Estares Spouses vs CA
Topic: Preliminary Injunction
Facts: •The spouses Estares secured a loan of P800k from Prominent Lending
& Credit Corporation (PLCC) in 1998. To secure the loan, they mortgaged a
parcel of land. They however only received P637k as testified by Rosenda
Estares in court.
•Now, the spouses are questioning the validity of the loan as they alleged
that they agreed to an 18% per annum interest rate but PLCC is now charging
them 3.5% interest rate per month. In the interim, they prayed for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the mortgaged property and
proceeding with the extrajudicial sale
•PLCC argued that the spouses were properly apprised of the terms of the
loan including the rate of interest, penalties and other charges.
•At the hearing, the Estares spouses insist that they firmly established their
right to injunctive relief. They claim that the promissory note, credit
application, disbursement voucher, disclosure statement and real estate
mortgage are falsified; the promissory note is not reflective of the true
amount of the loan, as well as the term, interest and charges thereon; the
P126,362.28 represent additional charges, not as part of the loan, that were
not agreed upon prior to or before the consummation of the loan; and the
amount of the loan and rate of interest stated in the falsified promissory
note are fictitious or simulated.
•RTC Decision: denied the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, holding that the latter failed to establish the facts
necessary for an injunction to issue.
•The Estares spouses filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the
Court of Appeals. The action on the Estares spouses’ application for a TRO
and writ of preliminary injunction was deferred and held in abeyance until
after receipt of the comment. With no restraining order enjoining him,
Sheriff Magat conducted an auction sale.
•CA Decision: Affirmed RTC. That RTC did not abuse its discretion in denying
preliminary injunction.
•Hence, this appeal to the SC.
Issue: WON the writ of preliminary injunction should be granted
Held: NO. Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of
substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely
a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The controlling reason for
the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may
thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of
the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly
adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to
avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
of compensation. The application of the writ rests upon an alleged existence
of an emergency or of a special reason for such an order before the case can
be regularly heard, and the essential conditions for granting such temporary
injunctive relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for injunction and that on the entire
showing from both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that
the injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of plaintiff
pending the litigation.
The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish the
following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive relief: (a) the
existence of their right to be protected; and (b) that the acts against which
the injunction is to be directed are violative of such right. To be entitled to
an injunctive writ, the petitioner must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear
and unmistakable right and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ
to prevent serious damage. Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted
to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which
cannot be remedied under any standard compensation.
In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right to
injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC but only
question the amount thereof. Their property is by their own choice
encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the non-payment of the loan,
which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly
subject to a foreclosure sale.
It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence in the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings of facts
ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination. As such, a
trial court’s decision to grant or to deny injunctive relief will not be set aside
on appeal unless the court abused its discretion.
Northern Luzon Island Co. v
Garcia, 753 SCRA 603
The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment
which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered
appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The
attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate actionindependent of
the principal action because the attachment was
only an incident of such action
NORTHERN VS SPS. GARCIA
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated
January 19, 2012 and the Resolution[3] dated August 24, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97448, ordering the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 215 (RTC) to appoint a commissioner to determine
the value of the attached properties of respondents Spouses Dennis and
Cherylin Garcia (respondents), and to discharge any excessive attachment
found thereby.
The Facts: On September 23, 2005, petitioner Northern Islands Co., Inc.
(petitioner) filed a Complaint[4] with application for a writ of preliminary
attachment, before the RTC against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-05-53699 (Main Case), which was subsequently amended[5] on October
25, 2005.[6] It alleged that: (a) from March to July 2004, petitioner caused
the delivery to respondents of various appliances in the aggregate amount
of P8,040,825.17;[7] (b) the goods were transported, shipped, and delivered
by Sulpicio Lines, Inc., and were accepted in good order and condition by
respondents' representatives;[8] (c) the parties agreed that the goods
delivered were payable within 120 days, and that the unpaid amounts would
earn interest at a rate of eighteen percent (18%) per annum;[9] (d) however,
the value of the goods were not paid by respondents despite repeated
demands;[10] and (e) respondents fraudulently asserted that petitioner had
no proof that they had indeed received the quantity of the subject goods.[11]
In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary attachment,
petitioner posted a bond, through Visayan Surety and Insurance
Corporation, in the amount of ?8,040,825.17. On November 7, 2005, the RTC
issued the writ sought for.[12]
Instead of filing an answer, respondents filed on November 11, 2001, an
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Proper Pleading and Motion for
Discovery (Production and Inspection)[13] (November 11, 2001 Motion),
asking the RTC to allow them to photocopy and personally examine the
original invoices, delivery cargo receipts, and bills of lading attached to the
Amended Complaint, claiming that they could not "come up with an
intelligent answer" without being presented with the originals of such
documents.[14]
Thereafter, or on January 11, 2006, respondents filed a Motion to Discharge
Excess Attachment,[15] alleging that the attachment previously ordered by
the RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that the estimated value of the
attached properties, including the garnished bank accounts, as assessed by
their appraiser, Gaudioso W. Lapaz (Lapaz), amounted to P17,273,409.73,
while the attachment bond is only in the amount of P8,040,825.17.[16]
In an Order[17] dated February 28, 2006, the RTC denied the November 11,
2001 Motion, and, instead, directed respondents to file their answer, which
the latter complied with through the filing of their Answer Ad Cautelam Ex
Abudante with Compulsory Counterclaim[18]on April 3, 2006. Despite this,
respondents again filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion for
Discovery (Production and Inspection)[19] (Motion for Discovery) on April 7,
2006.[20]
The RTC Ruling
In an Order[21] dated June 21, 2006, the RTC, among others, denied the
Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, finding that the appraisal made by
Lapaz was not reflective of the true valuation of the properties, adding too
that the bond posted by petitioner stands as sufficient security for whatever
damages respondents may sustain by reason of the attachment.[22]
On the other hand, the RTC granted the Motion for Discovery in accordance
with Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, despite petitioner's claim that it did not
have the originals of the documents being sought.[23]However, no
production or inspection was conducted on July 10, 2006 as the RTC directed
since respondents received the copy of the above order only on July 11,
2006.[24]
On July 25, 2006, respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the Order dated June 21, 2006, specifically assailing the denial of their
Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment. In this relation, they prayed that the
RTC refer to a commissioner, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, the
factual determination of the total aggregate amount of respondents'
attached properties so as to ascertain if the attachment was excessive. Also,
they prayed that the order for production and inspection be modified and
that petitioner be ordered to produce the original documents anew for their
inspection and copying. [25]
The foregoing motion was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order[26]
dated August 23, 2006 for lack of merit. Thus, respondents elevated the
matter to the CA via petition for certiorari and mandamus,[27] docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 97448 (Certiorari Case).
In the interim, the RTC rendered a Decision[28] dated September 21, 2011 in
the Main Case. Essentially, it dismissed petitioner's Amended Complaint due
to the absence of any evidence to prove that respondents had agreed to the
pricing of the subject goods.[29]
The RTC's September 21, 2011 Decision was later appealed[30] by petitioner
before the CA on October 27, 2011. Finding that the Notice of Appeal was
seasonably filed, with the payment of the appropriate docket fees, the RTC,
in an Order[31] dated January 25, 2012, ordered the elevation of the entire
records of the Main Case to the CA.
The appeal was then raffled to the CA's Eighth Division, and docketed as CA-
G.R. CV No. 98237. On the other hand, records do not show that respondents
filed any appeal.[32]
The CA Ruling in the Certiorari Case
Meanwhile, the CA, in a Decision[33] dated January 19, 2012, partly granted
the certiorari petition of respondents, ordering the RTC to appoint a
commissioner as provided under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court as well as the
subsequent discharge of any excess attachment if so found therein, and, on
the other hand, denying respondents' Motion for Discovery.[34]
It held that: (a) on the issue of attachment, trial by commissioners under Rule
32 of the Rules of Court was proper so that the parties may finally settle their
conflicting valuations;[35] and (b) on the matter of discovery, petitioner
could not be compelled to produce the originals sought by respondents for
inspection since they were not in the former's possession.[36]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration[37] on
February 13, 2012 but was, however, denied in a Resolution[38]dated August
24, 2012, hence, the present petition.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues presented for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether the RTC had
lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after
petitioner appealed the decision in the Main Case, and thereafter ordered
the transmittal of the records to the CA; and (b) whether the CA erred in
ordering the appointment of a commissioner and the subsequent discharge
of any excess attachment found by said commissioner.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of
appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.
In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC's September
21, 2011 Decision resolving the Main Case through the timely filing of its
Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011, together with the payment of the
appropriate docket fees. The RTC, in an Order[39]dated January 25, 2012,
had actually confirmed this fact, and thereby ordered the elevation of the
entire records to the CA. Meanwhile, records do not show that respondents
filed any appeal, resulting in the lapse of its own period to appeal therefrom.
Thus, based on Section 9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously doubted that the
RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the Main Case.
With the RTC's loss of jurisdiction over the Main Case necessarily comes its
loss of jurisdiction over all matters merely ancillary thereto. Thus, the
propriety of conducting a trial by commissioners in order to determine the
excessiveness of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary
matter to the Main Case, is now mooted by its supervening appeal in CA-
G.R. CV No. 98237.
Note that in Sps. Olib v. Judge Pastoral,[40] the Court, in view of the nature
of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that the attachment itself
cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal
action because the attachment was only an incident of such action, viz.:
Attachment is defined as a provisional remedy by which the property of an
adverse party is taken into legal custody, either at the commencement of an
action or at any time thereafter, as a security for the satisfaction of any
judgment that may be recovered by the plaintiff or any proper party.
It is an auxiliary remedy and cannot have an independent existence apart
from the main suit or claim instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant.
Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if
the suit itself cannot be maintained as the purpose of the writ can no longer
be justified.
The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment
which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered
appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The
attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of
the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such
action.[41] (Emphases supplied)
That being said, it is now unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised
herein. In fine, the petition is granted and the assailed CA rulings are set
aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 19, 2012
and the Resolution dated August 24, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97448 are hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Luzon Dev. Bank v Krishman,
755 SCRA (2015)
Once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the
petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the
counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that petitioner’s argument that it has
the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing a
counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation
thereof is unmeritorious.
The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is unmistakable
in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely
concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of money as the word
"amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money.
Petitioners should not give a special or technical interpretation to a word
which is otherwise construed in its ordinary sense by the law and broaden
the signification of the term "deposit" to include that of real properties.
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, et.al. v. ERLINDA KRISHNAN
TICKLER: Sec. 5 of Rule 57 requires that the counter-bond is in the form of
cash. A party may not deposit any real or personal property in lieu of cash as
a counterbond.
DOCTRINE: The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is
unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can
be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of money as the word
"amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money.
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure praying for the annulment of the Decision and Resolution
Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Orders Regional Trial Court (RTC)-
Manila.
Erlinda Khrishnan filed a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and
Damages against petitioners Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente,
and Oscar Ramirez. Erlinda claimed that she is a client of the petitioner bank
wherein she maintained several accounts including time deposits. On several
occasions, when Erlinda presented her Time Deposits Certificates amounting
to P28,597,472.70 for payment because they have become due, petitioners
refused to honor them for the reason that they were fraudulent. Respondent
Erlinda likewise applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment. In a Decision
granting a Petition for Certiorari filed by Erlinda, the RTC ordered the
petitioner bank file a counter bond in accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 57, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, within 10 days from the finality of this decision;
otherwise, the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 36, in Manila shall
immediately reinstate the writ of attachment issued and implemented in
Civil Case No. 01-100046. Respondent Erlinda filed her attachment bond on
June 25, 2009 in the amount of P35,000,000.00 through Visayan Surety and
Insurance Corporation. Meanwhile, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion
praying that a hearing be held to determine the sufficiency of the
attachment bond and they be allowed to deposit Certificates of Title of real
property, and the issuance of the writ of attachment be held in abeyance.
The CA affirmed the Orders of the RTC reinstating the Writ of Attachment
for failure of petitioners to file the required counter-bond.
In their petition, petitioners contend that it has the option to deposit real
property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to secure any contingent lien on
its property in the event respondent wins the case. They argue that Section
2 of Rule 57 only mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only be
confined or construed to refer to cash.
ISSUE: May the bank property be deposited in lieu of cash or a counter-
bond?
RULING: No. Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that
"[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte or upon motion with
notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the
court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the party against
whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy
the applicant’s demand, unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as
hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order, which
may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand or the value
of the property to be attached as stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."
Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing the
writ shall without delay and with all reasonable diligence attach, to await
judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the
Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from
execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant’s demand, unless the
former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives
a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond
fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the property
to be attached, exclusive of costs."
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has
been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through
a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that
petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead
of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or
stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious.
In Security Pacific Assurance Corporation v. Tria-Infante, the trial court ruled
that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or
construed to refer to cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in
the present case for the reason that a party seeking a stay of the attachment
under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount equal to the
bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment or to the value of the
property to be attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and
"amount" is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said
words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of
money as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated
with a sum of money.
Excellent Quality Apparel v
Visayan Surety, 761 SCRA 464
Under Section 20, Rule 57, in relation to Section 4 therein, the surety bond
shall answer for all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party
and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment. In other
words, the damages sought to be enforced against the surety bond are
unliquidated. Necessarily, a notice and hearing before the finality of
judgment must be undertaken to properly determine the amount of
damages that was suffered by the defendant due to the improper
attachment. These damages to be imposed against the attaching party and
his sureties are different from the principal case, and must be included in the
judgment. On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, in relation to Section
12 therein, the cash deposit or the counterbond shall secure the payment of
any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. Stated
differently, the damages sought to be charged against the surety bond are
liquidated. The final judgment had already determined the amount to be
awarded to the winning litigant on the main action. Thus, there is nothing
left to do but to execute the judgment against the losing party, or in case of
insufficiency, against its sureties.
EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL, INC. VS VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE
CORPORATION (Visayan) , and FAR EASTERN SURETY & INSURANCE CO.,
DOCTRINE: To hold a surety liable upon an application for damages against
the wrongful attachment, the surety must be given due notice on the
application for damages before the judgment becomes final and executory.
On the other hand, to hold a surety liable on its counterbond, notice to the
surety even after the judgment had become final and executory is allowed.
FACTS: Petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel (EQA), then represented Max L.F.
Ying (Ying), Vice-President for Productions, and Alfiero R. Orden, Treasurer,
entered into a construction contract with Multi-Rich Builders, a single
proprietorship establishment. Included in the contract was an Arbitration
Clause in case of dispute. Later, Win Multi-Rich Builders, Inc. (Win Multi-Rich)
was incorporated.
Win Multi-Rich filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with an
application for writ of attachment against petitioner and Ying before the
RTC. Win Multi-Rich then secured the necessary bond from respondent
Visayan Surety and Insurance Corporation (Visayan Surety). Consequently,
the RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Win Multi-Rich.
To prevent the enforcement of the writ, petitioner filed a counterbond in an
amount equal to the attachment bond payable to the Clerk of Court of the
RTC. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion seeking to discharge
the attachment. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC due to
the presence of the Arbitration Clause in the contract. This motion was
denied by the RTC on the ground that the issues of the case could be
resolved after a full-blown trial.
In its answer with compulsory counterclaim, petitioner denied the material
allegation of the complaint and sought the immediate lifting of the writ of
attachment. It also prayed that the bond filed by Win Multi-Rich to support
its application for attachment be held to satisfy petitioner’s claim for
damages due to the improper issuance of such writ. Later, the RTC issued an
order directing the deposit of the garnished funds of petitioner to the cashier
of the Clerk of Court of the RTC. Thereafter, Win Multi-Rich filed a motion
to release petitioner’s cash deposit to it which was granted by the RTC. To
secure the withdrawal of the cash deposited by petitioner, Win Multi-Rich
posted a surety bond issued by FESICO. Thus, Win Multi-Rich was able to
receive the funds of petitioner even before the trial began.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the RTC’s orders
denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion and directing the deposit of the
garnished funds of petitioner to the cashier of the Clerk of Court of the RTC.
Petitioner also filed its Supplemental Manifestation and Motion, asserting
that its cash deposit with the RTC was turned over to Win Multi-Rich. The CA
partially granted petitioner’s petition. The Supreme Court resolved the
matter in favor of petitioner and held: first, that Win Multi-Rich was not a
real party in interest; second, that the RTC should not have taken cognizance
of the collection suit because the presence of the arbitration clause vested
jurisdiction on the CIAC over all construction disputes between petitioner
and Multi-Rich; and lastly, that Win Multi-Rich could not retain the garnished
amount, as the RTC did not have jurisdiction to issue the questioned writ of
attachment and to order the release of the funds. Win Multi-Rich filed a
motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the decision became final
and executory.
Thereafter, petitioner moved for execution thereof, praying for the return of
its cash deposit and, in the event of refusal of Win Multi-Rich to comply, to
hold Visayan Surety and FESICO liable under their respective bonds. The RTC,
at first, granted the motion for execution, however, upon respondents’
motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed its previous order and lifted its
order insofar as it granted the motion for execution against Visayan Surety
and FESICO. The RTC absolved the surety respondents because petitioner did
not file a motion for judgment on the attachment bond before the finality
of judgment, thus, violating the surety respondents’ right to due process. It
further held that the execution against the surety respondents would go
beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed considering that
the Court decision pertained to Win Multi-Rich only.
On appeal, the CA found petitioner’s appeal without merit. Citing Section 20,
Rule 57 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (Section 20, Rule 57), the CA held
that petitioner failed to timely claim damages against the surety before the
decision of the Court became final and executory. It further stated that a
court judgment could not bind persons who were not parties to the action
as the records showed that Visayan Surety and FESICO were neither
impleaded nor informed of the proceedings before the Court. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in ruling that the petitioner cannot claim
against the surety for its failure to timely claim damages against the surety
before the decision of the court became final and executory.
2. WON the CA erred in ruling that the court judgment cannot bind
Visayan Surety and FISECO because neither were impleaded as parties nor
informed of the proceedings.
RULING: The Supreme Court held that there was an application for damages
but Visayan Surety cannot be held liable because it was not duly notified of
the application for damages resulting from the improper, irregular or
excessive attachment.
In this case, the attachment bond was issued by Visayan Surety in order for
Win Multi-Rich to secure the issuance of the writ of attachment. Hence, any
application for damages arising from the improper, irregular or excessive
attachment shall be governed by Section 20, Rule 57. In a catena of cases,
the Court has cited the requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 in order to claim
damages against the bond, as follows:
1. The application for damages must be filed in the same case where the
bond was issued;
2. Such application for damages must be filed before the entry of judgment;
and
3. After hearing with notice to the surety.
The usual procedure is to file an application for damages with due notice to
the other party and his sureties. The other method would be to incorporate
the application in the answer with compulsory counterclaim. In the present
petition, the Court holds that petitioner sufficiently incorporated an
application for damages against the wrongful attachment in its answer with
compulsory counterclaim filed before the RTC. However, petitioner’s answer
with compulsory counterclaim, which contained the application for
damages, was not served on Visayan Surety. Visayan Surety was only notified
of the application when the motion for execution had become final and
executory. Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the requisites under
Section 20, Rule 57 because Visayan Surety was not given due notice on the
application for damages before the finality of judgment. The subsequent
motion for execution, which sought to implicate Visayan Surety, cannot alter
the immutable judgment anymore.
On the other hand, the same cannot be said of FESICO because, in the first
place, Win Multi-Rich should not have filed its motion to release the cash
deposit of petitioner and the RTC should not have granted the same. The
release of the cash deposit to the attaching party is anathema to the basic
tenets of a preliminary attachment. The chief purpose of the remedy of
attachment is to secure a contingent lien on defendant’s property until
plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and have such
property applied to its satisfaction, or to make some provision for unsecured
debts in cases where the means of satisfaction thereof are liable to be
removed beyond the jurisdiction, or improperly disposed of or concealed, or
otherwise placed beyond the reach of creditors. The garnished funds or
attached properties could only be released to the attaching party after a
judgment in his favor is obtained. Under no circumstance, whatsoever, can
the garnished funds or attached properties, under the custody of the sheriff
or the clerk of court; be released to the attaching party before the
promulgation of judgment.
The cash deposit or the counter-bond was supposed to secure the
payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action.
In this case, however, Win Multi-Rich was able to withdraw the cash deposit
and, in exchange, it posted a surety bond of FESICO in favor of petitioner to
answer for the damages that the latter may sustain. Corollarily, the surety
bond of FESICO substituted the cash deposit of petitioner as a security for
the judgment. Thus, to claim damages from the surety bond of FESICO,
Section 17, Rule 57 could be applied. Unlike Section 20, Rule 57, which
requires notice and hearing before the finality of the judgment in an
application for damages, Section 17, Rule 57 allows a party to claim damages
on the surety bond after the judgment has become executory.
Under Section 20, Rule 57, in relation to Section 4 therein, the
surety bond shall answer for all the costs which may be adjudged to the
adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
attachment. In other words, the damages sought to be enforced against the
surety bond are unliquidated. Necessarily, a notice and hearing before the
finality of judgment must be undertaken to properly determine the amount
of damages that was suffered by the defendant due to the improper
attachment. These damages to be imposed against the attaching party and
his sureties are different from the principal case, and must be included in the
judgment.
On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, in relation to Section 12 therein,
the cash deposit or the counter-bond shall secure the payment of any
judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. Stated
differently, the damages sought to be charged against the surety bond are
liquidated. The final judgment had already determined the amount to be
awarded to the winning litigant on the main action. Thus, there is nothing
left to do but to execute the judgment against the losing party, or in case of
insufficiency, against its sureties.
Indeed, FESICO cannot escape liability on its surety bond issued in favor of
petitioner. The purpose of FESICO's bond was to secure the withdrawal of
the cash deposit and to answer any damages that would be inflicted against
petitioner in the course of the proceedings. Also, the undertaking signed by
FESICO stated that the duration of the effectivity of the bond shall be from
its approval by the court until the action is fully decided, resolved or
terminated.
FESICO cannot simply escape liability by invoking that it was not a party in
the previous case. From the moment that FESICO issued a surety bond in
favor of Win Multi-Rich and the same was posted before the RTC, the court
has acquired jurisdiction over the surety, and the provisions of Sections 12
and 17 of Rule 57 became operational. Thus, the Court holds that FESICO is
solidarily liable under its surety bond with its principal Win Multi-Rich.
Watercraft Venture Corp v
Wolfe, 770 SCRA 179
The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show
the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent
cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or
failure to comply with his obligation. The particulars of such circumstances
necessarily include the time, persons, places and specific acts of fraud
committed. An affidavit which does not contain concrete and specific
grounds is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such writ. In fact, mere
general averments render the writ defective and the court that ordered its
issuance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction.
The defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment
under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual
averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was
based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly
or irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion
for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the
action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere
hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial.
Be that as it may, the foregoing rule is not applicable in
this case because when Wolfe filed a motion to dissolve the writ
of preliminary attachment, he did not offer to show the falsity
of the factual averments in Watercraft's application and
affidavit on which the writ was based. Instead, he sought the
discharge of the writ on the ground that Watercraft failed to
particularly allege any circumstance amounting to fraud. No
trial on the merits of the action at a mere hearing of such
motion will be had since only the sufficiency of the factual
averments in the application and affidavit of merit will be
examined in order to find out whether or not Wolfe was guilty
of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon
which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof.
WATERCRAFT VENTURE CORP. v.
ALFRED RAYMOND WOLFE
RULE 57 – PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
FACTS: Petitioner Watercraft Venture Corporation (Watercraft) is engaged in
the business of building, repairing, storing and maintaining yachts, boats
and other pleasure crafts at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Subic, Zambales.
It hired respondent Alfred Raymond Wolfe (Wolfe), a British national and
resident of Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Zambales, as its Shipyard Manager.
During his employment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull, within
Watercraft1’s boat storage facilities, but never paid for the storage fees. Later
on, Watercraft terminated Wolfe’s employment.
Sometime in June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's
storage facilities after
signing a Boat Pull-Out Clearance where he allegedly acknowledged the
outstanding obligation of
US$16,324.82 representing unpaid boat storage fees. Despite repeated
demands, he failed to pay the said
amount. Thus, Watercraft filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money
with Damages with an
Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
Wolfe on the other hand, claimed that he was hired as Service and Repair
Manager, instead of
Shipyard Manager and denied owing Watercraft the amount of
US$16,324.82. He explained that the
sailboat was purchased in February 1998 as part of an agreement between
him and Watercraft1’s then
General Manager and President for repair and be used as training or fill-in
project for the staff, and to be
sold later on.
RTC granted Watercraft’s application for Writ of Preliminary attachment. CA
on the other hand,
granted Wolfe’s petition, annulling and setting aside the Writ of attachment,
and declaring null and void
the Notice of attachment and levy.
ISSUE
WON the allegations of fraud are sufficient to warrant the ex-parte issuance
of the Writ of
Preliminary Attachment in favor of Petitioner Watercraft.
HELD
A writ of preliminary attachment is defined as a provisional remedy issued
upon order of the court
where an action is pending to be levied upon the property or properties of
the defendant therein, the
same to be held thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
whatever judgment that might
be secured in the said action by the attaching creditor against the defendant.
For the issuance of an ex-parte issuance of the preliminary attachment to be
valid, an affidavit of
merit and an applicant's bond must be filed with the court in which the
action is pending. Such bond
executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court is subject to
the conditions that the
applicant will pay:
All costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party. The mere filing of an
affidavit reciting the facts required by Section 3. Neither can it be inferred
from such affidavit the particulars of why he was guilty of fraud in the
performance of such obligation. that the amount due to the applicant. . that
a sufficient cause of action exists. Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary
Attachment does not contain specific allegations of other factual
circumstances to show that Wolfe. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
September 27. SP No. Section 3 Rule 57 of the Rules of Court states that an
order of attachment shall be granted only when it appears in the affidavit of
the applicant. 2007 and its Resolution dated January 24. Rule 57. 97804. or
the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to recover.
Watercraft failed to state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud. that the case is one of those mentioned in Section 1[17] hereof.R. and
2. 2. and 4. 2008 in CA-G. 1. is not enough to compel the judge to grant the
writ of preliminary attachment. is as much as the sum for which the order is
granted above all legal counterclaims. upon his sound discretion. that there
is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the
action. as required by Section 5 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court. and its
acceptance or rejection. All damages which such party may sustain by reason
of the attachment. premises considered. 3. absent any showing that such
failure was due to insidious machinations and intent on his part to defraud
Watercraft of the amount due it. are AFFIRMED. or of some other person
who personally knows the facts: 1. the petition is DENIED. if the court shall
finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto. The sufficiency or
insufficiency of an affidavit depends upon the amount of credit given it by
the judge. had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay. DISPOSITIVE
PORTION WHEREFORE. at the time of contracting the obligation. and that
Wolfe's mere failure to pay the boat storage fees does not necessarily
amount to fraud. As to the requisite affidavit of merit. however.
ET AL. On April 5. the petitioner sought a clarificatory order moving that the
TRO be vacated due to its being effective for only twenty days and because
such effectivity could neither be extended nor be made indefinite. The RTC
Judge’s issuance of the assailed order dated November 12. including the
respondents. On October 30. 2000. the MTCC issued the writ of execution
upon the petitioner’s motion. herein petitioner Angelina Pahila- Garrido.
from his properties. injunction. 2002.PAHILA-GARRIDO v. On February 16.
1999 decision and the February 16. 2002. She complained that her hands had
already been tied for a year from executing the decision and from availing
herself of the writ of demolition. None of the parties objected to or
challenged the corrections.: RULE 58 – PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION FACTS On
June 23. 2000. The writ of execution was duly served on August 24.
TORTOGO. 2002 granting the respondents’ application for the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction constituted manifestly grave abuse of
discretion. 2000 writ of execution and its aliases. including the respondents
herein. and pleaded that it was time to give her justice in order that she could
already enjoy the possession of the property. On October 25. 1998. was
substituted for him on September 24. 2001. the principle of immutability of
a final judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally applied
against the respondents. as the sheriffs return of service indicated. the
respondents moved for the early resolution of the case and for the issuance
of the writ of prohibitory injunction. is not a cause of action in itself but
merely a provisional remedy. being a preservative remedy for the protection
of substantive rights or interests. They could not anymore be permitted to
interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through their
interposition of new petitions or pleadings. and a motion to stay the
execution of the March 17. HELD Under the circumstances. the respondents
filed a motion to quash against the April 5. the MTCC amended its decision
to correct typographical errors in the description of the properties involved.
J. ISSUE WON the RTC lawfully issued the TRO and the writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction to enjoin the execution of the already final and
executory March 17. Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC an action for
ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several
defendants. G. 156358 August 17. however. he died during the pendency of
the action. On November 12. He amended the complaint to implead the
spouses of some of the defendants. 2002. It is resorted to only when there is
a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences that cannot be . 1997.
2000 upon all the defendants. Generally. the RTC issued the assailed writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction.R. 1999 decision of the MTCC. and his
surviving spouse. On April 20. 2011 BERSAMIN. an adjunct to a main suit. No.
2000 amended decision.
because injunction protected only an existing right or actual interest in
property. Thus. Presumably well aware that the respondents held absolutely
no valid and existing right in the land. which is merely contingent. . and in
the absence of facts bringing the matter within the conditions for its
issuance. he was guilty of committing manifestly grave abuse of discretion.
Thus. and which may never arise. A writ of preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a transcendent
remedy. They did not. to begin with. We NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction issued on November 12. It is granted only
to protect actual and existing substantial rights. The respondents did not
establish the existence of an actual right to be protected by injunction. the
ancillary writ must be struck down for being issued in grave abuse of
discretion. He obviously acted arbitrarily and whimsically. we GRANT the
petition for certiorari. hold any enforceable claim in the property subject of
the MTCC decision and of the writ of execution. DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE. and DIRECT the Regional Trial Court. 01-11522. Branch 48. in
Bacolod City to dismiss SCA Case No. and compounded his guilt by stopping
the enforcement of a final and executory decision of the MTCC.redressed
under any standard of compensation. 2002 for being devoid of legal and
factual bases. Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant.
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse. the RTC Judge had
plainly no factual and legal bases for enjoining the enforcement of the writ
of execution through the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction. or to
restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.
computed according to the assessed value thereof. R-II Builders argues that
it filed its complaint with the Manila RTC which is undoubtedly vested with
jurisdiction over actions where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. seeking the reconsideration of Court's decision dated 9 March
2011. it was established that R-II Builders complaint did not involve an intra-
corporate dispute and that. continues until the case is finally terminated. that
the re-raffle and/or amendment of pleadings do not affect a court's
jurisdiction which. & NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY G. said complaint
was raffled to Branch 24. that despite the determination subsequently made
by Branch 24 of the Manila RTC that the case did not involve an intra-
corporate dispute. and. with prayer to be furnished all pleadings.: RULE 59 –
RECEIVERSHIP FACTS Before the Court are: (a) the Entry of Appearance filed
by Atty. 192649 June 22. that R-II Builders had no hand in the raffling of the
case. said court issued the 2 January 2008 order erroneously ordering the re-
raffle of the case. HELD The record shows that. Having consistently sought
the transfer of possession and control of the properties comprising the Asset
Pool over and above the nullification of the Deed of Conveyance in favor of
HGC. notices and other court processes at its given address. Lope E. and (b)
the motion filed by R-II Builders. the subject matter of the case is clearly one
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. venue was improperly laid since
none of the parties maintained its principal office in Manila. While it is true.
it cannot be gainsaid that Branch 24 of the RTC Manila had no jurisdiction
over the case. It appears that. the designated Special Commercial Court
(SCC) tasked to hear intra-corporate controversies. J. In obvious evasion of
said directive to pay the correct docket . even if it is. once acquired. however.
that the court erred in holding that the case was a real action and that it
evaded the payment of the correct docket fees computed on the basis of the
assessed value of the realties in the Asset Pool. Amended and Supplemental
Complaint and Second Amended Complaint all primarily sought the
nullification of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) transferring
the Asset Pool in favor of petitioner Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC). lack
of jurisdiction and improper venue. therefore. Inc. that through no fault of
its own. This much was directed in the 19 May 2008 Order issued by Branch
22 of the Manila RTC which determined that the case is a real action and
admitted the Amended and Supplemental Complaint R-II Builders
subsequently filed in the case. Feble of the Toquero Exconde Manalang Feble
Law Offices as collaborating counsel for respondent R-II Builders. No. it
follows R-II Builders should have paid the correct and appropriate docket
fees. the Manila RTC did not lose jurisdiction over the same and its Executive
Judge correctly directed its re-raffling to Branch 22 of the same Court. 2011
PEREZ. among other grounds.HOME GUARANTY CORP. with the raffle of R-
II Builders complaint before Branch 24 of the Manila RTC and said courts
grant of the application for temporary restraining order incorporated
therein. v. at said preliminary hearing. Rather than ordering the dismissal of
the complaint. R-II BUILDERS INC. HGC sought a preliminary hearing of its
affirmative defenses which included. that since its original Complaint. (R-II
Builders).R.
Feble of Tuquero Exconde Manalang Feble Law Offices as collaborating
counsel for respondent R-II Builders. and (b) DENY with FINALITY R-II
Builders. Lope E.fees.s Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 9
March 2011 for lack of merit. With the adverse consequences that could result
from the transfer of possession and control of the Asset Pool. and DENY
counsels prayer to be furnished with all pleadings notices and other court
processes at Unit 2704-A. nevertheless prayed for its appointment as
Receiver of the properties comprising the same. Ortigas Center Pasig. R-II
Builders withdrew its Amended and Supplemental Complaint and. filed its
Second Amended Complaint which. however. it finally bears emphasizing
that the Asset Pool is comprised of government properties utilized by HGC
as part of its sinking fund. it is imperative that R-II Builders should be made
to pay the docket and filing fees corresponding to the assessed value of the
properties comprising the same. in pursuit of its mandate as statutory
guarantor of government housing programs. the basic issues having been
already passed upon and there being no substantial argument to warrant a
modification of the same. Philippine Stock Exchange Centre. since only the
lead counsel is entitled to service of court processes. No further pleadings
or motions shall be entertained herein. Inc. while deleting its causes of action
for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entire
Asset Pool. DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE. West Tower. Inc. the Court
resolves to: (a) NOTE the Entry of Appearance of Atty. in lieu thereof.
Exchange Road.. In addition to the jurisdictional and pragmatic aspects
underlying the payment of the correct docket fees which have already been
discussed in the decision sought to be reconsidered. .
there should be a report indicating that the person who received the
summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had
a relation of confidence. This is not the kind of service contemplated by law.
184333 April 1. Petitioner failed to file any responsive pleading. HELD As a
rule. – If.: RULE 60 – REPLEVIN FACTS Respondent Mach Asia Trading
Corporation is a corporation engaged in importing dump trucks and heavy
equipments. service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons
at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein. the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. J. replevin. CHU v.
ensuring that the latter would actually receive the summon. Upon motion. It
is only when summons cannot be served personally within a reasonable
period of time that substituted service may be resorted to. attorney’s fees
and damages against the petitioner. The service of summons is a vital . 2013
PERALTA. thereafter. since the latter was not there. MACH ASIA TRADING
CORPORATION G. Chu purchased on installment one (1) Hitachi Excavator.
or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business
with some competent person in charge thereof. Petitioner made down
payments with the balance payable in 12 monthly installments through Land
Bank postdated checks. Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides: “SEC.”
Respondent filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City for sum of money. it was not shown that the security guard who received
the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and possessed a
relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons.
The RTC rendered a decision against the petitioner. Thus. summons should
be personally served on the defendant.R. for justifiable causes.SIXTO N. The
RTC issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on the subject
heavy equipments. On appeal. writ of replevin and bond. Sheriff Cortes
proceeded at petitioner’s given address for the purpose of serving the
summons.” It is to be noted that in case of substituted service. However.
upon presentment of the checks for encashment.” “drawn against
insufficient funds. However. the Sheriff failed to serve the summons
personally upon the petitioner. 7. the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section. allowed respondent
to present its evidence ex parte. Section 7. Petitioner Sixto N. NO. together
with the complaint. service on the security guard could not be considered as
substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted service. the RTC
issued an Order declaring defendant in default and. they were dishonored
by the bank either by reason of “closed account.” or “payment stopped. The
Sheriff then resorted to substituted service by having the summons and the
complaint received by a certain Rolando Bonayon. a security guard of the
petitioner. Substituted service. one (1) motorgrader and one (1) payloader.
Clearly.
which permission includes the authority to receive the summons and the writ
of replevin. . 2007. 70666 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. and a
judgment rendered against them is null and void. premises considered.
thereafter. x x x. the petition is GRANTED. Hence. proceed with the trial of
the main action with dispatch.and indispensable ingredient of due process.
dated July 25. Chu and. if Chu had actually received the summons through
his security guard. Chu. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
December 15. DISPOSITIVE PORTION WHEREFORE. 2000 is declared NULL
and VOID. The Regional Trial Court is hereby ORDERED to validly serve
summons upon Sixto N. would not have given his permission without being
informed of the fact of the summons and the writ of replevin issued by the
lower court. otherwise he would be accountable to Chu for the said units.R.
the judgment rendered by the court could not be considered binding upon
him for being null and void. the court acquires no jurisdiction over their
person. the security guard would not have allowed the sheriff to take
possession of the equipments without the prior permission of Chu. Since the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. if
defendants have not been validly summoned. as well as its Resolution dated
August 28. The Decision of the Court of Appeals. CV No. Based on the
presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. As a rule. for
his part. 2008. the requirement of due process would have nevertheless been
complied with. in CA-G.
J. MA. not if they are liable. together with Edwards ailing grandmother.
Branch 140 (trial court) for support. HELD By statutory and jurisprudential
mandate. and thus subscribe to petitioners theory. 2009 CARPIO.000
pendente lite. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is
able to give to respondents. respondents Lester Edward. 163209 October 30.
son of petitioners. for herself and her children. To hold otherwise. This
inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts
a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree.R.
bringing the children with her (then all minors). following the ordering in
Article 199.000 monthly support to respondents.000 subject to Chua Giaks
subsidiary liability. CA affirmed the trial court. Edward and their children
resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park. Cheryl bore Edward three
children. sued petitioners. the liability of ascendants to provide legal support
to their descendants is beyond cavil. petitioners theorize that their liability is
activated only upon default of parental authority. Cheryl and Edward
exercised parental authority over their children. RTC rendered judgment
ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40. respondent Cheryl
S. Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City. Because at the time respondents sued for support. Makati City. The trial
court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6. which provided him
with a monthly salary of P6. conceivably either by its termination or
suspension during the childrens minority. Candice Grace and Mariano III.
CHERYL LIM G.000. with Edward shouldering P6. is to . P6.: RULE 61 –
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE FACTS In 1979. Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park
residence. on Parental Authority. shouldered the family expenses. Petitioners
themselves admit as much they limit their petition to the narrow question of
when their liability is triggered.SPS. Cheryl had no steady source of
income.000 a month. there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge
her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children. Cheryl. LIM
v. as amended.000 and petitioners the balance of P34. Cheryl. is insufficient
to meet respondents basic needs. Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim
(Mariano). On 14 October 1990. both in the paternal (petitioners) and
maternal lines. No. after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she
caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court
described a very compromising situation. Relying on provisions found in
Title IX of the Civil Code. Edwards family business. petitioners submit that
the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them. Lim (Cheryl)
married Edward Lim (Edward). ISSUE WON petitioners are concurrently liable
with Edward to provide support to respondents. then all school-bound.
Edward. Here.
As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood. Branch 140. we are constrained to
remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose. we DENY the
petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals. We REMAND the
case to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Candice Grace and Mariano
III belong to this category. However. and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004
with the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim are
liable to provide support only to respondents Lester Edward. arising from
their marital bond. Thus. dated 28 April 2003. DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE. . only respondents Lester Edward. for further proceedings
consistent with this ruling.sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating
extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give
adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than
able to fill the void. petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only
to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to
relatives. Unfortunately. Indeed. Cheryl’s right to receive support from the
Lim family extends only to her husband Edward. Candice Grace and Mariano
III. all surnamed Lim. Cheryl’s share from the amount of monthly support the
trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records. by blood of
lower degree.
UNITED ALLOY PHILIPINES CORPORATION, SPOUSES DAVID C. CHUA and
LUTEN CHUA, Petitioners vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,
Facts: On December 18, 2000, herein petitioner corporation, United Alloy
Philippines Corporation (UNIALLOY) applied for and was granted a credit
accommodation by herein respondent United Coconut Planters Bank.
(UCPB) in the amount of PhP50,000,000.00, as evidenced by a Credit
Agreement. Part of UNIALLOY's obligation under the Credit Agreement was
secured by a Surety Agreement, dated December 18, 2000, executed by
UNIALLOY Chairman, Jakob Van Der Sluis (Van Der Sluis), UNIALLOY
President, David Chua and his spouse, Luten Chua (Spouses Chua), and one
Yang Kim Eng (Yang). Six (6) Promissory Notes, were later executed by
UNIALLOY in UCPB's favor. In addition, as part of the consideration for the
credit accommodation, UNIALLOY and UCPB also entered into a "lease-
purchase" contract wherein the former assured the latter that it will purchase
several real properties which UCPB co-owns with the Development Bank of
the Philippines.
UNIALLOY failed to pay its loan obligations. As a result, UCPB filed against
UNIALLOY, the spouses Chua, Yang and Van Der Sluis an action for Sum of
Money with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment. UNIALLOY filed against
UCPB, UCPB Vice-President Robert Chua and Van Der Sluis claiming that it
holds office and conducts its business operations in Tagoloan, Misamis
Oriental. UNIALLOY contended that Van Der Sluis, in cahoots with UCPB
Vice-President Robert Chua, committed fraud, manipulation and
misrepresentation to obtain the subject loan for their own benefit.
UNIALLOY prayed, among others, that three (3) of the six (6) Promissory
Notes it executed be annulled or reformed or that it be released from liability
thereon.
UNIALLOY filed with the RTC of Makati an omnibus motion praying for the
suspension of the proceedings of the collection case in the said court on the
ground of pendency of the certiorari petition it filed with this Court.
However, the RTC denied UNIALLOY's motion in its Order dated August 19,
2002. On September 21, 2006, the CA rendered its assailed judgment denying
UNIALLOY's appeal and affirming the questioned RTC Decision.
Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred and/or committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the
assailed questioned decision when there is a pending civil action before the
regional trial court of Cagayan de oro, branch 40, involving the same parties
and subject matter which case, is now pending and assailed by the plaintiff-
appellee via petition before the honorable supreme court.
Ruling: The honorable court of appeals committed a serious, reversible error
if not grave abuse of discretion, in denying petitioners' urgent motion for
reconsideration without stating clearly and distinctly the factual and legal
basis thereof. Considering that the promissory notes subject of G.R. No.
179257 are among the promissory notes which are also involved in the
present case, petitioner contends that a judgment by this Court in G.R. No.
179257 that reverses the Decision of the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City, which
in effect would declare the nullity of the subject promissory notes, may
conflict with the Decision of this Court in the present petition, which involves
the collection of the sum being represented in the same promissory notes.
Phil Airconditioning Center v
RCJ Lines, 775 SCRA 265
There are various modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.:
(1) by depositing cash or posting a counterbond under Section 12; (2) by
proving that the attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued or
enforced, or that the bond is insufficient under Section 13; (3) by showing
that the attachment is excessive under Section 13; and (4) by claiming
that the property is exempt from execution under Section 2.
The discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon posting of a counter-bond
or depositing cash, and after hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash
deposit or counterbond. On the other hand, the discharge under Section 13
takes effect only upon showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond
was improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is insufficient. The
discharge of the attachment under Section 13
must be made only after hearing. The dissolution of the preliminary
attachment upon security given [Section 12], or a showing of its irregular or
improper issuance [Section 13], does not of course operate to discharge the
sureties on plaintiffs own attachment bond. The reason is simple. That bond
is executed to the adverse party,. . . conditioned that the ... (applicant) will
pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all
damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall
finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto."
Hence, until that determination is made, as to the applicant's
entitlement to the attachment, his bond must stand and cannot
be withdrawn.
Republic vs Mega Pacific
Marphil Export vs allied bank
Republic vs sandiganbayan’
Davao Light v. Court of Appeals
Facts: The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao Light") filed a collection
suit against Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and Teodorico Adarna
("Adarna") with an ex parte application for a writ of preliminary attachment.
On 3 May 1989, the trial court issued an Order of Attachment, and the
corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May 1989. On 12 May 1989, the
summons, a copy of the complaint, and the writ of attachment was served
upon Queensland and Adarna. Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to
discharge the attachment on the ground that at the time the Order of
Attachment and Writ of Attachment were issued, the trial court has yet to
acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action and over the persons of the
defendants.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was validly issued.
Held: Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be issued before the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Ratio Decidendi
The court may validly issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. There is an
appreciable period of time between the commencement of the action (takes
place upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and the service of summons
to the defendant. In the meanwhile, there are a number of actions which the
plaintiff or the court may validly take, including the application for and grant
of the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. There is nothing in the
law which prohibits the court from granting the remedy prior to the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. In fact, Rule 57
of the Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of preliminary injunction
at the commencement of the suit. In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and
Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was held that notice and hearing are
not prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Further,
in the case of Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
it was ruled that giving notice to the defendant would defeat the purpose of
the remedy by affording him or her the opportunity to dispose of his
properties before the writ can be issued.
A preliminary attachment may be discharged with the same ease as
obtaining it. In any case, the ease of availing the provisional remedy of
preliminary attachment is matched by the ease with which it can be
remedied by either the posting of a counterbond, or by a showing of its
improper or irregular issuance. The second means of defeating a preliminary
attachement, however, may not be availed of if the writ was issued upon a
ground which is at the same time the applicant's cause of action.
Preliminary attachment not binding until jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, however, even
though validly issued, is not binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction
over his person is first acquired.
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