Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)

THE PUBLIC LAND ACT (COMMONWEALTH ACT 141)

Act classification,
delimitation,
Preliminaries
survey,
and disposition of
Governing Law
alienable lands of
the public
Land Governing Law
domain.
Lands of the Public Domain CA 141 (The Public Land
Act) which was enacted on
Policy Considerations
November 7, 1936
Timber and Mineral Lands Special Laws EDU. Exploration, Development and Utilization of Natural
Friar Lands & Governed by laws presently Resources shall be for the benefit of the Filipino People.
Private Lands Reverted to in force or which may
RP hereafter be enacted The DENR shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy. It shall be in charge
of carrying out the State‘s constitutional mandate to control
Historical Background and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and
conservation of the country‘s natural resources.
Before CA 141. ACT 926 and Act 2874.
Regalian Doctrine
Act 926 was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. It governed the disposition of lands This is the same as Jura Regalia. All lands belong to the
of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for State which is the source of any asserted right of ownership
the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the to the land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private
public domain. It also provided for the issuance of patents dominion presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly,
to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
confirmation of Spanish Concessions and grants in the public domain.
island.
Except for agricultural lands, natural resources cannot be
Act 2874 was the second Public land Act. This was passed alienated. The exploration, development and utilization of
under the Jones law. It was more comprehensive in scope natural resources shall be under the full control and
but limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos supervision of the State. The Regalian Doctrine reserved to
and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave the State all natural wealth that may be found in the
Filipinos the same privilege. bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is
made be private. Thus, once minerals are discovered in the
The Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws lands, whatever the use to which it is devoted, such use
on lands of the public domain, remains to this day the may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the
existing general law governing the classification and minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber
and mineral lands. The Regalian Doctrine is enshrined in Section 2 Article 12 of
the Constitution (1935, 1973 and 1987) on National
Law Charter Scope Economy and patrimony.
Act 926 Philippine Bill of Disposition of
First Public Land 1902 Lands of the Cases:
Act Public Domain
Act 2874 Jones Law More The Supreme Court stated that we adhere to the Regalian
Second Public comprehensive in Doctrine wherein all agricultural, timber and mineral lands
Land Act scope but limited are subject to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any
the exploitation of land may be classified as alienable land, there must be a
agricultural lands positive act from the government.
to Filipinos and
Americans and Sunbeam Convenience Food vs Court of Appeals
citizens of other (181 SCRA 443)
countries which Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. is the recipient of a
gave Filipinos the Sales Patent issued by the Bureau of Lands over two
same privilege parcels of land in Bataan. An OCT was thereby issued. The
CA 141 1935 The general law Solicitor-General filed an action for reversion on the ground
The Public Land Constitution governing the that the lots were forest lands and therefore inalienable.

Notes of Cesnee Tan Page 1

Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
CA ruled, upholding the Solicitor-General's contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not land is alienable and disposable land
of the State.
HELD: The SC affirmed.
Our adherence to the Regalian Doctrine subjects all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of
the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from
the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural purposes, there must be a positive act
from the Government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land
classified as forest land is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of
Lands does not confer any validity on such title if the
property covered by the title or patent is part of the public
forest.
What is the presumption? The Supreme Court held that in
the absence of proof that the property is privately owned,
the presumption is that it belongs to the State. If there is
no showing that the land hand been classified as alienable
before the title was issued, possession thereof no matter
how lengthy cannot ripen into ownership.
Republic vs Sayo
(191 SCRA 71)
FACTS: The case at bar started at 1961 when the spouses
Casiano and Luz Sandoval filed an application for a parcel
of land, Lot 7454 originally party of Santiago but had since
then been transferred to Nueva Vizcaya.
The registration was opposed by Bayaua, Reyes, and the
Philippine Cacao and Farm Products.
The case went on until on 1981, 20 years after, the Heirs of
Sandoval, Heirs of Bayaua, and the Bureau of Lands and
Bureau of Forest Development entered a compromise
agreement, which effectively distributed parts of lot 7454
among the aforesaid parties and the counsel of the Heirs of
Sandoval as attorney's fees. The compromise agreement
was approved by the court and confirmed the title and
ownership of the parties in accordance with its terms.
Having knowledge of the incident, the Solicitor General filed
a complaint before the court to annul the decision rendered
by the court a quo for being void and made in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
The Solicitor General contended that the the Heirs of
Sandoval et. al. did not present any evidence to support
their claims of ownership or registration, nor did the
government agencies involve have a authority to enter into
the compromise agreement, and finally, that he was not
notified of the proceedings and so had not opportunity to
Notes of Cesnee Tan
take part therein.
As for the Heirs of Sandoval et.al.'s contention, they
asseverate that the land is not a public land as the
possessory information title in their name and of their
predecessors-in-interest, the pre-war certification appearing
in the Bureau of Archives, and the fact that the proceeding
of the registration was brought under the Torrens act which
presupposes an existing title to be confirmed, are all
evidences that the land is a private land.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent's evidences can be considered
as proof that the lot 7454 is a private land.
RULING: NO. Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not
otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Hence it is that all
applicants in land registration proceedings have the burden
of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to
be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless the
applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or
his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title, or any other
means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the
property must be held to be part of the public domain. The
applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may not rely on general
statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidence of possession and title.
In the proceeding at bar, it appears that the principal
document relied upon and presented by the applicants for
registration, to prove the private character of the large tract
of land subject of their application was a photocopy of a
certification of the National Library. But, as this Court has
already had occasion to rule, that Spanish document cannot
be considered a title to property, it not being one of the
grants made during the Spanish regime, and obviously not
constituting primary evidence of ownership. It is an
inefficacious document on which to base any finding of the
private character of the land in question.
It thus appears that the decision of the Registration Court a
quo is based solely on the compromise agreement of the
parties. But that compromise agreement included private
persons who had not adduced any competent evidence of
their ownership over the land subject of the registration
proceeding. Portions of the land in controversy were
assigned to persons or entities who had presented nothing
whatever to prove their ownership of any part of the land.
The assent of the Directors of Lands and Forest
Development to the compromise agreement did not and
could not supply the absence of evidence of title required of
the private respondents.
As to the informacion posesoria invoked by the private
respondents, it should be pointed out that under the
Spanish Mortgage Law, it was considered a mode of
acquiring title to public lands, subject to two (2) conditions:
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first, the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property, and
second, actual, public, adverse, and uninterrupted
possession of the land for twenty (20) years (later reduced
to ten [10] years); but where, as here, proof of fulfillment
of these conditions is absent, the informacion posesoria
cannot be considered as anything more than prima facie
evidence of possession.
Finally, it was error to disregard the Solicitor General in the
execution of the compromise agreement and its submission
to the Court for approval. It is, after all, the Solicitor
General, who is the principal counsel of the Government;
this is the reason for our holding that "Court orders and
decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as agent of the Solicitor
General in land registration cases, are not binding until they
are actually received by the Solicitor General."
Seville vs National Development Company
(GR No. 129401, February 2, 2001)
FACTS: LSBDA (Leyte Sub-A Basin Development Authority)
was created by virtue of PD no. 625. In connection with
this, a letter of instruction was executed authorizing LSBDA
to purchase or acquire privately owned land.
In June 14, 1980, certain Calixto Yap sold to LSBDA a
464,920 square meter parcel of land. The LSBDA was able
to register it under its name through the approved
miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands.
However in May 11, 1990, petitioner Seville filed a
complaint for recovery or real property, rentals and
damages against LSBDA, contending that he acquired the
property and its predecessor-in-interest for more than 30
years and therefore they are the rightful owner of it.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, when
the case reached in the CA, the latter reversed the RTC
decision on the ground that petitioner‘s possession of the
said property had never ripen into ownership since it still
remains under the inalienable land of public domain.
ISSUE: W/N LSBDA ‗s title to property valid?
W/N petitioner‘s claim of ownership over the property
was correct?
RULING: The SC ruled in favor of LSBDA. According to the
SC, Seville or the Ortega estate did not become the owner
of the subject property even though they possessed the
land for more than 30 years, because at the time they
occupied the said land, it is still part of inalienable land of
public domain. Until the State declares it to be alienable
and disposable, no matter how long they possessed it, it
may not ripen into ownership.
- Here the petitioner failed to discharge the burden of
proving in court that the subject property is already outside
the component of inalienable land of public domain when
they occupied the same.
- LDBDA is a rightful owner of the said land because,
it acquired ownership and title over it through Sales patent
application which was approved by the Bureau of Land, this
shows that the said property is no longer under the ambit
of inalienable public land.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Director of Lands vs Intermediate Appellate Court
(219 SCRA 108)
Facts: The land involved is an island known as Tambac
Island in Lingayen Gulf situated in the Municipality of Bani,
Pangasinan. Pacific Farms, Inc. initially applied for
registration the subject property under the Land
Registration Act (Act No. 496). The Republic of the
Philippines, thru the Director of Lands opposed the
application alleging that Pacific Farms, Inc. does not
possess a fee simple title to the land nor did its
predecessors possess the land for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of application. The
opposition likewise specifically alleged that the applicant is
a private corporation disqualified under the (1973) new
Philippine Constitution from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain citing Section 11, Article 14. The Director of
Forest Development also entered its opposition alleging that
the land is within the unclassified public land and, hence,
inalienable. Other private parties also filed their
oppositions, but were subsequently withdrawn. Pacific
Farms, Inc. filed a manifestation-motion to change the
applicant from Pacific Farms, Inc. to J. Antonio Araneta.
Issue:
WON the land known as the "Tambac Island" can be
subject of registration.
Held:
No. The Court held that lands of the public domain are
classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral,
Forest and Disposable or Alienable Lands. Under the
Commonwealth Constitution, only agricultural lands were
allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), which states
that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of
the proper department head, who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or
disposable, timber and mineral lands. Mineral and Timber
or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless
they are first reclassified as agricultural lands and so
released for alienation. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
Courts have no authority to do so.
This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Hence, a positive act of
the government is needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
state ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.
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Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever
possession the applicant may have had and however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership. The conversion of
subject property does not automatically render the property
as alienable and disposable.
Now, how about mining claims? Is it covered by the
concept of Jura Regalia? In the case of United Paracale vs
Dela Rosa, the Supreme Court held that under the Regalian
Doctrine, the State has the power to control mining claims
as provided under PD 1214.
United Paracale vs Dela Rosa
(221 SCRA 108)
Facts: United Paracale Mining Company, Inc. and Coco
Grove, Inc., seek to set aside the Order of dismissal of the
case they filed with the trial court for the ejectment of their
respective defendants from the mining claims which were
allegedly privately owned by them having been located and
perfected under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 624.
ISSUE: W/N PD 1214 constitutional (REQUIRING
ALLLOCATORS UNDER THE ACT OF CONGRESS OFJULY 1,
1902, AS AMENDED, TO SECURE MINING LEASE
CONTRACTS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OFPRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 463 INVOLVING THEIRPATENTABLE MINING
CLAIMS)
RULING: Yes. As held in the case Santa Rosa Mining
Company, Inc. vs. Leido, Jr. 11 thus:"(W)e hold that
Presidential Decree No. 1214 is not unconstitutional. ** It is
a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as
owner, over lands of the public domain, of which
petitioner's mining claims still form apart, and over the
patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a
valuable asset. It may be underscored, in this connection,
that the Decree does not cover all mining claims located
under the Phil. Bill of1902, but only those claims over which
their locators had failed to obtain a patent. And even then,
such locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five
year (25) lease prescribed by Pres. Decree No. 463, the
Mineral Development Resources Decree of 1974.
Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the
affected land or the mining claim. It merely segregates the
located land or area from the public domain by barring
other would-be locators from locating the same and
appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To
rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed
to acquire and maintain rights over a located mining claim.
This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary
to the intention of the lawmaker that the locator should
faithfully and consistently comply with the requirements for
annual work and improvements in the located mining claim.
Now, who has the task of administering lands and to whom
does it belong? The Director of Lands which is now the
Land Management Bureau. The task of administering lands
is purely an executive privilege that belongs to the Director
Notes of Cesnee Tan
of Lands and ultimately the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources. It is the prerogative of the President
upon recommendation of the Secretary of the DENR. The
Secretary is the alter ego of the President and has the
mechanism to determine the specifics regarding the land.
Republic vs Register of Deeds of Quezon
(224 SCRA 537)
FACTS: Petitioner was awarded a 17-hectare parcel of land,
by virtue of which he was issued an OCT.
Through an investigation conducted by the Bureau of
Lands, it was found that the free patent acquired by
Petitioner was fraudulent. A case for falsification of public
documents was filed by Petitioner and was acquitted of the
crime.
Subsequently, the Solicitor-General filed a complaint against
Petitioner, praying for the declaration of nullity of the Free
Patent and the OCT.
Petitioner's main contention was that the land in question
was no longer within the unclassified public forest land
because by the approval of his application for Free Patent
by the Bureau of Lands, the land was already alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. He also claimed that the
land was a small portion of Lot 5139, an area which had
been declared disposable public land by the cadastral court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land is alienable and disposable
public land
HELD: Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
clearly appearing to be privately-owned are presumed to
belong to the State. Forest lands, like mineral or timber
lands which are public lands, are not subject to private
ownership unless they under the Constitution become
private properties. In the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified public land until released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition.
The task of administering and disposing lands of the public
domain belongs to the Director of Lands, and ultimately the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Classification of public lands is, thus, an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.
Thus, in controversies involving the disposition of public
agricultural lands, the burden of overcoming the
presumption of state ownership of lands of the public
domain lies upon the private claimant.
In the present case, Petitioner failed to present clear,
positive and absolute evidence to overcome said
presumption and to support his claim.
Moreover, the fact the Petitioner acquired a title to the land
is of no moment, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of title
issued under the Torrens System. The indefeasibility of a
certificate of title cannot be invoked by one who procured
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the same by means of fraud.
What is the ratification if you occupy forest lands? Forest
lands are not capable of private appropriation. Possession
thereof cannot ripen into ownership.
Ituralde vs Falcasantos
(GR No. 128017, January 20, 1999)
Facts: On October 17, 1986, Ramon Ituralde, herein
petitioner, acquired by purchase from the heirs of Pedro
Mana-ay a parcel of land, with an area of 6.0000 hectares,
more or less. However, on November 3, 1986, respondent
Alfredo Falcasantos applied with the Bureau of Lands for
the award to him of the same parcel of land under free
patent, which application was protested by Ramon Ituralde.
On February 7, 1989, the Regional Director of Lands
rendered a decision giving respondent a period of one
hundred twenty (120) days to exercise the right to
repurchase the land by reimbursing petitioner of all
expenses he incurred in the purchase of the property in
question, and held in abeyance respondent's application for
free patent. Alfredo failed to exercise the right of
repurchase, which amounted to a waiver. The Director of
Land then rejected Alfredo‘s application and allowed Ramon
Ituralde to file a public land application for the subject land.
Meanwhile, in a case for the recovery of ownership and
possession filed by Ituralde against Alfredo, the trial court
rendered a decision declaring petitioner the owner and the
possessor of the subject parcel of land with all the
improvements existing thereon, with an area of 3.1248
hectares, and ordering respondent to vacate the land in
question. Ramon appealed to the decision. However the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
dismissed Roman‘s appeal. Hence this case.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals committed an error in
reversing the decision of the trial court and dismissing
petitioner‘s appeal.
Ruling: NO.
Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in setting
aside the trial court's decision in his favor and dismissing
the complaint because when the Director of Lands allowed
petitioner to file a public land application for said property,
it was equivalent to a declaration that said land was no
longer part of the public domain.
We deny the petition. The Court of Appeals correctly held
that "the evidence is unrebutted that the subject land is
within the Forest Reserve Area as per L.C. Map No. 1557
certified on August 13, 1951'." and, hence, not capable of
private appropriation and occupation.
In Republic vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon, we held that
"Forest land, like mineral timber lands which are public
lands, are not subject to private ownership unless they
under the Constitution, become private properties. In the
absence of such classification, the land remains unclassified
public land until released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition."
In Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,
Notes of Cesnee Tan
we said: "Thus, before any land may be declassified from
the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government. Even rules on the
confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and
until the land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part
of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain."
Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to
declassify a forest land into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. "
And the rule is "Possession of forest lands, however long,
cannot ripen into private ownership."
What is more, there is yet no award or grant to petitioner
of the land in question by free patent or other ways of
acquisition of public land. Consequently, he cannot lawfully
claim to be the owner of the land in question.
How about minerals or wealth found in the land? Is it
subject to Jura Regalia? Even if it is registered in your
name, so it is already private property, if there are minerals
found within that land, the State can discontinue the
private use thereof and convert or revert it back to the
government. However, in the absence of fraud in your
registration, you can demand payment of just
compensation.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and dela Rosa
(GR No. L-43938, 04/15/1988)
FACTS: The case is about a parcel of land whose ownership
is being disputed by four parties: the Dela Rosas, Benguet
Consolidated Inc. (BCI), Atok Corp. (Atok) and the Bureau
of Forestry Development (BFD).
Sometime in 1965, Jose dela Rosa, on his own behalf and
on behalf of this three children, filed an application for the
registration of a parcel of land divided into 9 lots in
Benguet. According to the children, they had acquired the
land by virtue of prescription. As evidenced, they produced
tax declarations and realty tax receipts.
BCI and Atok opposed their application claiming that the
lots were covered by mineral claim sold to it in 1934. BCI,
on lots 1-5, contented that it had been in actual,
continuous and exclusive possession of the land in the
concept of an owner. As evidence, BCI presented geological
maps, payments of taxes and construction on the land.
Atok claims of ownership on a portion of lots 1-5 and all of
lots 6-9 is similar to that of BCI, that a mineral claim
covering that the lots had been sold to them in 1931 and
produced evidence such as the construction and tax
payments.
BFD objected that the land in dispute was covered by the
Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proc. No. 217. And
since it was a forest land, it cannot be subject to alienation,
pursuant to the 1935 and 1973 Constitution.
The Lower Court denied the application, while the CA
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reversed the decision, affirming the surface rights of the
Dela Rosas, while also the sub-surface rights of the BCI and
Atok. In other words, the CA ruled that the surface was to
be agricultural and mineral underneath.
ISSUE:
1. Who has better claim on the land in dispute
2. WON land can be classified as both agricultural and
mineral at the same time.
HELD:
1ST ISSUE:
The Court held that BCI and Atok have vested rights over
the land. The Court found that the mineral claims of both
BCI and Atok have been perfected prior to the approval of
the 1935 Constitution. As a legal effect of a valid mineral
claim, it segregates the area from the public domain and
confers to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim.
As of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and
had become private properties of BCI and Atok. Even if the
land was included in the Central Cordillera forest reserve, it
did not impair the rights vested in both mining companies.
The claim of the Dela Rosas was disregarded for weak
evidence, and even so, they could not have acquired the
land through prescription since the lad had already been
converted to mineral land.
2ND ISSUE:
No. Land cannot be classified as half agricultural and half
mineral. The Court held that the classification of land must
be categorical: the land must either completely be mineral
or agricultural. In this case, while the land was initially
classified as forest land, it ceases to be so and completely
became mineral when the mining claims were perfected.
Even if the surface was being tilled by the Dela Rosas, it is
still to be considered as mineral land.
As long as mining operations were being undertaken
thereon or underneath, it is still mineral, and not
agricultural.
Hence, the Court ruled that BCI and Atok have exclusive
rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before
the 1935 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of the
lands of the public domain except agricultural lands. It
could not have been transferred to private respondents by
virtue of acquisitive prescription not could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for
agricultural and mineral purposes.
Prior to the issuance of patent, can a subsequent title in
their name transfer the property in favour of another? So
that was not allowed since they have no title yet over the
property and therefore they cannot transfer it. Remember
in your Civil Law, nemo dat quod non habet. No one gives
what he does not have.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Heirs of Gozo v. Philippine Union Mission Corp. of
the Seventh Day Adventist Church,
G.R. No. 195990, [August 5, 2015])
FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of Spouses Rafael and
Concepcion Gozo who possessed a property in Brgy. Lala,
Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte of 236,638 sq.m.
Respondent (PUMC-SDA) claimed that a portion of that
property was donated to it by spouses Gozo based on the
deed of donation dated 28 Feb. 1937.
When spouses Gozo donated the property in 1937, they
were not yet the registered owners of the property
although they are the lawful possessors thereof.
In 1953, the land was registered under the name of
spouses Gozo and an OCT was issued in their favor
pursuant to Homestead Patent granted by the President of
the Phil.
After Rafael Gozo‘s dealth, his wife Concepcion and their 6
children, herein petitioners, caused the extrajudicial
partition of the property. Thus, the Register of Deeds
issued a TCT under the names of the heirs/petitioners in
1954.
When Concepcion caused the survey and the subdivision, it
was at this point that respondent brought to the attention
of Concepcion that 5,000 sq.m. portion of the property is
already owned by it based on the deed of donation. Upon
learning from the ROD that the donation was not annotated
in the title, petitioners refused to recognize the donation.
After Concepcion‘s death, the heirs/petitioners continued to
pursue their claims to recover the subject property from
respondent.
In 2000 or after 6 decades after the alleged deed of
donation was executed, petitioners filed an action for
declaration of nullity of deed of donation and recovery of
possession and ownership against respondent. Petitioners
argued that the signatures of their parents in the deed are
not genuine and the donation lacks the formality of
acceptance, hence invalid.
Respondent argued that since 1937 they are in open,
continuous, exclusive and adverse possession of the
property in the concept of an owner, that they have built
therein a church and an elementary school and that the
petitioners‘ claim of lack of acceptance 63 years after the
deed was executed is already barred by laches.
In 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioners
declaring that since the deed is void for lack of acceptance,
they are the rightful owners thereof. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC decision on the ground of laches stating
that petitioners failed to assert their rights over the land for
more than 60 years, thus laches had set in.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the donor is necessarily the owner of the

real estate donated? On the basis of the order of award of the Director of Lands,
the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
RULING: issued Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to
which an OCT was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga
No. The donors may be the possessor at the time of the City to Aniano David.
donation in 1937, but they are not the owners thereof as
the subject property was part of the public domain. It was Since the filing of the sales application of Aniano David and
only in 1953 that ownership of the property was vested by during all the proceedings in connection with said
the State to the spouses Gozo by virtue of its issuance of application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in
the OCT pursuant to the Homestead Patent granted by the his favor, Lee Hong Kok did not put up any opposition or
President of the Phil. Hence the donor is not necessarily adverse claim to Lot 2892.
the owner of the real property they donated when the said
property was still part of the public domain (inalienable). The opposition was fatal because after the registration and
The donors cannot give what they do not have, nemo dat issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title
quod non habet. based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby
automatically comes under the operation of RA 496 subject
Imperium and Dominium to all the safeguards provided therein. Under Section 38 of
RA 496, any question concerning the validity of the
Imperium Dominium certificate of title based on fraud should be raised within 1
The State‘s authority to The capacity of the State to year from the date of the issuance of the patent otherwise
govern is embraced in the own and acquire property. It the certificate of title becomes indefeasible after the lapse
concept of sovereignty that covers such rights as title to of 1 year.
includes passing laws land, exploitation and use of
concerning a territory, it, and disposition or sale of The contention of Lee Hong Kok was that David‘s lot is a
maintaining peace and order the same. private property for it was formed thru the process of
over it, and defending it It refers to lands held by the accretion.
against foreign invasion. government in a proprietary
character: can provide for Issue:
the exploitation and use of Can the patent certificate of Aniano David to the property
lands and other natural be nullified?
resources.
When the State acts in this The Regalian Doctrine Held:
capacity, jure imperii, it whereby all lands of the No. There is no legal justification for nullifying the right to
generally enjoys state public domain belong to the the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor.
immunity. State, and anyone claiming The lot in question is NOT a private property as the Director
title has the burden to show of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
ownership, comes within Resources have always sustained its public character for
this concept. In this having been formed by reclamation and not accretion.
capacity, jure gestium, the
State descends to the status RECLAMATION is the act of filling submerged land by
of ordinary persons and thus deliberate acts and reclaiming title thereto.
becomes liable as such. ACCRETION - is the process whereby the soil is deposited;
accretion resulting from the gradual deposit by or
sedimentation from the waters belongs to the owners of
Lee Hong Kok vs. David the land bordering on streams, torrents, lakes, or rivers
(GR No.G.R. No. L-3038 12/27/1972)
Nature: Therefore the only remedy available to the appellants is an
Lee Hong Kok, et al filed an appeal on certiorari seeking to action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud.
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the lower court in dismissing the complaint Issue: Did Aniano David commit fraud?
to have the Torrens Title of Aniano David be declared null
and void. NO. Aniano David has not committed any fraud in applying
for the purchase of the Lot because everything was done in
Facts: Aniano David acquired lawful title to a parcel of land the open. The notices regarding the auction sale of the land
pursuant to his miscellaneous sales application. An order of were published, the actual sale and award thereof to
award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public
Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 official acts of an officer of the Government. The
containing an area of 226 square meters, which is a portion application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's
of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. application who had occupied the land since 1938.

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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)

As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of Lands, Justice

If the grant was presumed to be invalid, who has the right Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings
to question it? under the Land Registration Law and under the provisions
of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same in that
Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands both are against the whole world, both take the nature of
or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources can judicial proceedings, and for both the decree of registration
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title pursuant issued is conclusive and final."
to a void patent.
The private parties cannot claim that the patent and title Meanwhile in Cabacug v. Lao. There is this revealing
issued for the land involved are void since they are not the excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with
registered owners thereof nor had they been declared as reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent
owners in the cadastral proceedings of the Naga Cadastre is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
after claiming it as their private property. registered property. Not only does a free patent have a
Citing Maninang vs Consolacion: ‗The fact that the grant force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the
was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the
grant was in conformity with the law or not is a question right to repurchase within a period of five years." It is quite
which the government may raise, but until it is raised by apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is legally
the government and set aside, the defendant cannot indefensible.
question it. The legality of the grant is a question between
the grantee and the government. RULING:
The decision of the CA of January 31, 1969 and its
By what authority does the government have in disposing resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed.
of the land in question?
b. IPRA Law (Indigenous Peoples Act of 1997)
IMPERIUM refers to the government authority possessed by (RA 8371)
the state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty. DOMINIUM, on the other hand, is appropriate Under the IPRA Law, indigenous peoples may obtain the
with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary recognition of their right of ownership over ancestral lands
character. In such capacity, it may provide for the and ancestral domains by virtue of native title.
exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the 1. Ancestral Lands and Ancestral Domains
Constitution.
Ancestral Lands Ancestral Domain
The manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, which was Small parcels of lands Broader, it includes all the
adopted by the present Constitution, was embodied in the granted to individual natural resources included
universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the indigenous people therein
Crown, the ownership however is vested in the state rather Lands occupied by Areas generally belonging to
than the head thereof. individuals, families, and indigenous cultural
clans who are members of communities.
As to the unappropriated public lands constituting the indigenous cultural
public domain, the sole power of legislation is vested in communities.
Congress. These lands are required to
have been occupied,
There being no evidence whatever that the property in possessed, and utilized
question was ever acquired by the applicants or their by them or their ancestors
ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish ―since time immemorial,
Government or by possessory information title or by any continuously to the present‖.
other means for the acquisition of public lands, the property
must be held to be public domain (Heirs of Datu Pendatun
v. Director of Lands). 2. Constitutionality of the IPRA LAW

―No public land can be acquired by private persons without

any grant, express or implied, from the government.‖
Therefore it is indispensable that there be a showing of a
title from the state or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law otherwise the property is and remains
part of the public domain.
Was David‘s title to the property already indefeasible?
3. Native Title: Exception to Jura Regalia
Cases:
IPRA law granted vast authority to the IPs which is in
contravention of the Regalian Doctrine. In this case, the
Supreme Court was not able to rule on the substance of the
case as to whether or not the IPRA Law is unconstitutional.

Notes of Cesnee Tan Page 8

Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
The petition was dismissed. However, in the separate
opinion of Justice Kapunan, he stated that jura regalia does
not negate a native title.
Opinion of Justice Kapunan in the case of Cruz vs Secreaty
(2000): Regalian Theory does not negate native title to
lands held in private ownership since time immemorial. In
Cariño VS Insular Government (1907), when as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under the claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
(GR No. 135385, 12/6/2000)
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
People‘s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain
provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State‘s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the
Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the
law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral
domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
part of the lands of the public domain. They are private
lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a
concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any
royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership
and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains
is a limited form of ownership and does not include the
right to alienate the same.
SEPARATE OPINION; JUSTICE KAPUNAN
JURA REGALIA
• private title to land must be traced to some
grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown or its
successors, the American Colonial Government, and
thereafter, the Philippine Republic
> In a broad sense, the term refers to royal rights, or those
Notes of Cesnee Tan
rights to which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives
> The theory of jure regalia was therefore nothing more
than a natural fruit of conquest
CONNECTED TO THIS IS THE STATE‘S POWER OF
DOMINUUM
> Capacity of the state to own or acquire property—
foundation for the early Spanish decree embracing the
feudal theory of jura regalia
> This concept was first introduced through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas
> The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of discovery
and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown.
> The Law of the Indies was followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. This law provided
for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims
> The Maura Law: was partly an amendment and was the
last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines, which
required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural
lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the State
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are part of the public domain and, thus, owned by
the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution, petitioners and the Solicitor General advance
the following arguments:
• First, according to petitioners, the King of
Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion
over the Philippines by virtue of discovery and conquest.
They contend that the Spanish King under the theory of
jura regalia, which was introduced into Philippine law upon
Spanish conquest in 1521, acquired title to all the lands in
the archipelago.
• Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General
submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
owned by the State. They invoke the theory of jura regalia
which impute to the State the ownership of all lands and
make the State the original source of all private titles. They
argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and
the United States, is the source of any asserted right of
ownership in land.
• Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General
concede that the Cariño doctrine exists. However,
petitioners maintain that the doctrine merely states that
title to lands of the public domain may be acquired by
prescription. The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that
the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public
domain and, thus, cannot be extended to other lands of the
public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks.
• Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even
assuming that native title over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such
native title was extinguished upon the ratification of the
1935 Constitution.
• Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is
mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to
protect that rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral
lands and ancestral domains. However, they contend that
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
the mandate is subject to Section 2, Article XII and the
theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to
petitioners, the recognition and protection under R.A. 8371
of the right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains is far in excess of the legislative power and
constitutional mandate of Congress.
• Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners posit
that R.A. 8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of non-
agricultural lands of the public domain and other natural
resources.
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions
of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands, ancestral domains,
and natural resources are unconstitutional. The
fundamental question is, who, between the State and the
indigenous peoples, are the rightful owners of these
properties?
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands and ancestral
domains are not unconstitutional.
Cariño vs. Insular Government
x x x Every presumption is and ought to be taken against
the Government in a case like the present. It might,
perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far
back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held
by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be
presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
x x x.
ICPs acquired their ancestral domain through "ownership
by virtue of native title" and not through "ownership of land
by acquisitive prescription against the State"
• Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes
that the land has been held by its possessor and his
predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since
time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State,
that is, Spain or its successors-in-interest, the United States
and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer
of title from the State as the land has been regarded as
private in character as far back as memory goes.
• Ownership of land by acquisitive prescription
against the State involves a conversion of the character of
the property from alienable public land to private land,
which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a
private person.
Acquisition of Spain on certain parts of the Phil. through
terra nullius (no man's land)
• Although Spain was deemed to have acquired
sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not mean that it
acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of
the colonial laws of Spain, the Spanish Crown was
considered to have acquired dominion only over the
unoccupied and unclaimed portions of our islands.
Intent of the framers of the Constitution
• It is readily apparent from the constitutional
Notes of Cesnee Tan
records that the framers of the Constitution did not intend
Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be
public or private property. Rather, they acknowledged that
ancestral domains shall be treated as private property, and
that customary laws shall merely determine whether such
private ownership is by the entire indigenous cultural
community, or by individuals, families, or clans within the
community.
• The framers of the Constitution inserted the
phrase ―subject to the provisions of this Constitution‖ in the
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution mainly to prevent
the impairment of Torrens titles and other prior rights in the
determination of what constitutes ancestral lands and
ancestral domains.
B. The provisions of R.A. 8371 do not infringe upon the
State‘s ownership over the natural resources within the
ancestral domains.
• Although under Section 3(a) of IPRA states the
inclusion of natural resources in the definition of ancestral
domains purportedly results in the abdication of State
ownership over these resources; however, Section 3(a)
merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and
describes the extent, limit and composition of ancestral
domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in
determining whether a particular area is to be considered
as part of and within the ancestral domains.
• In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a
yardstick which points out what properties are within the
ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any
right of ownership over the natural resources to the
indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not
declarative of a right or title.
The phrase ―private but community property‖ is merely
descriptive of the indigenous peoples‘ concept of ownership
as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code.
• In Civil Law, ―ownership‖ is the ―independent
and general power of a person over a thing for purposes
recognized by law and within the limits established
thereby.‖ It has the following attributes:
jus utendi or the right to receive from the
thing that which it produces,
jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing
by its use,
jus disponendi or the power to alienate,
encumber, transform and even destroy that which is owned
and
jus vidicandi or the right to exclude other
persons from the possession the thing owned.
• In contrast, the indigenous peoples‘ concept of
ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or
group ownership. By virtue of the communal character of
ownership, the property held in common ―cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed‖ because it was meant to benefit the
whole indigenous community and not merely the individual
member. Thus, the IPs could not alienate, encumber or sell
those of pertaining to natural resources.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of
natural resources are not unconstitutional.
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
• The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples
shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural
resources found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from
and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization
of these resources, and to negotiate the terms and
conditions for the exploration of such natural resources.
The statute also grants them priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any
natural resources within the ancestral domains.
• Although Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the
exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources must be under the full control and supervision of
the State, the Constitution itself states in the third
paragraph of the same section that Congress may, by law,
allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its
citizens.
Cariño vs Insular Government
41 Phil. 935 (1909)
Facts:
Mateo Carino(appellant) filed his petition in the Court of
Land Registration to be granted a parcel of land consisting
of 40 Hectares,1are and 13 Centares in Baguio, Province of
Benguet together with a house erected thereon. It was
granted, but the Government of the Philippines and also on
behalf of the United States averred having taken possession
of the property for public and military purposes,
Respondents also asserted that they had title to all the land
in the Philippines except to permit private lands to be
acquired and no prescription runs against the Spanish
crown. The US succeeded the title of Spain through Treaty
of Paris and Mateo‘s land was not registered and that he
had lost all his rights and now is deemed to be a mere
trespasser. Then the Court of First Instance dismissed the
application for Mateo since he did not possess the land
since time immemorial and the land was property of the
Government. The decision was affirmed by the Philippine
Supreme Court. Thus the case was brought to the US
Supreme Court by virtue of Writ of Error(general method of
bringing cases to this court, an appeal the exception,
confined to equity in the main.
Mateo Carino in his appeal stated that he is an Igorot of the
Province of Benguet, they have owned the land for more
than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, and they all had
been recognized as owners by the Igorots and had
inherited or received his land from his father in accordance
with Igorot custom. However, no document of title had
been issued from the Spanish Crown
Issue : WON Carino owns the land.
Held : Yes
The US Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Philippine Supreme Court.
Mateo Carino should be granted what he seeks and should
not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those
among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
Notes of Cesnee Tan
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.
The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of
Prescription as mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states
: ― Where such possessors shall not be able to produce
title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they s hall show that
ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription‖ .
Moreover, the Decree of June 25, 1880 states that
possessors for certain time shall be deemed owners, if a
cultivated land 20 years, if uncultivated 30 years.
Mateo‘s father was the owner of the land by the very terms
of this decree- by Organic Act of July 1, 1902 ,all the
property and rights acquired there by the United States are
to be administered ―for the benefit of the inhibitants
thereof.‖
c. Reservations of lands of the public domain are valid
assertions of Regalian Right
Reserving certain lands of the public domain for specific
public purposes have the character of official assertions of
ownership, and the presumption is that they have been
issued by right of sovereignty and in the exercise of the
State‘s dominical authority. These are valid asseveration of
Regalian right over the property.
In Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay VS
RTC (1990), what the government occupies is what the
government owns, unless otherwise shown.
Cases:
Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay
City vs. Regional Trial Court Branch 57 Makati
(GR No. 81564, 4/26/1990)
FACTS:
On November 5, 1985, Domingo Palomares, as
administrator of the heirs of Delfin Casal, commenced suit
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati, Metro
Manila for declaratory relief, quieting of title, cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, and cancellation of
entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291.
However, during the trial the court found hard evidence on
record that: (1) the property covered by OCT No. 291 had
been conveyed to the United States of America; (2) it had
been later ceded to the Republic of the Philippines; and (3)
as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled upon final
orders of Judge Ostrand.
During the pendency of the case also, Proclamation No. 192
(―RESERVING FOR THE VETERANS CENTER SITE
PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND
OF LUZON‖) and Proclamation No. 423 (―RESERVING FOR
MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG,
TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND
PASAY CITY‖) were issued by the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Proclamation 192 and 423 were
Page 11
Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)

valid in the absence of proof of ownership of the property

by the government? Classification of Lands

HELD: Yes. Such proclamations have the character of Lands of the Public Lands of the Private
official assertions of ownership, and the presumption is that Domain Domain
they have been issued by right of sovereignty and in the Lands which are either Land belonging to and
exercise of the State‘s dominical authority. We take not only alienable or inalienable. owned by the State as a
judicial notice thereof but accept the same as a valid private individual, without
asseveration of regalian right over property. being devoted for public
use, public service or
Organizational Structure development of national
wealth
A. DENR, functions of the DENR Secretary, Director of LMB (similar to patrimonial
The DENR Secretary is the executive officer charged with properties of the State)
carrying out the provision of the Public Land Act, through
the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate NCC: Properties of Public NCC: Patrimonial
control. Dominion Properties of the State
Those intended for public Properties other than
The Director of Lands, shall have direct executive control of use or those which belong properties of the public
the survey, classification, lease, sale, or any other form of to the State without being dominion or former
concession or disposition and management of the lands of for public use, intended for properties of the public
the public domain. some public service or for dominion that are no longer
the development of intended for public use
The jurisdiction of the Department over public lands does national wealth or public service.
not negate the authority of the court to resolve questions of
possession and the court‘s decision stands in meantime that As to the general classification of the land, there are 2.
the DENR has not settled the respective rights of public First, lands of the public domain then lands of private
land claimants. But once DENR has decided, particularly domain. Now under the lands of public domain, this
with the grant of a public land patent, for instance, and includes alienable and non-alienable lands. Alienable lands
issuance of the corresponding certificate of title, DENR‘s are limited to agricultural lands. If you also remember
decision prevails. under your Constitution, there is what we call Public
Agricultural Land. Those are the only ones that can be
The administration and distribution of public land is registered. Non alienable, of course, mineral, timber lands
committed by law to the Director of Lands and ultimately to and foreshore lands.
the DENR Secretary.
There is also a separate classification under the Civil Code.
General Rule: Under EO 192, the newly created Lands 1. Properties of the Public Dominion or those intended for
Management Bureau (LMB) has absorbed the functions and public use
powers of the Bureau of Lands 2. Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, intended for some public service or for the
Exception: Except those line functions and powers which development of national wealth
were transferred to the regional field offices. 3. Patrimonial properties of the State

DENR
A Regional Office is headed
by a Regional Executive
Director who shall be
assisted by 5 Regional
Technical Directors.
Note: The Regional Offices
of the then Bureau of Forest
Development,
Bureau of Mines and
Geosciences, and Bureau of
Lands are now integrated
into Regional Environment
and Natural Resources
Office.
LMB So for public use, some examples would be roads, canals
Is headed by a Director and and bridges. Lands of public service may be used only by
assisted by an Assistant duly authorized persons. An example is a public national
Director who shall advise government building. Lastly, patrimonial properties are
the DENR Secretary on properties of the State which are declared to be no longer
matters pertaining to needed in public use or for public purpose.
rational land classification
management and Under the 1935 Constitution, there were 3 classifications:
disposition. 1. Agricultural
2. Timber
3. Mineral
―Public Agricultural Lands‖ are neither timber nor mineral,
and includes residential lands.
Under the 1973 Constituion, the classification are as
follows:
1. Agricultural

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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
2. Industrial
3. Commercial
4. Residential
5. Resettlement
6. Mineral
7. Timber or forest
8. Grazing lands
9. Such other classes provided by law
There is also a separate classification of lands found in the
1987 Constitution. There are only 4:
1. Agricultural land,
2. Forest/Timber lands
3. Mineral Lands and
4. National Parks
Only Agricultural lands are open for alienation and
disposition.
For the purpose of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of DENR, shall from time
to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under the Act.
Sec. 9 of CA 141 provides that alienable or disposable lands
shall be classified, for the purpose of administration and
disposition into: ARER 1. Agricultural; 2. Residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
3. Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and 4.
Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi- public
purposes
Constitution (Section 3-5, Article XII)
SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be
further classified by law according to the uses which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens
of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof
by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation,
ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements
of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law,
the size of lands of the public domain which may be
acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefor.
SECTION 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible,
determine by law the specific limits of forest lands and
national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the
ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks
shall be conserved and may not be increased nor
diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide, for
Notes of Cesnee Tan
such period as it may determine measures to prohibit
logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.
SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary
laws governing property rights or relations in determining
the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.
Cases:
How about lands covered by forest reservations? In the
case of Palomo, the land was reserved for the Tiwi Hot
Springs. They were able to register it in their name. The
Supreme Court held that it is invalid. Possession of lands
subject to forest reservations, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership. The Supreme Court held that the
classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature and
not how the land actually looks like. Even if it looks like an
agricultural land, then classified as timber land, it‘s actually
timber land and you cannot possess it.
Palomo v. Court of Appeals
266 SCRA 392
FACTS:
In 1913, some 440,530 square meters of land in Albay were
reserved for provincial park purposes by virtue of EO No.
40. Of said area, 15 parcels of land were registered in the
name of Diego Palomo by the Court of First Instance.
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these lands to his heirs
Ignacio and Carmen Palomo. Claiming that the aforesaid
original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on
May 30, 1950. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and
3914 sometime in October 1953.
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 47 converting the area covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi
Hot Spring National Park. The Palomos contended that they
have been in possession of the subject lands and have
introduced improvements thereon.
ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles issued to the
petitioners valid? –NO
HELD
Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the lands, whether
agricultural, mineral, or forest were under the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish crown.Private
ownership of land could only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in various forms, such
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial
or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase
and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information
title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the
Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
The decision of the CFI relied upon by petitioners were not
signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of
notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the
Clerk of Court.
More importantly, the lands in question were not classified
as alienable lands. Since the lands were made part of a
reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of
the forest zone. Thus, they cannot be the valid subject of
alienation.
What must the applicant show? This pertains to when you
apply for registration. To prove that the land subject for
application is alienable, an applicant must conclusively
establish the existence of a positive act of the government
such as a Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order or
Administration. This was held in the case of Republic vs
Candy Maker.
Republic vs Candy Maker Inc
(GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006)
FACTS:
On April, 29, 1999, Antonia, Eladia, and Felisa, all
surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Candy Maker, Inc. for a parcel of land located below the
reglementary lake elevation of 12.50m, about 900 meters
away the Laguna de Bay. Candy Maker, Inc. as applicant,
filed an application with the MTC of Taytay, Rizal for
registration of its alleged title over the lot. The CENRO of
Antipolo City declared the land to fall within the alienable
and disposable zone. On the other hand, the Land
Registration Authority recommended the exclusion of lot no.
3138-B on the ground that it is a legal easement and
intended for public use, hence, inalienable and
indisposable. On July 2001, the Republic of the Philippines,
the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) filed its
opposition which alleged that the lot subject of the
application for registration may not be alienated and
disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna Lake Bed,
a public land within, its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the property subject of the amended application is
alienable and disposable property of the State, and if so,
whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove its ownership over the property?
HELD:
The property subject of this application was alienable and
disposable public agricultural land. However, respondent
failed to prove that it possesses registrable title over the
property. The statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural lands does not operate against the statute
unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of
Notes of Cesnee Tan
the same after a claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State. A
mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership, such possession is not exclusive and notorious
as to give rise to presumptive grant from the state. In light
of the foregoing, the petition of the Republic of the
Philippines is granted.
This case discussed the requirement for the presentation of
the proof. There are actually 2 conflicting cases. On the
first case, general rule Republic vs TAN Properties June 26,
2008, the applicant must submit or present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary. An
exception is Republic vs Serrano, allows such not to be
submitted (classification). In this case of Leonidas vs
Vargas, the Supreme Court reiterated that you always
follow the general rule and that is, to present the
classification approved by the DENR Secretary. Substantial
compliance applies on a case to case basis. That is, based
on the sound discretion of the Court.
Leonidas vs Vargas
201031 dec 14 2017
[I]n Republic v. TA.N Properties, Jnc., which was
promulgated on 26 June 2008 x x x we held that applicants
for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
In Republic v. Serrano (decided on 24 February 2010)], we
allowed the approval of a land registration application even
without the submission of the certification from the DENR
Secretary. As this ruling presented an apparent
contradiction with our earlier pronouncement in Republic v.
TA.N Properties, Inc., we sought to harmonize our previous
rulings in Republic v. vega [(decided on 17 January 2011)J.
We then said that the applications for land registration may
be granted even without the DENR Secretary's certification
provided that the application was currently pending at the
time Republic v. vega was promulgated.
It is worth stressing, however, that the foregoing ruling is
the exception, not the rule. As explicitly elucidated in
Republic v. Vega:
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on
substantial compliance applies pro hac vice. It does not in
any way detract from our rulings in Republic i~ TA.N
Properties, Inc., and similar cases which impose a strict
requirement to prove that the public land is alienable and
disposable, especially in this case when the Decisions of the
lower court and the [CA] were rendered prior to these
rulings. To establish that the land subject of the application
is alienable and disposable public land, the general rule
remains: all applications for original registration under [PD
1529] must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO
certification and (2) a certified true ~Jf the original
classification made by the DENR Secretary.
As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound
discretion and based solely on the evidence presented on
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
record - may approve the application, pro hac vice, on the
ground of substantial compliance showing that there has
been a positive act of government to show the nature and
character of the land and an absence of effective opposition
from the government. This exception shall only apply to
applications for registration currently pending before the
trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to
all future applications. (Underscoring and emphases in the
original) That said, we hold that both the petitioner and
Tancredo failed to establish clearly and convincingly their
respective rights to registration of imperfect titles under CA
141 and PD 1529, as will be discussed below.
WHAT IS THE POLICY OF THE STATE IN CONNECTION
WITH ALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS?
TO ENCOURAGE AND PROMOTE THE DISTRIBUTION OF
ALIENABLE PUBLIC LANDS TO SPUR ECONOMIC GROWTH
BUT SAFEGUARDS ARE IMPOSED LEST SUCH LANDS FALL
INTO WRONG HANDS TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE
NATIONAL PATRIMONY.
It is axiomatic of course that ―[i]t is the policy of the State
to encourage and promote the distribution of alienable
public lands as a spur to economic growth and in line with
the social justice ideal enshrined in the Constitution. At the
same time, the law imposes stringent safeguards upon the
grant of such resources lest they fall into the wrong hands
to the prejudice of the national patrimony.‖63 This ruling
controls the present case.
How about submerged lands? Can you register it?
Submerged lands cannot be registered. However, if it will
be reclaimed, meaning land will be placed, that may be
registered provided that it is declared open for disposition,
alienable and disposable.
As to foreshore lands, they may be subject of foreshore
lease application but they cannot be registered in the name
of one person.
Chavez vs Public Estates Authority
[G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002]
Facts: Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a wholly
government-owned and –controlled corporation which is
the primary implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of
the public domain. By virtue of a Special Patent issued by
President Corazon Aquino, the Register of Deeds of the
Paranaque, in April 1988, issued certificates of title, in the
name of PEA, covering three reclaimed islands known as
the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paranaque City. The Freedom
Islands have a total land area of 157.841 hectares.
In April 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of
an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding
these islands to complete the configuration in the Master
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation Project-
Manila Cavite Coastal Road Reclamation Project. The JVA
was later amended giving AMARI an option to reclaim an
additional 350 hectares of submerged area. Part of the
consideration for AMARI‘s work is the conveyance of 70%
of the total net usable reclaimed area – equivalent to 367.5
hectares, title of which will be in AMARI‘s name.
Issue: Whether or not AMARI, a private corporation, can
acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of
reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay
Held: No. AMARI as a private corporation cannot acquire
the reclaimed Freedom Islands, though alienable lands of
the public domain, except by lease, as provided under
Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The still
submerged areas (i.e., the more or less additional 250 and
350 hectares of submerged areas) in Manila Bay are
inalienable lands of the public domain; as such, they are
beyond the commerce of man, as provided under Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.
The reclaimed Freedom Islands: The assignment to PEA of
the ownership and administration of the reclaimed areas in
Manila Bay, coupled with President Aquino‘s actual issuance
of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. They also constitute a declaration that the
Freedom Islands are no longer needed for public service.
The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties.
The submerged areas: The mere reclamation of foreshore
and submerged areas by PEA does not convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law
or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to
disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands
cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law
has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
PEA‘s authority to sell: In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public
domain, there must be legislative authority empowering
PEA to sell these lands, in view of the requirement under
CA No. 141. Without such legislative authority, PEA could
not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and
submerged alienable lands of the public domain. PEA‘s
Charter grants it such express legislative authority to sell its
lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public
domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to
PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on
private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the
public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only
benefit private individuals.
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
Registration of alienable lands of the public domain:
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does
not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of the
land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but
is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by
any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership.
Registration does not give the registrant a better right than
what the registrant had prior to the registration. The
registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private
lands. Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the
patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable
land of the public domain automatically becomes private
land cannot apply to government units and entities like
PEA.
Lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not
exclusively private or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public
domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.
Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be
registered under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now
PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands.
For instance,
- Under the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, private property purchased by the National
Government for expansion of an airport may be titled in the
name of the government agency tasked to administer the
airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use
as a town plaza or public school site may likewise be titled
in the name of the municipality. All these properties
become properties of the public domain, and if already
registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain
registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any
existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens
System.
- Private lands taken by the Government for
public use under its power of eminent domain become
unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless,
Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds
to issue in the name of the National Government new
certificates of title covering such expropriated lands.
Public Land Act
Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of
classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain
belongs to the executive branch of the government and not
the court. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible
evidence, the presumption that the land of an application
for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.
Section 6 of the Public Land Act classifies lands of the
public domain into: 1. Alienable or disposable 2. Timber
and 3. Mineral lands. The President may at any time and in
a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another,
for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Classification of Public lands open to disposition
Now, how about lands classified under CA 141? There are
only 3; Alienable and disposable, timber and mineral lands.
Now, specifically, this alienable and disposable lands may
be classified further to which purposes such land are
destined; such as, Agricultural, Residential, Educational,
and Reservation for Camp sites and for public and quasi-
public purposes.
From the foregoing classification, public agricultural land
may be defined as those alienable portions of the public
domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. Thus,
the term includes residential, commercial and industrial
lands for the reason that these lands are neither timber nor
mineral lands.
Cases:
Alba vs Court of Appeals
(GR No. 120066, 9/9/1999)
FACTS:
In 1958, Lachica filed an application for title to a 4,485
sq.m. parcel of land which he had acquired through
purchase dating back to 1945. However, some parties filed
their opposition thereto invoking that they are owners of
some parts of land within the total area applied for. The
lower court ruled in favor of Lachica and held, among
others, that Lachica had been in actual, open and
continuous possession of the subject land in the concept of
owner since 1945 and thus had acquired it through
prescription.
ISSUE:
Did Lachica acquire the subject property by prescription?
RULING:
The Court ruled on the negative.
Based from the facts and evidences presented, it was
proven that Lachicha only had a title to a 620sq.m. portion
of the total area. Prescription cannot be had on the
remaining area as the Court held that the law applicable in
this case is Sec. 48 of CA 141 (wc deals with registration of
lands of public domain) and not Sec. 19 of Act 496 (wc
deals with registration of private lands) and with which the
lower courts had relied on.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what
governs the proceeding consistent with the fundamental
dictum that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is proved. In this case, the lower courts relied on
the provisions on prescription with the assumption that the
subject property is a private land. However, the application
for registration should be that of a judicial confirmation of
an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed
under the Regalian Doctrine to be part of the public
domain.
Public lands are classified into (1) alienable or disposable
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
lands which includes agricultural lands and (2) inalienable
or non-disposable lands or those not susceptible of private
appropriation which includes Timber lands and Mineral
lands. For purposes of administration and disposition, the
lands of the public domain classified as "disposable" or
"alienable" are further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural;
b.] Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar
productive purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other
similar purposes, and d.] Reservations for town sites and
for public and quasi-public purposes.
Possession of public agricultural land, however long the
period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon
the possessor and it is because the statute of limitations
with regard to public agricultural land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.
Under (b), Sec. 48, CA 141, confirmation of an imperfect
title to a public domain requires that:
1. There be an open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain;
2. It should be under a bona fide claim of ownership;
and
3. possession should be for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure
In this case, Lachica had not yet satisfied the requirement
of the 30 years possession, hence, prescription cannot be
granted in favor of him.
D. Classification of Lands an Executive Privilege
Who classifies the lands? That is the prerogative of the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the
DENR. A positive act from the government is required and
that is by virtue of a Presidential Proclamation or
Administrative Enactment.
Cases:
Republic vs Imperial
(GR No. 130906, 2/11/1990)
FACTS:
On September 12, 1917, the late Elias Imperial was issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 408 (500) pursuant to
Decree No. 55173 of then Court of First Instance of Albay.
OCT No. 55173 was subdivided and further subdivided
resulting in the issuance of several titles, which are now the
subjects of herein petition in the name of private
respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a
case with the trial court to judicially declare the Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) issued to herein private
respondents null and void on the ground that the subject
land, on which the OCT was based, has the features of a
Notes of Cesnee Tan
foreshore land based on an investigation conducted by the
DENR, Region V, Legazpi City. Respondents, on the other
hand contend that Director of Lands found Jose Baritua's
land covered by TCT No.18655, which stemmed from OCT
408(500), to be "definitely outside of the foreshore area."
Within the time for pleading, private respondents EANCRA
Corporation, Lolita Alcazar and Salvador Alcazar filed their
answer with cross-claim, while the rest, namely, Felix S.
Imperial, Feliza S. Imperial, Elias S. Imperial and Miriam S.
Imperial filed a motion to dismiss. They contended that the
adjudication by the cadastral court is binding against the
whole world including the Republic since the cadastral
proceedings are in rem and the government itself through
the Director of Lands instituted the proceedings and was a
direct and active participant therein. Petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, filed an objection to the
motion to dismiss. After hearing the motion to dismiss, the
trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
judgment rendered by the cadastral court in G.R. Cad. Rec.
No. 88 and the Courts resolution in the petition to quiet
title, G.R. 85770, both decreed that the parcel of land
covered by OCT No. 408 (500) was not foreshore. Petitioner
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit and for failure to file the appellants brief within the
extended period granted to petitioner.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be granted.
HELD: Yes.
At the core of the controversy is whether the parcels of
land in question are foreshore lands. Foreshore land is a
part of the alienable land of the public domain and may be
disposed of only by lease and not otherwise. It was defined
as "that part (of the land) which is between high and low
water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides." It is
also known as "a strip of land that lies between the high
and low water marks and, is alternatively wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide."
The classification of public lands is a function of the
executive branch of government, specifically the director of
lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau).
The decision of the director of lands when approved by the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) as to questions of fact is conclusive upon
the court.
There is allegedly a conflict between the findings of the
Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, in the present
case. Respondents contend that the Director of Lands
found Jose Baritua's land covered by TCT No.18655, which
stemmed from OCT 408(500), to be "definitely outside of
the foreshore area." Petitioner, on the other hand, claims
that subsequent investigation of the DENR, Region V,
Legazpi City, disclosed that the land covered by OCT No.
408 (500) from whence the titles were derived "has the
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
features of a foreshore land." The contradictory views of
the Director of Lands and the DENR, Region V, Legazpi City,
on the true nature of the land, which contradiction was
neither discussed nor resolved by the RTC, cannot be the
premise of any conclusive classification of the land
involved.
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether
the lands subject of petitioner's reversion efforts are
foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for
relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth
motions for extension to file appellant's brief. Petitioner's
appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed
with public interest and must then be given due course.
In the case at bar, the need to determine once and for all
whether the lands subject of petitioners reversion efforts
are foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause
for relaxing the procedural rules and granting the third and
fourth motions for extensions to file appellants brief.
Petitioner Republics appeal presented an exceptional
circumstance impressed with public interest which in the
Courts discretion must be given due course.
Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals and Bisnar
(GR No. 83609, 10/26/1989)
Facts: On July 20,1976, Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar filed their
joint application for the registration of two parcels of land,
located in the province of Capiz, in the CFI of Capiz. They
claimed that they inherited those parcels of land. The
Director of Lands and Director of the Bureau of Forest
Development opposed the application on the ground that
said parcels of land were part of a timberland, a public
dominion, so it cannot be the subject of the registration
proceedings. After the hearing, the CFI ordered the
registration of the title of the lots in the names of the
applicants, herein private respondents after finding that the
applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have been in
open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession
of the subject parcels of land under bona fide claims of
ownership for more than 80 years. The CA affirmed the
CFI‘s decision, holding that the classification of the lots as
timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the
absence of proof that the said lots are indeed more
valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as
authority the case of Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippine Islands (40 Phil.10).
Issue/s: Whether or not the possession of forestlands or
timberlands for 80 years can ripen to private ownership.
Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that possession of forestlands, however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership. It emphasized
that a positive act of the government, particularly the
Executive Department is needed to declassify land, which is
classified as forest, and to convert it into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes before
registration of which may proceed. The Court, citing various
cases, stated that a parcel of forestland is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, an office
under the Executive Department, and beyond the power
Notes of Cesnee Tan
and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the
Torrens System.
E. Public Land vs Government land
Now what is the difference of government lands and public
lands? Government lands cover public lands. Public lands
means public domain or lands open for private
appropriation.
Cases:
Montano vs Insular Government
(GR No. 3714, 1//26/1909)
Facts: Montano applied for land registration of a parcel of
land used for fishery in Libis, Caloocan. This was opposed
to by the Solicitor-General (Sol. Gen.) contending that the
land is owned by the US Government as well as Obras Pias
de la Sagrda Mitra as it was the absolute owner of the lot.
The Court of Land Registration granted the application of
Montano. Only the Sol. Gen. appealed the decision.
Issue: Whether the lands used as a fishery, for the growth
of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some distance from the
sea, and asserted, though not clearly proved to be
overflowed at high tide could be registered as private
property.
Held: Yes, it can.
The Supreme Court held that since fish ponds are not
classified as forest or mineral lands, it must necessarily be
agricultural land. The Court noted that before Montano
owned the lot, bacawan had been sown and propagated in
the mud by the owner.
The Court also noted that government land is NOT
similar to public domain or public land. Government land
includes not only public domain, but also other lands of the
Government already reserved or developed to public use or
subject to private right.
Government owns real estate which is part of public lands
and other real estate which is not part thereof. There is
much real property belonging to the Government which is
not affected by statutes for the settlement, prescription or
sale of public lands. Examples in point are properties
occupied by public buildings or devoted to municipal or
other governmental uses.
Modes of Disposition
No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied from the government. In
other words, it is indispensable that there be a showing of
a title from the state. This may come in the form of a
homestead, sales or free patent or grant. One claiming
private rights must prove that he has complied with the
Public Land Act which prescribes the substantive as well as
the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands.
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be
disposed of only as follows:
1. For homestead settlement
2. By sale
3. By lease
4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles
a. By judicial legalization
b. By administrative legalization (free patent)
The words alienation, disposition or concession as used in
the Public Land Act means any of the methods authorized
by the Act for the acquisition, lease, use or benefit of the
lands of the public domain other that timber or mineral
lands. Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by
separate chapters of the Public land Act because there are
specific requirements and application procedure for every
mode.
Cases:
Lee Hong Kok vs David
(GR No.G.R. No. L-30389, 12/27/1972)
FACTS: Aniano David acquired lawful title pursuant to his
miscellaneous sales application in accordance with which an
order of award and for issuance of a sales patent (*similar
to public auction) was made by the Director of Lands on
June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892.
On the basis of the order of award of the Director of
Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales
Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to which OCT No. 510 was
issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City on October
21, 1959.
Land in question is not a private property as the Director
of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character for
having been formed by reclamation (as opposed to
petitioners contention that it is accretion)
The only remedy: action for reconveyance on the ground
of fraud - But there was no fraud in this case
ISSUES:
1. W/N Lee Hong Kok can question the grant. - NO
2. W/N David has original acquisition of title. - YES
HELD: Court of Appeals Affirmed. (no legal justification for
nullifying the right of David to the disputed lot arising from
the grant made in his favor by respondent officials)
Only the Government, represented by the Director of
Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate
of title issued pursuant to a void patent. The legality of the
grant is a question between the grantee and the
government. Private parties like the plaintiffs cannot claim
that the patent and title issued for the land involved are
void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor
had they been declared as owners in the cadastral
Notes of Cesnee Tan
proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their
private property.
Well-settled Rule : no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
the government
Cabacug v. Lao: holder of a land acquired under a free
patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of
registered property. Not only does a free patent have a
force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in addition the
person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the
right to repurchase within a period of 5 years.
Imperium v. Dominium
1. Imperium - government authority possessed by the
state which is appropriately embraced in the concept of
sovereignty
2. Dominium - capacity to own or acquire
property. The use of this term is appropriate with reference
to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In
such capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of
lands and other natural resources, including their
disposition, except as limited by the Constitution.
Director of Lands vs CA and Valeriano
(GR No. 58867, 6/22/1984)
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of
land (mangrove) which he alleged he acquired by right of
accretion since it adjoins a parcel of land owned by the
Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of Lands,
Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of
the public domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application
holding that said land formed part of the public domain.
Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES
1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in
the present case because it refers to accretion or deposits
on the banks of rivers while this refers to action in the
Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea
2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that
lands added to shores by accretions caused by actions of
the sea form part of the public domain when they are no
longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the
executive and the legislative departments have the
authority and the power to make the declaration that any
said land is no longer necessary for public use. Until such
declaration is made by said departments, the lot in question
forms part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership.
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Menguito vs Republic
(GR No. 134308, 12/14/2000)
FACTS: A petition for review assailing the Court of Appeals
Sept 30, 1997 decision against the Menguito‘s –the
petitioners, with promulgated resolution 10-Mos. later
reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City. The RTC decision confirmed the application for the
titling of the parcel of land with aggregate area of 2112
sqm located at Brgy Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila, in favor
of the Menguito‘s.
The application of TCT was brought by the operation of the
Land Registration of Authority as amended by the Property
Registration Decree No. 1529 proceeding to declare:
1. That its applicants –the Menguito‘s, are owners, in fee
simple, these 11 parcels of land.
2. Listing the applicants lot title numbers, attendant
documents given with their respective Technical
Descriptions.
For the said application, the RTC of Pasig issued a
notice of its initial hearing against the whole world
publishing the same at Abante Tabloid on April 5, 1989.
Seven days earlier, however, March 30, 1989, the
Office of Solicitor General, filed its contention as:
1. Applicants nor its predecessor‘s in interest were neither
in open, continuous, exclusive, adverse and notorious
possession or occupation of the land they applied for since
1945.
2. Applicants don‘t have competent and sufficient evidence
of bonafide acquisition –without open, uninterrupted-
continuous, exclusive, adverse or notorious occupation of
the lot in the concept of the owner and so appearing not
genuine or indicative of pretended possession.
3. Titling from fee simple with Spanish grant title
were not anymore available after Feb 16, 1976 as required
by PD 892.
4. That the said parcel of land applied for is part
of the public domain and belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines –and not subject to private appropriation.
The OSG thus stated its valid opposition on the presented
documents by the applicants leaving its prayers that said
application be denied and land in question be reverted to
the ownership of the Republic of the Philippines.
At the appellate court, the RTC‘s decision favoring the
registrations of the land applied were reversed and thus
this petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA‘s did not err in its decision to reverse
the trial court findings.
HELD: No. The petition is without merit.
The Court cited Sec. 48 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 as amended, provide the registration the
registration of the title of lands in this wise;
Notes of Cesnee Tan
―(b) Who by themselves, or their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
occupation of the land in the concept of the owner.‖
The Court thus observed that the petitioners have
insufficient evidence on this.‖
The Court likewise pointed that;
• Applicants to avail the OCT they must
overcome the presumption that the land they applied for
forms part of the public domain and if so, it has to be
shown as re-classified or alienated to a private person by
the state.
• Otherwise, the land remains inalienable lands
of the public domain.
• To overcome this, an incontrovertible or clear
and convincing evidence must be presented.
• The court observed that applicants possession
were tacked only as far back as 1948 to its predecessors of
interest –the same must have shown that their
predecessors in interest were in possession of the property
by some 30-years back or 1938 before WW-2.
The court find the petitioners failed to show it
even as they claimed that Cirilo Menguito once declared the
land for tax purposes in 1943 –yet failed to show
documentary evidence to support the claim.
The court therefore find no reason to modify the appellate
court‘s decision -thus denied the petition and declared cost
against petitioner.
Note:
Menguito v. Republic:
―Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
A. Homestead Settlement
The law provides that any citizen of the Philippines over the
age of 18 years, or the head of the family, may enter a
homestead of not exceeding 12 hectares of agricultural land
of the public domain. The applicant must have cultivated
and improved at least 1/5 of the land continuously since the
approval of the application and resided for at least one year
in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a
municipality adjacent to the same, and then, upon payment
of the required fee, he shall be entitled to a patent.
Effect of compliance with legal requirements
When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and
conditions which entitle him to a patent for a particular
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tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest therein,
and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof. The
execution and delivery of the patent, after the right to a
particular parcel of land has become complete, are the
mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with that duty.
Even without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property
right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the
paramount title to the land is still in the government. Such
land may be conveyed or inherited. No subsequent law can
deprive him of that vested right.
Transfer of Rights
Section20; CA 141: If at any time after the approval of the
application and before the patent is issued, the applicant
shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands that
he has complied with all the requirements of the law, but
cannot continue with his homestead, through no fault of his
own, and there is a bona fide purchaser for the rights and
improvements of the applicant on the land, and that the
conveyance is not made for purposes of speculation, then
the applicant, with the previous approval of the Director of
Lands may transfer his rights to the land and improvements
to any person legally qualified to apply for a homestead,
and immediately after such transfer, the purchaser shall file
a homestead application for the land so acquired and shall
succeed the original homesteader in his rights and
obligations beginning with the date of the approval of said
application of the purchaser. Any person who has so
transferred his rights may not again apply for a new
homestead. Every transfer made without the previous
approval of the Director of Lands shall be null and void and
shall result in the cancellation of the entry and the refusal
of the patent.
Registration court cannot be divested of jurisdiction by
subsequent issuance of a homestead patent over the same
land subject of registration
Cases:
Mesina vs Sonza
(GR No. L-14722, 5/25/1960)
Plaintiff Mesina claimed to be the owner of a parcel of land
located in San Antonio, Nueva, Ecija. He has been in
possession of the subject land openly, publicly and
peacefully since 1914. The said lot was subject of
registration proceedings. Surprisingly, the defendant Pineda
without knowledge of the Plaintiff was able to procure a
homestead patent in the same court were the registration
of property was pending of the same land by the plaintiff,
despite of the fact that defendant had not complied with
the requirements of CA 141. That the said title was
procured by defendants through frauds, deception and
misrepresentation since they knew that the lot belong to
the plaintiff. Thus, the Plaintiff sought to annull and cancel
the patent issued to defendant and prayed that this
registration case pending in the same court be given due
course.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
ISSUE: WON the homestead patent given to defendant
Pineda be declared null and void
RULING: In view of the fact that plaintiff was able to prove
his open, continuous, exclusive possession of the disputed
land for more than thirty years or since 1914 and that lot is
at present subject of registration proceeding. Plaintiff is
deemed to have acquired the lot by grant of the state, it
follows that the same had ceased to part of the public and
had become private property and therefore beyond the
control of the Director of Land. The homestead patent
issued to defendant therefore is null and void and for
having it issued through fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation. The case was remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Susi vs Razon
(G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925)
FACTS: On September 5, 1899, Valentin Susi bought a
parcel of land from Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza.
Prior to such purchase, the said sellers have been in an
open, continuous, adverse and public possession of the
land for 19 years.
After the purchase, Valentin Susi took possession of the
land in an open, continuous, adverse and public manner
and without interruption. However on September 13, 1913,
the possession was interrupted when Angela Razon filed an
action to recover possession of the land. The Court of First
Instance dismissed Angela Razon‘s complaint.
Despite the dismissal of the case, Angela Razon filed for the
purchase of the disputed land with the Director of Lands.
Valentin Susi filed his opposition and asserted his right over
the land. However, the Director of Land overruled the
opposition and sold the land the Angela Razon on the
ground that the land was still and public land and Valentin
Susi does not have a title over it.
ISSUE:
WON Valentin Susi already acquired title to the land.
HELD:
YES. Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in
question openly, continuously, adversely and publicly
personally and through his predecessors for 45 years. This
being the case, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of United States in Cariño vs Government of the
Philippine Islands is applicable. Here, it held that To acquire
a right to a certificate of title over a land of the public
domain, under the provisions of Chapter VI of Act No. 926,
as amended by Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, an open,
adverse, public and continuous possession from July
26,1894, is sufficient, provided the possessor makes
application therefor under the provisions of section 47 of
Act No. 2874. The possessor under such circumstances
acquires by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but
a grant of the government, and the actual issuance of a
title is not necessary in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts.
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In the present case all the requirements for a grant were
complied with since Valentin Susi has been in possession of
the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and
publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the
year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. By a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a
grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public
domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of
a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and
the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela
Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
B. Sale of Public Agricultural Land
The acquisition of public agricultural lands by purchase is
governed by Chapter V (Sale) of the public land Act. Any
citizen of the Philippines of lawful age or the head of a
family may purchase any tract of public agricultural land not
to exceed 12 hectares which shall be sold through sealed
bidding. The land shall be awarded to the highest bidder,
but the applicant may equal the highest bid. The purchase
price may be paid in full upon the making of the award or
in not more than ten equal annual instalments from the
date of the award. It is required that the purchase shall
have not less than 1/5 of the land cultivated within 5 years
from the date of the award, and before any patent is
issued, he must show actual occupancy, cultivation, and
improvement of at least 1/5 of the land until the date of
final payment.
C. Lease
Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines and any
corporation or association of which at least 60 per centum
of the capital stock of any interest in said capital stock
belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippines, may lease any
tract of agricultural public land available for lease under
Chapter VI (Lease) of the Act. Private corporations or
associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-
five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens
of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof,
by purchase, homestead, or grant.
D. Confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title
(Judicial Legalization or Administrative
Legalization)
The confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles may be
done in 2 ways:
1. Judicial legalization or judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles under Chater VIII of
the Public land Act
2. Administrative legalization or free patents under
Chapter VII of the same act.
Section48. The following-described citizens of the
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act , to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the prior United States have applied for the
purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of
the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in
force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except
when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.
Ownership based on adverse possession
As a rule, no title or right to, or equity in, any lands of the
public domain may be acquired by prescription or by
adverse possession or occupancy except as expressly
provided by law. However, the public land Act recognized
the concept of ownership under the civil law. This
ownership is based on adverse possession and the right of
acquisition is governed by Chapter VIII on judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. The applicant
must prove that:
1. The land is alienable public land
2. His possession and occupation has been exercised
in the manner and for the period prescribed by law,
or since June 12, 1945. Registration under the Act
presumes that the land was originally public
agricultural land but because of adverse possession
since June 12, 1945, the land has become private.
Period of Possession
RA 1942 – possession of at least 30 years immediately
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preceding the filing of the application. Only applications
filed prior to January 25, 1977 may invoke RA 1942.
PD 1073 (repealed ra 1942) – possession since June 12,
1945 or earlier.
a. Also extended the period for the filing of
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect
and incomplete titles to December 31, 1987
b. Limited the area of the land applied to 144 hectares
c. Repealed section 48 (b) on judicial confirmation of
incomplete titles to public land based on
unperfected Spanish grants
d. Amended Sections 48 (b) and (c) in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself
or through his predecessors in interest, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership since
June 12, 1945.
RA 9176 has extended period of filing to December 31,
2020
1. Extended the period to file and application for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles to December 21, 2020
2. Further limiting the area applied for to 12 hectares
3. Providing that all pending applications filed before
the effectivity of the amendatory act shall be
treated as having been filed in accordance with the
provisions thereof.
Requisites for availment of Chapter VIII
1. Must be a Filipino citizen
2. He must have, by himself or through his
predecessors in interest, possessed and occupied
an alienable and disposable agricultural portion of
the public domain
3. The possession is open, continuous, exclusive,
notorious and in the concept of an owner since
June 12, 1945
4. The application must be filed with the proper court
Only when these conditions are met may the possessor of
the land acquire, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The application for confirmation or
imperfect title must be filed in accordance with the
procedural requirements specified in Section 50 of the
Property Registration Decree (PD 1529).
Land must be alienable and disposable at the time the
application for confirmation is filed
Cases:
Alba vs Court of Appeals
(GR No. 120066, 9/9/1999)
Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land
on April 28, 1958 with the claim that the land applied for
Notes of Cesnee Tan
was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from one
Eulalio Raz. The documents attached to the application are:
technical description, surveyor's certificate, certification by
the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of
Psu-161277. The land applied for is residential.
The initial hearing was held on and an order of general
default was issued but those who presented their
opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and
Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco.
Petitioners contended that they were the real owners of the
subject land, which they have been possession
continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of
ownership for not less than 70 years together with their
predecessor-in-interest, and the applicant is only entitled to
have the portion of 620 square meters which is contrary to
his application of 4,845 square meters.
The trial court finds that Dr. Jose Lachica as the absolute
owner in fee simple of the land described in his application
for its original registration in his name.
Issue:
WON the private respondent/applicant is entitled to the
confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for the 4, 845
square meter parcel of land he applied for.
Held: NO
In Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141, (which is the law
enforced during the filing of application) as amended by RA
Nos. 1942 and 6236, which states that:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have
not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claim and issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase,
composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and
have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title
therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have
occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications. 49
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership, for
at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. 50
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
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suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. 51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily
shows that in the affirming the ruling of the trial court, the
Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of
Act 496 52 in relation to the Civil Code's provision's on
prescription on the assumption that the subject land is
private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate court's
postulate. The application for registration of private
respondent is for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title
considering that the land is presumed under the Regalian
Doctrine to be part of the public domain.
The private respondent failed to satisfy the Supreme Court
that he complied the condition set forth for the judicial
confirmation of his title for the following reasons, to wit;
a. as to the (a) of Section 48 of CA 141- respondent did
present any imperfect title with Spanish decree.
b. as to the (b) of Section 48 of CA 141- prescription
cannot be applied as there were no express grant from the
government that the subject land was amongst the
agricultural land certified as alienable and disposable.
Ultimately, No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of
title from the state.
c. nor he is members as specified on the (c) condition of CA
141.
This case discussed that it is important that the land is
declared alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of
application.
Republic vs Court of Appeals and Naguit
(GR No. 1/17/2005)
On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration
of title of a parcel of land. The application sought a judicial
confirmation of imperfect title over the land.
The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and
Angeles opposed the petition. The court issued an order of
general default against the whole world except as to
Angeles and the government.
The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was
originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in
favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced all his
rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made
by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.
Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon
started occupying the same.
Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator. The administrator introduced improvements,
planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which
were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding
taxes due on the subject land.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the
land openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the government
until she filed her application for registration.
The OSG argued that the property which is in open,
continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Since the subject land was declared alienable only on
October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior
to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable.
The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible
to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Issue: Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be
first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant‘s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
could even start.
Held: Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
governing original registration proceedings, provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1) –
that the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain; that the applicants by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation, and; that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
The OSG's interpretation would render paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to
reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would
even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent
state.
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The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the
right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as
it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the
part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over
the property.
In this case, the 3 requisites for the filing of registration of
title under Section 14(1) had been met by Naguit. The
parcel of land had been declared alienable; Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land evidenced by the 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
she purchased the property; as well as the tax declarations
executed by the original owner Urbano in 1954, which
strengthened one's bona fide claim of ownership.
Now we go to the favourite Bar question. This case
discussed the main difference between Section 14(1) and
Section 14(2) of PD 1529. Section 14(1) is very similar to
Section 48(b) of CA 141. However, the subsequent
enactments of the law say the availing of Section 48(b) can
only be availed until December 31, 2013.
What are the requirements of Section 14(1)? There are 3.
1. Possession by themselves or thru their
predecessors in interest under a bone fide
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier;
2. Possession and ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier;
3. Land is declared alienable and disposable at the
time of the filing of the application
Now, if you are not qualified, just look at the period to
determine what to apply; either Section 14(1) or Section
14(2). If the possession is earlier than June 12, 1945, you
apply Section 14 (1). If you are not qualified under that,
look at Section 14 (2).
These are the requirements under Section 14 (2):
1. Land is patrimonial property of the State. Meaning,
no longer intended for public use or public purpose.
2. there must be an express declaration that it is no
longer needed for public use and public purpose
3. Period of possession. 30 years, without good faith
and just title. 10 years, with good faith and just
title. This descriptive period will only begin to run
at the time it was declared no longer needed for
public use and public purpose.
In this case, he did not qualify applying Section 14(1)
because the tax declarations do not cover June 12, 1945
Notes of Cesnee Tan
earlier. He also did not qualify under Section 14(2) because
the prescriptive period only began to run upon the
declaration that the land was no longer needed for public
use and public purpose. So, even if he occupied the land for
a very long time, he is still not qualified because yung
recognized lang ng law, the period of possession na
nacover nya is only 2 years from the date of the
declaration.
Now, Section 14 (1) and Section 14 (2) that is what you call
as Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Title.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic,
G.R. No. 179987, [April 29, 2009], 605 PHIL 244-
326)
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application
for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay,
covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite,
consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed
that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco,
and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful
possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Velazco testified that the property originally belonged to a
twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-
grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto,
Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes‘s
grandfather. Upon Lino‘s death, his four sons inherited the
property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Esteban‘s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator
of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their
father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena,
their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged
to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was
sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial
was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
―verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982.‖ On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved
the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the
Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the
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public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to
the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as
alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in
accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject
land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD:
The Petition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that ―those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945‖ have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length
and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12
June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed
by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a
declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
Notes of Cesnee Tan
must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under
Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith
and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person‘s uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year
1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as
basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code.
The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic,
G.R. No. 179987, [September 3, 2013
This case is a resolution of the Motions for Reconsideration,
filed by the parties who both assail the decision of the
Court promulgated on April 29, 2009. In the decision, the
Court upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals which
denied the application of the petitioners for the registration
of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang,
Cavite, on the ground that they had not established by
sufficient evidence their right to the registration in
accordance with either section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of the
Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529).
On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
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purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an
application for land registration covering the property in the
RTC in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more
than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title. To prove such, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the DENR. The RTC rendered judgment
granting Malabanan‘s application for land registration. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the
judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required
by law for confirmation of imperfect title. The CA
promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing
the application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the
ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), the CA declared
that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification
of the land as alienable and disposable was
inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession. Noting that the
CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazco‘s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could
not be tacked for purposes of computing Malabanan‘s
period of possession.
DISCUSSION:
Classifications of land according to ownership Land may be
classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.
It is of public dominion if it:
(a) is intended for public use; or
(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and
is intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth. Land belonging to the State that is
not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms
part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is
other than part of the patrimonial property of the State,
provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if
it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), all lands
of the public domain belong to the State. All lands not
appearing to be clearly under private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands remain
part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the
State is shown to have reclassified or alienated them to
private persons.
Classifications of public lands according to alienability 1935
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Constitution: lands of the public domain were classified into
- agricultural, timber and mineral.
Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution: lands of
the public domain were classified into - agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that
the law might provide other classifications.
1987 Constitution adopted the classification under the 1935
Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks. Under Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may
not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories:
(a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as
lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code, without limitation; and
(b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that
the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are
not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government
is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing
laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the
courts. If, however, public land will be classified as neither
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or
when public land is no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public
dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made
in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect.
Disposition of alienable public lands Section 11 of the Public
Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, i.e.,
agricultural lands, can be disposed of:
(1) For homestead settlement; (2) By sale; (3) By lease;
and (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or (b) By administrative
legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper
interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession
by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public
Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest, has been in possession and occupation of the
property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
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4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
In sum, these are the rules relative to the disposition of
public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:
(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State and are
inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private
ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and,
therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) Exceptions:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered
alienable and disposable through any of the exclusive
modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural
land subject of the application needs only to be classified
as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant‘s possession and
occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the
applicant has performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete
title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part
of the public domain and has become private property.
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or
declared as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted
into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that
may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or
extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite
acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine qua non in
observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code)
that property of the State not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription.
In the case at bar, the petitioners failed to present sufficient
evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12,
1945.
Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945,
or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure
converted to private property even upon the subsequent
declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription
never began to run against the State, such that the land
has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation
declaring the land as no longer intended for public service
Notes of Cesnee Tan
or for the development of the national wealth.
PETITION DENIED
Rule different where land is not registrable as when it forms
part of the public forest
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that
forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not
registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it to private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
The applicant must secure a certification from the
government that the land applied for by the applicant is
alienable and disposable. This can be established by a
presidential proclamation, or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of lands or
forest investigators or legislative acts or statue.
Palomo vs CA
(GR No. 95608, 1/21/1997)
FACTS: In 1913, some 440,530 square meters of land in
Albay were reserved for provincial park purposes by virtue
of EO No. 40. Of said area, 15 parcels of land were
registered in the name of Diego Palomo by the Court of
First Instance.
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these lands to his heirs
Ignacio and Carmen Palomo. Claiming that the aforesaid
original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on
May 30, 1950. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and
3914 sometime in October 1953.
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 47 converting the area covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi
Hot Spring National Park. The Palomos contended that they
have been in possession of the subject lands and have
introduced improvements thereon.
ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles issued to the
petitioners valid? –NO
HELD
Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the lands, whether
agricultural, mineral, or forest were under the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish crown.Private
ownership of land could only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in various forms, such
as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession Especial
or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase
and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information
title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the
Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
The decision of the CFI relied upon by petitioners were not
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of
notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the
Clerk of Court.
More importantly, the lands in question were not classified
as alienable lands. Since the lands were made part of a
reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of
the forest zone. Thus, they cannot be the valid subject of
alienation.
Republic vs Bracewell
[G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000]
Facts: The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six
hundred fifty-seven (9,657) square meters of land located
in Las Piñas, Metro Manila.
In 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., who
acquired the said parcels of land from the Dalandan and
Jimenez families of Las Piñas; after which corresponding
Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles.
On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of
land to her son, the petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale
which was duly annotated and registered with the Registry
of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter
issued in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax
Declarations issued to Maria Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal an action for
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.
The Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General,
opposed petitioner's application on the grounds that neither
he nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title
to the subject land nor have they been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same for at least thirty (30) years prior to the application,
and that the subject land is part of the public domain.
On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting
the application of petitioner. The Solicitor General promptly
appealed to respondent Court which, on June 29, 1992,
reversed and set aside the lower court's Order. It also
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in its
Resolution of September 30, 1992.
Issues: a) Whether or not the petitioner failed to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time?
b) Whether the tax declarations attached to the complaint
do not constitute acquisition of the lands applied for?
Held: The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner
asserts his right of title to the subject land under Section 48
(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by himself and
through his predecessors-in-interest been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject parcels of land, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other
Notes of Cesnee Tan
hand, it is the respondents' position that since the subject
parcels of land were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972, petitioner did not have any
title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963.
Neither was the requisite thirty years possession met.
A similar situation in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,
where a homestead patent issued to the petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on the ground that at
the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the
public domain.
In the said case, this Court ruled as follows —
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also
states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
219 SCRA 340).
Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption
of State ownership of lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration. The applicant must show
that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. These petitioners failed to do.
The homestead patent was issued to petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the
inalienable and undisposable portion of the public domain.
Thus, any title issued in their name by mistake or oversight
is void ab initio because at the time the homestead patent
was issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the
original patent applicant, the Director of Lands was not
then authorized to dispose of the same because the area
was not yet classified as disposable public land.
Consequently, the title issued to herein petitioners by the
Bureau of Lands is void ab initio.
Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry
Administrative Order recognizes private or vested rights
under which his case may fall. We only find on record the
Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development from
which no indication of such exemption may be gleaned.
Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his
application for confirmation of imperfect title, we see no
need to discuss the other errors raised in this petition.
Republic vs Court of Appeals and Bernabe
(GR No. L-40402, 3/16/1987)
FACTS: Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared
public land in a decision rendered before the last war in
Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On
July 6, 1965 such lot was segregated from the forest zone
and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry (BOF)
as an agricultural Land for disposition under the Public Land
Act. On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed in the CFI of
Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 to
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
perfect their rights and register their titles to said lots. They
alleged that they acquired ownership and possession of
said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners
thereof, whose possession of the same including that of the
herein respondents, has always been continuous, open,
active, exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of
owners for more than 30 years. The Director of Forestry
filed an opposition to the above petition but later withdrew
the same upon verification of findings that this portion of
the timberland had already been released from the mass of
the public forests. Subsequently, the Acting Prov. Fiscal of
Bataan, for and in behalf of the Director of Lands filed his
opposition alleging that the land is still a Public Land and as
such cannot be the subject of a land registration
proceeding under Act 496. The lower court adjudicated in
favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that the latter have
complied with all the terms and conditions entitling them to
a grant. This decision having become final, the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued the
corresponding decrees of registration. On the other hand,
petitioner DL through the Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for
review of the decrees. Afterwards, he filed an Amended
Petition for Review, adding: that respondents executed
simulated deeds of sale conveying portions of the subject
parcels to third parties for fictitious considerations in order
to remove the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act
496, but in truth, buyers are mere dummies of petitioners;
hence, not purchasers for value. The Court of First
Instance denied this petition and on appeal, the CA
affirmed the questioned decision. Petitioner‘s Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit;
hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the lots claimed by respondents could be
legally be the subject of a juridical confirmation of Title
under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act 141 as
amended by Republic Act 1942.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA
141, as amended, applies exclusively to public lands.
Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded.
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long cannot ripen
into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond
the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register
under the Torrens System. Thus, even if the reopening of
the cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private
respondents have not qualified for a grant under Section 48
(b) of CA 141. They can only be credited with 1 year, 9
mos. and 20 days of possession and occupation of the lots
involved, counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots involved
had been segregated from the forest zone and released by
the BOF as an agricultural land for disposition under the
Public Land Act. As such, respondents and their
predecessors in interest could not have possessed the lots
for the required period of 30 years as disposable
agricultural land.
Republic v. Bautista, Jr.,
G.R. No. 166890, [June 28, 2016])
Notes of Cesnee Tan
FACTS: Apolonio Bautista Jr. acquired lot 17078 through
succession, when his father Apolonio Sr. died in 1987. He
applied judicial confirmation of imperfect title before MTC
with testimonial evidence that his father was in possession
of the said lot since 1969 and acquired it from Jardin and
Villanueva, through notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 15, 1971 and May 25, 1973 respectively. The MTC
granted the application and declared him as the owner in
fee simple of the said land.
The Government of the Philippines appealed before CA,
contending that the testimony of Apolonio Jr. is based on
hearsay which should not be given probative value. The
application of judicial confirmation of imperfect title must
comply with Sec. 48(b) of CA 141. The CA affirmed the
ruling of MTC, it pointed out that the Government of the
Phil. did not timely object to the evidence presented.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of judicial confirmation of imperfect
title to Apolonio Jr proper?
RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of MTC
and CA. It held that the requisite period of possession must
conform with Sec 48(b) of Public Land Act as amended by
RA 1942 which provides that any person who applies for
judicial confirmation, he or his predecessor in interest must
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land
of public domain under the bonafide claim of ownership at
least 30 years since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
In the present case, the lower court relied only on the
testimony of Bautista Jr. that his father acquired the land
and in possession since 1969. He failed to prove that the
transferor had in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of said land for at least 30 years since June 12,
1945 or earlier. Bautista Jr. has no personal knowledge of
these facts. Lack of this evidence does not give the court
the right to grant a judicial confirmation of imperfect title in
favor of Bautista Jr.
E. Non-Registrable Properties
The following cannot be the subject of registration:
1. Property of public dominion
2. Forest lands
3. Watersheds
4. Mangrove swamps
5. Mineral Lands
6. National Parks and protected areas
7. Military or naval protection
8. Foreshore lands and reclaimed lands
9. Submerged lands
10. Lakes
11. Navigable rivers
12. Creeks
13. Reservations for public and semi-public purposes
Cases:
MIAA vs Court of Appeals
(GR No. 155650, 7/20/2006)
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
Facts: Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)
operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
Complex in Parañaque City. The Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 which
states that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew
the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA. Thus,
MIAA negotiated with City of Parañaque to pay the real
estate tax imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the
real estate tax already due.
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency
from the City of Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to
2001 amounting to 624M. The City of Parañaque, through
its City Treasurer, also issued notices of levy and warrants
of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of
the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction
the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the
real estate tax delinquency. MIAA thus sought a clarification
of OGCC Opinion No. 061. The OGCC issued Opinion No.
147 clarifying OGCC Opinion No. 061 and pointed out that
Local Government Code requires persons exempt from real
estate tax to show proof of exemption. The OGCC opined
that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter is the proof that MIAA
is exempt from real estate tax. MIAA then filed with the
Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and
injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order to restrain the City of
Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands
and Buildings. However, this was dismissed due to because
MIAA filed it beyond the 60-day reglementary period. The
Court of Appeals also denied MIAA's motion for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Hence, MIAA filed a petition for review
before the SC.
Issue: WON the Land and Buildings of MIAA are part of the
public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and
auction sale.
Held: Yes. The Court held that the land and buildings of
MIAA are part of the public dominion. Since the airport is
devoted for public use, for the domestic and international
travel and transportation. Even if MIAA charge fees, this is
for support of its operation and for regulation and does not
change the character of the land and buildings of MIAA as
part of the public dominion.
As part of the public dominion the land and buildings of
MIAA are outside the commerce of man. To subject them to
levy and public auction is contrary to public policy. Unless
the President issues a proclamation withdrawing the airport
land and buildings from public use, these properties remain
to be of public dominion and are inalienable. As long as the
land and buildings are for public use the ownership is with
the Republic of the Philippines.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo vs Municipality of
Buruanga
(GR No. 149145, 3/31/2006)
FACTS: Petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Kalibo was
allegedly the lawful owner and possessor of a parcel of
residential and commercial land, designated as Lot 138.
The Roman Catholic Church was built in 1984 in the middle
portion of the said lot and has been in existence since then
up to the present. That sometime in 1978, the Municipality
of Buruanga constructed its municipal building on the
northeastern portion of the Lot 138 after it obtained the
permission of the then parish priest of Buruanga on the
condition that the municipality remove all the improvements
it constructed thereon if and when the petitioner needed
the said lot.
When the municipal building was razed by fire in 1989,
petitioner, through its counsel requested the officials of the
municipality to refrain from constructing its new building on
the same site because it is the property of the church and it
needed the lot for its social projects. However, the
construction of the new municipal building on the same site
proceeded. Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint and
prayed that it be declared the lawful owner and possessor
of Lot 138. Petitioner contends that it does not allegedly
lose its possession or ownership over the property if the
possession or use by another of the same is by mere
tolerance.
In its answer, the municipality alleged that said
lot was surveyed as property of the municipality and that
the said municipality alone had possessed the said land
under the claim of title exclusively for over fifty (50) years,
exclusive of all other rights and adverse to all other
claimants.
After due trial, the trial court declared
petitioner as the lawful owner and possessor of Lot 138-B
and the Municipality of Buruanga as the lawful owner and
possessor of Lots 138-A and 138-C, the said lots being
public plaza for public use. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
ownership of petitioner over Lot 138-B but declared Lots
138-A and 138-C as property of public dominion.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner‘s open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of Lot
138 since 1894 and for many decades thereafter vests ipso
jure or by operation of law upon it a government grant, a
vested title, to the subject property.
HELD: No. There was no question that petitioner has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of Lot 138-B since 1894 as evidenced by
the church structure built thereon but there was no
evidence to show that such possession and occupation
extended to Lots 138-A and 138-C beginning the same
period. No single instance of the exercise by the petitioner
of proprietary acts or acts of dominion over these lots was
established. Its unsubstantiated claim that the construction
of the municipal building as well as the subsequent
improvements thereon was by its tolerance does not
constitute proof of possession and occupation on the
petitioner‘s part. Absent the important requisite of open,
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereon since 1894, no government grant or
title to Lots 138-A and 138-C had vested upon the
petitioner ipso jure or by operation of law.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show
exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it
to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood. Use of land is
adverse when it is open and notorious.
Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry
(GR No. L-27873, 11/29/1983)
There were two petitions for review on certiorari
questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals which
declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject
to titling in favor of private persons, Borre and Amunategui.
The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of
Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for
registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove
swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain.
Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition
insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956
square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said
portion be confirmed and registered in his name.
Issue: WON the lot in question can be subject of
registration and confirmation of title in the name of the
private person.
Held: The opposition of the Director of Forestry was
strengthened by the appellate court's finding that timber
licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose
Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to
cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950
that the property was converted into fishpond but only
after a previous warning from the District Forester that the
same could not be done because it was classified as "public
forest‖.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees,
nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The possession
of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question never
ceased to be classified as forest land of public domain.
Ankron vs Government of the Philippines
(GR No. 14213, 8/23/1919)
This case involves an application for registration under the
Torrens system of a certain parcel of land. The only
opposition of the said application which was presented by
the Director of Lands was that the land in question was the
property of the Government of the United States under the
control and administration of the Government of the
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Philippine Islands. The lower court ordered and decreed
that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the
said applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right
of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road
thereon in the manner and conditions mentioned in said
decision. On appeal, appellant, contented, among others
that, that portions of said land cannot be registered in
accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the
reason that they are manglares.
Issue: WON the land in question cannot registered?
Ruling: The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it
or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare
that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There
must be some proof of the extent and present or future
value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have
just said, many definitions have been given for
"agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in
each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say
that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must
show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral
which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7,
Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists
some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral.
Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by
reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by
reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of
valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may
be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be
decided upon the proof in that particular case, having
regard for its present or future value for one or the other
purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it
is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands
in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the
courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land
involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or
mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its
superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of
fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The
fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not
sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural,
forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or
the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the
first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may,
by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land
shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests
have intervened before such reservation is made. In the
latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or
mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the
"public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry
or mineral land
Sta. Rosa Development Corporation vs CA
(GR No. 112526, 10/12/2001)
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
FACTS: The case is a petition regarding Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board‘s (DARAB) order of
compulsory acquisition of petitioner‘s property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Petitioner Sta. Rosa Development Corporation (SRRDC),
was the registered owner of two parcel of land situated at
Brgy. Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna. According to them, these
lands are watersheds which provide clean and potable
(drinkable) water to the Canlubang community and that 90
light industries are located in that area.
They were alleging respondents usurped its rights over
their property thereby destroying the ecosystem. Since the
said land provides water to the residents, respondents
sought an easement of a right of a way to and from
Barangay Castile, to which, by counterclaim, Sta. Rosa
sought ejectment against respondents.
Respondents went to the DAR and filed a case for
compulsory acquisition of the Sta. Rosa Property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Compulsory acquisition is the power of the government to
acquire private rights in land without the willing consent of
its owner or occupant in order to benefit the society.
The said land was inspected by the Municipal and Agrarian
Reform Officer, and upon consensus of the authorities
concerned, they decided that the said land must be placed
under compulsory acquisition.
Petitioners filed an objection on the ground that:
· The area is not appropriate for agricultural purposes.
· The area was rugged in terrain with slopes 18% and
above. (which falls under the exception in compulsory
acquisition of CARP)
· The occupants of the land were illegal settlers or
(squatters) who by no means are entitled to the land as
beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property in question is covered
by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed
part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R.A No.
6657
· Whether the petition of land conversion of the parcels
of land may be granted?
HELD: Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to
be exempt from its coverage.
· Art. 67 of PD 1067 provides that Any watershed or
any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying
any ground water may be declared by the Department of
Natural resources as a protected area.
· Watersheds may be defined as an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a
boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent
watersheds.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land
form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for
watershed purposes. The protection of watersheds ensures
an adequate supply of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only damage property but
cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
intergenerational responsibility that needs to be answered
now.
Although evidence of petitioners is strong, the Supreme
Court opines that the area must be maintained for
watershed purposes for ecological and environmental
considerations despite the 88 families who are beneficiaries
of the CARP. It is important that a larger view of the
situation be taken because of the thousands of residents
downstream if the watershed will not be protected and
maintained for its natural purpose.
Despite Supreme Court‘s strong opinion of protection of
watersheds as an intergenerational responsibility, they,
however ordered to DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of
the case since the said land falls under exception.
Collado vs Court of Appeals
(GR No. 107764, 10/4/2002)
FACTS: Petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land
registration court an application for registration of a parcel
of land (―Lot‖), situated in Antipolo Rizal. Attached to the
application was a technical description, stating ―this survey
is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.‖ The Solicitor General
filed oppositions to the application. Petitioners (Edna
Collado and her co-applicants) allege that they have
occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession
has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of
owners. They paid all real estate taxes and submitted
evidence to prove that there have been 9 transfers of rights
among them and their predecessors-in-interest. RTC ruled
in favor of the petitioners for having presented sufficient
evidence to establish registrable title over the property.
ISSUE: (1) WON petitioners have registrable title over the
Lot. NO.
(2) Did petitioners acquire private rights over the parcel of
land prior to the issuance of EO 33? NO.
HELD: 1) Petitioners concede that the Lot is inside the
literal description of Marikina Watershed Reservation
(MWR). Their main claim over the Lot is that ―all
Presidential proclamations like the proclamation setting
aside the MWR are subject to private rights.‖ EO 33 (which
established the MWR) has a saving clause that the
reservations are ―subject to existing private rights, if any
there be.‖
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. The Spaniards first
introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws
of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14,
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de
las Indias which laid the foundation that "all lands that
were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." Upon
the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all
"lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley
Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of
titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal
Decree of 1894 or the "Maura Law" partly amended the
Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura
Law was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the
Philippines. It required the "adjustment" or registration of
all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to
the state.
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the
United States all rights, interests and claims over the
national territory of the Philippine Islands through the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United
States colonial government, through the Philippine
Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act,
which was described as follows:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public
lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and
grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Name: I. Concept of Jura Regalia Natural Resources First
Set_ Philippine Islands remained in the government; and
that the government‘s title to public land sprung from the
Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between
Spain and the United States. The term "public land"
referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to
private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar
lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the
alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands
of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this
Notes of Cesnee Tan
policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all
natural resources enumerated in the Philippine Constitution
belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource: The term
"natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal,
minerals, lakes, and submerged lands, but also, features
which supply a human need and contribute to the health,
welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to
the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property
devoted to park and recreational purposes."
(2) An applicant must overcome the presumption that the
land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that
he has an interest to warrant registration in his name
arising from an imperfect title (may have been derived from
old Spanish grants or titles). In the case at bar, petitioners
were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title
because of the failure to complete the required period of
possession (at least 30 years).
Assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land
prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the
Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-
disposable and inalienable public land. At the time
petitioners filed their application on April 25, 1985, the Lot
has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years
prior to the filing of petitioners‘ application.
Director of Forestry vs. Villareal
(GR No. L-32266, 2/27/1989)
FACTS: The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian,
Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on
January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land for more than
forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including
the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to this
Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the
land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to
private appropriation. He asks that the registration be
reversed. It is undisputed by the parties that the land in
dispute is a mangrove land HOWEVER the legal nature of
mangrove swamps or manglares are still in contention.
Director of Forestry claims that it is forestall and is not
disposable. On the other hand, Private respondents insists
that it is alienable as agricultural land.
ISSUES: Are mangrove swamps classified as public forest
lands?
RULING: YES. Part of our public forest lands, they are not
alienable under the Constitution or are they considered
public agricultural lands; they may be acquired under
private ownership.
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as
defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative
Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we
have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in
effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The
statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less
noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive
department. More importantly, the said provision has not
been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or
unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify
our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus
presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our
statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of
what the land actually looks like. That determination having
been made and no cogent argument having been raised to
annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being
admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and
for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by
the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be
considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject
of the adverse possession and consequent ownership
claimed by the private respondent in support of his
application for registration. To be so, it had first to be
released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land
pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may
issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
The Respondent even showed, a survey of the land and its
tax declaration to support its claim, however the court held
that the same is insufficient especially now that the land is
a forest land.
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Corporation vs Court of
Appeals,
GR No. 88883, 1/18/1991)
FACTS: Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares
situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located sometime
between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a
period of six (6) days, by A.I. Reynolds in accordance with
the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better
known as the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called
Declaration of Location.
The said Declaration of Location of mineral claim was duly
recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on
January 2, 1931. Fredia mineral claim, together with other
mineral claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge
Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big
Wedge Mining Company, Inc. (Atok for short; herein
petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on November 2,
1931. Since then petitioner Atok has been in continuous
and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to
the present.
Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral claim together
with other mineral claims owned by Atok has been declared
under Tax Declaration No. 9535 and that in view of
Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was
filed by Atok covering the Fredia mineral claim.
On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a
lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at Tuding Slide,
Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime
in 1964. The lot is covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462.
When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr.
Acay he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain
a building permit as it was only a nipa hut. And no one
prohibited him from entering the land so he was
constructing a house thereon. It was only in January 1984
when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that
people came to take pictures and told him that the lot
belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has been paying
taxes on said land which his father before him had occupied
On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed
Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok, that a construction
was being undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral
claim by private respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes
instructed the cashier to go and take pictures of the
construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and other security
guards went to the place of the construction to verify and
then to the police to report the matter.
On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry
and detainer against Liwan Consi, which was dismissed
after due hearing by the MTC of Itogon in favor of Liwan
Consi. Petitioner ATOK appealed to the RTC of Baguio,
which reversed the decision of the MTC, ordering
defendant Liwan Consi to vacate the premises of the Fredia
Mineral claim, restoring possession thereof to the plaintiff
Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. Defendant Liwan Cosi
was further ordered to remove and demolish the house he
constructed in the premises of the land of Fredia Mineral
claim.
In a petition for review filed by Liwan Consi with the CA,
the CA rendered its decision dismissing the subject forcible
entry action, and further rule in part that: Liwan Consi had
a possessory right over the property which may mature into
ownership on the basis of long-term possession under the
Public Land Law. Thus, it held that both Consi and ATOK
are of equal footing with regards to the subject lot, holding
possessory titles to the land. The petitioner through its long
term occupancy while respondent mining firm being the
claim locator and applicant for lease on the mineral claim.
ATOK filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not an individual's long term occupation
of land of the public domain vests him with such rights over
the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that claim.
HELD: It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok
had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership,
the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is
as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).
In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the
petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with all the
requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the
said Fredia Mineral Claim.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property
to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed it
from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the
government, without need of any further act such as the
purchase of the land or obtaining of a patent over it. As the
land had become the private property of the locators, they
had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet
and Atok.
As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in
question was acquired through a Deed of Sale executed
between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.
It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have
exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before
the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all
lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject
to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The
land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the
mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes
(Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends
that his predecessor-in-interest has been in possession of
said lot even before the war and has in fact cultivated the
same. Since the subject lot is mineral land, private
respondent's possession of the subject lot no matter how
long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the
same.
Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding
the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be
preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the
one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are
equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through
proper proceedings.
Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in
continuous and exclusive possession of the Fredia mineral
claim while private respondent's possession started only
Notes of Cesnee Tan
sometime in 1964 when he constructed a house thereon.
Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private
respondent, Liwan Consi, the former being "the one longer
in possession."
It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was
really petitioner who was in actual physical possession of
the property. Having been deprived of this possession by
the private respondent, petitioner has every right to sue for
ejectment.
With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be
declared and held that petitioner Atok has the exclusive
right to the property in question.
Palomo vs Court of Appeals
[G.R. No. 95608. January 21, 1997]
FACTS: In 1913, some 440,530 square meters of land in
Albay were reserved for provincial park purposes by virtue
of EO No. 40. Of said area, 15 parcels of land were
registered in the name of Diego Palomo by the Court of
First Instance.
In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these lands to his heirs
Ignacio and Carmen Palomo. Claiming that the aforesaid
original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for
reconstitution with the Court of First Instance of Albay on
May 30, 1950. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912, 3913 and
3914 sometime in October 1953.
On July 10, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 47 converting the area covered by EO 40 into the Tiwi
Hot Spring National Park. The Palomos contended that they
have been in possession of the subject lands and have
introduced improvements thereon.
ISSUE: Were the Original Certificate of Titles issued to the
petitioners valid? –NO
HELD: Before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, the lands,
whether agricultural, mineral, or forest were under the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish crown.
Private ownership of land could only be acquired through
royal concessions which were documented in various forms,
such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant," (2) Concession
Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by
Purchase and (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory
Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law
or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
The decision of the CFI relied upon by petitioners were not
signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of
notification to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the
Clerk of Court.
More importantly, the lands in question were not classified
as alienable lands. Since the lands were made part of a
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reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of
the forest zone. Thus, they cannot be the valid subject of
alienation.
Republic vs Southside Homeowners
(GR No. 156951, 9/22/2006)
FACTS: The subject matter of these proceedings for
declaration of nullity of title are parcels of land with a total
area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as the JUSMAG
housing area in Fort Bonifacio where, military officers, both
in the active and retired services, and their respective
families, have been occupying housing units and facilities
originally constructed by the AFP.
Private respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation
organized mostly by wives of AFP military officers. Records
show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title – Transfer Certificate
of Title in its name to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG
area.
The Rizal Registry issued TCT No. 15084 on October 30,
1991on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale purportedly
executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G.
Palad, Jr. of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor
of SHAI.The total purchase price as written in the
conveying deed was P11,997,660.00 or P30.00 per square
meter
It appears that in the process of the investigation
conducted by the Department of Justice on reported land
scams at the FBMR, a copy of the aforesaid October 30,
1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The
results of the examination undertaken by NBI Document
Examiner Eliodoro Constantino reveals that the puported
signatures in the document are forgeries.
On October 16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued
Memorandum Order No. 173 directing the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards the
cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the
Navy Officer‘s Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger
parcel within the reservation. A month later, the OSG, in
behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig
City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of title
suit against the private respondent SHAI, purported
signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b) there are no
records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and
(ii) the alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the
property in question is inalienable, being part of a military
reservation established under Proclamation No. 423.
On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and
later offered in evidence)the Deed of Sale dated October
30, 1991 as its Exhibit "A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit
"B."Respondent, then defendant SHAI adopted Exhibits "A"
and ―B‖ as its Exhibits "1" and ―2,‖ respectively.
During the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness
NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino who testified
on NBI QDR No. 815-1093 and asserted that the signature
of Palad in Exhibit ―A‖ is a forgery. For his part, Palad
Notes of Cesnee Tan
dismissed as forged his signature appearing in the same
document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in
front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB
premises. Pressing the point, Palad stated that he could not
have had signed the conveying deed involving as it did a
reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the
LMB‘s jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place.
For its part, then defendant SHAI presented an opposing
expert witness in the person of Police Inspector Redencion
Caimbon who testified that Palad‘s signature in Exhibit ―A‖
is genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president,
likewise testified, saying that applications to purchase were
signed and then filed with the LMB by one Engr. Eugenia
Balis, followed by the payment in full of the contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial
court rendered judgment dismissing the Republic‘s
complaint as it considered the parcels covered by the deed
in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the
Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto
that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.
ISSUE: Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material,
alienable or inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore,
can or cannot be subject of a lawful private conveyance?
RULING: Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the
inalienable character of the JUSMAG area, the same having
not effectively been separated from the military reservation
and declared as alienable and disposable.
The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary
of Environment and Natural Resources, may designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public
domain as reservations for the use of the Republic or any of
its branches, or for quasi-public uses or purposes. Such
tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be non-alienable
and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until
again declared alienable. Consistent with the foregoing
postulates, jurisprudence teaches that a military
reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to
private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not
registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and
declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until
a given parcel of land is released from its classification as
part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law
or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable,
its status as part of a military reservation remains,even if
incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as a
military camp or for defense. The same is true in this case.
There is no doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the
questioned October 30, 1991sale formed part of the FBMR
as originally established under Proclamation No. 423. And
while private respondent SHAI would categorically say that
the petitioner Republic had not presented evidence that
―subject land is within military reservation,‖and even dared
to state that the JUSMAG area is the private property of the
government and therefore removed from the concept of
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public domain per se its own evidence themselves belie its
posture as their evidence both the TCT and the Deed of
Sale technically described the property as situated in
Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio which is now
renamed Fort Mckinley a declared a military reservation.
The Republic has, since the filing of its underlying
complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it
has invariably invited attention to the proclamation‘s
specific area coverage to prove the nullity of TCT No.
15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area
considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce
of man.
The October 30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed
by Palad, assuming its authenticity, could not plausibly be
the requisite classifying medium converting the JUSMAG
area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent
SHAI‘s unyielding stance that would have the Republic in
estoppel to question the transfer to it by the LMB Director
of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should have realized
that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or
error on the part of its officials or agents.
Since the parcels of land in question allegedly sold to the
private respondent are, or at least at the time of the
supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the
purported sale is necessarily void ab initio.
Moreover, Article XII, Section 3[of the 1987 Constitution
forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain, except through lease
for a limited period.
The interplay of compelling circumstances and inferences
deducible from the case, also cast doubt on the authenticity
of such deed, if not support a conclusion that the deed is
spurious.
1. Palad categorically declared that his said signature on
the deed is a forgery. The NBI signature expert
corroborated Palad‘s allegation on forgery.Respondent
SHAI‘s expert witness from the PNP, however, disputes the
NBI‘s findings. In net effect, both experts from the NBI and
the PNP cancel each other out.
2.Palad signed the supposed deed of sale in Manila,
possibly at the LMB office at Plaza Cervantes, Binondo.
Even if he acted in an official capacity, Palad nonetheless
proceeded on the same day to Pasig City to appear before
the notarizing officer. The deed was then brought to the
Rizal Registry and there stamped ―Received‖ by the entry
clerk. That same afternoon, or at 3:14 p.m. of October 30,
1991to be precise, TCT No. 15084 was issued. In other
words, the whole conveyance and registration process was
done in less than a day. The very unusual dispatch is quite
surprising. Stranger still is why a bureau head, while in the
exercise of his functions as the bureau‘s authorized
contracting officer, has to repair to another city just to have
a deed notarized.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
3. There is absolutely no record of the requisite public land
application to purchase required under Section 89 of the
Public Land Act. There is also no record of the deed of sale
and of documents usually accompanying an application to
purchase, inclusive of the investigation report and the
property valuation. The Certification under the seal of the
LMB bearing date November 24, 1994 and issued/signed by
Alberto Recalde, OIC, Records Management Division of the
LMB pursuant to a subpoena issued by the trial court attest
to this fact of absence of records. Atty. Alice B. Dayrit, then
Chief, Land Utilization and Disposition Division, LMB,
testified having personally looked at the bureau record
book, but found no entry pertaining to SHAI.
4. In its Answer as defendant a quo, respondent SHAI
states that the ―deed of sale specifically meritorious Official
Receipt No. 6030203 as evidence of full payment of the
agreed purchase price‖ An official receipt (O.R.) is
doubtless the best evidence to prove payment. While it kept
referring to O.R. No. 6030203 as its evidence of the
required payment, it failed to present and offer the receipt
in evidence. We can thus validly presume that no such OR
exists or, if it does, that its presentation would be adverse
to SHAI.
A contract of sale is void where the price, which appears in
the document as paid has, in fact, never been paid.
5. The purchase price was, according to the witnesses for
SHAI, paid in full in cash to the cashier of the LMB the
corresponding amount apparently coming in a mix of P500
and P100 denominations. Albeit plausible, SHAI‘s witnesses‘
account taxes credulity to the limit.
TCT No. 15084 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal issued on
the basis of such Deed are declared void and cancelled
Republic vs Alagad
(G.R. No. L-66807 January 26, 1989)
Facts: On 11 October 1951, Melitona, Carmen (with spouse
Espiridion Kolimlim), Justo, Carlos, Librada (with spouse
Emerson Abano), Demetrio, and Antonio Alagad filed an
application for registration of their title over a parcel of land
situated at Linga, Pila, Laguna, with an area of 8.1263
hectares (survey plan Psu116971), which was amended
after the land was divided into two parcels, namely, Lot 1
with an area of 5.2476 hectares and Lot 2 with an area of
2.8421 hectares (survey plan Psu-226971, amendment 2).
The Republic opposed the application on the stereo-typed
ground that applicants and their predecessors have not
been in possession of the land openly, continuously, publicly
and adversely under a bona fide claim of ownership since
26 July 1894 and the land has not ceased to be a part of
the public domain. It appears that barrio folk also opposed
the application. On 16 January 1956, by virtue of a final
judgment in said case, supplemented by orders issued on
21 March 1956 and 13 August 1956, the Alagads were
declared owners of Lot 1 and the remaining portion, or Lot
2, was declared public land. Decree N-51479 was entered
and OCT 0- 401, dated 18 October 1956, was issued in the
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names of the Alagads. In August 1966, the Alagads filed
before the Municipal Court of Pila, Laguna (Civil Case 52)
an action to evict the barrio folk occupying portions of Lot
1. On 8 August 1968, judgment was rendered in the
eviction case ordering the barrio folk therein to return
possession of the premises to the Alagads. The barrio folk
did not appeal.
The Republic filed a petition for ―annulment of title and
reversion, insofar as the 1.42 hectare northwestern portion
on end of Lot 1 is concerned, contending that such is
foreshore land, and that the Alagads could not have had an
imperfect title to it as it was the barrio folk who filled up
the land to elevate the land to its present condition. The
Court, on 6 October 1970, issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the Provincial Sheriff of Laguna or his
deputies from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Civil
Case 52, and the Alagads from selling, mortgaging,
disposing or otherwise entering into any transaction
affecting the area. The case was set for pre-trial on 6 July
1971, to which the attorney representing the Republic did
not appear. On 16 July 1971, the court dismissed the
complaint. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration,
was set for hearing, and finally denied by the court. Appeal
was made to the Court of Appeals, which sustained the trial
court for failure to show in the record on appeal that the
appeal was perfected on time. Hence, the appeal.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower
courts, and reinstated the Republic‘s complaint and
thus remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
1. State cannot be bound by or estopped from the mistakes
or negligent acts of its officials or agents
The State cannot be bound by, or estopped from, the
mistakes or negligent acts of its official or agents, much
more, non-suited as a result thereof. This is so because the
state as a persona in law is the judicial entity, which is the
source of any asserted right to ownership in land under the
basic doctrine embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as
the present charter. It is charged moreover with the
conservation of such patrimony. There is need therefore of
the most rigorous scrutiny before private claims to portions
thereof are judicially accorded recognition. Such primordial
consideration, not the apparent carelessness, much less the
acquiescence of public officials, is the controlling norm.
2. Ramos v. Central Bank, and Nilo v. Romero not applicable
to the present case
The cases of Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines and
Nilo v. Romero, are not applicable. In Ramos, the Court
applied estoppel upon finding of bad faith on the part of
the State (the Central Bank) in deliberately reneging on its
promises. In Nilo, the Court denied efforts to impugn the
jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the defendant
had been ―erroneously‖ represented in the complaint by the
City Attorney when it should have been the City Mayor, on a
holding that the City Attorney, in any event, could have ably
defended the City (Davao City). In both cases, it is seen
that the acts that gave rise to estoppel were voluntary and
intentional in character, in which cases, it could not be said
that the Government had been prejudiced by some
Notes of Cesnee Tan
negligent act or omission.
3. Res judicata is not an impediment to reversion of
property; Republic v. CA, requisites for a prior judgment to
become a bar Res judicata is not an impediment to
reversion of property. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the
Court stated that a certificate of title may be ordered
cancelled (Republic v. Animus, et al.), and the cancellation
may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor. This
action cannot be barred by the prior judgment of the land
registration court, since the said court had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter. And if there was no such
jurisdiction, then the principle of res judicata does not
apply. For it is a well-settled rule that for a prior judgment
to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following
requisites must concur; (1) it must be a final judgment; (2)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of
subject matter and identity of cause of action (Municipality
of Daet vs. C4 93 SCRA 503; Mendoza vs. Arrieta, et al., 91
SCRA 113)
4. Property of public dominion: Property for public use or
public service ―Property‖, according to the Civil Code, ―is
either of public dominion or of private ownership.‖ Property
is of public dominion if it is (1) intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and
others of similar character;or if it (2) belongs to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
5. Patrimonial property and property of public dominion
―All other property of the State which is not of the character
mentioned in article [420], is patrimonial property,‖
meaning to say, property ―open to disposition‖ by the
Government, or otherwise, property pertaining to the
national domain, or public lands. Property of the public
dominion, on the other hand, refers to things held by the
State by regalian right. They are things res publicae in
nature and hence, incapable of private appropriation. Thus,
under the present Constitution, ―[w]ith the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated.‖
6. Public Dominion, as to waters Article 502 provides that
―(1) Rivers and their natural beds; (2) Continuous or
intermittent waters of springs and brooks running in their
natural beds and the beds themselves; (3) Waters rising
continuously or intermittently on lands of public dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on public lands,
and their beds; (5) Rain waters running through ravines or
sand beds, which are also of public dominion; (6)
Subterranean waters on public lands; (7) Waters found
within the zone of operation of public works, even if
constructed by a contractor; (8) Waters rising continuously
or intermittently on lands belonging to private persons, to
the State, to a province, or to a city or municipality from
the moment they leave such lands; and (9) The waste
waters of fountains, sewers and public establishments‖ are
of public dominion. It is also ordained in Article 44 of the
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Spanish Law of Waters of 3 August 1866 that ―natural
ponds and lakes existing upon public lands and fed by
public waters, belong to the public domain. Lakes, ponds,
and pools existing upon the lands of private individuals, or
the State or provinces, belong to the respective owners of
such lands, and those situated upon lands of communal use
belong to their respective ‗pueblos.‘‖
7. Laguna de Bay is a lake (Colegio de San Jose case);
Highest Ordinary Depth Laguna de Bay has long been
recognized as a lake. Laguna de Bay is a body of water
formed in depressions of the earth; it contains fresh water
coming from rivers and brooks or springs, and is connected
with Manila Bay by the Pasig River. Inasmuch as Laguna de
Bay is a lake, the Court must resort to the legal provisions
governing the ownership and use of lakes and their beds
and shores, in order to determine the character and
ownership of the parcels of land in question. The recourse
to legal provisions is necessary, for under Article 74 of the
Law of Waters, ―the natural bed or basin of lakes is the
ground covered by their waters when at their highest
ordinary depth‖ and in which case, it forms part of the
national dominion. When Laguna de Bay‘s waters are at
their highest ordinary depth has been defined as the
highest depth of the waters of Laguna de Bay during the
dry season, such depth being the ―regular, common,
natural, which occurs always or most of the time during the
year. Otherwise, where the rise in water level is due to the
―extraordinary‖ action of nature, rainfall for instance, the
portions inundated thereby are not considered part of the
bed or basin of the body of water in question. It cannot
therefore be said to be foreshore land but land outside of
the public dominion, and land capable of registration as
private property.
8. Foreshore land
A foreshore land has been defined as ―that part of (the
land) which is between high and low water and left dry by
the flux and reflux of the tides,‖ or ―The strip of land that
lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.‖
If the submergence, however, of the land is due to
precipitation, it does not become foreshore, despite its
proximity to the waters.
9. Court not a trier of facts; not enough evidence to arrive
a conclusive disposition; Remand
The case has to be decided alongside the above principles
and regretfully, the Court cannot make a ruling because it is
not a trier of facts, and it is in possession of no evidence to
assist it in arriving at a conclusive disposition. The Court
thus remanded the case to the court a quo to determine
whether or not the property subject of controversy is
foreshore.
SIAN Enterprise vs. FF Cruz
(GR no. 146616, 8/31/2006)
That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does not
remove it from its classification of foreshore area subject to
the preferential right to lease of the littoral owner.
Western Visayas Industrial Corporation (WESVICO) filed a
foreshore lease application over the foreshore land adjacent
Notes of Cesnee Tan
to certain lots registered in its name. It eventually withdrew
the application and filed a petition for registration over the
same foreshore land with the then Court of First Instance of
Iloilo. The case was, however, archived as WESVICO‗s
representative could no longer be contacted, and later on,
WESVICO has ceased operations.
F.F. Cruz & Co. (F.F. Cruz) filed with the Bureau of Lands,
Iloilo City a foreshore lease application over a foreshore
land, a portion of which is adjacent to the lot previously
occupied by WESVICO. Sian Enterprises Inc. (SIAIN)
purchased the properties previously owned by WESVICO
from the Development Bank of the Philippines. It
subsequently filed a foreshore lease application over the
foreshore land adjacent to the properties it bought from
DBP.
Upon learning that 130 linear meters of the foreshore land
subject of F.F. Cruz‘s foreshore lease application overlapped
that covered by its foreshore lease application, SIAIN filed a
protest 8 alleging that it being the owner of the property
adjoining the overlapping area, it should be given
preference in its lease.
F.F. Cruz, argued that SIAIN must not be given preferential
right since the area in dispute is classified as ―reclaimed‖
and that the ownership was not by means of accretion. This
argument has been sustained by the Land Management
Bureau.
Upon appeal to the DENR Secretary, SIAIN was upheld,
declaring that there was no basis to declare the area as
―reclaimed‖. F.F. Cruz however appealed to the Office of
the President which overturned the decision of the DENR
Secretary and found that the area is reclaimed. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence, the
present petition. SIAIN contends that the evidence
overwhelmingly proves that the disputed area is foreshore
land and not reclaimed land which thus entitles it
preferential rights over the
ISSUES: Whether the disputed land is a ―foreshore‖ or
―reclaimed‖ area
HELD: That the foreshore area had been reclaimed does
not remove it from its classification of foreshore area
subject to the preferential right to lease of the littoral
owner.
It bears noting that it was not the reclamation that brought
the disputed foreshore area into existence. Such foreshore
area existed even before F.F. Cruz undertook its
reclamation. It was ―formed by accretions or alluvial
deposits due to the action of the sea.‖ Following Santulan,
the littoral owner has preferential right to lease the same.
Contrary to the ruling of the Office of the President, as
affirmed by the appellate court, littoral owner WESVICO
cannot be considered to have waived or abandoned its
preferential right to lease the disputed area when it
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
subsequently filed an application for registration thereover.
For being a part of the public domain, ownership of the
area could not be acquired by WESVICO. Its preferential
right remained, however. Its move to have the contested
land titled in its name, albeit a faux pas, in fact more than
proves its interest to utilize it.
As correctly argued by SIAIN, were WESVICO‗s petition for
registration which, as stated earlier, was archived by the
trial court, pursued but eventually denied, WESVICO would
not have been barred from filing anew a foreshore lease
application. Parenthetically, the petition for registration of
WESVICO was archived not on account of lack of interest
but because it ceased operations due to financial reasons.
F. Administrative Legalization (Free Patent)
Now, we go to the Administrative. You file it with the DENR.
A new law on this matter is the Residential Free Patent Act
issued on lands that are zoned as residential. If you
remember, you can register it (residential/commercial and
residential/industrial). So file it in the CENRO of the place
where the property is located. So if you remember the
qualifications are the following:
1. Any Filipino citizen who is an actual occupant of a
residential land (natural born, naturalized and dual
citizens)
2. Of legal age (minors can file a case if they are
represented by their legal guardian);
3. That in highly urbanized cities, the land should not
exceed two hundred (200) square meters; in other
cities, it should not exceed five hundred (500)
square meters; in first class and second class
municipalities, it should not exceed seven hundred
fifty (750) square meters; and in all other
municipalities, it should not exceed one thousand
(1,000) square meters;
4. Under a bona fide claim of ownership
5. Land must be used exclusively for residential
purposes
6. Provided, further, That the land applied for is not
needed for public service and/or public use.
a. New RA 10023
Section 1. Qualifications. - Any Filipino citizen who is an
actual occupant of a residential land may apply for a Free
Patent Title under this Act: Provided; That in highly
urbanized cities, the land should not exceed two hundred
(200) square meters; in other cities, it should not exceed
five hundred (500) square meters; in first class and second
class municipalities, it should not exceed seven hundred
fifty (750) square meters; and in all other municipalities, it
should not exceed one thousand (1,000) square meters;
Provided, further, That the land applied for is not needed
for public service and/or public use.
F. Special Patents
Notes of Cesnee Tan
This is by way of Presidential Proclamation or a Legislative
Act.
As a matter of ordinary land registration practice, a special
patent is a patent to grant, cede and convey full ownership
of alienable and disposable lands formerly covered by a
reservation or lands of the public domain and is issued
upon the promulgation of a special law or act of Congress
or b the Secretary of Environment and Natural resources as
authorized by an Executive order of the president.
Cadastral Registration Proceedings
This is a way of bringing public lands under the Torrens
system. Usually, this is initiated by the government to
facilitate the registration of the properties. Individual
registrations initiated by an individual usually take a long
time.
This is initiated by the Solicitor General. It is an in rem
proceeding because of the publication. The publication is a
notice to the whole world, and if you fail to put your answer
in a given period, you are barred from filing the same.
A. Section 53 of CA 141
Section53. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands,
whenever in the opinion of the President the public
interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the proper
Court of First Instance, through the Solicitor-General or the
officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder,
claimant, possessor, or occupant of any land who shall not
have voluntarily come in under the provisions of this
chapter or of the Land Registration Act, stating in
substance that the title of such holder, claimant, possessor,
or occupant is open to discussion; or that the boundaries of
any such land which has not been brought into court as
aforesaid are open to question; or that it is advisable that
the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated, and
praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries
thereof or the right to occupancy thereof be settled and
adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section
shall be in accordance with the laws on adjudication of title
in cadastral proceedings.
B. Section 35-38 of PD 1529
Section 35. Cadastral Survey preparatory to filing of
petition.
(a) When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines
public interest so requires that title to any unregistered
lands be settled and adjudicated, he may to this end direct
and order the Director of Lands to cause to be made a
cadastral survey of the lands involved and the plans and
technical description thereof prepared in due form.
(b) Thereupon, the Director of Lands shall give notice to
persons claiming any interest in the lands as well as to the
general public, of the day on which such survey will begin,
giving as fully and accurately as possible the description of
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the lands to be surveyed. Such notice shall be punished
once in the Official Gazette, and a copy of the notice in
English or the national language shall be posted in a
conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the municipal
building of the municipality in which the lands or any
portion thereof is situated. A copy of the notice shall also
be sent to the mayor of such municipality as well as to the
barangay captain and likewise to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Sangguniang Bayan concerned.
(c) The Geodetic Engineers or other employees of the
Bureau of Lands in charge of the survey shall give notice
reasonably in advance of the date on which the survey of
any portion of such lands is to begin, which notice shall be
posted in the bulletin board of the municipal building of the
municipality or barrio in which the lands are situated, and
shall mark the boundaries of the lands by monuments set
up in proper places thereon. It shall be lawful for such
Geodetic Engineers and other employees to enter upon the
lands whenever necessary for the purposes of such survey
or the placing of monuments.
(d) It shall be the duty of every person claiming an interest
in the lands to be surveyed, or in any parcel thereof, to
communicate with the Geodetic Engineer upon his request
therefor all information possessed by such person
concerning the boundary lines of any lands to which he
claims title or in which he claims any interest.
(e) Any person who shall willfully obstruct the making of
any survey undertaken by the Bureau of Lands or by a
licensed Geodetic Engineer duly authorized to conduct the
survey under this Section, or shall maliciously interfere with
the placing of any monument or remove such monument,
or shall destroy or remove any notice of survey posted on
the land pursuant to law, shall be punished by a fine of not
more than one thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both.
B. PETITION; LOT NUMBERS
Section 36. Petition for registration. When the lands have
been surveyed or plotted, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Solicitor General, shall institute original
registration proceedings by filing the necessary petition in
the Court of First Instance of the place where the land is
situated against the holders, claimants, possessors, or
occupants of such lands or any part thereof, stating in
substance that public interest requires that the title to such
lands be settled and adjudicated and praying that such
titles be so settled and adjudicated:
The petition shall contain a description of the lands and
shall be accompanied by a plan thereof, and may contain
such other data as may serve to furnish full notice to the
occupants of the lands and to all persons who may claim
any right or interest therein.
Where the land consists of two or more parcels held or
occupied by different persons, the plan shall indicate the
boundaries or limits of the various parcels as accurately as
Notes of Cesnee Tan
possible. The parcels shall be known as "lots" and shall on
the plan filed in the case be given separate numbers by the
Director of Lands, which numbers shall be known as
"cadastral lot numbers". The lots situated within each
municipality shall, as far as practicable, be numbered
consecutively beginning with number "one", and only one
series of numbers shall be used for that purpose in each
municipality. However in cities or townsites, a designation
of the landholdings by blocks and lot numbers may be
employed instead of the designation by cadastral lot
numbers.
The cadastral number of a lot shall not be changed after
final decision has been entered decreasing the registration
thereof, except by order of court. Future subdivisions of any
lot shall be designated by a letter or letters of the alphabet
added to the cadastral number of the lot to which the
respective subdivisions pertain. The letter with which a
subdivision is designated shall be known as its "cadastral
letter": Provided, however, that the subdivisions of cities or
townsites may be designated by blocks and lot numbers.
C. ANSWER
Section 37. Answer to petition in cadastral proceedings. Any
claimant in cadastral proceedings, whether named in the
notice or not, shall appear before the court by himself or by
some other authorized person in his behalf, and shall file an
answer on or before the date of initial hearing or within
such further time as may be allowed by the court. The
answer shall be signed and sworn to by the claimant or by
some other authorized person in his behalf, and shall state
whether the claimant is married or unmarried, and if
married, the name of the spouse and the date of marriage,
his nationality, residence and postal address, and shall also
contain:
(a) The age of the claimant;
(b) The cadastral number of the lot or lots claimed, as
appearing on the plan filed in the case by the Director of
Lands, or the block and lot numbers, as the case may be;
(c) The name of the barrio and municipality in which the
lots are situated;
(d) The names and addresses of the owners of the
adjoining lots so far as known to the claimant;
(e) If the claimant is in possession of the lots claimed and
can show no express grant of the land by the government
to him or to his predecessors-in-interest, the answer shall
state the length of time he has held such possession and
the manner in which it has been acquired, and shall also
state the length of time, as far as known, during which the
predecessors, if any, held possession;
(f) If the claimant is not in possession or occupation of the
land, the answer shall fully set forth the interest claimed by
him and the time and manner of his acquisition;
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(g) if the lots have been assessed for taxation, their last
assessed value; and
(h) The encumbrances, if any, affecting the lots and the
names of adverse claimants, as far as known.
D. HEARING; JUDGMENT; DECREE
Section 38. Hearing, Judgment, Decree. The trial of the
case may occur at any convenient place within the province
in which the lands are situated and shall be conducted, and
orders for default and confessions entered, in the same
manner as in ordinary land registration proceedings and
shall be governed by the same rules. All conflicting interests
shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in
favor of the persons entitled to the lands or to parts thereof
and such decrees shall be the basis for issuance of original
certificates of title in favor of said persons and shall have
the same effect as certificates of title granted on
application for registration of land under ordinary land
registration proceedings.
Cases:
Director of Lands vs. Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila
(GR No. 14869)
FACTS:
In 1913, cadastral proceedings were conducted to settle the
title to a considerable tract of land in the Province of Rizal.
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (church) and
other private parties were claimants of 13 cadastral lots
that comprised the contested property. The lower court
ruled in favor of the private claimants. Upon appeal, the
church invoked that the composition title of the church with
the Spanish Government included the subject property. The
church then presented one witness and rested. The private
oppositors then called their respective witnesses to prove
title by possession, and rested. The church thereafter made
an offer to present additional testimony intended to show
that the possession of the private claimants had been
interrupted and that it was merely possession through the
tolerance of the church. However, the counsel for the
oppositors objected to the entry of additional testimonies
which was sustained.
ISSUE:
Did the lower court err in refusing the entry the church‘s
additional testimonies?
RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The object of a cadastral petition is that the title to the
various lots embraced in the survey may be settled and
adjudicated. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem,
promoted by the Director of Lands, somewhat akin to a
judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial
Notes of Cesnee Tan
decree. In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is no
defendant. In another sense, the Government is the
plaintiff and all the- claimants are defendants.
As a general rule, courts should adhere to the usual rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence that governs registration
proceedings. However, in registration proceedings where so
many parties are involved and action is taken quickly and
abruptly, opportunity should be given to parties to submit
additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims
of title, if the ends of justice so require. This case was
remanded back to the lower court with the church being
allowed to admit additional testimonies in the interest of
justice and ascertainment of truth.
Abellera vs Farol
(GR No. 48480, 7/30/1943)
Abellera, in a previous case concerning the same real estate
involved herein, sued Hermegildo Balanag and others who
are either the same parties in this case or the latter's
predecessors in interest, alleging ownership of the land. But
his complaint was dismissed by the Court of First Instance
on two grounds:
(1) prescription in favor of defendants; and
(2) the deed of donation of these lands to him had not
been formally accepted according to Article 633 of the Civil
Code.
Upon appeal to this Court, the judgment of the trial court
was affirmed on the second ground aforementioned. It
appears in that decision of this Court that after the
perfection of the appeal, Abellera executed a public
document formally accepting the donation of the land, and
presented and deed of acceptance together with proofs of
notification of acceptance to the donor, as ground for new
trial.
In July of 1918, or four months after the above-mentioned
decision of this Court, petitioner herein brought another
action for recovery of the land against the same defendants
in the previous case.
The second suit was later dismissed by the Court of First
Instance and transferred to cadastral case No. 5 which
included the hacienda in question that had in the meantime
been subdivided into lots.
The latter through counsel moved that Abellera's claim over
the lots concerned be dismissed on the grounds of res
judicata and prescription.
Issue:
Did the cadastral court, on the ground of res
judicata, have any power to entertain the motion to dismiss
Abellera's claim and bar him from presenting evidence to
prove his ownership of these lots?
Ruling:
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral
and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
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whenever practicable and convenient.
The Rules of Court may be applied in cadastral cases when
two conditions are present: (1) analogy or need to
supplement the cadastral law, and (2) practicability and
convenience.
The principal aim is to settle as much as possible all
disputes over land and to remove all clouds over land titles,
as far a practicable, in a community.
To attain this purpose, the cadastral court should allow all
claimants ample freedom to ventilate whatever right they
may assert over real estate, permitting them, in keeping
with the law of evidence, to offer proofs in support of their
allegations.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that while in a cadastral
case res judicata is available to a claimant in order to
defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, nevertheless
prior judgment can not set up in a motion to dismiss.
Prohibited Alienations and Transfer of Private Lands
Now there are limitations in the ownership of lands. This is
not absolute. Prohibited alienations from the issuance of
the patent or the issuance of title. After the lapse of the
period, you can alienate it. Otherwise, the transfers will be
void. This alienation extends to the sale between sons or
daughters as well as even only a portion is sold.
Transfers of lands to aliens are not allowed except in cases
of intestate succession. Former natural born Filipinos who
have reacquired their Filipino citizenship under RA 9225
may acquire the lands in the Philippines.
A. SECTIONS 118-124 of CA 141
Section118. Except in favor of the Government or any of its
branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free
patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to
encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of
the application and for a term of five years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the expiration of said period, but the improvements
or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to
qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead
after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance
of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be
denied except on constitutional and legal grounds.
Section119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the
free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be
subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the
conveyance.
Section120. Conveyance and encumbrance made by
persons belonging to the so-called "non-Christian Filipinos"
or national cultural minorities, when proper, shall be valid if
Notes of Cesnee Tan
the person making the conveyance or encumbrance is able
to read and can understand the language in which the
instrument or conveyance or encumbrances is written.
Conveyances and encumbrances made by illiterate non-
Christian or literate non-Christians where the instrument of
conveyance or encumbrance is in a language not
understood by the said literate non-Christians shall not be
valid unless duly approved by the Chairman of the
Commission on National Integration.
Section121. Except with the consent of the grantee and the
approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources, and solely
for commercial, industrial, educational, religious or
charitable purposes or for a right of way, no corporation,
association, or partnership may acquire or have any right,
title, interest, or property right whatsoever to any land
granted under the free patent, homestead, or individual
sale provisions of this Act or to any permanent
improvement on such land.
The provisions of Section 124 of this Act to the contrary
notwithstanding, any acquisition of such land, rights thereto
or improvements thereon by a corporation, association, or
partnership prior to the promulgation of this Decree for the
purposes herein stated is deemed valid and binding;
Provided, That no final decision of reversion of such land to
the State has been rendered by a court; And Provided,
further, That such acquisition is approved by the Secretary
of Natural Resources within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Decree.
Section122. No land originally acquired in any manner
under the provisions of this Act, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall encumbered, alienated, or
transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations,
or partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain
under this Act or to corporations organized in the
Philippines authorized therefor by their charters.
Except in cases of hereditary succession, no land or any
portion thereof originally acquired under the free patent,
homestead, or individual sale provisions of this Act, or any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be transferred
or assigned to any individual, nor shall such land or any
permanent improvement thereon be leased to such
individual, when the area of said land, added to that of his
own, shall exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares. Any
transfer, assignment, or lease made in violation hereof, shall
be null and void.
Section123. No land originally acquired in any manner
under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal
order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly
in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands,
terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor
any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the
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public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies
organized in the Philippines whose charters authorize them
to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not
be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by
competent courts; Provided, further, That in the event of
the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in
this section and in the last preceding section being
transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or
associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same
under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations,
or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or
improvements to others so capacitated within the precise
period of five years; otherwise, such property shall revert to
the Government.
Section124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation,
transfer, or other contract made or executed in violation of
any of the provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen,
one hundred and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one
hundred and twenty two, and one hundred and twenty-
three of this Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its
execution and shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the grant, title, patent, or permit originally
issued, recognized or confirmed, actually or presumptively,
and cause the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State.
Cases:
Gayapanao vs. IAC
(GR No. 68109, 7/17/1991)
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Severino Gayapanao and his siblings questioning the
decision of the IAC in upholding the validity of the sale of
the land between their father Constantino and their sister.
The 2 hectare land, subject of this case is part of 10
hectare homestead land registered in the name of
Constantino Gayapanao under OCT. The final order of the
Director of Lands for the issuance of patent was issued on
December 10, 1937. On November 15, 1938, Constantino
Gayapanao executed a private deed entitled kasulatan ng
bilihan in favor of Simeona Gayapanao and his husband.
RTC‘s decision: The contract of sale between Simeona
Gayapanao and her father is null and void for having been
executed with the 5 year prohibitory period provided under
Section 118 of the Public Land Law
CA‘s decision: It reversed the decision of the RTC and
uphold the validity of the sale.
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in upholding the validity of the
sale?
RULING:
No, the provision of law which prohibits the sale or
encumbrance of the homestead within 5 years after the
grant is mandatory.
From the date of the approval of the application and for a
Notes of Cesnee Tan
term of five (5) years from and after the date of issuance of
the patent or grant, lands acquired under free patent or
homestead provisions cannot be subject to encumbrance or
alienation, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction
of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of said period.
The only exception mentioned by the law is the sale or
encumbrance in favor of the government or any of its
branches, units or institutions.
In a number of cases, we have consistently ruled that a
sale of homestead within the five (5) year prohibitive period
is void ab initio and the same cannot be ratified nor can it
acquire validity through the passage of time.
Republic vs Garcia
(GR No. L-11597, 5/27/1959)
Facts:
Garcia was granted a homestead patent for his
23.21 hectares of land. After 3 years and 3 months later
(April 14, 1950), he sold 19 hectares to the lot to several
persons. For this reason, the CFI of Cotabato decreed the
reversion of the property in favor of the Government for
violating the selling the property within the prohibitive
period of 5 years from date of issuance under Sec. 118 of
CA 141.
Garcia contends that he did not violate the said provision
since the sale was not registered and that it was not the
entire land was sold.
Issue: Whether or not Garcia violated the Sec. 118 of CA
141.
Held. Yes, he did.
The Supreme Court held that it is enough that the property,
in whole or in part, was alienated or encumbered within the
prohibitive period except in favor of the Government, Sec.
118 of CA 141 partly provides: Except in favor of the
Government or any its branches, units, or institutions, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead provision shall not
be subject to encumbrance of alienation from the date of
the approval of the application and for a term of five years
from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grant,
nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period, but the
improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or
pledged to qualified persons, association, or corporations.
Such alienation is a sufficient cause for reversion to the
State of the whole grant. In granting a homestead to an
applicant, the law imposes as a condition that the land
should not be encumbered, sold or alienated within five
years from the issuance of the patent. Sec. 124 of CA 141
provides: Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer,
or other contract made or executed in violation of any of
the provisions of section118, 120, 121, 122, and 123 of this
Act shall be unlawful and null and void from its execution
and shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the
grant, title, patent, or permit originally issued, recognized
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or confirmed, actually or presumptively, and cause the
reversion of the property and its improvements to the
State.
Lee Chuy Realty Corp vs Court of Appeals
(GR No. 104114, 12/4/1995)
A valuable piece of land located at Meycauyan, Bulacan,
with an area of 24,576 sq. m. and covered by OCT No. 0-
5290 is disputed by Lee Chuy Realty Corporation and Marc
Realty and Development Corp. Such land was originally co-
owned by Ruben Jacinto(one-sixth), Dominador, Arsenio,
Liwayway all surnamed Bascara and Ernesto
jacinto(collectively owned the remaining five-sixths).
On Feb. 4, 1981, Ruben Jacinto sold his one-sixth pro-
indiviso share to LEE CHUY REALTY which was registered
30 April 1981. On 5 May 1989 the Bascaras and Ernesto
Jacinto also sold their share to MARC REALTY which was
registered on 16 October 1989.
Lee Chuy Realty claims that it was never informed of the
existence of the sale between Marc Realty and the
Bascaras/Jacinto. Marc Realty insists that Lee Chuy verbally
notified of the sale and was given a copy of the deed of
sale.
On 13 November 1989 LEE CHUY REALTY filed a complaint
for legal redemption against MARC REALTY and consigned
in court a manager's check for 614,400. MARC REALTY
insisted that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state
a cause of action there being no allegation of prior valid
tender of payment or a prior valid notice of consignation.
On Dec 26, 1990, the trial court ruled in favour of Lee Chuy
Realty which stated that there was a valid tender of
payment and consignation. It also stated that neither a
separate offer to redeem nor a formal notice of
consignation is necessary for the reason that the filing of
the action itself, within the period of redemption, is
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
On 1 February 1991 MARC REALTY filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition with Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction which was referred to
the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the
lower court and ruled that "a prior tender or offer of
redemption is a prerequisite or precondition to the filing of
an action for legal redemption‖ and that "there must be
tender of the redemption price within the required period
because the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser's
title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period.
MARC REALTY contends that prior tender of payment is a
condition precedent to the filing of an action in court in
order to validly exercise the right of legal redemption. LEE
CHUY REALTY however argues that the filing of the action
itself is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, which is a
condition precedent to the valid exercise of the right of
legal redemption.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Lee Chuy filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied
Issue: WON a formal offer to redeem accompanied with
tender of payment a condition precedent to the filing of an
action for the valid exercise of the right of legal
redemption; is the filing of the action with consignation
equivalent to a formal offer to redeem
Held: No.In Hulganza v. Court of Appeals14 the Court,
citing previous decisions, declared that the formal offer to
redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the
redemption price, within the prescribed period is only
essential to preserve the right of redemption for future
enforcement beyond such period of redemption and within
the period prescribed for the action by the statute of
limitations. Where, as in the instant case, the right to
redeem is exercised through judicial action within the
reglementary period the formal offer to redeem,
accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption
price, while proper, may be unessential. The filing of the
action itself is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem.
In sum, the formal offer to redeem is not a distinct step or
condition sine qua non to the filing of the action in Court
for the valid exercise of the right of legal redemption. What
constitutes a condition precedent is either a formal offer to
redeem or the filing of an action in court together with the
consignation of the redemption price within the
reglementary period.
The doctrine in Tolentino, Tioseco and Belisario cases was
jettisoned by the Court of Appeals on the ground that they
do not involve legal redemption by a co-owner but by a
mortgagor. It concluded that the application of the rules on
legal redemption by a co-owner differs from the legal
redemption by a mortgagor. But the law does not
distinguish; neither should we. For sure, the principle in the
aforecited cases is applicable regardless of whether the
redemptioner is a co-owner or a mortgagor. Public policy
favors redemption regardless of whether the redemptioner
is a co-owner or mortgagor, although perhaps with unequal
force and effect since each is given a fixed but different
period. A co-owner desirous of exercising his right of legal
redemption is given a period of thirty (30) days from notice
of the sale within which to avail of the right to redeem.15
Under the free patent or homestead provisions of the Public
Land Act a period of five (5) years from the date of
conveyance is provided,16 the five-year period to be
reckoned from the date of the sale and not from the date of
registration in the office of the Register of Deeds.17 The
redemption of extrajudicially foreclosed properties, on the
other hand, is exercisable within one (1) year from the date
of the auction sale as provided for in Act No. 3135.
B. SECTION 7, ARTICLE XII, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
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acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
SECTION 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of
this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
Cases:
Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals
(239 SCRA 341)
FACTS:
• Ong Joi Jong, sold a parcel of land located at
Fundidor Street, San Nicolas to private respondent Soledad
Parian on 23 July 1947. The sale was evidenced by a
notarized Deed of Sale, written in English, and was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Manila which in
turn issued TCT no. 9260 dated 2 September 1947 in the
name of private respondent. According to private
respondent, she entrusted the administration of the lot and
building to Ong Ching Po when she and her husband settled
in Iloilo, however when her husband died she demanded
that the lot be vacated since she was going to sell it,
petitioners refused to vacate said premises. On 19 March
1984, Parian filed a case for unlawful detainer against Ong
Ching Po. The MTC dismissed her case and was reaffirmed
by both the RTC and CA.
• On the other hand, on 6 December 1983, Ong
Ching Po executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the
same property to his children Jimmy and David Ong. On 12
December 1985, the Ong‘s filed an action for reconveyance
and damages against Parian in RTC, Manila. Upon the
private respondent‘s motion, this was consolidated with her
action for quieting of title against the petitioners. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of private respondent and was
confirmed by the CA, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ong Ching Po could legally acquire
the property?
HELD: No. Petition is dismissed.
RATIO: Ong Ching Po cannot legally claim ownership of
the disputed property since the capacity to acquire private
lands is dependent on the capacity to acquire or hold lands
of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities ―qualified to acquire
lands of the public domain‖. Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a
Chinese citizen and therefore is disqualified from acquiring
and owning real property. Further, despite the documentary
evidence provided by petitioners, they failed to provide
evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of the
deed of sale. Likewise, the tax receipts, tax declaration,
rental receipts, deed of sale and TCT were in Ong‘s
possession, these were not reflective of dominion or
ownership as even a mere administrator or manager may
lawfully perform payment duties relative to his appointment
as such. It was also noteworthy that the tax receipts and
rental receipts were in the name of Parian‘s husband.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Hence, petition was dismissed.
Frenzel vs Catito
(GR No. 143958, July 11, 2003)
FACTS: Petitioner – Alfred Fritz Frenzel, is an Australian
Electrical Engineer who once worked with New Guinea
Airlines, started doing business in the Philippines since
1974, and two years later got married to a Filipina Teresita
Santos. They were separated bread and board in 1981 and
two years later met Ederlina Catito as a masseuse in one of
night clubs in Sydney Australia
Frenzel got enamored with Ederlina and convinced her to
setup wholesome business in Manila for her own as he was
willing to help her. Ederlina returned and later Alfred
followed and helped her setup a Edorial Beauty saloon with
his personal funds –let alone Ederlina as sole registered
owner. Alfred went back to work in Papue New Guinea as
airline pilot while Ederlina too went to Germany to file her
divorce with her husband –Muller.
When Alfred returned to the Philippines to live with
Ederlina–he bought house and lot or real properties in QC
for her with his own funds and agreeing to name it under
Ederlina alone accepting that as a foreigner he is not
allowed to own a real estate property under the Philippine
Laws. Alfred decided to stay for good in the Philippines and
sold his personal properties in Australia with proceeds later
used to buy other 2-more properties in Davao City –again,
in Ederlina‘s name only. There was also an occasion when
Ederlina deposited some USD 250,000 in their joint-
accounts.
Meanwhile, Ederlina‘s divorce case with her German
husband was denied and with the prospect that she could
be charged with bigamy along with Alfed who himself is still
married. This started their common law marriage
deterioration and soon enough Alfred got penniless and
filed his claim on the properties listed in Ederlina‘s name
alone as well as charges the return of all other asset
bought with his own funds.
ISSUE: Will the good faith doctrine and applicable Articles
in Civil code 1416, In combination with RA Nos. 133,
4381 and Rep. Act No. 4882, the proceeds of the sale
would be remitted to him, by way of refund for the money
he used to purchase the said properties. To bar the
petitioner from recovering the subject properties, or at the
very least, the money used for the purchase and to bar the
petitioner to the proceeds thereof is to enrich the
respondent at his expense, and can this withstand the
Constitutional proscription on the property ownership for
the aliens in the Philippines?
Hence, this petition, after successive defeat from lower and
appellate court.
HELD No. The petition is Denied.
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The Court ruled on evidence on record: to wit;
―The three parcels of land subject of the complaint were
not mortgaged to the petitioner by the owners thereof but
were sold to the respondent as the vendee, albeit with the
use of the petitioners personal funds.‖ The sales of three
parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner
is illegal per se. The transactions are void ab initio because
they were entered into in violation of the Constitution.
Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or
the money used in the purchase of the parcels of land
would be subversive of public policy.
This finds support under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which states: ―Save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.‖
The court stated: MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST (No person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery
of what has been paid without just cause has been
designated as an accion in rem verso.
This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is
proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the
pari delicto doctrine.
It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing
an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but,
as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman vs.
Johnson. ‖The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal
as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all
times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his
sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is
founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant
has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as
between him and the plaintiff, therefore, the petition is
bereft of merits.
Muller vs. Muller
(GR no. 149615, August 29, 2006)
Elena Buenaventura Muller and Helmut Muller are husband
and wife in this case. They wed and resided in Germany
until they decided to permanently reside in the Philippines
in 1992. By this time, they bought a house in Antipolo, Rizal
using the proceeds that they got from selling the house the
Helmut Muller inherited from his parents in Germany.
The marriage, however, did not last. They were eventually
separated and Helmut Muller filed for separation of their
properties. The trial court then dissolved the absolute
community of property and ordered the equal partition of
their personal properties located within the country,
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during
marriage. As to the Antipolo property, the court held that it
was acquired using the paraphernal funds of Helmut,
however, he cannot recover said property, nor have a right
Notes of Cesnee Tan
to recover the funds used to buy it since it was purchased
in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals granted Helmut Muller‘s
prayer for reimbursement for the Antipolo property.
ISSUE: WON Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement of
the funds used to acquire the Antipolo property.
HELD: NO. Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to
this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property
titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or
claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained.
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear
that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite
the constitutional prohibition. To allow reimbursement
would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise
proscribed by law.
Lee vs. Director of Lands
(GR No. 128195, October 3, 2001)
Facts: Sometime in March 1936, Carmen, Francisco, Jr.,
Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose,
Loreto, Manuel, Rizal, and Jimmy, all surnamed Dinglasan
sold to Lee Liong, A Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with
an approximate area of 1,631 square meters, designed as
lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
3389.
However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of
First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee
Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The
plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the
constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership
of private agriculture land, including residential, commercial
or industrial land.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court and ruled thus:
pari delicto (in sales of real estate to aliens incapable of
holding title thereto by virtue of provision of the
Constitution, both the vendor and vendee are deemed to
have committed the constitutional violation and thus the
courts will not afford protection to either party).
On July 1, 1968, the same former owners (Dinglasans) filed
with the Court of First Instance and action for recovery of
the same parcel of land. On Sept. 23, 1968, the heirs of
Lee Liong file with the trial. Both cases were elevated to
the Supreme Court but were dismissed holding the suit
barred by res judicata. On Sept. 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-
Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the RTC, Roxas City a
petition for reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of Capiz.
They were the widows of the heirs of Lee Liong, the owner
of the lot. Both widows received a parcel of land through
succession from their deceased husbands. RTC ordered the
reconstitution of the lost and destroyed certificate of said
title of lot. On Jan. 25, 1995, OSG filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment of
reconstitution alleging that petitioners were not the proper
parties in the reconstitution of title, since Lee Liong did not
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acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and
was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.
CA decided, declaring the judgment of reconstitution to be
void. Hence this petition.
Issue/s:
1. WON OSG has the capacity to object the reconstitution.
2. WON constitutional prohibition still exists considering the
land is now under the ownership of Lee‘s heirs thru
succession.
Held:
1. Yes.
The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land t
an alien did not validate the transaction. For it was still
contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens
acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However,
the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction as
was not the parties to the transaction. The proper party to
assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was
done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an
action for annulment of judgement of reconstitution of title.
While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert it,
it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription
never lies against the State.
2. No.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands
of the public or private domain was intended to protect
lands from falling in the hands of non- Filipinos. In this
case, however, there would be no more public policy
violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified
to acquire and own such land. ―If the land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen
or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.‖
Ramirez vs. Vda de Ramirez
(111 SCRA 704)
FACTS OF THE CASE: The main issue in this appeal is the
manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his
widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his
companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on
December 11, 1964, with only his widow as compulsory
heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios
was appointed administratrix of the estate. The widow
Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the companion
Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the
testator provided for substitutions. On June 23, 1966, the
administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows:
the property of the deceased is to be divided into two
parts. One part shall go to the widow in satisfaction of her
legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge
and Roberto Ramirez. Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the
free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the
remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the
grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar substitution in
favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's
usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio
V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid
because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the
testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not
related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first
degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that
the grant of a usufruct over real property in the Philippines
in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates
Section 5, Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that
(d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in the
Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle
and the appellants, violates the testator's express win to
give this property to them. Nonetheless, the lower court
approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3,
1967.
ISSUE: Whether or not the usufruct over real properties of
the estate in favor of Wanda is void because it violates the
constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
aliens.
RULING: The 1935 Constitution which is controlling
provides as follows: SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to
Wanda on the ground that the Constitution covers not only
succession by operation of law but also testamentary
succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional
provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does
not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien
would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying
money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise
of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, we uphold the usufruct in
favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does
not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed
by the Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, the estate of Jose Eugenio
Ramirez was ordered distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto
and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and the usufruct to
Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
The Supreme Court held that they are allowed because
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they are former natural born Filipinos. That is explicitly
provided under the Constitution. The limitation only
provided is under the Foreign Investments Act limiting the
size of the area.
Republic vs Court of Appeals
(235 SCRA 567)
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots, as
their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in
San Pablo City, from one Cristeta Dazo Belen. At the time of
the purchase, respondent spouses where then natural-born
Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for
registration of title of the two (2) parcels of land before the
RTC of San Pablo City. This time, however, they were no
longer Filipino citizens and have opted to embrace
Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
RTC rendered a decision confirming the title of the
Spouses. Republic filed an opposition to the decision of
RTC. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of RTC.
Republic submits that private respondents have not
acquired proprietary rights over the subject properties
before they acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their
favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered
lands are presumed to be public lands under the principle
that lands of whatever classification belong to the State
under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before the issuance of
the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical
sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the
State. Petitioner further argued that it is only when the
court adjudicates the land to the applicant for confirmation
of title would the land become privately owned land, for in
the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
ISSUE: WON a foreign national apply for registration of
title over a parcel of land which he acquired by purchase
while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who
has complied with the requirements for registration under
the Public Land Act (CA 141)? YES
HELD:
Since the spouses‘ predecessor in interest has
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession for at
least 30 years of alienable public land, such possession ipso
jure converts the same to private property (Recall
ruling of Director of Lands v. IAC). This means that
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an
applicant and his predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such
applicant so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public.
What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees
of a private land, they could apply for registration in
accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Constitution.
In the case at bar, the spouses were
undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of the
acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired
vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed
period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under
the Public Land Act.
But what should not be missed in the
disposition of this case is the fact that the Constitution itself
allows private respondents to register the contested parcels
of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to
wit:
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this
Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost
his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted
is similar to Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of
this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his citizenship may be a transferee of private land, for
use by him as his residence, as the Batasang Pambansa
may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into
law, the relevant provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost his Philippine citizenship and who has the legal capacity
to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a
transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of one
thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one
hectare in the case of rural land, to be used by him as his
residence. In the case of married couples, one of them may
avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both
shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not
exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for
residential purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a
transferee of an additional urban or rural lands for
residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the
present, no other law has been passed by the legislature on
the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of
private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens
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at the time they applied for registration of the properties in
question, said properties as discussed above were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal
impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in
view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land
sought to be registered no longer form part of the public
domain. They are already private in character since private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation
thereof under claim of ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or
since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may
be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
1,000 sq.m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural
land, to be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a
private land, were natural-born citizens of the Philippines.
For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of
residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they
purchased or registered the parcels of land in question.
What is important is that private respondents were formerly
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as transferees
of a private land, they could apply for registration in
accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution. Considering that private respondents were
able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must perforce
be approved.
Remedies to recover private land from disqualified
Alien: Action for Reversion
If your client is an individual who has a pre-existing right
over the property, you file an action for cancellation.
A. Who can initiate
Cases:
Republic vs Animas
(GR No. L-37682, 3/29/1974)
(NAG PATENT SYA SA SOUTH COT THEN TAGA DAVAO
SYA)
Facts:
The land covered by the free patent and title in question
was originally applied for by Precila Soria, who on February
23, 1966, transferred her rights to the land and its
improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol who filed his
application therefor on February 3, 1969, as a transferee
from Precila Soria.
• 12 12, 1969:Free Patent was issued by the
President of Phils.
• 07-20-1970 after the transmittal of the patent
to ROD Gensan, OCT was issued in the name of Isagani Du
Timbol
• 08-5-1971, Bureau of Forestry filed a
Notes of Cesnee Tan
complaint before the CFI Cotabato to declare the FP and
OCT void and order the reversion of the lang to the mass of
public domain on the ground that the land covered was
timber/forest which is not disposable under PLA. The said
lot was plotted by the Bureau of Forestry LC 700 to be
inside the area which was reverted to the catefory of public
forest, whereas the application of Timbol was filed on 06-3-
1969 11 years after, That the FP was obtained fraudulently
as Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land.
• Timbol invoked the ruling of Ramirez vs
Ramirez which ruled that Certificate of Title based on the
patent had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the
one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the
ground of fraud. The Court ruled to dismiss the complaint
hence this petition.
Issue: WON the Director of Lands under the case of
Ramirez or the Bureau of Forestry may initiated reversion of
the subject land.
Held: NO.Timbol‘s Free Patent was void
• The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of
title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against
the state in an action for reversion of the land covered
thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a
forest reservation.
• It is the Bureau of Forestry (Not Director of
Lands like in Ramirez case) that has jurisdiction and
authority over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and
forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the
taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth
(Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code).
• (note in Ramirez, no forest land was involved,
but only Public Agricultural land).
• A patent is void at law if the officer who issued
the patent had no authority to do so.
• In the case at bar the party seeking the nullity
of the title and reversion of the land is the state itself which
is specifically authorized under Section 101 of the Public
Land Act to initiate such proceedings as an attribute of
sovereignty, a remedy not available to a private individual.
• The complaint alleges in its paragraph 8 that
applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of the
land. He is living in Davao City and the land is in South
Cotabato, it was fenced by one Hermogenes Chilsot;no
improvements nor cultivation introduced thereof and it was
not surveyed.
B. When Proper/improper
Cases:
Republic vs Umali
(GR No. 80687, 4/10/1989)
The land in question is situated in Tanza, Cavite, and
consists of 78,865 square meters. It was originally
purchased on installment from the government on July 1,
1910 by Florentina Bobadilla, who allegedly transferred her
rights thereto in favor of Martina, Tomasa, Gregorio and
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Julio, all surnamed Cenizal, in 1922. Tomasa and Julio
assigned their shares to Martina, Maria and Gregorio. In
1971, these three assignees purportedly signed a joint
affidavit which was filed with the Bureau of Lands to
support their claim that they were entitled to the issuance
of a certificate of title over the said land on which they said
they had already made full payment. On the basis of this
affidavit, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
executed Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No. 1280) on
September 10, 1971, in favor of the said affiants.
Subsequently, on October 13, 1971, TCT No. 55044
(replacing Bobadilla's OCT No. 180) was issued by the
register of deeds of Cavite in favor of Maria Cenizal,
Gregorio Cenizal, and (in lieu of Martina Cenizal) Rosalina
Naval, Luz Naval, and Enrique Naval.
When the complaint for reversion was filed on October 10,
1985, the registered owners of the land, following several
transfers, were Remedios Miclat under TCT No. 80392, Juan
C. Pulido under TCT No. 80393, and Rosalina, Luz and
Enrique Naval under TCT No. 80394. They were named as
defendants and asked to return the property to the State
on the aforestated grounds of forgery and fraud. The
plaintiff claimed that Gregorio Cenizal having died on
February 25, 1943, and Maria Cenizal on January 8, 1959,
they could not have signed the joint affidavit dated August
9, 1971, on which Deed No. V-10910 (Sale Certificate No.
1280) was based. The present holders of the property
claiming to be innocent purchasers for value and not privy
to the alleged forgery, contend that the action cannot lie
against them.
ISSUE:
WON the sale itself be considered null and void from the
start, as the petitioner insists, so as to make all titles
derived therefrom also ineffectual, void ab initio.
HELD:
No. Section 44 of P.D. 1529 (then Sec. 39 of the Land Reg.
Act), states that, every registered owner receiving a
certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a
certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances except those noted on
the certificate and any of the encumbrances which may be
subsisting, and enumerated in the law. Under said
provision, claims and liens of whatever character, except
those mentioned by law as existing against the land prior to
the issuance of certificate of title, are cut off by such
certificate if not noted thereon, and the certificate so
issued binds the whole world, including the government.
The Torrens system was adopted in this country because it
was believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee
the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
If a person purchases a piece of land on the assurance that
the seller‘s title thereto is valid, he should not run the risk
of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after
all.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
We find that the private respondents are transferees in
good faith and for value of the subject property and that
the original acquisition thereof, although fraudulent, did not
affect their own titles. These are valid against the whole
world, including the government.
Piñero vs Director of Lands
(GR No. L-36507, 12/14/1974)
We hold the appeal to be meritorious. In the light of the
facts disclosed in the foregoing stipulation, We reiterate
Cebedo vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-12777, May 22,
1961, 2 SCRA 25, wherein We held that it is not only the
right but the duty of the Director of Lands to conduct the
investigation of any alleged fraud in securing a free patent
and the corresponding title to a public land and to file the
corresponding court action for the reversion of the same to
the State, if the facts disclosed in the course of such
investigation should so warrant. Consequently, prohibition
cannot be issued to enjoin such an investigation despite the
existence of a Torrens title.
Indeed, it is to be clarified that Section 91 of the Public
Land Act leaves no other alternative to the Director of
Lands. The provision reads thus:
SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be
considered as essential conditions and parts of any
concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statement therein or omission of
facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of
the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set
forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It
shall be the duty of the Director of Lands, from time to time
and whenever he may deem it advisable, to make the
necessary investigations for the purpose of ascertaining
whether the material facts set out in the application are
true, or whether they continue to exist and are maintained
and preserved in good faith, and for the purpose of such
investigation, the Director of Lands is hereby empowered to
issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if
necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In
every investigation made in accordance with this section,
the existence of bad faith, fraud, concealment, or
fraudulent and illegal modification of essential facts shall be
presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall
refuse or fail to obey a subpoenas or subpoenas duces
tecum lawfully issued by the Director of Lands or his
authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail to
give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and
on the basis of such presumption, an order of cancellation
may issue without further proceedings.
Underlying this section and providing its justification is the
Regalian doctrine embodied in Section 1 of Article XIII of
the Constitution of 1935, in force during the material dates
of the events herein involved, declaring that "all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain
. . and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
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the State...." And under Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79
Phil. 461, "the scope of this constitutional provision,
according to its heading and its language, embraces all
lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to
establish a permanent and fundamental policy for the
conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the
Nation." Accordingly, the right to acquire disposable lands
from the State through any of the means provided for in
the Public Land Act, Commonwealth Act 141, must
necessarily be subject to the reservation expressly made in
above quoted Section 91 to the effect that "the statements
made in the application shall be considered as essential
conditions and parts of any ... title ... issued on the basis of
such application" and that "any false statement therein or
omission of facts altering, changing or modifying the
consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and
any subsequent modification, alteration or change of the
material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto1
produce the cancellation of the concession, title or permit
granted."
It is true that under Section 122 of the Land Registration
Act, a Torrens title issued on the basis of a free patent or a
homestead patent is as indefeasible as one judicially
secured. And in repeated previous decisions of this Court
that indefeasibility has been emphasized by Our holding
that not even the Government can file an action for
annulment, but at the same time, it has been made clear
that an action for reversion may be instituted by the
Solicitor General, in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.2 It is to the public interest that one who
succeeds in fraudulently acquiring title to a public land
should not be allowed to benefit therefrom, and the State
should, therefore, have an ever existing authority, thru its
duly authorized officers, to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of any such title, to the end that
the Republic, thru the Solicitor General or any other officer
who may be authorized by law, may file the corresponding
action for the reversion of the land involved to the public
domain, subject thereafter to disposal to other qualified
persons in accordance with law. In other words, the
indefeasibility of a title over land previously public is not a
bar to an investigation by the Director of Lands as to how
such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such
investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been
committed in securing such title in order that the
appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the
Government.
Nothing said above, however, should be understood as
holding that the Court has found that the titles of appellees
have been in fact fraudulently secured. That matter may be
resolved only after the Director of Lands shall have finished
his investigation.
C. Reversion vs Action for Nullity of land titles
REVERSION CANCELLATION/NULLITY
Allegations State owned Pre-existing right of
in the ownership/ possession
Notes of Cesnee Tan
complaint
Basis Fraud/deceit Beyond Director of lands
Real party State Person whi has a pre-
in interest existing right
Effect of Reconvey Reconvey to rightful owner
Grant back to
government/
public domain
Cases:
Kionisala vs. Dacut
(GR No. 147379, 2/27/2002)
On 7 September 1990 Lot No. 1017 was granted a free
patent to petitioners Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala under Free
Patent No. 603393.
And on 13 November 1991 Lot 1015 was bestowed upon
Isabel Kionisala, one of the impleaded heirs of Ambrocio
Kionisala under Free Patent No. 101311-91-904.
Thereafter, on 19 November 1990 Lot 1017 was registered
under the Torrens system and was issued OCT No. P-19819
in petitioners‘ name, while on 5 December 1991 Lot No.
1015 was registered in the name of Isabel Kionisala under
OCT No. P-20229.
On 19 December 1995 Heirs of Dacut filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of titles, reconveyance and damages
against Heirs of Kionisala, with the RTC of Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon of the two (2) parcels of land known as Lot No.
1017 and Lot No. 1015 with areas of 117,744 square
meters and 69,974 square meters respectively, located in
Pongol, Libona, Bukidnon.
In support of their causes of action for declaration of nullity
of titles and reconveyance, private respondents claimed
absolute ownership of Lot 1015 and 1017 even prior to the
issuance of the corresponding free patents and certificates
of title. They further alleged in their complaint –
• Are absolute and exclusive owners by virtue of
inheritance from their late father, Honorio Dacut
• In actual possession and cultivation of two
parcels of agricultural lands for more than thirty (30) years.
• They discovered that the petitioners, without
their knowledge and consent, fraudulently applied for
patent the said parcels of land and as a result thereof
certificates of titles had been issued to them
• That the patents issued to defendants are null
and void
• That in the remote possibility that said
certificates of title cannot be declared as null and void,
plaintiffs, being the absolute and exclusive owners of the
parcels of land titled by the defendants, are entitled to
reconveyance
On 7 February 1996 petitioners filed their answer to the
complaint and asserted the following affirmative defenses –
• That the complaint states no cause of action;
• That the cause of action, if any, is barred by
statute of limitations, prescription of action or by equitable
principle of laches;
• 10. That x x x it is only the Director of Lands
(now DENR) through the Office of the Solicitor General that
has the authority to file annulment of Free Patent or
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Homestead Patent issued by the Director of Lands or DENR;
On 3 December 1996 the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the cause of action of private
respondents was truly for reversion so that only the
Director of Lands could have filed the complaint.
On 23 December 1996 private respondents moved for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal but on 3 June
1997 the motion was denied by the trial court.
On 7 June 1997 private respondents appealed the order of
dismissal to the Court of Appeals.
On 15 February 2000 the appellate court reversed the order
of dismissal. It ruled that while the allegations in the
complaint were insufficient for purposes of an ordinary civil
action for declaration of nullity of a certificate of title since
the actual date when private respondents became owners
of Lots 1015 and 1017 prior to the issuance of the
corresponding free patents and certificates of title was not
specifically indicated in the complaint, nonetheless the
allegations therein were comprehensive enough to
constitute a cause of action for reconveyance.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision
but the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit,
hence this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint state a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of the free patents and certificates of
title for Lot 1015 and Lot 1017, or alternatively a cause of
action for reconveyance of these two lots.
Whether the cause of action, has prescribed.
First issue: The court ruled that the complaint does not
allege an action for reversion which private respondents
would obviously have no right to initiate, but that it
sufficiently states either a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of free patents and certificates of title over Lot 1015
and Lot 1017 or alternatively a cause of action for
reconveyance of these two pieces of realty, wherein in
either case private respondents are the real parties in
interest.
An ordinary civil action for declaration of nullity of free
patents and certificates of title is not the same as an action
for reversion. The difference between them lies in the
allegations as to the character of ownership of the realty
whose title is sought to be nullified. In an action for
reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would
admit State ownership of the disputed land. On the other
hand, a cause of action for declaration of nullity of free
patent and certificate of title would require allegations of
the plaintiff‘s ownership of the contested lot prior to the
issuance of such free patent and certificate of title as well
as the defendant‘s fraud or mistake; as the case may be, in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the
parcel of land claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity
arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but from the fact
that the land is beyond the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Lands to bestow and whatever patent or certificate of title
obtained therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real
party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff who
alleges a pre-existing right of ownership over the parcel of
land in question even before the grant of title to the
defendant.
It is obvious that private respondents allege in their
Notes of Cesnee Tan
complaint all the facts necessary to seek the nullification of
the free patents as well as the certificates of title covering
Lot 1015 and Lot 1017. Clearly, they are the real parties in
interest in light of their allegations that they have always
been the owners and possessors of the two (2) parcels of
land even prior to the issuance of the documents of title in
petitioners‘ favor, hence the latter could only have
committed fraud in securing them.
It is not essential for private respondents to specifically
state in the complaint the actual date when they became
owners and possessors of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017.
With respect to the purported cause of action for
reconveyance, it is settled that in this kind of action the free
patent and the certificate of title are respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of
the property, in this case the title thereof, which has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant‘s
name. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two (2)
facts which admitting them to be true would entitle the
plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1)
that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that
the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of the
same.17
The Court ruled that private respondents have sufficiently
pleaded (in addition to the cause of action for declaration of
free patents and certificates of title) an action for
reconveyance, more specifically, one which is based on
implied trust. An implied trust arises where the defendant
allegedly acquires the disputed property through mistake or
fraud so that he would be bound to hold and reconvey the
property for the benefit of the person who is truly entitled
to it.
In the complaint, private respondents clearly assert that
they have long been the absolute and exclusive owners and
in actual possession and cultivation of Lot 1015 and Lot
1017 and that they were fraudulently deprived of ownership
thereof when petitioners obtained free patents and
certificates of title in their names. These allegations
certainly measure up to the requisite statement of facts to
constitute an action for reconveyance.
Second. The court ruled that neither the action for
declaration of nullity of free patents and certificates of title
of Lot 1015 and Lot 1017 nor the action for reconveyance
based on an implied trust of the same lots has prescribed.
"A free patent issued over private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects whatsoever. Quos nullum est,
nullum producit effectum."
Moreover, private respondents‘ claim of open, public,
peaceful, continuous and adverse possession of the two (2)
parcels of land and its illegal inclusion in the free patents of
petitioners and in their original certificates of title, also
amounts to an action for quieting of title which is
imprescriptible.
The action for reconveyance based on implied trust, on the
other hand, prescribes only after ten (10) years from 1990
and 1991 when the free patents and the certificates of title
over Lot 1017 and Lot 1015, respectively, were registered.
Obviously the action had not prescribed when private
respondents filed their complaint against petitioners on 19
December 1995. At any rate, the action for reconveyance in
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
the case at bar is also significantly deemed to be an action
to quiet title for purposes of determining the prescriptive
period on account of private respondents‘ allegations of
actual possession of the disputed lots. In such a case, the
cause of action is truly imprescriptible.
In sum, the grounds relied upon in petitioners‘ desire to
dismiss the complaint of private respondents in Civil Case
No. 95-312 cannot be impressed with merit. By this
decision, however, the court is not foreclosing the
presentation of evidence during trial on the merits that Lot
1015 and Lot 1017 are not private property and that private
respondents are not truly the owners thereof. This and
other issues on the merits must follow where the
preponderant evidence lies.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15
February 2000 reversing the Order dismissing the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 95-312 entitled Heirs of Honorio
Dacut, namely, Visaminda Orevillo, Violeta Dacut, Josephine
Dacut and Elizabeth Dacut v. Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala,
namely, Ana, Isabel, Grace, Ophelia, Joven and Camilo, all
surnamed Kionisala, and Isabel Kionisala is AFFIRMED with
the understanding that private respondents Heirs of
Honorio Dacut as plaintiffs therein may proceed on the
basis of their causes of action of declaration of nullity of
free patents and certificates of titles and/or reconveyance
based on an implied trust, with claim for damages. The
proceedings in the trial court shall commence forthwith
within thirty (30) days from notice of the finality of this
Decision without unnecessary delay.
Evangelista vs. Santiago
(GR No. 157447, 4/29/2005)
This Court cannot sustain petitioners argument. Actual
proof of possession only becomes necessary because, as
the same whereas clause points out, Spanish titles are
subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still
lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who
actually possesses the same for the required prescriptive
period.[38] Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish
title, the applicant for registration of his Spanish title under
the Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in
actual possession of the real property, so as to discount the
possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to
the same property by virtue of prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole, and not just a
particular provision alone. A word or phrase taken in the
abstract may easily convey a meaning quite different from
the one actually intended and evident when the word or
phrase is considered with those with which it is associated.
An apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions of the
statute.[39]
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be
interpreted and harmonized with the other provisions of the
whole statute.[40] Note that the tenor of the whole
presidential decree is to discontinue the use of Spanish
Notes of Cesnee Tan
titles and to strip them of any probative value as evidence
of ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of
applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the
Torrens system (i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14
August 1976), after which, the Spanish titles may no longer
be presented to prove ownership.
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications
for registration of their title on or before 14 August 1976. In
a land registration proceeding, the applicant should present
to the court his Spanish title plus proof of actual possession
of the real property. However, if such land registration
proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976,
the applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to
the court to evidence his ownership of the real property,
regardless of whether the real property was in his actual
possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual
possession of the Subject Property when they filed the
Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996 does not
exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and
their Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their
ownership of the Subject Property, whether in a land
registration proceeding or in an action to remove a cloud on
or to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish
titles from claiming ownership of the real property on some
other basis, such as those provided in either the Land
Registration Decree[41] or the Public Land Act.[42]
Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their
titles in their Complaint aside from possession of the
Subject Property from time immemorial, which this Court
has already controverted; and the Spanish title, which is
already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject
Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject
Property, the petitioners lacked the personality to file an
action for removal of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and
their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to state a
cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this
ground, it is already unnecessary for this Court to address
the issue of prescription of the action.
Wherefore, this Court DENIES the instant petition and
AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29
July 2002, and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, dated 05 February 1999,
dismissing petitioners Complaint for failure to state a cause
of action.
SO ORDERED.
Roco vs. Gimeda
(GR No. L-11651, 12/27/1958)
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Hon. Jose S. Rodriguez, presiding, dismissing the
complaint upon petition of defendants, on the ground that
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it fails to state a cause of action.
The complaint makes the following allegations: that before
August 22, 1918, Espiridiona Caramihan, owned and
possessed two parcels of land known as lots Nos. 2741 and
3082 of the Barili Cadastral Survey No. 219, covered by tax
declarations Nos. 01865 and 01854; that upon the death of
said Espiridiona Caramihan on August 22, 1918, said lands
were partitioned equally among her children, who similarly
possessed and cultivated their respective shares and paid
the taxes thereon; that in the years 1925 to 1927, through
ignorance and inadvertence of the heirs, the said lots were
declared public land in a cadastral proceeding; that
Espiridiona occupied said lands openly, adversely,
continuously and publicly, planting coconut and fruit trees
and building her dwelling house thereon, and that said
improvements and house are still on said lots; that the
present plaintiffs acquired their rights to the lots by
purchase from the heirs of the original owner Esperidiona
Caramihan; that on or about December 7, 1940, Juan
Gimeda, defendant, filed an application for a free patent to
said lands, surreptitiously and fraudulently, without
knowledge of the owners and possessors, and on
December 7, 1940, the Director of Lands issued an order
and in accordance therewith, on September 17, 1951, the
Bureau of Lands issued patent No. 51552 in the name of
defendant Juan Gimeda; that the plaintiffs and their original
predecessor-in-interest have always been in the actual,
physical, continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
said parcels of land and defendant Juan Gimeda applied for
and obtained his patent thereto without notice to them and
without their knowledge, and secured the approval of his
patent by fraudulent statements, alleging that he was the
only heir of Espiridiona Caramihan and the only occupant of
the land; and that by such false and fraudulent statements
the Bureau of Lands approved his application and ordered
the issuance of his patent.
The defendant filed an answer to the complaint, then
amended the said answer and alleges that he is the
youngest among the children of Espiridiona Caramihan;
denies the allegations made in the complaint as to the
acquisition by false and fraudulent means of the said lands;
alleges that the complaint states no cause of action. He
presents a counterclaim for P5,000 and P10,000 as moral
and exemplary damages, respectively, and P500 as
attorney's fees. Plaintiffs deny this counterclaim.
Later on defendant presented a motion to dismiss, alleging
that the complaint alleges no cause of action, arguing that
as the title in his favor was issued on October 17, 1951 and
action was filed on July 15, 1954, the action was filed more
than two years after the issuance of the patent, beyond the
one-year period provided by law. The authorities cited for
this defense are the case of Director of Lands vs. Gutierrez
David, 50 Phil, 797; Villarosa vs. Sarmiento, 46 Phil., 814;
Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds, 40 Phil., 620; Sumcad vs.
Judge of the Court of First Instance, et al., 96 Phil., 946; 51
Off. Gaz., [5] 2413.
Notes of Cesnee Tan
It is to be noted that the petition does not seek for a
reconsideration of the granting of the patent or of the
decree issued in the registration proceeding. The purpose is
not to annul the title but to have it conveyed to plaintiffs.
Fraudulent statements were made in the application for the
patent and no notice thereof was given to plaintiffs, nor
knowledge of the petition known to the actual possessors
and occupants of the property. The action is one based on
fraud and under the law, it can be instituted within four
years from the discovery of the fraud. (Art. 1146, Civil
Code, as based on Section 3, paragraph 43 of Act No. 190.)
It is to be noted that as the patent here has already been
issued, the land has the character of registered property in
accordance with the provisions of Section 122 of Act No.
496, as amended by Act No. 2332, and the remedy of the
party who has been injured by the fraudulent registration is
an action for reconveyance. (Director of Lands vs. Register
of Deeds, 92 Phil., 826; 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 935; Section 55 of
Act No. 496.)
The order of dismissal appealed from is, therefore, reversed
and the case is returned to the court a quo for further
proceedings in accordance with law.
Republic v. Hachero,
G.R. No. 200973, [May 30, 2016])
Facts:
In 1996, Amor Hachero (Hachero) filed his Free Patent
Application No. 045307-969 covering Lot No. 1514, CAD-
1150-D (subject land) before the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Palawan. The
said application for free patent was later approved by the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(PENRO) of Palawan based on the following findings,
among others that the land applied for had been classified
as alienable and disposable and, therefore, subject to
disposition under the Public Land Law;
On October 15, 1998, Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 was
issued to Hachero and the subject land was registered
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. E-18011 on
May 7, 1999.
After an inspection and verification were conducted by the
CENRO in 2000, it was discovered that the subject land,
covered by OCT No. E-18011, was still classified as
timberland and so not susceptible of private ownership
under the Free Patent provision of the Public Land Act.
Hence, the Republic filed the Complaint for the Cancellation
of Free Patent No. 045307-98-9384 and OCT No. E-18011
and for Reversion, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
3726.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Hachero on the
ground that the free patent and title had already been
issued after Hachero was found to have complied with all
the requirements; that it was the Republic itself thru the
DENR-CENRO, Coron, which brought the subject land under
the operation of the Torrens System. The CA affirmed the
RTC decision.
Issue:
1. Won the petition for cancellation of the title
and reversion of the subject lot is meritorious.
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
2. WON the Government is estopped by its
previous acts.
Ruling:
1. Cancellation of title and reversion proper
where there exists a mistake or oversight in granting free
patent over inalienable land
Reversion is an action where the ultimate relief sought is to
revert the land back to the government under the Regalian
doctrine. Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation
therefore is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
xxx. In Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic
(Yujuico case), reversion was defined as an action which
seeks to restore public land fraudulently awarded and
disposed of to private individuals or corporations to the
mass of public domain. It bears to point out, though, that
the Court also allowed the resort by the Government to
actions for reversion to cancel titles that were void for
reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation by the grantee of a
patent of the conditions imposed by law; and lack of
jurisdiction of the Director of Lands to grant a patent
covering inalienable forest land or portion of a river, even
when such grant was made through mere oversight.d
In the case at bench, although the Republic's action for
cancellation of patent and title and for reversion was not
based on fraud or misrepresentation on the part of
Hachero, his title could still be cancelled and the subject
land reverted back to the State because the grant was
made through mistake or oversight. This could probably be
the reason why, shortly after one (1) year from the
issuance of OCT No. E-18011 to Hachero, the DENR
personnel conducted another investigation and verification
on the subject land. It would appear that they suspected
that a mistake was made in their issuance of the patent as
the subject land had not been reclassified or released as
alienable or disposable land. It remained plotted within the
timberland classification zone.
2. Prescription and estoppel cannot
lie against the State
At any rate, it is a time-honored principle that the statute of
limitations or the lapse of time does not run against the
State. Jurisprudence also recognizes the State's immunity
from estoppel as a result of the mistakes or errors of its
officials and agents.
It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued
under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a
homestead patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible
as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration
proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is
a disposable public land within the contemplation of the
Public Land Law. Yet, we emphasize that our statement in
the aforequoted case that a certificate of title issued
pursuant to a homestead patent becomes indefeasible after
one year, is subject to the proviso that "the land covered by
said certificate is a disposable public land within the
Notes of Cesnee Tan
contemplation of the Public Land Law."
But then again, the Court had several times in the past
recognized the right of the State to avail itself of the
remedy of reversion in other instances when the title to the
land is void for reasons other than having been secured by
fraud or misrepresentation.
Be that as it may, the mistake or error of the officials or
agents of the BOL in this regard cannot be invoked against
the government with regard to property of the public
domain. It has been said that the State cannot be estopped
by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents.
Republic v. Espinosa,
G.R. No. 186603, [April 5, 2017])
The State failed to prove that the property was classified as
forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral decree
and issuance of title to Espinosa.
In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the
burden of overcoming the presumption of State ownership.
It must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that
the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable
based on a positive act of the government. 30 Since
cadastral proceedings are governed by the usual rules of
practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a
certificate of title are issued only after the applicant proves
all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to
the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence
is considered.31 As such, the cadastral decree is a
judgment which adjudicates ownership after proving these
jurisdictional facts.32
Here, it is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral
decree and was subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N, the
predecessor title of Caliston's TCT No. 91117. Having been
granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can
be presumed to have overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. 33 This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was
able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property
is alienable and disposable property in the cadastral
proceedings.
This is not to say, however, that the State has no remedy to
recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable
lands of the public domain. The State may still do so
through an action for reversion, as in the present case.
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the
Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of
the public domain. 34 It is proper when public land is
fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals
or corporations.35 There are also instances when we
granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as
when a "person obtains a title under the Public Land Act
which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be
registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director
of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it
is of the public domain."36
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Natural Resources 1st Exam (2017-2018)
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General,
alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral
proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa's
favor. The argument for the State is merely that the
property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title
because it is of the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land
registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the
property was classified as timberland or forest land at the
time it was decreed to Espinosa.37 To reiterate, there is no
burden on Caliston to prove that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land. 38 At this stage, it is
reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston
derived her title, had already established that the property
is alienable and disposable land considering that she
succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it.39 In this reversion
proceeding, the State must prove that there was an
oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in
Espinosa' s title because it was of public dominion. This is
consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on
the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the
nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue.40
Here, the State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of
evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986.
The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not
formally offered in evidence. The rules require that
documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence
after the presentation of testimonial evidence, and it may
be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing.41 Due
process requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit
of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate
courts.42 This gives the adverse party the opportunity to
examine and oppose the admissibility of the evidence.43
When evidence has not been formally offered, it should not
be considered by the court in arriving at its decision.44 Not
having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court
to have considered the survey map. Consequently, it also
erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the mass
of the public domain on the basis of the same.
Moreover, even assuming that the survey can be admitted
in evidence, this will not help to further the State's
cause.1âwphi1 This is because the only fact proved by the
map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the
land was reclassified in 1986.45 This fact does not address
the presumption/conclusion that Espinosa has, at the time
of the cadastral proceedings conducted in 1955, proved
that the land is alienable and disposable, as evidenced by
the decree issued in his favor in 1962.
II
The reclassification of the area where the property is
located in 1986 should not prejudice Espinosa and her
successor-in-interest.46 Apropos is the case of Sta. Monica
Industrial and Dev't Corp. v. Court of Appeals. 47 In that
Notes of Cesnee Tan
case, the State offered in evidence a land classification map
to prove that at the time the land was decreed to the
original owner, it had not yet been released and still fell
within the forest zone. However, the map did not
conclusively state the actual classification of the land at the
time it was adjudicated to the original owner. We thus ruled
that the State failed to prove that the titles should be
annulled- Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an
action to annul a judgment, the burden of proving the
judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
judgment is fatally defective. When the proceedings were
originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals,
the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of
De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels
of land were still part of the inalienable public forests.
However, petitioner's case rested solely on land
classification maps drawn several years after the issuance
of the decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively
establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and
the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner
reiterates said contention and refers, for the first time, to a
1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a
naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of
land are parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier,
are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor
of the decree's regularity, more so when we consider that
notice of the application for registration and the date of
hearing thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the
Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the
Director of Forestry, among others, was published in the
Official Gazette and that Governor General Smith's
Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private rights.48
We stress that our ruling is not inconsistent with the
doctrine that forest lands are outside the commerce of man
and unsusceptible of private appropriation.1âwphi1 Neither
are we changing the rule on imprescriptibility of actions for
reversion. We are merely deciding on the facts as proved by
the record. To allow a reversion based on a classification
made at the time when the property was already declared
private property by virtue of a decree would be akin to
expropriation of land without due process of law.49
At this juncture, we agree with the CA' s application of
SAAD AgroIndustries, Inc., 50 which involved a complaint
for annulment of title and reversion of a lot covered by a
free patent and original title. To support its claim that the
lot was part of the timberland and forest reserve, the State
submitted as evidence a photocopy of a land classification
map. This map also became the basis of the testimonies of
City Environment and Natural Resources Office officers
declaring that the lot falls within the timberland or forest
reserve. The State, however, failed to submit either a
certified true copy or an official publication of the map,
prompting the trial court to deny its admission in evidence.
After proceedings, the trial court dismissed the complaint
due to the State's failure to show that the subject lot
therein is part of the timberland or forest reserve or has
been classified as such before the issuance of the free
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patent and the original title. The CA, relying on the map,
reversed the trial court.
When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated
the trial court's decision. We held that the photocopy of the
land classification map cannot be considered in evidence
because it is excluded under the best evidence rule. We
emphasized that all parties, including the Government, are
bound by the rules of admissibility and must comply with it-
The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The
same rule holds true when the Government is one of the
parties. The Government, when it comes to court to litigate
with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of
procedure and its rights and privileges at every stage of the
proceedings are substantially in every respect the same as
those of its citizens; it cannot have a superior advantage.
This is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the
jurisdiction of the court and participates therein, its claims
and rights are justiciable by every other principle and rule
applicable to the claims and rights of the private parties
under similar circumstances. Failure to abide by the rules
on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by
respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the subject
lot is part of the forest reserve. 51
We went on to explain that even if the map was admitted in
evidence to prove that the lot was classified as part of the
timberland or forest reserve, the classification was made
long after private interests had intervened. Not only was
the lot already occupied and cultivated, a free patent and a
certificate of title were also awarded and issued years
ahead of the classification- Even assuming that the L.C.
Map submitted by respondent is admissible in evidence, still
the land in question can hardly be considered part of the
timberland or forest reserve. L.C. Map No. 2961, which
purports to be the "correct map of the areas demarcated as
permanent forest pursuant of the provisions of P.D. No. 705
as amended" was made only in 1980. Thus, the delineation
of the areas was made nine (9) years after Orcullo was
awarded the free patent over the subject lot.
xxx
Obviously, private interests have intervened before
classification was made pursuant to P.D. No. 705. Not only
has Orcullo by herself and through her predecessors-
ininterest cultivated and possessed the subject lot since
1930, a free patent was also awarded to her and a title
issued in her name as early as 1971. In fact, it appears that
the issuance of the free patent and certificate of title was
regular and in order. Orcullo complied with the requisites
for the acquisition of free patent provided under
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), as certified
by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
xxx
The Regalian doctrine is well-enshrined not only in the
present Constitution, but also in the 1935 and 1973
Notes of Cesnee Tan
Constitutions. The Court has always recognized and upheld
the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of the State's
property regime. Nevertheless, in applying this doctrine, we
must not lose sight of the fact that in every claim or right
by the Government against one of its citizens, the
paramount considerations of fairness and due process must
be observed. Respondent in this case failed to show that
the subject lot is part of timberland or forest reserve it
adverted to. In the face of the uncontroverted status of
Free Patent No. 473408 and OCT No. 0-6667 as valid and
regular issuances, respondent's insistence on the
classification of the lot as part of the forest reserve must be
rejected. 52
These principles laid down in SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc.
undoubtedly apply here. As part of fair play and due
process, the State is as bound by the rules on formal offer
of evidence as much as every private party is. More, the
State's subsequent reclassification of the area where the
property is situated cannot be used to defeat the rights of a
private citizen who acquired the land in a valid and regular
proceeding conducted 24 years earlier.
The result would have been different had the State proved
that the property was already classified as part of forest
land at the time of the cadastral proceedings and when title
was decreed to Espinosa in 1962. However, it failed to
discharge this burden; the grant of title which carries with it
the presumption that Espinosa had already proved the
alienable character of the property in the cadastral
proceedings stands. To grant the reversion based on a
subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence,
would amount to taking of private property without just
compensation and due process of law.53 This, however, is
not what our Constitution envisions; fairness and due
process are paramount considerations that must still be
observed.54
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