EIRA,N AND LANGUAGE 1, 257-276 (1974)

A Linguist Looks at
“Schizophrenic” Language

ELAINE CHAIKA

Department of Modern Languupes, Providence College

The language of some patients diagnosed as schizophrenic is apparently caused

by a disruption in the ability to order linguistic elements into meaningful struc-
tures. This disruption affects different levels of language at different times. even in
the same patient, thus causing six definable characteristics of schizophrenic
speech. These characteristics are discoverable only through a linguistic analysis
of a corpus of such speech.

It has lately become fashionable to assume that crazy people aren’t

crazy at all, or at least not much (Ssasz, 1961; Laing, 1960; Chesler,
1972). Or to put it more eruditely, the actuality of a disease definable as
schizophrenia has been called into question. Not surprisingly, then, so
has the existence of a language peculiar to schizophrenics (Brown,
1973). Even one who does believe in schizophrenia and schizophrenic
language complains, “We are faced with the paradox that while we
recognize schizophrenic language when we see it, we cannot define it”
(Lorenz, 1961. p. 28).
Whether or not there is such a disease is not the province of this
paper. However, that Roger Brown heard no one diagnosed as schiz-
ophrenic using what he “would want to set apart as schizophrenic
speech” ( 1973, p. 397). or that Lorenz can’t define schizophrenic speech
cannot be ignored. For, as illustrated below, there are patients in mental
hospitals whose speech contains definable deviant characteristics and
these patients are rightly or wrongly classified as schizophrenics. This
does not mean that all patients so categorized evince such speech. It is
not the particular label given to patients or their speech which is the con-
cern of this paper. It is, rather, the nature of the deviance in the
linguistic code, and the regularity of that deviance over a particular pop-
ulation of patients. Because schizophrenia has been the term tradi-
tionally applied to patients who evince the characteristics of speech set
forth below, I shall use the word and its derivatives in this paper. Thus,
the use of the term “schizophrenic language” may be considered a meth-
odological convenience. There are six discoverable features of such
speech, and these features, especially in combination, differ from other
kinds of linguistic deviance, such as that occurring in ljoetry (Mu-
karovsky, 1964; Levin. 1971) or in aphasia.
257
Copyright 0 1974 by Academic Press. Inc
All right\ of reoroduction in anv fol-m rewrved
258 ELAINE CHAIKA

That I refer only to deviance in the language itself is pertinent. Roger

Brown (1973, p. 397), after claiming “I would have to conclude that
there is no such thing as schizophrenic speech” goes on to say that he
“encountered plenty of schizophrenic thought.” He is certainly not the
first to equate schizophrenia with thought disorders Won Domarus.
1944). And it may well be that schizophrenics have a thought disorder;
however, this may be irrelevant to their linguistic difficulties. In other
words, the schizophrenic’s difficulty in thinking and his difficulty in
speaking are not necessarily the same phenomenon. Language is a
coding of thought, but the relation between language and thought is not
at all clear. Liberman (1972) suggests that there is a poor fit between the
parts of the brain responsible for each.’ Furth (1961) showed that the
performance of deaf and hearing children on cognitive tasks was not
necessarily related to knowing a word for the abstraction involved.
He concludes:

. language experience may increase the efficiency of concept formation in a certain

situation but is not a necessary prerequisite for the development of the basic capacity
to abstract and generalize. (Furth. I96 1, p. 56)

Similarly Lantz and Lenneberg (1966, p. 74) conclude that “ . . . mere

possession of a verbal label does not necessarily affect cognitive behav-
ior.” Sperry (1968, p. 73 1) claims that split-brain patients were able to
categorize and think abstractly with their right, non-language hemi-
sphere.
If language is not necessary to abstraction and generalization and if it
does not necessarily affect cognitive behavior, then misuse of language
does not, in itself. prove impairment in thinking. This does not mean that
schizophrenics do not have impairment in thinking or in perceiving the
same reality as non-schizophrenics. For one thing, they often hallu-
cinate. However, as Roger Brown noted, the hallucinations may be
reported in structurally normal language. On the other hand, as will be
shown, some structurally abnormal language may represent non-aberrant
thinking. Thus. not to keep separate both investigation into and judg-
ments about a schizophrenic’s language and his thought only befuddles
the issues. It is necessary to mention this because so many previous in-
vestigators have based their analyses on the assumption that speech and
thought are inseparable. Therefore, in this paper I will attempt to de-
* However. he does raise the possibility that “non-linguistic intellectual mechanisms
might themselves have been altered in the course of evolutionary adaptations associated
with the development of grammar” (Liberman. 1972, p. 4). Until we know what these are
and how they relate to language. there is no way to analyze thought disorder solely on the
basis of linguistic evidence.
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 259

scribe the data in purely linguistic terms. treating language as a compe-

tence in itself.
The very fact of definable aberration in language does suggest a distur-
bance in those areas of the brain concerned with linguistic production.
The exact nature of such a disturbance, e.g., hormonal, chemical, neuro-
logical, and, indeed, where it lies is a problem for other scientists. How-
ever, it is the linguist who can lay out the exact nature of the problem to
be solved.2
The primary data for the ensuing analysis comes from a tape recording
of a 37-year-old female, hereinafter called “X”, who had been repeat-
edly diagnosed as schizophrenic. Supporting data from the literature,
notably Laffal (1965). will also be used, although, as will be immediately
evident, my interpretation of these data is considerably at variance with
the original observers’ interpretations. Despite the copious samples of
schizophrenic speech already published, it was necessary to gather some
fresh material since previous reporting has been by psychiatrists and
psychologists who did not include phonetic transcriptions even where
these were necessary [note (Ic), (Sp), and (5q) below], as in discussing
gibberish.
X’s records reveal that she spoke normally for weeks at a time, her
deviant language coinciding with what her psychiatrists term “psychotic
episodes.” Despite extensive psychological and neurological testing, no
lesion or other known organic cause was found to cause her deviant
speech. She was being treated with thorazine at the time of the re-
cording, but, although it reduces hallucinations and aggressiveness, this
drug does not cause or reduce incoherence. Furthermore, X’s speech
conforms so well to the descriptions of schizophrenic speech in the liter-
ature that it could be termed classic.
The excerpts below are taken from what is virtually a monologue.
Within each set of utterances reproduced below, there was no pause
long enough to allow a listener to intrude comfortably. Moreover, X’s in-
tonation was usually not amenable to intrusion. She often seemed to be
speaking to herself. However, whenever the psychiatrist asked her a
question, she did answer. When a set was preceded by a long pause, that
fact is indicated above it.
It may be that during such pauses X was hearing a voice and that the
set is a response to that voice, so that we are getting one side of a true
dialogue. Knowing what such a voice is saying might explain the first
utterance in a set,6 but aberrations in the ensuing utterances can not be
explained away as responses to a hallucination. That is, it is virtually im-
z Word association tests. such as those used by psychologists. for instance, Chapman.
Chapman, and Miller (1964) do not reveal the six characteristics presented in this paper.
 260 ELAINE CHAIKA

possible to imagine what any of the sequences below could be a non-

deviant response to, except, perhaps, for 3.
The following excerpts from the tape show the nature of the aberra-
tions in X’s code:
(I) a. Good mornin’ everybody!
b. (lower pitch, doubtfully) I don’t know what that is. (laughs)
c. [61 sDandan so thyi: fo juari13
d. (loudly, very surprised) Oh! it’s that thorazine. I forgot 1 had it.
(5a-5x below complete this set.)
Preceded by 20 second pause
(2) a. My mother’s name was Bill. (pause)
b. (low pitch, as in an aside, but with marked rising question in-
tonation) . . . and coo?
c. St. Valentine’s Day is the official startin’ of the breedin’ season
of the birds.
d. All buzzards can coo.
e. 1 like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly.
f. They work hard.
g. So do parakeets.
(3) a. This is a holy smoke (Dr: that’s a cigarette you’re holding)
b. It’s a holy one. (pause)
c. It goes in one hole and out the other and that makes it holy.
Preceded by 45 second pause
(4) a. In a month I’ve been upstairs, they’ve been taking my brains
out a piece at a time or all together.
b. Federal case doesn’t mean communication.
c. Steal from Mrs. Gotrocks, she can afford it.
d. I’ve got something (inaudible).
e. Did that show up on the X-rays?
f. You’ll see it tonight.
g. I’ve been drinking phosphate.
h. You’ll see it in the dark (inaudible)
i. Glows.
j. We all glow as we’re glowworms.
Preceded by 30 second pause
(5) a. Oh, it’s that thorazine. I forgot I had it.
b. That’s Lulubelle.

3 The items within brackets are in IPA. The first “word” was pronounced like a New
England “there” without the final lrl. In conventional orthography, this passage is “the(re)
sawendon saw turch faw jueri.” Sp is “dudn”; Sq, “He still had fooch with
teykrimez ”
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 261

c. This one’s Jean. J-E-A-N.

d. 1’11 write that down.
e. Speeds up the metabolism.
f. Makes your life shorter.
g. Makes your heart bong.
h. Tranquilizes you if you’ve got the metabolism 1 have.
i. I have distemper just like cats do, ‘cause that’s what we all are,
felines. (pause)
j. Siamese cat balls. They stand out.
k. 1 had a cat, a manx, still around somewhere.
1. You’ll know him when you see him.
m. His name is Cl Joe; he’s black and white. (no sentence break
in intonation)
n. 1 had a little goldfish too, like a clown. (pause)
o. Happy Hallowe’en down. (pause)
p. [dAdn] (pause)
q. He still had [fuc] with [thekraimz] I’ll be willing to betcha.
r. Nobody takes my word for what I wanna do.
s. Not even God.
t. I believe I’ll try anyhow.
u. (declaiming) I believe in the spirit of the mountains.
v. Right now I’m thinking Pike’s Peak for a rehaul of the Korean
thing.
w. This time I’ll marry E---P---, or ‘bout H---G---?
x. Or Frank Sinatra, he’s already set.

The subject speaks in a southern uneducated dialect which pro-

nounces the post-vocalic /r/. Items in phonetic transcription, enclosed in
square brackets are gibberish. Except for these, the phonology of each
utterance seems to be entirely normal. It strikes the listener as being in
no way deviant. The gibberish, (lc), (5p), and (5q) is very significant. In
each case, it is uttered as if it were a meaningful string. That is, there
was no pause or stress before, after, or during these aberrations. Each
was uttered in a normal fashion, and each conforms completely to the
phonotactics of English. In fact, because they are so consistent with the
stress and phonemic rules of English, on first hearing, one4 thinks the pa-
tient has actually made utterances of the language which one has failed
to catch. In other words, these are not random sound productions. They
are rule governed and produced according to the phonological rules of
the patient’s dialect. Their deviance is caused by their not being words
now actually in use in the language. That is, the hearer cannot match
these sounds with known words. However, each could be coined if
4 Dr. Carol Milligan and Mr. Roger Desautels were kind enough to listen to these pas-
sages. They confirmed my experience.
262 ELAINE CHAIKA

English required new words. Even if the patient were deliberately

coining new words. this behavior would have to be considered bizarre,
as one normally explains to others what a new word means.
Such gibberish has been reported elsewhere (Robertson & Shamsie,
1958; Laffal; 1965, p. 85). Robertson and Shamsie comment on the fact
that the gibberish appears to be governed by rules of various languages
known by the patient. In fact, they assign different stretches to different
languages (1958, p. 146). These investigators attempted unsuccessfully
to isolate factors prompting gibberish. When testing the patient, a mul-
tilingual, in English. it appeared as if gibberish increased as the task
became “vaguer and less bounded.” However, the results were reversed
in a session in Urdu. The authors conclude (1958. p. 45) I believe,
fallaciously:
The influence of kind of task appeared therefore to be complicated by factors purely
internal to B [the patient].

Later, they note that,

It could be inferred that words in B’s immediate environment were quite likely to be
incorporated as sources of his gibberish ( 1958, p. 147).

This will be shown to be significant.

Laffal (1965. p. 85) describes a patient who “launched into gibberish
that sounded like a mixture of Chinese and Polish, with a distinctly con-
versational prosody.” Whatever Laffal means by this description is. of
course. impossible to really know. What an English speaker perceives as
“distinctly conversational prosody” is, more than likely, English pros-
ody. It is impossible to tell whether this patient used un-English sounds
or syllables as Laffal does not provide a transcription. However, the fact
that he speaks of conversational prosody and specific languages suggests
that this gibberish, too, may be rule governed. The dialogue sample he
provides does show that his patient’s gibberish. like X’s, is interspersed
with comprehensible strings. Laffal assumes that the patient deliberately
uses odd language so that he would not have to face the therapeutic
situation. Such an interpretation begs the question of why intermittent
gibberish would be used as a vehicle for such avoidance. Noting the
rule-governed nature of X’s meaningless strings, and noticing her general
verbosity, and decided willingness to talk, another interpretation of
this phenomenon is possible.
Admittedly. the question of whether or not the patient can control the
appearance of gibberish or other deviant structures goes beyond the data
presented by me or anyone else to date. However, since previous inves-
tigators like Laffal have imputed volition to such aberrations, the ques-
tion cannot be ignored. Furthermore, it is crucial to our understanding
of schizophrenia to deal with this matter. If the patient deliberately uses
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 263

such speech, then the problem is one of convincing him he shouldn’t. If

he can’t help himself, then he is suffering from some sort of intermittent
aphasia, and the problem of treatment is quite different. Although further
research is needed to settle the matter of “can’t” versus “won’t.” the fol-
lowing shows that it is just as reasonable to assume that the schiz-
ophrenic cannot help his peculiar speech as it is to assume that he
speaks that way deliberately.
X’s psychiatrist reports that (1) is uttered as X enters the room and
spies a pack of cigarettes. She picks up the pack and utters (1 b) and (1 c).
It is possible that the last item in (lc) is a mispronunciation of @w&y.
She seems to be wondering if the package is a case for jewelry. The
tone. tempo. and stress of the utterance is consistent with such an in-
terpretation. but the “words.” of course, do not quite fit. The [dhdn] of
(Sp) was uttered exactly as a movie director says “cut,” and possibly
might mean done. That is. the rhyme of (5n) and (50) is done. What it is
her goldfish had in (5q) is impossible to guess. At least my imagination
fails here. It is entirely possible that X intended actual words in ( Ic),
(5p), and (5q) but that a disruption in the ability to apply phonological
rules to the deep structure representation of words is responsible for her
intermittent gibberish.
To be sure. the exact nature of the representation of lexical items in
the brain is not known. Psychologists have usually acted as if words are
stored as whole units and retrieved under conditions of proper stimulus.
However, no word ever appears in speech with one invariant phono-
logical shape. Words are pronounced differently, according to mood,
context and register. And, of course, the ability to coin new words and
to make up nonsense words also suggests that word formation is an ac-
tive process. Linguists (e.g., Chomsky & Halle. 1968) usually think of
words as having deep structures upon which phonological rules operate.
In any event, the sounds X makes in (Ic), (5p), and (5q) do show organi-
zation according to the rules of the language, although they are not
organized into words.
This suggests that X, and, by implication, other schizophrenics who
produce gibberish, are suffering from a disruption in the ability to match
sound strings to actual words. The evidence presented by Robertson and
Shamsie, and Laffal is consistent with this view. And, as will be shortly
demonstrated, some schizophrenics may also have a companion dif-
ficulty in assigning semantic features to phonological shapes.
First, it must be noted that X does not appear to notice anything odd
in her speech. Unlike normal people who make “slips of the tongue,”
she makes no attempt to correct herself. Robertson and Shamsie (1958,
p. 147) and Laffal (1965. p. 85) did try to question their patients about
the meaning of their gibberish. In each instance, the patients either re-
264 ELAINE CHAIKA

sponded with more gibberish or comprehensible strings which did not

explain the previously uttered gibberish. These investigators concluded
that their patients were willfully refusing to explain. Robertson and
Shamsie ( 1958, p. 147) say:
He was prepared to utter unlimited amounts of it-but not to tolerate a direct inquiry
into it nor to work elements into it on the explicit instructions of the examiner.

Laffal (1965, p. 87) claims:

His gibberish would reflect the effort to keep such ideas and the consequences they
might entail from gaining verbal form.

Twice. (1965, pp. 84 and 87), Laffal claims that the patient is hiding
“intolerable” sexual wishes because the gibberish follows an attempt by
Laffal to shake the patient’s hand. Robertson and Shamsie offer no such
sexual explanation for their patient, nor does there seem to be any
sexual provocation for X’s speech, at least none verifiable.
Later Laffal (1965, p. 88) comparing gibberish with speaking in
tongues. argues.

speaking in tongues serves to provide verbal form to a conflicted wish while at

the same time hiding the wish by stripping the verbalization of communal meaning.

Why someone would use verbal form. e.g.. concatenation of sounds to

keep ideas from gaining verbal form, is never explained; nor is the fact
that only some of the patient’s output is gibberish, although much of it is
deviant in other ways, as is shown not only in the sample Laffal pro-
vides, but in his overt statement (1965, p. 85), “His [the patient’s] ordi-
nary communication was sufficiently obscure. . . .” Considering X’s
behavior, the fact that the gibberish is rule governed, is an integral part
of comprehensible utterances, and is apparently not noticed. a more
likely interpretation of the patients’ failure to explain their gibberish is
that they simply do not realize that they have uttered anything wrong.
The patient cannot answer questions about gibberish if he doesn’t real-
ize that is what he produced. The fact is, in the reported cases, the pa-
tients do respond to questions, although the responses themselves may
be gibberish (Laffal, 1965, p. 86; Robertson & Shamsie, 1958, p. 145).
Apparently the patients think they are really saying something. This
contention is further supported by Robertson and Shamsie’s (1958, p.
147) experiments that showed “that words in B’s immediate environ-
ment [words displayed on cards] were likely to be incorporated as
sources of his gibberish.” It sounds as if B were unsuccessfully trying to
talk about these words.
Production of gibberish is not the only phenomenon suggesting a
disruption in the ability to apply phonological rules. Many observers
have noted that schizophrenics often create neologisms (Laffal, 1965. p.
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 265

84; Vetter, 1968. pp. 5 and 10; Robertson & Shamsie, 1958, p. 147;
Forrest, 1965, pp. 168 and 176). These also could be caused by a failure
to apply phonological rules correctly. Not all patients who produce gib-
berish, produce neologisms. For instance, the tape recording of X re-
veals none, nor are there many in the Kisker (1964) tapes. Neologisms
may also be a result of assignation of semantic features to the wrong
phonological shapes. Such mismatching of phonological shapes to se-
mantic features produces yet a third phenomenon besides gibberish and
neologisms. That is, the patient may assign the wrong semantic features
or insufficient semantic features to recognized words in the lexicon. This
is seen in the Kisker (1964) tapes when a patient speaks of “the bell of
rights,” as well as when X, speaking of her mental illness, says she has
distemper (5i). Similarly, X’s comment on a cigarette she is smoking (3b)
and (3~) appears to be (but probably is not) an intentional pun. Puns, of
course, involve the deliberate assignation of wrong semantic features for
the context to a particular item in the lexicon. X’s exposition on birds
(2a)-(2g) is prompted by noting the wrong semantic features of Bill for
the context as is her statement in (4j), for glow when applied to humans
refers to emotions, not usually to visibility.
Admittedly, the deviance of these passages requires further explana-
tion, but, first, other examples of disruption of use of semantic features
should be examined. Laffal reports that the patient who had been
speaking gibberish suddenly says:
Pt. Whew! Boy, what a nice day, huh?
The following exchange then occurred:
Dr. Dean, come here.
Pt. What, you said go already.
Dr. No, I didn’t say go. I wanted to sit down near you Dean.
(Patient leaves room, and doctor follows)
Dr. Mr. Redfield, come on, 1 want to talk to you.
Pt. You want to talk to him? (pointing to another patient)
Dr. No, 1 want to talk to you.
Pt. Oh, we’re through.
As already mentioned. Laffal (1965. pp. 84 and 86) interprets such
speech as reflecting the patient’s desire to avoid the therapeutic situa-
tion. In other words, Laffal feels that the patient is deliberately misun-
derstanding.
Elsewhere (1965, pp. 3 l-35) Laffal gives many examples of what he
terms “opposite speech”, such as using “yes” for “no,” “always” for
“never, ” “1 do know” for “I don’t know.” He interprets such behavior
as “a way of dealing with ideas which were unacceptable” (1965, p. 34).
 266 ELAINE CHAIKA

However, if the patient is having difficulty in matching semantic fea-

tures to phonological strings, as evinced in the gibberish, he would easily
confuse antonyms just as young children learning the language do (e.g.,
Clark, E. 1970; Donaldson & Wales, 1970). Confusion in pronouns is also
common in early childhood (Huxley, 1970, p. 149). This does not mean
that schizophrenics who do such things have regressed and are using
child language. In fact, except for this confusion of antonyms, there is
little or no resemblance of schizophrenic language with that of young
children. The confusion of antonyms by both children and schizo-
phrenics, however, may result from the fact that antonyms belong to
the same grammatical category and share all but one semantic feature,
the distinguishing one. For instance, the verbs go and come are both
verbs of motion, differing only in the direction they indicate. In word
association tests, antonyms frequently elicit each other (Clark, 1970, p.
275) presumably because of their shared semantic features. Hence, if
the schizophrenic is suffering from a disability in matching semantic fea-
tures to phonological shapes, one form this disability could take is failure
to take note of the distinguishing feature in a word which has an ant-
onym. The apparently disparate phenomena of gibberish, neologisms,
inappropriate use of words, and “opposite speech,” then, could be
caused by one factor, a disruption in the ability to match semantic fea-
tures to actual words in the lexicon. This is but one facet of a larger
problem, a general disability in ordering linguistic elements into mean-
ingful structures, as is shown by examining larger stretches of schizo-
phrenic speech.
Words, of course, are only elements of larger structures: sentences,
which, in turn, are elements of discourse. It is no surprise, then, to find
that even if the schizophrenic produces words correctly, the syntax of
his sentences may be awry, or, if his sentences are grammatical, the dis-
course they form is odd.
Interestingly, this disruption need not affect all levels of language at
the same time, nor does any schizophrenic necessarily suffer from
disruption at each level. X, for instance. shows little disruption in her
syntax, although disruption to the point of “word salads” (Vetter, 1968,
P. 10)
(6) the house burnt the cow horrendously always
have been frequently recorded. Such productions are typically described
as “being made out of recognizable words that seem unrelated to each
other” (Vetter, 1968, p. 10). However, linguistic analysis reveals that
the structure of this supposed word salad is not aberrant. The articles
are placed before the nouns and the normal English word order of sub-
ject-verb-object-adverb(s) is maintained. The deviance lies in the viola-
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 267

tion of a co-occurrence restriction. Inanimate nouns may not be the sub-

ject of burn unless they can be a cause of burning, such as
match, cigarette, or iron. Other kinds of syntactic error are shown in:

(7) My teeth are killing me by expert dentistry of Dr. Brown the den-
tist and must be pulled as soon as possible as 1 will not live as I
am duped by expert dentistry. (Reported by Lorenz, 1961, p. 29.)
Here, the agentive by-phrase was incorrectly chosen. Rather the caus-
ative should have been used, “ . . . because of the expert dentistry of
Dr. Brown.” The wrong conjoining procedure was used to attach “I will
not live.” This seems to be in a disjunctive relation to the preceding,
“ . . . and must be pulled as soon as possible or I will not live. . . .”
Furthermore, the speaker speaks of “expert dentistry” by the “dentist.”
That is, he codes the same semantic information in the surface structure
of the same sentence. This is a phenomenon similar to failing to pronom-
inalize or delete. Saying “expert dentistry of Dr. Brown” conveys the
information that Dr. Brown is a dentist, since of is one agent marker.
Hence, it is as incorrect to mention this in the surface structure as it is to
fail to pronominalize friend, in “I gave my friend1 food so that my
friend2 would not go hungry” if both occurrences of friend have the
same referent. Similarly, failing to delete the second Mary in “Mary
cried and Mary shouted” is odd if the same Mary was crying and
shouting.
There also seems to be an error in tense and aspect marking in (7).
Apparently, this should have been “ . . . as I have been duped by ex-
pert dentistry.” It is also possible that the phenomenon of opposite
speech is evinced in (7), so that the speaker meant:
(7’) My teeth are killing me because of the inexpert dentistry of Dr.
Brown, and must be pulled as soon as possible or I will not live.
(as) I have been duped by inexpert dentistry.
It is possible that the patient used “expert” sarcastically here. That is,
the opposite speech is deliberate. However, the other errors in the pas-
sage lend support to the theory that the usage is inadvertent.
Of course, this reconstruction might be considered to be in the realm
of my fantasy, as there is no way to check to see if (7’) is what the pa-
tient intended, just as there is no way to check if a psychiatrist’s in-
terpretation of a symbol is accurate. However, analysis of (7) does at
least show erroneous application of syntactic rules, and that if related
rules were applied, a non-deviant structure would result. By related, I
mean choosing one of the other alternatives for the syntactic construc-
tion in question, e.g., the causative rather than the agent marker; the dis-
junctive rather than the conjunctive marker; the perfect rather than the
268 ELAINE CHAIKA

present marker. The one incontrovertible syntactic error X makes (4a)

“In a month I’ve been upstairs” can be similarly explained. Here the
wrong article was chosen. (4a), (6). and (7) all seem to confirm the thesis
of this paper that the schizophrenic suffers from a disruption in the abil-
ity to apply linguistic rules.
The oddity of X’s productions seem mostly to be caused by aberra-
tions in the structure of her discourse. There is no rigid boundary
between syntax of the sentence and structure of discourse. Some rules,
notably those of pronominalization, deletion, and selection of tense and
aspect, obviously overlap, choice of alternatives being governed both by
general context and requirements of individual sentences. Other rules,
notably selection of markers used for sequencing, either temporal or log-
ical (“then,” “finally,” “thus, ” “this proves”), announcing a coming con-
tradiction (“but,” “ however”), announcing a coming similarity (“and,”
“similarly”), or change of subject (“not to change the subject,” “Oh, that
reminds me”), clearly belong to rules of discourse. These rules enable a
hearer to perceive sentences as belonging together, as being part of a
whole. Normal discourse is centered on topics, what Ervin-Tripp (1964.
p. 88) calls.
the manifest content or referent of speech. This includes both gross categories such as
subject matter (economics, household affairs, gossip) and the propositional content of
utterances.
Examination of X’s productions shows that the propositional content of
individual sentences are usually understandable, but that they are not
subordinated to any subject matter. Or, if they are, what are absent are
the discourse markers necessary to show connections and to orient lis-
teners to her topic. Yet, it cannot truly be said her sentences are pro-
duced at random, for there is often an obvious connection between
them. The problem is that the kind of connection is not usual in normal
discourse. Furthermore, it cannot be claimed that X does not wish to
communicate. She talks very freely, often uses an “explaining” tone of
voice, and, like all the patients on the Kisker (1964) tapes readily
answers questions put to her. For instance, when the doctor half inquir-
ingly remarks, “That’s a cigarette you’re smoking”, X answers with
(3b)-(3c), here repeated:
(3) b. It’s a holy one. (pause)
c. It goes in one hole and out the other and that makes it holy.
The proper pronominal form referring to the doctor’s mention of “ciga-
rette” reinforces the contention that she is responding to the doctor’s
utterance, although the propositional content of her response is odd.
Although, in ,print, (3a)-(3c) looks like a pun, it was not uttered in a
joking manner. To the contrary, X sounded as if she were patiently
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 269

explaining something to a young child. so that the manner of her utter-

ance made it odd. There was, however, no hint of sarcasm in her voice,
nor did she sound as if she was joking when she uttered (3a). It may be
that she did intend (3a) as a pun, but failed to use the intonation proper
for word-play.
Then again, the peculiarity of (3a)-(3c) may be related to the factor
which governs much of schizophrenic discourse. Preoccupation with
definition, abnormal rhyming, and inappropriate word associating have
long been recognized as features of schizophrenic speech. These are not
so unrelated as they first seem. They all result from an interest in the
properties of words, such as sound and semantic features. In fact,
typically, these are the concern of poets. Of course, poets make these
their concerns by especially focusing on them. In their usual conversa-
tion, poets, like most people, ignore such features or, at least, they do
not allow them to interfere with the topic at hand in their surface utter-
ances. The schizophrenic, however, does not seem t,o be able to
suppress his notice of the features of words. This becomes very no-
ticeable at several points of X’s monologue.
She rhymes inappropriately only once, and it is evident that she is
very much aware of this as a special activity. While talking of her pets,
she says (5n)-(50):

(5) n. I had a little goldfish too like a clown. (pause. drop to low
pitch, as in an aside)
o. Happy Halloween down. (pause, higher pitch)
P. bdql
Normal intonation resumes as she continues her speech. The nonsense
syllable in phonetic transcription was said as a director says “cut” after
a take. The production of a sentence to follow (5n) was not because of a
general topic of pets or goldfish as would be the case in normal speech,
but because of the phonetic features of clown. “Happy Halloween”
could have been selected for its rhythmic properties, as well as the asso-
ciation of clowns who are dressed up in costume and Halloween, a night
for dressing up. Production of the sentence, (50), seems to have been
governed by phonetic features and, possibly, semantic association rather
than by the considerations of subject matter. This, then, is a violation of
a prime rule of discourse: that selection of lexical items and syntactic
structures is determined by a larger topic. Lexical items previously men-
tioned do not provide the impetus for further production except in
unusual circumstances such as conscious punning. If occasionally in
conversation, a lexical item does remind someone of another topic, he
signals that fact by conventional markers such as, “oh, that reminds
me,” or “not to change the subject.” However, such changes of topic are
270 ELAINE CHAIKA

just that, changes in actual subject matter. In normal discourse, it is

never permissible to say “Oh, that reminds me” and then provide a
rhyme for a word just uttered.5 Even X, as indicated, seemed aware that
it was odd for her to note that clown rhymes with down in the midst of a
conversation. In any event, the rhyming has no further effect on X’s
speech. That is, nothing else in her monologue seems to relate to it.
This is decidedly not true of word associations based on semantic fea-
tures, however. These are so important, that they often control what is
said “next.” Once she shows in (2a)-(2b), as she did with the rhyming,
that she is aware of the word association as an intrusion:
(2) a. My mother’s name was Bill. (pause, low pitch as in an aside,
but with marked rising question intonation)
b . . . . and coo? (strong, loud)
c. St. Valentine’s Day is the official startin’ of the breedin’ season
of birds.
d. All buzzards can coo.
e. I like to see it pronounced buzzards rightly.
f. They work hard.
g. So do parakeets.
What is most interesting here is the richness of the associations. The
patient is paying attention to far too many of the semantic features of a
word. In normal discourse, one only notes those semantic features that
fit the context. Here, however, X notes not only the feature [+name] in
Bill, but its meaning of making love, as in “bill and coo.” That the
semantic feature is as important as her being reminded of the expression
is evident from (2c), for St. Valentine’s Day is associated with love:
billing and cooing. Bill is also a portion of a bird’s anatomy. She incorpo-
rates her noting of this feature of bill in her statement about “the breed-
ing season of the birds.” In short, although X is paying as much atten-
tion to her speech as anyone else, she is paying attention to the wrong
aspects of it.6
5 Similarly, the kinds of errors associated with schizophrenic speech are different from
“normal” performance errors. “Normals” make anticipatory slips of the tongue (Spoon-
erisms). and make false starts, but they do not utter stretches of gibberish, rhyme, “free as-
sociate.” or misuse common words as the schizophrenic does.
6 There is no unequivocal way to tell from the tape what prompted the initial utterance
of a set. For instance, X’s mother’s name was not Bill. The attending psychiatrist was
female. One psychiatric theory states that homosexual panic is a cause of schizophrenia.
One who subscribes to this theory would explain (2a) as being prompted by homosexual
desires. If so, then (2a) must still be considered an exceedingly aberrant way of expressing
such a desire, even cryptically. Another possibility is that the name Bill symbolizes
strength and security to the patient. Her case history strongly suggests that she missed
having a supportive mother and that she saw the psychiatrist in that role. A third possibil-
ity is that this statement was truly inadvertent. Whether or not one believes “slips of the
tongue” can be truly accidental will influence one’s interpretation of such utterances.
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 271

Once it is recognized that the topic of discourse may be anything

which is suggested by any of the semantic features of a preceding word,
X’s speech no longer is so chaotic.
It is possible, for instance, to make some interpretation of (5+(5x).
Actually, this was uttered right after (Id)
(1) d. Oh, it’s that thorazine. 1 forgot 1 had it.
After discussing the effects of thorazine (Se)-(5h), she continues:
(5) i. I have distemper just like cats do, ‘cause that’s what we all are,
felines. (pause)
j. Siamese cat balls. They stand out.
k. I had a cat, a manx, still around somewhere.
1. You’ll know him when you see him.
m. His name is GI Joe: he’s black and white. (no sentence break
in intonation)
n. I had a little goldfish too, like a clown. (pause)
o. Happy Hallowe’en down. (pause)
P. IdAd (pause)
q. He still had [fuc] with [thekraimz] 1’11 be willing to betcha.
r. Nobody takes my word for what I wanna do.
s. Not even God.
t. I believe I’ll try anyhow.
u. (declaiming) I believe in the spirit of the mountains.
v. Right now, I’m thinking Pike’s Peak for a rehaul of the Korean
thing.
w. This time 1’11marry E---P---. or ‘bout H---G---?
x. Or Frank Sinatra, he’s already set.
Apparently, discussing the effects of the tranquilizer made her think of
an illness with a name that sounds like, although it is not, a mental
illness. (Temper refers to the mind, in one of its meanings.) In any event,
distemper reminds her of cats which reminds her of a kind of cat ball
which reminds her of her own pet cat which reminds her of her goldfish
which reminds her that one of her two pets has something, which
prompts her to make a wager that this is so which reminds her that no
one believes her, not even God (which is about as complete a case of not
being believed as there can be!). The phrase takes my word seems to
trigger the word believe which in one of its meanings is “take someone’s
word.” What it is that she believes she will try, she does not say. Ap-
parently, use of the word believe prompted her to think of this rather
common phrase. Using believe in one sense, then, prompts her to use it
in another, that of “having faith,” so that she uses a preacher’s intona-
tion and states her belief about the spirit of the mountains (Jehovah?
This allusion is not clear). Mountains reminds her of Pike’s Peak. The
connection between Pike’s Peak and Korea is not at all clear. However,
272 ELAINE CHAIKA

“The Korean thing” is associated with her marriage because during the
Korean war, she was in the military and married to her first husband,
whose name is among those deleted.
It should be noted that usually, although not always, X understands
individual words normally. That is, she assigns the same semantic fea-
tures to them that non-schizophrenics would. The apparent exception is
her explanation of holy, but even this is a statement a normal person
would make if he were punning. It is odd here only in that she doesn’t
seem to be punning, but to be noting what in this context are inappro-
priate semantic features of the string [ holi].
The above examples show that two rules of discourse are violated by
the schizophrenic. The first rule violated is that one is supposed to pay
attention only to those semantic features of an item that are pertinent to
the context. The second is that discourse is about something outside of
the elements of the discourse itself, what is usually termed “the topic.”
However, the deviance of schizophrenic discourse cannot always be
explained only by intrusive word associations. For instance,
(4) a. In a month I’ve been upstairs, they’ve been taking my brains
out a piece at a time or all together.
b. Federal case doesn’t mean communication.
c. Steal from Mrs. Gotrocks, she can afford it.
d. I’ve got something (inaudible).
e. Did that show up on the X-rays?
f. You’ll see it tonight.
g. I’ve been drinking phosphate.
h. You’ll see it in the dark.
i. Glows.
j. We all glow as we’re glowworms.
It must be emphasized that this sequence was not uttered as a disjointed
list of sentences. The intonation clearly indicates that it was intended as
one connected discourse. However. unlike the sequence in (5), it is im-
possible to segment out semantic features as the controlling elements in
the sequence in (4a)-(4d). Whether or not (4d) prompted the next state-
ment cannot be determined. In order to discover what is missing from
this discourse structurally, it is necessary to posit what could be added
to give it coherence. If (4a)-(4d) are reconstructed, as in (4’) below with
possible presuppositions overtly indicated and with sequencing markers
added, it becomes structurally normal. This is not to claim that X in-
tended (4’). This is only an attempt to explain the nature of the abnor-
mality of (4a)-(4d) by showing how they could be made more structurally
normal much as one corrects syntax by supplying a correct form. The
first sentence in (4) clearly refers to X’s hospitalization. Since she is in a
federal hospital, she is a federal case (4b). One usual presupposition
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 273

behind a sentence of the form “X doesn’t mean Y” is that “X is com-

monly thought of as a property of or cause of Y.” For instance, “Dia-
monds don’t mean riches” means “Although diamonds are considered a
property of riches, they don’t necessarily signal that a person is rich.”
Thus, (4b) could mean “Although I’m a federal case, doesn’t mean that I
have communication.” The presuppositions behind this statement would
have to be (A) that X realizes that she has communication difficulties,
and that (B) federal hospitals don’t necessarily help one communicate.
The reference to her brain being taken out in (4a) possibly refers to ther-
apy. She had not had any X-rays, brain scans, or other treatment which
would explain the imagery otherwise. This helps explain (4c), for if
taking her brain out is not helping her to communicate, then “they” in
(4a) are stealing it. This is presupposition (C). Assuming such presup-
positions, we get:
(4’) In the month I’ve been upstairs, they’ve been taking my brain out
a piece at a time or all together, in order to help me communicate.
However, being a federal case doesn’t mean communication
(being able to communicate). Instead of stealing my brains, steal
from Mrs. Gotrocks as she can afford it.
The imperative in “steal from Mrs. Gotrocks” is apparently addressed
to the psychiatrist who is also supposed to be helping X communicate.
In normal discourse, the presuppositions that require overt statement
need not be fully explicated. It is sufficient to indicate them partially.
Thus (A) is signalled by “in order to help me communicate”; (9) by the
addition of the gerund “being” to (4b); and (C) by “instead of stealing
my brains.” Although relatively little information need be in the surface
structure to indicate a rich network of presuppositions, this little infor-
mation is crucial to making oneself understood. Knowing what must be
overtly stated is an integral part of knowing or being able to use the rules
of discourse.
To be sure, there are other devices used in discourse to show that a
series of sentences belong together that X does use, notably pronominal-
ization and deletion. For instance,

(5) a. Oh, it’s that thorazine.

b. I forgot I had it.
c. That’s Lulubelle.
d. This one’s Jean. J-E-A-N.
e. I’ll write that down.
f. Speeds up the metabolism.
g. Makes your life shorter.
h. Makes your heart bong.
i. Tranquilizes you if you’ve got the metabolism I’ve got.
274 ELAINE CHAIKA

There is no intonation break between (5a) and (5b). That these are to be
related in the discourse is indicated by the prosody, but also by the
pronominalization of thorazine in (5b). The subject of the verbs in
(5f)-(Si) is, apparently, thoruzine. Within a discourse, a repeated subject
may be deleted, and the fact of the deletion itself helps indicate that the
sentence in which the first mention of the subject appeared, and the
subsequent sentences with the subjects deleted are related. Of course,
the content of this passage is odd. For one thing, she is hallucinating
about the thorazine (Dr. Jessica Oesterheld, personal communication).
For another, one does not usually name one’s pills. However, the trans-
formations used to indicate that (5a)-(5i) are related in a discourse, and
are not disparate sentences, are normal here.
That the patient is able to use some rules correctly and not others is
not surprising. As noted previously the disruptions in the ability to apply
linguistic rules does not affect all levels of speech at once nor is any
level affected all the time. It is now apparent that even when a level is
affected. not all rules of that level are equally affected. It may be that
deletion and pronominalization are affected least for X because her sen-
tential syntax is relatively intact, at least at the time of this recording,
and these transformations, although governed by considerations of dis-
course, are essentially tied to the sentence itself. As noted previously,
there are times when non-schizophrenics engage in some of the linguistic
activities associated with schizophrenic speech, notably focusing on
inappropriate semantic features and analyzing phonological features, as
in punning and rhyming. Of course, the non-schizophrenic does not let
his notice of these things govern his discourse. At least, he seems to be
able to control such noticing, and can or does suppress them in speech
unless the occasion is right for their mention. This argues, for one thing,
that part of normal linguistic competence is being able to assess a situa-
tion so as to mention only what it is proper to utter overtly. It also
suggests that there is a hierarchy of linguistic rules, and that conscious
noticing of phonological features or semantic features inappropriate to
the context is low on the hierarchy, being allowed to surface only when
other conditions allow the higher rules to be suspended. That is, pun-
ning, alliterating, and rhyming are allowed only under conditions which
say that consciously noting only those features of words appropriate to
the meaning of immediate context is no longer prime. If this is true, then
the schizophrenic may also be suffering from a disruption in the normal
hierarchy of linguistic rules. This may or may not be caused by an inabil-
ity to assess the social situation properly. In any event, this socio-
linguistic explanation for schizophrenic speech cannot be complete, for
it does not explain the breakdown in rules of syntax and discourse, or
the gibberish and other evidence of mismatching of semantic features to
lexical items.
 SCHIZOPHRENIC LANGUAGE 215

This paper started by contending that there is such a phenomenon as

schizophrenic language, although this language may not characterize all
patients diagnosed as schizophrenic. Analysis of the tape recording of X,
and of samples reported in the literature has revealed six characteristics
of such language:
(1) sporadic disruption in the ability to match semantic features with
sound strings comprising actual lexical items in the language (as
seen in Ic and 5i);
(2) preoccupation with too many of the semantic features of a word in
discourse (as seen in 2a-2c);
(3) inappropriate noting of phonological features of words in dis-
course (as seen in 5n-50);
(4) production of sentences according to phonological and semantic
features of previously uttered words. rather than according to a
topic (2a-2g);
(5) disruption in the ability to apply rules of syntax and discourse (as
seen in 4a-4i):
(6) failure to self-monitor, e.g., not noting errors when they occur.
All of these characteristics suggest a disruption in the ability to apply
those rules which organize linguistic elements, such as phonemes,
words, and sentences, into corresponding meaningful structures,
namely words, sentences. and discourse. There is also the possibility of
a disruption in the hierarchy of linguistic rules.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Thanks are due to Dr. Jessica Oesterheld who first interested me in this problem, and
was a willing repository of information thereafter; to Dr. Sheila Blumstein who read and
commented on an earlier version of this paper and to the readers. All errors. of course, are
mine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
ADAMS, PARVEEN (Ed.) 1972. Languugr and Thinking. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
BROWN, R. 1972. Schizophrenia, language, and reality. American Psychologist, 28,
395-403.
CHAPMAN, L., CHAPMAN, J. & MILLER, G. 1964. A Theory of Verbal Behavior in
Schizophrenia. In B. Maher (Ed.) Progress in Exnerimerlttrl Personality Reusearch.
New York: Academic Press. Vol. I.
CHESLER, PHYLLIS. 1972. Women rind Mo&rss. New York: Doubleday.
CHOMSKY, N. & HALLE, M. 1968. The Sound Paticrn of English. New York: Harper and
Row.
CLARK, E. 1970. How young children describe events in time. In D’Arvais and Levelt
(Eds.) Advances in Psycho/ing~,isfics. New York: American-Elsevier.
CLARK, H. H. 1970. Word associations and linguistic theory. In J. Lyons (Ed.) NCM. Hori-
zons in Linguistics. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
D’ARCAIS & LEVELT 1970. Advances in Psyc,holinXrristics. New York: American-El-
sevier.
276 ELAINE CHAIKA

DONALDSON, M. & WALES, R. 1970. On the acquisition of some relational terms. In J.

Hayes (Ed.) Cognition and the Development of Language. New York: Wiley.
ERVIN-TRIPP, S. 1964. An analysis of the interaction of language, topic, and listener.
American Anthropologist, 66, 86- 102.
FORREST, D. 1965. Poiesis and the language of schizophrenia. In. H. Vetter (Ed.) Lon-
guage Behavior in Schizophrenia. Springfield, Illinois: Thomas.
FURTH, H. G. 1961. The influence of language on the development of concept formation in
deaf children. In Parveen Adams (Ed.) Languuge und Thinking. Baltimore: Penguin
Books.
GARVIN, P. (Ed.) 1964. Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure and Style,
Georgetown: Georgetown University Press.
HAYES, J. (Ed.) 1970. Cognition and the Development of Language. New York: Wiley.
HUXLEY, R. 1970. The development of the correct use of subject personal pronouns in
two children. In D’Arcais and Levelt (Eds.) Advances in Psycholinguistics. New
York: American-Elsevier.
KASANIN, S. (Ed.) 1944. Language and Thought in Schizophrenia. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
KISKER, G. 1964. Tapes to Accompany The Disorganized Personulity. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
LAFFAL, J. 1965. Pathological and Normal Language. New York: Atherton Press.
LAING, R. 1960. The Divided Se!f. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
LANTZ, E. & LENNEBERG, E. 1966. Verbal communication and colour memory in the deaf
and hearing. In Parveen Adams (Ed.) Languuge und Thinking. Baltimore: Penguin
Books.
LEVIN, S. 1971. The analysis of compression in poetry Foundations of Language, 7,
38-55.
LIBERMAN, A. 1972. The Specialization of the Language Hemisphere. Status on Speech
Research SR-3 l/32 (Mimeo), Haskins Laboratories.
LORENZ, M. 1961. Problems posed by schizophrenic language. In H. Vetter (Ed.) Lun-
guuge Behavior in Schizophrenia. Springfield, Illinois: Thomas.
LYONS, J. (Ed.) 1970. New Horizons in Linguistics. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
MAHER, B. (Ed.) 1964. Progress in Experimental Personality Research. New York: Aca-
demic Press. Vol. I.
MUKAROVSKY, J. 1964. Standard Language and Poetic Language. In Garvin (Ed.) Prugue
School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure and Style. Georgetown: Georgetown
University Press.
ROBERTSON, J. & SHAMSIE, S. 1958. A Systematic Examination of Gibberish in a Mul-
tilingual Schizophrenic Patient. In H. Vetter (Ed.) Language Behavior in Srhi-
zophreniu. Springfield, Illinois: Thomas.
SSASZ, T. I96 I. The Myth of Mental Illness. New York: Harper.
SPERRY, R. 3968. Hemisphere disconnection and unity in conscious awareness. Americun
Psychologist, 23, 723-33.
VETTER, H. (Ed.) 1968. Language Behavior in Schizophrenia. Springfield, Illinois: Thomas.
VON DOMARUS, E. 1944. The specific laws of logic in schizophrenia. In S. Kasanin (Ed.)
Language und Thought in Schizophrenia. Berkeley: University of California Press.