To what extent does it make sense to use the term global insurgency in the context of the Iraq War

and the continuing insurgency in Afghanistan?

Conceptualizing the scenarios in Iraq and Afghanistan as elements of a singularly global or domestic
insurgency is at the outset problematic. The complexity of the conflicts precludes a straightforward
demarcation within this dichotomy. In the case of Iraq especially one may speak of insurgencies,
mutually oppositional militant components operating in a congruent geography but with differing aims,
means, and relations to transnational constituents. Nevertheless, I have posited a definition for ‘global’
insurgency and on a case-study basis evaluated the Iraq and Afghanistan situations according to the
criteria. Whilst global elements have exploited the weak state institutions and ideologically sympathetic
elements within these theatres, it cannot be said that the qualitative nature of the insurgencies are
focused globally in scope. Iraq is typified by localized Shia-Sunni conflict and state-centred concerns of
US/Iranian encroachment, whilst the Taliban traditionally has upheld a tribal isolationist stance towards
issues outside its immediate aegis.

Conceptualising Global Insurgency

Before application to the global scale, I make the distinction between terrorism, insurgency, and
guerrilla warfare using Hoffman’s rubric. Insurgency is defined as the non-state mobilisation of
“coordinated informational and psychological warfare efforts1” against a status quo power, be it an
occupying force, illegitimate state, or systemic power. ‘Guerrilla’ and ‘terror’ warfare are subsumed as
tactical methods employed by insurgencies. Guerrilla war involves irregular forces emerging from, and
subsequently retreating into, an urban or rural citizenry sympathetic to their cause. Terror tactics are
those designed to have “far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or
target2.” They are often used by forces which lack the resources to mount a traditional insurgency, and
who operate in an urban setting which is not so conducive to Maoist fish/sea3 analogies. I follow
Shultzin, offering a contention that terrorists may operate outside a concerted insurgent effort. Groups
such as the BaaderMeinhof Gang and the Italian Red Army cannot be said to operate in a concerted
insurgency4. Rather, their use of terror encompasses the entire scope of their operation (see below)5. As
such we define terror tactics as existing both within and outside insurgency.

1
Hoffman, B. 2006. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press: New York, p. 35
2
Ibid, p.40
3
Tung, Mao Tse. 2000. On Guerilla Warfare. URL:
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/
4
Shultz, R. H. 2008. Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement. INSS Occasional Paper 66, USAF
Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy: Colorado, p. 15
5
Such a distinction becomes important once we consider Al Qaeda as an insurgency as opposed to a terror
organization outright.
To apply this definition globally, I require a qualitative difference. The importance of external factors in
modern terrorism and insurgency has long been an empirical reality. Irgun enjoyed funding from the
world’s Zionist Jewish diaspora6, ditto for the IRA and Irish diaspora7; the PLO and many European
socialist terrorist organisations collectivised training and funding procedures8; Hezbollah has an
international department of operations9 but remains a domestic insurgency. All contemporary
insurgencies to some extent ‘plug in’ to the transnational black market, whether for arms or drug
financing10. Therefore the mere presence of trans/international factors in the insurgent network is
insufficient for a distinct labelling. A global insurgency must satisfy two criteria. Firstly, it must exhibit
global capabilities. This does not imply a literal global omnipresence, but rather that key global systemic
nodes11 are accessible for attack by the organisation. Secondly, its goals must be oriented globally.
Domestic insurgencies seek admittance to the status quo of international relations. Global insurgencies
wish to disrupt and subvert the global order fundamentally12.

Al Qaeda is currently the only organisation which satisfies both the criteria. Firstly, its stated aim of
uniting the Islamic world under a single caliphate offers an elemental challenge to the regional and
global status quo. In balance-of-power terms a restorative pan-Islamic contiguous boundary modelled
on Mohammad’s holdings would completely erase foreign machinations for resources in the region and
provoke a rebalanced Nash equilibrium for global power13. Beyond this, Al Qaeda’s envisaged caliphate
is not functionary in a modern, Westphalian sense. There would be no acceding to the grundnorms of
international society in statehood and the authority of procedural justice14. Regarding its capabilities, Al
Qaeda has an extensive range of operations. One may observe Killcullen’s compilation of insurgencies
linked to Al Qaeda below. Evidently, the organisation’s power extends beyond its own few attacks.

6
Hoffman, B. 2006. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press: New York, p. 51
7
Duffy, J. 2001. Rich Friends In New York. BBC News. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1563119.stm
8
Hoffman, B. 2006. Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press: New York, p. 76
9
Brew, N. 2003. Hezbollah in Profile. Parliament of Australia: Parliamentary Library.
URL:http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/rn/2002-03/03rn42.htm
10
Rollins, J., & Sun Wyler, L. 2010. International Terrorism and Transnational Crime: Security Threats, U.S. Policy,
and Considerations for Congress. Congressional Research Service. p. 8.
11
This terminology is related to the theoretical basis for my analysis of Al Qaeda, and is elucidated below.
12
Kilcullen, D. J. 2005. Countering Global Insurgency. Journal of Strategic Studies. 28, 4, p. 610
13
For a discussion of regional and global balancing in the post-Cold War world order, see Schwenninger, S. W.
1999. World order lost: American foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. World Policy Journal, 16, 2, p. 42
14
Reus-Smit, C. 1997. The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental
Institutions. International Organisation, 51, 4, p. 567
Current domestic insurgencies networked to the global ‘platform’ span four continents and cover the
entire spectrum of the desired Caliphate15.

The sweeping breadth of the insurgency may impart a mistaken impression on the reader regarding the
nature of Al Qaeda as a worldwide phenomenon. Al Qaeda is not a centralised, state-like organisation.
Especially since the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent response by the US, it has exhibited behaviour of
an organism or ecology as opposed to a mechanistic actor or hierarchical ‘corporation’ of violence.
Kilcullen states that a “Cartesian systems analysis” in the vein of rationalist equilibria predictors, “cannot
handle the complexity inherent in counterinsurgency”16. Instead, he advocates a shift to modelling
utilising the emerging methodology of complexity studies, which he believes “may be the tool needed to
develop a fundamentally new version of counterinsurgency for this War”17. Homer-Dixon outlines the
qualitative properties of complex systems:

“[Complex Systems] have a high degree of connectivity between [many] components.

Additionally, complex systems are thermodynamically open. By this I mean that they’re very
difficult to bound: we can’t draw a line around them and say certain things are inside the system
while everything else is outside. As a result, in terms of their causal relationships with the
surrounding world, complex systems tend to bleed out – or ramify or concatenate out – into the
larger systems around them. And ultimately the boundary that we draw demarcating what is
inside and what is outside is largely arbitrary.

15
Kilcullen, D. J. 2005. Countering Global Insurgency. Journal of Strategic Studies. 28, 4, p. 599
16
Kilcullen, D. J. 2004. Countering Global Insurgency. Australian Department of Defence, p. 24
17
Ibid, p. 46
 [Their behaviour also carries] the characteristic of emergence...We have emergence when a
system as a whole exhibits novel properties that we can’t understand – and maybe can’t even
predict – simply by reference to the properties of the system’s individual components.”18

Whilst originally applied to natural dynamic systems, the theory has recently been transported to the
realm of social science. International Relations proper accommodates a budding CS literature19, along
with insurgency and terrorism studies20.

This conceptualisation mirrors the empirical reality closely, increasingly so. Once one could characterize
Al Qaeda using Dempsey’s “hubs” and “nodes” formulation21. At its genesis, Osama Bin Laden
established Al Qaeda as a franchising operation, whereby he as ‘entrepreneur’ would seek a financial
and infrastructural base in a failed or weak state (The nonexistence of law-and-order facilitates access to
black markets, staging grounds and transit zones ideal for terrorist activity. Moreover, despite complete
institutional collapse the legal preservation of sovereignty by failed states insulate terrorists from
probes by multilateral policing efforts22). The “nodes” were smaller, impermanent cells of up to ten
people where attacks were actually carried out. For example, the planners of the Kenya hotel bombings
of 1992 operated under a “node” model for six months before the attack, setting up temporary
residence until the task had been completed.

After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s operational capabilities were severely compromised,
and it assumed a more decentralised form. Franchising and ideological guidance became its primary role
as opposed to the planning of large-scale attacks à la 9/1123. Autonomous and even disobedient24 cells
in Europe have operated with little to no direct contact with Al Qaeda, using it as a platform for
information coordination and legitimacy. The director-general of the UK Security Service stated in 2005
that there were roughly 30 terrorist conspiracies established in the UK. She characterised the cells as
"resilient networks, some directed from Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, some more loosely inspired by it, planning
attacks including mass casualty suicide attacks in the UK"25. Brian Jackson of RAND confirms the
increasing decentralization of Al Qaeda: ”Given the structural changes that were required of al-Qaeda to
adapt to its loss of Afghanistan as a safe haven,” Jackson says, ”the interconnections among disparate

18
Homer-Dixon, T. 2010. Complexity Science and Public Policy. Speech to the National Arts Centre, Ontario.
URL:http://www.homerdixon.com/download/complexity_science_and_public_policy.pdf
19
A collection of essays highlighting the literature can be found in Harrison, N. E. Harrison. 2006. Complexity in
World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm. State University New York Press: Albany
20
Homer-Dixon, T. 2002. The Rise of Complex Terrorism. Foreign Policy, 128, p. 52. Robb, J. 2006. Brave New War:
The Next Stage of Terrorism. John Wiley & Sons: New Jersey, Edwards, S. J. A. 2004. Swarming and the Future of
Warfare. RAND Doctoral Dissertation. URL:http://www.rand.org/pubs/rgs_dissertations/2005/RAND_RGSD189.pdf
21
Dempsey, T. 2006. Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions. Strategic Studies
Institute, p.3
22
Takeyh, R, & Gvosdev, N. 2002. Do terrorist networks need a home?, The Washington Quarterly, 25: 3, 97, p.99
23
Simon, S., & Stevenson, J. 2010. Al Qaeda’s New Strategy: Less Apocalypse, More Streetfighting. Washington
Post. URL: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/08/AR2010100802664.html
24
Unknown. 2010. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Page: Al Qaeda. IHS (Global) Limited. URL unavailable.
25
Brooks, P. 2007. Flashpoint: Peril in Pakistan. Armed Forces Journal.
URL:http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/06/2732023/
parts of the decentralized organization that the Internet made possible have been important for its
survival.”26

The effects allowing this evolution toward a disparate network are twofold. First, barriers to entry from
violence production have been removed. Secondly, the internet has negated the transaction costs for
information transfer across distance. Previously, only state-sponsored suppliers of violence had a
sustainable business model, in that traditional industrialisation favoured economies of scale and
required significant demand to generate output production. However, with the ubiquitous spread of the
internet, information as a commodity has become virtually costless, and suppliers in small groups or
even individuals can transform resources for the production of violence. Learning how to make an IED
(improvised explosive device) is costless with internet access, and building the bomb itself can cost as
little as $50.00. Moreover, the returns to attacks are extremely high. Attacks costing between $50-$400
can cause millions of dollars worth of damage27. This is due to the makeup of massively complicated
infrastructure (electricity grids, global economic networks), which is designed to withstand random
occurrences well but not targeted nodal attacks28. Homer-Dixon displays the relation of tightly coupled
networks to resiliency, citing quantitative complexity and not just qualitative structure of the system as
important29:

26
Charrette, R. N. 2007. Open Source Warfare. Inside Technology.
URL:http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/opensource-warfare/0
27
Robb, J. 2006. Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism. John Wiley & Sons: New Jersey, p. 51
28
Homer-Dixon, T. 2002. The Rise of Complex Terrorism. Foreign Policy, 128, p. 54
29
Homer-Dixon, T. 2010. Complexity Science and Public Policy. Speech to the National Arts Centre, Ontario.
URL:http://www.homerdixon.com/download/complexity_science_and_public_policy.pdf
It is this ‘brittleness’ of the system which the insurgency can exploit.

Global insurgencies have porous borders, with actors entering and exiting the network as local rules
dictate. Al Qaeda functions as a software platform, offering a broad set of goals and means onto which
the parochial insurgent may stamp his/her innovations and idiosyncrasies30. Whilst a worldwide pan-
Islamic jihad exists, its construct is a loosely aligned “confederation of independent networks and
movements.”31 Rarely is there contact directly between Al Qaeda and its local beneficiaries; most
contact is through intermediates or even anonymous chat-room representatives. This affords the global
insurgency a robust resilience. It also renders any hypothetical definition of a domestic insurgency as
symptomatic of the global arbitrary. Appreciation for the amorphous, emergent nature of the
insurgency is a requirement in evaluating the case studies below. I posit that whilst branches of the
global insurgency exist in each Iraq and Afghanistan, it is fallacious to define each by the global-oriented
constituents acting within their respective battle-spaces.

Iraq

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) represents the primary radical Sunni Islamist insurgency in Iraq. It found its origin
in Abu Musab al-Zarqai’s organisation, Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ). Operating out of fluid
headquarters from Afghanistan to Iraq, Zarqawi’s network aspired to the overthrow of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, a moderate monarchy considered emblematic of the decay within Islam. Following
the US invasions of 2001 and 2003, JTJ reformed as an insurgency against the coalition occupation of
Iraq. By October 2004 JTJ had absorbed several smaller Salafi Islam movements and pledged allegiance
to the broader jihad as led by Al Qaeda. The primary benefit of patronage has been pooled financial and
manpower resources (combat forces along with leadership personnel)32. Subsequently it has maintained
a numerically limited presence but engaged in high-intensity attacks against all rivals:

• On 22 February 2006 the Shi’a al-Askariyah Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of the holiest sites
in Shia Islam, was bombed, launching a wave of sectarian violence.33
• On 23 November 2006, bombings in the predominantly Shiite section of Sadr City, Baghdad,
killed 168 people and injured 25034;
• In August 2007, car bombings targeting Yazidi villages in northern Iraq killed an estimated 700
people35;
• On 25 October 2009 suicide vehicle based improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks targeting
the Ministry of Justice and Baghdad's governorate headquarters resulted in deaths of 155
people and 500 injured.36

30
Kilcullen, D. J. 2005. Countering Global Insurgency. Journal of Strategic Studies. 28, 4, p. 614
31
Mahnken, T. G., & Maiolo, J. A. 2008. Strategic Studies: A Reader. Routledge: New York, p. 330
32
Unknown. 2010. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Page: Al Qaeda in Iraq. IHS (Global) Limited. URL
unavailable.
33
Assyrian International News Agency. 2006. Iraq's Sunni Arabs Endure Backlash of Mosque Bombing.
URL:http://www.aina.org/news/20060223122939.htm
34
Parker, N. 2006. Al-Qaeda foments civil war in Iraq with triple bomb attack on market. The Sunday Times.
URL:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article648209.ece
35
Bruno, G., & Jeffrey, J. 2010. Profile: Al Qaeda in Iraq. Council on Foreign Relations.
URL:http://www.cfr.org/publication/14811/profile.html
36
The Associated Press. 2009. Al Qaeda lays claim to Baghdad Bombings. CBC News.
URL:http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/10/27/iraq-baghdad-bombing-al-qaeda391.html
 • On 8 December 2009 the group detonated five consecutive VBIEDs in Baghdad killing 112
civilians and wounding 42537.

Such attacks typify the organization as a dominant militia in the state. However, such a categorization is
inaccurate. Firstly, the organisation’s connection to Al-Qaeda proper is tenuous, markedly so since 2007
when links were significantly informalised. Secondly, AQI’s position in Iraq relative to the multiplicities of
foreign and domestic actors is not definitive or all-encapsulating. Instead, one must view the
organisation as a resilient organism which diverts peripheral agents within the context of a larger
conflict. Viewed as a holistic phenomenon, the conflict in Iraq is not dominated by the intrigues of a
global insurgency.

Since its genesis as a franchise of Al-Qaeda, AQI has exhibited heterogeneous traits to its umbrella
movement. Despite the alignment of his organisation with Al-Qaeda, AQI’s leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
ignored its leadership's advice and pursued a domestically specific strategy of inciting a sectarian war
between Iraq's Sunni and Shia communities in 200438. In 2007 Bin Laden admitted mistakes in the
strategic direction of the jihad in Iraq39. Subsequently external support for AQI has been sporadic and
informal. Foreign troops dropped as a proportion of members of AQI, as well as in absolute terms40. The
group’s resurgence in 2010 was not a result of renewed external support, but extensive domestic
networking between dissatisfied Sunni factions41. Financially, criminal enterprise has expanded as a
proportion of AQI funding resulting from growingly unreliable Diaspora sources42.

Conceptualizing circumstances in Iraq evokes a complex patchwork of national-tribal allegiances rather

than a dichotomous conflict between radical Islamists and secular foreign forces. During the war there
were two major Kurdish militias or peshmerga, the Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK)43. Whilst superficially allied with the coalition and supportive of Iraqi
statebuilding, at their core the militias are, “first loyal to their party, then to Kurdistan, and only thirdly,
and lukewarmly, to Iraq as a whole.”44 The Kurds have aided coalition efforts in Fallujah, Tal Afar, and
Mosul, the east of which exists under Kurdish suzerainty. Disarming the Kurdish militia has proven
difficult despite the official position of the KDP as a government body. The peshmerga have raised
tensions with the Sunni community due to its support in coalition combat missions45.

Sunnis in general have expressed umbrage at the marginalisation of their ethnicity in the new Iraqi
government. Actions by the Shi’a dominated Iraqi security forces has imparted a sense of persecution on

37
Unknown. 2009. Al Qaeda in Iraq Claims Responsibility for Baghdad Bombings. The Telegraph.
URL:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/6774396/Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq-claims-
responsibility-for-Baghdad-bombings.html
38
Unknown. 2010. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Page: Al Qaeda. IHS (Global) Limited. URL unavailable.
39
Roggio, B. 2007. Osama Bin Laden on the State of Iraq. The Long War Journal.
URL:http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/osama_bin_laden_on_t.php
40
Unknown. 2010. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Page: Al Qaeda in Iraq. IHS (Global) Limited. URL
unavailable.
41
Williams, T. 2010. Insurgent Group in Iraq, Declared Tamed, Roars. The New York Times.
URL:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/middleeast/28qaeda.html
42
Unknown. 2010. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Page: Al Qaeda in Iraq. IHS (Global) Limited. URL
unavailable.
43
Eland, I. 2005. Occupied Iraq: One Country, Many Wars. Middle East Policy, 12, 3, p. 3
44
Ibid, p.4
45
Ibid, p.5
the Sunnis46. This has bolstered the insurgencies, of which there are two main strands. There are
Jihadists, of which the AQI is a key member, and former Baathist nationalists such as the Islamic Army in
Iraq. There is a tentative alliance between the two, although internecine conflict has broken out
regarding pre-eminence within the Sunni community and concerns over AQI’s use of radical tactics
(suicide bombing, targeting of Shi’a holy sites)47.

The Shias represent the bulk of the Iraqi government and Shia bloc. The Badr Corps has evolved from a
militant group into an official political organisation, and carries on much of the administration in the
Iraqi state. It maintains that it has cut militant ties, but intelligence indicates that its armed wing remains
active in the south48. Badr claims to be patriotic regarding an Iraqi state. Nonetheless it considers Sunni
nationalists and jihadists as the more pernicious threats than excessive Iranian influence. Many Badr
squads were trained by Iran’s Iranian Revolutionary Guard Ops (IRGC); the organisation has enjoyed an
advisory role in some aspects of JAM’s operations49. Badr has encountered criticism from Muqtada al-
Sadr, a renegade Shia cleric with broad popular appeal. There was internecine Shia fighting between the
forces of Muqtada al-Sadr and Badra through to 2008 but this has since been resolved in an uneasy
compromise. Sadr continues to criticise Iranian influence in Iraqi politics50.

Betwixt this labyrinthine interplay between actors, it is accurate to speak of AQI as co-opting a domestic,
political conflict as opposed to being an integral player in its machinations. One may observe hallmarks
of this in AQI’s Sunni strategy. AQI found public support lacking in its initial foray into insurgency,
instead opting to secure save havens through intimidation and enforcement tactics on its surrounding
populace51. This has precluded deep integration of the organization into the Sunni insurgency, with AQI
resorting to assassinations of the Awakening Council’s52 leaders following violence with Sunni tribal
militia Al-Anbar Salvation Council, and the Islamist nationalist Islamic Army of Iraq (IAI)53. Furthermore,
AQI has scaled down Al-Qaeda proper’s networking strategies, hiring Shia IED teams background on a
pragmatic basis. Just who is/isn’t participatory in AQI’s insurgency is unclear (Foreseeable given the
decentralized strategy employed. Typical of this ambiguity is the renewed unison between AQI and

46
Ap. 2009. Iraq Must Be Fair to Sunnis: US Commander. Kuwait Times.
URL:http://www.kuwaittimes.net/read_news.php?newsid=MTE0NDY5MTUxMA==
47
Gosh, B. 2007. A Truce Between US Enemies in Iraq. Time.
URL:http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1629871,00.html
48
Stone, B. 2010. Blind Ambition: Lessons Learned and Not Learned in an Embedded PRT. Prism. 1, 4, p. 151
49
United Press International. 2010. Iraq: Return of Sheibani’s Killing Squads.
URL:http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/09/30/Iraq-Return-of-Sheibanis-killer-squads/UPI-
36301285859253/
50
Unknown. 2010. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Page: Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM). IHS (Global) Limited. URL
unavailable.
51
Mardini, R. 2009. Al-Qaeda in Iraq Operations Suggest Rising Confidence Ahead of U.S. Military Withdrawal.
Terrorism Monitor, 7, 36, p. 2
52
The Awakening Council is a Sunni virtual government set up to legitimise inroads into the Shia dominated
government.
53
Roggio, B. 2008. Al Qaeda assassinates Awakening leader in Adhamiyah. Long War Journal.
URL:http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/01/al_qaeda_assassinate.php
Baathist insurgents following disappointing Sunni performance in the 2010 parliamentary elections54),
but it cannot be said that “Iraq” as a holistic entity is a global insurgency.

Afghanistan

There is a much more compelling argument to be made about Afghanistan. The relationship between
the two groups began in 1997 when Mullah Omar (head of the Taliban at the time) forged close
personal links with Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who moved his base from Nangarhar province to
Kandahar. The result was a close military and financial alliance between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda55.
Militarily the link was extensive. Bin Laden ingratiated himself with the Taliban, securing a position as
Minister of Defence. Translating the Sudan model to a novel locale, he seeded extensive guerrilla
training camps under the explicit approval of the Taliban. In between ten and seventy thousand foreign
guerrillas were trained under Al-Qaeda auspices in Afghanistan from 1996-2001, originating from over
fifty countries56. Al-Qaeda continues to maintain a presence in the tribal north-west of Pakistan and the
areas of Afghanistan still controlled by the Taliban insurgency57.

The influence of ideological constructs offers an explanation for both the Taliban’s supportive attitude
to Al Qaeda and my definition of the Taliban as a domestic insurgency. The Taliban is motivated by a
radical strand of Sunni Islam derivative of Deobandism, a conservative Islamic orthodoxy calling for
emulation of the Prophet Mohammed in all facets of life. Al-Qaida is influenced by a similar extremist
Sunni ideology, though with slight divergences regarding the non-Islamic ‘other’. Islamic scholars as
Sayyid Qutb, a leading intellectual of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s, have
imparted an expansionist ethic to Al-Qaeda Ideology. In Maalim-l-tariq, Qutb argued that anything non
Islamic was evil and corrupt. To Al Qaeda the spread of Islam is an altruistic act, and required by the
Prophet.

Aside from its inwardly-focused Islamic bent, there is a conflicting cultural impetus for the Taliban which
limits any intentions on the part of the insurgency for expansion. Depending on the context the tribal
impetus of “Pashtunwali” can limit globalisation of the Taliban’s struggle. The ideology is encoded with
strong notions of honour as bound to socially constituted traditions of conduct58. Hospitatility to
strangers, generosity to defeated enemies, and (of particular interest to military observers) badal, a
concept of complete revenge for acts of violence are examples of these normative constructs and are
strongly utilised by the Taliban among its chiefly Pashtun ethnic subjects. Badal in particular is salient in
factoring Taliban’s intentions and capabilities. A pashtun tribesman was quoted as explaining, “We are
content with discord, we are content with alarms, we are content with blood...we will never be content

54
Unknown. 2010. Post-Election Watch Iraq: March 2010 Parliamentary Elections. International Republican
Institute. URL:http://www.iri.org/explore-our-resources/election-watch/iraq-post-election-watch-march-2010-
parliamentary-elections
55
Rashid, A. 2000. Taliban. New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 129
56
Shultz, R. H. 2008. Global Insurgency Strategy and the Salafi Jihad Movement. INSS Occasional Paper 66, USAF
Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy: Colorado, p. 76
57
Glenger, V. 2010. Pakistan Army Planning Assault on Al-Qaeda Terror `Epicenter,' Mullen Says. Reuters.
URL:http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-13/pakistan-army-planning-assault-on-al-qaeda-terror-epicenter-
mullen-says.html
58
Johnson, T.H. 2007. On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan. China and Eurasia
Forum Quarterly, 5, 2, p. 121
with a master.”59 Such determination in insurgency belies the fact that Pashtunwali principally serves to
consolidate domestic tribal stability. From this viewpoint the Taliban insurgency is domestic, not global.
The harbouring of Al-Qaeda is framed as an exercise by the Taliban of its sovereign privilege to aid an
ideological ally, not an expression of desire to join global jihad.

Such a claim bundled wholly in rhetoric, citing centuries-old tribal norms is condescending and lacks
substance. However, there is empirical evidence to support the claim that Taliban is foremost concerned
with whittling a territory for itself, and only secondarily in aiding Al-Qaeda. In 1998 the Taliban
attempted to ground Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan and toyed with the idea of expulsion in response
to his massively disruptive plans surrounding the World Trade Centre60. In 2008, there were talks
between the Afghan government and Taliban on severance between Taliban and Al-Qaeda in return for
concessions of land and legitimacy. Talks faltered but the Afghan government has continued this
strategy with individual Pashtun tribal chiefs, with some degree of success61.

Conclusion

Al Qaeda’s chosen strategy of decentralisation and dispersion relegates the delineation of insurgent
elements as “domestic” or “global” arbitrary. However, a qualitative distinction may be made at the
nexus between intentions and capabilities of an organisation. Using this methodology, I have defined
the insurgencies in Iraq as domestic due to both capabilities and intentions. The plethora of divergent
interests in Iraq prevents a systematic harnessing of militant elements toward global ends. Even AQI
itself is not wholly devoted to global struggle. In Afghanistan, characterisation in either classification is
not wholly without merit, but the primarily domestic concerns of the Taliban frame it more as a
sympathiser to than a member of the global insurgency as led by Al Qaeda. If Al Qaeda were to abandon
Afghanistan for Somalia or Yemen (as has been conjectured), the Taliban insurgency would continue
fundamentally unaltered.

59
Macyntire, B. 2008. The harsh lesson of Afghanistan: little has changed in 200 years. The Sunday Times.
URL:http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/ben_macintyre/article5141513.ece
60
Unknown. 2005. U.S., Taliban bargained over bin Laden, documents show. CNN News.
URL:http://articles.cnn.com/2005-08-19/us/taliban.documents_1_embassy-bombings-top-taliban-officials-mullah-
omar?_s=PM:US
61
Unknown. 2010. Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism Page: Taliban. IHS (Global) Limited. URL unavailable.
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