CHAPTER EIGHT

THE CONDEMNATION OF 1270 AND ITS AFTERMATH

On December 10, 1270, bishop Tempier condemned a series of thirteen

propositions, including the eternity of the world and that there was no
first man, and forbade any master to maintain them. As would become
clear by 1272, the arts faculty itself was divided on the issue, and on
April 1, 1272, following the election of a new rector, a majority of that
faculty forbade its members to dispute a number of topics, which were
reserved to theology, or in matters common to the two faculties to
determine in a way inconsistent with theology.1 Whatever the theoreti-
cal legal basis if the bishop's condemnation may have been, it seems to
have been universally ignored. Between these two years, four major
works on the eternity of the world were written, two by artists, Siger of
Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, and two by theologians, one by the
Franciscan William of Falegar and one by the Dominican Thomas Aqui-
nas. The exact dating and sequence of the above-mentioned treatises
cannot be established, but they have been placed with confidence be-
tween 1270 and 1272.
At some time during 1271 or 1272, William of Falegar, a Franciscan
and student of John Pecham, disputed the question Utrum deus potuerit
producere aliquid sibi coeternum, differens ab eo essentialiter,2 that is,
anything other than the divine persons. It is representative of the moder-
ate position of Bonaventure and Pecham, although it is inferior in quality
to the works of both of these masters. This question is remarkable for its
moderate and conciliatory tone and for the way it sums up much of the
preceding thought on the question and sets the stage for the subsequent
works of Matthew of Aquasparta and Henry of Ghent.
In describing the state of the question, William goes out of his way to
avoid personal controversy. Some people, he says, assert that the world
is eternal and not made by God; others hold that it is eternal but made.
Both of these are erroneous and contrary to faith, but the first is worse
than the second. Then he goes on to state a third opinion - that the

1
Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis #441, I, 499.
2
Edited by A. J. Gondras, "Guillaume de Falegar. Oeuvres inédites," AHDLMA 47
(1972), 185-288, on pp. 211-16.
130 THE CONDEMNATION OF 1270 AND ITS AFTERMATH

world was in fact created with time, but it, or some creature, could have
been produced from eternity. "I do not believe this to be the position of
Augustine or of the other saints," he says, "nor even of that doctor to
whom it is imputed, nor do I believe that it is true."3 The doctor to
whom it is imputed seems certainly to have been Aquinas. On the basis
of Aquinas's works prior to his De aeternitate mundi, one could reason-
ably doubt that the opinion just stated was his.4 But after the appearance
of De aeternitate mundi there could have been no doubt, and so we may
assume that this question was disputed shortly before De aeternitate
mundi. It is refreshing to see William refrain from imputing the most
extreme interpretation to Aquinas's writings and in effect inviting him to
clarify his position in the direction of Bonaventure's doctrine.
The form of William's Response is similar to that of Pecham's. He first
states eight principles, which will form the basis of his determination:

1. Divine production is twofold, intensive (Le., the divine per-

sons) and extensive (i.e., everything else).
2. Intensive production cannot be in time, but extensive produc-
tion can be, since it posits no change or innovation in God, but
only in the produced thing, "although this is very difficult to
understand.
3. Eternity in God is nothing other than his own utterly simple
essence; in no other thing is its duration identical with its exis-
tence.
4. Only in divine eternity is there pure simplicity; in the duration
of everything else there is composition and succession.
5. All things which are other than God depend totally on him, so
that, if he should cease to conserve what he has created, the world
would instantly cease to exist.
6. God's power is never increased, diminished, or changed.
7. We do not understand by "a thing's being created from
eternity" that it is measured by eternity, which is God, but that a
thing thus produced from eternity would not have a beginning of
duration, but always was.
8. In no respect can a creature by equated to the creator, since
whatever is in the creator will be infinite in its most true actuality;
but no creature can have anything infinite in act, either essentially
or accidentally.

On the basis of these principles, he states his position:

3
"Hanc non credo esse positionem Augustini nee aliorum Sanctorum nee etiam
illius Doctoris, cui imponitur, nee credo esse veram." Ed. cit., p. 212.
4
See John F. Wippel, "Did Thomas Aquinas Defend the Possibility of an Eternally
Created World?"