
based, are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by
evidence on record.25
Respondents in the present Petition filed three cases against petitioner: (1)
Criminal Case No. 4659 for violation of P.D. No. 77226 (filed on October 2,
1991), in which petitioner was acquitted on the ground of good faith; (2)
Civil Case No. 5681 for forcible entry (filed on July 10, 1992) which was
resolved by the MTCC on October 26, 1992.27 (3) Criminal Case No. 5734
for Violation of P.D. No. 109628 (filed on July 15, 1993), wherein petitioner
was again acquitted.
We agree with respondents that Lot 10-A, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-1620029 and registered under the name of
Severo Malvar, is different from Lot 1 which is covered by TCT No.
RT-1599330 and registered under the name of Severo Malvar also.
However, we cannot ignore the Decision31 dated April 30, 1996 in Criminal
Case No. 4659 for violation of P.D. 772; or the Decision32 dated November
26, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 5734 for violation of P.D. 1096. The property
involved in these two criminal cases and in the instant case for forcible
entry is one and the same—petitioner’s house.
The allegation of petitioner that there is only one house involved in these
three cases has not been controverted by respondents. Neither was there
evidence presented to prove that, indeed, she had constructed one house
on Lot 1 and another on Lot 10-A. On the contrary, she correctly points out
that the house involved in these three cases is found on one and the same
location. Verily, in his Sworn Statement33 submitted in Criminal Case No.
4659, Respondent Severo Malvar stated that petitioner’s house was
“located in front of the Museum and just behind the City Hall.” On the other
hand, in the Complaint34 for forcible entry, the subject property was said to
be “located along Doongan Road and right in front of the Regional National
Museum and not far behind the City Hall of Butuan City.” Lastly, the
Decision35 in Criminal Case No. 5734 stated that the building inspector,
Engineer Margarita Burias, had “responded to a verbal complaint involving
a structure built near the Museum in Upper Doongan, Butuan City.”
Based on these factual antecedents, there is cogent basis for petitioner’s
contention that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction in this case.
First, respondents allege that the subject house was built by petitioner
on Lot 10-A covered by TCT No. 16200. This allegation is belied by the
sketch plan36 dated June 16, 1994, submitted by Engineer Regino A.
Lomarda, Jr. To recall, in an Order37 dated March 4, 1994, the RTC had
required petitioner to submit a relocation survey of Lot 10-A to determine
the location of the house and to ascertain if it was the same house involved
in Criminal Case No. 4659 for anti-squatting. However, because of the Holy
Week, petitioner failed to submit the relocation survey within the period
provided by the RTC. In the said sketch plan that was offered in evidence
as Exhibit “5” in the anti-squatting case, Engineer Lomarda, Jr. certified that
“the hut of Teresita Bongato is not within Lot 10-A as shown in this plan as
relocated by the undersigned based [o]n TCT No. RT-1576 of Benjamin
Eva, et al. and [o]n TCT No. RT-16200 of Lot 10-A of Severo Malvar.”
Second, according to the Decision in Criminal Case No. 4659, petitioner’s
house is actually located on Lot 1, the parcel of land previously covered by
TCT No. RT-15993 and subject of the anti-squatting case. The RTC Judge
in said case ruled:
“The lot on which accused’s house is standing was formerly covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-15993 dated January 24, 1983 in the
name of Severo Malvar, and superseded by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-24589 dated December 3, 1991 in the name of Butuan Land
Developers Group, Inc.”38
64
Third, petitioner’s house had actually been in existence prior to February
1992, the alleged date of illegal entry. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 5734 for
violation of P.D. 1096, the RTC Judge opined as follows:
“Firstly, the prosecution has not proven that the accused had constructed or
for that matter was constructing the questioned house in February of 1992,
since it was never stated that when the complaint was lodged with the City
Engineer’s Office, that the house occupied by the accused was under
construction or under renovation. The fact that Engr. Burias even admitted
that she had no knowledge of when the structure was built implicitly
indicates that the same was completely erected or constructed before Engr.
Burias’ visit, or even for that matter, before the complaint was filed.”39
That the house of petitioner had been constructed by her father and that
she had merely continued to reside therein was upheld by the Decision,
which we quote:
“Suffice it to state, however, that We are convinced, given the testimonial
evidence offered that the house in question was not built by the accused,
but by her father, Jacinto Bongato sometime in 1935; that accused merely
lived in the house as a member of Jacinto Bongato’s family until the death
of her parents, whereupon, she continued to reside in the said house and
now claims to be its owner.”40
Fourth, Respondent Severo Malvar admitted in Criminal Case No. 4659
that he had knowledge of petitioner’s house since January 1987. We quote
from his testimony:
“Q Earlier, Judge Malvar, you told this Honorable Court that you
discovered sometime in January 1987, the accused was occupy
ing your property consisting of 348 square meters. What did you
do upon discovering that the accused already occupied a portion
of your property without your knowledge?
A I want to demolish her house. I told her that I am the owner of the
land and she is looking for the 1/4 hectare that was not sold by her
father to me.
“Q And upon being informed by Teresita Bongato that they were
looking for the 1/4 hectare lot which was not sold to you by her
father, what did you say to her?
A I told her to remove her house. Then after that, I was so busy with
the squatters along Satorre Street of the Malvar Village that kept
me so busy. It was only last year that we were able to attend to
this.”41
It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that
the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of
such process.42 Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action
for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the
land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year
period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it.43 After the
lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land
may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the
right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to
recover ownership as well as possession.44
On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for
forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed
the Complaint for ejectment on July 10, 1992.45Hence, even if Severo
Malvar may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be
wrested through a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had
been occupying it for more than one (1) year.46 Respondents should have
presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible
entry.47 Their cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and
the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.48
Second Issue:
Motion to Dismiss
Petitioner further argues that a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading, but is
allowed under Sec. 19 (a) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure.49 We agree.
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated specifically to
achieve “an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.”50 The
speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public
policy,51 and the Rule should equally apply with full force to forcible entry
cases, in which possession of the premises is already illegal from the
start.52 For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and prohibits
altogether the filing of motions for extension of time. Consistently, Section 6
was added to give the trial court the power to render judgment, even motu
65
proprio, upon the failure of a defendant to file an answer within the
reglementary period.53However, as forcible entry and detainer cases are
summary in nature and involve disturbances of the social order, procedural
technicalities should be carefully avoided54 and should not be allowed to
override substantial justice.55
Pursuant to Section 3656 of B.P. 129,57 the Court on June 16, 1983,
promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases.58Under
this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however,59 a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an
exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings:
“SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions.—The following pleadings,
motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by this Rule:
(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or
information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, or failure to comply with the preceding section;
xxx xxx x x x”
Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be
waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even
express consent.60 A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the
action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.61 That the
MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise held
in Bayog v. Natino:62
“The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, as well as its predecessor,
do not provide that an answer filed after the reglementary period should be
expunged from the records. As a matter of fact, there is no provision for an
entry of default if a defendant fails to answer. It must likewise be pointed out
that MAGDATO’s defense of lack of jurisdiction may have even been raised
in a motion to dismiss as an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings in
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Such a motion is allowed under
paragraph (a) thereof, x x x.”
In the case at bar, the MTCC should have squarely ruled on the issue of
jurisdiction, instead of erroneously holding that it was a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on Summary Procedure.63Because the Complaint for
forcible entry was filed on July 10, 1992, the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure was applicable.
Finally, the MTCC should have taken into account petitioner’s
Answer,64 in which she averred that she had been “in constant occupation
on said land in question since birth on March 17, 1941 up to the present,
being an heir of the late Emiliana Eva-Bongato, who inherited said property
from her father Raymundo Eva with considerable improvements thereon.” It
should have heard and received the evidence adduced by the parties for
the precise purpose of determining whether or not it possessed jurisdiction
over the subject matter.65 And after such hearing, it could have dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction.66 In this way, the long, drawn out
proceedings that took place in this case could have been avoided.67
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint for forcible entry is
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman) and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., On leave.
Petition granted, judgment annulled and set aside.
Note.—In forcible entry or ejectment cases, the only issue for resolution
is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party litigants. (Ceremonia vs.
Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 731[1999])
G.R. No. 116192. November 16, 1995.*
EUFEMIA SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
GENEROSA S. CRUZ, respondents.
Actions; Jurisdiction; Pleadings and Practice; Ejectment; Jurisdiction of
the court, as well as the nature of the action, is determined by the
averments in the complaint.—The chief issue for our resolution is whether
or not the court of origin had jurisdiction over the ejectment case.
Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature
of the action, are determined by the averments in the complaint.
Accordingly, the issue in the instant case can only be properly resolved by
an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint in Civil
Case No. 899 of said trial court.
66
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the facts averred in the complaint
reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful
detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute, the same must be
resolved in an accion reivindicatoria.—A careful reading of the facts
averred in said complaint filed by herein private respondent reveals that the
action is neither one of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer but essentially
involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an accion
reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the disputed 71 square
meters involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Forcible Entry” and
“Unlawful Detainer,”Distinguished.—Forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases are two distinct actions defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In
unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract,
express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the
beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de
facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession was originally lawful but became
unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess, hence the
issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in such action, the defendant is
in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of
the defendant’s right to continue in possession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What determines the cause
of action—whether for forcible entry or unlawful detainer—is the nature of
defendant’s entry into the land.—What determines the cause of action is
the nature of defendant’s entry into the land. If the entry is illegal, then the
action which may be filed against the intruder within one year therefrom is
forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal, the case is one of unlawful detainer which must
be filed within one year from the date of the last demand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state
how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria.—To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should
embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on
its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The
jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if one is the owner of the property,
the possession thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in
the physical or material possession of the same for more than one year by
resorting to a summary action for ejectment.—If private respondent is
indeed the owner of the premises subject of this suit and she was unlawfully
deprived of the real right of possession or the ownership thereof, she
should present her claim before the regional trial court in an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before the municipal trial
court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or forcible entry. For
even if one is the owner of the property, the possession thereof cannot be
wrested from another who had been in the physical or material possession
of the same for more than one year by resorting to a summary action for
ejectment. This is especially true where his possession thereof was not
obtained through the means or held under the circumstances contemplated
by the rules on summary ejectment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In giving recognition to the action for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the
person who in fact has actual possession.—We have held that in giving
recognition to the action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, the
purpose of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual
possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right, the law requires
the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other sees fit to
invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the question of
ownership.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
De Guzman, Florentino, Celis, Moncupa & Torio for petitioner.
David C. Paguio for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
67
The judgment promulgated on February 28, 1994 by respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 1 reversing the decision of the regional
trial court, as well as its resolution of June 29, 1994 denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, are assailed in this petition for
review on certiorari.
This case originated from a complaint for ejectment with damages filed
by herein private respondent Generosa S. Cruz, as plaintiff, against herein
petitioner Eufemia Sarmiento, as defendant, in the Municipal Trial Court of
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan as Civil Case No. 899, which complaint
alleges these material facts:
xxx
. 2.That the plaintiff acquired by purchase a parcel of land known as
Lot No. 2-A of the subd. plan, Psd-03-0345 being a portion of Lot 2,
covered by TCT No. T-147219, located at Bo. Mabuco, Hermosa,
. Bataan, containing an area of 280 square meters, xerox copy of the
title is hereto attached as Annex “A” hereof and for taxation
purposes, the same is declared in the name of the plaintiff, xerox
copy of the tax declaration is hereto attached as Annex “B” of this
complaint;
. 3.That the adjacent lot of plaintiff is still owned by the family of Atty.
Gonzalo Nuguid but the same is being used and occupied by the
defendant where a house was constructed thereon;
. 4.That when the plaintiff caused the relocation of her lot herein
mentioned, it was found out by the Geodetic Engineer that the
defendant is encroaching on her lot for about 71 square meters,
copy of the relocation sketch by said surveyor is hereto attached as
Annex “C” hereof;
. 5.That when the plaintiff talked to the defendant that she would like
to remove the old fence so that she could construct a new fence
which will cover the true area of her property, the defendant
vehemently refused to let the plaintiff remov(e) the said fence and
menacingly alleged that if plaintiff remove(d) the said fence to
construct a new one, she would take action against the plaintiff
legally or otherwise;
. 6.For fear that plaintiff may be charged in court should she insist on
removing the fence encroaching on her property, plaintiff now
seeks judicial relief;
. 7.That plaintiff refer(red) this matter to the Katarungang
Pambarangay of Mabuco for settlement, however, the efforts of the
Lupon Tagapamayapa turned futile, as evidenced by a certification
to file action issued by the Lupon secretary and attested by the
Lupon Chairman, copy of the certification to file action is hereto
attached as Annex “D” hereof;
. 8.Plaintiff as much as possible would like to avoid court litigation
because she is poor but nevertheless she consulted the
undersigned counsel and a demand letter was sent to the
defendant for conference and/or settlement but the defendant stood
pat that she will not allow the removal of the fence, thus depriving
the plaintiff of the use and possession of the said portion of her lot
(71 square meters) which is being occupied by the defendant for
several years, xerox copy of the demand letter is hereto attached
as Annex “E” of this complaint;
. 9.That by virtue of the willful refusal of the defendant to allow the
plaintiff to have the fence dismantled and/or to be removed, the
plaintiff is deprived of the possession and she was forced to hire the
services of counsel for which she contracted to pay the sum of
P2,000.00 plus acceptance of P1,000.00 until the termination of this
case before this Honorable Court.2
xxx
On January 21, 1993, the trial court, on motion, issued an order giving the
defendant therein an extension of five days within which to file her answer
to the complaint.3 This was opposed by the plaintiff therein on the ground
that Section 15(e) of the Rule on Summary Procedure does not allow the
filing of motions for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other
papers.4Nonetheless, defendant filed on January 29, 1993 her “Answer
with Motion to Dismiss.”5 Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion reiterating her
contention that the filing by defendant of her aforesaid answer with motion
was barred for the reason that her preceding motion for extension of time to
file an answer is a prohibited pleading.6 On February 4, 1993, the trial court,
finding merit in plaintiff’s ex partemotion, ordered that defendant’s answer
be stricken from the records for having been filed out of time.7 The case
was then submitted for decision.
68
 On February 18, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision, with the
following decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant, ordering the latter:
. 1.To vacate the area being encroached (upon) by the defendant
and allowing the plaintiff to remove the old fence permanently and
(to) make the necessary enclosure of the area pertaining to the
herein plaintiff containing an area of 280 square meters, more or
less;
. 2.Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,500.00
as attorney’s fees. No pronouncement as to damages;
. 3.To pay the cost(s) of this suit.8 (Corrections in parentheses
supplied.)
Defendant filed a motion for the reconsideration of said judgment, but the
same was denied by the trial court for lack of merit in its order dated March
2, 1993.9
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan Bataan, Branch 5,
in Civil Case No. DH-121-93, defendant assailed the jurisdiction of the
court a quo. On June 21, 1993, said lower appellate court rendered
judgment, stating in part as follows:
A perusal of the records of the case and the memorandum of appeal of the
adversaries led this court to the opinion that the court a quo did not acquire
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the instant appealed case based on (the)
reason that the said case should be one of question of ownership or accion
rei(vin)dicatoria rather than that of forcible entry as the(re) was no
allegation of prior possession by the plaintiff (of) the disputed lot as required
by law and jurisprudence. Absence of allegations and proof by the plaintiff
in forcible entry case of prior possession of the disputed lot (sic) cannot be
said that defendant dispossesses her of the same, thus, the legal remedy
sought by the plaintiff is not the proper one as it should have been accion
publiciana or accion rei(vin)dicatoria, as the case may be, and the forum of
which is the Regional Trial Court.
This Court declines to venture into other issues raised by the
defendant/appellant considering that the resolution on jurisdiction renders
the same moot and academic.”10 (Corrections in parentheses ours.)
Therein plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration having been denied in said
lower court’s order dated August 12, 1993,11she elevated the case to the
Supreme Court through a petition for review on certiorari, purportedly on
pure questions of law. This Court, treating the petition as a special civil
action for certiorari, referred the case to respondent Court of Appeals for
proper determination and disposition pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.12
On February 28, 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA-G.R.
SP No. 32263 13 reversing the decision of the regional trial court and
reinstating that of the municipal circuit trial court, hence the present petition.
The chief issue for our resolution is whether or not the court of origin had
jurisdiction over the ejectment case. Well-settled is the rule that the
jurisdiction of the court, as well as the nature of the action, are determined
by the averments in the complaint.14Accordingly, the issue in the instant
case can only be properly resolved by an examination and evaluation of the
allegations in the complaint in Civil Case No. 899 of said trial court.
A careful reading of the facts averred in said complaint filed by herein
private respondent reveals that the action is neither one of forcible entry nor
of unlawful detainer but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must
be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the
disputed 71 square meters involved.
Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are two distinct actions defined
in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived
of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds
possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on
who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, the possession
was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of
the right to possess, hence the issue of rightful possession is decisive for, in
such action, the defendant is in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause
of action is the termination of the defendant’s right to continue in
possession.15
What determines the cause of action is the nature of defendant’s entry into
the land. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
intruder within one year therefrom is forcible entry. If, on the other hand, the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter became illegal, the case is one
69
of unlawful detainer which must be filed within one year from the date of the
last demand.16
In the case at bar, the complaint does not characterize herein
petitioner’s alleged entry into the land, that is, whether the same was legal
or illegal. It does not state how petitioner entered upon the land and
constructed the house and the fence thereon. It is also silent on whether
petitioner’s possession became legal before private respondent made a
demand on her to remove the fence. The complaint merely avers that the
lot being occupied by petitioner is owned by a third person, not a party to
the case, and that said lot is enclosed by a fence which private respondent
claims is an encroachment on the adjacent lot belonging to her.
Furthermore, it is also alleged and admitted in the complaint that the said
fence was already in existence on that lot at the time private respondent
bought her own lot and it was only after a relocation survey was made that it
was found out that petitioner is allegedly encroaching on the lot of the
former. Consequently, there is here no contract, express or implied,
between petitioner and private respondent as would qualify it as a case of
unlawful detainer. Neither was it alleged that the possession of the disputed
portion of said lot was acquired by petitioner through force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth to make out a case of forcible entry.
Private respondent cannot now belatedly claim that petitioner’s
possession of the controverted portion was by mere tolerance since that
fact was never alleged in the former’s basic complaint, and this argument
was raised in her later pleadings more as an afterthought. Also, it would be
absurd to argue that private respondent tolerated a state of affairs of which
she was not even then aware. Finally, to categorize a cause of action as
one constitutive of unlawful detainer, plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance
must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered.17
Indeed, and this was definitely not the situation that obtained in and gave
rise to the ejectment suit, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous
doctrine, for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open
challenge to the right of the lawful possessor, the violation of which right
authorizes the speedy redress in the inferior court provided for in the Rules.
If a period of one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit
is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy and the aggrieved possessor
is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior
court. Second.If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after
the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of
forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in
physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the
inferior court—upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription from setting
in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable, especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings
of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the
one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of
the action.18
To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or
deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint should embody
such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature.19 The complaint must show enough on its face to give
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.20
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer,
as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when
dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court.21
If private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises subject of this
suit and she was unlawfully deprived of the real right of possession or the
ownership thereof, she should present her claim before the regional trial
court in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, and not before
the municipal trial court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer or
forcible entry. For even if one is the owner of the property, the possession
thereof cannot be wrested from another who had been in the physical or
material possession of the same for more than one year by resorting to a
summary action for ejectment. This is especially true where his possession
thereof was not obtained through the means or held under the
circumstances contemplated by the rules on summary ejectment.
We have held that in giving recognition to the action for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, the purpose of the law is to protect the person who in
fact has actual possession, and in case of a controverted proprietary right,
the law requires the parties to preserve the status quo until one or the other
sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of competent jurisdiction upon the
question of ownership.22
On the foregoing premises and with these conclusions, it is unnecessary
to pass upon the other issues raised in the petition at bar.
70
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32263 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan,
Branch 5, in Civil Case No. DH-121-93 is REINSTATED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The only issue for resolution in ejectment cases is who is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership. (Somodio vs. Court of Appeals, 235
SCRA 307 [1994])
The subsequent acquisition of ownership over the property by the
defendants in an unlawful detainer case is not a supervening event that will
bar the execution of the judgment in said case. (Oblea vs. Court of
Appeals, 244 SCRA 101 [1995])
G.R. No. 169380. November 26, 2012.*
FIORELLO R. JOSE, petitioner, vs. ROBERTO ALFUERTO, ERNESTO
BACAY, ILUMINADO BACAY, MANUEL BANTACULO, LETTY BARCELO,
JING BERMEJO, MILNA BERMEJO, PABLO BERMEJO, JHONNY BORJA,
BERNADETTE BUENAFE, ALFREDO CALAGOS, ROSAURO CALAGOS,
ALEX CHACON, AIDA CONSULTA, CARMEN CORPUZ, RODOLFO DE
VERA, ANA DELA ROSA, RUDY DING, JOSE ESCASINAS, GORGONIO
ESPADERO, DEMETRIO ESTRERA, ROGELIO ESTRERA, EDUARDO
EVARDONE, ANTONIO GABALEÑO, ARSENIA GARING, NARCING
GUARDA, NILA LEBATO, ANDRADE LIGAYA, HELEN LOPEZ, RAMON
MACAIRAN, DOMINGO NOLASCO, JR., FLORANTE NOLASCO,
REGINA OPERARIO, CARDING ORCULLO, FELICISIMO PACATE,
CONRADO PAMINDALAN, JUN PARIL, RENE SANTOS,
DOMINADOR SELVELYEJO, ROSARIO UBALDO, SERGIO VILLAR,
JOHN DOE, JANE DOE and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound,
Phase II, Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City, respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Action; Unlawful Detainer; Words and
Phrases; Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of
possession of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied.—Unlawful
detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real
property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other
person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the
possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract
between them. However, the defendant’s possession became illegal when
the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the subject property due to
the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and
the defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer
must be instituted one year from the unlawful withholding of possession.
Same; Same; Same; In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s
possession becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the
defendant to vacate the property and the defendant’s subsequent
refusal.—In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’
occupancy was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or
legal basis. In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession
becomes illegal only upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate
the property and the defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the present case,
paragraph 8 characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even
before the formal demand letters were written by the petitioner’s counsel.
Under these allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not
be based on the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged unlawful
act had taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
Same; Same; Same; A case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance
must definitely establish its existence from the start of possession;
otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for unlawful
detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the required one-year prescription
period from the time of forcible entry.—As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et
al. v. Villegas, et al., 22 SCRA 1257 (1968), we already ruled that a
complaint which fails to positively aver any overt act on the plaintiff’s part
indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any showing of such fact
during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer. As the Court then
explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance must
definitely establish its existence from the start of possession;
otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for
unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the required
one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry: A close
assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our
view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from
71
the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of
action as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold
otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First.
Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress—in the
inferior court—provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is
allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy;
and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior court is
allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be
that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long
such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates
that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the
summary nature of the action.
Same; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Theory of the Case; Cause of Action;
A party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of action on
appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the
attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court.—It
is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his
cause of action on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered by the
reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer cannot, on appeal,
change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would
be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence
in connection with the new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due
process and fair play.
Sales; Special Civil Actions; Forcible Entry; An action for forcible entry
cannot be treated as an accion publiciana; The cause of action in ejectment
is different from that in an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria.—In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 611 (2007),
we ruled that an action for forcible entry cannot be treated as an accion
publiciana and summarized the reasons therefor. We find these same
reasons also applicable to an unlawful detainer case which bears the same
relevant characteristics: On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible
entry can be treated as accion publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible
entry is distinct from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed
within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property,
while accion publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of
the real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the
right to the physical possession of the real property; in accion publiciana,
what is subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the real
property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court
and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the
RTC. [italics supplied] The cause of action in ejectment is different from that
in an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is
brought before the proper inferior court to recover physical possession only
or possession de facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and
forcible entry cases are not processes to determine actual title to property.
Any ruling by the MeTC on the issue of ownership is made only to resolve
the issue of possession, and is therefore inconclusive.
Same; Same; Same; Ejectment; The purpose of allowing actions for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings
is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an
alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his
possession during the long period it would take to properly resolve the
issue of possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the
maintenance of peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party
illegally deprived of possession might take the law in his hands and seize
the property by force and violence.—Because they only resolve issues of
possession de facto, ejectment actions are summary in nature,
while accion publiciana (for the recovery of possession) and accion
reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are plenary actions. The
purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer to be
decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a peaceful, speedy and
expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal possessor of property
from unjustly taking and continuing his possession during the long period it
would take to properly resolve the issue of possession de jure or ownership,
thereby ensuring the maintenance of peace and order in the community;
otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might take the law in
his hands and seize the property by force and violence. An ejectment case
cannot be a substitute for a full-blown trial for the purpose of determining
rights of possession or ownership.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Fiorello R. Jose for petitioner.
Luisito Lopez for respondents.
72
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the decision1 dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166. The Court of Appeals’ decision reversed the
decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 257,
and of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 77,
by dismissing petitioner Fiorello R. Jose’s complaint for ejectment against
Roberto Alfuerto, Ernesto Bacay, Iluminado Bacay, Manuel Bantaculo,
Letty Barcelo, Jing Bermejo, Milna Bermejo, Pablo Bermejo, Jhonny Borja,
Bernadette Buenafe, Alfredo Calagos, Rosauro Calagos, Alex Chacon,
Aida Consulta, Carmen Corpuz, Rodolfo De Vera, Ana Dela Rosa, Rudy
Ding, Jose Escasinas, Gorgonio Espadero, Demetrio Estrera, Rogelio
Estrera, Eduardo Evardone, Antonio Gabaleño, Arsenia Garing, Narcing
Guarda, Nila Lebato, Andrade Ligaya, Helen Lopez, Ramon Macairan,
Domingo Nolasco, Jr., Florante Nolasco, Regina Operario, Carding Orcullo,
Felicisimo Pacate, Conrado Pamindalan, Jun Paril, Rene Santos,
Dominador Selvelyejo, Rosario Ubaldo, Sergio Villar, John Doe, Jane Doe
and Unknown Occupants of Olivares Compound, Phase II, Barangay San
Dionisio, Parañaque City (respondents), on the ground that the petitioner’s
cause of action was not for unlawful detainer but for recovery of possession.
The appellate court affirmed this decision in its resolution of August 22,
2005.2
The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo
Chua Sing under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52594,3with an area of
1919 square meters, located in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing leased
the property to the petitioner. Their contract of lease was neither notarized
nor registered with the Parañaque City Registry of Deeds.4
The lease contract provided that:
That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the
same period upon mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the
total eviction of any occupant or occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers
all its rights and prerogative to evict said occupants in favor of the
LESSEEwhich shall be responsible for all expenses that may be incurred
without reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is understood however that the
LESSOR is hereby waiving, in favor of the LESSEE any and all damages
that [may be] recovered from the occupants[.]5 (Underscore ours)
Significantly, the respondents already occupied the property even before
the lease contract was executed.
On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the
lease contract, the petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents
vacate the property within 30 days and that they pay a monthly rental of
P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.6
The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20,
1999, the petitioner filed an ejectment case against the respondents before
Branch 77 of the Parañaque City MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
11344.7 In this complaint, no mention was made of any proceedings before
the barangay. Jose then brought the dispute before the barangay for
conciliation.8 The barangay issued a Certification to File Action on March 1,
2000.9 Jose was then able to file an amended complaint, incorporating the
proceedings before the barangay before the summons and copies of the
complaint were served upon the named defendants.10
In the Amended Complaint11 dated March 17, 2000, the petitioner
claimed that as lessee of the subject property, he had the right to eject the
respondents who unlawfully occupy the land. He alleged that:
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy of the
subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat without benefit of
any contract or law whatsoever, much less any building permit as
sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of its true, lawful and registered
owner, plaintiff’s lessor.12
The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents
failed to vacate the property without legal justification. He prayed that the
court order the respondents; (1) to vacate the premises; (2) to pay him not
less than P41,000.00 a month from May 30, 1999 until they vacate the
premises; and (3) to pay him attorney’s fees of no less than P50,000.00,
and the costs of suit.13
In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in
possession of the land long before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991,
and that the lease contract between the petitioner and Chua Sing does not
affect their right to possess the land. The respondents also presented a
Deed of Assignment,14 dated February 13, 2000, issued by David R. Dulfo
in their favor. They argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case
as the issue deals with ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction. They
also filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages for the filing of a
baseless and malicious suit.
73
 After the required position papers, affidavits and other pieces of
evidence were submitted, the MeTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s
favor. In its decision15 of January 27, 2003, the MeTC held that the
respondents had no right to possess the land and that their occupation was
merely by the owner’s tolerance. It further noted that the respondents could
no longer raise the issue of ownership, as this issue had already been
settled: the respondents previously filed a case for the
annulment/cancellation of Chua Sing’s title before the RTC, Branch 260, of
Parañaque City, which ruled that the registered owner’s title was genuine
and valid. Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not divested of jurisdiction
over the case because of the respondents’ assertion of ownership of the
property. On these premises, the MeTC ordered the respondents to vacate
the premises and to remove all structures introduced on the land; to each
pay P500.00 per month from the date of filing of this case until they vacate
the premises; and to pay Jose, jointly and severally, the costs of suit and
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
On appeal before the RTC, the respondents raised the issue, among
others, that no legal basis exists for the petitioner’s claim that their
occupation was by tolerance, “where the possession of the defendants was
illegal at the inception as alleged in the complaint[,] there can be no
tolerance.”16
The RTC affirmed the MeTC decision of January 27, 2003. It issued its
decision17 on October 8, 2003, reiterating the MeTC’s ruling that a case for
ejectment was proper. The petitioner, as lessee, had the right to file the
ejectment complaint; the respondents occupied the land by mere tolerance
and their possession became unlawful upon the petitioner’s demand to
vacate on April 28, 1999. The RTC, moreover, noted that the complaint for
ejectment was filed on October 20, 1999, or within one year after the
unlawful deprivation took place. It cited Pangilinan, et al. v. Hon. Aguilar,
etc., et al.18 and Yu v. Lara, et al.19 to support its ruling that a case for
unlawful detainer was appropriate.
On March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC
decisions.20 It ruled that the respondents’ possession of the land was not by
the petitioner or his lessor’s tolerance. It defined tolerance not merely as
the silence or inaction of a lawful possessor when another occupies his
land; tolerance entailed permission from the owner by reason of familiarity
or neighborliness. The petitioner, however, alleged that the respondents
unlawfully entered the property; thus, tolerance (or authorized entry into the
property) was not alleged and there could be no case for unlawful detainer.
The respondents’ allegation that they had been in possession of the land
before the petitioner’s lessor had acquired it in 1991 supports this finding.
Having been in possession of the land for more than a year, the
respondents should not be evicted through an ejectment case.
The Court of Appeals emphasized that ejectment cases are summary
proceedings where the only issue to be resolved is who has a better right to
the physical possession of a property. The petitioner’s claim, on the other
hand, is based on an accion publiciana: he asserts his right as a possessor
by virtue of a contract of lease he contracted after the respondents had
occupied the land. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision dated
October 8, 2003 of the RTC, Branch 257, Parañaque City, in Civil Case No.
03-0127, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the amended complaint for
ejectment is DISMISSED.21
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,22 which the Court of
Appeals denied in its resolution23 of August 22, 2005. In the present appeal,
the petitioner raises before us the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE SUBJECT COMPLAINT IS NOT
FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER BUT FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
AND THEREFORE DISMISSIBLE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECIDING
THE CASE BASED ON RESPONDENTS’ MATERIAL CHANGE OF
THEORY WHICH IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR
DEFENSES INVOKED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THIS HONORABLE COURT MAY DECIDE THIS
CASE ON THE MERITS TO AVOID CIRCUITOUS PROCEDURE IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.24
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
74
Unlawful detainer is not the proper
remedy for the present case.
The key issue in this case is whether an action for unlawful detainer is
the proper remedy.
Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession
of real property. This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. In unlawful
detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as his
possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or
implied contract between them. However, the defendant’s possession
became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate the
subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess
under the contract, and the defendant refused to heed such demand. A
case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful
withholding of possession.25
The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action
and the jurisdiction of the court. The complaint must specifically allege the
facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these allegations of
facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the
municipal trial court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.26
In his amended complaint, the petitioner presents the following
allegations in support of his unlawful detainer complaint:
3. On April 1, 1999, plaintiff leased from lessor, Mr. Rudy Chuasing,
that parcel of lot owned and registered in [the] lessor’s name,
covering the area occupied by the defendants.
xxxx
6. Plaintiff’s lessor had acquired the subject property as early as
1991 through sale, thereafter the aforesaid Transfer Certificate
of Title was subsequently registered under his name.
7. Defendants, having been fully aware of their unlawful occupancy
of the subject lot, have defiantly erected their houses thereat
without benefit of any contract or law whatsoever, much less any
building permit as sanctioned by law, but by mere tolerance of
its true, lawful and registered owner, plaintiff’s lessor.
8. By reason of defendants’ continued unlawful occupancy of the
subject premises, plaintiff referred the matter to his lawyer who
immediately sent a formal demand upon each of the defendants
to vacate the premises. Copies of the demand letter dated 28
April 1999 are xxx hereto attached as annexes “C” to “QQ[.]”
9. Despite notice, however, defendants failed and refused and
continues to fail and refuse to vacate the premises without valid
or legal justification.27(emphasis ours)
The petitioner’s allegations in the amended complaint run counter to the
requirements for unlawful detainer. In an unlawful detainer action, the
possession of the defendant was originally legal and his possession was
permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.
In this case, paragraph 7 makes it clear that the respondents’ occupancy
was unlawful from the start and was bereft of contractual or legal basis. In
an unlawful detainer case, the defendant’s possession becomes illegal only
upon the plaintiff’s demand for the defendant to vacate the property and the
defendant’s subsequent refusal. In the present case, paragraph 8
characterizes the defendant’s occupancy as unlawful even before the
formal demand letters were written by the petitioner’s counsel. Under these
allegations, the unlawful withholding of possession should not be based on
the date the demand letters were sent, as the alleged unlawful act had
taken place at an earlier unspecified date.
The petitioner nevertheless insists that he properly alleged that the
respondents occupied the premises by mere tolerance of the owner. No
allegation in the complaint nor any supporting evidence on record, however,
shows when the respondents entered the property or who had granted
them permission to enter. Without these allegations and evidence, the bare
claim regarding “tolerance” cannot be upheld.
In Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,28 the Court cited Prof. Arturo M.
Tolentino’s definition and characterizes “tolerance” in the following manner:
Professor Arturo M. Tolentino states that acts merely tolerated are “those
which by reason of neighborliness or familiarity, the owner of
property allows his neighbor or another person to do on the property; they
are generally those particular services or benefits which one’s property can
give to another without material injury or prejudice to the owner, who
permits them out of friendship or courtesy.” He adds that: “[t]hey are acts of
little disturbances which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or
friendly relations, permits others to do on his property, such as passing
75
over the land, tying a horse therein, or getting some water from a well.” And,
Tolentino continues, even though “this is continued for a long time, no right
will be acquired by prescription.” Further expounding on the concept,
Tolentino writes: “There is tacit consent of the possessor to the acts which
are merely tolerated. Thus, not every case of knowledge and silence on the
part of the possessor can be considered mere tolerance. By virtue of
tolerance that is considered as an authorization, permission or license, acts
of possession are realized or performed. The question reduces itself to the
existence or non-existence of the permission. [citations omitted; italics
supplied]
The Court has consistently adopted this position: tolerance or
permission must have been present at the beginning of possession; if
the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would not be the proper remedy and should be dismissed.29
It is not the first time that this Court adjudged contradictory statements in
a complaint for unlawful detainer as a basis for dismissal. In Unida v. Heirs
of Urban,30 the claim that the defendant’s possession was merely tolerated
was contradicted by the complainant’s allegation that the entry to the
subject property was unlawful from the very beginning. The Court then
ruled that the unlawful detainer action should fail.
The contradictory statements in the complaint are further deemed
suspicious when a complaint is silent regarding the factual circumstances
surrounding the alleged tolerance. In Ten Forty Realty Corporation v.
Cruz,31 the complaint simply stated that: “(1) [defendant] immediately
occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action merely
tolerated by [the plaintiff]; and (2) [the respondent’s] allegedly illegal
occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.” The Court expressed
its qualms over these averments of fact as they did not contain anything
substantiating the claim that the plaintiff tolerated or permitted the
occupation of the property by the defendant:
These allegations contradict, rather than support, [plaintiff’s] theory that its
cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the
view that [defendant’s] occupation of the property was unlawful at its
inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful
detainer cases that [plaintiff’s] supposed act of sufferance or tolerance must
be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to be
recovered.
As the bare allegation of [plaintiff’s] tolerance of [defendant’s] occupation
of the premises has not been proven, the possession should be deemed
illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment
case should have been for forcible entry—an action that had already
prescribed, however, when the Complaint was filed on May 12, 1999. The
prescriptive period of one year for forcible entry cases is reckoned from the
date of [defendant’s] actual entry into the land, which in this case was on
April 24, 1998.32
Similarly, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,33 the Court considered the
owner’s lack of knowledge of the defendant’s entry of the land to be
inconsistent with the allegation that there had been tolerance.
In Padre v. Malabanan,34 the Court not only required allegations
regarding the grant of permission, but proof as well. It noted that the
plaintiffs alleged the existence of tolerance, but ordered the dismissal of the
unlawful detainer case because the evidence was “totally wanting as to
when and under what circumstances xxx the alleged tolerance came
about.” It stated that:
Judging from the respondent’s Answer, the petitioners were never at all in
physical possession of the premises from the time he started occupying it
and continuously up to the present. For sure, the petitioners merely derived
their alleged prior physical possession only on the basis of their Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT), arguing that the issuance of said title presupposes
their having been in possession of the property at one time or another.35
Thus, the complainants in unlawful detainer cases cannot simply anchor
their claims on the validity of the owner’s title. Possession de facto must
also be proved.
As early as the 1960s, in Sarona, et al. v. Villegas, et al.,36 we already
ruled that a complaint which fails to positively aver any overt act on the
plaintiff’s part indicative of permission to occupy the land, or any showing of
such fact during the trial is fatal for a case for unlawful detainer. As the
Court then explained, a case for unlawful detainer alleging tolerance
must definitely establish its existence from the start of possession;
otherwise, a case for forcible entry can mask itself as an action for
unlawful detainer and permit it to be filed beyond the required
one-year prescription period from the time of forcible entry:
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance”
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible
entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And
76
for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to
the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy
redress—in the inferior court—provided for in the rules. If one year from the
forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases
to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second. If a forcible entry action in the inferior
court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may
well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how
long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates
that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature, and that the one year time-bar to the suit is but in pursuance of the
summary nature of the action.37 (italics supplied)
Given these rulings, it would be equally dangerous for us to deprive the
respondents of possession over a property that they have held for at least
eight years before the case was filed in 1999, by means of a summary
proceeding, simply because the petitioner used the word “tolerance”
without sufficient allegations or evidence to support it.
There was no change in the respon-
dents’ theory during the appeal that
would amount to a deprivation of the
petitioner’s right to due process.
The petitioner alleges that the respondents had never questioned before
the MeTC the fact that their occupancy was by tolerance. The only issues
the respondents allegedly raised were: (1) the title to the property is
spurious; (2) the petitioner’s predecessor is not the true owner of the
property in question; (3) the petitioner’s lease contract was not legally
enforceable; (4) the petitioner was not the real party-in-interest; (5) the
petitioner’s predecessor never had prior physical possession of the
property; and (6) the respondents’ right of possession was based on the
“Deed of Assignment of Real Property” executed by Dulfo. The
respondents raised the issue of tolerance merely on appeal before the RTC.
They argue that this constitutes a change of theory, which is disallowed on
appeal.38
It is a settled rule that a party cannot change his theory of the case or his
cause of action on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered by the
reviewing court. The defenses not pleaded in the answer cannot, on appeal,
change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. To do so would
be unfair to the adverse party, who had no opportunity to present evidence
in connection with the new theory; this would offend the basic rules of due
process and fair play.39
While this Court has frowned upon changes of theory on appeal, this rule
is not applicable to the present case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
action due the petitioner’s failure to allege and prove the essential
requirements of an unlawful detainer case. In Serdoncillo v. Spouses
Benolirao,40 we held that:
In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must
sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without
resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In
short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. (emphasis ours; italics
supplied)
Regardless of the defenses raised by the respondents, the petitioner
was required to properly allege and prove when the respondents entered
the property and that it was the petitioner or his predecessors, not any other
persons, who granted the respondents permission to enter and occupy the
property. Furthermore, it was not the respondents’ defense that proved fatal
to the case but the petitioner’s contradictory statements in his amended
complaint which he even reiterated in his other pleadings.41
Although the respondents did not use the word “tolerance” before the
MeTC, they have always questioned the existence of the petitioner’s
tolerance. In their Answer to Amended Complaint, the respondents negated
the possibility of their possession of the property under the petitioner and
his lessor’s tolerance when the respondents alleged to have occupied the
premises even before the lessor acquired the property in 1991. They said
as much in their Position Paper:
RODOLFO CHUA SING never had actual physical possession of his
supposed property, as when he became an owner of the 1,919 square
meters property described in TCT No. 52594, the property had already
been occupied by herein DEFENDANTS since late 1970. Therefore,
DEFENDANTS were already occupants/possessors of the property from
77
where they are being ejected by FIORELLO JOSE, a supposed LESSEE of
a property with a dubious title. The main thing to be proven in the case at
bar is prior possession and that the same was lost through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it behooves the court to
restore possession regardless of title or even ownership xxx. In the case at
bar, neither RODOLFO CHUA SING nor herein PLAINTIFF ever had any
actual physical possession of the property where DEFENDANTS have
already possessed for more than ten (10) years in 1991 when RODOLFO
CHUA SING got his fake title to the property[.]42 (citation omitted)
In addition, whether or not it was credible, the respondent’s claim that their
possession was based on the Deed of Assignment executed by Dulfo, in
behalf of the estate of Domingo de Ocampo, shows that they considered
the petitioner and his lessor as strangers to any of their transactions on the
property, and could not have stayed there upon the latter’s permission.
We note that even after the issue of tolerance had been directly raised
by the respondents before the RTC, the petitioner still failed to address it
before the RTC, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court.43 At best, he
belatedly states for the first time in his Memorandum44 before this Court
that his lessor had tolerated the respondents’ occupancy of the lot, without
addressing the respondents’ allegation that they had occupied the lot in
1970, before the petitioner’s lessor became the owner of the property in
1991, and without providing any other details. His pleadings continued to
insist on the existence of tolerance without providing the factual basis for
this conclusion. Thus, we cannot declare that the Court of Appeals had in
anyway deprived the petitioner of due process or had unfairly treated him
when it resolved the case based on the issue of tolerance.
The Court cannot treat an eject-
ment case as an accion publiciana
or accion reivindicatoria.
The petitioner argues that assuming this case should have been filed as
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, this Court should still resolve
the case, as requiring him to properly refile the case serves no other ends
than to comply with technicalities.45
The Court cannot simply take the evidence presented before the MeTC
in an ejectment case and decide it as an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria. These cases are not interchangeable and their differences
constitute far more than mere technicalities.
In Regis, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,46 we ruled that an action for forcible
entry cannot be treated as an accion publiciana and summarized the
reasons therefor. We find these same reasons also applicable to an
unlawful detainer case which bears the same relevant characteristics:
On the issue of whether or not an action for forcible entry can be treated
as accion publiciana, we rule in the negative. Forcible entry is distinct
from accion publiciana. First, forcible entry should be filed within one year
from the unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion
publiciana is filed a year after the unlawful dispossession of the real
property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to
the physical possession of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is
subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the real
property. Third, an action for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court
and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the
RTC. [italics supplied]
The cause of action in ejectment is different from that in an accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. An ejectment suit is brought before the
proper inferior court to recover physical possession only or possession de
facto, not possession de jure. Unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases
are not processes to determine actual title to property. Any ruling by the
MeTC on the issue of ownership is made only to resolve the issue of
possession, and is therefore inconclusive.47
Because they only resolve issues of possession de facto, ejectment actions
are summary in nature, while accion publiciana(for the recovery of
possession) and accion reivindicatoria (for the recovery of ownership) are
plenary actions.48 The purpose of allowing actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer to be decided in summary proceedings is to provide for a
peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal
possessor of property from unjustly taking and continuing his possession
during the long period it would take to properly resolve the issue of
possession de jure or ownership, thereby ensuring the maintenance of
peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of
possession might take the law in his hands and seize the property by force
and violence.49 An ejectment case cannot be a substitute for a full-blown
trial for the purpose of determining rights of possession or ownership.
Citing Mediran v. Villanueva,50 the Court in Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals51 describes in detail how these two remedies should be used:
In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose
of the law is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in
case of controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status
78
quountil one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just
that the person who has first acquired possession should remain in
possession pending [the] decision; and the parties cannot be permitted
meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property
which is the subject of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to
individual security and disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a person
supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to
vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it is
incumbent upon him to institute an action to this end in a court of competent
jurisdiction; and he [cannot] be permitted, by invading the property and
excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of
instituting an [action] to try the property right. [italics supplied]
Thus, if we allow parties to file ejectment cases and later consider them as
an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, we would encourage parties
to simply file ejectment cases instead of plenary actions. Courts would then
decide in summary proceedings cases which the rules intend to be resolved
through full-blown trials. Because these “summary” proceedings will have to
tackle complicated issues requiring extensive proof, they would no longer
be expeditious and would no longer serve the purpose for which they were
created. Indeed, we cannot see how the resulting congestion of cases, the
hastily and incorrectly decided cases, and the utter lack of system would
assist the courts in protecting and preserving property rights.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM the Court of
Appeals’ decision dated March 14, 2005 and resolution dated August 22,
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80166.
SO ORDERED.
Caro vs. Sucaldito
G.R. No. 157536. May 16, 2005.*
MELCHOR CARO, petitioner, vs. SUSANA SUCALDITO, respondent.
Actions; Land Registration; Reconveyance and Reversion; Words and
Phrases; The essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name, to its right-ful owner or to one with a
better right.—The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the
RTC prays for the annulment of the free patent issued in the respondent’s
favor. Considering that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to
“return” the subject property to him, it is in reality an action
for reconveyance. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
“[t]he essence of an action for reconveyance is that the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another person’s name, to its rightful owner or to one with a
better right.” Indeed, in an action for reconveyance filed by a private
individual, the property does not go back to the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Reversion is an action where the ultimate
relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the
Regalian doctrine.—Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the
ultimate relief sought is to revert the land back to the government under the
Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated
from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; “Legal Standing” and “In-terest,”
Explained; Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest, or one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit.”—Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, or one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit.” Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.
Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned
act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the
question involved.
Same; Same; Same; Parties; Free Patents; A mere applicant for a free
patent, hence not the owner of the disputed property, cannot be considered
as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.—A
suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be dismissed. In this
case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed property but a
mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered as a
party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance. The
Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine in Tankiko v.
Cezar as follows: . . . Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that
the patent was obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently, prayed for
79
the annulment of said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The
Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government,
to which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v.
Heirs of Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff, being a mere
homestead applicant, was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action
for reconveyance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Only the Solicitor General or the officer
acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion.—This provision was
applied and discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, et al., a case on all fours with the present one, as follows: Under
Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion. Consequently,
Sumail may not bring such action or any action which would have the effect
of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued
on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered thereby will again
form part of the public domain. Furthermore, there is another reason for
withholding legal personality from Sumail. He does not claim the land to be
his private property. In fact, by his application for a free patent, he had
formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part of the public
domain; this, aside from the declaration made by the cadastral court that lot
3633 was public land. Consequently, even if the parcel were declared
reverted to the public domain, Sumail does not automatically become the
owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like others who may apply
for the same.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rey G. Canindo for petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
45503, affirming the dismissal of Civil Case No. 15529 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, Branch 39, as well as the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Gregorio Caro bought a parcel of land known as Assessor’s Lot No. 160
from Ruperto Gepilano as evidenced by a Deed of Sale2dated October 21,
1953. The said lot was situated in Sitio Bangyan, Barrio Calaya,
Municipality of Nueva Valencia, Iloilo City, consisting more or less of
17.9849 hectares. Thereafter, Gregorio Caro sold a portion of the said lot to
his son Melchor Caro, consisting of 70,124 square meters, and now
identified as Lot No. 4512 of the Cadastral survey of Nueva Valencia,
Pls-775. Father and son executed a Deed of Definite Sale3 dated January
31, 1973 covering Lot No. 4512.
On August 1, 1974, Melchor Caro applied for a free patent before the
Bureau of Lands, District Land Office No. 6-1, covering the said area of the
property which he bought from his father. The application was, however,
opposed by Deogracias de la Cruz. On November 6, 1980, the Regional
Director rendered a Decision4 canceling the said application, thusly:
“This is a claim of Deogracias de la Cruz to Lot No. 4512, Pls-775 of Calaya,
Nueva Valencia, Guimaras, covered by the above-noted application of
Melchor Caro.
In the investigation, respondent claims preferential rights over the land
as he acquired it through sale from his father Gregorio Caro who had
likewise bought the land from Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in 1953. On the other
hand, protestant De la Cruz testified that the land in controversy was
bought by him from Cipriano Gallego in 1965; that he thereafter occupied,
possessed and improved the land by planting coconut trees; and that in
1968 he was forcibly driven out by Gregorio Caro from the land in question.
Verification of the records disclosed that the land which was actually
sold to Gregorio Caro by Ruperto Gepellano (sic) is Assessor’s Lot No. 160.
The description and physical identity of Lot No. 160 is basically different
and distinct from Lot No. 4512, the land in question. This could be clearly
seen in the Certified True Copy of the Sketch Plan from the Assessor’s
Office of Assessor’s Lot No. 160 and the Sketch Plan marked as Exhibit “9”
of the Respondent-Applicant. It has been established that Assessor’s Lot
No. 160 corresponds to Lot No. 4511 and not Lot No. 4512 claimed by the
protestant. Moreover, Ruperto Cepellano (sic) in his affidavit testified that
what he sold to Gregorio Caro is a land distinct and different from the land
in question.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, it is ordered that the F.P.A.
No. (VI-1)8548 of applicant-respondent Melchor Caro be, as hereby it is,
80
cancelled. Protestant Deogracias de la Cruz if qualified, is given one . 1.Ordering the annulment and voiding of the decision of the Bureau
hundred twenty (120) days from the finality of this decision to file an of Lands, the free patent and the Original Certificate of Title No.
appropriate public land application otherwise he shall lose his preferential F-27162 or in the alternative;
right thereto.
. 2.Ordering defendant to reconvey the ownership and in the event
SO ORDERED.”5 she wrests possession from plaintiff then, also the possession of
Lot 4512 PLS-775 of Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre, back to
Caro filed a notice of appeal before the Regional Land Office in Iloilo City, plaintiff;
docketed as MNR Case No. 5207. However, the appeal was dismissed in
an Order6 dated June 29, 1982, on the ground of failure to file an appeal . 3.Declaring plaintiff as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 4512
memorandum within the reglementary period therefor. PLS-775 of Nueva Valencia, Guimaras Cadastre and ordering the
issuance of a free patent or a torrens title in favor of plaintiff;
On August 29, 1982, Susana R. Sucaldito, as the buyer of Lot No. 4512,
filed an Application for a Free Patent7 covering the said lot, and was issued
. 4.Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff P50,000.00 as moral
Free Patent No. 597599. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City
damages, P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P2,000.00 as
issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. F-27162 in her favor. Sucaldito
expenses on litigation plus exemplary damages in an amount at the
then filed a Petition for Writ of Possession8 before the RTC of Iloilo City,
discretion of this Court.
which was granted in an Order9 dated May 7, 1984.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief just and equitable in the
Thereafter, on February 20, 1984, Caro filed a Complaint10against
premises.”12
Sucaldito for “Annulment of Title, Decision, Free Patent and/or Recovery of
Ownership and/or Possession with Damages” before the RTC of Iloilo City.
In her answer with counterclaim, Sucaldito interposed, as a special
He later filed an amended complaint,11alleging that he was the owner of
affirmative defense, the fact that she intervened in the proceedings on
the subject lot, and had been in possession of the same “since 1953 and/or
Caro’s application for a free patent over Lot No. 4512 before the Bureau of
even prior thereto in the concept of owner, adversely, openly, continuously
Lands having bought the subject land from De la Cruz. Moreover, contrary
and notoriously.” He further alleged that the said lot had been declared for
to the allegations of the petitioner, Lot No. 989 and Lot No. 4512 were one
tax purposes in his name and that of his predecessors-in-interest, and that
and the same lot, as per the findings of the Bureau of Lands.
the corresponding land taxes had been paid therefor. He claimed that
Assessor’s Lot No. 160 had actually been divided into two lots, namely, Lot
The parties thereafter presented evidence to prove their respective
No. 4511 and Lot No. 4512; Sucaldito had actually been claiming Lot No.
claims. In a Decision13 dated December 7, 1993, the trial court ruled in
989 (Lot No. 4512), which was located two kilometers away. He lamented
favor of the respondent and dismissed the petitioner’s complaint. The
that despite the overwhelming evidence proving his ownership and
dispositive portion reads:
possession of the said property, the Bureau of Lands did not award it to
him.
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint filed by plaintiff is
dismissed. The counterclaim of defendant which is merely the result of the
Caro further alleged that since the issuance of the free patent over the
filing of the complaint, is likewise dismissed.
subject lot in favor of Sucaldito was wrongful and fraudulent, she had no
right whatsoever over the subject lot. Hence, as a “trustee of a constructive
Costs against the plaintiff.
trust,” she was obliged to return the same to him as the lawful owner. The
complaint contained the following prayer: SO ORDERED.”14
“WHEREFORE, it is prayed that judgment be rendered: Citing the case of Maximo v. Court of First Instance of Capiz, Br. III,15 the
trial court ruled that Caro had no personality to file the action for the
annulment of the free patent issued in favor of Sucaldito, which could only
81
be brought by the Solicitor General. It held that “an applicant for a free
patent who is not the owner of a parcel of land cannot bring an action in
court to recover the land, for the court may not usurp the authority of the
Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture to dispose lands of the
public domain through administrative proceedings under the Public Land
Act,”16 or Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. The trial court further
stressed that the remedy of a rival-applicant for a free patent over the same
land was through administrative channels, not judicial, because even if the
oppositor succeeds in annulling the title of the applicant, the former does
not thereby become the owner of the land in dispute.17
The trial court also declared that contrary to Caro’s claims, the evidence
clearly showed that Lot No. 4512, with an area of 70,677 square meters,
was not included in Assessor’s Lot No. 160, thus:
Assessor’s Lot 160 is Cadastral Lot 4511, which has an original area of
around 17 hectares, more or less, later on, increased to 21 hectares. If we
add Lot 4512 to Lot 4511 following the contention of the plaintiff, then the
area would be more than 28 hectares. Thus, belying the claim of plaintiff
that Lot 4512 was formerly a part of Assessor’s Lot 160.
The contention of the plaintiff that the defendant is claiming Lot 989
which is owned by Felix Galabo and located at Brgy. Olacon, is not well
taken, because the identification of the lot as stated in the tax declaration is
not binding and conclusive. What is binding and conclusive is what is stated
in the title of the land and its technical description. In the technical
description as found in the title of the defendant [Sucaldito], it is clearly
stated therein that the lot is Lot 4512 and is located at Brgy. Calaya and not
Brgy. Olacon, Nueva Valencia, Guimaras.18
Aggrieved by the trial court’s ruling, Caro elevated the case to the CA on
the following grounds:
I personality to bring and institute the present action against the respondent,
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF HAS NO
PERSONALITY TO BRING THE ACTION;
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT EVEN IF THE
PLAINTIFF HAS THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE ACTION STILL HE
CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT IN QUESTION, CAD. LOT NO. 4512;
III
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO
RECONVEY THE LAND IN QUESTION TO PLAINTIFF AND TO PAY
DAMAGES.19
The CA dismissed the petition in its Decision20 dated July 31, 2002. The
appellate court agreed with the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner had no
personality to file the action under Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, considering further that he was a mere applicant for a free patent.
Citing several cases,21 the appellate court ruled that the findings of fact
made by administrative agencies which are supported by substantial
evidence must be respected, particularly where the question demands the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge and
experience.22
Caro filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the
appellate court denied in a Resolution23 dated February 7, 2003.
Caro, now the petitioner, assails the ruling of the appellate court on the
following grounds:
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO
FILE THIS ACTION;
THAT THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY PETITIONER ON THE
GROUND THAT ONLY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL CAN FILE AN
ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY
PATENT.24
The petitioner insists that contrary to the ruling of the CA, he has the legal
considering that title issued on the basis of a patent is annullable on the
ground of fraud. Furthermore, the one-year period within which to file an
action to cancel a torrens title under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 does not apply where the registered owner, or the
successor-in-interest, knew that the property described in the title actually
belongs to another, as in this case. The petitioner cites Vital v. Anore, et
al.25 to bolster his claim. The petitioner also cites Director of Lands v.
Abanilla26 where the Court stressed that any false statement in the
application, which is an essential condition of the patent or title under
82
Section 91 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, “shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title or permit granted.”
In her comment, the respondent points out that the decision of the
Bureau of Lands itself would show that the petitioner is not the true and
lawful owner of the subject lot; as such, the argument that he has the legal
personality to file the action for annulment of patent based on constructive
trust is untenable. The respondent further contends that the CA did not err
in upholding the ruling of the RTC.
The petitioner merely reiterated his previous arguments in his Reply
dated December 30, 2003.
The Court agrees with the ruling of the RTC and the CA, and holds that
the petitioner has no personality to file a suit for reconveyance of the
subject property.
The Court notes that the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC prays for the
annulment of the free patent issued in the respondent’s favor. Considering
that the ultimate relief sought is for the respondent to “return” the subject
property to him, it is in reality an action for reconveyance. In De Guzman v.
Court of Appeals,27 the Court held that “[t]he essence of an action for
reconveyance is that the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible but what is sought instead is the transfer of the property
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s
name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.”28 Indeed, in an
action for reconveyance filed by a private individual, the property does not
go back to the State.29
Reversion, on the other hand, is an action where the ultimate relief
sought is to revert the land back to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action originated from a
grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the grantor
and the grantee.30
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,31 every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, or one
“who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.”
Corollarily, legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the challenged act. Interest means a material interest in
issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished
from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.32
Clearly then, a suit filed by one who is not a party-in-interest must be
dismissed. In this case, the petitioner, not being the owner of the disputed
property but a mere applicant for a free patent, cannot thus be considered
as a party-in-interest with personality to file an action for reconveyance.
The Court, citing several of its holdings, expounded on this doctrine
in Tankiko v. Cezar33 as follows:
. . . Thus, in Lucas v. Durian [102 Phil. 1157 (1957)], the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was
obtained by fraudulent means and, consequently, prayed for the annulment
of said patent and the cancellation of a certificate of title. The Court
declared that the proper party to bring the action was the government, to
which the property would revert. Likewise affirming the dismissal of a
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, the Court in Nebrada v.
Heirs of Alivio [104 Phil. 126 (1958)] noted that the plaintiff, being a mere
homestead applicant, was not the real party-in-interest to institute an action
for reconveyance. . . .
...
Verily, the Court stressed that “. . . [i]f the suit is not brought in the name
of or against the real party-in-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action [Travel Wide v.
CA, 199 SCRA 205, 209 (1991), per Cruz, J. See also Suguister v.
Tamayo, 176 SCRA 579, August 21, 1989]. In fact, a final judgment may be
invalidated if the real parties-in-interest are not included. This was
underscored by the Court in Arcelona v. CA [280 SCRA 20, October 2,
1997], in which a final judgment was nullified because indispensable parties
were not impleaded.
In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a
public land. Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants
for sales patents thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit.
Neither will they be directly affected by the judgment in such suit.34
In De la Peña v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court, in dismissing the
petitioner’s imputation of fraud in securing a free patent and title over a
parcel of land, declared that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the
owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in another’s
name.36 The Court further expounded:
Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the
titles legally issued by the State [Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776
83
(1936)]. In such cases, the real party-in-interest is the Republic of the
Philippines to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after
appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the grantee is
indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to
comply with the conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant,
much less a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance.37
In VSC Commercial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,38 where the
private respondents therein were mere lessees of the property in question,
the Court ruled that as mere lessees, they had “no present substantial and
personal interest with respect to issues involving ownership of the disputed
property.” The Court went on to declare:
. . . The only interest they have, in the event the petitioner’s title over the
subject property is cancelled and ownership reverts to the State, is the
hope that they become qualified buyers of the subject parcel of land.
Undoubtedly, such interest is a mere expectancy. Even the private
respondents themselves claim that in case of reversion of ownership to the
State, they only have “pre-emptive rights” to buy the subject property; that
their real interest over the said property is contingent upon the
government’s consideration of their application as buyers of the same. It is
settled that a suit filed by a person who is not a party-in-interest must be
dismissed.39
In fact, Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 states this provision was
applied and discussed in Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, et al.,40 a case on all fours with the present one, as follows:
Under Section 101 of the above reproduced, only the Solicitor General or
the officer acting in his stead may bring the action for reversion.
Consequently, Sumail may not bring such action or any action which would
have the effect of cancelling a free patent and the corresponding certificate
of title issued on the basis thereof, with the result that the land covered
thereby will again form part of the public domain. Furthermore, there is
another reason for withholding legal personality from Sumail. He does not
claim the land to be his private property. In fact, by his application for a free
patent, he had formally acknowledged and recognized the land to be a part
of the public domain; this, aside from the declaration made by the cadastral
court that lot 3633 was public land. Consequently, even if the parcel were
declared reverted to the public domain, Sumail does not automatically
become the owner thereof. He is a mere public land applicant like others
who may apply for the same.
To reiterate, the petitioner is not the proper party to file an action for
reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to the
government.41 The petitioner has no personality to “recover” the property
as he has not shown that he is the rightful owner thereof.42
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45503 and
the Resolution dated February 7, 2003 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170189. September 1, 2010.*
SPOUSES ELEGIO** CAÑEZO and DOLIA CAÑEZO,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES APOLINARIO and CONSORCIA L. BAUTISTA,
respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Accion Reivindicatoria; Accion reivindicatoria is an
action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession.—The present case, while inaccurately
captioned as an action for a “Writ of Demolition with Damages” is in reality
an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under
Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434 of the Civil Code reads: “In an
action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s
claim.” Accion reivindicatoria seeks the recovery of ownership and includes
the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership
over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession.
Same; Same; Same; In order that an action for the recovery of title may
prosper, it is indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established
by the courts, that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his
ownership of the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same.—In order
that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is indispensable, in
accordance with the precedents established by the courts, that the party
who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of the thing
claimed, but also the identity of the same. However, although the identity of
the thing that a party desires to recover must be established, if the plaintiff
has already proved his right of ownership over a tract of land, and the
defendant is occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the
portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiff’s property.
84
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Marcelino P. Arias for petitioners.
Jesus B. Roldan for respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
G.R. No. 170189 is a petition for review1 assailing the
Decision2promulgated on 17 October 2005 by the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75685. The appellate court granted the
appeal filed by the Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista (spouses
Bautista) and dismissed the complaint for the issuance of a writ of
demolition with damages filed by the Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo
(spouses Cañezo) without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action
with the proper forum. In its Decision3 on Civil Case No. MC-00-1069 dated
25 March 2002, Branch 213 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong
City (trial court) rendered judgment in favor of the spouses Cañezo. The
trial court also ordered the issuance of a writ of demolition directing the
removal of the structures built by the spouses Bautista on the portion of the
land belonging to the spouses Cañezo.
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the facts as follows:
“Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo (hereafter appellees) are the
registered owner[s] of a parcel of land with an area of One Hundred Eighty
Six (186) square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
32911.
Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia Bautista (hereafter appellants) are
the registered owners of a parcel of land, containing an area of One
Hundred Eighty One (181) square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 31727. Both parcels of land are located at Coronado
Heights, Barangka Ibaba, Mandaluyong City and registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City. Appellants’ lot is adjacent to that of
appellees [sic].
Sometime in 1995, appellees started the construction of a building on
their lot. During the construction, appellees discovered that their lot was
encroached upon by the structures built by appellants without appellees’
knowledge and consent.
The three (3) surveys conducted confirmed the fact of encroachment.
However, despite oral and written demands, appellants failed and refused
to remove the structures encroaching appellees’ lot.
Attempts were made to settle their dispute with the barangay lupon, but
to no avail. Appellees initiated a complaint with the RTC for the issuance of
a writ of demolition.
For failure to file an Answer within the extended period granted by the
court, appellants were declared in default. Appellees were allowed to
present their evidence ex parte before an appointed commissioner.
Thereafter the RTC rendered the assailed decision in the terms earlier set
forth.”4
The spouses Cañezo filed their complaint for the issuance of a writ of
demolition with damages on 13 April 2000. In an Order dated 15 August
2000, the trial court declared the spouses Bautista in default for failure to
answer within the reglementary period. The Public Attorney’s Office, which
represented the spouses Bautista at the time, filed a Motion to Admit
Answer dated 15 June 2000. The trial court denied the motion in its
Decision.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
On 25 March 2002, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of the
spouses Cañezo. The trial court found that the spouses Bautista built
structures encroaching on the land owned by the spouses Cañezo. The
spouses Bautista also refused to remove the structures and respect the
boundaries as established by the various surveyors. A referral to
the Barangay Lupon failed to settle the controversy amicably. The trial court
thus ruled that the spouses Bautista are builders in bad faith, such that the
spouses Cañezo are entitled to an issuance of a writ of demolition with
damages.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
“IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants. Let a writ of demolition be accordingly
issued directing the removal/demolition of the structures built by the
defendants upon the portion of land belonging [to] the plaintiffs at the
former’s expense.
85
 Further,
1. the defendant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 (Philippine Currency) as
and by way of moral damages[; and]
2. [t]he defendant is hereby ordered to pay P30,000.00 as and by way
of attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.”5
The spouses Bautista filed a notice of appeal dated 29 April 2002 before
the appellate court.
The Appellate Court’s Ruling
On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision which
reversed the 25 March 2002 Decision of the trial court. The appellate court
ruled that since the last demand was made on 27 March 2000, or more than
a year before the filing of the complaint, the spouses Cañezo should have
filed a suit for recovery of possession and not for the issuance of a writ of
demolition. A writ of demolition can be granted only as an effect of a final
judgment or order, hence the spouses Cañezo’s complaint should be
dismissed. The spouses Cañezo failed to specify the assessed value of the
encroached portion of their property. Because of this failure, the complaint
lacked sufficient basis to constitute a cause of action. Finally, the appellate
court ruled that should there be a finding of encroachment in the action for
recovery of possession and that the encroachment was built in good faith,
the market value of the encroached portion should be proved to determine
the appropriate indemnity.
The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
The complaint filed by plaintiffs-appellees is hereby DISMISSED without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action with the proper forum.
SO ORDERED.”6
Issues
The spouses Cañezo enumerated the following grounds to support their
Petition:
I. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting
the petition of the [spouses Bautista] and reversing the Decision of
the Court a quo; [and]
II. Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in stating
that the petitioners should have filed recovery of possession and not
writ of demolition.7
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has merit.
The present case, while inaccurately captioned as an action for a “Writ of
Demolition with Damages” is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land
or an accion reivindicatoria under Article 434 of the Civil Code. Article 434
of the Civil Code reads: “In an action to recover, the property must be
identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not on
the weakness of the defendant’s claim.” Accion reivindicatoria seeks the
recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria is an
action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks
recovery of its full possession.8
In order that an action for the recovery of title may prosper, it is
indispensable, in accordance with the precedents established by the courts,
that the party who prosecutes it must fully prove, not only his ownership of
the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same.9 However, although the
identity of the thing that a party desires to recover must be established, if
the plaintiff has already proved his right of ownership over a tract of land,
and the defendant is occupying without right any part of such tract, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to establish the precise location and extent of the
portions occupied by the defendant within the plaintiff’s property.10
The spouses Cañezo were able to establish their ownership of the
encroached property. Aside from testimonial evidence, the spouses
Cañezo were also able to present documentary and object evidence which
consisted of photographs,11 transfer certificates of title,12 and a relocation
survey plan.13
The relocation survey plan also corroborated Elegio Cañezo’s testimony
on the reason for the spouses Bautista’s attitude regarding the encroached
property. The relocation survey plan showed that the spouses Bautista’s
property encroached upon that of the spouses Cañezo by 0.97 centimeters,
86
while the spouses Bautista’s property was encroached upon by 1.01
centimeters by another landowner. Elegio Cañezo testified thus:
Q I am showing you a survey plan of lot 13. Can you please tell us
what is this survey plan?
A That is the survey plan of the surveyor whom we hired sir.
Q Can you please point to us where in this plan is your property
indicated?
A This is our property, sir.
Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 13” indicated in the
survey plan. How about the property of the defendants?
A The defendants’ property is this, sir.
Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 14” indicated in the
survey plan. Now, Mr. Witness, you said that the defendants
wanted you to recover that portion of your property encroached
on from the property adjacent to theirs. Please illustrate to us by
referring to this survey plan what the defendants meant?
A The defendants want us to get the portion they had encroached
on from “Lot 15” because, according to them, Lot 15 also
encroached on their lot, sir.
Q The witness, your Honor, is pointing to “Lot 15” indicated in the
plan. What happened next?
A We told them that this is not possible because Lot 15 is not
adjacent to our property, sir.
Q What did the defendants do?
A The defendants still refused to remove their structure, sir.
Q So, what happened?
A We filed a complaint against the defendants before the Office of
the BarangayCaptain of Barangay Barangka, Ibaba, sir.
Q What happened in the Barangay?
A The Barangay council tried to settle the matter amicably between
us. However, no settlement was reached, sir.
Q While in the barangay, did you offer anything to the defendants in
order to settle the case?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was it?
A We offered that if the defendants will remove the structures, we
are willing to shoulder half of the expenses for the removal.
Q What did the defendants say to this?
A They refused our offer and insisted on their previous position that
we get our portion from Lot 15, sir.
Q What did the Barangay do after failing to settle the case?
A The Barangay issued a Certification to File Action, sir.14
Given the efforts made by the spouses Cañezo to settle the present
issue prior to the filing of a Complaint, the trial court was justified in ruling
that the spouses Bautista were in default and in not admitting their Answer.
The Complaint was not the spouses Bautista’s first encounter with the
present issue. Moreover, the spouses Bautista failed to file their Answer
even after the expiry of the motion of extension granted to them.15
The testimony and the relocation survey plan both show that the
spouses Bautista were aware of the encroachment upon their lot by the
owner of Lot 15 and thus they made a corresponding encroachment upon
the lot of the spouses Cañezo. This awareness of the two encroachments
made the spouses Bautista builders in bad faith. The spouses Cañezo are
entitled to the issuance of a writ of demolition in their favor and against the
spouses Bautista, in accordance with Article 450 of the Civil Code.16
We affirm the awards made by the trial court in its Decision:
“x x x Considering the length of time when [the spouses Cañezo] were
deprived of beneficial use on the subject portion of land owned by them, the
[spouses Bautista] are likewise liable to pay P30,000.00 (Philippine
Currency) in accordance with Article 451 of the Civil Code.
87
 With respect to the prayer for the award of P50,000.00 (Philippine
Currency) as moral damages, the court decides to give due course to it in
view of the fact that the [spouses Cañezo] satisfactorily proved the
existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal relation to [the
spouses Bautista’s] acts. There was bad faith on the part of the [spouses
Bautista] when they built the structures upon the land not belonging to them.
This wrongful act is the proximate cause which made the [spouses Cañezo]
suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and serious anxiety. The [spouses
Cañezo] positively testified about these matters.
As regards the prayer for exemplary x x x damages, no sufficient
evidence were adduced which would warrant and justify this court to award
the same. The prayer for attorney’s fees however, is found meritorious
hence, the same is hereby granted.”17
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75685 promulgated on 17 October 2005 is SET
ASIDE and the dispositive portion of the Decision of Branch 213, Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City promulgated on 25 March 2002 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. A writ of demolition of the encroaching
structures should be issued against and at the expense of Spouses
Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista upon the finality of this judgment.
Spouses Apolinario and Consorcia L. Bautista are further ordered to pay
Spouses Elegio and Dolia Cañezo P30,000 as actual damages; P50,000 as
moral damages; and P30,000 as attorney’s fees. The interest rate of
12% per annum shall apply from the finality of judgment until the total
amount awarded is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Emilia vs. Bado
No. L-23685. April 25, 1968.
CIRILA EMILIA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. EPIFANIO BADO (Alias Paño), ET
AL., defendants-appellees.
Injunction; Recovery of possession of real property; Injunction as a
remedy.—Injunctions are not available to take property out of possession or
control of one party and place it into that of another whose title has not
clearly been established. Where injunction was sought to recover
possession of real property, the limited concept of injunction may not be
availed of while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in
extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done
which can not be compensated in damages. To hold otherwise, would be to
render practically of no effect the various provisions of the code touching
many if not most of the ordinary actions, and the enforcement of judgment
in such actions. If a complainant could secure relief by injunction in every
case where the defendant is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of plaintiff’s
rights and could enforce the judgment granting the injunction by the
summary contempt proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to
punish violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights
in such cases by the ordinary remedies involving the difficult and oftimes
fruitless labor of enforcing judgment obtained therein by execution. (Citing
Devesa v. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273).
Same; Same; When not available; Reasons.—Where legal title is
disputed and the possessor asserts ownership over the land in controversy,
no injunction can issue to dispossess him. Reason for this is that before the
issue of ownership is determined by evidence, justice and equity demand
that the parties be maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may
be given to one to the prejudice of the other.
Same; Same; Same; Exceptions.—There are recognized exceptions
to the rule, as where defendant is clearly a mere intruder, or where the
action seeks to prevent a purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the
debtor’s co-owners whose rights have not been affected by the sale.
Actions; Recovery of possession of real property; Kinds of
actions.—There are three kinds of actions available to recover possession
of real property: (a) the summary action for forcible entry (where preliminary
mandatory injunction may be sought within ten days from the filing of the
complaint under article 539 of the Civil Code) or illegal detainer, which
seeks the recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one
year in the municipal court; (b) the accion publiciana, which is f or the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (c) accion de
reivindicacion,which seeks the recovery of ownership, which includes
the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, also brought in the Court of First
Instance.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte.
Pineda, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Manuel Deaño for plaintiff-appellant.
88
 Irene D. Jurado for defendants-appellees.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The relief prayed for but denied in an order of the court below, now the
subject of the present appeal, is that injunction issue to restrain defendants
from continuing with the construction of a house of light materials on a
48-square meter area on the northern border of plaintiff’s land.
The suit started on December 12, 1963 with the complaint, as
amended,1 that on or about December 1,1962, defendants, confederating
and helping one another, entered plaintiff’s land and commenced the
construction of a house of light materials on the northern boundary of her
Lot 1131 in Iligan City bordering the bank of Salabao Creek, covered by her
Torrens Title 0–267; that the continuance of such act against the will of
plaintiff would cause great and irreparable damage and injury and injustice
to her; and that there is no other plan, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Whereupon, she prayed for preliminary and final
injunction and damages. Preliminary injunction was issued ex-parte.
Plaintiff’s said complaint was met by defendants’ motion to dismiss upon
the ground of lack of cause of action. They attached to their motion the
sketch of a private land surveyor, Flordelito Aragon, and his affidavit, both
of which were intended to convey the alleged fact that the new house being
constructed was inside defendant Glicerio Bado’s Lot 2894 (covered by his
Torrens Title 0–275) being held by him. They averred, too, that the house
did not encroach upon the boundaries of plaintiff’s adjoining property (Lot
1131).
Obviously of the belief that procedural niceties should not bar consideration
of the equities of the case,2 the trial court, on the face of the conflicting
assertions of fact, called for a summary hearing.
On February 27, 1964, the trial court came out with an order sustaining
the motion to dismiss. The court gave credence to the testimony of
surveyor Flordelito Aragon (also a deputy public land surveyor) that the
house under construction was within Glicerio Bado’s Lot 2894 (Torrens
Title 0–275) and not on plaintiff’s Lot 1131 (Torrens Title 0–267). The trial
court took the position that to stop defendants from building a house within
Glicerio Bado’s lot “would be tantamount to depriving” the enjoyment of his
lawful dominical rights; that even on the assumption that defendant Glicerio
Bado’s title to Lot 2894 was obtained through fraud, as plaintiff avers,
nonetheless, said title subsists until declared null and void by a competent
court; and that these circumstances would tie up the hands of the court
from granting the relief prayed for. Whereupon, the court dissolved the
preliminary injunction theretofore issued, and dismissed the complaint.
1. The procedural question presented asks of us a ruling as to whether
injunction is the proper remedy in the premises.
Whether defendant Glicerio Bado’s lot is registrable or not, because, as
plaintiff avers, that land registered in the name of defendant Glicerio Bado
is a creek—Salabao Creek—is beside the point here. Unless and until
plaintiff succeeds in annulling the decree of registration in defendant’s favor
which she has sought in the cadastral proceedings, that title subsists.3 It is
to be presumed that
the judicial proceedings leading to the issuance of the decree are valid.
The pivotal facts that the record discloses may thus be summarized this
way: Plaintiff claims that the house being built is on her land; defendants,
on the other hand, say that that house is on the land of Glicerio Bado. Both
hold Torrens titles. The lower court, prima facie at least, believes that there
is factual support for defendants’ averment.
The remedy of injunction has been the subject of numerous judicial
pronouncements. The court cannot now afford to depart from the
well-ingrained precept that injunctions are not available to take property out
of possession or control of one party and place it into that of another whose
title has not clearly been established. Instructive in this respect is the early
1909 decision in Devesa vs. Arbes, 13 Phil. 273, where injunction was
sought to recover possession of real property. Mr. Justice Carson there
pithily summed up4 the limited concept of injunction which may not be
availed of “while the rights between the parties are undetermined, except in
extraordinary cases where material and irreparable injury will be done’,
which cannot be compensated in damages.” To hold otherwise, Mr. Justice
Carson continued to say, “would be to render practically of no effect the
various provisions of the code (of civil procedure) touching many if not most
of the ordinary actions, and the enforcement of judgment in such actions;
for it may well be supposed that if a complainant could secure relief by
injunction in every case where ‘the defendant is- doing or threatens or is
about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act probably in
violation of the plaintiff’s rights’ and could enforce the judgment granting the
injunction by the summary contempt proceedings authorized in section 172
of the code to punish violations of injunctions, he would seldom elect to
enforce his rights in such cases by the ordinary remedies, involving as they
do the difficult and ofttimes fruitless labor of enforcing judgments obtained
therein by execution.”5
89
 Long divorced from doubt is the doctrine that where legal title is disputed
and the possessor asserts ownership over the land in controversy, no
injunction can issue to dispossess him.6 Reason for this is that before the
issue of ownership is determined by evidence, justice and equity demand
that the parties be maintained in their status quo so that no advantage may
be given to one to the prejudice of the other.7
Given the fact that there is the debatable question of where the house
was being erected, we say that adherence to the precept just enunciated is
a forbidding obstacle to the grant of injunction.
2. To be sure, there are recognized exceptions to the rule, as where
defendant is clearly a mere intruder,8 or where the action seeks to prevent
a purchaser at an auction sale from molesting the debtor’s coowners whose
rights have not been affected by the sale.9But these, generally upon
hearing and not upon ex parte application for injunction.10
3. Upon well-entrenched jurisprudence, plaintiff’s principal suit for injunction
cannot, at bottom, prosper because there is an adequate remedy in law
open to her. It is elementary to the point of triteness that the special remedy
of injunction may not issue where there is a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
It is in line with the principle just enunciated that in affirming Devesa vs.
Arbes, supra, Palafox vs. Madamba, 19 Phil. 444, 446, declared in no
uncertain terms that injunction is not the appropriate remedy where “there
exists the ordinary remedy of action for property of possession, which may
be either plenary or summary, according to the method by which she may
have been deprived of her alleged possession.” A long line of cases has
since then stabilized the principle.11
Under the present state of the law, there are three kinds of actions
available to recover possession of real property: (a) the summary action for
forcible entry (where preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought within
ten days from the filing of the complaint under Article 539 of the Civil Code)
or illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession only
and is brought within one year in the municipal court; (b) the action
publiciana, which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary
action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and
(c) acción de reivindicación, which seeks the recovery of ownership, which
includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi, also brought in the Court of First
Instance.12
Plaintiff Cirila Emilia claims ownership of a 48-square meter portion of
land, which she avers is covered by Torrens title in her name. Defendant
Glicerio Bado, on the
other hand, also professes ownership over the same portion of land backed
up, too, by a Torrens title in his name. From these two directly opposing
positions, a legitimate issue of ownership emerges. This guides us to no
other conclusion than that plaintiff Cirila Emilia should have brought suit for
ownership (acción de reivindicación).Correctly did the trial judge dissolve
the preliminary injunction wrongfully issued and refuse the grant of a
perpetual injunction sought by her.
4. In a situation like the present, it was suggested in Devesa vs. Arbes,
supra, that it would not be improper if the record were to be returned to the
court of origin with instructions to further amend the complaint,13 such that
the question of ownership and possession (accion reivindicatoria) may
bring about a head-on contest between plaintiff and Glicerio Bado in the
same injunction case. As we make an appraisal of the record before us,
however, we are constrained to say that confusion may arise because of
the so many pleadings filed and court actuations taken before this decision.
With the voluminous record, difficulty may arise in pinpointing the exact
issue between the parties. Administration of justice could suffer thereby.
And then, there is the continued pendency of this case which has been
started since nearly five years ago. A final decision on the validity of
Glicerio Bado’s title in the cadastral proceeding could yet prevent further
controversy between the parties.
Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to affirm the order of
February 27, 1964, dismissing the complaint. With costs against
plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 132424. May 4, 2006.*
SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL
FABELLA and FRANCISCA FABELLA, respondents.
Actions; Possession; Ejectment; Jurisdictions; Three Kinds of Actions
Available to Recover Possession of Real Property; Accion interdictal
comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion)
and unlawful detainer (desahuico), the jurisdiction of these two actions,
which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or
90
metropolitan trial court.—Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are
three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property:
(a) accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria. Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action,
namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico). In
forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by
means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in
unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry,
the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the
issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer,
possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The jurisdiction of these
two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial
court or metropolitan trial court. Both actions must be brought within one
year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and
from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.The issue in said
cases is the right to physical possession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Accion publiciana is the plenary action to
recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper
regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one
year.—Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of
possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the
complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal,
the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an
ordinary civil proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it
is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been
present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered—such tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered to categorize a cause of action as one
of unlawful detainer, not forcible entry.—To justify an action for unlawful
detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is later
sought to be recovered.
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for
unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v.
Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257 (1968): But even where possession preceding the
suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made. If right at
the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do
not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue
before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from
the date of the demand to vacate. x x x x A close assessment of the law
and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of
possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one
of unlawful detainer—not of forcible entry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the nature of defendant’s entry into
the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or
unlawful detainer.—It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which
determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful
detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the
ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody
such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature.—To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of
an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the
face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of
forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either
be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional
trial court.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Aventino B. Claveria for petitioners.
91
 Juan Moreno for respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by
petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr. and Venida M. Valdez, seeks
to nullify and set aside the 22 April 1997 decision1 and 30 January 1998
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492, which
reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn,
affirmed in toto the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.
This case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners Bonifacio and Venida Valdez against private respondents
Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:
. “2.That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a piece of residential
lot denominated as Lot [N]o. 3 Blk. 19 located at Carolina Executive
Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which [they] acquired from
Carolina Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992 by virtue of
Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as
Annex “A” and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in
her name marked as Annex “B”;
. 3.That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupie[d]
the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving
the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof;
. 4.That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein
defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the
latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
. 5.That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay,
defendants still refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender
the lot peacefully;
. 6.That because of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants
to settle the case amicably, the Barangay Captain was forced to
issue the necessary Certification to File Action in favor of the herein
plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of action be taken before
the proper court, xerox copy of which is hereto attached marked as
Annex “C”;
. 7.That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and unfounded refusal
of the defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in question, the
herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional
services of counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee
and additional ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per
appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal demand was
likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
“D”;
. 8.That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of the defendants to
vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s] suffered
serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion;
x x x”2
In their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to
state that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that
they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents
claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as
attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.
They also stressed that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court
Circular No. 28-91 regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners, ordering private respondents to vacate the property and to pay
rent for the use and occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.
Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in
toto the decision of the MTC. Undeterred, the private respondents filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals on 10 March 1997 questioning
the decision of the RTC.
In a decision dated 22 April 1997, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC. It held that petitioners failed to make a case
for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that they had given the
92
private respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they had
tolerated private respondents’ possession of the same, which is a
requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in
petitioners’ complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which
requires an allegation of prior material possession. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated thus:
“An examination of the complaint reveals that key jurisdictional allegations
that will support an action for ejectment are conspicuously lacking. In
particular, an allegation of prior material possession is mandatory in forcible
entry, x x x and the complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand,
neither does there appear to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the
private respondents failed to show that they had given the petitioners the
right to occupy the premises, which right has now [been] extinguished.
x x x (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.6
In light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal
Trial Court before which the action for ejectment was filed had no
jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and
GRANTED. The decision dated 08 January 1997 rendered by the
respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is
hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction.”3
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated 30 January 1998.4
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners submit the following issues for the Court’s consideration:5
. A.WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
. B.WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE
COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO,
RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER THE
INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.
Since the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed
together.
In the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make
out a case for unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents
unlawfully withheld from them the possession of the property in question,
which allegation is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They
further contend that the summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
available to the owner if another occupies the land at the former’s tolerance
or permission without any contract between the two as the latter is bound
by an implied promise to vacate the land upon demand by the owner.
The petition is not meritorious.
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions
available to recover possession of real property: (a) accion interdictal;
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely,
forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).7 In forcible
entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of
force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer,
one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.8 The two
are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of
the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party
has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the
defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.9
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies
in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.10 Both actions
must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in
case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful
detainer.11 The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession
which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year.12 It is an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title.13 In other words, if at the time of the filing of the
complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal,
the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an
accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to
93
recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an
ordinary civil proceeding.14
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s
supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of
the possession which is later sought to be recovered.15 Otherwise, if the
possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer
would be an improper remedy.16As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:17
“But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner,
still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s
tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the
premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70,
within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
x x x x
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance”
confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be
present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to
categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer—not of forcible
entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And
for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to
the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy
redress—in the inferior court—provided for in the rules. If one year from the
forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases
to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek
relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior
court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may
well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how
long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a
demand, bring suit in the inferior court—upon a plea of tolerance to prevent
prescription to set in—and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a
conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates
that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in
nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the
summary nature of the action.”18 (Italics supplied)
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the
cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry
is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible
entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes
illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases for
which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in
nature.19 The complaint must show enough on its face the court jurisdiction
without resort to parol testimony.20
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When
the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and
when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial
court.21 Thus, in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,22petitioners filed an unlawful
detainer case against respondent alleging that they were the owners of the
parcel of land through intestate succession which was occupied by
respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their deceased
mother. Resolving the issue on whether or not petitioners’ case for unlawful
detainer will prosper, the court ruled:23
“Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they inherited the property
registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents; that possession
thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after
her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand
on December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the
property. x x x
It is settled that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant
illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is
essential in unlawful detainer cases of this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the
possession which is later sought to be recovered. This is where petitioners’
cause of action fails. The appellate court, in full agreement with the MTC
made the conclusion that the alleged tolerance by their mother and after
her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was illegal at the
inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering
that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house
thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners and before them,
their mother. x x x Clearly, defendant’s entry into the land was effected
clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is
94
categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. As explained
in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA
216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession
sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful
detainer not of forcible entry x x x.”
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v.
Cruz,24 petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained the
bare allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the subject
property after its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2)
her allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The
court, in finding that the alleged tolerance did not justify the action for
unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the permission or tolerance must
have been present at the beginning of the possession. x x x
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal.26 Since the
complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
case.27 It is in this light that this Court finds that the Court of Appeals
correctly found that the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the judgment of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2547 of the MTC
Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

x x x x

In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do not recite any
averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner that it
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent Cruz.
The complaint contains only bare allegations that 1) respondent
immediately occupied the subject property after its sale to her, an action
merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly illegal occupation of the
premises was by mere tolerance.

These allegations contradict, rather than support, petitioner’s theory that

its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance
the view that respondent’s occupation of the property was unlawful at its
inception. Second, they counter the essential requirement in unlawful
detainer cases that petitioner’s supposed act of sufferance or tolerance
must be present right from the start of a possession that is later sought to
be recovered.”25

In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint do not contain any
averment of fact that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that they
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The
complaint contains only bare allegations that “respondents without any
color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their
house in the said land thereby depriving petitioners the possession
thereof.” Nothing has been said on how respondents’ entry was effected or
how and when dispossession started. Admittedly, no express contract
existed between the parties. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
95