CONTENTS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PROLOGUE
THE HISTORY OF THE MARTIAL ARTS
MODERN COMBATIVES
FIGHTING WITH WEAPONS
FIGHTING STRATEGIES AND TRAINING METHODS
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLEFIELD
BASIC TECHNIQUES
COMBATIVES BELT-PROMOTION SYSTEM
COMPETITIONS
 Black Belt Books, Valencia CA 91355
Copyright © 2013 Cruz Bay Publishing, Inc
All Rights Reserved
Electronic Edition Published 2013
Manufactured in the United States of America
Edited by Vicki Baker and Jeannine Santiago
Graphic Design by John Bodine
Photography by Peter Lueders
Warning
This book is presented only as a means of preserving a unique aspect of the heritage of the
martial arts. Neither Ohara Publications nor the author makes any representation, warranty
or guarantee that the techniques described or illustrated in this book will be safe or
effective in any self-defense situation or otherwise. You may be injured if you apply or
train in the techniques illustrated in this book and neither Ohara Publications nor the
author is responsible for any such injury that may result. It is essential that you consult a
physician regarding whether or not to attempt any technique described in this book.
Specific self-defense responses illustrated in this book may not be justified in any
particular situation in view of all of the circumstances or under applicable federal, state or
local law. Neither Ohara Publications nor the author makes any representation or warranty
regarding the legality or appropriateness of any technique mentioned in this book.
 ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Matt Larsen started training in the martial arts as a young Marine infantryman stationed
in Tokyo and later Okinawa. He traveled and fought across East Asia from Korea and
Thailand to the Philippines. He continued his training and switched over to the Army
serving in the 75th Ranger Regiment for more than 12 years, including parachuting into
Torrijos/Tacumen airfield during the invasion of Panama and Ranger operations during the
Gulf War.
Holding black belts in several martial arts, Larsen served as the noncommissioned
officer in charge of combatives training for the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and as the program
grew, he trained the entire 75th Ranger Regiment, where he was also the regimental
master trainer for close-quarters battle and marksmanship. In 2002, as NCOIC for the
combatives program Ranger Training Brigade, he wrote Combatives: FM 3-25.150, the
Army’s field manual on hand-to-hand combat, which led to a training program for the
entire Army.
In 2002 Larsen founded what would become the U.S. Army Combatives School and
served as its commandant until retiring in 2005. After that, he was hired as the civilian
director of the U.S. Army Combatives Program.
Larsen has seen action around the world while working as a soldier and security
contractor, including combat in Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. He helped rewrite
the combatives curriculum for the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School, the U.S. Air Force and the Canadian Special Operations Regiment. He has
consulted with the Royal Marine Commandos as well as the British Army’s Infantry
Training Centre, Catterick, on the development of their combatives programs.
He rewrote the U.S. Army Survival Handbook and the U.S. Military Pocket Survival
Guide: Plus Evasion & Recovery and co-wrote Sniper: American Single-Shot Warriors in
Iraq and Afghanistan (2010). In addition, he wrote the 2009 version of FM 3-25.150. He
is a trainer and consultant on combatives and combatives training systems, marksmanship,
close-quarters battle and small-unit tactics using his combined knowledge from 30 years
of experience as an operator and teacher.
Larsen’s methods and concepts have revolutionized combatives training and the culture
of the U.S. military.
 PROLOGUE
The following story was told by Staff Sgt. Paul McCully during a post-action interview.
At the time of these events, McCully was a member of the U.S. Army’s B Company, 3rd
Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Stryker Brigade
Combat Team, of Fort Lewis, Washington.
On June 1, 2005, at about 2 a.m., I was staged with my platoon near the main gate of
Forward Operating Base Courage in Mosul, Iraq, as the Quick Reaction Force for our
battalion. We received a call that Iraqi commandos, friendly to the United States, were
conducting a raid on a suspected insurgent safe house. When the commandos entered the
house, they found one male, one nude female and next to them was a bomb. The
commandos, numbering about 100, immediately left the house because of the bomb and
sat outside — where they slept, smoked cigarettes or just hung about — while they waited
for us to come and secure the objective.
When we showed up, it was a blind hit. All the Iraqi commandos told us was that they
had taken fire from that building earlier. They left out the fact that it was a safe house for
bad guys and that the people who had been there had jumped the roof to the next house. At
the home of the bomb couple, we entered in teams; I was with the second team. We
secured the first floor and established a foothold. Once we cleared the house, my platoon
sergeant stepped on a loose tile in the kitchen floor. When we removed the tile, we found a
large cache of rocket-propelled grenades, ammo, U.S.-government-issued C-4 explosives,
two-way radios and multiple weapons systems but no people.
Because the roof of the house we were in was connected to the roof of the house behind
it, the call was made to move around and clear that house, too. Once my team moved into
position to breach the second house, we were given the word to secure it. Immediately on
entry, we were confronted by about 20 men, women and children who were all awake and
seemed scared. They were bunched together — a red flag that something was not right.
Once we secured the first floor, my team moved in to secure the group of people so we
could move up to the next floor and to the roof entrance. The door was barricaded from
the inside with a bed frame to keep people from coming in from the roof. Once we
managed to move the barricade, we stacked together at the door and proceeded to clear the
roof. Sgt. Joshua Owens was the first man in the stack, and I was right behind him.
Owens went out and turned right. I followed him and went left but was met by a wall,
so I fanned right to cover him. We were only a couple of steps outside the door; I was just
to the left of Owens. About two seconds passed when a bright flash lit us up.
I wasn’t sure what had happened, I just knew I was laid out on my stomach, and I
couldn’t feel my hands or legs. I could hear Owens screaming, and I was checking myself
to see whether I was physically intact when another explosion — a hand grenade — went
off, but it wasn’t as loud as the first one. I felt shrapnel impact my helmet. I was dazed and
confused, and sounds were muffled. Then I felt something tapping my helmet. My initial
thought was that my guys were pulling me out of there, but when I looked up, everything
came back to me — sound, reality, cleared vision. There was a bad guy standing over me.
 I was looking up at him and expecting him to unload his AK-47 on me, but he was
screaming and butt-stroking me in the head. I got up as fast as I could. I don’t even
remember placing my hands on the ground to push myself up. It just seemed like I floated
up. That’s how fast it happened. I grabbed the muzzle of his gun with my right hand and
the right shoulder of his shirt with my left hand.
After I grabbed him and his weapon, I jerked the gun in an outward motion, making
sure to keep the muzzle away from me. After what seemed to be two or three seconds, I
jerked the AK-47 out of his hands and it went flying. He tried to dive for it, but I grabbed
him and went to the Thai clinch, placing both my hands behind his neck to control his
upper body. Our bodies were close together. I had his hair in my right hand, pushing his
head down, and my left hand was controlling his left shoulder. I immediately started
throwing right uppercuts and knees to mess him up.
I held on to him by his shirt and hair, and I extended my arms to allow the guys who I
thought were behind me to have a clear shot. But that never happened.
I thought that there were more of my own guys behind me, but it turned out that Owens
and I were the only ones who had made it outside before the initial explosion. The No. 3
and No. 4 men had gotten blown back into the building.
It seemed like I was alone, with no one there to help me. The guy was screaming about
Allah, and I continued to hit him as he struggled to get to his weapon. Owens came
running up to me with his pistol drawn. He had lost his M4 rifle in the blast also, so he
pulled his M9 pistol.
Owens came up next to me on my right side so he wouldn’t shoot me in the struggle. As
he fired one shot into the enemy’s stomach, the guy reached up and grabbed Owens’
pistol. At that moment, I let go and took a step back and secured my M4. Owens had
swung him around to the left, which put him right in front of me.
With the two of them fighting for Owens’ M9, I put the barrel of my rifle in the bad
guy’s right side, point-blank, right underneath his armpit, and fired a single shot. He
squealed like a pig and hit the ground like a sack of shit, landing on his back. I
immediately placed the barrel of my rifle in his face and fired 10 shots to finish him. All
this happened within a matter of about 20 seconds, but it seemed like forever.
As far as my kit goes, I didn’t have a knife on me at that time. I was wearing a plate
carrier with 7.62 x 61 mm armor-piercing incendiary-proof plates, operator gloves with
hard plastic knuckles, ballistic eye protection and kneepads.
After I shot him in the face, I took a knee and was trying to comprehend everything that
had just happened. I thought, Holy shit, did this just happen? I was in a kind of weird
euphoria.
My platoon leader came out and asked whether we were hit, and I told him nothing hurt
but my leg felt different. They pulled me and Owens into the building for the medic.
Because we had blood and charred flesh and hair all over us, it was hard for the medic to
tell what was ours and what wasn’t. Spc. Danny Pech, our platoon medic, and Spc. Joshua
Curley, my rifleman, with the help of Spc. Jay Banuelos, carried us down to the designated
casualty collection point and started stripping us down so they could administer aid.
 My wound was first reported as a gunshot wound to my right thigh, and Owens had a
bullet graze on his right shin and shrapnel to his arms and legs. Once we were medevaced
to the main combat support hospital on Forward Operating Base Diamondback in Mosul,
we were given morphine and sent for X-rays to see what was inside us. My wound was
actually shrapnel, which had split into three pieces when it hit my leg, stopping just short
of my femoral artery. Owens had shrapnel in his arm and leg and a bullet graze on his
right shin.
I’ve always been a pretty aggressive person, but having some stuff to back you up, like
the Army combatives training, is great. It’s always good to have knowledge and
experience. When I looked up and saw [the enemy] standing over me, all I really thought
about was, This guy’s going to blast me. I was thinking about how I was going to let my
kids down, and I just thought, Screw it, I’m not going to die lying down like this. I just
jumped up and expected him to pull the trigger, but he never got the chance.
 CHAPTER ONE

THE HISTORY OF THE MARTIAL ARTS

Where do the martial arts come from? Most people would answer that they come from
East Asia. The truth is that every culture that has a need for martial arts has them. Fighting
manuals from medieval Europe show many of the same techniques that we teach today.
The ancient Greeks had wrestling, boxing and pankration. Paintings on the walls of
Egyptian tombs that are more than 4,000 years old show armed and unarmed fighting
techniques that would seem familiar to many of today’s martial artists.
JITSU AND DO
You can learn quite a bit about the nature of martial arts by looking at the Japanese arts.
Their history is a microcosm of martial arts in general, and certain aspects are very useful
in understanding American attitudes toward martial arts in particular.
Every Japanese martial art ends either with jitsu or do, as in jujitsu/judo, kenjitsu/kendo
and aikijitsu/aikido. For the original martial arts that end with “jitsu,” the term means “the
art” or “technique.” These styles were created out of the necessity of a violent time, when
there was a definite need for fighting ability. These particular training styles existed to
produce competent fighters.
As Japanese society became more settled and peaceful, the ability to fight well became
less important. This was true even for members of the warrior class, the samurai. This, and
the modernization of the Japanese military, resulted in banning swords — the badge of the
samurai rank — effectively making the members of the warrior class the same as everyone
else.
This meant that thousands of men who had spent their entire lives learning to fight now
had no real need for their martial abilities. Most of them simply stopped practicing the
martial arts altogether and blended with other members of society. Some realized that they
had gained more than just the ability to fight. Training in the martial arts had made them
into men. This became the new reason to practice the martial arts. Now the primary goal
was not to produce competent fighters but to produce better people. One very good
example of this is Jigoro Kano, the founder of judo.
As a young man, Kano became an expert in several systems of jujitsu. However, not
only was he an expert in jujitsu, but he also was a teacher. He was director of the Tokyo
Higher Normal School (precursor of the present Tokyo University of Education) for 23
years and chief of the Education Bureau of the Ministry of Education.
As Kano continued his studies in jujitsu, he realized that it could be used as a tool to
develop more well-rounded people. With this in mind, he reformatted the jujitsu he knew
into a better teaching tool and called it judo. So the main difference between the jujitsu
that he learned and the judo that he taught was the purpose. Jujitsu was mostly concerned
with fighting ability and skills, whereas judo was most concerned with building the
character of students.
THE MODERN MARTIAL ARTS
Although I have been talking specifically about the Japanese martial arts, this transition
from jitsu to do is indicative of the modern martial arts world. If you read or listen to
almost anything about training put out by an expert in the contemporary martial arts
community, it will almost invariably be colored by this new intention for training.
To put things in perspective, imagine an accountant somewhere in America trying to
decide whether martial arts training is practical. If training cost him $100 a month, he will
spend $1,200 per year. What are the odds that he will be assaulted and robbed — by a
bandit who would use techniques that the accountant’s martial arts training could stop —
of $1,200 per year? Therefore, from a fiscal perspective, it makes more sense to save his
money. Now consider his chances of becoming injured during a class compared with his
chances of becoming injured by an assault. It doesn’t make much sense for the average
citizen to train in the martial arts, aside from the notion that they may join the military or
law enforcement.
There are many good reasons to train that have little to do with the practical need for
fighting ability. Thousands of people across America are learning to fight with a samurai
sword right now. Very few of them believe they may need to defend themselves against
sword-wielding ninjas on the way to their car at the mall. They practice because they
enjoy it. This, of course, is completely different from the situation with the Army.
Modern Army Combatives training therefore stands apart from the vast majority of
martial arts disciplines in that producing actual fighting ability is of primary concern. The
mental and physical aspects of training are primarily beneficial to producing capable
soldiers.
HISTORY OF COMBATIVES TRAINING
The first U.S. Army combatives manual (Manual of Bayonet Exercise: Prepared for the
Use of the Army of the United States) was published in 1852. It was a translation of a
French bayonet-fencing manual by young Capt. George McClellan. Since that time, the
Army has always had combatives training doctrines although not always successful
combatives training. Bayonet fencing, as delineated in McClellan’s manual, was the
accepted training method for the next half century.
Bayonet Fencing
Bayonet fencing was a skill-based system. The Army held competitions in it regularly,
and it was accepted even outside the Army. It became the fourth internationally
recognized form of fencing — with foil, epee and sabre — and was an Olympic sport until
1936.
Bayonet fencing, as outlined in the 1852 manual, remained the universally accepted
training method, not only in the United States but also in Europe, until it was shown to be
ineffective in the trenches during World War I. In the confined space of a trench, the
techniques and weapons designed for the confined parameters of the fencing strip proved
themselves worse than useless. It didn’t take soldiers long to realize they were better off
with an entrenching tool and a bag full of grenades than with a bolt-action rifle with a
bayonet on the end of it.
Early 20th-Century Japanese Influences
During the first decades of the 20th century, teaching empty-hand fighting techniques to
soldiers began in an organized way on a large scale. There were several attempts to teach
jujitsu and judo, which had been known in the United States since even before President
Theodore Roosevelt had trained with Yamashita Yoshitsugu, one of the best students of
Kano. Roosevelt had a “judo room” at the White House. Yoshitsugu later taught at the
U.S. Naval Academy. In 1920 a training manual was published at Fort Benning, Georgia,
written by Capt. Allan Corstorphin Smith, who had been awarded a judo black belt from
the Kodokan in Japan in 1916 and who was the hand-to-hand combat instructor at the
Infantry School.
With the rapid expansion of armies demanded by World War I, military trainers had
little time to teach the average soldier the complex techniques of judo and jujitsu taught by
Smith and others. Because of this and because bayonet fencing fell out of favor as a
fighting method in trench warfare, the Army lost faith in skill-based combatives training
programs. In the interwar years, non-skill-based techniques like pugil sticks and bayonet
assault courses were taught and gained prominence.
World War II
World War II saw a smattering of attempts at combatives training. Many of the top
names from boxing and wrestling at the time were brought in to train the various services.
Most programs had only partial success because the men had limited training time
available, considering the demands of fielding an Army of several million men.
The most successful programs were offshoots of the British commando training taught
by William E. Fairbairn and Eric A. Sykes. These two had trained the police force in
Shanghai before the war. With his depth of real-world experience, Fairbairn, who was also
a second-degree black belt in judo, had been brought back to Britain early in the war.
Fairbairn and American protégé Col. Rex Applegate practiced a limited number of simple,
effective techniques, with emphasis on aggressiveness and stressing the incivility of real
fights. (In fact, Applegate wrote a manual titled Kill or Get Killed in 1943, and Fairbairn
often referred to what he taught as “gutter fighting.”) They were able to somewhat
overcome the limitations of a lack of training time. Applegate also used feedback from the
field to adjust the curriculum. By the end of the war, thousands of soldiers had trained in
their methods.
Postwar Years
With the drawdown at the end of World War II, combatives training in the Army
virtually ceased. Lacking a train-the-trainer program, virtually all the teaching had been
done by a very small number of instructors such as Fairbairn and Applegate. With no
follow-on plan — other than continuing to practice the same limited number of techniques
— meaningful training came to a halt. There was a field manual. However, actual training
was reduced to initial entry training and was taught by drill sergeants with very little
official training. Quality inevitably plummeted.
Periodic attempts were made, especially as martial arts became more popular in the
United States, to introduce various training methods and techniques to the force. These
efforts were generally fruitless because of the lack of any mechanism for ensuring quality
instruction or training. There were a couple of notable exceptions in the mid-20th century:
the Air Force and the Marine Corps.
• Air Force Instructor Course and Follow-On Training
The Air Force Strategic Air Command under Gen. Curtis E. LeMay implemented a judo
program beginning in 1950. In 1952 the first class of 13 instructors went to Japan to train
at the Kodokan, the premier judo school in Tokyo. Within the next 10 years, there were
more than 160 black-belt judo instructors in the command. Between 1959 and 1962, a
judo instructor course at Stead Air Force Base in Nevada graduated nearly 10,000
instructors from a five-week course. The curriculum included judo, aikido, karate, air-
police techniques, aircrew self-defense, judo tournament procedures, code of conduct and
training methods classes.
The Air Force program was built around a club system. Instructors were placed at gyms
located on Air Force bases. All airmen were given basic instruction in the institutional
training pipeline, and follow-on training was made available at the post gymnasiums. This
training plan resulted in a reasonably large group with real expertise. In fact, the instructor
cadre formed a judo association that eventually outgrew the Air Force, becoming the U.S.
Judo Association, which is the largest judo organization in America.
The club nature of the training meant, though, that real skill was essentially limited to
those who were self-motivated to attend the training sessions. This, the fact that the
training methodology of judo was not built around producing proficient fighters quickly,
and the reliance on the enthusiasm of local commanders meant that the skill level of the
average airman remained low. Eventually, command influence waned and the program
within the Air Force died.
• Marine Corps Instructor Course and Follow-On Training
The Marine Corps adopted the Linear Infighting Neurological-Override Engagement
combat system in 1988. Primarily designed by Master Sgt. Ron Donvito, LINE was a
systematic way to teach and practice techniques derived from traditional martial arts in an
organized fashion. Techniques were presented in subsets called ditties; each subset
included related techniques such as defense to grabs or defense to punches. The training
was done in unit formation, which facilitated training in Initial Entry Training and other
institutional environments. There was also an instructor training course at Quantico,
Virginia.
Although the LINE system had more widespread success than even the Strategic Air
Command judo program, it suffered from different deficiencies. Principal among these
was its training methodology, which was built around formal methods of instruction best
suited for institutional training and insistence that every technique be “deadly.” A reliance
on formal training settings and formations that are less likely in regular units than in an
institutional setting meant that LINE training had to compete with other formal training
events such as physical training. The result was that training was less likely to be
conducted in the force. The insistence on “deadly” techniques did not fit the needs of the
Marine Corps or the demands of the modern battlefield. Additionally, the techniques of the
LINE system (defense to a grab, punch, chokes, etc.), which had been drawn from civilian
martial arts, were reactive in nature. Reactive techniques, in which the enemy initiates the
action and the soldier must react, are the norm for self-defense systems and passive
martial arts of the civilian world. They do, however, have serious drawbacks as a basis for
a combatives system.
 CHAPTER TWO

MODERN COMBATIVES
In 1995 when Gen. Stanley McChrystal, then a lieutenant colonel commanding the 2nd
Ranger Battalion, ordered a reinvigoration of combatives, it didn’t take long for serious
problems with the Army’s combatives doctrine to surface. There was a widespread belief
among the battalion’s Rangers that the doctrine was lacking and that combatives was a
waste of valuable training time.
The Army had a combatives field manual, titled FM 21-150: Combatives (1992), but no
effective way to implement it. There was neither a program to produce qualified
instructors nor a standardized system to implement training for the men at the unit level. It
was left to each local commander’s discretion; meaning, in most units, there was no
training for instructors or soldiers at all. In those where training did occur, the job of
instructor inevitably fell to whatever martial arts hobbyist happened to be in the unit. The
sessions adhered to the principles of the civilian martial arts they had happened to study in
their off-duty time.
I was part of an ad hoc committee formed in 1995 by some of the more experienced
martial artists among leaders in the battalion. Together, we had taken on the task of
training our small units. The initial group consisted primarily of leaders who trained
during their off time in bujinkan ninpo techniques and others who had wrestled at various
levels. Some also held black belts in various traditional martial arts.
I was the outlier with a long martial arts training background that began 11 years before
while stationed in Japan as a young Marine. I had trained in karate and judo while there
and, over the years since, had earned several black belts. I also boxed and kickboxed. By
1995 I was training judo and had begun learning Brazilian jiu-jitsu.
Pooling our collective experience, we began to develop a training program tailored to
the battalion’s needs: effective training methods in limited time. J Robinson, a Ranger
combat veteran during Vietnam and the head coach at the University of Minnesota
wrestling program, came out to evaluate the emerging program. At that early stage of
development, it was mostly a combination of old combatives techniques and bujinkan
ninpo. Robinson provided valuable advice, saying that a successful program must have
competition, including “live” sparring, at its core in order to cultivate a combatives culture
among soldiers. This fit perfectly with what I had been teaching my soldiers — mostly
judo and jiu-jitsu. After years of trying to teach striking and throwing skills, I had finally
figured out that soldiers picked up ground grappling much more quickly. My men had
begun earning a reputation as fighters because of their success in the fighting/wrestling
that went on constantly, mostly in fun, between the squads and platoons of the Rangers.
As the group began developing a program based on the various martial arts we had
experienced, it became evident that the only instructors having any success with imparting
real skill to their soldiers were those who emphasized ground grappling. After considering
many different systems and weighing the success of ground grappling heavily, a decision
was made to send a small group of Rangers to train at the Gracie Jiu-Jitsu Academy in
Torrance, California, made famous by their victories in the Ultimate Fighting
Championship.
The type of jiu-jitsu taught by the Gracie family fit many of the battalion’s needs. The
Gracies had originally learned from Mitsuyo Maeda, a student of Kodokan judo, but they
had added the concept of a hierarchy of dominant body positions. This revolutionary idea
provided a basic strategy to win fights and could offer an organized framework for
learning. It was therefore easy to learn. It had a competitive form and was proved effective
within the realm of one-on-one unarmed arena fighting or challenge matches.
Its success in the octagon, however, was also its greatest shortcoming. It was designed
primarily for the one-on-one challenge matches that had made it famous and not for the
complex situations that arise in battle. Despite this flaw, the general consensus was that it
would make a great base from which to grow a Ranger combatives system with input from
other sources. Rorion and Royce Gracie made three trips to the battalion over the next
couple of years, and a few Rangers, myself included, traveled to Torrance to train on our
own.
As the system matured, we began to realize what about the techniques of jiu-jitsu made
them work. Above all, they could be practiced at full speed against a fully resistant
opponent. This allowed techniques that do not work to be quickly identified and
abandoned for those that do. We also began to draw from other martial arts that share
various levels of this “live” training to fill in the tactical gaps.
By exploring the various training methods of the other (feeder) arts, the weaknesses and
ways in which they can complement each other became clear. The concept of positional
dominance from jiu-jitsu was expanded to the other ranges of combat and blended with
techniques from wrestling, boxing, muay Thai and judo, to name just a few. We also drew
on weapons fighting lessons from kali and the Western martial arts and our own
experiences from years in the Ranger Regiment, which included the limited combat of that
era. The Ranger Regiment, as an organization, is built on the concept of setting high
standards and then enforcing them. In keeping with that idea, we developed a set of basic
techniques that every Ranger would learn.
U.S. ARMY COMBATIVES SCHOOL
Most combatives programs before ours had started when commanders, who may or may
not have known anything about hand-to-hand combat, decided that they wanted their units
to train for that type of combat. They then did two things. First, they’d find someone they
thought knew martial arts to create and teach a curriculum. Second, they set aside a
limited time for it within their overall training schedule. The teachers, most likely martial
arts enthusiasts themselves, then decided what they were going to teach during the finite
amount of time they were given. With years of martial arts training behind them, which
martial art they knew was immaterial. They picked a set of simple, easy-to-learn
techniques that fit the tactical situation they thought their students would find themselves
in. It is a seemingly sensible method, which is why many units’ first forays into martial
arts nearly always happened this way.
Unfortunately, this approach almost always kills training in the unit, with soldiers never
reaching any sort of proficiency. To explain, imagine that the “unit” we are talking about
is the female employees of a major corporation and that the tactical situation you believe
they must prepare for is fighting off a sexual assault. The time available for training is
three hours on Saturday morning. The ladies will most likely enjoy the training. They will
sort of learn some techniques that might be useful but which they will never train on
again. They will have a very short-term lift in their self-confidence. However, six months
or six years later, when they are the victims of an assault, it will be as if the training never
happened because they never mastered or retained those skills. The outcome does not
change if the students are soldiers, the tactical situation is close-quarters battle and you
add a few more hours to the training. This approach to training simply does not work.
Worse, it also gives the organization a block to check that they are “trained.” As a result,
those who do not want to train further have an excuse to avoid it. Because the training
stops at the end of the official course, we coined the term “terminating training” to refer to
this approach.
Culture of Training
To get past the tendency to think of preparation as stopping at the end of a course, I
decided that training must — although it seems counterintuitive — be focused not on
immediate battlefield effectiveness but on building a culture of training in the unit. The
chaotic and unpredictable nature of combat makes teaching specific techniques to fit
anticipated situations to otherwise untrained fighters a total waste of training time.
However, in a very short period, people can be taught effective fight strategies that require
little skill to employ and, if training becomes a normal part of life in the unit, much higher
ability levels can be reached.
When involved in a fight, the strategy the average American male uses to win is to
strike his opponent with his fists until eventually his opponent can no longer fight back.
This is what we started calling the “universal fight plan.” It is almost instinctual. You
don’t even need to teach it, which is why it is entertaining that most striking-based martial
arts employ the same untrained fighter plan. The difference is that students attempt to
become more skillful at it. You can certainly become a better fighter this way, but it is not
a short-term proposition. Becoming proficient requires practice and dedication. Not every
skill is created equal when it comes to the ease with which it can be learned. It is certainly
easier to gain some competence in dribbling a basketball than in playing the violin, but the
fact that you have an opponent in a fight makes gaining skill at it more equivalent to
learning to dribble while driving down the court against someone attempting to steal the
ball or stop you. In other words, it’s going to take practice and dedication to gain
proficiency.
After years of attempting to teach striking skills to my soldiers, I realized that it was
difficult for them to reach proficiency in the short time available for combatives training.
So, on top of using the training as a primer and catalyst for further training, I decided that
it should give soldiers a better strategy to win. At first, we started by teaching the same
simple plan Royce Gracie had used to such great effect in the early Ultimate Fighting
Championship: Close the distance, gain a dominant position and then finish the fight.
Of course that basic plan is not a universal fit for every situation that soldiers may find
themselves in. This is one of the basic differences between what we were trying to achieve
and what the Gracies were teaching. But their method was a good start. It inculcated the
warrior spirit and started soldiers on the road to understanding fighting through the lens of
tactics rather than just memorizing techniques. It also addressed what we thought, given
our limited combat experience at the time, would be the most likely scenario in which a
Ranger would find himself in a hand-to-hand engagement — namely when a weapon jams
during an assault. We relied on the experience of soldiers returning from Iraq and
Afghanistan to fine-tune and develop the methods to deal with the way fights actually
occurred more often. However, the concept of teaching soldiers to fight more efficiently,
using simple tactics rather than relying on the memorization of techniques, has stood the
test of time and war.
The basic techniques of the system were chosen not because they were simple, easy to
teach or they fit the tactical situations we anticipated. Rather, they were chosen because
they laid the groundwork for follow-on training by teaching the fundamentals: the
hierarchy of dominant positions, the concept of “live” free sparring and giving soldiers a
simple fight strategy that would beat untrained fighters. It was also designed so that what
they learned would fit in their daily lives as Rangers. Drilling and sparring became a
common sight around the battalion area, and the abilities of the average Ranger began a
dramatic climb.
As the program matured, its success gained notice and it grew beyond the battalion.
McChrystal, by then a full colonel, took command of the entire Ranger Regiment and
brought me with him to the headquarters to spread the training to the rest of the Rangers.
The first Ranger Regimental Combatives Championship took place as one of the events
surrounding the 1998 Change of Command Ceremony when McChrystal gave up
command of the Ranger Regiment.
It is the nature of the Rangers that the leaders go back frequently to the regular infantry.
Before an officer may command a unit of Rangers, he must first prove himself by
commanding a similar-sized unit in the infantry. For example, a captain who wishes to
command a Ranger company must have first commanded a company in a unit such as the
101st Airborne Division or the 82nd Airborne Division and been selected from among his
peers. Similarly, a lieutenant colonel who commands a Ranger battalion will have already
commanded a battalion in the conventional infantry. As the senior leaders who had been
trained on the new system cycled out of the Ranger Regiment, demand for similar Army-
wide training gained traction. To spread the program to the rest of the Army, I transferred
to the Ranger Training Brigade, which runs the Ranger School and at the time was
responsible for combatives doctrine. Soon after transferring, I was asked to rewrite the
field manual. With the publication of The U.S. Army Field Manual for Combatives: FM 3-
25.150 (2002), the program, born in 2nd Ranger Battalion, became Army doctrine.
Establishing new doctrine is a long way from having every soldier trained in the new
system. After all, as mentioned in Chapter One, the doctrine for combatives for the Army
has existed since 1852. A mechanism to systematically train soldiers throughout the Army,
however, did not.
In 1999, Lt. Gen. Mike Ferriter, at the time a colonel commanding the 11th Infantry
Regiment, brought me in to help establish a training course for the cadre of the officer
training schools. I had taught him when he commanded the 3rd Ranger Battalion. The 11th
was responsible for conducting the infantry officer education courses at Fort Benning. The
training quickly became very popular among the young lieutenants and captains, just like
it had in the Ranger Regiment.
This cadre certification course eventually became the Level I Combatives Instructors
Course. As the training spread through the unit, the need became clear for an additional
course to provide more supervision of the training. That became the Level II course.
Skeptical senior commanders kept these courses limited to ground grappling at the time.
Many of them had grown up after Vietnam but before September 11, 2001, and held the
mistaken belief that there was a division between so-called “combat” and “noncombat”
soldiers. In addition, attempts to integrate combatives and close-quarters-battle training
were looked on as unnecessary. The main objective of combatives was to build
confidence, just like it had been for pugil stick-fighting and bayonet assault courses of the
World War I era.
By the time fighting started in Afghanistan, what would become the U.S. Army
Combatives School at Fort Benning had already been unofficially established with the
mission to train instructors to man the various infantry schools at the base.
Moving Between Levels
It is difficult to teach adults to execute takedowns and throws effectively in a short
period. When my oldest son, Brett, was about 7, I took him to a Brazilian jiu-jitsu
tournament. Because he grew up hanging around the gym, his ground-grappling technique
was already well-developed. He didn’t have much experience with takedowns, however,
because there simply weren’t any other children for him to practice with. At the
tournament, just before he went onto the mat for his first fight, I showed him how to hit a
head and arm throw, and I had him practice it on me. Being 7, and having total faith in
what his father taught him, he went out and successfully executed a head and arm throw
on every kid he fought that day.
Had I done that with almost any adult who was not already a skilled fighter — in fact, if
I had spent a month drilling the technique with them — the odds are that they would not
have attempted it. If they did, it likely would have been with so much hesitation that they
would fail to use the technique effectively. That is simply the nature of teaching
takedowns to most adults.
In the Level I course, the theory on how to best take the enemy down accounted for this.
Instead of teaching technical takedowns, we showed the students that if they were in front
of their opponent, they use a football tackle. If they were behind the opponent, they could
drag him down. Dragging an opponent down from the front (also called a sacrifice throw)
is ill-advised because it often results in your opponent sitting on your chest.
In the Level I course, specific techniques were taught, but their main purpose was to
impart the simple strategy. In the Level II course, it was time to take the next step in
learning effective takedowns.
Defense or Offense?
Self-defense is a common phrase in the martial arts world. Not only is it the reason
many people give for why they train, but it is also often explicitly the purpose of most
martial arts. All self-defense systems have this in common: They assume that the
practitioner will be on the defensive in any given altercation. In other words, their purpose
is to defend against an attack; therefore, the starting point is being attacked. The
techniques in these systems are reactive. If someone grabs you like this, then you react by
doing Technique No. 1. If he grabs you like that, you react with Technique No. 2. Or if he
tries to punch you like this, you counter the punch with Technique No. 13. In other words,
the opponent always has the initiative.
This approach to training may be necessary when training civilians to defend
themselves, but any system that cedes the initiative has serious drawbacks for soldiers.
Nonetheless, there has often been bleed-over from this approach to military training. The
LINE system used by the Marine Corps, for example, was made up of sets of techniques
such as defense to grabs, defense to punches or defense to chokes in exactly this way.
The problem with this is something that every junior-high wrestling coach understands.
When two people are facing each other, it is very difficult to predict with what method, of
the vast number possible, the opponent will attack. You are then forced to quickly
recognize that you are being attacked, identify the method of attack, remember the specific
technique to counter that method of attack and, finally, execute the counter before the
attack has effect. All that must happen between the time the opponent throws a punch or
shoot a double-leg takedown and the time the person lands the blow. The difficulty of
accomplishing all this before a punch can land is the inspiration for many satirical skits
about karate classes that include the lines, “Hit me! No slower” or “No, hit me like this.”
The wrestling coach understands that if you initiate action, your opponent must react to
you. Because there are only a few effective methods to defend any given attack, either
your attack will work or your opponent will be forced to react in a predictable way. By
seizing the initiative, you can control your opponent’s actions in the same way that you
can in chess. Because his reactions to your attack are predictable, you then can drill how
to counter them and continue your attack much more easily than reacting to his attack. If I
attack with Technique No. 1, he must attempt to counter with either A, B or C. If he does
A, I do Technique No. 2, if B, Technique No. 3 or if C, I do Technique No. 4. In this way,
large chains of related techniques can be drilled so that the fighter remains a step ahead of
his opponent throughout an attack. This method is called chain wrestling and is the norm
throughout the wrestling world.
Rather than just picking more advanced takedowns for the Level II course, we taught
via the chain principle by selecting a takedown sequence based on the attacks from the
Level I course. In keeping with the idea that the techniques in the system are a learning
metaphor, soldiers would initially have a good set of techniques, but what’s more
important, they would have understanding so that as they learned other things, from
whatever source, they would have the context and understanding to pick strong techniques
and build on their personal abilities in an effective manner.
As the number of people trained grew, the demand for combatives began spreading to
what the Army calls maneuver units — regular Army combat units, as opposed to the
training organizations for whom the courses had been designed. The program to this point
had been centered on teaching individual soldiers as a part of a larger course, such as the
Infantry Officers Basic Course. Having learned the lesson of “terminating training,” the
goal here was that after the course ended, soldiers would continue to train using the
methods they had learned.
This proved hugely successful, but it ran into a problem as it spread to combat units.
Few knew enough to run a continuing training program that was more than just a club of a
few motivated people. How to make sure that every soldier in the unit was training was
the larger issue, and there simply wasn’t enough time to teach what we knew about it in
the existing courses. There also wasn’t enough time to teach some of the other skills that
are important, nor was there enough time to teach how to integrate combatives into a
unit’s regular mission training. So I decided to create a longer course, with Level I and
Level II as prerequisites.
Curriculum in Context: Striking Skills
I had been thinking about what should be in the curriculum for a while before the
demand grew enough to actually hold the course. I would obviously need to teach striking
skills. I would also need to teach how striking affected fighting in the clinch, or the
standing grappling portion of the fight, which was proving to be one of the most important
skills in Iraq and Afghanistan, and integrate striking and clinch fighting with takedowns.
Weapons, of course, are a major component of fighting on the battlefield. All these
unarmed skills would have to be put into context with weapons fighting, including not
only how to fight with the weapons soldiers are issued but also using improvised weapons,
as well as fighting an armed opponent.
It was a challenge to teach striking skills. As easy as it seems to teach someone how to
punch, to get any actual improvement in fighting ability takes time. In almost any boxing
gym in the world, for instance, you can see a very similar process. Students are first taught
some rudimentary footwork and then taught the jab. They will be shown a series of
exercises to practice their jab, pushing off with the back leg as they advance with the jab
or throwing the jab against a heavy bag. Then they will work on just the jab for a couple
of weeks before they are taught the next punch, the cross. For a couple of weeks, they will
work on their jab and cross. This procedure will continue until they have learned the basic
punches.
If fighters begin to spar too early in their training, they can become punch shy. Because
they have not yet been taught to defend effectively, they will be hit often. After they have
the basic punches down, they will begin to learn how to defend the jab. Only then will
they begin to spar and then against an opponent who is only throwing jabs. This will be
followed by learning to defend body punches and sparring with only body punches.
Finally, after many weeks, they will begin to spar with their entire arsenal.
Some coaches will hold punching mitts for their fighters, and using a system of
numbering the punches, they will call out what punch combinations they want them to
throw — one for a jab, two for a cross, etc. Of course, gaining skill at coaching this way
takes quite a bit of time, as well.
This method is used all over the world because it works. The problem is that it doesn’t
fit within any system for training large groups of soldiers. There are simply too many
things that soldiers must learn to dedicate sufficient time to such detailed, intensive
training. This is why even during the World War II era, when practically every boxing
coach in America was training servicemen, there was very limited success giving any
large group of them any actual skill. The only real exceptions were some of the programs
for training officers, such as at the service academies or in the Navy’s V-5 program for
training naval aviators using combative sports as a method of teaching the warrior
mindset.
In practice, most attempts to teach striking skills became little more than going through
the motions of showing the basic punches and then having the soldiers fight each other,
slugging away with no skill. This has been done since World War II in the British
Parachute Regiment as part of its selection process. Referred to as milling, there isn’t any
pretense that the perspective paratroopers gain any skill. This was also what I had
experienced as a Ranger instructor.
Clearly, a new approach would be necessary. During the time I was drafting a new
curriculum, David Rogers visited me. Rogers was a muay Thai instructor under Ajarn
Surachai “Chai” Sirisute, one of the most widely known instructors in the country. His
son-in-law was graduating basic training at Fort Benning, and he heard about our training.
He came by and gave us an excellent lesson. During the training session, he taught us a
series of five punch combinations, giving each of them a number. His basic students
memorized the combos and could then not only use them as a tool to perfect the basic
punches but also could hold mitts for each other after a very short time. He used a similar
approach to teaching basic defense, memorizing a series of defensive maneuvers in a row.
Although I believed this approach to training defense left something to be desired, I
loved the idea behind the basic combos and adopted it immediately. It was hard to imagine
a platoon doing any kind of effective striking training before we implemented that simple
idea — it was the key. We not only could realistically expect every soldier to know the
simple combos, but also, because every soldier then would know how to coach, the
combos could be used to get the men training. And getting platoons to actually train is the
most important thing. Once a soldier is expected to know the combos, platoons and squads
could be expected to spend time training with them. Once they were actually throwing
punches, knowledgeable trainers could tighten up their technique.
I didn’t care for the memorization technique for defense, though. I had seen far too
many fighters who looked good on the mitts but fell apart against an actual opponent.
Memorizing series of defensive techniques does a poor job of preparing you to defend
because, by its very nature, it is different from the circumstance you are preparing for.
Defense must always be either a component of good form (keeping your other hand in a
good defensive position when throwing a punch), evasion (being difficult to hit because of
your movement) or reactionary (reading your opponent’s body motion to have the proper
block in place).
Soldiers could learn the system in stages by first simply memorizing the combos and
then adding reacting to attacks and counterpunching. As they became more proficient,
kicks, kick defense, and takedowns and defense could be added in a simple-to-follow
system that made them act and react in the same way as in a fight.
The way a platoon could learn striking skills using the mitt-holding matrix was mirrored
in our curriculum. We would teach the students the punching skills and how to train them
with the matrix during the first week. The second week, we would add kicking and kick
defense. During the third week, we would integrate takedowns and defense, which had
been trained throughout the preceding weeks. Each week would end with sparring sessions
based on the skills learned that week.
COMPETITIONS
At first, competitions for military personnel consisted only of grappling, following
Brazilian jiu-jitsu rules. It became clear that these rules encouraged fighters to do things
that a soldier shouldn’t do on a battlefield. The jiu-jitsu rules worked fine for ground
grappling. Points are given for gaining positions of dominance such as the mount or the
back mount and are also given to encourage certain actions such as passing the guard or
sweeping your opponent from within your guard to achieve a top position. The rules for
takedowns, however, presented some problems.
In Brazilian jiu-jitsu, points for takedowns require that a player initiate the takedown
and end in a top position. That, however, allows fighters who have weak takedown skills
to avoid the takedown fight altogether by stealing the initiative to take a bottom position.
This is known as pulling or jumping to guard. Of course, in a real fight, and certainly on
the battlefield, this is a terrible idea and rules that encourage it just will not do to train
soldiers. Another problem is that jiu-jitsu rules do not recognize a difference between a
good takedown and a better one.
This isn’t a problem in some other systems. In judo, takedowns are graded for quality
based on how flat you can put your opponent on his back. If, for instance, you throw him
flat on his back with speed and control, it is counted as an ippon or one full point to
signify a perfect throw and the match immediately ends. If he lands only three-quarters on
his back or with not enough speed or control to be considered an ippon, it is scored as a
waza ari or a half point. Two waza ari end the match. There is also a lesser score of yuko,
which are not cumulative and only serve as tiebreakers. A competitor can score a waza ari
and any number of yuko and still be defeated by one throw that scores an ippon. The rules,
therefore, encourage the pursuit of the perfect throw as measured by the one factor of an
opponent’s relationship to the ground at the completion of the throw.
The discipline known as sambo takes that a step further. Still trying to encourage the
perfect throw, its rules recognize that putting an opponent flat on his back is only one
component of perfection. The other is the relationship of your body to the ground when
the throw is complete. You could put your opponent flat on his back, for instance, and be
lying right beside him on your side. In judo, that would be graded as perfect and give you
the victory. Sambo rules recognize that it would be superior not only to throw your
opponent to the ground but also to remain standing over him when the throw is complete.
Throws are graded and points are awarded based on these two factors.
In most combat sports, rule changes are made for the same reasons they are made in
every noncombat sport. Rules are changed either to make the sport safer or to make it
more exciting to the crowd. This is the same for every sport from auto racing to
professional basketball, and it is one of the major reasons combat sports drift away from
combative reality. This tendency can be seen in many forms of wrestling. Freestyle
wrestling, which was called catch-as-catch-can wrestling until the 1936 Olympic Games
and it could be won by either pin or submission, is a good example of this with more
points being given for more dynamic and therefore more entertaining throws. Another
example is the gloves worn by mixed-martial arts fighters. They were added to protect the
fighters’ hands, leaving them free to throw many more punches, leading to much more
exciting fights.
In American folkstyle wrestling, which is also called collegiate wrestling, the basis for
awarding takedown points has nothing to do with the relationship to the ground but with
the relationship of the two competitors’ bodies when the throw is complete. Takedown
points do not even require taking your opponent to the ground and have nothing to do with
whether he lands flat on his back. Rather, points are awarded for getting behind him, in
other words for gaining a dominant position just like in the ground-grappling portion of
the Brazilian jiu-jitsu rules.
We decided on a system of awarding points based on the concept of gaining a dominant
position in the takedown (American folkstyle wrestling) and during ground grappling
(Brazilian jiu-jitsu), both with slight modifications. More important, we would not fall into
the trap of making rule changes based on making the fights more entertaining but rather on
whether they were encouraging correct combative technique.
Another aspect of having competitions had begun to emerge during this time. Although
competition had already proved itself to be the very best tool to motivate individual
soldiers to train harder and their commanders to encourage them to do so, it does have a
very serious drawback. No matter what rules you adopt, competitors will inevitably begin
to train for victory within the rules at the expense of training for actual fighting. This can
be witnessed by watching any combative competition. Boxers, for example, do not train
on how to defend against a double-leg takedown because they are not training to fight.
They are training to win boxing matches, and that is a very different thing.
It is also difficult to do competitively many things that would be very effective in a real
fight. A competition that allowed eye gouging or attacking the testicles would have a hard
time finding participants. This is the reason many martial arts do not have competitions,
judging that training without using these dangerous and effective techniques outweighs the
benefits. Jigoro Kano knew this when he created the rules for judo competition. His
answer was to train free play, known in Japanese as randori, and compete, known as shiai,
with safe techniques. More dangerous techniques were reserved for formal, prearranged
training called kata. Although many judo kata are designed for training on techniques that
can be used in randori, there are several that are specifically for these more dangerous
techniques.
Judo kata training is different from what is commonly known to practitioners of arts
such as karate or taekwondo. In a judo kata, two people go through the techniques and
positions together. In karate kata, performed solo, there is endless debate about the
meaning, known as bunkai, of the sometimes-intricate motions within the kata. In judo,
with two people performing, rather than imaginary foes, it is much simpler to keep straight
what exactly is being practiced.
Unfortunately, the draw of competitions is very strong. In judo, this tendency led many
students to forgo kata training unless it was forced on them by the belt promotion system.
They instead concentrated on the kata that supported competition. The use of formalized
training to ensure that students continued to train on techniques too dangerous for
competition is a very good idea, but judo had proved it to be inadequate to the task. We
would have to permeate the entire system with the idea of preparing for combat.
We could see the same forces at work right in front of us. It was becoming obvious at
that time that many Brazilian jiu-jitsu students were concentrating their learning
exclusively on winning competitions. Training in many gyms broke down into two
classes: those who only trained to win sportive grappling competitions, either with or
without the jiu-jitsu uniform, and then a much smaller group that began to learn the other
skills necessary for mixed martial arts. Generally speaking, neither group was training for
actual fighting. The classes were even billed that way. Soldiers could take the jiu-jitsu
class and train wearing a gi while learning how to earn points and set people up for
submissions that may or may not be the least bit practical if opponents were able to bite or
punch each other in the face. Or competitors could strip down to MMA fight shorts and
practice takedowns against the cage or other techniques useful to aspiring UFC
champions.
To eliminate this false dichotomy and to ultimately keep soldiers focused on the real
reason for training — survival on the battlefield — I decided on a graduated rule structure.
Preliminary bouts would follow the basic grappling rules that we had already figured out.
These rules also would be used for non-championship tournaments so that new
competitors would not be too intimidated to enter. For championship tournaments, there
would be two additional sets of rules. For brigade championships, the finals would be
fought using what would be called intermediate rules. These would allow limited striking,
including closed-hand punches to the body, open-hand strikes to the head and kicks but no
knee strikes. At division level and higher, these rules would be used for the semifinals.
The intermediate rules were based on the rules that I had seen used in the Pacific
Northwest before I left the 2nd Ranger Battalion. In those early days, there was
considerable controversy surrounding the sport of MMA. It had been made specifically
illegal in many states, and it was unclear whether it was legal in others. There was,
however, a great deal of excitement surrounding the sport, and people all over the country
were doing whatever they could to promote it.
In the Seattle-Tacoma area, there were several people with big names in the sport.
Among them was Maurice Smith who had been a legend in the kickboxing world for years
before defeating Marcus “Conan” Silveira, a Brazilian jiu-jitsu black belt under Carlson
Gracie, in a 1996 MMA contest. Silveira was the first fighter with a background primarily
in striking skills to be effective in mainstream MMA. There was also Matt Hume who had,
among other notable victories, defeated Olympic freestyle wrestling gold-medalist Kenny
Monday by submission in only 45 seconds. Hume went on to use what he had learned in
the arena to become one of the most widely respected coaches of the era, teaching many
successful MMA fighters such as Josh Barnett. These two partnered with several other
coaches in the area and started the International Sport Combat Federation, which
established a set of rules falling just short of MMA. As such, their fights were legal in
Washington and Oregon. I adopted these for the Army Combatives Championship with
slight modifications such as allowing the wearing of combat uniforms and disallowing
knee strikes to avoid unnecessary injuries in the semifinals.
The finals of the championships would be as wide open as we could reasonably allow in
order to force soldiers to train for the largest possible subset of techniques. The deciding
factor on choosing a technique would be whether disallowing it would change the nature
of the fight. For example, in disallowing knee strikes to the body in the intermediate rules,
the result was that during that portion of the competition, the fighters would almost
universally adopt a bent-over-at-the-waist posture to defend against takedowns, but such
posture would have left them wide open to knee strikes to the torso or head. For the
intermediate rules, because they were for the semifinal round and because any injuries
would disrupt the tournament, I decided that it was preferable to avoid the risk of injury,
knowing that the winners at that round would go on to fight with the advanced rules,
which would correct the tendency.
We held the first All-Army Combatives Tournament on November 4-6, 2005, at Fort
Benning. By then, we had been holding smaller tournaments on post for several years, so
it didn’t even make the radar screen of the chain of command. It was a two-day event held
over a weekend, and 128 fighters representing 26 teams came from all over the Army,
mostly on their own dime. Because there was still quite a bit of resistance to this type of
training at that time, holding the tournament over a weekend meant that fighters wouldn’t
have to get approval from their commands to come.
 CHAPTER THREE

FIGHTING WITH WEAPONS

Just like free play and competition are the heart of developing realistic unarmed skills, so
it is with weapons fighting. To be learned and practiced efficiently, weapons fighting can
be broken down into two categories: combat marksmanship and contact weapons. It is
important, however, just like in unarmed combatives, to remember that the tendency is to
specialize, becoming focused on one aspect of fighting, and drift away from the reality
that, in actual combat, the range and situation change very quickly. Fighters who fail to
train for the transitions of combat will soon find themselves ill-prepared.
Combat marksmanship and contact weapons, as well as unarmed fighting, are each
pieces of the whole. We, the ad hoc committee of experienced martial artists, which was
formed in the mid-1990s, purposefully looked for weakness in each in order to integrate
them into our methods of teaching these techniques.
COMBAT MARKSMANSHIP
In 1956, a retired Marine Corps colonel named Jeff Cooper began holding quick-draw
contests with a few of his friends. The prevailing technique at the time was the point-
shooting method that had become popular during the World War II era. The competitors
would shoot against each other at 18-inch balloons at up to seven yards. At one of the
matches, a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department deputy and former soldier named
Jack Weaver brought his weapon up to eye level and used the sights instead of trying to
quick-draw and fire from the hip with one hand as was the custom. Cooper, who was a
gun writer and firearms instructor, dominated the competitions. As the scope of these
competitions grew, Cooper organized the lessons learned from the competitions, including
the “Weaver stance,” into a method he called the Modern Technique of the Pistol.
Nearly two decades later, in 1976, Cooper chaired a conference of some of the top
firearms experts from around the world in Columbia, Missouri, with the intention of
forming an administrative body to develop and regulate practical shooting competitions.
Out of the conference was born the International Practical Shooting Confederation, which
quickly spread across the country and to many other parts of the world. The basic
principle was that competitions were to simulate real gunfights. Competitors would shoot
“stages” — scenarios with realistic shooting challenges that might be faced in a real
situation. Scoring involved adding the points made from hits on human silhouette targets
and dividing them by the time it had taken to shoot them. As is the case in a life-and-death
fight with an adversary, the merits of accuracy were balanced with speed. Pistols also had
to be of sufficient caliber and with ammunition powerful enough to be useful in combat.
Reflecting these principles, the organization’s motto was Diligentia, Vis, Celeritas (Latin
for accuracy, power, speed).
As the new sport spread, it prompted a flowering of vastly improved shooting abilities
and technique. The shooting industry soon caught on, and new products designed with the
lessons learned from the sport started to flood the market. Automatic pistols with high-
capacity magazines soon dominated. Before the International Practical Shooting
Confederation, the average law-enforcement officer in the United States carried a .38-
caliber revolver capable of holding just six rounds. Red dot sights, commonly called reflex
sights, which are now carried by almost every American soldier on the battlefield, were
another result and were largely popularized by their success in IPSC competitions. Tools
such as timers that could detect each shot to the thousandth of a second also were
developed.
The civilian practical shooting community has done much work over the years. The
strengths and weaknesses of a competitive approach to skills training are revealed in
practical shooting. First, it has been an almost unmitigated success at producing competent
battlefield marksmanship. The training methods pioneered by it have been adopted by the
world’s elite units and have trickled down to enhance the training even of average soldiers.
However, just like in unarmed fighting, there is a tendency to focus on the game, at the
expense of realistic combative ability. Techniques that are not tactically sound arise in
order to gain a competitive edge. This inevitably began to happen to practical shooting. In
1996, a group of IPSC competitors who wanted to get back to the original ideas behind its
formation started a new organization called the International Defensive Pistol Association.
One of its goals was to “provide shooters with practical and realistic courses of fire that
simulate a potentially life-threatening encounter or that tests skills that would be required
to survive a life-threatening encounter.”
Practical Shooting in the Rangers
Although I had grown up around guns and had been taught marksmanship in the Marine
Corps, I got my start in practical shooting in the Rangers. The Ranger battalions of the
1980s were arguably the best-trained infantry units in the world. But there is always room
for improvement. The invasion of Panama during operation Just Cause in December 1989
exposed some weaknesses in our skill sets. Chief among them was that we were
inadequately prepared for urban combat at a time when it was becoming clear that most
modern warfare would involve frequent fighting in city streets and among civilian
populations. In an effort to increase our skills in that area, a select few Rangers, myself
included, were sent to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to take a course at the John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and School, where the Special Forces taught their soldiers to
conduct direct-action raids in urban terrain.
The first portion of the schooling was dedicated to learning the skills of practical
shooting. Before learning how to fight in buildings, using live bullets in a dynamic and
confusing environment in close proximity with each other, every student had to pass a set
of weaponry standards.
In addition to marksmanship, other skills that were taught and tested to an exacting
standard included clearing weapon malfunctions, changing magazines and transitioning
from rifle to drawing a pistol. These standards were measured using the methods from the
International Practical Shooting Confederation. During the course, a competition took
place among the students, using IPSC rules, before we moved on to the close-quarters-
battle training.
The main difference, of course, was that this wasn’t a club full of civilian hobbyists.
Every man present was either a Special Forces operator or a Ranger. This was serious
combat training. It was fun and entertaining, but that didn’t change the fact that it was the
best combat training happening anywhere in the world at that time. It just motivated us to
train harder. We had a real mission to train for — that and the fact that most of the men in
the program had already seen combat kept us focused. Gamesmanship, in other words,
nontactically sound actions to improve times or competitiveness, was immediately derided
by the group as going against the purpose and spirit of the events.
When I returned to the Ranger battalion, the 20 or so other course graduates and I
developed close-quarters-battle methods based on what we had learned, modifying the
techniques designed for the needs of the Special Forces A-team for those of a Ranger
platoon or company. I also started a practical shooting club at the pistol range on base. We
met every Sunday afternoon, and the events were soon called the Sunday Night Slaughter.
It was purely voluntary, but soon members of the battalion who were self-motivated to be
better marksmen were all coming. It was a great time, and more important, the skill level
with weapons in the battalion suddenly had a new standard. Because of the experiences of
the many noncommissioned officers who had attended the Special Forces school and those
who learned almost the same lessons at the weekly matches, leaders in the battalion started
to hold “stress shooting” events as a part of their unit training.
Upon transferring to the 2nd Ranger Battalion, I once again started a practical shooting
club with the same results. In the two decades since that time, this type of shooting has
become commonplace throughout the Army.
Practical Shooting in Modern Army Combatives
I learned many of the lessons that went into Modern Army Combatives training by
participating in practical shooting while I was a member of the Ranger Regiment. One
lesson was that competition is a great motivational tool that drives performance to levels
that are not achievable in any other way. Another was that competitions feature pressure to
move away from what is tactically sound for the sake of winning, but also that we must
maintain constant vigilance to keep the correct battlefield focus.
Like in the other areas of Modern Army Combatives, understanding and evaluating the
pros and cons of training methods with intellectual honesty is key to good training. The
flat-range practice with a shot timer and live-fire room clearing against paper targets was
cutting edge for weapons training in that era. It is still a valuable approach, but it must be
combined with other methods for the best results. Force-on-force scenario training, for
example — with either marking or non-marking cartridges of various types — can build
on those basic skills by including role players in protective equipment who may or may
not be armed and may or may not give resistance. Scenarios should require operators to
act in accordance with realistic rules of engagement in situations developed to fit their
mission, whether that is battlefield, close-quarter battle, law enforcement or civilian self-
defense.
To understand the relationships between the various training methods, realistic
weaponry training can be compared to learning striking skills. Dry-fire practice can be
compared to shadowboxing, live shooting can be compared to the heavy bag and force-on-
force training can be compared to sparring. The comparison goes even further. Shooting
competition can drive development of very high-level skills. However, a specialist in
shooting sports is only learning one component of being a skilled warrior. A true
combatives expert must have well-rounded skill sets and the ability to operate across the
ranges of combat and the spectrum of force, individually or as a member of a team.
CONTACT WEAPONS
It was clear, as we started to develop the new Modern Army Combatives Program,
soldiers were not being taught how to fight effectively with their weapons during the close
fight. In World War I, the idea of a skill-based combatives program went away in the mad
rush to turn hundreds of thousands of volunteers and conscripts into fighting men in a few
short weeks. Training to fight with weapons was reduced to a physical bayonet assault
course — a roughly 200-meter course with obstacles to be traversed and targets that had to
be engaged by the appropriate combination of parries and thrusts. There was no serious
effort to teach soldiers how their weapons impacted the close fight.
Contact weapons require physical contact with the enemy to be effective. Examples of
these types of weapons include clubs, fixed bayonets and knives. Because a contact
weapon is seldom a soldier’s principal means of defeating an enemy, and considering the
wide variety of weapons available, our program needed to focus not only on the specific
weapons that soldiers carry but also on their ability to use any weapon effectively.
Weapons can be categorized by the distance from which they can be used and the
method of attack. For example, the range and attack methods that would be used with an
entrenching tool are virtually the same as any other weapon that can be used in an arcing,
swinging-type attack from just beyond grappling range.
The most significant differences in these types of attacks are the weight and length of
the weapon, which will affect the timing and range of the attack and thus the appropriate
response. Training with all such weapons should be similar, and those weapons should be
classified together (i.e., those that can be used effectively outside of grappling range, such
as entrenching tools, and those that can be used effectively from inside grappling range,
such as combat knives). The latter category is the main interest here.
The Importance of Short-Range Weapons
When the Iraq and Afghanistan wars started, the belief in most of the forces was that
hand-to-hand combat would be infrequent. In fact, the doctrine for close-quarters battle
was that if a fighter’s weapon malfunctioned while clearing a room, the correct immediate
action was to drop to a knee so that the other members of the unit would know he was out
of the fight and would cover his areas of responsibility for him. The corollary to this in the
special-operations world, where most operators are armed with pistols as side arms, was
that when a weapon malfunctioned, the appropriate action was to transition to the side arm
and continue with the assignment. These ideas broke down almost immediately when
soldiers were actually engaged in urban combat.
The principal issue that had been overlooked in peacetime training was the interplay of
range and timing when a soldier enters a room. The average size of a room in Iraq or
Afghanistan is about 8 feet by 8 feet. That means that upon clearing the door — called the
“fatal funnel” because enemy fire will be concentrated there — a weapon malfunction
isn’t even noticed until the soldier is within a couple of feet of the enemy. The idea of
going down on one knee at the enemy’s feet so that teammates can engage is ludicrous,
plus there is simply not enough room or time to transition to a side arm before a soldier
would become physically engaged with anyone in his area of responsibility.
The bottom line is that if a fighter’s weapon does malfunction in a room, he is two or
three feet, at most, from the opponent. There’s no time or distance to take a knee or
transition to a side arm. There is just time to attack! Bringing a secondary weapon to bear
means a soldier must transition after crashing into the enemy and becoming engaged in
hand-to-hand combat. This is the case whether the secondary weapon is a pistol, a knife or
a bayonet.
In a close-quarters battle, the most important thing is that a fighter deploys a weapon in
a manner that allows effective use of it and prevents the enemy from using it against him.
This means first gaining control of the opponent. Only when the soldier establishes a
position of control can he safely deploy his weapon. This means that the principal skills in
becoming effective with either knife or pistol in the typical hand-to-hand fight on today’s
battlefield are the same fundamental grappling skills, whether standing or on the ground,
that are taught from the very beginning of Modern Army Combatives training. After that
comes making the best use of weapon-design features and attacking where it can cause the
greatest damage.
Much of the training for fighting with blades that is done in the civilian martial arts
world is useless for soldiers because it focuses on two fighters armed only with knives, as
if they were dueling. The odds are practically nil that a soldier, armed only with a knife,
will be confronted by an enemy, also armed only with a knife (and that they will both have
their respective knives in their hands at the beginning of the fight). Fights simply do not
happen that way. And yet, much of what has passed for training with knives is centered on
exactly that situation.
Two principal situations require training involving bladed weapons: Either a soldier has
a knife as a secondary weapon and therefore must deploy it during the fight, as mentioned
above, or the enemy has a knife that the soldier had no way of knowing about when the
fight started. In other words, the soldier is either on the offense with or defending against a
close-contact weapon.
Training With the Combat Knife/Bayonet
A bayonet or combat knife is the traditional side arm of the soldier. This will remain the
case because of the prohibitive cost of pistols.
Although few would prefer a knife to a pistol, at close range, a pistol is much easier for
an enemy to grab and gain control of than an edged weapon. If soldiers are properly
trained, knives are a good choice as a side arm when fighting in the confined spaces of
urban combat.
As the war in Iraq progressed, it became apparent that the current-issue bayonet (the
M9, adopted in 1987) was entirely inadequate as a side arm for the average soldier, and it
was very seldom brought to the war zone by units. Most soldiers bought whatever knives
happened to be for sale at the Post Exchange and wore them however they wanted without
thinking about how or when they would employ them. In fact, it was soon discovered that
soldiers in Iraq were much more likely to be stabbed with their own knife than to use it
effectively as a weapon. This shouldn’t be taken to mean they are not a good choice as a
weapon — the drawbacks can be overcome.
First, and most important to that end, is training. Most soldiers carry a knife but seldom
practice using it during training. To overcome this, Modern Army Combatives must be an
integral part of mission training. For purposes of instruction, soldiers must have training
blades equivalent to those that can be deployed by soldiers or taken away from them just
like in combat, and the blades must fit in regular sheaths.
Second is to take a lesson from law enforcement. Because law-enforcement officers
routinely find themselves engaged in hand-to-hand combat situations while armed with a
handgun, they long ago learned that a holster needs to be designed so that the weapon
comes out easily for them but not for the opponent. Various mechanical methods have
been designed to accomplish this task. There is even a grading system for the number of
retention devices built into a holster, many police departments requiring their officers to
use a Level III holster or, in other words, a holster with three retention devices built into it.
Many holsters designed for the tactical market, however, continue to only be designed
to keep the weapon from falling out of the holster. These types of holsters should be
avoided.
Because few people outside the armed forces are engaged in hand-to-hand combat
while wearing a fixed-blade knife, this knowledge is just now beginning to migrate into
sheath design. The vast majority of sheaths are not designed to provide any retention
during a hand-to-hand engagement. The sheath for the current-issue bayonet does not have
any retention device.
Soldiers today have gotten so used to not having a side arm, because of the
inadequacies of the current bayonet, that they seldom even notice the deficiency. For those
who do carry one, the combat knife, with a weapon- retention sheath, is more effective
because it’s designed to be deployed from the sheath as a side arm during a fight. The
knife itself should be manufactured primarily as a thrusting weapon and designed robustly
so that it will not break when used in a utility roll. Based on lessons learned on today’s
battlefields, a soldier is better off carrying a combat knife specifically designed for current
fight scenarios.
Knife Design
Knives can be broadly classified by their principal design features.
Daggers typically are double bladed and are designed primarily for stabbing. The
purpose of the sharpened edges is to make it difficult for an enemy to even think about
grasping the weapon. The classic example of this is the Fairbairn-Sykes knife, which was
issued to British commandos and U.S. Rangers during World War II. This knife had a
great reputation as a fighting knife because of its superior effectiveness as a thrusting
weapon, even when used against an enemy wearing heavy clothing. However, its thin
double-edged blade made it useless in any utility roll. (It had little other practical
application than its intended use in hand-to-hand combat.) This knife has had several
variants over the years. The Marine Raiders and the 1st Special Services Force carried a
similar blade. The most popular combat knife of the Vietnam era was the Gerber Mark II,
which was a very similar concept.
Utility knives are designed primarily to be useful tools for a soldier’s daily life. They
are typically single edged and have a much wider blade to prevent breakage.
They can be useful for stabbing, although somewhat less so than daggers, and allow for
some other types of attacks. The classic example is the trademarked KA-BAR issued to
Marines during World War II. This knife had a good reputation as a utility tool, serving in
all the roles Marines and soldiers typically use their knives for, from C-ration opener to
entrenching tool stand-in. It had some usefulness as a fighting implement, but its
utilitarian design is less suited for thrusting through heavy clothing than chopping sector
stakes.
Folding knives, from a fighter’s perspective, have the disadvantage of being more
difficult to deploy. A fighter not only must get the knife in his hand, but he also must
deploy the blade, both while engaged in a fight. Of course, this can be done, but it is much
more difficult than most companies selling “combat folders” would have the buyer
believe. For this reason, although most soldiers carry various folding knives/multipurpose
tools, folding knives as a weapon are much less useful to soldiers than fixed-blade knives.
Knife Attacks
There are two basic types of knife attacks: slashing and thrusting. Slashing attacks are
usually done when a soldier is not fully committed to the grapple; they are seldom fatal
and often do not change the outcome of a fight. Also, heavy clothing such as a field
uniform or any sort of coat acts as armor against slashing attacks often severely limiting
their effectiveness. Thrusting attacks are much more deadly and are much less likely to be
stopped by heavy clothing. The rib cage forms natural body armor against knife attacks.
The most effective knife attacks are thrusts around the body armor such as the stomach or
front of the neck.
Training with knives must be geared toward the fact that the enemy will rarely let a
soldier know he is in a knife fight until it is too late. The soldier must therefore assume
that any enemy may be armed with a close-contact weapon and must fight them
accordingly. This fact places controlling an opponent on an entirely different plane than
fighting one who is known to be unarmed, as is the case in most systems that train
exclusively for competitive sport applications of their art.
An example of how soldiers may train for this, and incidentally reinforce the combat
focus of combatives for those who zero in too heavily on winning tournaments, is to use a
stun gun to represent a bladed weapon. If an enemy is able to get to the soldier’s weapon
and deploy it, he pays the piper. The element of fear that the electricity injects into the
training kicks up the intensity level and ensures that the lesson of controlling the opponent
is learned. (See Chapter Four for more on training with stun guns.)
This technique can be expanded on and should be used frequently when conducting
scenario training. It must be common enough that the lesson is never forgotten when
soldiers are trying to carry out their battlefield tasks.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
 FIXED BAYONET
Fighting with a rifle and fixed bayonet was dropped from the curriculum in Army
Initial Military Training in 2009 and replaced by fighting with a bayonet or combat
knife as a side arm to be deployed from the sheath. This change stirred up
controversy at the periphery of the Army.
When I was with the 2nd Ranger Battalion and we started developing a new
program, we knew we had to update the weapons fighting portion. We also knew that
it would take some time to accomplish that goal. When making changes in an
organization as large and as old as the Army, we had to understand institutional
inertia and its effect on our plans.
A rifle with a fixed bayonet is as entrenched in the psyche of the Army as stepping
off with the left foot. Of course, in modern warfare, it’s just about as likely that
soldiers would fight with fixed bayonets as they would march into battle in
formation, but traditional ways of training armies die slowly. (Consider that the
troops in World War I, when facing down machine guns, used tactics that had worked
against Napoleon — and they paid for it dearly.)
Bayonet assault courses and pugil stick fighting were the only remnants of the
bayonet-fencing systems that had survived the mobilization of mass armies and the
nature of 20th century warfare. They had survived primarily because they do a pretty
good job of inculcating the mindset necessary for victory in battle. Generations of
soldiers have answered the questions “What makes the grass grow?” and “What is the
spirit of the bayonet?” with “Blood!” and “To kill!” shouted at the top of their lungs.
In basic training, the primary task is to turn young civilians into soldiers. You don’t
do that by mollycoddling them. It takes hard training, and the reality is that facing an
enemy and killing him are at its core.
It is of secondary importance that the method used is relevant to today’s fight. Of
course fighting with a fixed bayonet became the norm in training because it was the
way that soldiers and units once actually fought. To update the training, the
battlefield efficacy and the utility in inculcating the warrior ethos would have to be
improved on.
In 1969, the Human Resources Research Office of George Washington University
in the District of Columbia conducted a survey of soldiers’ opinions about the
bayonet at the request of the Department of the Army. Questionnaires were given to
soldiers who were assigned either as cadre or students to Fort Benning, Georgia, with
only the questionnaires of combat veterans being used to calculate the results. There
were 508 officers and 607 enlisted soldiers who met the combat-experience
requirements. Combat experience was counted from World War II, Korea and
Vietnam with differences in the answers from veterans of each war noted. The results
included the following responses:
“The [then]-present bayonet/knife [M7 introduced in 1964] is generally considered
to be an inferior knife and frequently is not carried for this reason. However, most
combat infantrymen will carry some form of cutting instrument, whether or not it
includes a bayonet mount.”
“Bayonet combat was infrequent in both theaters of WWII, Korea, and the
Dominican Republic and it is infrequent now in Vietnam.”
 “Bayonet training contributes to physical conditioning, and to the instilling of
motivation and discipline, but it is generally felt that other combative training
[unspecified] could achieve the same or greater results in a comparable period of
time.”
The experience of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has taught the same lessons.
 CHAPTER FOUR

FIGHTING STRATEGIES AND TRAINING

METHODS
When the war in Afghanistan began in 2001, our ideas about what hand-to-hand fights
would look like were pretty well-developed. We had, however, a fairly simplistic view of
the way fights on the battlefield start and the tactical role for combatives. We thought the
primary role of combatives would be when a soldier’s weapon failed to function. In our
defense, the prevailing wisdom at the time was that combatives wouldn’t really be
necessary because of firepower and superior tactics. In the initial phase of the war in Iraq
in 2003, when the Army was barreling across the country attacking and clearing towns and
buildings as necessary, our preconceived notions worked out pretty well.
BASIC FIGHT STRATEGY
The steps in basic fight strategy were the following:
1. Close the distance
Controlling a stand-up fight means controlling the range between fighters. The
untrained fighter is primarily dangerous at longer ranges where they can bring weapons to
bear more easily. The goal is to avoid that range. The most dangerous thing even a
superior striker can do is to spend time in the range within which the enemy has the
highest probability of victory. When training soldiers, the primary goal was instilling the
courage to close the distance so that when a soldier’s weapon malfunctioned, if they were
close to the enemy, they would immediately attack.
2. Gain dominant position
An appreciation for dominant position is fundamental to becoming a proficient fighter
because it ties together what would otherwise be a long, confusing list of unrelated
techniques. Before any killing or disabling technique can be applied, the soldier must first
gain and maintain dominant body position. The leverage gained allows the fighter to
defeat a stronger opponent. Dominant position also allows a soldier to control an enemy
more effectively, making it more difficult for him to get control of a weapon of
opportunity or to produce one from within his garments. This makes it easier for a soldier
to buy time for his teammates to gain control of the tactical situation and come to his aid.
3. Finish the fight
When dominant body position has been achieved, the fighter tries to finish the fight
secure in the knowledge that if an attempt fails, as long as he maintains dominance, he
may simply try again. If, on the other hand, a finishing technique is attempted from other
than a dominant position and fails, it could mean defeat. The soldier also has the
advantage of allowing his teammates to either help him subdue the enemy or bring one of
their weapons to bear.
Soon after the war entered its second phase — what the Army calls stability operations
— soldiers were no longer simply attacking and clearing buildings of enemies. As the
mission changed to uprooting resistance and suppressing the insurrection, so did what
soldiers needed to accomplish during room and building clearing. It developed that the
most likely scenario for combatives consisted of physically dominating someone — who
may or may not be an enemy — who was resisting. In other words, soldiers must remain
in control of the situation throughout, use restraint in the amount of force they employ, and
also be ready to turn it up to overwhelming force instantly if there is even the smallest sign
of the resistance turning aggressive or of the appearance of a weapon.
Imagine soldiers coming through the door of a home on a mission to look for hidden
weapons. Somewhere in the neighborhood there is also a cell of bomb makers building
suicide vests. As the soldiers enter the first room, a middle-aged man, who is obviously
startled, immediately puts his hands up. When the soldiers attempt to remove him from the
room, he begins to passively resist. At this point, they don’t know whether he is resisting
because his wife is undressed in the next room and he doesn’t want the soldiers to see her
or whether there is a bomb factory in there. Even when he turns from passive to more
aggressive resistance, though, almost all rules of engagement would allow the soldier to
use deadly force, even if there is a doubt about why he became more aggressive and
whether he is an enemy. Use of deadly force on someone who simply doesn’t want his
wife exposed or simply resisting because he is afraid of being taken away runs counter to
the entire strategy of counterinsurgency. Conversely, if he is resisting in order to buy time
for his bomb-making buddies to get away or to blow up the soldiers, they need to gain
control quickly and get on with the mission. Given these realities, we slowly began to
arrive at a new, more sophisticated strategy than the three basic fight strategies listed
above.
It is a principle of infantry doctrine that a unit should make contact with the enemy with
the smallest possible element. For example, if a platoon of 35 men makes contact with an
enemy force, it would be best if only one fire team was involved in the initial engagement.
This gives the larger unit the most freedom to maneuver. When contact is made, the leader
has three basic tactical options from which he will choose based on the mission and the
situation: He immediately can attack straight into the enemy, he can set in a base of fire
and attempt an envelopment or he can break contact. These are all well-practiced moves,
and executing any of them happens almost as second nature in a well-trained unit.
In the same way, soldiers need to gain control of an enemy at the farthest possible
range. If that is verbally from across a room, that is much better than becoming physically
engaged. At some point, however, because of a language barrier or simply passive
resistance, soldiers must lay hands on people. At this point, the same principle — gaining
control at the farthest range possible — applies. In addition to having the most tactical
options if passive resistance escalates, this also helps keep the enemy from grasping a
soldier’s equipment, which can give a combatant quite an advantage against a soldier in
full kit.
LINES OF DEFENSE
Control achieved at arm’s length gives three “lines of defense” if the enemy does attack.
These lines of defense, from farthest (and most desirable), are the following:
 Post, as the name implies, is essentially a stiff-arm, like in football. A soldier can either
use it when advancing, basically to stiff-arm someone to get past him without becoming
too engaged, or when grabbing someone to move him.

Post

Frame is using an elbow to keep someone off. It can be done with the hand on either
side of the head — on the same side as in the muay Thai clinch or across, which has
advantages when trying to get past someone.
Frame on same side
Frame across

Hook with head control is either an underhook or overhook, exactly like is done in
wrestling. The soldier uses his head to provide control and as a block to keep control of
the range.
Hook with head control

Once the enemy has been stopped by one of the lines of defense, the soldier has three
tactical options available:
• Regain projectile-weapons range. This is the primary option because it allows the
most flexibility for the soldier and his team. It cannot always be used (for example, if
the mission is to capture someone who is trying to flee); therefore, soldiers must train
for other options.
• Transition to a secondary weapon. When a soldier has momentarily gained a
controlling position, the second option is to use a secondary weapon. This is the case
whether the secondary weapon is a pistol or a bladed weapon. Oftentimes when
engaged, a soldier will not be able to bring a long gun to bear, especially if the enemy
is attempting to gain control of it. This option also includes weapons of opportunity,
such as a brick or even a ballpoint pen.
• Achieve the clinch. Even acquiring a secondary weapon cannot always be done
safely. If, for instance, a soldier is unable to gain control of the opponent, drawing a
pistol or knife could have the effect of giving it away to the enemy. Also, if the
enemy begins to bring a secondary weapon into the fight, the best option might be to
close the distance and gain control of it.
These three lines of defense and three tactical options apply even if taken to the ground,
as long as the enemy has not been able to establish a dominant position. Even if tackled
from behind, once a soldier has turned toward the enemy and gained some sort of guard,
in other words he has his legs between himself and the enemy, and the enemy has not
achieved the mount on the soldier, he can use them to gain or maintain the space needed to
stand in base.
These techniques give a soldier a framework and the ability to handle a wide array of
situations. Of course, they are also built on solid grappling ability. The better and more
practiced a soldier’s grappling skills, the more likely it is that he will be able to dictate at
what range the fight will take place.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIGHTER
Ground Grappling
A fighter can make the quickest substantial gains in fighting ability in the area of
ground grappling. The only fighter who can afford to be aggressive in a fight is the one
who is most skilled at the closest ranges. Just like a tall boxer must be careful to stay away
from his opponent in order to use the advantage of his superior range and the shorter
fighter longs to get up close to nullify that advantage, the inferior grappler must take pains
to avoid becoming decisively engaged lest he be beaten where he is weakest. Therefore,
becoming a superior ground grappler is the foundation of training to be a competent
fighter.
The first techniques of ground grappling, taught to every soldier in initial military
training, serve to impart the concept of the hierarchy of position from Brazilian jiu-jitsu
and the movement patterns that will make someone an effective grappler. Additionally,
each technique is representative of a class of techniques. It is important that the same ones
be taught to everyone in an organization simply because standardization is the only way
that a large organization can ensure that every member knows something. There must be a
standard that people can be held to or the less motivated will do nothing. With that being
said, the fundamental techniques include a method to:
• escape the mount by rolling on top
• pass the closed guard to side control
• gain the mount from side control
• gain the rear mount from the mount
• escape the rear mount
• escape the mount and place the opponent in your closed guard
• sweep the opponent from within your guard to mount him
• choke from the mount
• choke from the rear mount
• choke from the guard
• arm break from the mount
• arm break from the guard
It is helpful that the escapes and sweeps taught come from opportunities set up by the
chokes and arm breaks that are taught. This will ensure that the students will be presented
with opportunities for the techniques they know during ground sparring. It is also helpful
that the techniques used exploit openings that would be common when fighting an
untrained fighter so that the students are not simply learning to fight each other. An
example of this is teaching how to attack someone who presents straight arms to a fighter
while attempting to push him off the mount. Even the lowest level of submission
grappling training makes this weakness unlikely; however, it is very common when
fighting untrained people. All initial guard training should begin with the closed guard.
Notice that the basics do not include how to defend against chokes or joint attacks other
than to use the attacks as an opening to improve on a position. It is a common mistake to
teach an attack and the defense to the attack in the same or proximal sessions. The result
would be meeting every attempt at an attack with a defense. Of course, the attack will not
be very well-developed, so even a poor defense will stand a good chance of working. If
the attack seldom works, students will be discouraged from attempting it. Therefore, the
attack will never become very well-developed nor will the defense because it will only
have to be used against poor attacks. It is much better to teach only attacks at the
beginning. Instructors should wait until the students have a very well-developed attack and
everyone thinks the technique is almost unbeatable before teaching the defense. If done
that way, the defense will have to be very well-developed to work because the attack is
good.
When a fighter has become proficient in the basic techniques and can use them during
ground sparring, new techniques from each of the basic classes of techniques can be
taught and they will fit naturally into the fighter’s repertoire. Additionally, new classes of
techniques, for example passing the half guard, can be introduced very easily with the
fighters being able use them effectively almost immediately.
As fighters progress, the new techniques taught can open up new methods of sparring.
For example, after teaching how to defend punches from the guard, fighters can spar with
strikes. This same method holds true with higher-end techniques and training methods
such as the introduction of grappling over weapons.
Training also should include reminders that there are no rules on the battlefield.
Instructors must teach techniques that are good for sparring, as well as those that are not.
This goes for offense and defense. It is easy to forget, when sparring with friends, that in a
fight, the enemy will put his thumb in an adversary’s eye or bite his nose off if given the
opportunity. It takes constant and systematic diligence to ensure that the training stays
focused on real fighting.
Finally, on the battlefield, soldiers will have to grapple in full kit against someone
wearing street clothes — after an approach march that might be several miles and after
storming a building. It will involve weapons of various kinds such as rifles, pistols, knives
and objects that are just lying around. To be a proficient fighter, a soldier must be able to
control the position, deal with techniques that cannot be trained easily (such as biting, eye
gouging or grabbing testicles), use weapons, stop the enemy from using theirs, work
together with teammates and stay within the Rules of Engagement, all while keeping the
larger tactical situation in mind. It is a tall order and is quite a bit different from what goes
on in the average grappling gym. It is also only one small portion of being a good fighter.
Clinch Fighting
 Although ground grappling is the area where fighters make the quickest gains and is
most important because it allows a fighter to be aggressive, clinch fighting is where a
fighter can decide whether he wants the fight to go to the ground. This is the range where
a fighter gains the ability to use more than just the most basic fight tactic. Therefore, it
should be introduced near the beginning, and once it has been introduced, it should be
drilled as a part of every combatives workout.
Clinch fighting is taught by doing drills and then expanding on them. These are outlined
in the Training Methods section of this chapter. We begin with basic pummeling like is
done in wrestling. This builds the habit of fighting for underhooks and is a key to
takedown setups and defense. This is essential given the aggressive nature of combatives
during close-quarters battle in which there is very little time spent outside clinch range
once a fight has started.
The next drill is neck wrestling or swimming for neck control like in muay Thai. After
the fundamental movement of swimming one hand under to gain inside position and
proper posture have been learned, techniques can be added for each of the ways
combatants may make this difficult for soldiers. New positions of control can be
introduced with the respective techniques to attain them. Knee strikes and defense can be
added and, finally, takedowns can be included.
This progression will correct many of the mistakes made in other martial arts that
include portions of clinch training and will help integrate the best techniques from them
into a cogent whole. Such mistakes include, for example, the poor posture that comes from
training only takedowns like they’re done in wrestling or the way the round knees from
muay Thai can leave a fighter totally vulnerable to hip throws and foot sweeps.
After the fundamental clinch-fighting drills have been learned, they should be practiced
against a padded wall. Most of the clinch fighting and takedowns done on the battlefield
involve pushing someone or being pushed against a wall. How to dominate this portion of
the fight must be an area of emphasis in training.
Every aspect of clinch-fight training can be conducted with full combat equipment.
Although takedown training with full kit adds significantly to the dangers of training and
should therefore be done sparingly, all the other aspects such as neck wrestling with knee
strikes can be done with kit routinely and should become normal activity in every unit.
They should even be done as a warm-up before CQB. For too long, units have treated
battle as if it were not an athletic activity. I consider it very athletic — and all similar
athletic endeavors require a warm-up. This has the effect not only of making a soldier
more prepared for the physical demands he will face but also, just like in other combative
activities, such as boxing or wrestling, helps control the dump of adrenaline that hits at the
moment of engagement.
Striking Skills
In ground grappling and clinch fighting, portions of the training are very similar,
whether it’s in a civilian gym or Army unit. The primary differences are that the initial
techniques must be standardized and that the training can therefore be very systematic.
Striking skills, however, are much different.
 For striking skills, there are no shortcuts. Because every untrained fighter knows how to
throw some sort of blow, a soldier must have skill to be effective. This takes time and
practice. As discussed in Chapter Two, the path to teaching striking skills to an individual,
self-motivated person is tried and true. Techniques are taught and movement patterns built
over the course of two or three months. Sparring is slowly introduced, beginning with jab
sparring and body sparring before progressing to full sparring, to avoid making the student
punch shy. Sparring can be introduced earlier in the case of very self-motivated students,
but effectiveness in actual fighting, because of the more complicated nature of timing and
range control, simply takes time.
The primary difference between training an individual and a unit or group is the level of
motivation that can be counted on. Almost every person who has gone through it
remembers the beginning of their training, before the movement patterns they will later
take for granted have been built, when they felt and looked terribly awkward. It doesn’t
take too long to get through it with continuous practice, but the group dynamic makes it
more difficult. That may be the reason, for example, despite the thousands of U.S. troops
stationed in Korea since 1954 and with many commanders attempting to make their
soldiers learn it, taekwondo has not become a normal skill in the U.S. Army. It’s also the
same reason, with almost every boxer or boxing coach in America trying to teach the
armed forces during World War II, the skill level attained in boxing was never very high
and the training did not last beyond the war.
This is overcome when a new student enters an existing class and gets caught up in the
enthusiasm of those who have made it past the awkward stage and for whom the path to
success is clear. When trying to teach a large group from scratch, however, every student
is in the awkward stage together. It is possible, with a very large time commitment, to get
through this stage, but that seldom happens because of another dynamic. Even in the most
motivated units, when it becomes apparent that it will take a while to gain any useful skill,
some in the unit will begin to grumble that the training is a waste of time. Soon, the many
other training demands will exert pressure, and unless there is a very rigid schedule, the
training will drop off before the unit has made any real gains in skill. Generations of
would-be combatives instructors have made this same mistake, and most old soldiers have
experienced this same phenomenon when one of their commanders made the attempt.
A much more successful approach is to first teach a few basic punching combinations
and have students memorize them instead of trying to teach the details of correct
technique or rush the members of the unit into sparring. These punch combos then can be
billed initially as mostly a method of physical training and can be integrated into the other
elements of PT, such as running and calisthenics. This can be done with or without
training aids such as boxing gloves and mitts, although they make it easier to hit hard,
which will make the training seem more like PT. In each session, the leader or coach can
make small corrections in the soldiers’ technique, introducing footwork, defense, etc., and
after a little time, if this becomes routine, there will be a perceptible growth in technique.
Sparring should be introduced slowly, not only for safety but also because it will better
ensure everyone’s growth. It is very easy for a motivated coach — who loves to spar
because he is fairly good at it — to forget that in every sparring session, someone is
getting the worst of it. In a gym where the objective is to train champions, this may be
OK, but in a unit, it is the skill level of the average member that matters. Care must be
taken to ensure that everyone has a good experience. Jab sparring should be taught first;
for quite some time thereafter, the training sessions should concentrate on defending the
jab. This guarantees that few people take any serious blows for their first few sparring
sessions, allowing them time to get used to the give and take.
To help this process, we developed a system of striking combinations and a method for
calling them and holding punching mitts for them that allows students to simultaneously
learn to become proficient strikers and striking coaches. It begins with five simple punch
combos. When they have been learned, defense can be added in a way that makes fighters
react naturally to an enemy attack and instills counterattacking as a reflex. Soon, kicks are
integrated, then takedowns, as well as the defenses to both — all in the ways that they will
happen in fights. This system is laid out in the Training Methods section below.
TRAINING METHODS
Warm-Ups and Drills
Unless combatives training follows a strenuous workout, it is always a good idea to
warm up. Warm-up drills should comprise movements that help in building the movement
patterns and skills necessary to be a good fighter.
After an initial warm-up of more vulnerable areas, such as the fighter’s neck, training
drills should be conducted to:
• continue the warm-up
• reinforce the importance of dominant body position
• perfect the soldier’s basic skills
During these drills, soldiers flow between dominant positions repeating basic
techniques, with a different detail emphasized during each session. This allows for the
maximum use of training time by simultaneously building good movement patterns,
refining basic combatives techniques and enabling soldiers to warm up further.
As soldiers perfect the basics, new techniques can be substituted so that the drills
remain fresh and offer opportunity to drill. (See Table 1.) One of the most common
mistakes is to spend all the time sparring and not enough drilling to perfect new
techniques. This also allows more experienced soldiers, who may be working on a new
technique, to train with newer soldiers whom they can help coach through the basics
during the same drill.
Table 1. Drills and Techniques From Various Starting Positions

Live Training
Live training is the execution of techniques in real time with a fully resistant opponent.
In combatives, live training includes various categories of sparring each with several
forms. The major categories are ground sparring, clinch sparring, standing-strikes sparring
and full sparring.
Ground Sparring
Ground sparring isolates the ground-grappling portion of fighting. Fighters should avoid
the common mistake of beginning ground sparring by facing each other while on their
knees. Some fighters become very proficient at getting on top from this position, but it’s a
position that very seldom happens in an actual fight. Then they concentrate the bulk of
their training while attacking from the top position. Conversely, some fighters learn to
give up the initiative and assume the guard, spending the bulk of their training on the
bottom. The way to avoid this mistake is to always start from a position likely to happen
in a real fight. Of course, this puts one fighter at a disadvantage from the outset, but this
fact only serves to illustrate the reasons that many instructors make the mistake. The only
reason to start on the knees is because it is fair. That only matters if egos get in the way of
good training. If the best fighter in the unit starts with someone of lesser skill on his back
in the rear mount and gets submitted, it doesn’t make him the lesser fighter. It simply
means that he needs to train more on escaping the rear mount; having someone start there
may be the only way that he will ever have to work on it.
Ground-sparring methods consist of situational sparring, limited sparring and sparring
with strikes.
• Situational sparring In situational sparring, soldiers assume a set position to work
on a specific technique and reset upon meeting certain objectives. This type of
training is key to developing well-rounded fighters. Here’s an example of situational
sparring: Soldier A begins within Soldier B’s guard. They spar until Soldier A passes
the guard, is swept or is submitted. In this example, Soldier A is working on his
guard-passing skills, while Soldier B is working on his guard-passing defense.
• Limited sparring In limited sparring, soldiers can use only a limited number of
techniques (e.g., sparring for dominant position, submissions with chokes only).
 • Sparring with strikes When ground sparring with strikes, open-hand strikes should
be used to the head, and closed-fist strikes should be used to the body. An appropriate
level of force should be used to promote safety and provide sufficient motivation to
learn proper defense. Caution must be taken not to slap the ears because of the danger
of ruptured eardrums.
Clinch Sparring
This type of live training occurs at a close range. Clinch-sparring techniques consist of
the following:
• Pummeling The soldier is sparring for dominant arm position only. In pummeling,
soldiers begin in a neutral position and fight for dominant position (e.g., double
underhooks or neck control).
• Clinch with knee strikes While pummeling for dominant arm position, soldiers try
to create openings in their training partner’s position to land controlled strikes with
their knees. This allows soldiers to better understand the actions involved in creating,
exploiting and defending openings. Note: For best results, this type of sparring
should be done lightly and for longer periods. (Twenty minutes or more is common.)
• Sparring for takedowns This is done from a standing position. This type of
training will typically cause soldiers to take a lower, crouching stance, which makes
them vulnerable to knee strikes. Instructors should follow this training with clinch
sparring to reinforce good posture. Sparring for takedowns can and should be
conducted with and without a uniform top. Soldiers must be able to exploit an
enemy’s clothing but should not become dependent on it.
• Clinch with knee strikes to a takedown The clinch with knee strikes to a
takedown combines all techniques of the clinch range. When using this technique,
soldiers begin with their arms in a neutral posture and pummel for dominant position
while effecting strikes and takedowns. This type of clinch sparring is the most
effective, but it requires a high level of skill and cooperation from both training
partners.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Caution: When throwing knee strikes, fighters must take care to avoid injury to their
training partners. All strikes should have no power behind them.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Standing-Strikes Sparring
To be effective in standing-strikes sparring, fighters must be within striking range of the
opponent to apply full-force strikes and kicks. Strikes must be thrown in combinations to
be effective — “bunches of punches,” as the old boxing saying goes. Punches can be
labeled using two conventions: individual strikes and combinations. In the traditional
method — holding boxing mitts — each of the four techniques is numbered. The mitt
holder calls out the punches he wants the fighter to throw. (See Table 2.)
The Modern Army Combatives Program, however, uses five basic combinations for
ease of learning. (See Table 3.)
Table 2. Individual Strikes and Their Numbering Convention
Table 3. Punching Combinations and Their Numbering Convention

Practicing combinations (Table 4) enables the fighter to correct his technical mistakes
with a proficient training partner or coach. Punching combinations must be practiced until
they become a soldier’s natural pattern of movement.
When learning the basic combinations, soldiers should return each hand to a defensive
posture after it is used. When a soldier is within punching range, so is his opponent;
therefore, soldiers should make good defense an integral part of their offense.
To reinforce good fighting habits, the holder can do the following: repeat a strike by
saying its name (i.e., “jab”) as many times as he likes to reinforce good defensive habits,
such as snapping the jab back or keeping the other hand up; throw a jab back at the same
time as the puncher, forcing him to defend; or fire a jab, in which the puncher should
simultaneously catch it and fire his jab.
• Counterpunching Defensive boxing skills can be practiced by adding them to
basic combinations with counterpunching (as in Table 4). Note: Defensive skills
should always be practiced with counterpunching and never by defending multiple
punches in a row. Trying to block multiple punches gives your opponent the
initiative, enabling him to break down your defenses.
Mitt holding for combinations with punching/counterpunching Punching and
counterpunching can be incorporated into mitt holding (Table 5). Note: In order to
teach fighters to read their opponents’ body language, mitt holders should mimic the
movements of opponents.
Table 4. Counterpunching Combinations
Table 5. Mitt Holding for Combinations With Punching and
Counterpunching

• Combinations with kicks Soldiers should practice punching combinations until the
strikes and subsequent defense become natural and then add kicks (Table 6) into the
pattern of movement. This increases the effectiveness of the kick.
Defense against kicks To add kick defense, the holder attacks with kicks in several
ways, as shown in Table 7.
Mitt holding for combinations with kicks The goal of mitt holding for combinations
with kicks is to become proficient at attacking with and defending against kicks
(Table 8).
Table 6. Kicks and Their Naming Convention
Table 7. Combinations for Defense Against Kicks
Table 8. Mitt Holding for Combinations With Kicks

• Combinations with takedowns Finally, takedowns (Table 9) are added so that the
combinations address the full range of combatives techniques.
Mitt holding for combinations with takedowns The goal of mitt holding for
combinations with takedowns is to become proficient at attacking with takedowns
(Table 10).
Table 9. Takedowns and Their Naming Convention
Table 10. Mitt Holding for Combinations With Takedowns

Full Sparring
Full sparring combines all other methods of sparring. (See the Sparring Methods list
shown below.) Although it is one of the main categories of live training, full sparring is
less useful than other forms because the more skillful or physically gifted fighter only
trains in his best position and his partner in his worst.
Sparring Methods
• Jab sparring is used as an introduction to sparring with strikes and remains
important as a means of developing a good jab and the ability to defend the jab.
• Body boxing is usually reserved for beginners and only allows body punches. This
type of sparring permits new fighters to become comfortable with sparring before
punches to the head are allowed. Body boxing also forces fighters to become
accustomed to exchanging blows with a partner at a close range. Note: Allowing
punches to the head too early can cause some fighters to become punch shy (overly
cautious of being hit), which hinders their development.
• Boxing is sparring in which only punches to the head and torso are allowed. Boxing
is the foundation of striking-skills development and should not be neglected.
• Kickboxing is sparring in which punches and kicks are allowed. Note: Kicks
should not be limited to the upper body, which is common in some martial arts.
• Kickboxing with takedowns can be done with boxing gloves, headgear and no
uniform top or with no gloves and a uniform top (being gloveless makes grasping a
shirt possible). In the latter, open-hand strikes to the head and closed-fist strikes to
the body are allowed.
WEAPONS DRILLS
Tueller Drill
In March 1983, an article titled “How Close Is Too Close?” by law-enforcement officer
Dennis Tueller, appeared in S.W.A.T. magazine. In that piece, Tueller talked about an
experiment that he had done to figure out how much ground a subject armed with a
contact weapon could cover before an officer would be able to draw and shoot. He found
an average adult male could cover 21 feet in the 1.5 seconds it took, on average, for an
officer to deploy his weapon. His advice was to “draw your weapon as soon as the danger
clearly exists,” and the testing showed that the “danger zone” was farther than people had
previously thought.
This testing and follow-up investigation by noted gun writer and trainer Massad Ayoob
established the principle of the “reactionary gap,” which is the distance an assailant can
cover before an officer can respond. It varies based on the situation and factors such as
how practiced the officer is in his draw stroke, whether the officer is drawing from
concealment, how alert the officer is and how athletic the assailant is. But, in general, the
lesson spread throughout the law-enforcement community that an officer should deploy
his weapon before he thinks there is danger.
In the combatives program, we modified the drill somewhat and used it for a slightly
different purpose. It is used in the Modern Army Combatives Program to indicate at what
distance grappling range begins. It is conducted by putting an assailant (wearing a
paintball mask and carrying a doubled-up martial arts belt) at range, starting at 10 feet and
increasing by one full pace in each iteration. The shooter carries a holstered marking-
cartridge pistol. The assailant has the initiative, and when he springs forward, the shooter
has to hit the assailant or be slapped across the stomach with the belt.
The purpose of this drill is to demonstrate where grappling range begins. Of course,
even then it only shows the distance if the soldier is expecting an attack and has already
made the conscious decision to shoot the assailant before he ever lunges. Add in the
complications of a real situation — an attack from behind or to the side through a crowd
— then making the decision to employ deadly force, and the time it takes to recognize the
threat and eliminate it can increase greatly. In fact, in combatives training, this drill is
often called the “I would just shoot you” drill because its primary result is to show just
how impotent that statement, made by every wannabe pistolero who doesn’t want to learn
combatives, is. In real life, the operative part of the word gunfighter is fighter.
Grappling With Electricity
After the Tueller or “I would just shoot you” drill establishes that grappling range starts
much farther away than most people think, it is time to address what happens at grappling
range. By the time this lesson is taught, the students should already be somewhat
accomplished grapplers with decent clinch-fighting skills.
When engaged in a fight with someone, there is no way to know whether the person you
are fighting is armed. It is the nature of some weapons to be concealable, and there are so
many ways of carrying a weapon that there is no way to reliably check. Soldiers must
therefore fight everyone as if they are armed.
During the grappling-with-electricity drill, students are placed in pairs in a circle facing
outward. The instructor moves around the room and places a 100,000-volt stun gun in one
or more of their pockets. He then places everyone in a starting position, such as one
student in the other’s guard or in side control, and calls for them to begin. At this point,
the only certainty is that somebody in the drill is armed. If the armed student(s) can get to
their weapon and employ it, their opponent pays the piper.
Two things happen in this drill. First, the intensity level of the training goes through the
roof. Even though the stun-gun shock is not very painful and does not cause any damage,
no one wants to get shocked. The drill can be made even more intense by allowing slaps to
the face and closed-fist punches to the body like during ground grappling with strikes.
Second, everyone quickly learns that the key to success is to control the opponent. That
is done in much the same way as in unarmed grappling. Of course, there are differences. A
soldier can’t afford to let the opponent have a free arm, for example, or wouldn’t want to
put hooks in when in the rear mount.
Once this drill has been introduced to the class, the electricity should be introduced
randomly during grappling or scenario training. Fighters must make that major shift to
fighting as if an opponent might be armed because in a real fight, that is the case.
Standing Grappling With Side Arm
The next drill is to put on a side arm and engage while standing. The best method is to
have one student wear a training pistol or knife in a sheath that would hold a real weapon.
The drill starts with one student pinned against a wall. One student wins if he is able to
deploy the weapon with enough control to bring it to bear without shooting himself. After
the students get the hang of the drill, it should be conducted in full combat equipment
against opponents wearing appropriate padding.
The first iterations should be done with the armed student pinned against a wall with his
pistol on the wall side or away from the opponent. This is the easiest defensive scenario
and affords the opportunity to practice skills already acquired in the context of unarmed
fighting — pummeling, strikes, takedowns — only now with the objective of gaining
control of the weapon. During this drill, the utility of weapons-retention holsters and
sheaths becomes apparent. Once this is learned, the students can begin from a position of
being pinned against the wall with the gun toward the opponent, then have the gun wearer
pin his opponent against the wall.
Ground Grappling With Side Arm
The same kind of drills that can be performed while standing and grappling over a side
arm can be done for ground grappling, too. The key to a successful drill is to start in a
position likely to happen in a fight, such as one person is mounted or in the guard. It is
important to experiment with different starting positions in the same way that ground-
grappling sparring should always start in a position likely to occur in a fight. These drills
also can be conducted with strikes and with stun guns. Ground grappling and standing
grappling over side arms also can be conducted with more than one opponent.
“Graduation” Drill
The graduation drill from basic training combatives is called the “react to contact” front
or rear drill. Briefly, the student enters a corner-fed room where the door opens with the
hinges farthest away from the corner. Taking the path of least resistance, as soon as he
enters the room, he is confronted by someone whose hands are in the air. The trainee must
move toward the opponent and take charge of him, but the person becomes aggressive and
attacks.
The standard is to successfully execute option one, two or three. The first option, which
is usually preferable, is to regain projectile-weapons range by using the inherent
advantages of the post, frame or hook with head-control positions to push or throw the
enemy away from him. The second option is to use a secondary weapon such as a combat
knife or pistol. The important thing here is that the same positions (post, frame or hook
with head control) allow him to protect his weapon from the enemy’s grasp as he is
drawing it from its sheath or holster and give the student the advantage on employment
once he has his weapon in his hand. The last option, for example, if the enemy is
employing his own secondary weapon and will have it in hand before the student can try
option one or two, is to close the distance and gain a dominant body position.
Alternately, after the student enters the room, someone may attack him from a position
hidden behind the door. The attack should hit him behind the shoulder/elbow. The
standard for success is the same as in front contact.
The culmination for individual combatives training is to enter and clear a room as a
member of a fire team. The best way to set it up for the first iteration is with a four-man
team and one opponent. Very frequently all four students will turn to face the fight, or they
may even get involved in it, leaving themselves totally without security. At that opportune
time, a second opponent should enter the room shooting. It doesn’t take long to drive
home the central point that everyone needs to be a proficient fighter. It shouldn’t take a
four-man team to subdue one opponent.
At this point, a soldier is ready to take part in the more complex scenario training that
his unit will do in preparation for carrying out battlefield missions.
Scenario Training
It’s best to introduce students to scenario training in stages. In the first stage, a student
enters a room with a rubber training weapon and is confronted by an opponent in
appropriate padding. Usually during this phase, the student will immediately drop his
weapon and go hand-to-hand. In the second stage, the student enters with a training
weapon that can fire marking projectiles, but the instructor has set up the weapon to either
fire or not. This is called a ball-and-dummy drill, as in the marksmanship training
technique used to eliminate jerking the trigger. During this stage, the student does not
know whether his weapon will fire and should therefore attempt to shoot his opponent, if
possible, resorting to hand-to-hand only, if necessary.
In the third stage, the ball-and-dummy portion of the drill stays the same, but this time
when the student enters the room, the opponent waits with hands in the air. The student
has to take charge of the opponent, who may or may not attack at any moment, forcing the
student to work within the Rules of Engagement.
 CHAPTER FIVE

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE

BATTLEFIELD
One of the advantages of developing a combatives system in what the military calls “an
era of persistent conflict” is the constant feedback from soldiers returning from the fight.
When the forces were mobilized to go into Afghanistan and later Iraq, men were drawn
directly from the Combatives School to fight with various units such as the 101st Airborne
or the 3rd Infantry. These men came back in a matter of months, so almost from the
beginning, we were able to start collecting combat stories and lessons learned.
The rotation schemes of different units varied. Some of the special operations units
went on much shorter but more frequent deployments, allowing a quick turnaround for
lessons learned. Regular Army soldiers would spend a year or more at a time deployed,
and it was very common for someone to have three or four total years or more in the war
zone. Soldiers can take down a lot of objectives in four years.
The lessons drawn during this time have resulted in the flourishing combatives system
that we have today, built on principles of training and understanding of training methods
illuminated by the experience of war.
Here are a few of those experiences and some of the lessons to be learned from them.
EVERY SOLDIER A WARRIOR
The least likely place you would expect to see hand-to-hand combat might be the back
of a helicopter flying at 9,000 feet over a dark and remote area of Afghanistan. But that is
exactly what happened one night in early 2002, and everyone involved lived to tell about
it because of the actions of one well-trained soldier.
During an early phase of the war in Afghanistan, while the wreckage of the World
Trade Center in New York was still smoldering, a Special Forces team placed 15 Taliban
prisoners in the back of a CH-47 Chinook helicopter for transportation to American-
controlled territory. The Chinook is a large dual-rotor, heavy-lift helicopter — the kind
often seen on the news carrying U.S. troops. For this short trip, the prisoners’ hands were
bound in front of them, and at the time, it was determined that only one guard would be
needed to watch over them.
But a few minutes into the nighttime flight, with the prisoners seemingly docile and
with thousands of feet of elevation making escape unlikely, the guard, who was watching
the prisoners through night-vision goggles — which offer a very restrictive peripheral
field of view — inadvertently turned his back on one of the prisoners seated near him.
In the moment it took for the guard to lose sight of him, the prisoner grabbed him with
his legs in a triangle-like choke and began to squeeze. The combination of the helicopter’s
deafening noise and the guard’s constricted movement made it impossible for him to
signal for help. But an alert door gunner turned and saw the commotion through his own
night-vision goggles and moved to help.
 The gunner, who had been trained in basic hand-to-hand fighting skills as a part of the
Modern Army Combatives Program, was tethered to the aircraft with a harness designed
to catch him if he fell out, but he applied the rear-naked choke from his position behind
the prisoner, pulling the attacker and his victim back from the open ramp and certain death
if they fell.
As he was choking the prisoner, the gunner backed into a second Taliban who dug his
teeth into the gunner’s backside in an attempt to assist his compatriot. Enduring the pain
from the second prisoner’s tooth-hold, the door gunner continued to apply pressure on the
choke until the first prisoner released the guard. He then struck the biter in the face with
downward elbows, driving him to the floor of the helicopter, where the guard was able to
control him long enough to more securely bind him.
No shot was ever fired, and there was no fiery crash because of the actions of that
aviation crew member, who reacted with his wits, using fundamental techniques he
learned in combatives training.
Most of these stories are never told in the United States, but as many soldiers who have
fought in Afghanistan and Iraq can attest, hand-to-hand combat is a fact of life in war and
scenes like the one in the Chinook repeat themselves every day.
For U.S. troops, the modern battlefield is rife with technological advantages, up-
armored vehicles (high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, or HMMWVs, with
added armor), high-speed personal-protection gear and all sorts of lethal weapons. But
hand-to-hand fighting, in which a soldier must close with the enemy and dominate him
physically, is still one of the most fundamental aspects of warfare and has become a
regular occurrence in modern wars such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, even in the most
unexpected places.
An aggressive approach is required toward preparing our soldiers, pushing them to their
limits of pain and endurance, and instilling the warrior spirit needed to overcome the fear
of closing with the enemy.
LIVE TRAINING PAYS OFF
A gunner let loose a long burst of machine-gun fire through the windshield of a
speeding car. The driver was clearly bent on ramming through the roadblock just outside
Baghdad, and the gunner wasn’t taking any chances.
Only days earlier, two Rangers had been killed nearby when a “pregnant” woman —
feigning distress at a vehicle checkpoint — detonated her suicide vest as they approached
her to render aid.
Despite the onslaught, the driver continued at a high speed toward the soldiers’
makeshift defensive position, ramming the metal guardrail it was built behind. The car
struck the guardrail with tremendous impact and flipped through the air, directly over the
soldiers’ heads, landing upside down behind them in a huge cloud of dust, the wheels still
spinning.
With the two-man machine-gun team still covering the intersection, three more soldiers
moved in to cover the crashed vehicle. Seeing the soldiers’ muzzles pointed at their heads,
the three men inside the car raised their hands to surrender, clumsily pouring out the
window of the upturned car. Once the men were on their feet, the soldiers began to search
them for weapons and tie their hands behind their backs.
One soldier searching the men had his weapon hanging from an assault sling so he
could use both hands, and he was counting on cover fire from his teammate. As the soldier
began to search the third man, the suspect became unruly and brazenly tried to get at the
soldier’s assault-slung rifle.
Not wanting to shoot what he thought was an unarmed man, the soldier instead drove
hard into his opponent, pushing him against the vehicle. The suspect was still trying to
reach for the rifle, so the soldier grasped the man’s wrist and drove it downward, reaching
over the guy’s arm to grasp his own wrist, forming the figure-4.
He pulled his aggressor forward and twisted the man’s arm into a reverse bent armbar,
or kimura, just as he had done a thousand times in training.
“The added weight of my body armor and equipment only made it that much easier to
break his arm,” the soldier said later.
After the enemy was subdued, a pistol was found hidden in his clothing, and three AK-
47 assault rifles were found in the vehicle.
There are a couple of lessons that can be learned from this event. The first is that the
soldier who performed the kimura had no problem executing it in real time against an
actual enemy because he had performed the very same techniques many times against
fully resistant training partners. It is instruction against fully resistant partners, or live
training, that sets apart the realistic preparation in arts like Brazilian jiu-jitsu and muay
Thai. A realistic approach to combatives training demands the same.
The second lesson is that the soldier’s equipment did not fundamentally change the
nature of the fight. In a misguided attempt to “train like you fight,” which is a very good
principle of training, many combatives systems advocate always training with full
equipment. The logic is that a soldier will have this equipment on in a fight and therefore
had better get used to it. However, this approach has a blaring drawback.
When soldiers train wearing full kit, the danger level of the training goes up. A fall on a
canteen or a strike against the edge of a partner’s helmet, for example, could cause an
injury. As a result, the speed, intensity or unpredictability of the training is backed down
to make up for the obvious danger. In the end, the training resembles, at best, the “one-
step sparring” that is done in many traditional martial arts classes; that’s the same training
plan that worked out so spectacularly poorly for most of the traditional martial artists early
on in the Ultimate Fighting Championship.
The best combatives plan, then, calls for much of the training to be done without
equipment, the reality of having a fully resistant opponent far outweighing other factors.
Training with equipment should be done so that the lessons permeate the rest of the
instruction and, more important, so they become an integral part of mission training;
however, the skills are built on the mat without the use of gear.
The best practice is to integrate combatives into a unit’s regular activities such as daily
physical training. Instead of sectioning off specific combatives training sessions,
combatives drilling and sparring should be integral parts of each day’s PT: Go for a run or
foot march, do sets of exercises such as push-ups or crunches, include 10 or 20 repetitions
of one of the ground-grappling drills or pummeling or working the striking matrix and, a
few times a week, practice ground sparring of various types or clinch sparring. In this way,
being a good fighter becomes expected of every member of the unit.
With that solid foundation laid, combatives also can become an integral part of tactical
training. It is impossible to be fully trained on many of the tasks units are called on to do
on today’s battlefields without combatives. If soldiers could shoot everyone they
encounter during close-quarters battle, there would be no need to send them into a
building. But they can’t “just shoot them.” They have to lay hands on people, and that
means combatives.
The same thing is true for manning a traffic-control point or a roadblock. Vehicles will
approach and they will be full of people, many of whom will not be the enemy. Soldiers
will have to lay hands on some of them, which means combatives.
CLOSE WITH THE ENEMY*
*This story was previously published in Army Times, October 4, 2008.

The Rangers had been on the ground for less than a minute when they came under
small-arms fire from fairly close range. After evacuating two wounded comrades, one of
whom had a life-threatening gunshot, they began to clear a large grassy field near the
landing zone.
Wading through tall grass laced with irrigation ditches, Spc. Joseph Gibson at first
didn’t think about it when his foot came down on something odd. “He was kneeled down
in one of the irrigation ditches. I actually stepped on him, and just because of how the
terrain was, I really didn’t even think anything of it. I took about two more steps before I
thought, ‘I’d better see what that was,’” the Ranger, who was on his fourth three-
monthlong tour in Iraq, said in a later interview. Turning, he saw an armed man bringing
his weapon to bear in an attempt to shoot him.
At the moment he saw the enemy, Gibson was looking back over his shoulder, and
because he had been pushing through the grass, he didn’t have his own weapon in a
position to shoot.
“He was fixin’ to shoot me, and there’s no way I could have shot him first, so I just got
in front of his weapon,” he said, referring to getting past the enemy’s muzzle, “and he
fired it off right next to my face. I tackled him to the ground and grabbed hold of his
weapon … and I started hollering for help. While I was doing that, he ripped my helmet
off.”
With the open formation the Rangers were using to move through the chest-high grass,
it would take a moment before help could arrive. In the meantime, Gibson was on his own
in a life-and-death fight.
With little room in the ditch, Gibson gained the top position and control of the enemy’s
rifle. The enemy then grabbed the Ranger’s rifle, which was slung around his head and
lead arm on an assault sling. “He got my weapon, so I started to hit him in the face,” he
said. “He wasn’t trying to aim my weapon at me; he was in no position to do something
like that.”
 While Gibson was throwing punches, he felt the enemy reaching his hand down to
“grab a knife or something to attack,” he said.
“Then he told me in English, ‘Bomb,’ and I realized he had a bomb on him and he was
trying to clack himself off,” Gibson said. “It definitely dropped my morale, but it didn’t
slow me down or anything.
“I kept control of his hand and he used his foot to push my chest plate up into my throat
and it was beginning to choke me, so I let all my weight down on him and I hit him in the
face as hard as I could and knocked him out for just a second.”
Seizing the momentary advantage, Gibson pushed away, gaining enough space between
them to bring his rifle to bear. “I buried my weapon into his gut and fired one off, and he
hollered and then that’s when I got off of him and neutralized him,” he said.
After finishing the fight with that one enemy, Gibson and the rest of the Rangers fought
on for about another hour.
Gibson said later, “I’ve thought about it, and I know it could have played out a lot of
different ways. I’m just glad the guy did what he did and wasn’t thinking very smart. As
long as I got out of his weapon’s reach, he didn’t have a chance.”
The primary lesson that can be learned from this encounter is that the ideas we had
about what hand-to-hand combat would look like still hold true in many cases. The basic
tactics of close the distance, gain a dominant position and finish the fight (as described in
Chapter Four) worked perfectly in this case, as it often will, especially in an environment
with few noncombatants. There was no time to bring his weapon to bear, so Gibson
attacked. His instinct to close the distance was the only reason he was not shot. Getting
past the enemy’s muzzle and jamming him up gave Gibson a chance to turn the tables.
Even encumbered by body armor and other combat equipment and with the limited
maneuvering room in the ditch, armed with the concept of dominant position practiced no
doubt in friendly competition among his fellow Rangers, Gibson was able to fight his way
on top and from there use his positional advantage to finish the fight.
It is also instructive that Gibson did not bring a secondary weapon to bear. At that time,
the Rangers did not generally carry pistols as secondary weapons, and because they were
not considered a very good piece of equipment, they did not bring their issue bayonets to
war, either. In fact, the standard practice in the Rangers, as in most of the units at that time,
was for individuals to purchase knives to their tastes on the civilian market. There was
also no culture of using a knife as a secondary weapon during training. It would have been
very rare at that time for a Ranger to have a training blade that fit into the same sheath
worn on his kit when going to war so that he could practice with it under duress.
TACTICAL COMBATIVES
While guarding the outside of a compound, his Special Forces A-Team was raiding in
search of high-value enemy personnel, Staff Sgt. Rich Miranda’s job was to prevent
anyone from coming onto or leaving the objective. As it happened, a shadowy figure
scurried over the perimeter wall and started to disappear into the night. With only a
fleeting moment to make the decision of life or death for the fleeing figure, Miranda
squeezed the trigger. With solid intelligence on the enemy personnel who were on the
objective, which turned out to be true, the shooting was well within the Rules of
Engagement in place at the time. But although the target area was full of high-value
enemies, this particular person was not one of them and was only an unarmed teenager
fleeing out of fear. Although collateral damage happens on every battlefield, it does weigh
heavy on the soldiers. This incident partially explains the actions Miranda would take a
couple of nights later. You simply cannot go on an objective with the attitude to “just
shoot” everyone that you encounter.
The team soon had another mission. In a dynamic takedown, it is more usual to go with
weapon-mounted white lights and aggressive action to storm a building, but it is useful,
sometimes, to come in stealthily in the dark using night-vision goggles and infrared laser-
aiming devices. That was the decision on this night.
The first house of the evening had been a dry hole. Though, at first, it seemed they had
hit pay dirt. It was full of men because of a family get-together. As the team entered the
second house, the No. 1 man seemed to be struggling with something as he went through
the first door. The No. 2 man, keying off the direction taken by No. 1, turned left, the
opposite direction from No. 1, which is the standard close-quarters-battle method, and
Miranda, No. 3, came in to follow No. 1 who at this point was obviously engaged with
someone. So as not to be stuck standing in the doorway, what is known in CQB as the
fatal funnel because enemy fire will normally be concentrated there, Miranda placed the
palm of his non-firing hand on the back of No. 1 and pushed him and the person he was
tangled up with farther into the room.
The enemy had a grip on the No. 1 man’s weapon and was fighting to get control of it,
although this was not clear to Miranda who was looking at the scene through the narrow
green-tinted view of his night-vision goggles.
While struggling to gain control of his weapon, No. 1 pulled on it as if to rip it out of
the enemy’s hands. This is known as the tug-of-war technique: When an enemy has hold
of your weapon by the barrel, if you simply step back and pull, it will normally be pointed
straight at him, allowing you to shoot. In doing so, the soldier stepped slightly back and
toward the center of the room.
With nothing now between him and the man No. 1 had been struggling with, Miranda
grasped him with his non-firing hand and, using an advancing foot sweep, tossed him
easily into the center of the room.
At the same moment, with his weapon finally clear enough, No. 1 fired a three-round
burst into the enemy. Unfortunately, with Miranda still grasping the enemy’s shirt, one of
the rounds passed through his left arm before striking the enemy. While searching the
room after securing the rest of the house, an AK-47 was found at the enemy’s feet.
During the time of this incident, the Special Forces community as a whole did not have
a very advanced combatives program. The Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, where all
new Special Forces soldiers attend the Special Forces Qualification Course, was teaching
the Linear Involuntary Neurological Override Engagement system, which had been
abandoned by the Marine Corps several years earlier. Fifth Special Forces Group, of
which Miranda and his team were a part, had one of the more advanced programs at the
time. (The group combatives instructor, John Renken, was a former 101st Airborne soldier
who, after getting out of the Army, had put himself through seminary school by becoming
a professional mixed-martial arts fighter. Renken was a key source for some of the clinch-
fighting curriculum at Fort Benning.)
Miranda was one of the more experienced fighters in the entire Special Forces. He had
been training, mostly on his own, for years and was an accomplished judo player and
kickboxer. Also, his team was one of the most combat experienced in the Special Forces.
The No. 1 man in this story had been in more than a few gunfights and had “killed more
men than cancer,” as the saying goes.
The bottom line, however, was that there had been a disconnect between their
combatives training and their mission training. Combatives is a part of CQB and must be
trained as such. At that time, CQB training mostly consisted of live fire against paper
targets or bullet traps. Occasionally, role players were used to simulate noncombatants.
Many people treated combatives as a separate topic. There was still a lot of resistance to it
from the people who had spent the last 20 years in a peacetime army and who simply did
not want to face the facts about combat. Combatives, like marksmanship, is a method used
to handle an enemy at a certain range. You cannot claim to be well-trained, as an
individual or as a team, without either, and they must both be a natural and seamless part
of the whole.
The resistance started to fade as more and more soldiers came to grips, literally, with the
enemy. Miranda’s incident and others acted as a catalyst for change. I was brought to the
Special Warfare Center to help redesign the entire combatives program based on the
lessons we had been learning about realistic training. Soon, in the courses in which
Special Forces soldiers are trained to conduct what are referred to as direct-action
missions — fighting with hands on bad guys and dealing with the ambiguities of who is or
isn’t a combatant — combatives became an integral part of the training.
Miranda said in his post-action interview, something that we have heard from many
men who have a lot of combatives experience, that one of the remarkable things about this
fight was that he felt no more amped up when laying hands on the enemy than he had
when he was about to go through the door. The techniques and nature of hand-to-hand
combat were second nature to him. Although the stakes were higher, the adrenaline was
the same. He also, however, noticed an obvious difference in the other men in the room
with him, very experienced gunfighters all but without the time on the mat and in the ring
that put him at ease.
BATTLE PROVEN
After receiving very good information that a large number of improvised explosive
device makers and fighters were residing in several homes in a village his unit was
responsible for, Capt. Troy Thomas conducted a ground assault convoy from his patrol
base two kilometers away with every man he could spare from his company’s other
missions. He had about 45 men with him to simultaneously take down several houses and
block three possible escape routes. Being short-handed for such a large task, Thomas
accompanied what he thought was the main effort, a large house known to be home to
three brothers who were suspected to be enemy fighters.
Thomas followed the lead men, of the eight men assigned the task, into the building. “I
would usually not be in an entry team, but with the other requirements … I felt that I
needed to be in this entry team to ensure that we completed the task,” he said later in his
post-action interview.
“Upon entry into a small foyer, the home opened up into three rooms, a stairwell and a
small bathroom. I was the second or third guy in the stack, and when I entered, I moved to
the right. Directly in front of me was a large living room and about five or six adults who
were sleeping/waking up as we entered. Directly to my right was a closed metal door
(bathroom). Almost immediately after entry, the metal door opened and a fighting-age
male started moving toward me. I noticed that the room he was in was a bathroom that
was very small and only he and I would fit into the room. I verbally commanded him to sit
down as I grabbed him on the shoulder to force him to the ground. (My weapon was slung,
and I still had control of it with my firing hand.)
“As I attempted to get the individual to the ground, he started to push back into me and
was trying to fight his way past me. I immediately grabbed behind his head and forced his
head down and kneed him (the strike hit him in the right eye) in an attempt to get him to
comply. After the strike, the individual did not settle down. Instead, he grabbed my rifle
and attempted to pull it away from me. I then kicked him back with a straight kick and
fired into his chest three times.”
The enemy died of wounds after receiving medical treatment from the American medics
and being medically evacuated to a U.S. base. He and his brothers were found to have
been responsible for emplacing an explosive-formed penetrator, a very effective form of
IED, that had wounded five soldiers from a sister battalion and completely destroyed an
M2 Bradley fighting vehicle.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
Author’s Note: In the late 1990s, when Lt. Gen. Mike Ferriter brought me over
from the Ranger Training Brigade to teach the cadre of the infantry officer training
courses, Troy Thomas was my partner in designing the first course. Thomas was a
sergeant first class at the time before getting his commission from Officer Candidate
School. He, along with Jeremy Brown, who had been my deputy while training the
Rangers and took my place as the regimental master trainer when I left to write the
field manual, was among the key people in the development of what would become
the Army’s combatives training program. These men had served for years in the
Ranger Regiment before the war and had trained as hand-to-hand fighters in exactly
the ways outlined in this book.
They, and many others like them, went on to prove time and time again in battle
that the techniques and training methods we developed work.
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
 CHAPTER SIX

BASIC TECHNIQUES
BASIC WEAPON DEFENSE
Muzzle Thump
A fighter may use a short, sharp strike with the muzzle of the weapon to maintain
distance from an opponent.

Maintain a firm grip on your weapon (1). With a short, sharp motion, strike the enemy directly in the chest with the muzzle of your weapon (2).
Tug of War
If an opponent grasps a fighter’s rifle, he can simply pull on it to free it or, if the
opponent is holding on tightly, point the muzzle at him to take a shot.

The enemy grasps the muzzle of your weapon (1). Pull back forcefully. This will point the muzzle at him, allowing a shot (2).
Palm-Heel Strikes
A fighter also may free his weapon from an opponent’s grasp by using palm-heel strikes
with the non-firing hand.

To free your weapon, use palm-heel strikes to the chin or face.

Push Kick
If there is enough space, a push kick can be used.

The push kick should be directed at the inner thigh or preferably the hip joint.
Head Butts
If an opponent has a determined grasp on the weapon with both hands, the fighter can
push the muzzle downward. This will commit both of the enemy’s hands and bring his
now-unprotected head in range for head butts.

Push the weapon down. This will draw him in close (1). His hands being committed to holding the weapon leaves him open for head butts (2).

BASIC STANDING SKILLS AND DRILLS

Dominant Positions
Underhook
Overhook
Body Lock

Head Position and Control

Head position and control are key components in gaining a tactical edge. The fighter
who keeps the control of head positioning while also maintaining stance will hold the edge
offensively and defensively.
For the best head position, the fighter gets an angle on his opponent and posts his head
against the opponent’s neck or side of his head. If an opponent gains head position over a
fighter by posting on the side of his head, he should simply roll his head under the
opponent’s chin and put pressure into his jaw or the side of his head.
Head Position
Head Control

Your head should be up and pushing into your opponent’s jaw.

Neck Control
Gaining Dominant Head Position

The enemy has dominant head position (1). Circle your head around (2). Position your head under his chin (3). You have gained the dominant position (4).

Pummeling
Exchanging Body Locks
The enemy has a body lock on you (1). Turn your body slightly to create space and wedge your hand, fingers first, through the opening at either the elbow or armpit (2). Push your arm through (3). Form a deep
underhook (4). Maintaining a tight underhook, repeat on the other side (5). This forms a body lock on the enemy (6).
Pummeling Simultaneously

The fighters start from a neutral position in which each has an underhook and an overhook and each has his head on the overhook side (1). Both fighters simultaneously begin to pummel with the hand on the
overhook side attempting to gain an underhook (2). As they both drive their arms through toward their opponent’s back, they will each be losing the underhook they had at the start (3). As they begin to lose the
first underhook, they should both switch sides with their heads (4). They end in the opposite position from which they started by switching their feet to face their new overhook (5). This should be repeated on the
opposite side (6). In competitive pummeling, starting from the neutral posture, on the command to go, students attempt to establish a body lock on each other using only the pummeling technique and body
movements.

Neck Wrestling
Basic Swimming

The enemy gains neck control on you (1). You attempt to “swim” through (2). To do so, turn your shoulders slightly and drive one hand up through the center (3). Grasp him by the back of his head (4). Repeat these
actions on the opposite side (5). You have established neck control (6).
Other Neck-Wrestling Techniques

Good Posture and Push the Elbows Up

Over and Under Lever

Good Posture and Push the Elbows Up

KNEE STRIKES
Long Knee
This is used when there is space between a fighter and his opponent. The fighter secures
inside control by pulling the opponent in while driving a knee into his center of mass,
throwing the knee straight into the opponent or slightly upward. The fighter thrusts the
hips forward while pointing the toes downward.

The long knee should push forward into the opponent with a thrust of the hips.
Up-Knee
This is a rising strike (at close range) to the head or chest, from front or side. The
fighter secures inside control by pulling the opponent’s head down toward his knee and
then drives the top of the knee into the opponent’s head or chest.

An up-knee should thrust upward into the opponent’s solar plexus (1) or his face (2).
Round Knee
The round knee is used from the side and goes into the opponent’s ribs or thigh. The
fighter secures inside control by lifting one knee at an angle and striking with the inside of
that knee.

A round knee should be directed at the ribs on the side (1) or to the meaty portion of the thigh (2).

KNEE-STRIKE DEFENSES
Good Posture
A fighter should maintain good posture — it is the best defense against long-knee or up-
knee strikes in a neck and biceps clinch. The head is up; the hips are close to the enemy’s
and canted (tilted or turned) slightly to avoid being kneed in the crotch. The position can
be improved by swimming to inside control.
To defend against knee strikes up the center, keep good posture with your head up and hips in. To defend against knee strikes to the groin, keep your hips turned slightly.
Hip Check
The hip check can be used as a defense against round knee strikes.

When an opponent attempts to use a round knee in a neck and biceps clinch, you can lessen the impact by pushing your hip into it. Maintain good posture — move your hip inside the knee strike. Catch your
opponent’s inner thigh with your outer thigh to beat the knee strike.
Pull Toward the Knee
Pulling toward the knee reduces an opponent’s ability to strike with his knee. In a neck
and biceps clinch, as the opponent lifts his leg for a knee strike, the fighter pulls him
toward the leg he is throwing (in a snapping motion).

The most effective defense against a round knee is to break your opponent’s base by pulling him toward the knee that he is using to strike.
Pull Away From the Knee
Pulling away from the knee reduces an opponent’s ability to strike with his knee. As the
opponent throws a knee, the fighter pulls him away from the knee he is striking with.

Nearly as effective as pulling toward the knee that your opponent is using to strike is to break his base by pulling him away from the attacking knee.

LINES OF DEFENSE WHILE STANDING

The fundamental principle when a fighter is armed and dealing with an enemy or
potential enemy is to gain control at the farthest possible distance, which usually allows
not only a higher degree of safety but also more tactical options when trouble does occur.
It is better, for example, to gain control verbally without physically engaging until
compliance is achieved than to charge across a room to take control.
This principle continues to apply when physically engaged. With this in mind, there are
three lines of defense to keep the enemy at the farthest range when physically engaged: the
post, the frame and the hook with head control.
Post
Your non-firing hand forms a “post” on the enemy’s chest or neck. Ensure that your post-hand fingers are down and high on the enemy’s chest. To protect against an overhand blast, your posted biceps should be
protecting your face or cheek.
Frame

As the enemy gets close to you, use your non-firing forearm as a frame. With your fingers flexed, direct (move) your enemy around. The enemy throws hands and knees, and crashes into you. Grab the wrist of your
frame arm and use it as a lever to create space. A frame can be formed on either side of your opponent’s neck. Frame on same side (A); frame across (B).
Hook With Head Control

From a frame on the non-firing side, underhook to control and direct the enemy.

TACTICAL OPTIONS
Once the enemy has been stopped at one of the lines of defense, there are three tactical
options for how to deal with him further: Regain projectile-weapon range, go to a
secondary weapon, or close the distance and go into a clinch.
Regain Projectile-Weapon Range
Use the leverage inherent in the post, frame or hook-and-head control positions to push
or throw the enemy away from you. It is important to keep other tactical considerations in
mind, such as where you are in the room and in relation to your teammates when
executing this option.
Post
You can push from a post (1) to regain projectile-weapon range (2).
Frame

When your frame is across his chest (1), switch your feet to avoid a takedown (2). Pull him past you (3) and regain projectile-weapon range (4).

Go to a Secondary Weapon
In a close-in fight, the advantage of a handgun, which is its range, is negated. At this
range, fighting with a pistol or knife is done in a very similar manner. With either, you
must first clear the weapon from whatever method you were using to carry it to the fight
and then maintain control as you employ it.
Post

In a situation in which you cannot disengage (1), an option is to transition to a secondary weapon (2). In a close-in fight, sometimes a knife is preferable to a handgun (3).
Frame

This is an example of employing a secondary weapon from a frame.

Hook With Head Control

This is an example of employing a secondary weapon from a hook with head control.

Close the Distance

The last option is to close the distance and achieve the clinch. This option becomes
necessary when the enemy may have a weapon of his own. If a soldier cannot disengage
with sufficient time to employ his own weapon, he must drive into the opponent and gain
control.
Clinch

If the enemy has a weapon on his person (1), many times the best option is to close the distance to gain control (2).

BASIC GROUND FIGHTING

When engaged in ground fighting, the goals and tactical options remain the same as
when fighting while standing. In order to mount a strong defense and be able to move, the
fighter must normally create and maintain space between himself and the enemy.
Lines of Defense on the Ground
The first goal is to gain a good defensive position when the fight goes to the ground. If
the fighter manages to form the guard as he goes down, the post, frame and hook
techniques are identical to when standing. However, to escape, the fighter may have to
move his hips to the side rather than straight back.
Use Post, Frame or Hook

You can use a post from the guard (1-2).

Regain Your Feet

When you have established a post (1) — or a frame or hook — you can use the space it allows to regain your feet (2).
Escape the Mount
If the fighter fails to gain a good position when the fight goes to the ground and he is
mounted, he must achieve a good position in order to have any options.

Keep your elbows in, gain control of one of the enemy’s arms and lift with your hips (1) to roll your opponent (2) and come up on top, in his guard (3).

Grapple Over Weapons

When ground grappling while armed, control of the weapons will be the principle aim
of the fight. If the soldier has managed to gain a good position, he may be able to turn the
enemy’s attempts at taking his weapon to his advantage.
The enemy may set himself up for a reverse bent armbar if he reaches for the fighter’s
secondary weapon with one hand while in the fighter’s guard. If the enemy reaches for the
fighter’s secondary weapon with two hands while in the guard, he may set himself up for a
sweep.
Reverse Bent Armbar

Grasp his hand to keep him from getting your weapon out of your holster or sheath (1). Once you have his hand isolated, reach over it to form the figure-8 (2). Escape your hips and execute a reverse bent armbar
(3). When you have gained control with the armbar, you can engage your secondary weapon (4).
Hip-Heist Sweep

Place your hand on top of his to ensure he doesn’t get your weapon out of your holster or sheath (1). Escape your hips away from your weapon so that your body is on top of it (2). With both hands committed, he
will be easy to sweep by arching your hips (3). Once on top in the mounted position, use your leg to clear your weapon (4). Now that you are in control, it is safe to employ your weapon (5).

REACT TO CONTACT
As a test of basic proficiency, a fighter should be able to react to an unexpected attack
either from the front or the rear. If the opponent strikes from the rear and the soldier is able
to remain standing, the soldier must turn in order to stay in the fight. If the opponent takes
the fight to the ground, the soldier should attempt to gain the guard on the way down or, as
soon as possible, turn to face the opponent after hitting the ground.
On Your Feet
If the enemy attacks you from behind (1), reach back and form an overhook (2). Clear your feet by stepping back and then gain dominant head position (3).
On the Ground

If an enemy hits you from behind with force and you think you will not be able to remain standing (1), attempt to place him in your guard as you fall (2). Maintain control of your weapon on the way down, and use
your legs to keep him as far away as possible (3). Once down, establish a post, frame or hook in order to keep your tactical options open (4).
 CHAPTER SEVEN

COMBATIVES BELT-PROMOTION SYSTEM

“Naturally, if grading examinations were not carried out strictly and if grades were
awarded on the recommendation of only one or two instructors, those unworthy of
promotion may well be favored, which would naturally invite further criticism of the
whole system and bring the reputation … into disrepute.”
— Jigoro Kano1

Martial arts rank systems can serve as a road map for growth in their art and as symbols
of progress along that road. There are innumerable such systems, and their divergent
nature and inherent problems within the martial arts culture have made the majority of
them meaningless as a measure of fighting ability or anything else. In the quote above,
Jigoro Kano, the inventor of martial arts belt systems, was speaking about mechanisms
that he put in place in the early days of Kodokan judo to address these same problems.
Since his time, the problems he was worried about for judo rank have become the norm in
most of the martial arts world.
As the commandant of the Army Combatives School for its first decade, I saw an
astounding number of people show up at the school who were black belts in various
systems. Even more astounding was that few of them had any sort of actual fighting
ability when tested. In fact, nothing proved more predictable. There were certain
exceptions — practitioners of martial arts that have a large competition aspect, like jiu-
jitsu or judo, would frequently have demonstrable skills in the narrow range required by
their competitions, but even this proved to have little connection with their rank within
their system. Let us first examine the problems of martial arts rank systems in general and
then look at the combatives solution to them.
LEGACY BELT SYSTEMS
The most important weakness in traditional martial arts belt systems is their feudal
nature, specifically, that a teacher is empowered to promote his own students. The
problem with this is that any belt given in such a system only actually carries the weight of
one man’s opinion. For many years, I kept a newspaper article over my desk that
illustrated this point: It was about two brothers, one 6 years old and the other 7, receiving
their black belts. The only thing their belts meant was the opinion of their teacher.
Apparently, his opinion of what a black belt means is pretty low. This is why in some
martial arts you seldom hear that someone is a black belt without also hearing from whom.
It is only the reputation of the person who gave the belt that gives it any meaning.
Compare this to the way someone earns a Ph.D. It does not matter whether your father
is the president of a university and himself a highly respected scholar. He cannot give you
a Ph.D. You must do the coursework and go through all the requisite performance gates
because in theory, a doctoral dissertation is a masterwork, a work by an apprentice in a
guild that is presented to a committee of the masters of that guild as evidence that the
apprentice is ready to be included in their company. If one such master, no matter how
accomplished, is empowered to admit members, the standards for admittance will
inevitable drop, just like they have in most martial arts.
Another problem in many martial arts is that the path to progression is to memorize an
increasingly difficult and expansive set of techniques. Often, there is a minimum time
requirement to ensure a modicum of experience and maturity in students who are
particularly adept at memorizing the techniques. This type of system is designed to
preserve an art as it exists from generation to generation as if the demands of the
battlefield never change.
Promotion based on minimum training-time requirements and testing on the
memorization of techniques also has the problem that it can create paper tigers. There is a
world of difference between demonstrating a memorized technique with a willing partner
and pulling off a technique during a fight with a fully resistant enemy.
Finally — and this is more a criticism of the martial arts rather than just their belt-
promotions system, but it is a topic that a promotion system must address if not to go
down the incorrect path — martial arts and their promotion systems, in the absence of a
battlefield imperative, tend toward specialization. In the civilian world, people do what
they like to do. Rare is the person self-motivated to acquire and maintain the broad range
of skills demanded by the contemporary battlefield.
Donn F. Draeger said in Classical Budo, “A lack of combative balance is the
outstanding characteristic of all budo (martial way) entities. Combative balance is
established and maintained by attaining expertise in a wide range of weapons and
familiarity with other martial systems. But the effects of peace in the Edo period
eventually eroded this sense of practical realism.”2 Peace has eroded the practical realism
of martial arts in the modern world in just the same way, and the belt systems of the
existing arts have been a part of that erosion.
COMBATIVES BELT SYSTEM
Rather than a minimum time requirement, the combatives belt system has performance
requirements. It does not matter whether you memorize a thousand techniques and can
demonstrate them flawlessly; to advance you must be able to fight. This can only be
measured safely in the crucible of competition. Just like knights in the Middle Ages
proved their worthiness before battle by competing in the mock battles of the tournament
and the joust, modern warriors prove and hone their mettle in competitions specifically
designed to develop the skills needed on the modern battlefield. Because of the limitations
of competition as a training tool, the tendency to specialize and narrow technical growth to
what wins rather than what the battlefield demands, fighters are expected to compete
across a spectrum of types of competition specifically designed to complement each other
to produce well-rounded skills.
Of course victory in competition is not the only aspect of growth and cannot be the sole
factor in promotion, unless sport itself is the goal, which is anathema to combatives.
Victories are instead only one of the performance gates required. As the student
progresses, he or she must meet other performance gates selected because they measure
different aspects of what it means to be a combatives expert. How can you claim to be an
expert in combatives if you cannot shoot or have never produced any competent students
or had any close-quarters-battle training? These performance gates are also just the
prerequisites for testing. Just like a Ph.D. candidate must go before a committee of masters
to defend his or her thesis, and this after many years of lesser testing, the prospective
combatives master must be tested by a board of combatives masters.
Unarmed and hand-to-hand combat do not happen in a vacuum. Real fights happen as
part of a whole of tactical ability that includes everything from land navigation skills and
trauma medicine to sniping and close-proximity breaching. The goal of a combatives belt
system is to provide both a road map for the growth of a modern warrior, in all the skills
required by the demands of today’s battlefield, from the maximum range of personal
weapons to dominating an enemy physically at the closest possible range, and a visible
sign of someone’s advance on that path.
In the combatives system, it is understood that the demands of the battlefield will
change, therefore the tactics and techniques a fighter will need also will need to change.
This is a lesson that the military has learned painfully over the course of our nation’s many
wars. This is why principles such as fire and maneuver and combined arms warfare are
taught instead of having troops memorize rigid ideas about how units should fight in an
endless list of possible circumstances.
In the same way, in combatives, which is the tactical level closest to the enemy,
memorization of technique is used only at the lower levels and then with the
understanding that these techniques are only important as a method of teaching the
fundamental concepts and abilities from which fighting skills are built. Weapons,
equipment and situations will change as will the nature of the enemy, but physiology and
physics remain the same.
The following is the list of accomplishments a fighter must have to be eligible for belt
testing. To be promoted, a fighter must test in front of a board that, in the case of gray and
green belts, is composed of at least three holders of a belt higher than the one the person is
testing for (with a minimum of green), and, in the case of black belts, is composed of at
least four holders of black-belt rank. The test has three phases: first, a record review to
ensure the candidate is eligible; second, a comprehensive written exam; and third, a
practical application test (assuming the person has passed the written exam).
Fighters may work ahead. In other words, a green belt while working on a brown belt
also may be accomplishing work from the black-belt list. Physical fitness standards must
be accomplished within 90 days before testing. Competition points and referee experience
only count for one promotion.
Tan-Belt Requirements
For soldiers, marines and airmen, all the requirements for tan belt are accomplished
during basic combat training in accordance with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command Regulation 350-6. The same is true for sailors or Coast Guard personnel, but
they also must qualify with a service rifle to meet the tan-belt standard. For non-soldiers,
alternative ways to meet the standard are provided that approximate the level of
skill/knowledge required of soldiers.
The qualification authority must be at least a green belt, and a promotion board must
award the belts. Within 90 days prior to appearing before the board, a fighter must achieve
the following in physical fitness, warrior skills, weaponry and close combat.
Physical Fitness
1. Complete the Army Physical Fitness Test with a minimum of 50 points in each
event.
2. Complete a road march of nine miles with a load of at least 30 pounds.
Warrior Skills
3. Complete combat lifesaver training.
Weaponry
4. Qualify with an individual rifle to service standards, including the scaled target
alternate course, or to the National Rifle Association Marksmanship Qualification
Program, High Power Rifle aggregate competition course to the marksman standard.
Close-Combat Skills
5. Complete basic and tactical combatives training, including the following
performance standards:
a. Compete in one basic rules combatives match.
b. Successfully complete the react-to-contact front/rear exercise.
Gray-Belt Requirements
Basic Soldier Skills
In order to be eligible for the gray-belt test, a fighter must prove his or her abilities in
basic soldier skills. Certifying officials must be at least green-belt level or Modern Army
Combatives Program Level-III certified noncommissioned officers or officers. Within 90
days prior to appearing before the board, a fighter must achieve the following in physical
fitness and weaponry.
Physical Fitness
1. Score above 240 on the 18- to 20-year-old scale with a minimum score of 70 in
each category.
2. Complete a road march of eight miles in two hours with a load of at least 35
pounds, weight to be measured at the start and finish.
3. Complete a five-mile run in less than 45 minutes.
Weaponry
4. Qualify expert with the service rifle to service standards, including the scaled
target alternate course, or to the NRA Marksmanship Qualification Program, High
Power Rifle aggregate competition course to the expert standard.
5. Qualify with the service pistol or show equivalent skill.
Competition
 In order to be eligible for the gray-belt test, a fighter must prove his or her ability in
combatives competition. Fighters must acquire 10 competition points in any of these two
ways:
1 point, victory by points in standard rules competition
2 points, victory by submission in standard rules competition
Qualifying competitions must have a green-belt Army tournament director. Qualifying
Army competitions must have a tournament director who is at least MACP Level-III
certified.
Equivalencies for combatives standard rules competition include those sanctioned by
the International Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu Federation, the North American Grappling
Association and the Grapplers Quest organization.
Certifying officials must be at least green-belt level or an MACP Level-III certified
NCO or officer and witness the individual match.
Green-Belt Requirements
Basic Soldier Skills
In order to be eligible for the green-belt test, a fighter must prove his or her abilities in
basic soldier skills. Certifying officials must be at least green-belt level or MACP Level-
IV certified NCOs or officers of at least one grade above the tested fighter. Within 90 days
prior to appearing before the board, a fighter must achieve the following in physical
fitness and weaponry.
Physical Fitness
1. Score above 260 on the 18- to 20-year-old scale with a minimum score of 70 in
each category.
2. Complete a road march of 12 miles in three hours with a load of 40 pounds.
3. Complete a five-mile run in less than 40 minutes.
4. Complete at least six dead-hang pull-ups.
5. After entering from the side of the pool in water at least 9 feet deep, the fighter
must swim at least 15 feet in his or her field uniform and combat boots.
Weaponry
6. Qualify expert with the service rifle to service standards, including the scaled
target alternate course, or to the NRA Marksmanship Qualification Program, High
Power Rifle aggregate competition course to the expert standard.
7. Qualify expert with the service pistol or show equivalent skill by classifying
marksman according to the combatives pistol classification system or in the
International Defensive Pistol Association, class C in the International Practical
Shooting Confederation or sharpshooter in NRA Action Pistol.
8. Participate in the “grappling with electricity” exercise.
9. Participate in the “Tueller” drill.
Competition
In order to be eligible for the green-belt test, a fighter must prove his or her ability in
combatives competition. The fighter first must be a gray belt and then acquire 25
competition points in any of the ways noted below. At least 10 of those points must be
earned in standard rules competition. A fighter also must have at least one victory in
intermediate rules competition.
1 point, victory by points in standard rules competition
2 points, victory by submission in standard rules competition
1 point, defeat by other than decision in intermediate rules competition
2 points, defeat by decision in intermediate rules competition
4 points, victory by decision in intermediate rules competition
6 points, victory by submission or knockout in intermediate rules competition
Qualifying competitions must have a green-belt Army tournament director. Qualifying
Army competitions must have a tournament director who is at least MACP Level-III
certified. Equivalencies for combatives standard rules competition include those
sanctioned by the IBJJF, NAGA and the Grapplers Quest organization. For IBJJF
competitions, points count double for fights at purple belt or above in the adult class,
younger than 30 years old, only.
Certifying officials must be at least green-belt level or MACP Level-III certified and
witness the individual match.
Referee Experience
A fighter also must pass an eight-hour standard rules referee class (which can be done
as part of the Level-II course) and perform satisfactorily as a floor referee in a minimum
of 10 total bouts in at least two separate standard rules tournaments.
Brown-Belt Requirements
Basic Soldier Skills
In order to be eligible for the brown-belt test, a fighter must prove his or her abilities in
basic soldier skills. Certifying officials must be at least green-belt level or MACP Level-
IV certified NCOs or officers. Within 90 days prior to appearing before the board, a
fighter must achieve the following in physical fitness and weaponry.
Physical Fitness
1. Score above 270 on the 18- to 20-year-old scale with a minimum score of 70 in
each category.
2. Complete a road march of 12 miles in three hours with a load of 40 pounds.
3. Complete a five-mile run in less than 40 minutes.
4. Complete at least eight dead-hang pull-ups.
5. After entering from the side of the pool in water at least 9 feet deep, the fighter
must swim at least 15 feet in his or her field uniform and combat boots.
Weaponry
6. Qualify expert with the service rifle to service standards, including the scaled
target alternate course, or to the NRA Marksmanship Qualification Program, High
Power Rifle aggregate competition course to the expert standard.
7. Pass the combatives brown-belt rifle weaponry qualification course.
8. Classify sharpshooter according to the combatives pistol classification system or in
the IDPA, class B in the IPSC or expert in NRA Action Pistol.
Competition
In order to be eligible for the brown-belt test, a fighter must prove his or her ability in
combatives competition. A fighter first must be a green belt and then acquire 50
competition points in any of the ways noted below. At least 10 of those points must be
earned in standard rules competition. A fighter also must have at least one victory in
advanced rules competition.
1 point, victory by points in standard rules competition
2 points, victory by submission in standard rules competition
1 point, defeat by other than decision in intermediate rules competition
2 points, defeat by decision in intermediate rules competition
4 points, victory by decision in intermediate rules competition
6 points, victory by submission or knockout in intermediate rules competition
2 points, defeat by other than decision in advanced rules competition
5 points, defeat by decision in advanced rules competition
8 points, victory by decision in advanced rules competition
12 points, victory by submission or knockout in advanced rules competition
Qualifying standard rules competitions must have a tournament director who is at least
MACP Level-III certified. Equivalencies for combatives standard rules competition
include those sanctioned by the IBJJF, NAGA and the Grapplers Quest organization. For
IBJJF competitions, points double for fights at purple belt or above in the adult class only.
Advanced rules competitions may be any mixed-martial arts competitions similar to the
consolidated rules of at least three rounds of three minutes each. Fights with rounds of less
than three minutes, less than three rounds or that limit closed-fist strikes to the head
should be scored as intermediate rules competitions.
Certifying officials must be at least MACP Level-III certified and witness the individual
match.
Referee Experience
A fighter also must referee at least 10 total standard rules bouts in at least two separate
tournaments. In addition, he or she must perform as a floor judge in at least two
intermediate rules fights, must pass an eight-hour intermediate rules referee class (which
can be done as part of the Level-III course) and perform satisfactorily as a floor referee in
a minimum of five total bouts in at least two separate events. (Advanced rules events may
substitute for intermediate rules to meet this requirement.)
Black-Belt Requirements
Basic Soldier Skills
In order to be eligible for the black-belt test, a fighter must prove his or her abilities in
basic soldier skills. Certifying officials must be at least brown belt or MACP Level-IV
certified NCOs or officers. Within 90 days prior to appearing before the board, a fighter
must achieve the following in physical fitness, weaponry and warrior skills.
Physical Fitness
1. Score above 270 on the 18- to 20-year-old scale with a minimum score of 70 in
each category.
2. Complete a road march of 12 miles in three hours with a load of 40 pounds.
3. Complete a five-mile run in less than 40 minutes.
4. Complete at least eight dead-hang pull-ups.
5. After entering from the side of the pool in water at least 9 feet deep, the fighter
must swim at least 25 feet in his or her field uniform and combat boots.
Weaponry
6. Qualify expert with the service rifle to service standards, including the scaled
target alternate course, or to the NRA Marksmanship Qualification Program, High
Power Rifle aggregate competition course to the expert standard.
7. Pass the combatives black-belt rifle weaponry qualification course.
8. Classify master according to the combatives pistol classification system or in the
IDPA, IPSC or NRA Action Pistol.
Warrior Skills
9. Pass the combatives black-belt tactical driving test.
Competition
In order to be eligible for the black-belt test, a fighter must prove his or her ability in
combatives competition. Fighters first must be a brown belt and then acquire 50
competition points in any of the ways noted below. At least 15 of those points must be
earned in standard rules competition. A fighter also must have at least one victory in
advanced rules competition.
1 point, victory by points in standard rules competition
2 points, victory by submission in standard rules competition
1 point, defeat by other than decision in intermediate rules competition
2 points, defeat by decision in intermediate rules competition
4 points, victory by decision in intermediate rules competition
6 points, victory by submission or knockout in intermediate rules
competition
2 points, defeat by other than decision in advanced rules competition
 5 points, defeat by decision in advanced rules competition
8 points, victory by decision in advanced rules competition
12 points, victory by submission or knockout in advanced rules
competition
Qualifying standard rules competitions must have a tournament director who is at least
MACP Level-III certified. Equivalencies for combatives standard rules competition
include those sanctioned by the IBJJF, NAGA and the Grapplers Quest organization. For
IBJJF competitions, points double for fights at purple belt or above in the adult class only.
Advanced rules may be any mixed-martial arts competition similar to the consolidated
rules of at least three rounds of three minutes each. Fights with rounds of less than three
minutes or less than three rounds or that limit closed-fist strikes to the head should be
scored as intermediate rules.
Certifying officials must be at least MACP Level-III certified and witness the individual
match.
Referee Experience
A fighter must referee at least 10 total standard rules bouts in at least two separate
tournaments. In addition, he or she must pass an eight-hour advanced rules referee class
(can be done as part of the Level-IV course), perform satisfactorily as a referee in a
minimum of five total bouts in at least two separate events and must serve as the
bracketing official in a tournament of at least 35 competitors.
1 Watson, Brian N. Judo Memoirs of Jigoro Kano. Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2008.

2 Draeger, Donn F. “Classical ‘Weaponless’ Systems: From Jujutsu to Judo,” in Classical Budo: The Martial Arts and Ways of Japan (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1973), vol. 2, chap. 7.
 CHAPTER EIGHT

COMPETITIONS
Fighting competitions are almost as old as mankind. There is evidence of organized
fighting competition more than 4,000 years ago, and almost assuredly men began to
organize them even before then. From stick fighting in ancient Egypt to wrestling, boxing
and the pancrathalon in Greece to jousting and the tournament in medieval Europe to
wrestling in Mongolia and the Nuba Mountains in South Sudan, no other training method
has withstood the test of time. From motivating young warriors to perfect their skills to
providing a lesser form of martial glory during peacetime, combative competitions have
proved their worth in building and maintaining a warrior culture through the millennia.
THE SPIRIT OF COMPETITION
Misconceptions About Combatives Systems
A look at the history of combatives systems reveals two fundamental misconceptions:
1. Combatives techniques are too dangerous for competition. Although many
techniques are too dangerous for live competition, many benefits can be gained by
competing—even when using a limited set of techniques.
2. The risks of competition outweigh the benefits. Many programs have failed
because they did not provide students sufficient motivation to train hard.
Competitions are a useful tool to motivate fighters and unit leaders to emphasize
combatives training.
Competition Principles
Although competitions are powerful training tools, they are a form of athletic
competition and, as such, have drawbacks that impact competitors and competition
administrators.
• Competitors. The pressures of athletic competition will drive competitors to
become focused on winning at competition, not in combat. This pressure will pull
them away from the most efficient combat strategies and techniques. To gain the
benefits from competition without falling into a competitive focus, modern
combatives has a graduated system of rules. Those who train specifically for one
level of competition will find themselves unprepared for the techniques allowed at
the next level.
• Competition Administrators. When officials in regular sports consider a rule
change, they must reflect on the safety of the participants and the entertainment
value. This is the same from professional basketball to auto racing. No one would
argue the validity of the first consideration; in all sports, safety should be a priority.
The second consideration, however, differs in combatives. The purpose of
combatives competition is to produce trained fighters; all rule changes must be made
with this principle in mind.
Competition Philosophy
 The philosophy behind combatives competition is to encourage proper fighting habits.
Actions that would give someone an advantage in a real fight should be rewarded, and
poor fighting habits should be penalized. The winner of a combatives competition should
be the competitor who, if it were a fight without limitations, would have won.
ARTICLES OF RULES AND REGULATIONS
Article 1. Types of Competition
There are three types of combatives competitions: open tournaments, command-
directed competitions and championships. Each accomplishes a different part of the
mission to motivate fighters to develop their skills.
1.1 Open Tournaments
Open tournaments serve two purposes: encouraging maximum participation and giving
fighters a venue to acquire competition experience. Open tournaments entail two types of
competition: individual and team. These types occur at the same time. As individual
fighters compete, they represent two parties: themselves as individuals and their
command. When the results of individual fighters are tallied, they contribute to their team
standings.
Note: Weight classes do not apply in open tournaments. Competitors are arranged from
lightest to heaviest and then grouped into brackets according to their current weight.
Fighters do not fight outside of their brackets. The winner of a given bracket is the
champion.
1.1.1 Individual. Because inexperienced competitors may not have enough confidence in
their skills to participate with more advanced rules and face more experienced
competitors, several steps should be taken to encourage participation:
a) This competition should use only the basic or standard rules.
b) New competitors should not be expected to face past champions or tournament
winners.
c) A handicapping system that segregates past winners and high-level competitors in
an advanced bracket should be used.
1.1.2 Team. Because a program’s success is measured more by the level of proficiency of
the average fighter, team points in open tournaments should favor the unit that has more
competitors over the unit that has a smaller number of more proficient fighters.
1.2 Command-Directed Competitions
Within a military unit, every member should be expected to be a warrior. They should be
expected to compete. Commanders and noncommissioned officers should include
combatives competition in unit physical training plans.
1.3 Championships
Championships are a way for commanders to encourage and reward excellence. They can
be held at every level. Championships address two types of competition: individual and
team.
1.3.1 Individual. Championships give self-motivated fighters opportunities to gain
recognition for their efforts and skills.
1.3.2 Team. Championships should recognize sub-units with more successful programs
measured in large numbers of competent fighters rather than the team that has a few
very skilled fighters.
Article 2. Levels of Competition
There are four levels of combatives competition: basic, standard, intermediate and
advanced. Competitors progress through the levels of competition, each level having its
own set of rules and personnel. Table 2(a) depicts the progression of competitions.
Note that more than one level of competition may be addressed in a given tournament.
In this case, certain administrative functions may be performed only once (e.g., fighters
will weigh in once per tournament, there will only be one tournament director per
tournament); however, the number, required level of referee certification and function of
staff may change.
Bracketing is used to determine who advances to the next level. (Many wrestling and
sports bracketing computer programs are available.) Combatives competitions should
always be at least double elimination.
Table 2(a). Progression of Competitions in Military Units

2.1 Basic Competition

2.1.1 Basic competition rules are used when the participants have a limited knowledge
base (e.g., during initial military training or advanced individual training).
2.2 Standard Competition
2.2.1 Standard competition rules are used during open tournaments, at the company and
battalion levels, and during the preliminary rounds of larger championship tournaments.
2.3 Intermediate Competition
2.3.1 Intermediate competition rules are used during the finals at local championship
tournaments and during the semifinals at division/state or higher-level championship
tournaments.
2.3.2 Striking is introduced at the intermediate competition level. Fighters can use open-
hand strikes to the face, closed-fist strikes to the body, kicking with the foot and shin,
takedowns, ground-fighting techniques with chokes and joint locks (shoulder, elbow,
straight ankle and straight knee) to submit their opponents.
2.4 Advanced Competition
2.4.1 Advanced competition rules are used during the finals for division and higher-level
tournaments or for state, regional or national championships.
Note: For further discussion of advanced competition rules for a military unit, reference
Army Field Manual 3-25.150. For nonmilitary competitions, consult the state athletic
commission.
2.4.2 Closed-fist strikes, kicks with the feet and shins, and knee strikes below the head are
allowed in advanced matches. In this level, competitors can use takedowns to dominant
body positions, ground fighting with chokes, joint locks (shoulder, elbow, straight ankle
and straight knee) and muscle manipulation to submit their opponents.
2.4.3 Many state governments control competitions at this level through athletic
commissions or similar bodies.
Article 3. Competition Layout
A graduated set of rules allows only the best fighters to advance from safer, more
restrictive forms of competition to higher-risk rule sets, thereby minimizing high-risk
exposure to the larger population.
3.1 Guidelines
All competitions should adhere to the following guidelines.
3.1.1 Competitions should take place regularly.
3.1.2 Competitions should exist at every echelon.
3.1.3 Warriors who demonstrate superior skills should be able to compete at higher levels.
3.2 Competition Venues
There are four types of venues for combatives competition: open terrain, matted area,
boxing ring and fighting cage. Table 3(a) outlines the types of venues used for matches
and the level or levels at which they are allowed.
Table 3(a). Types of Venues and the Levels at Which They Are Allowed

3.2.1 Open terrain. Competitions may be conducted on any open space with a suitably soft
surface. The space should be a grassy area free from debris and cleared of dangerous
objects.
3.2.2 Matted area. The matted area, as shown in Figure 3(a), should be a minimum of 10

meters long and 10 meters wide, and a maximum of 16 meters long and 16 meters wide.
All surfaces must be covered by tatami-style mats (sectional mats that are 2 meters long
and 1 meter wide). The elements making up the surface must be aligned without gaps,
smooth and fixed to a resilient floor or platform to prevent displacement. Caution:
Wrestling mats should be avoided because of increased risk of knee and ankle injuries.
The matted area consists of the following:
a) Safety buffer: The area outside of the warning line is the safety area. This area
must be a minimum of 3 meters wide.
Note: Where two or more adjoining competition areas are used, a common safety
area of between 3 meters and 4 meters is necessary.
b) Warning line: The warning line is a boundary clearly indicated by a l-meter-wide
area with mats of a distinctive color. This area surrounds the free zone and runs
parallel to the four sides of the mat area.
c) Free zone:
(i) The area within and including the warning line is the free zone. This area is a
minimum of 8 meters long and 8 meters wide, and a maximum of 11 meters long and
11 meters wide.
(ii) The free zone also may contain a square that is 2 meters long and 2 meters wide.
It should be composed of two mats that are the same color as the warning line to
indicate the starting positions for the contestants. The starting position also may be
designated by colored tape strips placed 6 feet apart in the center of the free zone.
Figure 3(a). Matted Area Layout

3.2.3 Boxing ring. A standard boxing ring is allowed. The ring floor should extend no less
than 18 inches beyond the ropes.
a) Padding. The gym floor surrounding the ring must be padded with no less than 1½
inches of closed-cell foam, extending no less than 3 feet from the ring outward.
Note: No vinyl or other plastic rubberized covering should be permitted.
b) Tables. Ringside tables can be placed directly next to the padding.
Note: Ringside tables and steps must be no higher than the platform.
3.2.4 Fighting cage. The confined area should be an octagonal or circular space no smaller
than 18 feet by 18 feet and padded with a ½- to 1-inch layer of closed-cell foam.
a) Tables. Ringside tables can be placed directly next to the padding.
Note: Ringside tables and steps must be no higher than the platform.
3.3 Competition Officials and Staff
To ensure that the competition runs smoothly, certain duty positions must be filled by
qualified personnel, as shown in Table 3(b), including the competition director, chief of
referees, judges, referees, bracketing official, scorekeepers and timekeepers.
Note: The officials and staff can be identified by specific uniforms, such as colored T-
shirts or credentials attached to lanyards, with the exception of referees. Referees must
wear a uniform that can be easily identified.
3.3.1 Competition director. The competition director oversees and directs the entire
competition.
a) The competition director’s duties include the following:
Registration
Publicity
Scheduling
Positioning of staff
Area sanitation
Briefings
Awards
b) The competition director has the final authority with regards to implementing all
rules and regulations of the competition.
c) The competition director is responsible for ensuring that all locker rooms, mats
and other equipment are sanitary. The competition area must be swept and mopped
with an anti-bacterial/anti-fungal cleaning agent before the event and before the
fights each day. Before each event, the competition director and medical staff must
examine the area for violations of area sanitation standards.
Table 3(b). Personnel and Required Level of Certification

3.3.2 Chief of referees. In larger competitions, it may be necessary to appoint a chief of

referees. The chief of referees is the interim authority with regard to implementing all
rules and regulations of the competition, and the chief is subject only to the oversight of
the competition director. He also conducts the pre-fight briefing.
a) The chief of referees is seated at the head table but may move throughout the
competition venue.
b) In the absence of a chief of referees, the competition director will perform these
duties.
3.3.3 Judges. Judges must know all general and referee match rules, referee signals, illegal
techniques, basic bracketing techniques, competitor divisions and durations. To
maintain impartiality, judges will not be allowed to confer with one another.
Note: Judges are used to score intermediate rules matches. In the case of competition on a
mat, judges will be seated in chairs. In the case of a ring or a confined area, they will be
 seated at ringside tables.
3.3.4 Referees. Referees must have general knowledge of all the rules and regulations.
They are responsible for the safety of the fighters, and during basic or standard rules
competition, they choose a winner if no submission takes place before the time limit is
reached (if one is used).
a) Referees are responsible for the following:
Starting and stopping all matches
Awarding points during standard rules competition
Warning competitors for rule infractions
Disqualifying competitors
Communicating to the other officials and signaling the match winner
b) All referees will be impartial in their decision-making; a referee may not officiate
for one of his own competitors without notification to the fighter and/or coach. The
opposing coach/fighter may request a referee replacement if this occurs.
c) If a situation occurs that cannot be determined to be in accordance with the
competition rules, a referee will confer with the chief of referees or competition
director to determine the fair and proper action.
d) Referees must wear a uniform that can be easily identified.
e) Signals: Referees are responsible for making all the technical calls during a match,
including awarding points during standard rules, warnings and (if necessary)
disqualification of a competitor. Table 3(c) lists the referee signals.
f) Out of bounds: Referees also deal with competitors who approach the bounds of
the mat area or who are out of bounds. If at all possible, the out-of-bounds line
should not impact the outcome of the bout. Referees should use their best judgment
on when to halt the action. For example, a referee might not halt the action during a
scramble or in the middle of a submission attempt; he might wait until a dominant
body position has been established and the threat of submission is distant. If the
competitors move out of bounds, the referee performs the following actions:
(i) If the contestant(s) move into the danger zone while on their feet, the referee must
stop the contest for a brief moment to move them back into the center of the contest
area. Match interruption should not be signaled to the officials if the pause in the
match is brief.
(ii) If the contestant(s) move into the danger zone while on the ground, the referee
must stop the contest, tell the competitors to hold their position, and signal to the
officials to stop the clock using the signal for match interruption. The contestants will
then be moved back into the center of the contest area to resume competing in the
same position.
Table 3(c). Competitor/Match Actions and Referee Signals
Table 3(c). Competitor/Match Actions and Referee Signals (Continued)

3.3.5 Bracketing official. The most important staff member to the efficient flow of the
competition is the bracketing official. This official is responsible for ensuring that
fighters are in the right place on time and face the correct opponents.
3.3.6 Scorekeeper. During standard rules competition, the scorekeeper keeps track of the
points awarded by the referee. Upon reaching the time limit, the timekeeper and the
scorekeeper are responsible for ensuring that the fight is stopped if the score is not tied.
Upon reaching the time limit or upon breaking a tie by first score, the scorekeeper is
responsible for telling the referee which fighter has won the match.
a) The scorekeeper must:
Be familiar with the timekeeper’s responsibilities
Be knowledgeable of all general and referee match results, referee signals, illegal
techniques, basic bracketing techniques, competitor divisions and durations
Have a basic understanding of the competition flow
b) The scorekeeper sits at the mat table with the timekeeper.
3.3.7 Timekeeper. The timekeeper keeps the time during each bout, starting and stopping
the official clock for timeouts designated to him by the referee.
Note: The time should not be displayed. The timekeeper reports time to the referee only.
a) The timekeeper indicates when he is ready to begin the match duration, according
to a stopwatch, by saying, “Ready,” and giving a visual cue or signal (i.e., nod).
b) The timekeeper keeps track of the time remaining in the match. Upon reaching the
time limit, the timekeeper and the scorekeeper are responsible for ensuring that the
fight is stopped if the score is not tied.
c) The timekeeper must:
i) Be knowledgeable of the scoring process, referee signals, competitor divisions and
durations
ii) Have a basic understanding of the competition flow
 Note: If a fighter is rendered unresponsive, a second timepiece will be used to record
the amount of time that a competitor is unresponsive. This time will be reported to
the medical authority.
d) The timekeeper signals that the match duration has expired by tossing a rolled-up
towel or object (typically colored white) near the referee’s feet.
e) The timekeeper sits at the mat table with the scorekeeper.
3.4 Fighter Support Personnel
The fighter can bring various staff to support him or her during the competition. This
includes coaches and seconds (assistants).
3.4.1 Coaches
a) Each fighter may have a coach of his or her choice for the match. While assisting
the fighter, coaches must wear an approved uniform (clothing with appropriate
service or unit symbols or solid-colored shirts, subject to the approval of the
competition director) and must present a neat and tidy appearance.
b) When the coach’s fighter is competing, he or she may enter the competition area
and stand alongside the mat area.
Note: Only one coach is allowed for each fighter. Coaches are identified by
credentials attached to lanyards.
c) Coaches may not:
Enter the mat area during the course of the bout without approval from the referee
Interfere physically or verbally with the bout or the duties of the officials
Use abusive and/or foul language or perform any blatant act of disrespect
Approach the referee, scorekeeper or timekeeper
d) The chief of referees or competition director may disqualify the fighter for
improper and unprofessional conduct by the coach.
Note: The competition director or chief of referees should field complaints.
3.4.2 Seconds (assistants)
a) In advanced rules, a fighter may have up to two seconds of his or her choice for
the match. At the other levels, a fighter is only authorized to have a coach.
b) Seconds must be identified before the match and must be credentialed.
Article 4. Pre-Fight Rules and Regulations
Before the bouts begin, fighters must be registered, classified and briefed.
4.1 Pre-Fight Meeting
4.1.1 All fighters and coaches must attend the pre-fight meeting held by the competition
director and the chief of referees.
a) This meeting addresses the following:
Flow of the tournament
Rules
 Key personnel
Medical procedure
Evacuation plan
b) Personnel who do not attend the rules brief should not be allowed into the
competition area.
4.1.2 Additional briefs are conducted when transitioning between levels to alert fighters to
changes in the rule sets.
4.2 Competitor Classification
The goal of competitor classification is to ensure safe and fair competitions.
4.2.1 Informal competition. Although weight and size are not considered in basic
competition (unlike standard, intermediate and advanced levels of competition), leaders
should ensure fair matchups between competitors.
4.2.2 Formal competition. Competitors are classified by weight.
4.2.3 Open tournaments. To avoid competitors’ tendency to cut weight, competitors are
divided into brackets, starting with the lightest fighter. This format should be adhered
to, except with the heaviest weight class or when the weight difference will exceed 10
percent of the lighter fighter’s bodyweight.
4.2.4 Championships. In championships at battalion level and above, competitors are
divided into seven weight-class brackets, shown in Table 4(a). These classes take into
account weight and gender.
a) Weight.
(i) On or before the day of the match, fighters will be weighed on the same scale by
the tournament director or his authorized representative. Weight will be determined
by the fighter’s bodyweight minus his or her uniform.
(ii) Opposing teams are allowed to have a representative at the weigh-in; however,
the weigh-in will not be delayed because of his or her absence.
(iii) If a fighter is over the intended weight class, he or she will have until the end of
the registration period to make weight. Fighters are not allowed to change weight
classes after registration.
(iv) Crash weight-loss practices are not encouraged.
b) Gender. Because of the physiological difference between the sexes and in order to
treat all fighters fairly and conduct gender-neutral competitions, female competitors
will be given a 12 percent overage at weigh-in.
Table 4(a). Competitor Classification

4.3 Competitor Uniforms/Garments

Competitors must wear a serviceable Army combat uniform (bottoms, sand T-shirt and
top) or a well-fitting judo or jiu-jitsu competition uniform. All fighters must be dressed
appropriately when they enter the competition area (attire must be clean, display a
respectful attitude toward the event and not tend to bring the organization in to ill-repute
with cutoff shirt sleeves or offensive slogans, for example). Any fighter presenting himself
or herself in attire deemed inappropriate will not compete in the bout until dressed in
appropriate attire.
Note: Uniforms are subject to the competition director’s discretion.
4.3.1 Jacket. The Army combat uniform jacket may be worn inside out. The zipper of the
jacket must remain unzipped with 1½ inch of athletic tape applied to both sides of the
zipper. The sleeve cuffs of the top must be rolled down. The lapel and skirt must remain
exposed; no tucking in or stitching down is permitted.
4.3.2 T-shirt. The sand T-shirt must be tucked into the uniform bottoms.
4.3.3 Bottoms. The uniform bottoms will be fully buttoned at the crotch. They must fit
correctly with no belt worn. (No belts are permitted.) The legs of the trousers must
remain unbloused and must extend to the ankle. The blousing strings may be cut.
4.3.4 Footwear. The fighter must be barefoot.
4.3.5 Undergarments and other apparel. Earrings and all other body piercings, wrist and
ankle bracelets, necklaces, watches and rings are prohibited.
4.3.6 Women must wear a breast protector and/or an athletic brassiere.
4.4 Competitor Equipment
Fighters must be properly equipped for their bouts; the equipment is listed in Table 4(b).
Fighters who do not present themselves properly equipped at the start time of their bout
may be penalized by the referee, including being counted out of the match if any
equipment problem cannot be solved within five minutes of the referee’s order to correct
such problem.
Note: Pieces of equipment are required only to the extent outlined in Table 4(b).
Table 4(b). Equipment Required for Each Level of Competition

4.4.1 Mouthpiece. All competitors must wear fitted mouthpieces during intermediate-level
competitions. Competitors should have an extra mouthpiece ringside during their
match. Competitors must furnish their own mouthpieces.
4.4.2 Groin protector. All competitors are required to wear an approved groin protector
during intermediate-level competitions. A plastic cup with an athletic supporter is
adequate. Competitors must furnish their own groin protectors.
4.4.3 Soft braces/pads for the elbows, knees and ankles. Soft braces and/or pads for the
elbows, knees and ankles are permitted; however, they must not restrict range of motion
or give an unfair advantage to the competitor wearing them. Elbow, knee or ankle
supports must be made of neoprene. The chief of referees or tournament director must
inspect all elbow, knee or ankle braces, pads and supports before the bouts.
4.4.4 Hard braces. No metal or hard plastic elbow, knee or ankle supports are allowed, nor
are those with sharp edges or surfaces.
4.4.5 Shin/instep pads. All competitors must wear serviceable, soft pull-on shin and instep
pads during intermediate-level competitions. These pads must be worn under the
uniform trousers and over any wrapping applied to the fighter’s ankles or feet. Shin and
instep pads should be supplied to the competitor.
4.4.6 Kneepads. All competitors must wear serviceable, soft pull-on kneepads under the
uniform bottoms. The kneepads must fully cover the competitor’s kneecap area (at a
minimum). Kneepads should be supplied to the competitor.
4.4.7 Martial arts belt. Each competitor will be designated by a colored martial arts belt.
The belt will be wrapped securely around the waist and tied in front with a square knot.
Martial arts belts should be supplied to the competitor.
4.4.8 Tape and gauze for wrapping feet or ankles. Competitors may wrap their feet and
ankles, but it is not mandatory. Fighters who wish to wrap their feet/ankles are
responsible for their own gauze and tape. Gauze must be of the soft or soft-stretch type
and must not exceed 2 inches in width. Tape must be of the soft cloth adhesive type and
must not exceed 1½ inches in width. Up to 6 feet of tape may be used to wrap each foot
and ankle. The chief of referees or tournament director must inspect all wrappings
before the bouts.
4.5 Competitor Requirements
For the referee to maintain the highest standards of hygiene on the mat, he must enforce
the following rules.
4.5.1 Personal hygiene. Attention to personal hygiene is a must. Fighters should:
Be clean and free of foul odors
Keep all fingernails and toenails trimmed short
Pull back and secure long hair
4.5.2 Fighters should not wear any lubricants, analgesic cream and/or skin creams that
may inconvenience an opponent or allow an unfair advantage to the wearer.
Article 5. Competition Conduct
To ensure that the competition runs safely and smoothly, certain procedures must be
followed.
5.1 Start of the Match
5.1.1 Before the match, the bracketing noncommissioned officer brings the bout sheet to
the mat table. In formal competitions, the referee ascertains from each fighter the name
of his or her coach or second and holds the fighter responsible for the coach’s or
second’s conduct during the progress of a bout.
5.1.2 Once the referee has differentiated the contestants to the scorekeeper/judges, the
referee brings the competitors together so that they may shake hands. The competitors
are then separated. The timekeeper indicates when he is ready to begin the match
duration on the stopwatch by saying, “Ready,” and giving a visual cue (i.e., nod). Then
the referee signals the beginning of the match by extending his arms, with his palms
facing the competitors; bringing his palms together; moving backward out of the way;
and calling, “Fight.”
5.2 Match
5.2.1 On command from the referee, the competitors start the contest, using various
techniques to submit the opponent. The techniques that may be used vary according to
the level of the competition, shown in Table 5(a).
Table 5(a). Techniques Allowed During Each Level of Competition

5.2.2 In informal competitions, competitors fight until submission or referee stoppage. In

formal competitions, bouts have a time limit, shown in Table 5(b).
Table 5(b). Time Limit for Each Level of Competition

5.2.3 Mouthpiece. If a fighter’s mouthpiece is knocked out, dropped or spit out during a
bout, the referee will:
Wait for a lull in the activity of both fighters
Call timeout
Stop the bout in place
Replace the mouthpiece
Note: Willful dropping or spitting out of the mouthpiece is deemed a “delay of bout” foul,
and the referee will penalize the fighter accordingly (a one-point deduction).
5.2.4 Stalemate. Intermediate competitions may result in a stalemate. If both competitors
have gone to the ground and neither is actively working to improve his or her position
within (in the referee’s judgment) a reasonable time, the referee will separate and stand
the competitors up and restart the bout from the standing position.
5.3 End of the Match
At the end of the match, the winner and loser of the bout report to the mat table to sign
their bout sheet. The match may end in eight different ways: forfeit, no contest, knockout,
submission, choke-out, scoring the match, disqualification/foul or referee stoppage.
The referee separates the competitors and faces them toward the scoring table, holding
both competitors’ arms at the wrists. Then he raises the arm of the competitor who has
won the match and leads the competitors by the wrist to face one another so that they may
shake hands.
5.3.1 Forfeit. In the event that one of the competitors is not present for the match, he or
she will be called over the intercom three times before the match is deferred to his or
her opponent.
Note: Competitors who are not present for the semifinal and final matches will not receive
a medal(s) unless serious injury has occurred.
5.3.2 No contest. If both fighters are in such a condition that to continue might subject
 them to serious injury, the referee will declare the match a “no contest” (most common
in the intermediate and advanced levels).
5.3.3 Knockout. At the intermediate level, competitors may receive a knockout. There are
two kinds of knockouts:
a) Knockout (unconscious). This type of knockout occurs when a fighter is knocked
unconscious.
b) Technical knockout. This type of knockout occurs when the referee deems that one
fighter cannot defend himself or herself and is in danger of receiving excessive
damage if the match continues. In this case, the referee will award the other fighter a
TKO victory.
A fighter who loses a bout by technical knockout or knockout will be suspended from
competition for a minimum of 30 or 60 days, respectively.
5.3.4 Submission. Submission may occur in two ways:
a) A fighter taps on the mat or his or her opponent a minimum of two times.
b) A fighter makes a loud noise (i.e., grunt or groan) indicating pain or verbally
submits, saying “stop” loudly.
5.3.5 Choke-out. When a choke has been applied, the referee will watch for any sign of
unconsciousness (e.g., failure to respond to verbal questions) and immediately stop the
match, awarding the victory to the competitor who applied the choke.
5.3.6 Scoring the match. Scoring occurs differently in informal and formal competitions.
Also, scoring criteria vary according to the level of competition.
a) Informal competition. For informal competitions, the referee designates a winner
based on aggressiveness and display of superior technique.
b) Formal competition. If no submission takes place during the match, the competitor
who has been awarded the most points by the end of the time limit wins. The
timekeeper signals the end of the match by tossing a rolled-up towel or object
(typically colored white) close to the referee’s feet (for multiple ongoing bouts) when
the match duration has expired.
Note: For all signals made indicating scoring, the referee will raise his arm that has
an armband matching the color of the belt of the fighter receiving the points.
c) Basic and standard competitions. For formal competitions, the referee scores the
competitors using the system outlined in Table 5(c). If no submission takes place
during the match, the competitor who has been awarded the most points by the end of
the time limit wins.
d) Intermediate competitions. After the bout has been completed, judges determine a
winner using the “five-point must” scoring system as in Table 5(d). Judges evaluate
mixed-martial arts techniques.
Table 5(c). Competitor Actions and Points Awarded for Basic and
Standard Competitions
Table 5(c). Competitor Actions and Points Awarded for Basic and
Standard Competitions (Continued)
Table 5(d). Competitor Actions and Points Awarded for Intermediate
Competitions

5.3.7 Disqualification/foul. At the discretion of the referee, fouls (based on the intent of
the fighter committing the foul and the result of the foul) may cause time to be stopped
in the bout and warnings, recuperation time and/or disqualification to be issued.
a) The following fouls will be considered enough to warrant immediate
disqualification from a tournament:
Using abusive and/or foul language, cursing or other act of blatant disrespect
Biting; pinching; clawing; hair pulling; attacking the eyes, nose or mouth;
intentionally seeking to injure genitalia; or using fists, feet, knees, elbows or head
with the intention to hurt or gain an unfair advantage
Blatantly using intentional avoidance (running or pulling oneself into the safety
and/or danger area) while caught in a submission attempt by the opponent (This will
be deemed a submission.)
Fighting and/or engaging in illegal conduct within the tournament venue
Intentionally or repeatedly not complying with competition rules
Flagrantly disregarding the referee’s instructions
Twisting knee or ankle attacks
Manipulating small joints of the fingers, toes or wrists
Striking to the throat
Fish-hooking of the mouth
Striking the spine (including the top of the head)
Striking elbows or forearms
Head-butting
Kicking to the head or torso of a downed fighter
Holding on to a fence or rope (when used)
Spiking an opponent to the ground on the head or back of the neck
Throwing an opponent out of the fenced area, ring or mat
Striking the knees, unless using advanced competition rules
Closed-fist striking to the face
Ax-kicking to the top of the head
Instep stomping with the foot
Up-kicking by a downed fighter to the head or torso of a standing opponent
Fleeing the action of the fight
Intentionally delaying the contest because of improper equipment, or by intentionally
dropping or spitting out the mouthpiece
b) Other fouls are specific to the level of the competition, as shown in Table 5(e).
c) Disqualification occurs after any combination of three fouls or after a flagrant foul.
Fouls may result, at the referee’s discretion, in a point being deducted by the judges.
If a referee determines it is appropriate to take a point from a contestant for a foul, he
will identify the corner of the fighter from which he will take the point and indicate
the point deduction to each judge.
Note: Only a referee can assess a foul. If the referee does not call the foul, judges
must not make that assessment on their own.
Table 5(e). Description of Prohibited Techniques

d) A fouled fighter has a reasonable amount of time (referee’s discretion) to

recuperate. If an intentional foul is committed, the referee will do the following:
Call time
Check the fouled contestant’s condition and safety
e) If the referee determines that a fighter needs time to recover because of a foul or
injury, he may stop the bout (and the time) and give the injured fighter a reasonable
amount of time to recover or he may stop the match.
5.3.8 Referee stoppage. The referee can stop a match at any time and award a winner
because of concerns of potential injury, attrition and/or technical dominance or if at any
time a competitor makes any verbal sounds that could be construed as a sign of pain.
The referee will consider both competitors’ safety at all times. The referee will award
the victory to the appropriate fighter.
The referee can stop a match and determine a winner for any of the following reasons:
a) The referee has called a foul. The referee will determine whether it was
intentional.
(i) If intentional, the referee may disqualify the offending fighter and declare the
fouled fighter the winner by “disqualification.”
(ii) If the referee determines that the injured fighter was responsible for his or her
own injury, the referee will not penalize the opponent. If the referee or medical staff
determines that the injured fighter is unable to continue, he or she will lose by
“referee stoppage.”
(iii) If the referee determines that both fighters caused the injury (no fault), the
referee will give the injured fighter time to recover. If the referee or medical staff
determines that the fouled fighter cannot continue, the bout will be scored a “no
contest.”
b) A competitor has performed a legal submission that would (in the opinion of the
referee) submit the opposing competitor or potentially cause serious injury. This is
important if the referee thinks that a fighter’s safety is in danger or that an injury is
eminent and the fighter refuses to submit.
c) A competitor (by means of legal choke, smother, intense contact with the floor or
opponent, or extreme attrition) loses consciousness. The conscious opponent shall be
the winner.
d) A competitor becomes injured, sick or incapacitated during a match by means of
legal techniques or natural occurrences and cannot continue the match. The opponent
will be deemed the winner.
e) A competitor becomes injured as a result of an illegal technique and cannot
continue the match. The competitor injured by the illegal technique will be deemed
the winner.
f) A competitor becomes unconscious because of a violent fall or throw, or the
competitor may have a cervical injury.
5.4 Procedure for Failure to Compete
When the referee decides that the fighters are not honestly competing (e.g., that a
knockout is a dive) or that a foul is a prearranged termination of the bout, the referee will
not disqualify a fighter for fouling and render a decision. The referee will, however, stop
the bout and declare it ended (“no contest”). Both fighters will be disqualified from the
tournament, and the team points of both fighters will be deleted.
5.5 Protest
During formal competitions, a coach and/or competitor have the right to lodge a
complaint. The procedure to lodge such a complaint is as follows:
Notify the chief of referees, who will discuss the issue with the competition director. The
competition director will make the final decision on the outcome of the complaint/protest.
Note: This rule is to prevent arguments in the mat area. Such arguments will warrant
immediate disqualification and/or removal from the event.
5.6 Team Points
Unit teams will amass team points as individual competitors fight their way through the
tournament. Team points are awarded for submissions, victory at higher levels of
competition and (in non-championship tournaments) participation of larger groups. The
team points awarded are listed in Table 5(f).
Note: Team points will not include any points earned by a competitor who is ejected from
the competition.
Table 5(f). Team Points at Different Levels
Table 5(f). Team Points at Different Levels (Continued)
 Table of Contents
CONTENTS
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
PROLOGUE
THE HISTORY OF THE MARTIAL ARTS
MODERN COMBATIVES
FIGHTING WITH WEAPONS
FIGHTING STRATEGIES AND TRAINING METHODS
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLEFIELD
BASIC TECHNIQUES
COMBATIVES BELT-PROMOTION SYSTEM
COMPETITIONS