Alvarez v. Guingona – G.R. No.

118303 – 252 SCRA 695

Facts:

On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of
Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate.
On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate,
approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.

Issue:

Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720
be said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required?

Held:

Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the
claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable
because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB
No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.

The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does
not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House
bill.

Aquino III v. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 17, 2010

FACTS:
 Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed R.A. 9716, which reapportioned the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur to create an
additional legislative district. The first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.
 Sen. Aquino III and Naga Mayor Robredo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners
claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts
of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
  Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
o Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact,
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not R.A. 9716 was unconstitutional
RULING:
 NO. While Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum
population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not have to increase its
population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.

League of Cities vs COMELEC

FACTS:

Supreme Court en banc, struck down the subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied by the
Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November
2008, the judgement became final and executory.

The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the
constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court could reverse the decision it already rendered

RULING:

Yes, The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under
the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain
unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of
the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of
salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be
recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain
void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a
matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the
Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.

Navarro v. EA
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, (D)

G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

FACTS:

•October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An Act
Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands).

•December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for
the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite
yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. With the approval of the people from both
the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat).

•November 10, 2006, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds.
Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

•Undaunted, petitioners filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being
unconstitutional. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a
large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the
area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square
kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC.

•May 12, 2010, movants-intervenors raised three (3) main arguments to challenge the above
Resolution, namely: (1) that the passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending
Section 461 of the LGC; (2) that the exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province
consists of two or more islands, includes the exemption from the application of the minimum land area
requirement; and (3) that the Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case.

•July 20, 2010, the Court denied the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010 on the ground that the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the
appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case.
•September 7, 2010, movants-intervenors filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010
Resolution, citing several rulings of the Court, allowing intervention as an exception to Section 2, Rule 19
of the Rules of Court that it should be filed at any time before the rendition of judgment. They alleged
that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. They
averred that prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, they were unaware of the proceedings in this case.

•October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case
had become final and executory on May 18, 2010.

ISSUE:

•Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 valid.

HELD:

•Yes, the Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a full-fledged province,
enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from the land area requirement, which, with respect to
the creation of provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR. In effect, pursuant
to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of
the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of
Dinagat.

•The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive
in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance,
which is four times more than the minimum requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a
province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible and sustainable.
Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as mere fait accompli
circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must be seen
from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not be
instrumental in stunting such capacity.

•Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and
that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Put a bit differently, that
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter, and that
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would
defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.
MALABANG v. BENITO, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969 (Digested Case)

Re: De facto municipal corporation

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of EO 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, which created
the Municipality of Balabagan out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. Petitioner relied on the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General while respondent contended that that the rule announced in Pelaez can have
no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of
Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this
was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality
itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this
action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked,
although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and
not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.

WON:

(1) WON the controverted matter may be attacked collateraly.

(2) WON EO 386 is constitutional.

HELD:

(1) Yes. It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved
to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few
exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral
attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporations. For where it is
neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned
collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected
thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct
from doing so.
 (2) No. In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that
the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the
consideration that there was some other "valid law" giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence,
in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been
invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative
Code provision in question, there is "no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation".

Case Digest: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to
create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public
funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the
authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.”

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices
of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not
include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional
mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the
Constitution.
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. (G.R. No. 111097)

Facts:

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit
to the establishment for the operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the
operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential
Decree No. 1869. Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the
police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.
Issue:

Whether the Ordinances are valid.

Ruling:

No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under
what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.

General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those
necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other
things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units
can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate
by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced
therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

Case Digest: Parayno vs. Jovellanos

FACTS:

Respondent Parayno was an owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989,
some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or
transfer of the station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of
Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advice,
the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's
gasoline station. Resolution 50 stipulated the alleged violations of the gasoline station in question.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration, which was then denied. She then filed a special civil action for
prohibition and mandamus in the RTC, contending that her gasoline station was not covered by Section
44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, which prohibits gasoline service stations which are within
100meters away from any public or private school, public library, playground, church, and hospital
based on the straight line method measured from the nearest side of the building nearest the lot if there
are no intervening buildings to the nearest pump of the gasoline station. Petitioner contended that hers
was not a "gasoline service station" but a "gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21 thereof.
Moreover, the decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in a previous case filed
by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) should bar the grounds
invoked by respondent municipality in Resolution No. 50. The RTC ruled against petitioner by applying
the virtue of ejusdem generis, saying that a “gasoline filling station” fell within the ambit of Section 44.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was, again, only denied by the RTC. The same fate was met by
the petition in the CA. Hence this appeal
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s gasoline filling station could be likened to that of a gasoline service
station as provided for in Section 44 of the Official zoning Code by virtue of Ejusdem Generis.

HELD:

The Court held that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between a
gasoline service station and a gasoline filling station as found in Section 21 and Section 42 of the said
ordinance. It was made clear that the two terms were intended to be distinguished from the other,
which the respondent further admitted. Respondent municipality cannot invoke the principle of
Ejusdem generis which means "of the same kind, class or nature” but rather should apply the legal
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing implies
the exclusion of others.

With the distinction clearly provided, respondents could not insist that "gasoline service station" under
Section 44 necessarily included "gasoline filling station" under Section 21.

The Court also held that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed against her predecessor (Dennis
Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the
principle of res judicata or the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all
points and matters determined in the former suit. With the similarity of the identity of interest of the
case at bar and that of the previous case already decided by HLURB, the litigation should already end
since the concerns had already been resolved. The Court stated that an individual should not be vexed
twice for the same cause

Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City and MMDA – July 18, 2006 (G.R. No. 177807) MMDA vs.
Gancayco – May 10 2007 (G.R. No. 177933)

FACTS: The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City Government of Quezon City
and the Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed from a local ordinance pertaining to
Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he
was able to obtain a building permit for a two-storey commercial building, which was situated along
EDSA, in an area which was designated as part of a Business/Commercial Zone by the Quezon City
Council. The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the construction of
Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was amended to not require the properties located at
the Quezon City - San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to construct
the arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his property, already
covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a
notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904, part of his property had to be demolished, if he did not
clear that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did not comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish
the party wall, or “wing walls.” Gancayco then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his property,
without due process and just compensation, claiming that Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and
selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the ordinance and payment for damages. MMDA
contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an ordinance that he already violated, and that
the ordinance had the presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City Council,
taking to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance. The RTC, however, declared that the Ordinance was
unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. MMDA appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly
granted the appeal, with the contention that the ordinance was to be modified; it was constitutional
because the intention of the ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and business in the
commercial area, as well as to protect the welfare of the general public passing by the area, however
the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance is lifted. With that
decision, the MMDA and Gancayco filed Motions for Reconsideration, which the CA denied, as both
parties have no new issues raised. Therefore they petitioned to the Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as a public nuisance.
Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish Gancayco’s property.

HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided that the wing wall of
Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
nuisance is defined as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else
that (1) injures of endangers the health or safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance
may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se are those which affect the
immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of
necessity. As Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to construct the building, it was implied
that the city engineer did not consider the building as such of a public nuisance, or a threat to the safety
of persons and property. The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro
Manila, and was not supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such
by the constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore,
MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s property, and was solely liable for the
damage.
Tano vs Socrates

Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law; Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 110249; August 21, 1997

FACTS:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1,
1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a
resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several
species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the
said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived
them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:

Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged
ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is
absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman.
Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to
lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential
right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and
utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of
ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the
principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to
LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.
Aug

Ponente: PADILLA, J.

FACTS:

The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).

•On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais
from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).

•On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No.
7065 entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development
Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms
And Conditions And For Other Purposes.”

•On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree,
entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or
Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque
Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises
and permits issued by local governments.

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government
through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which
expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including
Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.

ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the
Constitution.

HELD:

NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.

RATIO:

Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No.
771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the
executive still exercised legislative powers).

Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of
the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First
Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as
unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.

And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of
a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)

Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 118533 October 4, 1995 248 SCRA 700 (1995)

Facts: Paranaque Sanguaniang Bayan Resolution 744, approved by Mayor Olivarez 6 Oct 1922,
authorized Baclaran Credit Cooperative Inc (BCCI) to set up a manfacturer’s night (Christmas Agro-
Industrial Fair sa Baclaran) during the Christmas fiesta celebration, at Baclaran for 60 days, (11 Nov 92 to
15 Feb 93) for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard.

Allegedly, BCCI exerted all possible efforts to secure the necessary permit but Olivarez simply refused to
issue the permit unless BCCI gives money to the latter.
On 15 Dec 1992, BCCI charged Olivarez with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for
unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor’s permit deapite request and follow ups to implement SB
Resolution 744.

After preliminary investigations and pleadings before the Sandiganbayan, the case was remanded to the
Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, the Ombudsman found Olivarez liable by giving unwarranted
benefit though manifest impartiality to another group on the flimsy reason that complainant failed to
apply for a business permit.

Olivarez filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue: Whether or not Olivarez exhibited partiality in the denial/inaction over BCCI’s license application

Decision: Olivarez issued a permit to an unidentified Baclaran-based vendor’s association by the mere
expedient of an executive order, whereas so many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it could
be granted the same permit.

Worse, Olivarez failed to show that BCCI and the unidentified association were not similarly situated as
to give at least a semblance of legality to the apparent haste with which the said executive order was
issued.

There was nothing to prevent Ollivarez from referring the BCCI letter-application to the licensing
department, but which paradoxically, he refused.

Olivarez, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses
for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose. Hence, he cannot really feign total lack
of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Constructio

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

Facts:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in order to execute
the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable development so as to accelerate the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.

Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities assumed
exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters since Sec.149
thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the authority to grant fishery privileges in the
municipal waters and impose rental fees or charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage
of the occasion to establish fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.

The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation and the
indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have saturated the lake with
fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.

The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:

(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of March 31, 1993 are
declared illegal;

(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for Illegal Fishpen
and Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39-A of RA 4850 as
amended by PD 813.

A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed fishpens, fishcages
and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their respective structures otherwise
demolition shall be effected.

Issue

Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its
environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned?

Held

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991.

The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.

The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges
in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such
powers as are by its charter vested on it.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which
grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code
of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

Binay vs Domingo Case Digest

Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of Municipal Corporations

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500
burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month.
The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The
Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on
Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety,
etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and,
(3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:

1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause

2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose

3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:

1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born
with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and
"Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people.

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation
may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are
clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and insure the protection of property therein