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TC 2-22.

601

Army Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive


Device Electronic Warfare Handbook

April 2008

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION:
Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only because it requires protection in accordance with
AR 380-5 and as specified in DCS G-3 Message DTG 091913Z Mar 04. This determination was made on
28 February 2007. Contractor and other requests must be referred to ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D, U.S. Army Intelligence
Center, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017, or via e-mail at ATZS-FDC-D@us.army.mil

DESTRUCTION NOTICE:
Destroy by any method that prevents disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (http://www.train.army.mil).
TC 2-22.601

Training Circular Headquarters


No. 2-22.601 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 9 April 2008

Army Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised


Explosive Device Electronic Warfare Handbook

Contents
Page
PREFACE ..............................................................................................................v
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................vii
Chapter 1 FUNDAMENTALS.............................................................................................. 1-1
Operational Environment.................................................................................... 1-1
Irregular Warfare ................................................................................................ 1-1
Improvised Explosive Device ............................................................................. 1-2
Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device ................................................. 1-2
Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare .... 1-3
Chapter 2 ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND CREW BASICS ............................................. 2-1
Electronic Warfare .............................................................................................. 2-1
The Electromagnetic Spectrum .......................................................................... 2-3
Radio Communications ...................................................................................... 2-5
Defensive Electronic Attack Components .......................................................... 2-6
Chapter 3 PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CREW EMPLOYMENT....................... 3-1
Electronic Warfare Officer .................................................................................. 3-1
Basic Electronic Warfare Officer CREW Responsibilities .................................. 3-1
Spectrum Management ...................................................................................... 3-2
Crew and Electronic Warfare Staff Planning...................................................... 3-4
CREW Threat Load Process .............................................................................. 3-5

DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only because it requires
protection in accordance with AR 380-5 and as specified by DCS G-3 Message DTG 091913Z Mar 04. This
determination was made on 28 February 2007. Contractor and other requests must be referred to ATTN:
ATZS-CDI-D, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017, or via email at
ATZS-FDC-D@us.army.mil.

DESTRUCTION NOTICE––Destroy by any method that prevents disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


Contents

Chapter 4 CREW COMPATIBILITY AND COMMUNICATION ALTERNATIVES..............4-1


Compatibility........................................................................................................4-1
Frequency Deconfliction .....................................................................................4-3
Communications Alternatives .............................................................................4-3
Chapter 5 CREW EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS.....................................................5-1
Pre-Convoy Measures ........................................................................................5-1
Convoy Measures with CREW ...........................................................................5-2
Post-Convoy Activities ......................................................................................5-10
Appendix A ARMY WARLOCK CREW SYSTEMS .............................................................. A-1
Appendix B ARMY WARLOCK CREW SYSTEMS .............................................................. B-1
Appendix C CREW ANTENNAS ........................................................................................... C-1
Appendix D CREW COMPATIBILITY ................................................................................... D-1
Appendix E ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION ................................................. E-1
Appendix F TRAINING STRATEGY ......................................................................................F-1
GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES.................................................................................. References-1
INDEX ......................................................................................................... Index-1

Figures

Figure 2-1. Electronic warfare overview ................................................................................ 2-2


Figure 2-2. The electromagnetic spectrum ............................................................................ 2-3
Figure 2-3. Visual example of different frequencies .............................................................. 2-4
Figure 2-4. Federal government spectrum usage example ...................................... 2-4
Figure 2-5. Example of a transmitter/receiver (appliance controller)..................................... 2-6
Figure 2-6. Jamming illustration............................................................................................. 2-8
Figure 2-7. Example of barrage jamming .............................................................................. 2-9
Figure 2-8. Example of sweep jamming ................................................................................ 2-9
Figure 2-9. Examples of high-power threats (cell phones) .................................................. 2-10
Figure 2-10. Examples of low-power threats (key fobs) ...................................................... 2-11
Figure 2-11. Examples of high-power threats (integrated communications operations
management system) ....................................................................................... 2-11
Figure 2-12. Examples of low-power threats (wireless door bells)...................................... 2-12
Figure 2-13. Standoff vehicle jammer in urban area ........................................................... 2-13
Figure 3-1. CREW threat load process flow .......................................................................... 3-6
Figure 4-1. Example compatibility scenario ........................................................................... 4-2
Figure 5-1. Single vehicle jamming........................................................................................ 5-3

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Figure 5-2. Two vehicles, two jammers..................................................................................5-4


Figure 5-3. Multiple vehicles, single jammer .......................................................................... 5-5
Figure 5-4. Multiple vehicles, multiple jammers ..................................................................... 5-6
Figure 5-5. Multiple vehicles, single jammer in urban area.................................................... 5-7
Figure A-1. DUKE system components..................................................................................A-4
Figure A-2. Primary control unit..............................................................................................A-6
Figure A-3. Remote control unit .............................................................................................A-8
Figure A-4. mICE operator controls..................................................................................... A-13
Figure A-5. MMBJ operator controls ................................................................................... A-15
Figure A-6. Red/Green COMBO cabling ............................................................................. A-18
Figure A-7. Red Warlock ..................................................................................................... A-19
Figure A-8. Green Warlock.................................................................................................. A-20
Figure A-9. SSVJ-L components......................................................................................... A-22
Figure A-10. SSVJ-L DCU................................................................................................... A-22
Figure A-11. LX front panel controls and indicators ............................................................ A-25
Figure A-12. LX remote control ........................................................................................... A-25
Figure A-13. LOW-Q subsystem circuit breaker ................................................................. A-26
Figure A-14. LX zeroize buttons.......................................................................................... A-28
Figure A-15. Zeroize from laptop......................................................................................... A-29
CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer (CVRJ) .......................................................................... A-30
Figure A-16. Remote control unit ........................................................................................ A-33
Figure A-17. MS2711D turn-on function ............................................................................. A-39
Figure F-1. Institutional training..............................................................................................F-4
Figure F-2. Interconnection of CREW in the system view .....................................................F-7
Figure F-3. CREW operational skills, knowledge and attributes............................................F-9
Figure F-4. CREW self-development skills, knowledge and attributes ................................F-11
ƒ

Tables
Table 2-1. Radio frequency bands ......................................................................................... 2-5
Table 2-2. High- and low-power threats ...............................................................................2-10
Table A-1. CREW system capability comparison...................................................................A-1
Table A-2. Primary control unit functions ...............................................................................A-7
Table A-3. Remote control unit functions ...............................................................................A-8
Table A-4. DCU controls ..................................................................................................... A-23
Table A-5. LX panel indicators ............................................................................................ A-26
Table A-6. Remote control unit actions ............................................................................... A-33

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Contents

Table D-1. CREW interoperability chart example ..................................................................D-1


Table F-1. CREW tasks ......................................................................................................... F-6
Table F-2. CREW common tasks .......................................................................................... F-9

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Preface

This Training Circular (TC) provides guidance concerning the implementation of the Army’s Counter-Radio
Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) program. This publication does not
replace technical manuals for the individual CREW systems, but outlines roles and responsibilities for tactical
commanders, electronic warfare officers (EWOs), and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) supporting
operations in various theaters.
To make this publication useful to all Soldiers involved in combat operations, regardless of where these
operations may occur, the guidance contained herein is broad in scope and involves principles applicable to
various theaters. Even though this TC is not designed to focus on one specific region or country, the most
recent experience comes from the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operation.
This TC––
• Was quickly developed to immediately fill a gap in existing knowledge on how to implement a
CREW program.
• Provides guidance for commanders and staff in planning, preparing for, executing, and assessing
radio-controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) environments.
• Outlines the critical roles and responsibilities of the CREW EWO.
• Introduces the term “CREW” into doctrine.
This TC includes an overview of the operational environment and the threat’s use of RCIEDs as one of their
weapons of choice. It briefly discusses basic electronic warfare (EW) principles, and defines the role of the
Army EWO and staff in planning and employing CREW systems. CREW system specifics are listed in the
appendixes as follows:
• Appendix A – Army Warlock CREW Systems.
• Appendix B – Non-Warlock CREW Systems.
• Appendix C – CREW Antennas.
• Appendix D – CREW Compatibility.
• Appendix E – Additional Sources of Information.
• Appendix F – Training Strategy.
This TC is the second-phased publication from the US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
(USAIC&FH) to address combating threat IED operations. The first phase was released as TC 2-91.701,
Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter IED Operations.
This TC applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United
States (ARNGUS), and the United States Army Reserve (USAR) unless otherwise stated.
The proponent for this publication is United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. The preparing
agency is the Directorate of Doctrine, United States Army Intelligence Center. Send comments and
recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) directly to
Commanding General, United States Army Intelligence Center, ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D, Fort Huachuca, AZ
85613-7017. You can also leave your comments or changes electronically at ATZS-FDC-D@us.army.mil.

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Introduction

The term “threat” is used throughout this manual to refer to enemy, insurgent, terrorist, combatant, or
adversary.

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Introduction
An improvised explosive device (IED) is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner
incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals, designed to destroy,
disfigure, distract, or harass.
An IED may incorporate military stores, but is normally devised from non-military components. In combat,
IEDs are often employed by unconventional forces to harass, maim, create casualties, destroy
infrastructure, deny routes, and demoralize with the same goals as conventional artillery or aerial
bombardment. IEDs are also favored weapons of the threat in non-combat situations due to their
destructive power and the low probability of the emplacer being discovered.
Threat forces use IEDs to cause large numbers of casualties (such as detonating an IED in a crowded open-
air market), to destroy vehicles (such as attacks on mass transit trains and airliners), to damage
infrastructure to cause friendly forces to react to this type of threat (such as attacking an embassy or
compound with an IED), and to harass.
While there are several types of IEDs, this TC focuses specifically on countering the RCIED. An RCIED is
an electronically initiated explosive. A CREW system is a radio frequency (RF) jammer, designed to
prevent the detonation of an RCIED by disrupting the radio signal of the initiating device.
CREW systems are providing critical protection against RCIEDs. CREW technologies have evolved over
the past several years and upwards of 40,000 CREW systems are issued to operational units deployed
overseas. As deployed units and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)
aggressively work to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to mitigate the RCIED threat,
complementary efforts are required to convey current TTP and employment considerations to our
operational force to ensure effective employment of CREW capabilities.
This TC provides a tool for the operational force and reflects the current considerations for employment of
CREW systems.

CAUTION
Because of the nature of the evolving IED TTP and technologies, it is
imperative that the reader be cognizant of the date of this publication.
IED information must be cross-checked against the most up-to-date
information. Included in this TC, as appendix E, is a list of additional
sources of information to assist the reader in locating the most current
information.

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Introduction

OPSEC IS CRITICAL!!

z Do not talk in open areas about sensitive information. CREW information is


always FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY at a minimum.
z Guard all written information and dispose of material based on local security
manager’s (S-2) policies.

CLEARANCE + NEED TO KNOW = ACCESS

z Classification Guide defines the following as SECRET.


• Frequencies (programming loads).
• Power (per frequency or across a bandwidth).
• The specific techniques or methods used to defeat a radio-controlled
IED.
• All mission information about CREW systems.

CAUTION!

z All CREW systems are high value sensitive items and require safeguarding.
z Use caution when working around ALL electronic countermeasure (ECM)
equipment.
z High voltage and radio frequency (RF) radiation are present in CREW
systems.
z Keep systems dry.
z CREW systems are not a substitute for good tactical standing operating
procedures (SOPs) and situational awareness.
z CREW systems provide an additional layer of protection.
z CREW systems interfere with communication devices.
z Always check power cables, antenna cables, nuts, bolts and lock-washers,
cable tie-downs, and security fasteners. Inspect the antenna locations for
missing or broken parts.
z Operator must receive interoperability distances before convoying with
vehicles using CREW devices. Convoying with systems that are NOT
compatible can cause system performance degradation. See your Joint
CREW Field Office representative or your S-6/S-2 or EWO for
interoperability and current program load information.

For Emergency Destruction it is recommended a thermite


grenade be used to destroy the CREW Systems.

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Introduction

WARNING

Hazards of EM Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) – The danger of


accidental actuation of electro-explosive devices or otherwise
electrically activating ordnance because of RF electromagnetic
fields. This unintended actuation could have safety (premature
firing) or reliability (dudding) consequences.

Hazards of EM Radiation to Fuels (HERF) – Fuel vapors can be


ignited by RF-induced arcs during fuel handling operations close
to high-powered radar and radio-transmitting antennas.

Hazards of EM Radiation to Personnel (HERP) – The potential for


electromagnetic radiation to produce harmful biological effects in
humans.

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Chapter 1
Fundamentals
This chapter provides an overview of the operational environment, irregular warfare, and a detailed
description of IEDs, RCIEDs, and CREW. Because it is impossible to predict the exact nature of a specific
operational environment in which RCIEDs might be used, the Army must be ready to meet challenges that
IEDs present within a multitude of diverse operational environments. The threat quickly adapts its weapons
and tactics to its operational environment. Since the threat can construct IEDs out of various materials,
ranging from everyday household items to military ordnance, this makes IED detection extremely difficult.
In order to successfully counter the ever-changing IED threat, Soldiers must understand the need to remain
vigilant and flexible while understanding the environments in which we operate.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-1. Joint doctrine describes the operational environment as a composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander (JP 3-0). The operational environment includes physical areas—the air, land, maritime, and
space domains. It also includes the information environment and enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral
systems relevant to that joint operation.
1-2. Military planners describe the operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational
variables are those broad aspects of the environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from
one operational area to another and affect campaigns and major operations. Operational variables describe
not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the population’s influence on it. Joint
planners analyze the operational environment in terms of six interrelated operational variables: political,
military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure. To these variables Army doctrine adds two
more: physical environment and time. As a set, these operational variables are often abbreviated as
PMESII-PT (FM 3-0).
1-3. It is this conceptual framework which will assist Soldiers, leaders, and commanders alike, not only in
understanding the specific operational environment in which RCIEDs are employed but also in
understanding the who, what, when, where, why, and how of the threat and their use of RCIEDs. For
further information concerning the operational environment concept, see FM 3-0.
1-4. The rise of international terrorist networks, religious radicalism, ethnic genocide, sectarian violence,
criminal networks, and failing nation-states provides the United States (US) with a distinct set of problems
and threatens its national interests. This increasingly complex range of threats compels the US military to
become ever more versatile.

IRREGULAR WARFARE
1-5. The increase of American conventional military supremacy is driving adversaries to employ
asymmetric methods of engagement. Irregular warfare (IW) favors indirect and asymmetric approaches in
order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Asymmetry may reflect differences in equipment,
the structure and composition of forces, and technology. Examples of asymmetric approaches to IW can
include the use of terrorism; suicidal attacks; integration of low- and high-technology means into weapons;
the use and/or threat of use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
(CBRNE) devices to disrupt military operations and create panic and/or fear among the civilian population.

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Chapter 1

US forces have dominated their adversaries in conventional operations. It is not surprising that adversaries
respond asymmetrically by avoiding conventional armies’ strengths and attacking their weaknesses.
Lessons learned concerning insurgent tactics in Afghanistan and in Iraq since 2003 have shown us how the
threat is highly adaptive and can exploit weaknesses to reveal conventional force vulnerabilities.
1-6. To be successful, US and Coalition Force leaders must develop organizations which can be adaptive
and master the complexities of the spectrum of conflict and their specific operational environment. Recent
Army experience in counterinsurgency operations demonstrates this need. Commanders must train and
educate Soldiers to operate in dynamic environments. These environments are often urban, culturally
unfamiliar, and of interest to nongovernmental organizations, government and private sector officials, news
media, and other nonmilitary individuals and groups. Operations are as much intellectual activities as they
are physical undertakings. Thinking and adaptive organizations develop an appreciation of all aspects of
their operational environment. This appreciation then guides the leaders’ use of military capabilities.

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE


1-7. The IED proliferation on the Iraqi and Afghan battlefield poses one of the most pervasive dangers
the US and Coalition Forces face in those theaters. The extent of casualties caused by threat IEDs in each
theater has influenced unit operations, US policy, and public perception.
1-8. An IED can be fabricated out of almost anything with any type of material and initiator. It is a device
that is designed to cause death, destruction, or injury by using explosives alone or in combination with
toxic chemicals, biological toxins, fragmenting components, or radiological material. IEDs vary in sizes,
functioning methods, containers, and delivery means. IEDs utilize commercial or military explosives,
homemade explosives, or military ordnance and ordnance components. The materials needed to build IEDs
are widely available.
1-9. The use of IEDs is ideal because they deliver a higher degree of precision to their attacks (command
detonated, victim initiated, or radio controlled), are difficult to locate, can be hidden easily, and are
sometimes difficult to counter. They can be detonated by forces hiding among rubble or innocent civilians
and do not require large numbers to operate. As US and Coalition Forces learn to counter various types of
IEDs, the threat adapts by reverting to previous TTP or creates more sophisticated and different devices.
1-10. IEDs have had a devastating effect on US and Coalition Forces. Threat IED use has proven effective
against mounted and dismounted patrols, personnel and equipment at entry control points, fixed key
facilities, and convoys despite US technological superiority. The flexibility provided by IEDs and
specifically RCIEDs indicates that their use is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It is important
to note that not only will initiation techniques change but also IED TTPs may migrate across the area of
operations (AO) and possibly to other countries. The use of IEDs is not likely to stop since IEDs have
proven to be successful and the threat receives the largest return on their money through the use of IEDs.

RADIO CONTROLLED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE


1-11. The RCIED is an electronically initiated explosive that uses a wireless detonation method consisting
of a transmitter and a receiver. Examples include radios, cordless phones, key fobs, or any over-the-air
technology that can transmit a RF signal to an electronic receiving unit. In this application, an RCIED
transmitter sends a signal to the threat receiver which is modified to send an initiating signal to an
explosive initiator (for example, electric blasting cap). Successful transmission and reception of the
initiating RF signal will result in detonation of the RCIED.
1-12. RCIEDs have been effectively used in many regions and conflicts including Israel, the Balkans,
Chechnya, Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]), and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF]).

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Fundamentals

RCIEDs are cost-effective weapons used to counter more advanced weapons technology. They provide
stand-off and do not require the threat to commit forces. See Chapter 2 for further information on RCIEDs.
1-13. Due to the impact of IEDs on US and Coalition Forces, an effort was initiated to leverage existing
technologies to counter the effectiveness of RCIEDs. Material solutions were one facet of several
addressed by JIEDDO, whose mission is to develop both material and procedural solutions to the IED
problem. One result of those efforts was the fielding and deployment of an array of CREW system
capabilities.

COUNTER-RADIO CONTROLLED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE


DEVICE ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1-14. A CREW system is an RF jammer designed to prevent the detonation of an RCIED by
disrupting the radio signal to the receiver. In order for any CREW system to be effective, it must
be programmed to jam or disrupt the correct RCIED signal frequency and be within range of the RCIED
to prevent the accurate reception of the initiating signal. Some CREW systems are reactive and include a
receiver that scans preprogrammed frequency ranges to detect and target active signals. Other CREW
systems are active and constantly emit energy on one or more frequencies that have been identified as
threat utilized frequencies. While both methods are highly effective against specific threats, Soldiers
operating CREW technologies must be aware of both types of CREW systems and their capabilities and
limitations. For further information, see Chapter 2.
1-15. Since the enemy uses a multitude of commercially utilized RF technologies, CREW systems are not
capable of distinguishing a specific RF signal as a signal being used to initiate an RCIED.

CREW PROGRAM – HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE


1-16. The CREW program is an incremental development program, which is divided into a minimum of
three planned increments. Additionally, each increment introduces new capabilities or technology as it
becomes available to address changing and evolving requirements. Previous increments will be phased out
as threats change and CREW evolves. The three projected increments are discussed below.

Increment-1
1-17. CREW Increment 1 (CREW-1), also known as the Warlock Family of Systems (FOS), began
fielding in FY 04. The CREW-1 systems were developed and deployed to counter specific RCIED threats
that were prevalent in FY 04. As the threat quickly exposed their use of various RF initiating devices,
several different CREW technologies were deployed, including––
z Warlock – GREEN.
z Warlock – RED.
z Warlock – RED/GREEN COMBO.
z Warlock – IED Countermeasures Equipment (ICE).
z Warlock – Modified ICE (mICE).
z Warlock – Self-Screening Vehicle Jammer (SSVJ).
z Warlock – Multimode Broadband Jammer (MMBJ).
z Warlock – BLUE.
z Warlock – LX.

Increment-2
1-18. CREW Increment 2 (CREW-2) consolidated the capabilities of the CREW-1 FOS, enhanced
operational flexibility and was intended to mitigate the need for multiple hardware platforms, maintenance,

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Chapter 1

and planning. Initial CREW-2 efforts included the development and deployment of three different systems:
Duke, Chameleon, and Hunter.

Note. Nomenclature for post-Increment 2 systems became JCREW in accordance with DODD
5101.14 assigning single manager of CREW technologies for the Joint Services to the US Navy.

Increment 2.1
1-19. JCREW 2.1 will be a mounted capability for all ground, air, and seaborne non-human tactical
platforms, as well as fixed sites to include defensive positions, command posts, and controlled points of
entry.

Increment 2.2
1-20. JCREW 2.2 will be a dismounted light (man-wearable) and dismounted heavy (man-transportable)
capability.

Increment-3
1-21. JCREW Increment 3 (JCREW-3) will be an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) driven increment to
develop a system of systems approach to address the global long-term requirements for RCIED protection.
JCREW-3 will expand the employment in multiple configurations, including JCREW 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.

Increment 3.1
1-22. CREW 3.1 will be a dismounted light (man-wearable) and dismounted heavy (man-transportable)
capability. It is intended to fill gaps between legacy dismounted CREW capabilities and the desired
endstate dismounted capabilities for Increment-3.

Increment 3.2
1-23. CREW 3.2 will be a mounted capability for all ground, air, and seaborne non-human tactical
platforms, as well as fixed sites to include defensive positions, command posts, and controlled points of
entry. It is intended to fill gaps between legacy-mounted CREW capabilities and the desired endstate
mounted capabilities for Increment-3.

Increment 3.3
1-24. CREW 3.3 will be the full spectrum capability desired as a suite (system of systems) of fixed site,
mounted, and dismounted systems intended to satisfy all current and expected gaps. This increment may
have the ability to receive threat frequency updates dynamically via over-the-air reprogramming.

FUTURE INCREMENTS
1-25. The capabilities of future increments will be refined based on the evolution of the threat and desired
US capabilities. Indications from OIF and OEF show the potential for attacks using radio-controlled IED
technology beyond the RF spectrum. Such capabilities could include passive infrared, laser-initiated
devices, or acoustic spectrum initiation, which would require capabilities not covered by previous CREW
increments. Additionally, CREW systems have the potential to support counter-fuse threats, emitter
mapping, and networked fusion if required by a formal AoA. (See appendix A for descriptions of specific
Army Warlock CREW systems.)

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Chapter 2
Electronic Warfare and CREW Basics

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
2-1. EW refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) or directed energy to
control the EM spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1). EW includes three major subdivisions:
electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). See figure 2-1 for
an EW overview.

ELECTRONIC ATTACK
2-2. EA is the subdivision of EW involving the use of EM energy, directed energy (DE), or anti-radiation
weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or
destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires (JP 3-09). EA includes––
z Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the EM spectrum, such as
jamming and EM deception.
z Employment of weapons that use either EM energy or DE as their primary destructive
mechanism (lasers, RF weapons, or particle beams).
z Both offensive and defensive activities to include countermeasures (CM):
Offensive EA activities are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. Examples
include jamming an adversary’s radar or command and control (C2) systems; using anti-
radiation missiles to suppress an adversary’s air defenses; using electronic deception
techniques to confuse an adversary’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
systems; and using DE weapons to disable an adversary’s equipment or capability.
Defensive EA activities use the EM spectrum to protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and
equipment. Examples include self-protection and force protection (FP) measures such as
use of expendables (for example, flares and active decoys), jammers, towed decoys, DE
infrared CM systems, and CREW systems.

ELECTRONIC PROTECTION
2-3. EP is the subdivision of EW involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment
from any effects of friendly or enemy use of the EM spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly
combat capability. Examples include spectrum management, EM hardening, emission control, and use of
wartime reserve modes.
2-4. EP includes actions taken to ensure friendly use of the EM spectrum (such as frequency agility in a
radio or variable pulse repetition frequency in a radar). EP should not be confused with self-protection. The
use of flare rejection logic on an infrared missile to counter a threat’s use of flares is EP. The flare rejection
technique ensures friendly use of the EM spectrum to track the intended target despite the threat’s self-
protection or defensive EA actions (for example, the flare) to prevent or reduce friendly use of the EM
spectrum.

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Chapter 2

2-5. While defensive EA actions and EP both protect personnel, facilities, capabilities, and equipment,
EP protects from the effects of EA (friendly and/or adversary); defensive EA is primarily used to protect
against lethal attacks by denying adversary use of the EM spectrum.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE SUPPORT


2-6. ES refers to that division of EW involving actions tasked by, or under direct control of, an
operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and
unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. ES data can be used to
produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce
measurement and signature intelligence. Figure 2-1 provides an overview of EW.

Figure 2-1. Electronic warfare overview

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THE ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM


2-7. The EM spectrum is the entire range of wavelengths or frequencies of EM radiation extending from
gamma rays to the longest radio waves and including visible light. Visible light is the most familiar part of the EM
spectrum. The term “spectrum” was originally limited to light.

2-8. Light exhibits properties of waves and can be focused and bent like waves in a pond. Just as a wave
traveling through water has a wavelength (the distance between wave peaks) and a frequency (the number
of wave peaks passing a point in a unit of time); light has a wavelength and a frequency.
2-9. The EM spectrum extends in both directions from the visible range. Shorter-wavelength, higher
frequency “light” includes ultraviolet, x-rays, and cosmic rays. Longer-wavelength, lower-frequency
“light” includes first infrared light then, as wavelengths become longer and longer, radio waves. Figure 2-2
shows the EM spectrum.

Figure 2-2. The electromagnetic spectrum

2-10. Electrons traveling through wires are surrounded by both electric and magnetic fields, and that a
wire carrying an alternating current is surrounded by electric and magnetic fields varying in intensity at the
same frequency as the electric current. Furthermore, the wire radiates energy that propagates just as do
light waves with a frequency and wavelength corresponding to the frequency of the alternating current in
the wire. Figure 2-3 provides a visual example of different frequencies.

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Figure 2-3. Visual example of different frequencies

2-11. The Federal Government uses the spectrum for a variety of purposes. Figure 2-4 shows examples of
this. The uses include Voice of America broadcasts, weather radio services, radars and voice communication systems used to
control both commercial and private aeronautical and maritime traffic, weather satellite systems, flood warning and water
control systems, and time signals.

Figure 2-4. Federal government spectrum usage example

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2-12. Almost 93 percent of the assignments authorizing government radio stations are below 3.1 gigahertz
(GHz). The Department of Defense (DOD) uses a significant portion of the Federal Government spectrum for national
security purposes. The Federal Government uses only the portions of the spectrum that it needs to provide critical public
services, and seeks to deploy the most efficient technology consistent with available resources. Chapter 3 discusses spectrum
management in more detail.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS
2-13. Radio communications use radio waves at different frequencies, grouped within bands, which are
part of the radio spectrum. Radio waves are the basic building block of radio communications. Like waves
on a pond, a radio wave is a series of repeating peaks and valleys. The entire pattern of a wave, before it
repeats itself, is called a cycle. The number of cycles, or times that a wave repeats in a second, is called
frequency.

FREQUENCY
2-14. Frequency describes how often radio waves cycle per second through the air, which is measured in
hertz (Hz). Typical measurements are in kilohertz (kHz) (or thousands of cycles per second), megahertz
(MHz) (or millions of cycles per second), and 1 billion hertz as a GHz. Think of frequency as how often a
signal is sent in one second. The CREW system frequency needs to be programmed to cover the frequency
of the RCIED receiver to stop it from detonating.

RADIO SPECTRUM
2-15. A radio spectrum is the complete range of frequencies from approximately 3 kHz up to more than
300 GHz that can be used for radio communications. Frequencies are often grouped in ranges called bands
(see table 2-1). Bands of interest to public safety include high frequency (HF), VHF (very high frequency),
UHF (ultrahigh frequency), and most recently SHF (superhigh frequency). Radio systems operating in the
806 to 824 MHz and 851 to 869 MHz portion of the UHF band are often referred to as “800 MHz systems”
and are distinguished from systems in the other parts of the UHF band. Frequencies above 1 GHz are often
referred to as “microwave” bands.
2-16. A radio wave is generated by a transmitter and then detected by a receiver. An antenna allows a
radio transmitter to send energy into space and a receiver to pick up energy from space. Transmitters and
receivers are typically designed to operate over a limited range of frequencies within a specific frequency
band (or bands).
Table 2-1. Radio frequency bands
FREQUENCY DESIGNATION WAVELENGTH
3-30 kHz Very low frequency (VLF) 100,000-10,000 m
30-300 kHz Low frequency (LF) 10,000-1,000 m
300-3000 kHz Medium frequency (MF) 1,000-100 m
3-30 MHz High frequency (Short wave) (HF) 100-10 m
30-300 MHz Very high frequency (VHF) 10-1 m
300-3000 MHz Ultrahigh frequency (UHF) 1 m-10 cm
3-30 GHz Superhigh frequency (SHF) 10-1 cm
30-300 GHz Extremely high frequency (EHF) 1 cm-1 mm
*kHz = kilohertz, or 1,000 Hz; MHz = megahertz, or 1,000 kHz; GHz = gigahertz, or 1,000
MHz.

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DEFENSIVE ELECTRONIC ATTACK COMPONENTS


2-17. Defensive EA, as it pertains to CREW, consists of three basic components; transmitters, receivers,
and jammers. (See figure 2-5.)
z Transmitter:
Simple transmitters can operate on only a signal or limited range of frequencies with limited
modulation or wave forms.
More complex transmitters are capable of being tuned to a variety of different frequencies.
May be capable of transmitting a wide range of modulations or wave forms.
z Receiver:
The receiving end of a communications channel from a transmitter; receiver communications
link.
Tuned to specific frequencies and capable of interpreting the signal on those frequencies.
In an RCIED the receiver is modified to send an initiating signal to an explosive initiator.
z Jammer:
A jammer is a special transmitter that prevents a receiver from receiving a recognizable signal
from the intended transmitter.
The jammer does this by transmitting on the same frequency as the target transmitter/receiver,
but with higher power or specialized waveforms (techniques jamming). This action prevents
the receiver from hearing or correctly interpreting the transmitter’s signal thus preventing
the output signal being sent from the receiver to the IED initiator.

Figure 2-5. Example of a transmitter/receiver (appliance controller)

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Note. When a jammer is in use, the target transmitter is still sending a signal at the same power
as before; therefore, turning off the jamming device will allow the target receiver to receive the
RCIED initiating signal. Also, jammers can adversely affect other jammers as well as friendly
communications. Proper planning and spectrum management will help mitigate these adverse
effects.

ACTIVE VERSUS REACTIVE JAMMING


2-18. CREW uses two fundamental types of jammers: active and reactive.

Active Jamming
2-19. Active jamming constantly transmits jamming signals on one or more frequencies or bandwidths
programmed into the system (barrage jamming). Since each jammer is loaded with multiple programmed
frequencies, it is able to defeat multiple threats simultaneously.
2-20. However, active jamming effectiveness is dictated by the limitations of power sharing. As the
number of programmed frequencies increases, the available power for each targeted frequency is reduced.
Ultimately, there is a limit to the available power that can be dedicated to the CREW capability. Active
jamming can be effective against both high- and low-power RCIEDs; however, they are most commonly
employed against low power threats due to the considerations mentioned above.

Reactive Jamming
2-21. Reactive jamming utilizes detection technologies and algorithms to minimize radiated jamming
signals. Reactive jamming scans programmed frequency ranges or sets of individual frequencies to detect
signal activity. When a potential threat is detected, the jammer processes the signal data and only then
transmits a jamming signal against that perceived threat. This method of reactive jamming enables the
system to focus more power on the targeted frequency.
2-22. Since increased power on a target normally provides more reliable suppression of the RCIED,
reactive jamming is more effective in defeating high-power RCIEDs. The limitation of reactive jamming is
the ability of the CREW system to detect the threat signals. Since many RCIED transmission signals are at
power levels below the resident EM environment, reactive jamming must be coupled with active jamming
to provide full coverage against an array of high- and low-power RCIEDs. See figure 2-6 for a jamming
example.

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Figure 2-6. Jamming illustration

TECHNIQUES OF JAMMING
2-23. A jammer may be programmed to work on individual or multiple frequencies within RF bands or to
cover a range of frequencies (band). In the CREW environment, this program, or “loadset,” is designed to
focus the jammer on known or suspected areas of the RF spectrum used by the threat. Also, since a jammer
has a maximum power output, it is necessary to have an effective method to manage available power assets
against targets within the RF spectrum. Two basic techniques of active jamming are described below.
2-24. Active jammers are programmed to continuously jam on pre-programmed frequencies. Active
jammers can either spread available power across all programmed frequency bands (barrage jamming), or
they can cycle power through programmed frequency bands (sweep jamming) at a revisit rate quick
enough to deny service of the target. In barrage jamming, when systems are programmed to jam all
frequencies simultaneously (figure 2-7), the available jamming power is shared over a desired frequency
range (notional program load). It is imperative that the system’s programming load considers the available
power on each target, as reduced power on target may severely effect system effectiveness.

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Figure 2-7. Example of barrage jamming

2-25. In sweep jamming (figure 2-8), the power of the transmission is swept across the programmed
frequency range (notional program load). The sweep technique enables maximum watts per MHz;
however, when it is moving in a sweep pattern with a cycle rate, it is possible for a signal to “sneak” in
during the time period that a frequency is not actively jammed.

Figure 2-8. Example of sweep jamming

2-26. A variation of sweep jamming is to use a receiver to scan a frequency range to detect signal activity.
Upon detection of an active signal the jammer focuses its transmission power directly on the active signal’s
frequency. This power-sharing technique allows the jammer to bring the maximum amount of power on
target at any one time.
2-27. Jamming systems are not restricted to a single method of jamming and may integrate multiple and
varying methods into a single system. A system that utilizes barrage jamming may actually vary the power
on each target, based on the loaded mission profile. Likewise, a system utilizing a sweep technique may
also incorporate an element of barrage jamming. In determining the appropriate mission profile for
jamming, the operational planners will take into consideration the effectiveness of various techniques and
the capabilities and limitations of the jamming system.

POWER
2-28. For the sake of developing and deploying CM, RCIED threat devices are designated as either high
power or low power (table 2-2). While an RCIED consists of a threat transmitter and a threat receiver,
designation of high- and low-power threats evaluates the transmit signal of the threat transmitter. An

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RCIED designated as a low-power RCIED has a transmitter that emits signals measured at less than one
watt. An RCIED designated as a high power RCIED has a transmitter that emits signals measured at one
watt or greater. Figures 2-9 through 2-12 provide examples of high- and low-power RCIEDs.
Table 2-2. High- and low-power threats
High Power Threats Low Power Threats

Typically more expensive than low-power


Typically less expensive than high-power RCIEDs
RCIEDs
Sophisticated transmission link between RCIED Simple transmission link between RCIED
transmitter and RCIED receiver (relatively long transmitter and RCIED receiver (relatively short
transmission time) transmission time)
Stand-off distance (range) between RCIED
Provides greater stand-off distance (range)
transmitter and RCIED receiver is typically much
between RCIED transmitter and RCIED receiver
less than higher powered RCIEDs

Narrow frequency bandwidth signal between Short data stream signals with high/low signaling,
RCIED transmitter and RCIED receiver (varying frequency within bands, due to design)

Figure 2-9. Examples of high-power threats (cell phones)

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Figure 2-10. Examples of low-power threats (key fobs)

Figure 2-11. Examples of high-power threats (integrated communications


operations management system)

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Figure 2-12. Examples of low-power threats (wireless door bells)

LINE OF SIGHT
2-29. Line of sight commonly refers to RF communication links that rely on an unobstructed straight line
(a clear path) between a transmitting antenna and a receiving antenna. Other types of IED triggers (for
example, pressure plate or trip wire) do not need a clear line of sight. They rely on other methods of
transmitting the detonate commands. CREW protection is effective for vehicles and personnel that are in
direct line of sight of the jammer; however, CREW protection is reduced by objects that mask (block) the
jammer’s line of sight.

MASKING
2-30. RF waves radiating from antennas cannot penetrate solid objects; for example, buildings, equipment
placed around vehicle antennas, other vehicles in the convoy—this is called masking. Blocking the direct
line of sight between CREW antennas and RCIED receivers reduces CREW effectiveness.

Note. Keep areas around antennas clear of materials to ensure maximum effectiveness. See
figure 2-13.

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Figure 2-13. Standoff vehicle jammer in urban area

Note. Buildings mask protection, which causes the lead vehicle to be unprotected.

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Chapter 3
Planning Responsibilities for CREW Employment
CREW is a variety of specialized systems designed as a capability to defeat RCIEDs. Since a CREW
system is designed to disrupt signals, its employment must be carefully coordinated to ensure optimal
effectiveness against RCIEDs, while minimizing unintended adverse effects against friendly equipment.
The EWO is primarily responsible for coordinating all EW operations, ensuring G-6 coordination to de-
conflict US and Coalition Force frequencies in support of planned operations, and disseminating
information to subordinate brigade and battalion S-6s and CREW operators.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER


3-1. The EWO is the principal EW planner on the staff. The scope and nature of the EWO’s
responsibilities depends on the size of the staff, the AO, and the type of mission or operation which the
staff must plan. The EWO is responsible to the operations officer (G-3) and coordinates with the
information engagement officer (G-7) and the component command, control, communications, and
computer systems staff officer (G-6) for planning, synchronizing, coordinating, and deconflicting EW
actions.
3-2. The EWO normally works closely with the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) to integrate EW
efforts with other supporting missions. The EW coordination center is an ad hoc staff working group often
formed to facilitate the EW coordination function. The accomplishment of this support requires that the
core members of a staff assisting the EWO have a depth of technical expertise and knowledge of the
capabilities of EW systems currently employed by military service components, allies, and coalition
partners.

BASIC ELECTRONIC WARFARE OFFICER CREW


RESPONSIBILITIES
3-3. The following are EWO CREW-related responsibilities:
z Coordinate spectrum management with G-6/S-6 to include deconflicting EA.
z Facilitate persistent and realistic EW training.
z Obtain the most recent RCIED intelligence.
z Support the military decision-making process; specifically provide updates to intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and deployment of the EW assets.
z Monitor IED trends and emerging enemy TTP by coordinating with the G-2/S-2.
z Conduct EW mission planning.
z Load, validate, and update the loadsets based off fragmentary orders and specific sites
designated for that mission; for example, Task Force Troy or Task Force Paladin websites.
z Utilize CREW interoperability chart for mission planning.
z Ensure unit properly conducts CREW pre-combat checks (see chapter 5).
z Ensure CREW TTP are valid, implemented, and updated as appropriate.
z Coordinate the integration of CREW assets within the AO.
z Coordinate with the FSCOORD to maximize effects of lethal and nonlethal fires.

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z Monitor and advise the command on the proper employment of assigned CREW assets and
personnel.
z Monitor and advise the command on current status and maintenance issues relating to CREW
assets.
z Manage and oversee employment of assigned CREW assets and personnel.
z Ensure lost, stolen, or destroyed CREW systems procedures are in place.
z Be the representative for all other CREW-related issues.
z Act as a liaison for the following efforts: counter-IED, spectrum management, airborne EW
assets, electronics officer, communication officers, frequency managers, combat engineers,
EOD, combined explosives exploitation cell (CEXC), weapons intelligence team (WIT), Joint
Command Control System-1 (JCCS-1), and JIEDDO.

PRE-MISSION EWO CREW RESPONSIBILITIES


3-4. The following are pre-mission EWO CREW-related responsibilities:
z Ensure the command possesses the ability to perform appropriate levels of preventive
maintenance checks and services (PMCS) and is aware of criticality of performing these actions
prior to employing CREW capabilities.
z Ensure CREW system problems are reported to the appropriate maintenance personnel (for
example, Field Support Representative [FSR]).
z Maintain awareness of operational readiness status of all CREW systems in the unit.
z Maintain awareness of the current RCIED threat environment through continuous coordination
with the unit intelligence section (G-2/S-2).
z Maintain awareness of spectrum utilization through continuous coordination with the
communication section (G-6/S-6).
z Maintain awareness of operational employment of CREW systems through continuous
coordination with the unit operations officer (G-3/S-3).
z Ensure the unit is employing current and relative CREW system configuration.
z Ensure the unit is aware of necessary CREW pre-combat checks.
z As required, brief convoy commanders on current and relevant CREW information.

POST-MISSION EWO CREW-RELATED RESPONSIBILITIES


3-5. The following are post-mission EWO CREW-related responsibilities:
z Attend mission debriefs in which CREW was employed or RCIEDs were encountered.
z Report any new RCIED and CREW information to the commander.
z Download and analyze any collected data from CREW systems.
z Coordinate with operators and FSRs for equipment PMCS and repair.
z Debrief G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3.

SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
3-6. Spectrum management involves planning, coordinating, and managing the use of the EM spectrum
through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures. EM waves propagate outward in all
directions. An antenna radiates signals at lower levels and can receive signals from all directions. An
interfering signal will be amplified and detected just like the desired signal once it enters the receiver. If the
interfering signal is large enough, it can prevent the desired signal from being properly demodulated and
understood.

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3-7. Soldiers operating radio communication devices and other EW devices in a given area must
understand the system’s operating environment if they are to avoid interference problems. If they operate
on the same frequencies at the same time and in the same area, their transmissions will produce
interference with each other’s receivers.
3-8. The goal of spectrum management is to enable electronic systems to perform their functions in the
intended environment without causing or experiencing unacceptable interference. Spectrum managers are
concerned with the process of obtaining regulatory access to spectrum resources and influencing the
development of statutory and regulatory policy, rules, regulations, and procedures. It involves coordinating
new and emerging Army spectrum requirements, participating in national and international spectrum
regulatory bodies, radiation hazard protection, and developing long-range spectrum management plans.
Spectrum management requires active participation in all phases of the combat development and materiel
development cycle. Spectrum management centers on obtaining access to the spectrum and managing it
primarily through the establishment of frequency allocations and frequency allotments.
3-9. The primary focus of spectrum management, at the tactical level, is to obtain an approved frequency
license from the controlling authority at the international, national, host nation, unified command, allied, or
military department level. This process includes the application of operational, engineering, and
administrative procedures to allotted RF bands to maximize reuse and sharing of the available spectrum
area. The process also enables electronic equipment to perform their functions in their intended
environment using EM compatibility measures, without suffering degradation from or causing
unacceptable degradation to other equipment. It centers on managing discrete frequencies or frequency
bands through use of frequency allotments and frequency assignments; assuring compliance with local
radio regulatory policy, rules, and procedures; application of sound practices; resolution of harmful
interference at the lowest operational level possible; and timely reporting of incidents of harmful
interference that cannot be resolved locally.

SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS AND TASKS


3-10. The spectrum manager at the tactical level is the commander’s principal advisor on all spectrum-
related matters and is primarily concerned with the following:
z Determine user requirements:
Staff coordination.
Joint restricted frequency list (JRFL).
z Process requirements (standard frequency action format):
Processing continental United States frequency requirements.
Processing outside the continental United States frequency requirements.
z Frequency deconfliction.
z Frequency interference resolution.
z Evaluate and optimize spectrum use.
3-11. The tasks necessary to accomplish these functions are generally the same across the echelons. The
difference is the size and scope of the tasks:
z Build and distribute Combat Net Radio loadsets.
z Request, obtain, and distribute frequencies for all emitters.
z Perform network analysis to engineer radio links and assign frequencies.
z Advise network planners in matters concerning spectrum management.
z Maintain and update databases.
z Coordinating for EW.
z Perform spectrum analysis and deconfliction.
z Determine and process satellite frequency requirements.

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z Resolve interference.
z Advise the commander in spectrum prioritization and implementation.
3-12. For an in-depth discussion on spectrum management functions and tasks, see FMI 6-02.70.

CREW AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE STAFF PLANNING


3-13. EW is a complex aspect of current military operations that must be fully integrated with other
aspects of military operations in order to achieve its full potential for contributing to an operation’s
objectives. Such integration requires careful planning. EW is only one type of activity that occurs in an
increasingly crowded EM spectrum. As such, EWOs must coordinate their planned activities with other
aspects of military operations that use the EM spectrum as well as civilian users of the spectrum that EW
does not wish to disrupt. Military operations dependence on EM energy and use of the EM spectrum by the
systems that collect, process, store, measure, analyze, and communicate information create information
operations (IO) opportunities and vulnerabilities that EW may be able to address.

PLANNING FACTORS
3-14. Development of the EW appendix to the operations plan (OPLAN) requires consideration of a
number of diverse factors about the proposed operations. Some of these planning factors include the
following:
z Requirements for friendly communications nets, EM navigation systems, and radar. These
requirements should be considered with respect to the anticipated operations, tactical threat
expected, and EM interference considerations. Once identified, these requirements should be
entered into the JRFL under appropriate categories (for example, TABOO). TABOO
frequencies, also known as guarded frequencies, are any friendly or enemy frequency of such
importance that it must never be deliberately jammed or interfered with by friendly forces.
z Identification of communications security and electronic security measures necessary to deny
operations security (OPSEC) indicators to enemy passive EM sensors.
z Determination of what prior coordination and precautions will be necessary when conducting
EA in order to ensure continued effective ES. Development of the JRFL is a critical preliminary
step to ensuring deconfliction of EA and ES activities. Coordination and identification of
specific resources are required for interference deconfliction.
z Identification of commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) that support
commanders and EW operations. These CCIRs must be included in the intelligence annex
(Annex B) of the OPLAN to facilitate generation of ES.
z Coordination and establishment of procedures to ensure timely fulfillment, including tactical
real-time dissemination.
z Review of rules of engagement (ROE) to determine what restrictions (if any) apply to EW
operations.

PLANNING FOR CREW EMPLOYMENT


3-15. Planning considerations for proper CREW employment fall on unit commanders, staff officers, and
EWOs. Effectively employing CREW capabilities requires the following:
z Unit commanders to—
Exercise control over the employment of CREW capabilities and systems in concert with higher
headquarters planning.
Identify requirements and prioritize the distribution of CREW systems.

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Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of disrupting communications over defeating RCIEDs.
(Chapter 4 discusses compatibility and communications alternatives.)
z Staff officers to—
Provide technical coordination, which ensures CREW systems are appropriately programmed
for the mission profile.
Provide operational coordination to ensure that systems are employed effectively in convoy and
other combat operations.
z EWOs to—
Ensure coordination, employ information from all sources, disseminate data, and develop the
CREW threat load based on derived intelligence and reporting.
Manage the entire process for counter-RCIED efforts and synchronize those efforts with other
EW efforts including EA, EP, and ES.

CREW THREAT LOAD PROCESS


3-16. The following is how the CREW threat load process flows:
z The EWO, in coordination with the G-2/S-2, identifies high-priority RCIED threats and
deconflicts with US and Coalition Force communications (see figure 3-1).
z RCIED intelligence is collected by EOD units and/or through collection of current threat data
from theater.
z Data is transmitted on Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) via Army
Reprogramming Analysis Team (ARAT) websites.
z ARAT develops new profile and validation changes. Upon validation via a “chamber test” the
new threat load is posted back to the ARAT website.
z Transmit new validated threat load and mask via ARAT.
z FSR downloads new load and updates CREW equipment.

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Figure 3-1. CREW threat load process flow

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Chapter 4
CREW Compatibility and Communication Alternatives

COMPATIBILITY
4-1. CREW system compatibility with other systems is essential to the effective use of EW as an element
of joint military power. There may be occasions when CREW systems could interfere with other CREW or
friendly systems (ground or aerial) or communications (for example, Blue Force Tracker). In any
operational environment, commanders should assign CREW a high priority in mission planning.
Commanders and EWOs should develop procedures for deconflicting frequencies and work cooperatively
to solve compatibility issues to ensure CREW can operate at maximum capability and effectiveness.
Having Soldiers turn off their CREW system to achieve improved communication capabilities denies them
the protection against RCIEDs offered by CREW.
4-2. CREW systems may interfere with other CREW systems. Figure 4-1 is an example of a compatibility
scenario. Specifically, reactive systems are not always compatible with active systems. Active systems are
not affected by other CREW systems because they are constantly transmitting. Reactive systems do not
have the ability to distinguish RF energy emitted from a threat transmitter, or RF energy emitted by another
CREW system. Therefore, an active system can be perceived by a reactive system as a potential threat.
When this scenario presents itself, the reactive jammer utilizes critical resources in an attempt to defeat the
RF signal being emitted from the active jammer. This may cause a reactive CREW system to be
considerably less effective against actual RCIEDs.
4-3. The materiel developers for CREW are developing timing protocols to assist in the compatibility
issues. As the common timing protocol (CTP) initiatives mature, compatibility among jammers will
significantly improve. Unit commanders, staff officers, and EWOs supporting CREW technologies should
maintain awareness of CTP initiatives and update TTP and employment considerations as necessary.

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Figure 4-1. Example compatibility scenario

DANGER
CREW systems will not identify the differences between friendly
communications and threat communication devices. It will work
to defeat them both.
Turning off CREW for communications will increase the
vulnerability of an RCIED attack.
CREW antennas must be separated from each other and other
antennas (for example, global positioning system [GPS] or single-
channel ground and airborne radio system) by at least 36 inches.
Do not make modifications to antenna placement (only trained
engineers should alter the placement of antennas) or place
anything near the antennas as the signals being received and
broadcasted may be adversely affected.
CREW cables must be separated by at least 3 inches to avoid
crossover interference.

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4-4. Possible suggestions to combat compatibility problems include the following:


z Perform PMCS, pre-convoy checks, and pre-convoy inspections on your communications gear
and CREW systems.
z Test all of your equipment together before you go outside the installation or base. If you are
experiencing communication failures, determine the cause prior to leaving the forward operating
base (FOB).
z Plan convoy using the latest interoperability chart from the ARAT website.
z Turn your CREW on and apply your TTP.
z Always check with your EWO when multiple CREW systems are employed to avoid potential
conflicts. See Appendices A and B for Army Warlock and Non-Warlock CREW systems.

FREQUENCY DECONFLICTION
4-5. Friendly, adversary, and civilian operations that use or affect the EM spectrum (communications,
non-communications, jamming) have the potential to interfere with communications and other electronic
systems. To mitigate this interference, the US military has established spectrum management and EW
frequency deconfliction procedures. EW frequency deconfliction can be considered a subset of spectrum
management and is defined as a systematic management procedure to coordinate the use of the EM
spectrum for operations, communications, and intelligence functions.
4-6. EWOs should be prepared to examine cases where CREW conflicts with the JRFL or where JRFL
changes might affect CREW loadsets. The extent of conflict analysis depends on the tools and time
available to the EWO. EW personnel should attempt to resolve or diffuse the conflict by working within
the staff and subordinate EWOs. If the deconfliction effort is successful, the operation is conducted as
planned or modified.

COMMUNICATIONS ALTERNATIVES
4-7. If unable to deconflict frequencies between the CREW system and communication equipment, the
following are some example alternatives to consider to help restore communications:
z Notify EWOs of communications conflict. They may know of a technical solution, which may
include moving the antenna to a different location.
z Use Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below/Blue Force Tracker ability to transmit
information as primary means of communication in accordance with mission execution
checklist.
z Coordinate with signal officer or communications NCO to change communications antenna type
from omnidirectional to more focused transmission capability.
z Coordinate with signal officer or higher for alternate means to communicate (for example,
tactical satellite, HF).
z Use pre-planned hand-visual signals.

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Chapter 5
CREW Employment Considerations

PRE-CONVOY MEASURES
5-1. Commanders and leaders need to plan the placement of CREW systems within a convoy to
maximize protection against RCIEDs. This process is essential to ensure the commands’ requirements for
use of the EM spectrum are balanced with the specific mission needs. This planning responsibility starts
with the––
z Convoy commanders.
z EWOs.

CONVOY PLANNING
5-2. Pre-convoy planning considerations include the following:
z Electronic countermeasure insight.
It is essential to understand the basic theory on how the CREW system suppresses the enemy
threat devices.
CREW is a line-of-sight system and its employment in respect to possible threat device locations
and danger zones is analogous to a medium-range direct fire weapon. Maintaining CREW’s
line of sight and avoiding masking by either terrain, buildings, vehicles and other objects is
an important part of successful system employment.

Note. Planners must understand the basic principle that the CREW system targets the threat
receiver not the transmitter. The geographic relationship between the transmitter to receiver and
the CREW system to receiver plays a significant role in successful suppression.

z The known RCIED threats. Through proper IPB, planners must know the types of RCIED
threats used in the AO. This data, in concert with the electronic countermeasure insight, drive all
the other planning considerations.
z Selection of the appropriate CREW system. Planners must verify that the installed load set on
the system(s) is the most effective against the prevailing threat.
z The number of CREW systems required to support the operation is based on mission parameters
and number of vehicles involved in the operation. Ideally CREW systems will be installed in
every vehicle of the convoy. However, if this is not possible, then convoy commanders should
ensure a minimum ratio of one CREW system per every two convoy vehicles.
z Placement and separation of CREW equipment. Not all CREW systems are compatible with
each other, thus it may be necessary to consult the latest CREW interoperability chart for
required separation distances. An example interoperability chart is shown in appendix D.
Additionally, based upon the mission requirements, IPB, and the number and type of vehicles,
the convoy commander should place the CREW systems in a manner that affords CREW
protection for all elements.

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z Distribution of CREW systems. Distribution of CREW systems in a linear convoy is most


effective when the systems are equally distributed throughout the convoy with emphasis given
to the lead elements of the formation.
z Potential conflicts between communications frequencies and the CREW equipment. Plan for
communication alternatives to avoid communications fratricide (see Chapter 4). The EWO and
spectrum management officer can provide solutions or suggestions to minimize communications
interference between CREW and friendly communications.

CONVOY BRIEFING WITH CREW


5-3. The convoy commander, or his designated representative, will ensure the convoy briefing includes,
at a minimum for CREW equipment––
z The latest IED/RCIED threat intelligence.
z Local standing operating procedures (SOPs) for action on IED/RCIED contact.
z Likely RCIED emplacement locations along the route.
z CREW system employment plan with respect to line of sight, unit mission, and TTP.
z Use of secure communications.
z Potential conflicts between communications frequencies and the CREW equipment.
z Planned communication alternatives.

PRE-CONVOY CHECKS WITH CREW


5-4. The convoy commander will ensure the following is accomplished:
z Conduct PMCS.
z Conduct communication checks with CREW on and off. This check should expose potential
communications conflicts and provide the leadership an opportunity to resolve or mitigate the
conflict.
z Test all radios and GPS devices.
z Obtain EWO verification that the appropriate CREW loadsets are installed for the mission and
AO.

CONVOY MEASURES WITH CREW


5-5. Commanders and leaders must remain flexible and adjust the operation based upon reassessment of
the threat and the current situation. While this may require relocation of the CREW systems within a
convoy or military operation to maximize protection against RCIEDs there are also other considerations
that improve force protection.

CONVOY FORCE PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS


5-6. To ensure maximum protection in a convoy, all Soldiers must do the following:
z Remain vigilant.
z Be unpredictable in the times and routes of the convoy.
z Be extra cautious at choke points and watch flanks for IEDs. Based on pre-mission planning,
position or reposition available CREW assets to provide electronic overwatch while operating in
a danger zone.
z Maintain speed and movement.

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z Maintain vehicle dispersion and distance. Vehicle dispersion and distance are based on pre-
mission planning or analysis and unit SOP. The ideal CREW solution is to keep all entities
within the effective suppression range of the CREW systems.
z If movement is stopped, survey the immediate area using the 5/25 method of surveillance:
5-meter surveillance is conducted to search for IEDs in your immediate vicinity. A 25-meter
search is conducted to identify secondary IEDs or triggermen.
CONVOY MOVEMENT WITH CREW
5-7. To ensure maximum protection in a convoy movement with CREW, all Soldiers must do the
following:
z Map reconnaissance and terrain analysis should identify danger areas along the primary and
alternate routes. This analysis supports MDMP and IPB for the number of CREW systems
required and optimal CREW placement.
z Lead with CREW vehicles when approaching higher threat areas. Conducting operations in the
vicinity of an RCIED is most effective when the CREW system is given the opportunity to
suppress the threat receiver as early as possible.
z Vehicles turning a corner may be masked from CREW coverage until the vehicle with the
CREW system approaches the corner. This is not an absolute and depends on a number of
variables (for example, building and vegetation type, threat device type, convoy interval, other).
z Do NOT round off corners when making turns.
z A CREW vehicle may be placed in an overwatch position where it can provide the most
coverage before turning a corner.
z If you are within an IED kill radius, you need CREW system protection (figure 5-1).
z CREW jams the receiver at the RCIED, not the transmitter.

Figure 5-1. Single vehicle jamming

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z Two vehicles, both with jammers (figure 5-2).


z Overlaps in middle for additional coverage.
z Check interoperability chart when employing multiple CREW jammers.

Figure 5-2. Two vehicles, two jammers

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z Figure 5-3 is an example as to why a ratio of one CREW system per more than two vehicles is
unwise. In this figure, the CREW system is in the middle vehicle.
z This disposition places the lead vehicle in the RCIED blast area before suppression can be
established and maintained.
z If this configuration is necessary, the convoy should tighten up its interval to maximize
effectiveness of the CREW protection.

Figure 5-3. Multiple vehicles, single jammer

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z Figure 5-4 depicts the preferred CREW system to vehicle ratio where each vehicle is equipped
with a CREW system.
z In an urban environment, buildings mask the effectiveness of the jammers.

Figure 5-4. Multiple vehicles, multiple jammers

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z Another example of the attendant risk to exceeding a ratio of one CREW system per every two
vehicles. The center vehicle is CREW equipped (figure 5-5).

Figure 5-5. Multiple vehicles, single jammer in urban area

Note. When meeting another convoy, determine if there is a compatibility conflict. If none,
proceed with mission. If a conflict is determined, talk with the other convoy commander and
decide who will shut down their CREW equipment. If convoys have to operate in the same area,
one of them must back out of range of the other’s jammers. The CREW device will not identify
any difference between legitimate communications and threat devices and will work to defeat
them both.

ADDITIONAL CREW OPERATION HINTS


z Turn systems on and off when leaving and entering the FOB based on the SOP.
z If communications are lost––
Check communications equipment.
Retransmit the complete report.
Other vehicles may hear the reply from the distant station.

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Move C2 vehicle away from the CREW vehicle.


Utilize other means to send and receive messages.
z Coordinate with quick reaction force, EOD, or other units with CREW in the patrol or convoy.
What kind of equipment is used?
Who will turn off the equipment if required?

ENCOUNTERING AN IED – THE 5 C’S


5-8. Detection of an IED can be particularly difficult because the IED can be emplaced almost anywhere.
Soldiers must remain vigilant and practice their response, through the use of the 5 C’s, once an IED has
been encountered.

DANGER
Do not attempt to move the IED. Do NOT hug the curb at potential
IED locations but stay in the middle of the road. Never drive over
a suspected IED.

z Confirm:
Scan the immediate surrounds from a 360-degree perspective.
Use optics for standoff and protection.
Conduct surveillance, from a safe distance, of both the suspected IED and for a triggerman. DO
NOT ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE POSSIBLE IED.
Indicate location of suspected IED using unit-designated marking system.
The first vehicle in the patrol to identify the suspected IED should attempt to alert other vehicles
of the suspected IED location and mark it in accordance with the unit SOP.
The nearest vehicle to the IED with a radio must transmit the location of the IED to the
remainder of the patrol using vehicle internal call signs and indicate the distance and
direction of the threat.
Use available hard cover to the maximum extent.
Conduct checks of the immediate surroundings to ensure that there are no secondary devices.
Use theater-specific methods, such as the 5/25 method.
Detain a suspected triggerman if one was detected.
Give as much information as possible, to include a safe route or approach to the incident control
point (ICP) for EOD and other responding agencies.
Call higher headquarters using the 9-line explosive hazard (EH) spot report:
• Line 1: Date-time group (DTG) Discovered: (Command policy will dictate local or
Zulu time). Line 1, DTG. Provide the DTG that the item was discovered (for
example, 181230ZMAY05).
• Line 2: Reporting Activity (Unit Identification Code [UIC]). Location: Mandatory 8-
digit grid (include landmarks, reference points, or street addresses). Provide the UIC
of the reporting activity unit and the location of the EH in an 8-digit grid coordinate.
• Line 3: Contact Method: Radio Frequency/Call Sign or Telephone Number. (If using
phone number, provide name.) Provide the RF, the call sign, the point of contact,
and the telephone number.
• Line 4: Type of Munition: (Dropped, Projected, Placed, or Thrown). Note the size,
the quantity, the type of ordnance (dropped, projected, placed, possible IED, or

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thrown), and the subgroup, if available. If anti-handling devices were used, indicate
the emplacement method and type of initiation device.
• Line 5: CBRNE Contamination: Yes or No, known or suspected CBRNE
contamination. If yes, report type of agent if known or identified. Be as specific as
possible.
• Line 6: Resources Threatened: (What resource is threatened – is it a critical asset?)
Report any equipment, facilities, or other assets that are threatened.
• Line 7: Impact on Mission: (How the unexploded ordnance is affecting the
mission). Provide a short description of the current tactical situation and how the
presence of the EH affects the status (for example, delayed, diverted, cancelled).
• Line 8: Protective Measures taken: (Unit emplaced protective measures). Describe
any measures taken to protect personnel and equipment (for example, marked).
• Line 9: Recommended Priority: (Immediate, Indirect, Minor, or No Threat).
Recommend a priority for response by EOD technicians. Ensure that the priority
requested corresponds with the tactical situation you described on line 7 of the report
(Impact on Mission). These priorities refer only to the EH impact on the current
mission. A priority of MINOR or NO THREAT does not mean that the EH is not
dangerous.
z Clear:
Clear all personnel from the area to a minimum safe distance of 300 meters from a potential
IED.
Vary minimum distance (beyond 300 meters) to avoid establishing predictability, because of
possible secondary IED.
Avoid using any communications or electronic equipment (other than CREW devices).
Use mission, enemy, terrain, weather, troops and support, time available and civil considerations
factors.
z Cordon:
Cordon off the area.
Position CREW devices to best protect the element.
Direct personnel out of the danger area, allowing entry only to EOD personnel.
Follow existing ROE procedures to detain, search, and question suspects.
Direct people out of the 300-meter minimum danger area.
Check suspicious personnel exiting the cordoned-off area to suppress the enemy within the
danger area.
Identify, clear, and establish an area for an ICP.
Establish an ICP for follow-on agencies.
Focus Soldiers outward in cordoned positions and the ICP to provide protection and security
against other IEDs.
Control media reporters and reduce civilian distractions.
z Check:
Check the immediate area for secondary devices from the ICP or cordoned positions.
Conduct 5/25 meter checks, and 100-meter checks (if possible) of the area for IED materials,
indicators, and equipment that may lead to other IEDs flanking the unit.
z Control:
Control the area inside the cordon to ensure only authorized access.
• Allow only authorized emergency vehicles to enter the cordoned area.
• Ensure all personnel and vehicles enter and exit the cordoned area through the ICP.
Scan for other enemy indicators such as a cameraman, triggerman, or any other observer.

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POST-CONVOY ACTIVITIES
5-9. After return to the convoy’s compound, the convoy commander is required to close out the mission.
In order to accomplish this, several steps must be performed:
z Conduct post-convoy debriefing. Normally, the convoy commander is debriefed by the S-2 and
provides the S-2 with any new information observed about the enemy while traveling in the
convoy.
z Conduct post-convoy PMCS. The convoy noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC) ensures
after-action PMCS of the convoy vehicles. The NCOIC also ensures that Soldiers conduct
maintenance of all individual weapons, crew-served weapons, and convoy-related equipment, to
include CREW systems.
z Immediately notify FSR or appropriate personnel of any equipment damage or failure.
z Ensure CREW equipment is secure.

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Appendix A
Army Warlock CREW Systems
A-1. This appendix describes the following Army Warlock CREW systems and ancillary equipment. See
table A-1 for their capabilities. The systems and equipment include the following:
z Duke.
z Modified IED Countermeasure Equipment (mICE).
z Mobile Multi-Band Jammer (MMBJ).
z Red/Green COMBO.
z Self-Screening Vehicle Jammer L Band (SSVJ-L.)
z CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer (CVRJ).
z Mobile Multi Band Jammer (MMBJ-1B)
z Warlock LX.
z Spectrum Analyzer (which is not a CREW system).

Table A-1. CREW system capability comparison


System Active Reactive High- Power Low-Power Threats
Jammer Active Threats
Duke X X X X
mICE X Some X
MMBJ X Some Most
Red/Green X X Some Some
COMBO
SSVJ-L X X
CVRJ X X X X
MMBJ-1B X X
Warlock LX X X X

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Appendix A

OPSEC IS CRITICAL!!

z Do not talk in open areas about sensitive information. CREW information is


always FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY at a minimum.
z Guard all written information and dispose of material based on local security
manager’s (S-2) policies.

CLEARANCE + NEED TO KNOW = ACCESS

z Classification Guide defines the following as SECRET.


• Frequencies (programming loads).
• Power (per frequency or across a bandwidth).
• The specific techniques or methods used to defeat a radio-controlled
IED.
• All mission information about CREW systems.

CAUTION!

z All CREW systems are high value sensitive items and require safeguarding.
z Use caution when working around ALL electronic countermeasure (ECM)
equipment.
z High voltage and radio frequency (RF) radiation are present in CREW
systems.
z Keep systems dry.
z CREW systems are not a substitute for good tactical standing operating
procedures (SOPs) and situational awareness.
z CREW systems provide an additional layer of protection.
z CREW systems interfere with communication devices.
z Always check power cables, antenna cables, nuts, bolts and lock-washers,
cable tie-downs, and security fasteners. Inspect the antenna locations for
missing or broken parts.
z Operator must receive interoperability distances before convoying with
vehicles using CREW devices. Convoying with systems that are NOT
compatible can cause system performance degradation. See your Joint
CREW Field Office representative or your S-6/S-2 or EWO for
interoperability and current program load information.

For Emergency Destruction it is recommended a thermite


grenade be used to destroy the CREW Systems.

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SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:
• Active and Reactive jammer
• Effective against high- and low-power
threats
• Threat event logging
TABULATED DATA:
Jamming range....................... Line of sight
System weight.............. 70 lbs including mount
Temperature range…...……. -40° C to 65° C
MTFB……………………………… 4,000 hours
AN/VLQ-12 DUKE

NOMENCLATURE: AN/VLQ-12 Countermeasures Set (figure A-2)

PROJECT NAME: WARLOCK- DUKE

FUNCTION: Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Duke is an active and reactive jammer.

SYSTEM COMPONENTS: You may not have all of these DUKE components in figure A-1.

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Appendix A

Figure A-1. DUKE system components

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Essential Equipment

Primary Unit (figure A-2):


z Weight: 70 lbs including mount
z Size: 12.8” x 12.8” x 16.1”
z No. of Boards: 5
z MTBF: 4,000 hours
z Conduction/Convection Cooled
z MIL-STD-810 Compliant (shock, sand, rain)
z Operation Temperature: -40° C to 65° C
z Power Source: 22/28 VDC: external adaptors for 12 VDC, 110/220 VAC
z Built-in test
z Shock Mounted
z Field Programmable Gate Array: Threat Event Logging
z GPS Synchronized

Remote Control Unit (figure A-3):


z Weight: 3 lbs.
z Size: 3.3” x 10.3” x 5.6”
z MIL-STD-810 Compliant
z Threat Indicator

System Cables

GPS Antenna

Mission Support Equipment

R-PDA:
z Ruggedized
z New Threat Programmability
z Field Configurable Downloader
z Graphical User Man-Machine Interface (MMI)

Laptop:
z Ruggedized
z DVD ROM
z CD-R/RW Drive
z Field Configurable Downloader
z Diagnostics
z Graphical User MMI

Antennas:
z Vehicle Antenna
z Broadband
z Frequency-Bands A and B
z Single Mount

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Appendix A

z Spring Mount

OPERATOR CONTROLS AND INDICATORS:

Primary Control Unit

Figure A-2. Primary control unit

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Table A-2. Primary control unit functions


Item Control/Indicator Condition Function
#
1. LED PANEL GREEN Indicates power is applied. Green LED will blink in
STANDBY mode.
AMBER Indicates system is actively jamming.
RED Indicates system fault.
2. ANT-U Connector Used to connect the ANT-U cable to (J5).
The ANT-U cable has a Type-N connector on each
end.
3. ANT-L Connector Used to connect the ANT-L cable to (J6).
The ANT-L cable has a Type BNC connector on
each end.
4. GPS Connector Used to connect the GPS antenna and cable to (J7).
The GPS cable has a Type-TNC connector.
5. GND Connector Used to ground the Primary Unit to the vehicle.
6. PDA/REMOTE PDA Used to connect the PDA Interface Cable to (J2).
The PDA is used to upload or retrieve Event Log
information and mission configuration data to and
from the Primary Unit.
When operating the System with the remote control
REMOTE
unit (RCU), it is used to connect the RCU cable (J2)
on the Primary Unit and (J2) on the RCU.
7. BLANKING Currently reserved for future expansion of the
Connector system.
8. 24V Power All power sources for the AN/VLQ-12
Connector Countermeasures Set are connected to the 24V
connector (J1).
9. LAPTOP Connects the Laptop Interface Cable.
10. ZEROIZE Switch UP Normal operation.
DOWN Zeroizes or disables the Primary Unit.
Protects the Primary Unit from input power over-
voltage conditions.
11. 24V Circuit Protects the Primary Unit from input power over-
Breaker voltage conditions.
12. PWR POWER Engages power to the Primary Unit.
ON
ON/OFF/REMOTE POWER Removes power from the Primary Unit.
OFF
Switch
REMOTE Enables power when the RCU is connected.
13. RUN/STANDBY RUN Places Primary Unit in standby state.
STANDBY Places Primary unit in standby state.

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Appendix A

Remote Control Unit (RCU)

Figure A-3. Remote control unit

Table A-3. Remote control unit functions


Item # Control/Indicator Condition Function
1. PWR ON/OFF PWR ON Engages power to the Primary Unit.
Switch
PWR OFF Removes power from the Primary Unit.

2. RUN/STANDBY RUN Places Primary Unit in operational state.


Switch
STANDBY Places Primary Unit in standby state.

3 ZEROIZE Switch UP Normal operation.


DOWN Disables or zeroizes the Primary Unit.
4 LED Panel GREEN Indicates power is applied. Green LED will blink in standby mode.

AMBER Indicates system is actively jamming.

RED Indicates system fault.

5 System Connector Used to connect the RCU Cable to (J1) on the RCU and (J2) on
the Primary Unit.
6 PDA Connector Used to connect the PDA Interface Cable to (J2) on the Primary
Unit and (J2) on the RCU. The PDA enables the operator to
remotely transfer new configuration data or download event logs
remotely from the front of the vehicle.

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DEVICE OPERATION:

Turn ON Procedure- Primary Unit

Note. When the Primary Unit is powered on, the four blower assemblies (located under the
shroud cover) will start and the operator will feel air blowing out from under the cover. If the
fans are not functioning properly, a maintenance action should be initiated, as required, during
pre-mission. Ensure there is a 1-inch clearance on the sides and rear of the Primary Unit to allow
for adequate air flow.

1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning on the Duke device.
2. Ensure all System Cable connections are properly connected.
3. Ensure RUN/STANDBY switch (13) is in the STANDBY (Down) position.
4. Set the PWR switch (12) on the Primary Unit to the PWR ON (Up) position. System will run
through an Initial 16-second Built-in Test (BIT) which will be evident with the lights blinking
in sequence. The green LED (1) will illuminate ON-Blinking.
5. Set the RUN/STANDBY (13) switch on the Primary Unit to the RUN (Up) position. The green
LED (1) will be ON-Solid.

Addressing a Primary Unit Fault

If a fault occurs during a mission, the red LED will light or blink and the system will not
function properly. To clear the fault:

1. Cycle the power from either the Primary Unit (or RCU) if being operated remotely) by setting
the PWR switch (12) to the PWR OFF (Middle) position, waiting 10 seconds, and then setting
the PWR switch (12) back to the PWR ON (Up) position.
2. If the red LED is not lit or blinking upon power-up, the operator should continue the mission.
3. If the fault does not clear after cycling power (red LED remains lit or blinking), remove power
and check the Primary Unit and Antenna cable connections.
4. Restore power to the system.
5. If the red LED is not lit or blinking upon power-up, the operator should continue the mission.
6. If the red LED is lit or blinking, the fault has not been cleared. The operator should initiate a
maintenance action and contact an FSR, as required.

Follow unit TTP when RED Fault indictor is illuminated during mission.

Set STANDBY Procedure – Primary Unit

1. To place the Primary Unit in standby mode, set the RUN/STANDBY switch (13) to the
STANDBY (Down) position. The green LED will blink while in Standby mode.
2. To take the Primary Unit out of the standby mode, set the RUN/STANDBY switch (13) to the
RUN (Up) position. The green LED will return to a solid state.

Turn OFF Procedure – Primary Unit

1. Set the RUN/STANDBY switch (13) on the Primary Unit to the STANDBY (Down) position.
2. Set the PWR switch (12) on the Primary Unit to the PWR OFF (Middle) position. The green
LED will go out, indicating the power has been removed from the primary unit.

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Appendix A

RCU Turn ON Procedure

1. Ensure all AN/VLQ-12 Countermeasures Set cable connections are properly connected.
2. Ensure the RUN/STANDBY (13) switch on the Primary Unit is in the RUN (Up) position.
3. Ensure the PWR Switch (12) on the Primary Unit is in the REMOTE (Down) position.
4. Set the PWR Switch (1) on the RCU to the PWR ON (Up) position. SYSTEM WILL RUN
THROUGH AN INITIAL 16-SECOND BIT WHICH WILL BE EVIDENT WITH THE
LIGHTS BLINKING IN SEQUENCE. The green LED (4) will illuminate.
5. Set the RUN/STANDBY (2) Switch on the RCU to the RUN (Up) position.

Addressing an RCU Fault

If a fault occurs during a mission, the red LED (4) will light or blink and the system will not
function properly. To clear the fault:

1. Cycle the power from either the Primary Unit (or RCU if being operated remotely) by setting the
PWR switch (1) to the PWR OFF (Middle) position, waiting 10 seconds, and then setting the
PWR switch (1) back to the PWR ON (Up) position.
2. If the red LED is not lit or blinking upon power-up, the operator should continue the mission.
3. If the fault does not clear after cycling power (red LED remains lit or blinking), remove power
and check the Primary Unit and Antenna cable connections.
4. Restore power to the system.
5. If the red LED is not lit or blinking upon power-up, the operator should continue the mission.
6. If the red LED is lit or blinking, the fault has not been cleared. The operator should initiate a
maintenance action and contact an FSR, as required.

Follow unit TTP when RED Fault indictor is illuminated during mission.

RCU STANDBY Function

1. To remotely place the Primary Unit in Standby, set the RUN/STANDBY (2) switch on the RCU
to the STANDBY (Down) position. The green LED (4) will blink while in Standby mode.
2. To take the Primary Unit out of the Standby mode, set the RUN/STANDBY (2) switch on the
RCU to the RUN (Up) position. The green LED (4) will return to a solid state.

RCU TURN OFF Procedure

Set the PWR switch (1) on the RCU to the PWR OFF (Down) position. The green LED (1) will go out
indicating the power has been removed from the Primary Unit.

Zeroize/Emergency Erase:

Primary Unit Zeroize Function Procedure

Note. Power must be applied to the Primary Unit in order to disable it using the ZEROIZE (10)
switch.

Note. If the Primary Unit is inadvertently zeroized, it must be reconfigured by reloading the .c2f
file from the PDA.

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Zeroizing the Primary Unit will delete all critical systems information.

The Zeroize procedures need to be performed:


z To prevent the system from being compromised in hostile situations.
z Prior to the system being turned in for any maintenance actions.
z Prior to updating the configuration file on the system.
z Prior to storing the system when not needed for operation.

To Zeroize using the Primary Unit:

1. Lift the red cover, press down and hold the ZEROIZE switch (10) on the Primary Unit for 10
seconds before releaing the switch.
2. Set the PWR switch (12) on the Primary Unit to the PWR OFF (Middle) position.
3. Wait 10 seconds before setting the PWR switch (12) on the Primary Unit to the PWR ON (Up)
position. All of the LEDs (1) will blink.

Zeroize using the RCU:

1. Lift the red cover and press down on the RCU ZEROIZE switch (3) for 10 seconds before
releasing the switch.
2. Set the PWR switch (1) on the RCU to the PWR OFF (Down) position.
3. Wait 10 seconds before setting the PWR switch (1) on the RCU to the PWR ON (Up) position.
All of the LEDs will blink.

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Appendix A

SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:
• Active jammer
• Effective against low- and
some high- power threats
• Utilizes a Notch Filter to
prevent communications
fratricide.
TABULATED DATA:
Jamming range. .................Line of sight

mICE

PROJECT NAME: Modified IED Countermeasure Equipment (figure A-4).

FUNCTION: Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The mICE is an active jammer.

ANTENNAS:

z Vehicle Antenna

OPERATOR CONTROLS AND INDICATORS:

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Figure A-4. mICE operator controls


DEVICE OPERATION:

Turn ON Procedure

1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning unit on.
2. Ensure STANDBY/RADIATE switch is in the up position (STANDBY).
3. Place MASTER power switch in the down (ON) position.
4. Fault light should illuminate and stay on for 3 to 5 minutes. If the light does not go out after 5
minutes – possibly longer in cold weather – there is a fault. Inform your supervisor and/or FSR.
5. Ensure exhaust fans are operating and clear of debris.
6. When FAULT light goes out, place STANDBY/RADIATE switch down in the (RADIATE)
position.

Turn OFF Procedure

1. Turn off the mICE prior to turning off the vehicle.


2. Place STANDBY/RADIATE switch in the up (STANDBY) position.
3. Place MASTER power switch to the up (OFF) position.
4. Ensure power light is off.

CAUTION
Verify whip antennas are in upright position

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 A-13

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Appendix A

Zeroize/Emergency Erase

1. Lift Zeroize switch cover.


2. Hold switch in UP position and release.

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SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:
• Active jammer
• Operates on 12v-36v DC Power
• 10 Programming channels

TABULATED DATA:
Jamming range..................................Line of sight

MMBJ
PROJECT NAME: Mobile Multi-Band Jammer (figure A-5).

FUNCTION: Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The MMBJ is an active jammer.

POWER SOURCE: 12-36 Volts DC

ANTENNAS:
z Vehicle Antenna

OPERATOR CONTROLS AND INDICATORS:

Figure A-5. MMBJ operator controls

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Appendix A

DEVICE OPERATION:

Turn ON Procedure

1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning unit on.
2. Pull and move power switch to the up (ON) position.
3. The display will come on and cycle through its initialization and BIT.
4. Press “soft key” RF ON.
5. Press “soft key” YES to confirm RF ON.
6. Ensure fans are turning and moving air.
7. If display reads “UNIT ZEROIZED,” unit is non-functional. Contact FSR for reprogramming
MMBJ software/firmware.

Turn OFF Procedure

1. Turn off the MMBJ prior to turning off the vehicle.


2. Press “soft key” RF OFF.
3. Press “soft key” YES to confirm RF OFF.
4. Pull and move power switch to the down (OFF) position. Display will go off.

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SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:

• Active and Reactive System


• Green version 5.12 and blanking
cable required
• Covers a larger frequency spectrum
• Combination (Active and Reactive)
jammer RED/GREEN “COMBO”

TABULATED DATA: PROJECT NAME: RED/GREEN “COMBO”

Jamming range..........................Line of sight FUNCTION: Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Warlock Red/Green “COMBO” covers


a larger frequency spectrum by combining the low-power
jamming capabilities of the Red system with the high-power
jamming capabilities of the Green system.

ANTENNAS:

Vehicle Antenna

OPERATOR CONTROLS AND INDICATORS:

Red & Green Blanking Cable Configuration (figures A-6, A-7, and A-8).

1. Red will primarily be cabled to a Green.


2. If Red is in stand-alone configuration, there will be 1 or 2 antennas.
3. If Red is cabled with a Green, there will be 2 antennas.
4. See configuration below for Red/Green COMBO.
5. Verify Blanking Cable is connected.
6. Verify Dual Band antennas are connected and in upright position.

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 A-17

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Appendix A

Figure A-6. Red/Green COMBO cabling

RED DEVICE OPERATION:

Turn ON Procedure

1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning unit on.
2. Place both switches on the Low- and Mid- Band transmitters in the down (ON) position.
3. Ensure both power indicator lights are lit.
4. If not lit, inform your supervisor and/or FSR.

Turn OFF Procedure

1. Turn off the RED prior to turning off the vehicle


2. Place both switches in the up (OFF) position.
3. Ensure both power indicator lights are off.

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Figure A-7. Red Warlock

ENSURE system is OFF while on or entering FOB


ENSURE system is turned ON when departing FOB

GREEN DEVICE OPERATION:

Turn ON Procedure

1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning on Green.
2. Ensure user data module (UDM) card is installed.
3. Pull and move power switch to the up (ON) position.
4. Screen will display INIT WARLOCK.
5. The display will change as the Green goes through its initialization and BIT.
6. When the display shows a Floating Star (******), the Green is scanning ready to jam.
7. As it detects signals, the display will show which channel(s) it is transmitting on.
8. If the display shows a fault, turn it off and turn it on again.
9. If the display still shows a fault, inform your supervisor and/or FSR.

Turn OFF Procedure

1. Turn off the Green prior to turning off the vehicle.


2. To avoid damage to the system, place it in STANDBY before turning off power.
3. Press the MENU button once, the screen will display OPERATE.
4. Press the down arrow until the screen shows STANDBY.
5. Press the SEL (select) button (now in STANDBY).

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Appendix A

6. Pull and move power switch to the down (Off) position.


7. The display will go off.

Figure A-8. Green Warlock

Green Force Jam Mode:

Note. This operation is critical for performance against some threats.

1. Ensure Green is in Operate mode and press MENU, then press DOWN arrow. Once STANDBY is
observed, press SEL.
2. Press MENU then DOWN arrow until CHANNEL is observed. Press SEL.
3. Press UP or DOWN arrows to scroll to the desired channel, then press SEL.
4. Press UP arrow, FOR is seen, press SEL.
5. Press the MENU then press SEL, OPERATE is observed.
6. The system is now in the Force Jam mode for the selected channel; an audible tone will sound and
(FOR Channel #) will appear after 10 seconds.
7. If additional channels are required for Force Jam mode, repeat Steps 1 through 6.
8. To return to the normal Operation Mode, perform steps 9 and 10.
9. Repeat Steps 1 through 3, then press the down arrow once (ON is observed).
10. Then Press SEL, Press MENU, Press SEL; the Forced Channel is restored to normal operation.

Note. Up to three channels can be selected for Force Jam mode. Check with the program office
or S-6/S-2 for Force Jam Channels.

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SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:

• Active jammer
• Effective against specific high
power threats
• System has 5 RF cards

TABULATED DATA:

Jamming range.......................Line of sight

SSVJ-L

PROJECT NAME: Self-Screening Vehicle Jammer-L Band (figures A-9 and A-10).

FUNCTION: Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The SSVJ-L is an active jammer.

SYSTEM COMPONENTS:

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Appendix A

Figure A-9. SSVJ-L components

Figure A-10. SSVJ-L DCU

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Table A-4. DCU controls


DCU Controls
Up System ON
Center System OFF
Down System ON / BLK OUT (blackout)
AMP Meter Nominal reading of >3.8 and < 5.3

ANTENNAS:

Vehicle Antenna

DEVICE OPERATION:

Turn ON Procedure

1. Let the vehicle warm up for at least 3 minutes before turning unit on.
2. Center position is OFF.
3. Switch up position is ON and switch down position is ON / BLK OUT.
4. Press switch to UP / ON position (power lamp illuminates bright).
5. System is transmitting in UP or DOWN position.
6. Press switch to DOWN / BLK OUT (power lamp is dim).
7. Amp meter on DCU should read 3.8 to 5.3 Amps.
8. If red light does not come on, recheck power leads.
9. If Amp meter reads low or high, contact FSR.

Turn OFF Procedure

1. Move the switch to the OFF (center) position.


2. The Power indicator should be extinguished.
3. Turn off the vehicle.

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 A-23

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Appendix A

SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:

• Reactive jammer
• Effective against high- and low- power
threats
• Scan and jam over 20 channels
simultaneously WARLOCK LX

TABULATED DATA: PROJECT NAME: LX


Jamming range............... ………...Line of sight
FUNCTION: Jammer
Temperature range…... ………..……0° to 50°C

DESCRIPTION: The WARLOCK LX system is a reactive jammer.

ANTENNAS:

Vehicle

OPERATOR CONTROLS AND INDICATORS:

z LX front panel controls and indicators (figure A-11).


z LX remote control (figure A-12).
z Low-Q subsystem circuit breaker (figure A-13).
z LX panel indicators (table A-5).
z LZ Zeroize buttons (figure A-14).
z Zeroize from laptop (figure A-15).

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Figure A-11. LX front panel controls and indicators

Figure A-12. LX remote control

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Appendix A

Figure A-13. LOW-Q subsystem circuit breaker

Table A-5. LX panel indicators


LX Indicators
System State WARMU STBY TX BIT OK OTEMP LOW
P VOLT
Unclassified or ZEROIZED X BLINK OFF BLINK X X
Warming Up BLINK OFF OFF OFF X X
Configuring or Running BIT ON OFF OFF BLINK X X
Not Ready ON OFF OFF X X X
Standby Mode ON ON OFF X X X
Low Voltage Present X X X X X ON
Over Temp Present X X X X ON X
X = indeterminate, depends on other conditions (Not Blinking)

ON = LED is on OFF = LED is off BLINK = LED is blinking

WARNING

The system will not operate correctly with the chassis front panel
removed. The Warlock LX remote control operates exactly the
same as the Front Panel interface.

DEVICE OPERATION:

Turn ON Procedure:

1. Start the vehicle engine.


2. Turn on the circuit breaker on the front of the LOW-Q panel (figure A-14).

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3. Once system power has been applied, the LEDs on the Front Panel and the Remote Control will flash
on briefly.
4. The system then begins a boot-up sequence ends with the system entering the Standby state and with
the BIT passing.

This condition is noted by viewing the STBY and BIT OK LEDs illuminated. This
process takes approximately 40 seconds.

WARNING

If the ambient temperature within the vehicle is below 0 ºC, the


system requires a 5-minute warmup period. If the system has not
had adequate time to warm up, it may fail its BIT. It is
recommended that the system be configured following this
warmup period under these environmental conditions.

5. Connect the laptop computer.


6. Start the laptop and LX software.
7. If a file holding LX hardware settings has been created previously, open it on the laptop.
8. If the hardware settings file does not exist, create a new one using the menus.
9. Click the Configure Hardware button at the bottom of the Configuration Screen.
10. Transfer the file from the laptop to the LX hardware.
11. Click the Save and Configure button to save any changes to the file.
12. Once configuration is complete, verify that the BIT has passed by checking the BIT LED on the
system or the BIT lamp on the software screen.
13. If the WARMUP LED flashes, this indicates that the system requires configuration information to
operate.

WARNING

The engine should be running at all times that the system is


powered on. If the system is run without the engine running, the
vehicle BATTERIES WILL BE DRAINED.

System Bypass:

1. To bypass the system warmup time, press the BYPAS button.


2. The BYPAS button will bypass the warmup time and immediately configure the system for operation.

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Appendix A

Turn OFF Procedure:

1. Zeroize the system (figure A-14).


2. Shut down the computer and disconnect the laptop.
3. Turn off the circuit breaker (figure A-13).
4. Turn off the vehicle.

Zeroize/Emergency Erase:

To zeroize the system using the front panel:

1. Press the AUDIO and BYPAS buttons simultaneously for more than two seconds.
2. When ZEROIZE is initiated, all classified data is purged and the system is rendered unusable until it is
reconfigured with the laptop computer.
3. The BIT and STBY LEDs will blink continuously once the Zeroize function is complete.

Figure A-14. LX zeroize buttons

To zeroize the system using the laptop:

1. With the laptop connected to the LX system, go to the Windows Control Software -TW System
Summary menu.
2. Select Reset Hardware.
3. Select YES to DECLASSIFY system, which will erase the configuration stored in the electronically
erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM).
4. Select NO to leave the system CLASSIFIED.
5. Exit the software program.

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Figure A-15. Zeroize from laptop

WARNING

The system and laptop remain classified and must be properly


handled.

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 A-29

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Appendix A

SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:
• Active/Reactive jammer
• 22v-36v DC Power
• Effective against high and low power
threats
• Holds up to 15 mission loads

TABULATED DATA:

Jamming range…………………………Line of sight


System weight.....................57 lbs including mount

CREW Vehicle Receiver/Jammer (CVRJ)

PROJECT NAME: CVRJ

FUNCTION: Active/Reactive Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The CVRJ is a US Army Warlock system. The system operates on 24v DC and has a RCU
to operate the system. The CVRJ is effective against high- and low- power threats.

MODES OF OPERATION:

CVRJ Assembly Initialization Mode:

1. Initialization Mode is where the system will perform its bootload processing and initialization functions.
2. The system will transition to Initialization Mode immediately after power is applied to the system. Power will be
applied to the system whenever the RCU power button is pressed, or if the RCU is not connected to the system,
whenever the power switch (SW2) on the CVRJ Assembly’s front panel is turned to its ON position.
3. If the RCU is connected to the system, the system will complete its initialization functions and transition into
Standby Mode or Fail Mode depending on whether critical failures have been detected during Initialization Mode.
4. If the RCU is not connected to the system, and no critical failures were detected during Initialization Mode, the
system will transition into Operate Mode within 45 seconds of system power-on, and will execute the default
mission. If the RCU is not connected to the system, and critical failures were detected during Initialization Mode,
the system will transition into Fail Mode within 45 seconds of system power-on.

CVRJ Assembly Operate Mode: Operate Mode is when the system is fully mission capable. To enter Operate
Mode, press OPR on the RCU.

CVRJ Assembly Standby Mode:

1. Standby mode is where the all RF transmissions are disabled but the system receives and reports threats.
2. To enter Standby mode, select STBY on the RCU.

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3. If the RCU is not connected to the system, the system cannot be put into the Standby mode.

CVRJ Assembly Power OFF Mode:

1. Power-Off Mode is when no external power is applied to any of the system components.
2. To enter Power Off Mode, select PWR on the RCU or move the power switch (SW2) on the CVRJ Assembly’s
front panel to the OFF position.

CVRJ Assembly Fail Mode:

1. Fail Mode is where the system can no longer be relied upon due to detected critical errors.
2. The system will transition into Fail Mode each time it detects a critical failure (for example, voltage standing
wave ratio [VSWR]) regardless on whether the RCU is connected to the system.

WARNING

The system radiates RF power and can present a potential shock


and burn hazard when the system is radiated and the antenna is
physically touched.

CVRJ Assembly Built-In-Test:

The CVRJ Assembly performs a BIT during system start up and continuously monitors the health of the system
during operation. When the system detects a fault, the fault string will be reported to the operator on the RCU.
If a critical fault is detected (for example, VSWR), the system will enter fail mode until the fault is cleared and
the system is rebooted.

1. When power is applied, the RCU will enter its Self-Test Mode, and begin its internal self-test, this
checks RCU random access memory (RAM) and internal functions.
2. Self-Test begins by illuminating all pixels of the RCU display text area and all annunciators for 3
seconds before extinguishing them (Self-Test Display).
3. The RCU will then clear its display screen, including all annunciators, and then display the “TESTING
RCU” message on the second line of the RCU display screen (Testing RCU Display).
4. If the RCU completes its self-test successfully, it will transition into its Testing COMM message on
the second line of the RCU display screen. If the RCU fails its self-test, it will first clear its display
screen, save its failure code, and then display the “RCU FAIL - XX” message on the second line of the
RCU display screen where XX is the failure code in hex decimal language and transitioning into Idle
Mode (RCU Fail Display).
5. The RCU will then await the Start Host Communications Test control from the CVRJ Assembly to
begin its COMM Test transmit/receive message sequence with the CVRJ.
6. If the RCU does not receive the Start Host Communications Test control from the CVRJ Assembly
within 5 seconds after completion of its self-test, it will first clear its display screen, including all
annunciators, save its failure code, and then display the “COMM FAIL” message on the second line of
the RCU display screen (COMM Fail Display), and finally will transition into its Idle Mode.
7. If the RCU completes its Host Communications Test successfully, it will transition into its default
Mission processing and will display the Loading Mission in progress screen on the RCU (Loading
Mission Display). The first line of the RCU displays the Status, the second line displays the specific
Mission Identification being loaded, the third line displays the mission of the day filename, and the
fourth line displays the mission of the day file date.

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 A-31

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Appendix A

8. Following a successful load, the RCU will display Mission Load Complete screen (Mission Load
Complete screen). If the load was unsuccessful, the RCU will display the Load Fail display and
illuminate the front panel fault indicator (Load Fail Display). On the RCU, the Load Fail display on
line three (the slot number (first digit) and FPGA number (second digit)) that did not load properly
will be displayed. The identification of the Enhanced Red Field Programmable Gate-Array (FPGA)
that did not respond, or did not respond correctly is displayed with the capital letter “R”.
9. Once the Mission load is complete, the RCU will transition into Standby mode.

Note. Selecting the mission profile can be performed in either the Operate or Standby mode.
Once the mission load is complete the CVRJ will resume processing in the Mode it was
processing (for example, Operate, Standby).

The CVRJ can store up to 15 separate mission loads. If the RCU is not present, the CVRJ will default to the
most recent mission programmed into the system.

Operating Procedures

1. On the RCU, press and hold the “PWR” until the system turns on. Once the CVRJ Assembly
completes its initialization, the CVRJ will transition into Standby mode and light the STBY
Annunciator on the RCU (figure A-16 and table A-5).
2. Select Operate Mode by pressing “OPR” on the RCU.
3. Verify the OPR Annunciator is displayed on the RCU.
4. To change the desired Mission Load, perform the following:
a. Press “SEL” on the RCU.
b. Press the Up “↑” or Down “↓” Arrow keys on the RCU to select the mission desired.
c. Press “Load” on the RCU to load the selected mission.
d. Once the load is complete, the CVRJ Assembly will resume in Standby mode.
e. Select OPR on the RCU to Operate with the newly selected mission.

Note. The default Mission Load is automatically loaded during the Initialization Mode.

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Figure A-16. Remote control unit

Table A-6. Remote control unit actions


Button Action
PWR Turns the system ON or OFF. (R/T PWR switch must be in the ON
position to be controlled by the RCU.)
STBY RCV Set system to Standby/Receive Only Mode.
SEL Select a new mission, or select System Fault Details.
LT Toggle Dusk Mode On and Dusk Mode Off.
CLR Clear RCU display and refresh system status Information on RCU display.
OPR Set system to Operate Mode.
LOAD Load Selected Mission.
NVG Cycle through Night Vision Goggles (NVG) lighting settings.
F1 Display system configuration details including Missions of the Day, File name
and date.
F2 Display current system faults.
F3 Reserved for future use.
F4 Operation of keys on RCU keypad (in Standby Mode only).
MENU Select system menu. Currently not used.
↑ Up Arrow Scroll up through lists.
↓ Down Arrow Scroll down through lists.
EXIT Exit back to the previous menu.
ZERO Zero Key to Zeroize the CVRJ Assembly.
CAUTION: The Zeroize Key will be functional even when no power is applied
to the system.

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Appendix A

Operating Display
During normal operations, the system status will be displayed on the RCU display with information describing
any threats detected and threats jammed.

z Each Channel on the agile threat killer circuit card asset that is currently jamming will be shown
on lines 1 and 2 of the RCU, along with the code to describe the threats being jammed.
z If the STBY Annunciator was illuminated instead of the OPR Annunciator, the reported threats
would be interpreted as detected threats rather than jammed threats, and the JAM Annunciator
would be off.
z Each Channel is represented by a Capital letter A through H and the threat code for each channel
is a hexadecimal number format that represents the threats that have been detected and are being
jammed.
z The display position of each channel is fixed on the RCU display. Channels that have no threats
detected or jammed will not be displayed, and the positions of the channels that do have threats
detected or jammed will be unchanged.

System Configuration Display

If the “F1” key is pressed, the RCU will display the first page of the System.

Configuration Details:

z If the operator presses the “↑”up or “↓” down arrow keys while the system is in the
“Configuration” state, the RCU will display more System Configuration Detail pages, if they are
available.
z When the operator presses the “Exit” key while in the “Configuration” state, the display on the
RCU will return to normal.

Abnormal Operating Procedures

Loss of an Operational RCU

In the event that an operational RCU becomes non-operational (for example, umbilical cord disconnected), the
system will continue processing under its current mode (that is, Operate or Standby). If the system is powered
down and powered back up, the CVRJ will default Mission (Mission 0) in Operate Mode.

Zeroize

In the event that the CVRJ system may be compromised, proceed with the following: On the RCU keypad,
press Zero key or on the CVRJ lift the Zeroize switch on the front panel.

Note. Both the Zero button on the RCU and the Zeroize switch on the CVRJ Assembly front
panel will be functional even when no power is applied to the system.

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SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:
• Active Jammer
• 24v DC Power
• Effective low-power threats
• 20 Direct Digital Synthesizer Mobile Multi Band Jammer (MMBJ-1B)
(DDS) cards
PROJECT NAME: MMBJ-1B
TABULATED DATA:
FUNCTION: Active Jammer
Jamming range …..............Line of sight
DESCRIPTION: The Mobile Multi Band Jammer-1B is a US
Army system. The system operates on 24v DC and has an RCU to
operate the system. The system is effective against low-power
threats.

DEVICE OPERATION:

POWER UP:

1. Pull the DC Power Supply PWR ON switch toward you, lift it up to the ON position and release it.
You should hear the cooling fans running. Use your hand to feel the air flow and ensure both fans are
running.
2. Pull the Transmitter POWER ON/OFF switch toward you, lift it up to the ON position and release it.
3. Approximately 6 seconds after power up, the “INITIALIZING” message should appear on the RDU.
4. About 4 seconds after the INITIALIZING page, the CONFIG page will appear for approximately 3
seconds.
5. When the main screen initialization is complete, the RDU display will appear with the following:
z PROGRAM 1 – represents the current preset program.
z RF OFF – shows that the unit is not transmitting.
z SYNC OK – shows that the GPS system is working and synchronized.
z BIT OK – shows that MMBJ-1B has passed BIT checks and that no errors were found.
z RF ON – labels the “soft-key” immediately below RF ON as the button to press to begin
transmitting. Labeling of the soft-keys will typically be located on the third and fourth lines of
the display during operation.
z SEL PGM – labels the select program soft-key button. Press this button to enter the select
preprogrammed menu screen.
z PAGE – press the fourth soft-key to cycle through additional control screens. The operation is
“one-way.” The operator must go through all screens to get back to the first one.

Access Other Pages:

Press PAGE repeatedly to see other subsidiary pages:


z AMP Status Page.
z BIT Status Page.
z GPS Status Page.
z Screen Brightness Page.
z Configuration Status Page.

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Appendix A

Amplifier Status
z Temperature and overall status for each amplifier is shown.
z An over-temperature is indicated by “BAD” verses an acceptable range having an indication of
“OK.” This will cause a "*CHK BIT*" indication on the main page.
z Maximum amplifier temperature is 90°C (194°F) (A, B, and E) and 85°C (185°F) (F).
z Amplifiers will be automatically disabled upon exceeding temperature limit; amplifiers are
automatically re-enabled when temperature falls 5°C (9°F) below limit.
z Maximum ambient air operating temperature is 65°C (149°F) with no direct sun loading.

Checking Built-in-Test (BIT) Status:


z If BIT is OK, “BIT OK” will be displayed.
z If a BIT failure is detected, “*CHK BIT*” will flash on the display.
If the display is turned off, it will automatically turn on to warn of the failure condition.
The specific BIT failure can be viewed on the AMP STATUS and/or BIT STATUS pages.

Checking SYNC Status: SYNC is GPS based––


z All the rules and behaviors of the average commercial GPS receiver apply to MMBJ.
z It can take a few minutes after startup to obtain SYNC. If the GPS references are old or the GPS
battery is dead, it may take up to 20 minutes to obtain a fix and good SYNC.

Checking Jamming Status:


z If jamming is active, “*RF ON*” is displayed in the upper right corner.
z If jamming is not active, “RF OFF” is displayed in the upper right corner.
z Jamming status is also shown via the back-up RF status LED on the Transmitter front panel.

Select Jamming Program:

1. Press SEL PGM to select a preset combination of RF outputs: Goes to Program Change screen.
2. Press UP or DN to select a preset combination of RF outputs:
a. Each press changes the number after “PROGRAM” to a new number 1 through 30.
b. Programs 1 through 6 contain factory default programs and cannot be modified in the field.
c. Test programs A, B, E, and F are also provided for bench or open-air tests by FSRs.
3. Press DONE when complete.
4. Automatically shows this screen when the DONE key is pressed.
a. Or after the CONTINUE key is pressed from the empty program warning screen.
b. Prevents accidentally changing the selected program.
5. Upon pressing YES or NO, the screen returns to the main page.

Enable Jamming:

1. Press the RF ON key, or


2. Press the back-up RF ON/OFF button on the Transmitter TWICE within 2 seconds (double-tap).
a. Automatically shows this screen when the RF ON key is pressed and a valid (nonempty)
jamming program is selected.
b. Prevents accidentally entering the ON state.
c. Upon pressing YES or NO, the screen returns to the main page.

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Army Warlock CREW Systems

3. This screen is not displayed if the back-up RF Switch is used, since double-tapping the RF ON/OFF
switch serves as confirmation.

Disable Jamming:

1. The Confirmation screen appears when the RF OFF key is pressed, preventing accidentally entering
the OFF state.
3. Upon pressing YES or NO, the screen returns to the main page.
4. This screen is not displayed if the backup RF Switch is used, since double-tapping the RF ON/OFF
switch serves as confirmation.

RDU Display—Night Vision Mode:

1. Although the display has a built-in night vision (NV) filter, the display may still be overly bright.
2. The display and controls may be placed in a special NV mode by use of the DISP control.
3. The unit will switch between normal and NV mode displays each time the DISP control is pressed.

Zeroize: The ZERO switch on the RCU and the ZEROIZE switch on the Transmitter operate the same way:

1. Lift guard, press and hold for 4 seconds.


2. The unit will show ZEROIZING on the display and start flashing the ZEROIZE Status LED on the
Transmitter front panel.
3. Once the unit has zeroized, the display will change to UNIT ZEROIZED, and the LED will light
steady.
4. Once the unit is zeroized, the unit is inoperable and the software/firmware must be re-Ioaded by an
FSR.

POWER DOWN:

1. Lift and move the Transmitter POWER ON/OFF switch to the down position.
2. Lift and move the DC Power Supply PWR ON switch to the down position.

Note. When powering down, it is preferred if the jamming is disabled (RF is off) but this is not
required.

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Appendix A

SYSTEM SUMMARY

FEATURES:

• Handheld, battery-operated design


• Built in AM, FM and Single Side Band
demodulation

TABULATED DATA:

System weight.....................................4.9 lbs


Frequency Range.….…100 kHz to 3.0 GHz
Temperature range………....-10°C to +50° C
Operations………….1.5 hours of continuous
operations
Power.....……………….Rechargeable/field-
replaceable battery

Spectrum Analyzer

PROJECT NAME: NA

MODEL NUMBER: MS2711D

FUNCTION: Analyze RF spectrum interference issues.

DESCRIPTION: A spectrum analyzer is a solution for installing, provisioning, maintaining and


troubleshooting wireless systems and RF spectrum interference issues. This portable spectrum analyzer features
a built-in standard preamplifier in a compact, handheld design that is suitable for field environments and
applications that require mobility, such as site surveys and on-site system testing. The MS2711D spectrum
analyzer also features several dedicated smart measurements that can easily test cellular, Digital
Communications Services/Personal Communications Services (DCS/PCS) and Wireless Local Area Network
(WLAN) systems and other wireless systems. Measurements include received signal strength indicator (RSSI),
channel power, adjacent channel power ratio (APCR), and occupied bandwidth measurements that can confirm
the distortion level or channel power level of an Advance Mobile Phone System (AMPS), Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) or Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) transmitter. Additionally, the MS2711D can locate and identify out-of-band spurious
signals when analyzing a wireless base station transmitter, while the field strength mode allows users to
measure propagation and coverage, or to pinpoint EM leakage in broadcast systems. Other features include
trace averaging for more accurate noise measurements; a multilingual user interface with on-screen menus and
messaging in 6 different languages; and a 50-ohm interface that is adaptable to 75-ohms, enabling users to
conduct measurements of 75-ohm systems without sacrificing measurement accuracy.

POWER SOURCE: A rechargeable/field-replaceable battery, AC/DC power supply, and 12.5V automobile
cigarette lighter adapter. NOTE: The battery will not charge if the battery temperature is above 45° C or below
0° C. The NiMH battery will last longer and perform better if allowed to completely discharge before
recharging. For maximum battery life, it is recommended that the NiMH battery be completely discharged and
recharged once every 3 months. It is normal for NiMH batteries to self-discharge during storage, and to degrade
to 80 percent of original capacity after 12 months of continuous use.

REFERENCES: Anritsu Spectrum Master® MS2711D Users Guide

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Army Warlock CREW Systems

SYSTEM COMPONENTS: The MS2711D includes data analysis software, soft carrying case,
rechargeable/field-replaceable battery, AC/DC power supply, and 12.5V automobile cigarette lighter adapter
and users guide.

DEVICE OPERATION:

Note. Refer to the Users Guide for the particular spectrum analyzer you are using.

Figure A-17. MS2711D turn-on function

1. Press the On/Off front panel button.


2. The Spectrum Master takes about five seconds to perform a series of self-diagnostic routines. At
completion, the screen displays the Anritsu logo, the model number, and the version of firmware.
3. It also prompts you to press ENTER to continue.
4. The Anritsu Spectrum Master is now ready for operation. No additional keystrokes or installation are
required.

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Appendix B
Non-Warlock CREW Systems

DISMOUNTED – CREW (D-CREW) GUARDIAN


QUICK REACTION DISMOUNT (QRD)

FUNCTION: Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The QRD system is designed for deployment in a tactical man-pack configuration. The
system weight is 3 to 24 lbs. It is comprised of 3 manportable units. Each unit can be used alone; however,
when used as a suite of systems, protection is increased. Each system uses its own antenna.
z Guardian B1 (Low-Band).
z Guardian B (Mid-Band).
z Guardian C (High-Band).

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Appendix B

CHAMELEON ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURE (ECM) SYSTEM

FUNCTION: Active Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Chameleon is a US Marine Corps 4-channel active jammer system which jams high-
and low-power threats. The system uses a ruggedized personal digital assistant (PDA) for programming and
operator interface.

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Non-Warlock CREW Systems

HUNTER

FUNCTION: Active Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Hunter is the US Marine Corps system active jammer which jams high- and low-power
threats. The Hunter has not undergone interoperability testing with other CREW systems.

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Appendix B

ACORN

FUNCTION: Active Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Acorn is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is used against high- and low-
power threats.

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Non-Warlock CREW Systems

WILLOW

FUNCTION: Active Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Willow is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is used by Navy and Army
EOD personnel. The system is used against low-power threats.

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Appendix B

SPRUCE

FUNCTION: Reactive Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Spruce is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is effective against high- and
low-power threats.

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Non-Warlock CREW Systems

PECAN

FUNCTION: Active Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Pecan is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is effective against high- and
low-power threats.

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Appendix B

BEECH

FUNCTION: Active Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Beech is a US Navy Counter-RCIED system. The system is effective against high- and
low-power threats.

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Non-Warlock CREW Systems

SYMPHONY

FUNCTION: Active Jammer

DESCRIPTION: The Symphony is not based on any existing CREW technology and therefore its loss and
potential reverse engineering will not jeopardize our own technologies. The primary user for this system are
Coalition Forces. The system is effective against low- and some high-power threats.

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Appendix C
CREW Antennas
The following are antennas that may be associated with CREW systems. Please refer to your unit SOP for how
to employ the antennas in conjunction with the proper CREW system.

DUAL-BAND ANTENNA

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Appendix C

maxRAD ANTENNA

SHAKESPEARE ANTENNA

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CREW Antennas

SMITH ANTENNA

SNORKEL ANTENNA

WHIP ANTENNA

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Appendix D
CREW Interoperability
An interoperability chart is designed to show which systems operate with other systems in the area. Table D-1
is designed as a training tool to assist the reader in understanding where there may possibly be conflicts
between CREW systems. The ranges indicated in the example are fictitious numbers inserted for illustration
purposes only.
Table D-1. CREW interoperability chart example
Jammer 1 Jammer 2 Jammer 3 Jammer 4
Jammer 1 25 50
Jammer 2 200
Jammer 3 25
Jammer 4 50 200

z The numbers provided represent the range at which interference will occur degrading one or
both of the system’s ability to suppress targets.
z The gray boxes with a distance inside list the required separation to avoid interference.
z The boxes depicting horizontal stripes represent no interference.
z The boxes with diagonal stripes (classified) have interference ranges. Consult your S-6/S-2,
EWO, Warlock FSR, or go to the CREW SIPRNET site at http://arat.army.smil.mil/SEPS-
WARLOCK/warlock

Note. ALWAYS check with your S-6/S-2 when multiple CREW systems are employed to avoid
potential conflict

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Appendix E
Additional Sources of Information
The following websites can provide more information and assistance in convoy planning and current threat.

Center for Army Lessons Learned


http://call.army.mil

Counter Explosive Hazards Center


http://www.wood.army.mil/CEHC/

JCREW Web portal


https://ieddefeat.jfcom.smil.mil
https://ieddefeat.jfcom.mil

PM CREW and Warlock Training


https://arat.army.smil.mil/SEP_WARLOCK

Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange


https://hqerm01.ad.jfcom.smil.mil/knife/

WARLOCK and CHANNEL Systems Training Site


http://tsc.jeodnet.smil.mil/CREW/

CFLCC Mine Information Center


http://www.swa.arcent.army.smil.mil/sections/c7/mine_infocenter.html

CJTF-7
http://www.cjtf 7.army.mil

Dept of Army – Intelligence Information Services


http://dadpm.inscom.army.smil.mil/index.asp

National Ground Intelligence Center – Energetic Materials


http://www.ngic.army.smil.mil/

Electronics Attack Weapons School


http://eaws.nmci.navy.smil.mil/eaws_web/index.html

Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell


http://cexc.s-iraq.centcom.smil.mil/

Headquarters, Department of Army Improvised Explosive Device Task Force


http://iedtaskforce.army.smil.mil/

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned


http://www.mccll.usmc.mil

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Appendix E

http://www.mccll.usmn.smil.mil
Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Support Center https://www.jeodnet.mil
http://tsc.jeodnet.smil.mil

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization


http://releasable.portal.inscom.army.smil.mil/jieddo/default.aspx

Joint Information Operations Center


http://www.jioc.smil.mil/index.cfm?CFID=1022901&CFTOKEN=41801464

Navy Lessons Learned


http://www.naidc.navy.smil.mil/NLLS/NLLWeb/default/

Army Training and Support Command


http://www.train.army.mil

While deployed, you can contact the JIEDDO Field Team in theater for up-to-date developments.

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Appendix F
Training Strategy
F-1. Training is the means by which Soldiers, leaders, and units achieve the tactical and technical
competence required to conduct successful operations across the spectrum of conflicts. This entails
specific, dedicated training on not only offensive and defensive tasks but also on a wide range of stability
and civil support tasks. The Army trains Soldiers and units daily to accomplish tasks to standard while
developing leaders able to function under all conditions. The Nation’s responsibilities are global; therefore,
Army forces prepare to operate in all operational environments. It is essential that Army training develop
competent, adaptable, and flexible leaders and units. Training that produces balanced capabilities is
essential to remaining relevant and ready.
F-2. Effective training is the cornerstone of operational success. It is a full-time job for commanders in
peacetime that continues when units deploy. Army forces must train to and maintain the highest readiness
levels. Battle-focused training prepares Soldiers, units, and leaders to deploy, fight, win, and create a stable
and peaceful environment. Army forces execute full spectrum operations as part of a joint force. Joint
training is a critical part of mission planning and preparation for Army leaders and units.
F-3. CREW will be trained across the military spectrum. CREW training efforts will be coordinated with
the Joint Community through Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-3 and Headquarters Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Combined Arms Center to ensure synchronicity across the Services.
All Centers, Schools, and actual operational Army units with CREW systems must coordinate with the
Federal Communications Commission to obtain spectrum allocation to allow the use of actual CREW
systems to enable local training.

OPERATOR
F-4. Primary operators of the CREW system will be general-purpose users.

TRAINING
F-5. Initial operator training will consist of USAIC-provided mobile training teams (MTTs) which will
train CREW individual and collective tasks pertaining to the operational domain. Soldiers also receive
CREW training at combat training centers (National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, and
Joint Mobilization Readiness Center) as well as home station. There will also be New Equipment Training
(NET) provided at the time of equipment installation.

MAINTENANCE
F-6. Level-one maintenance will be performed by the individual Soldier. All other maintenance will be
provided by materiel developer maintainers until a military MOS is agreed upon and trained at the
appropriate institution.

SYSTEM TRAINING CONCEPT


F-7. The training concept is the same for Active Component and Reserve Components. CREW
capabilities will be implemented across the entire Army, throughout all warfighting functions, and
therefore requires a holistic training strategy that spans across the institutional, operational, and self-
development training domains. The proponent has identified all training support package (TSP)

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Appendix F

requirements necessary to execute the system training strategy, NET, institutional training, and unit
sustainment training. These training products constitute the system TSP and will be validated by the
system’s training proponent and tested during the developmental/limited user testing of the system.
F-8. The materiel developer will execute all system-related training development activities in support of
the proponent utilizing the TRADOC Systems Approach to Training process per AR 350-1 with all
training and doctrinal analysis data documented using Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT),
and/or any doctrinal analysis database that will replace the ASAT system in the future.
F-9. Familiarization training will be conducted at initial military training with the intent of integrating
CREW capabilities as part of Army culture. Initial operator training will consist of USAIC&FH-provided
MTTs which will train CREW individual and collective tasks pertaining to the operational domain. The
MTT will also conduct Instructor and Key Personnel Training for instructors at all centers and schools.
F-10. There will also be NET for operator and leader training provided at the time of equipment
installation. A Secret clearance is required for leader training at the time of NET and MTT. Doctrine and
tactics training will be presented by proponent personnel during NET and available online via NonSecure
Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)/SIPRNET.
F-11. The NET team will leave TSPs with the gaining unit. Unit commanders will be responsible for
providing operator sustainment training within their unit. Unit sustainment training reinforces and provides
any necessary additional training to support the unit’s Mission Essential Task List.
z Unit training can consist of field training exercises and Warfighter simulation exercises.
z Sustainment training will be supported by the creation of operator common task training,
modification of existing convoy-related common tasks, a CREW training device, and RCIED
simulator. Operator training will be integrated and trained at some level at all institutions and
sustained at combat training centers and home station.
z Leader training will be integrated into the existing Noncommissioned Officer Education System
(NCOES) and Officer Education System.
F-12. CREW leader training can be given to personnel with a Secret clearance by the training institution. If
leader personnel do not have a Secret clearance, then an unclassified version of CREW training can be
given in such cases.
F-13. CREW will be integrated into the existing virtual training environment and made available to the
operational training domain. CREW use and reinforcement training may occur in live, virtual, constructive
(LVC) environments: live at locations such as combat training centers; virtually in simulators such as the
Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer; and constructively in the Battle Command Training Program.

NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING CONCEPT


F-14. Upon development of a fielding strategy by Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Materiel
Developer will provide the NET materials and training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS)
in approved TRADOC and DOD formats. The concept of NET training is to provide on-site training
utilizing the train-the-trainer (T3) methodology. This will require NET training to units identified to deploy
during the Army Force Generation Model “Ready” phase. The NET will consist of both hands-on
applications and the use of the Level 3 interactive multimedia instruction (IMI). Doctrine and tactics
training will be presented by the proponent in conjunction with NET.

TRAINING TEST SUPPORT PACKAGE


F-15. Currently, systems are issued to operational units without completion of operational testing. The
materiel developer will develop a holistic Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). Upon development of
the TEMP, the proponent is responsible for providing the TTSPs. The final TTSP consists of:

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Training Strategy

z Training schedule.
z Program of Instruction.
z List of training devices and embedded training components.
z Ammunition, targets, and ranges for training.
z Army training and evaluation program draft mission training plans or changes to the mission
training plans.
z Target audience description.
z Draft Soldiers training publications or changes.
z Lesson plans.
z System Critical Task List.
z Field manuals or changes to field manuals (when not provided with the Doctrine and
Organization Test Package).

INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING DOMAIN


F-16. Army Training and Leader Development, through its centers and schools, will continue to be the
foundation of Army doctrine, IMT, and Professional Military Education (PME). CREW capabilities will be
introduced during IMT using familiarization training integrated throughout convoy training exercises.
Integration and repetitive use of CREW systems throughout various institutional training events will
prepare Soldiers and leaders with the appropriate skills, knowledge, and attributes necessary to effectively
employ CREW capabilities, thus providing enhanced FP to the force and its equipment.
F-17. CREW capabilities will be integrated into the POIs for officer, warrant officer, enlisted leader
courses, and select additional skill identifier-producing courses. CREW capabilities will be used to
enhance Soldier and leader skill training in decision making, planning for operations, C2 of small units,
convoy operations, convoy support coordination, avoidance, and defeat of RCIEDs.

INSTITUTIONAL TRAINING CONCEPT AND STRATEGY


F-18. The CREW training strategy utilizes the IMT programs to instill CREW as part of the Army culture.
Familiarization training will be integrated into all convoy and counter-IED training exercises currently
conducted throughout IMT. Additionally, the Army will prepare its leaders to employ CREW capabilities
through the integration of CREW training at the NCOES and OES.
F-19. Current CREW doctrine and tactics training is included with the delivery of all CREW training.
Repetitive use of CREW prepares Soldiers and leaders to effectively perform requisite tasks which will
mitigate the enemy’s RCIED effectiveness. Increased Soldier proficiency will be applied through the full-
spectrum of operations to include unified action, major theater war, and stability and support operations.
Figure F-1 describes the skills, knowledge, and attributes to be incorporated throughout the institutional
training domain.

TRAINING PUBLICATIONS
F-20. The materiel developer has developed an interactive technical manual (IETM) (TM 11-5865-359-
10). Institutions can access this information on Army Knowledge Online-Secret (AKO-S). The materiel
developer is responsible for developing a software users manual and Soldiers training publication for
CREW. Institutions will require multimedia computers with CD-ROM, web browser capability, and access
to the NIPRNET and SIPRNET and AKO. JCREW QRT has developed a JCREW Handbook that
describes EW principles, IED threats, EW staff planning, and types of CREW jammer systems. All training
publications will be updated by their respective developers when major modifications to CREW occur.

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Appendix F

Figure F-1. Institutional training

TRAINING SUPPORT PACKAGES


F-21. The materiel developer is responsible for funding the development of system TSPs for validation by
the system’s proponent. CREW TSPs will be complete, exportable packages integrating training products
and materials necessary to train one or more critical individual and leader tasks. CREW TSPs will provide
a structured training program that supports Soldier, leader, and staff training. CREW TSPs will be
integrated into a training and management exercise development system. All validated TSPs will be loaded
into the ASAT database. TSPs will contain operational software, operator Level 3 IMI in CD-ROM format,
and the JCREW Handbook. The materiel developer will provide a complete library of available CREW-
related manuals, to include all commercial-off-the-shelf and Government-off-the-shelf related software and
hardware components references as well as the developers’ training materials and manuals.

TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS, AND SIMULATIONS


F-22. The CREW TADSS will function as either training equipment or a stand-alone simulator. CREW
functions and capabilities may be trained or reinforced in various virtual simulators and simulations such as
Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer, Close Combat Tactical Trainer, or DARWARS Ambush. It will be
capable of operating with other TADSS and operational Army Battle Command System components.
CREW systems and simulators can be used during sustainment training on individual, collective tasks,
support leader training in preparing for situational training exercises, field training exercises, and missions.
US Army Program Executive Office Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) has provided
a Training Improvised Explosive Device (TIED) that has been fielded to combat training centers and
deploying units. Rapid Equipping Force, in conjunction with PEO-STRI, is retrofitting “dummy CREW”

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Training Strategy

training devices to work with the TIED. Current TADSS available for use in the institutional domain are as
follows:
z XM-1.
z TIED/ TIED 2.
z Actual CREW Systems.
z DARWARS Ambush.
z Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer.
z Close Combat Tactical Trainer.

Training Aids
F-23. Graphic Training Aid 90-10-047, JCREW Handbook, has been developed for training of EW
principles, IED threats, EW staff planning, and types of CREW jammer systems.

Training Devices
F-24. Training devices in the institutional domain include the XM-1 CREW training device and actual
CREW systems. Level 3 IMI and an IETM are currently available with unlimited distribution under the For
Official Use Only classification for all levels of training. The XM-1 training device is simply a physical
representation of CREW capabilities with very limited functionality. The XM-1 has basic switches,
indicator lights, and an audible alarm initiated by an observer or controller. This device is needed at
TRADOC installations for familiarization training with the concepts and principles of CREW
characteristics and operation.

Simulators
F-25. The Training Improvised Explosive Device Increment 2 (TIED 2), which includes several different
size devices (M155 large IED simulator, pressure-sensitive landmine, and tripwire booby trap) is available
for training. It is a safe effective system that provides non-pyrotechnic signatures using carbon dioxide, and
is much improved over the initial TIED. All simulated systems that can be affected by CREW should be
updated to reflect the effects of CREW operation on their platforms. If a CREW level two/three
maintenance MOS is established, maintenance training devices will be required for institutional and
sustainment training.

Simulations
F-26. The DARWARS Ambush Simulation can emulate CREW capabilities and functions for
reinforcement of individual or vehicle crew tasks. The 2d and 3d visual representation of the CREW
devices and any impact of CREW devices on military operations must be reflected in all current
interoperable simulations (for example, Aviation Semi-Automated Forces, Brigade/Battalion Battle
Simulation [BBS], JANUS, and Joint Conflicts and Tactical Simulation [JCATS]) and current and future
semi-automated forces (Aviation Semi-Automated Forces, Objective One Semi-Automated Forces, other).
CREW source data covering the full operational capability and the logistic requirements must be provided
to the National Simulation Center for inclusion in all higher level constructive simulations.

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Appendix F

OPERATIONAL VIEW
F-27. Table F-1 describes the battlefield tasks and activities the CREW system supports.
Table F-1. CREW tasks

Counter RCIED

A.1 - Prepare for CREW


A1.1 A1.2 A1.3
Train Equip for Crew Develop Doctrine for CREW
A1.2.2
A1.1.1 A1.1.2 A1.2.1
Ensure A1.3.1 A1.3.2
Standardize
Institutional CREW In Theatre CREW Vehicles Standardize Develop
Mounting
Training Training Have TTP SOI
Procedure
Mounts
A. 2 - Plan for CREW
A2.1 A2.3
Interagency Coordination Conduct Mission Planning

A2.1.1 A2.1.2 A2.2 A2.3.3 A2.3.4 A2.3.5


In Security A2.3.1 A2.3.2
Institutional Plan Plan Plan
Theatre Standardize Plan Route
CREW Check Other CREW
CREW TTP Clearance
Training Points Missions Utilization
Training

A.3 - Execute CREW


A3.2
A3.1
Test and Diagnose
Program CREW
CREW
A3.3
A3.2.1 Activate CREW
A3.2.2
Diagnose
Test
CREW
CREW
Faults
A.4 - Adapt CREW Activities
A4.1 A4.2
Train Equip for Crew

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Training Strategy

SYSTEMS VIEW
F-28. Figure F-2 describes the interconnection of CREW systems in the systems view.

Figure F-2. Interconnection of CREW in the system view

MANAGEMENT PROCESSES
F-29. CREW will use existing facilities and support infrastructure. The staff training estimate in support of
CREW will focus on the most efficient use of existing resources and precisely identify and quantify any
expected shortfalls. Training development will focus on producing products that are capable of being used
both in the institution and in the operational training domain and focused only on combat critical tasks.

POLICY AND GUIDANCE


F-30. The documents listed below apply to the design and use of the CREW and training:
z AR 350-1 and AR 350-38.
z TRADOC Regulation 350-70.
z Training Doctrine Manuals (FM 7-0 and FM 7-1).
z IETM (TM 11-5865-359-10).

REQUIREMENTS GENERATION
F-31. The CREW system training plan supports the capabilities production document (CPD) which was
approved at the Army Requirements Oversight Council on 12 March 2007.

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Appendix F

JOINT TRAINING SUPPORT


F-32. The fielding of the CREW will be synchronized with the following, as applicable:
z JIEDDO.
z Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability.
z Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability.
z Joint National Training Capability.
z Joint Advanced Distributed Learning Co-Labs.
z Joint Professional Military Education.

EVALUATION
F-33. The following feedback mechanisms will be used to measure, audit, and analyze the efficiency and
effectiveness of the CREW training.

Quality Assurance
F-34. Quality assurance plans will be used in accordance with each installation’s quality assurance plan.
The Standard Army After-Action Review System will be used to provide feedback on the course content
and the instructors. The quality assurance office at each center and school will receive feedback from the
users to ensure that the training meets the user’s need. Feedback will assist each center and school in
correcting training deficiencies and will provide information that may affect the next generation of
equipment or product improvement. This information will be used to revise the training courses and
materials.

Assessments
F-35. Assessments will be used, to include––
z Standard Army After-Action Review System.
z Training evaluation and analyses.
z Monthly status reports.

Lessons Learned After-Action Review and Training After-Action Reviews


F-36. After-action reviews will be used to further develop the course training materials and improve
instructor performance. Center for Army Lessons Learned and the Military Intelligence Lesson Learned
will be used to keep the TSPs up to date.

OPERATIONAL TRAINING DOMAIN


OPERATIONAL TRAINING CONCEPT AND STRATEGY
F-37. Continuous training throughout the operational training domain and the PME system will embed
critical training tasks that will be experienced in operations through the full-spectrum of conflict, to include
unified action in the operational environment. The combat training centers are the optimal location where
operational training can be planned and executed in a tactical environment. The operational training
strategy includes, whenever possible, using the actual CREW system for hands-on training as part of a
broader LVC training strategy. Representation and replication of RCIEDs and CREW device capabilities
LVC TADSS supports individual, staff, and collective training for the operational training domain. LVC
mission rehearsals and pre-deployment training for units at locations with these live devices, or simulators
and simulations should be part of the Combined Arms Training Strategy for CREW and IED-Defeat tasks.

F-8 TC 2-22.601 9 April 2008

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Training Strategy

F-38. TSPs will be delivered as part of the MTT as well as at NET and be available on exportable media or
online. TSPs will include doctrine and tactics training and exportable Level 3 IMI. CREW is integrated
into all convoy-related common tasks as shown in table F-3. See figure F-3 for CREW operational skills,
knowledge and attributes.
Table F-2. CREW common tasks
Skill Level Task Number Title
Officer 171-620-0024 Conduct Convoy Escort Operations At Company/Team/Troop
Level
1 551-88M-0005 Operate a Vehicle in a Convoy
3 071-326-3013 Conduct a Tactical Road March
3 191-379-4407 Plan Convoy Security Operations
4 551-721-4326 Perform Duties as Convoy Commander
4 551-88M-0001 Lead a Convoy Serial/March Unit

Figure F-3. CREW operational skills, knowledge and attributes

TRAINING DEVICES
F-39. Training devices in the operational domain include the CREW 2 training system. Level 3 IMI and an
IETM are currently available with limited distribution (For Official Use Only) for all levels of training.
Level 3 IMI has been created in the form of a CBT. The IMI supports operator and leader training. An
IETM has been created by the materiel developer to serve as training tool for all levels of training by
operators and maintainers.
F-40. The actual live CREW systems will be used during MTT and Instructor and Key Personnel Training
events. The CREW 2 training system is a fully functional CREW device. It has actual physical components
utilized with RF propagation recreated in a virtual (software) environment. The CREW 2 training system
creates operationally realistic cause and effects of employing CREW capabilities. The CREW 2 training
system training devices are for use at home station and include the following:
z Physical representation of the current CREW-2 (DUKE) system.
z Primary Unit.

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 F-9

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Appendix F

z Remote Control Unit.


z PDA.
z Laptop.
z CREW Test Box.
z Antenna (government-furnished equipment from the materiel developer).
z A-Kits (government-furnished equipment from the materiel developer)
z Mounting hardware and ancillary components consistent with actual CREW-2 (DUKE) systems.

SIMULATORS
F-41. PEO-STRI has developed the TIED 2, which includes several different size devices (large, pressure-
sensitive mine, and booby trap). It is a safe, effective system that provides non-pyrotechnic signatures
using CO2, and is much improved over the initial TIED. The CREW 2 training system has the ability to
interface with an IED effects simulator:
z Current – TIED 2 (with Interrupt Device).
z Future – IED effects simulator.

SELF-DEVELOPMENT TRAINING DOMAIN


F-42. The materiel developer will develop a website with a structured training approach to learn about the
CREW system, to view CREW items, and to learn about the benefits of and methods for proper operation
and employment of the CREW systems.

SELF-DEVELOPMENT TRAINING CONCEPT AND STRATEGY


F-43. The materiel developer has developed CBT lessons for Soldier self-development. Individuals can
access this information on SIPRNET, NIPRNET, AKO-S, and AKO sources. Soldiers will need
multimedia computers with CD-ROM, web browser capability, and/or access to the Internet to take
advantage of these training products. These training packages will be in the form of electronic portable
media and will include any procedural or doctrinal changes and any upgrades or other changes to the
training.

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Training Strategy

F-44. Figure F-4 shows the skills, knowledge, and attributes that have been identified for the self-
development domain.

DEVELOPMENT
SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND ATTRIBUTES

SELF-
CREW Familiarization X
CREW Principles and Fundamentals X
CREW System Operation X
CREW Capabilities and Limitations X
System Programming X
Pre-Combat Checks/Pre-Combat Inspections X
CREW Maintenance Procedures X
Integration of CREW into the Battle Command/MDMP X
CREW Considerations in Convoy Planning X
CREW Employment Considerations X
Staying Current with an Adaptive Migrating Threat X

Figure F-4. CREW self-development skills, knowledge and attributes

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 F-11

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Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC alternating current
AKO-S Army Knowledge Online-Secret
AM amplitude modulation
amp amplitude
ANCOC advanced noncommissioned officer course
AO area of operations
AoA Analysis of Alternatives
APCR adjacent channel power ratio
AR Army regulation
ARAT Army reprogramming analysis team
ARNG Army National Guard
ARNGUS Army National Guard of the United States
ASAT Automated Systems Approach to Training
BIT built-in test
BNC binary network connector
BNCOC basic noncommissioned officer course
BOLC basic officer leader course
BSNCOC battle staff noncommissioned officer course
C2 command and control
CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive
CBT computer-based training
CCC captains career course
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CD-R/RW compact disc-record/rewritable
CIED counter-improvised explosive device
CM countermeasures
CONUS continental United States
CPT convoy planning tool
CREW Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic
Warfare
CTP common timing protocol
D-CREW dismounted-Counter-Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
Electronic Warfare
DCU direct current unit

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Glossary

DE directed energy
DOD Department of Defense
DTG date-time group
DVD digital video disk
EA electronic attack
ECM electronic countermeasures
EH explosive hazard
EHF extremely high frequency
EM electromagnetic
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EP electronic protection
ES electronic warfare support
EW electronic warfare
EWO electronic warfare officer
FM frequency modulation
FMC fully mission capable
FOB forward operating base
FOS Family of Systems
FOUO for official use only
FP force protection
FRS family radio service
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSR field support representative
FTX field training exercise
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-6 assistant chief of staff, command, control, communications, and
computer operations
GHz gigahertz
GPS global positioning system
GTA graphic training aid
HF high frequency
Hz hertz
IAW in accordance with
ICE improvised explosive device countermeasures equipment
ICP incident control point
ID identification
IED improvised explosive device

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Glossary

IETM interactive electronic training manual


ILE intermediate-level education
IMI interactive multimedia instruction
IMT initial military training
IO information operations
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW irregular warfare
JCREW joint counter-radio controlled improvised explosive device electronic
warfare
JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
JRFL joint restricted frequency list
kHz kilohertz
LED light-emitting diode
LF low frequency
LVC live, virtual, constructive
MCM mobile countermeasure
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time
available, civil considerations
MF medium frequency
MHz megahertz
mICE modified improvised explosive device countermeasure equipment
MILSTD military standard
MMBJ multimode broadband jammer
MMI man-machine interface
MOS military occupational specialty
MTFB mean time between failures
MTT mobile training team
NA not applicable
NCO noncommissioned officer
NCOES noncommissioned officer education system
NCOIC noncommissioned officer in charge
NET new equipment training
NiMH nickel metal hydride
NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPLAN operation plan
OPSEC operations security

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Glossary

PDA personal digital assistant


PEO-STRI Program Executive Office-Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation
PIU programming interface unit
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
PME professional military education
PWR power
Q quadrant
QA quality assurance
QRD quick reaction dismount
RAM random access memory
RCIED radio-controlled improvised explosive device
RCU remote control unit
RF radio frequency
ROE rules of engagement
ROM read-only memory
RSSI received signal strength indication
S-2 intelligence staff officer
S-3 operations staff officer
S-6 command, control, communications, and computer operations staff
officer
SAT Systems Approach to Training
SEL select
SHF superhigh frequency
SINCGARS single-channel ground and airborne radio system
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SMC sergeants major course
SOP standing operating procedure
SSB single side band
SSVJ self-screening vehicle jammer
SV systems view
T3 train-the-trainer
TADSS training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations
TC training circular
TEMP test and evaluation master plan
TF task force
TIED training improvised explosive device
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TSP training support package

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Glossary

TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures


TTSP training test support package
UDM user data module
UHF ultrahigh frequency
UIC unit identification code
US United States
USAIC&FH United States Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
USAR United States Army Reserve
VAC volts, alternating current
VDC volts, direct current
VHF very high frequency
VLF very low frequency
WLC warrior leader course
WOAC warrant officer advanced course
WOBC warrant officer basic course
WOCC warrant officer career course
WOES warrant officer education system
WOSC warrant officer senior course

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References

SOURCES USED
These are the sources quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
FMI 6-02.70. Army Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations. 5 September 2006
JP 3-09. Joint Fire Support. 13 November 2006. Available online at
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_09.pdf
JP 3-13.1 Electronic Warfare. 25 January 2007. Available online at
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13_1.pdf
TC 2-91-701. Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations.
30 March 2007

DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
FM 1-02/MCRP 5-12A. Operational Terms and Graphics. 21 September 2004
JP 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.
Available online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/

READINGS RECOMMENDED
These sources contain relevant supplemental information.
AR 75-15. Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal. 22 February 2005
AR 350-1. Army Training and Leader Development. 3 August 2007
AR 350-38. Training Device Policies and Management. 15 October 1993
FM 2-0. Intelligence. 17 May 2004
FM 2-22.3. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 September 2006
FM 2-91.6. Fundamentals of Tactical Information Collection. 10 October 2007
FM 3-0. Operations. 27 February 2008
FM 3-05.30. Psychological Operations. 15 April 2005
FM 3-05.40. Civil Affairs Operations. 29 September 2006
FM 3-06. Urban Operations. 26 October 2006
FM 3-19.1. Military Police Operations. 22 March 2001
FM 3-19.50. Police Intelligence Operations. 21 July 2006
FM 34-2. Collection Management and Synchronization Planning. 8 March 1994
FM 3-90.119. Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. 21 September 2007
FM 4-30.51. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures. 13 July 2006
FM 5-0. Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 January 2005
FM 6-0. Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces. 11 August 2003
FM 6-20-10. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. 8 May 1996
FM 6-99.2. US Army Report and Message Formats. 30 April 2007
FM 7-0. Training the Force. 22 October 2002
FM 7-1. Battle Focused Training. 15 September 2003

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 References-1

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References

FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. 31 August 2003


FM 34-3. Intelligence Analysis. 15 March 1990
FM 34-8-2. Intelligence Officer’s Handbook. 1 May 1998
FM 34-54. Technical Intelligence. 30 January 1998
FM 34-60. Counterintelligence. 3 October 1995
FM 34-81-1, Battlefield Weather Effects, 23 December 1992
FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994
FMI 2-22.9. Open Source Intelligence. 5 December 2006
FMI 3-04.155. Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations. 4 April 2006
ST 2-50, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Systems. 1 June 2002
ST 2-50.4 (FM 34-1). Combat Commanders Handbook on Intelligence. 6 September 2001
TC 34-55. Imagery Intelligence. 3 October 1988
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms
DODD 5101.14. DOD Executive Agent and Single Manager for Military Ground-Based Counter
Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) Technology.
11 June 2007
TRADOC Regulation 350-70. Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products.
9 March 1999
GTA 90-10-047. Joint Counter Radio Controlled IED Electronic Warfare Handbook. 1 April 2008

References-2 TC 2-22.601 9 April 2008

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Index

self-development skills, H
A
knowledge and Hunter, B-3
active jammers, Table A-1
attributes, Figure F-4
Acorn, B-4
tasks, Table F-1 I
Beech, B-8
vehicle receiver/jammer, IED
Chameleon ECM, B-2
A-30 definition, vi
Hunter, B-3
threat use of,
Pecan, B-7
D 1-7 through 1-10
Spruce, B-6
dual-band antenna, C-1 impact of, 1-13
Symphony, B-9
Duke, A-3 types of triggers, 2-29
Willow, B-5
5/25 method, 5-6
additional sources, E-1
E 5 C's, 5-8
antennas,
Electromagnetic Spectrum, irregular warfare, 1-5
Dual-band, C-1
2-7 through 2-12
maxRAD, C-2
Electronic Attack, 2-1 J
Shakespeare, C-2
components, 2-17
Smith, C-3
Electronic Warfare, 2-2 Jammers
Snorkel, C-3
Electronic Protection, Acorn, B-4
Whip, C-3
2-3 through 2-5 Beech, B-8
Electronic Support, 2-6 Chameleon System, B-2
B
Employment, Guardian QRD, B-1
Beech jammer, B-8
convoy activities, 5-9 Hunter, B-3
convoy briefing, 5-3 Pecan, B-7
C
convoy measures, 5-5 Spruce, B-6
capability comparison
convoy planning, 5-2post- Symphony, B-9
Table A-1
force protection, 5-6 Willow, B-5
Chameleon, B-2
pre-convoy checks, 5-4 jamming. See also Jammers.
common tasks, Table F-1
pre-convoy measures, 5-1 active, 2-19
communication
movement with CREW, 5-7 barrage, 2-24, Figure 2-7
alternatives, 4-7
single vehicle, Figure 5-1 definition, Introduction
compatibility, 4-1, Figure 4-1
two vehicle, two jammer, JIEDDO, Introduction
convoy briefing, 5-3
Figure 5-2 material solutions, 1-13
convoy force protection, 5-6
multiple vehicles, single reactive, 2-21
convoy movement, 5-7
jammer, Figure 5-3 sweep, 2-25, Figure 2-8
definition, 1-14
multiple vehicles, multiple techniques of, 2-23
employment, 3-15
jammers, Figure 5-4 Warlock LX A-24
historical, 1-16
Electronic warfare officer
increments, 1-17 through 1-25
as principal EW planner, L
interoperability chart,
3-1 line of sight, 2-29
Table D-1
responsibilities, 3-3
operational skills, knowledge
pre-mission, 3-4 M
and attributes, Figure F-3
post-mission, 3-5 equipment (mICE), A-12,
planning factors, 3-14
EM spectrum, 3-13 Figure A-4
scenario, Table 4-1
CREW employment, 3-15 masking, 2-30, Figure 2-13
self-development skills,
threat load process, 3-16 maxRAD antenna, C-2
knowledge and attributes,
modified IED countermeasure
Figure F-4
staff planning, 3-13

9 April 2008 TC 2-22.601 Index-1

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Index

mobile multi-band frequency bands, Table 2-1 Spruce, B-6


jammer, A-15 spectrum, 2-15 symphony, B-9
mobile multi-band jammer 1B, Reactive jammers, 1-14, 2-18, tasks, 3-10
A-35 2-21, 4-2, Table A-1
O CVRJ, A-30 T
operational environment Duke, A-3 threats
overview, 1-1, F-27 limitations, 2-22, 4-2 high- and low-power, 2-28,
military planners, 1-2 Red/Green Combo, A-17 Table 2-2, Table A-1,
variables, 1-2 Spruce, B-6 Figures 2-9 through 2-12
organizations, 1-6 Remote Control Unit training
crew system Actions, Table A-6 aids, F-22
compatibility, 4-1 Functions, Table A-3 institutional, F-16
training, F-1, F-20, F-37 operational, F-37
S publications, F-20
P self-screening vehicle self-development, F-43
Pecan, B-7 jammer-L, A-21 support packages, F-21
Shakespeare antenna, C-2
Q Smith antenna, C-3 W
quick reaction dismount, B-1 Snorkel antenna, C-3 Warlock LX, A-24
Spectrum analyzer, A-38, Whip antenna, C-3
R Figure A-17 willow, B-5
Radio Communications 2-13 spectrum management, 3-6
frequency, 2-14 functions, 3-10
planning factors, 3-14

Index-2 TC 2-22.601 9 April 2008

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TC 2-22.601
9 April 2008

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

GEORGE W. CASEY, JR.


General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0807906

DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG)/Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS),
and the United States Army Reserve. To be distributed in accordance with the initial distribution
number (IDN) 115984, requirements for TC 2-22.601.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


PIN: 084726-000

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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