District Representatives and questions of apportionment

Aldaba v. COMELEC

GR. 188078

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declare unconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which
creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city. The said RA
was based on an undated certification issued by Region III, Regional Director Miranda of the NSO
that Malolos will have a projected population of 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit a representative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not RA 9591 was unconstitutional?

Ruling: Yes. Article VI section 3 of the constitution requires that a “legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of two hundred fifty thousand, or each province shall have at least one
representative. In the give case, it was computed that using the correct figures for the growth
rate, even if compounded, the malolos population of 223,069 as of August 2007 will grow only
to 249,333 by August 2010.

Moreover, the regional director’s certification is without legal effect as if failed to comply with
EO 135 which requires that the ceritification on demographic projection can be issued only if such
is declared by National Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, the certification was not
declared official by such board. The Reg. Director is likewise without authority as the NSO
certification can only be issued by the NSO administrator or his representative.
Freedom from arrest; effect of imprisonment
Trillianes IV v. Pimentel Sr.

GR 179817

Facts: Petitioner Antonio Trillanes IV led a failed coup de etat and was subsequently charged and
detained in violation of article 134 A of the Revised Penal code. While in detention, petitioner
ran and won in the 2007 senatorial elections. Before the commencement of his term, petitioner
file with the RTC an omnibus motion for leave of court to attend senate sessions and related
requests. The RTC denied such motion as well as its subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Thus, He filed this petition for prohibition and mandamus enjoining the respondents from
banning his senatorial staff from meeting or transaction with him and to allow him to attend
senate sessions.

Issue:

1. Whether or not a distinction should be made between the Jalosjos case and the Trillianes case
2. Whether or not Trillanes‘ election as senator provides legal justification to allow him to work
and serve his mandate as senator.

Ruling:

1. No, the bail prohibition on capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong apply equally to
both rape and coup de etat cases as both are punishable by reclusion perpetua. Within the class
of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as
to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime charged. In the present
case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on recognizance
was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a
hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty. This
accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is “regardless of the
stage of the criminal action.”

2. The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no “prior term” to
speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation
does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner’s electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when
the voters elected him to the Senate, “they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which
he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering mis impression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution
and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching
tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties
imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is
only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of
the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by
law.

Electoral Tribunals and Commission on Appointments (composition)

Robles v. HRET and Romeo Santos
GR. 866647

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent were both candidates for Congressman in the first
legislative district of Caloocan city in the May 11, 1987 Congressional Elections.

Santos filed an election protest with HRET as the previous election was riddled with electoral
frauds and irregularities. He then filed a motion to withdraw election contest but later filed an
urgent motion to recall/disregard his previous motion.

As such, petitioner now claims that HRET was divested of jurisdiction when the first motion was
withdrawn.

Issue: Whether or not the HRET was divested of jurisdiction when the first motion was
withdrawn?

Ruling: No. The mere filing of the motion to withdraw protest on the remaining uncontested
precincts, without any action on the part of respondent tribunal, does not by itself divest the
tribunal of its jurisdiction over the case.

It is an established doctrine that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost at the instance of the
parties but continues until the case is terminated. Certainly, the Tribunal retains the authority
to grant or deny the Motion, and the withdrawal becomes effective only when the Motion is
granted. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction already
acquired.