ISSN No.

: 2249-7242

UGC Approved Sr. No. 63879

Academic Views & Reviews

(An International Journal of Education, Research & Innovation)
 ACADEMIC VIEWS & REVIEWS
(An International Journal of Education, Research & Innovation)
ISSN No. : 2249-7242
Editorial Board
Founder Editor : Dr. Intakhab Alam Khan - Education & Peace
Editor (s) : Prof. Nirjha Shukla - Speical Educaton, NCERT, New Delhi
Prof. Anita Rastogi - Teacher, Distance and Elementary Education, JMI, N. Delhi
Prof. Moyan Chakrawati - Tribal and Population Studies, Raipur,
Chhatishgarh
Dr. ArshadIkram Ahmad - Education &Comparative Religion, JMI, Delhi
Dr. Jagdish Gupta - Management, Marketing & Accounts, Panipat,
Dr. Ganesha Somayaji - Sociology, Goa
Dr. S.S. Deora - Political Geography, SIS, JNU, New Delhi
Dr. J.S. Jakhar - Law, Sirsa (Haryana)
Mohd. Kamal Akhtar - Teaching of English & Social issues, Delhi
Imamkalyan Lahri - International Relation, Kolkata
Swapan Kumar Kolay - Associated Professor & Head, Anthropology & Tribal
Studies, Bastar University, Jagdalpur (C.G.)
Shitla Prasad - Archology & Modern History, New Delhi
Consulting : A. Naseeb Khan - ELT, Book Review & Comparative Religion
Editor (s) Dr. Rajesh Kumar - Subaltern Writings, Dalit and Aboriginal Writings,
English Literature, Delhi University, Delhi.
Dr. Girija B. Nanda - Good Goverance
Ghyan Shyam - History & International Relations, Varanasi
Rajkumar Siwach - Public Administration, Sirsa, Haryana
Anand Kattimani - English Literature, Hyderabad
Dr. Priti Srivastava - Spel. Field ---- Educational Finance, Admin. & Planning
Dr. Lalit Kr. Sagar - Teacher Education, Higher Educaion Administration,
Educational Technology & Distance Education, Faridabad
Sandeep Sharma - Antropology, Assam
Sangja Khandu - International Politics
Mandakini Das - Gender studies and comparative politics
Poonam Beniwal - Value & Co-curriculum Activities
Publishers : Meenakshi - Mark Books, Delhi.
VOL. 7 (No. IV), January - March, 2018
Periodicity of Publication – Quarterly
A Refereed, Multidiscipilinary, International Journal

Founder Editor : Intakhab Alam Khan, G-85, Abul Fazal Enclave, Jamia Nagar, New Delhi – 25 (India)

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42 AVR - ISSN : 2249 - 7242

The Quest for Qatari National Identity and

the Contribution of Shaikh Jassim bin
Mohammad Al-Thani

– Maheep*

Introduction
Like in case of individuals, the past is central to the sense of selfhood of
nations. Just as countries have physical national territories and are delimited on
earth, they also seek to claim and delimit bits of the past as their own. In national
imaginings these bits cohere to form a ‘national history’ and become the source of
a ‘national Identity’. The first to undertake the project of forging a national historical
self were the European states. In our own country, India, the project has been
underway for many decades, it commenced as an appendage to our struggle against
British colonialism.
Arab Gulf States have been latecomers to the project of acquiring a national
historical self. However, in recent years many of them have gone about the task
with great urgency. One of these many countries is tiny Qatar. The State of Qatar, of
late, has embarked upon an enterprise of self discovery. With enthusiastic patronage
from the political and intellectual elite, this quest for a national identity of this
relatively young State is still in the incipient stage. As to what are the foundational
characteristics of Qatari national identity there is still no definite answer. Opinions
on this subject are as diverse as are the perspectives. Of the myriad ideas proposed
in this regard, one in particular seems to have captured the imagination of the
Qatari people. In recent times a cherished memory of a military victory of the
nation’s founding Father; Sheikh Jassim bin Mohammad Al Thani, has been
identified as the hallmark of Qatari nationalism. Perhaps in foreseeable future

* Maheep is an Academic Associate, School of Social Sciences, IGNOU, New Delhi. He did his
PhD in Gulf Studies at India Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia and was the Lead
Researcher of Qatar Unified Imaging Project, Qatar Foundation (India Unit).

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this idea will grow, evolve and provide an objective answer to the question, “What
does it mean to be a Qatari”- This paper seeks to offer a rejoinder to the approach
which incorporates the martial glory of the nation’s founder with the nation’s
identity. Here I contend that the legacy of Sheikh Jassim Al Thani vis-à-vis the
national identity of Qatar, is not only martial but also intellectual. The recent
explosion of activities in the intellectual front, the vigorous patronage of the
authorities in the field of academics and last but not the least, the steady emergence
of Qatar as a soft power giant in the Arab World are but manifestations of a trend
which was initiated more than a century and half ago by Sheikh Jassim when
Qatar was a mere tract of land in the Ottoman Empire. I back my argument mainly
with archival materials pertaining to Qatar’s procured in the course of a Research
Project from the National Archives of India, New Delhi.
Key words: Qatar, National Identity, Sheikh Jassim bin Muhammad Al-Thani,
Battle of Wajbah, Soft Power, QUIP, National Archives of India.

National identity of Qatar: The problematic of conventional parameters

Little more than a year ago, on 21st October, 2014 a seminar1 on National
Identity was successfully conducted in Al Sharq village in Qatar five kms off the
national capital Doha. Ever since Qatar gained her independence in 1971 and
emerged as a sovereign nation from being a British protectorate, this was the first
official endeavour to convene a conference to discover and objectively define the
contours of Qatari national identity. The search for one or more objective criterion
that bestows a unique sense of national identity to the citizens of Qatar, as of now,
is a continuous process and will be far from complete in foreseeable future. The
traditional parameters conventionally associated with the idea of a nation like
ethnicity, language, religion, culture and tradition etc. have their limitations when
applied in the case of Qatar. This does not mean that the religious, cultural,
linguistic or ethnic elements are so diverse in Qatar that zeroing in on one ethnicity,
language, religion, or culture as determinant of national identity comes at the cost
ofdisregardingtheheterogeneityoftheQatarisociety.
On the contrary in a country with 40% of the citizens of Arab ethnicity and Sunni
Islam being the religion of 70-75%2 of Qatari people: a perfect ethnic, religious,
linguistic and cultural homogeneity is shared by a huge majority of the citizens,
the selection of should have been far from difficult. Yet, the diversity of opinions
on the subject as witnessed in the aforesaid seminar in popular and academic
discourses only indicates that there is still no unanimous verdict as to what it
means to be a Qatari.
Let us briefly discuss the problematic involved in defining Qatari national
identity through conventional parameters of ethnicity and language. It has been
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argued from various quarters that Qatari identity is essentially an Arab identity.
There is indeed no denial of this contention. The overwhelming majority of the
Qatar’s population are indeed ethnic Arabs with Arabic as their mother tongue.
But so is the case with the nationals of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, Yemen and other Arab states. Had the situation of Qatar
been like that of Israel where people of a Jewish ethnicity are placed among non-
Jewish neighbours or like that of Bangladesh where a common language spoken
by the citizens differentiates them from their surrounding nations, then Arab ethnicity
or Arabic language would have been an excellent marker of Qatari national identity.
But because of the very fact of being a part of a larger Arab world which is by and
large homogenous in ethnic and linguistic lines, Arab ethnicity or Arabic language
does not add any sense of uniqueness to Qatari identity.
Religious determinants too do not substantially help in this regard. For a
country like Iran with Sunni Muslim nations on the eastern and western frontiers,
Shiite religious identity has a strong influence in the definition of the Iranian
national self. In South Asia Islam is a strong marker of Pakistani national identity
as against a Hindu majority India. However, in the case of Qatar, Sunni Islam just
like Arab ethnicity and language is a common denominator that she shares with
other Arab Gulf States. No doubt Islamic faith is one of the most conspicuous
features of Qatar as a nation and Qataris as a people. As a matter of fact, Qatar is
one of the most ardent ambassadors of Islamic civilization in the world today.
Still when Muslim identity is chosen to define Qataris as a people, Qatari identity
gets dissolved into the larger Islamic identity of the Arab-Islamic world.

A different perspective of identifying the national self

Therefore the Holy Grail in the search of Qatari national identity is that factor
which defines Qatari people and their nation in exclusion to the World in general
and her Arab Muslim neighbours in particular. In this regard yet another perspective,
of late, is rapidly gaining popularity among the people of Qatar. This perspective
defines a national identity through the commemoration of collective struggle of
inhabitants of the land against a foreign power. Till 2006 Qatar celebrated 3
September as the National Day. It was on that day the British left Qatar lock, stock
and barrel transferring the rule of the country in the hands of the Al-Thani family.
However there was a sudden change in this regard in 2007.3 From that year onwards
18 December came to be officially designated as the National Day of Qatar instead
of 3rd of September. It was the day of confrontation between the Qataris and the
forces of the Ottoman Empire, the superpower that preceded the British Raj in the
History of Qatar. It was the day when the tribes of Qatar united under the leadership
of Sheikh Jassim Al-Thani and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Ottoman Imperial
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forces in the battle of Wajbah in the year 1871. This change reflects the collective
yearning of the Qatari people to look back to a heroic episode of past in order to
mark the genesis of their nation as well as that of their national identity.
This particular approach to build a national identity and stir up patriotic
fervour is not unique in the history of nations. To this day, the Scots proudly
recollect the memories of the battle of Bannockburn where Robert the Bruce defeated
the English Forces of Edward II in the year 1314.4 Likewise, the victories of ‘El
Liberator’ Simon Bolivar over the Spaniards is a proudly cherished memory all
over South America and is very crucial in defining their national identity5. Thus,
in the case of Qatar, we have Sheikh Jassim al-Thani, the heroic chieftain who
united the tribes under his banner against the foreign Ottoman Turkish domination
and defeated them in a crucial engagement which led to the eventual demise of
Ottoman presence and influence over the land.
Qatar, instead of being a colony, was a mandated territory of the British
Empire. Following the withdrawal of Ottoman presence, the land remained under
the British mandate since 3 November 1916 to 3 September 19716. During
these years Qatar did not witness any anti British mass movement in the form of
an anti-colonial struggle (Probably since Qatar was never a colony in the first
place) like India nor did her tension with the Western power lead to any sort of
violent confrontation as it happened in Egypt (The Suez crisis, 1956). Thus
defining Qatari identity in terms of anti British rhetoric had its obvious limitations.
It neither stirred up a sense of pride and glory felt while commemorating a
heroic past nor did it foster any sense of solidarity among the citizens that was
borne out of a memory of a collective action and shared pain. December 18 was
thus a natural choice in that regard.

How Qataris aspire to see themselves today: The Legacy of Sheikh Jassim
The concept of national identity, for any nation, is a multidimensional idea.
The idea of a nation and nationality is explored through diverse perspectives, the
case of Qatar being no different. Yet, as of now commemoration of the military
glory of the battle of Wajbah is the most important historical memory in the
creation of Qatari identity. The memories of past martial glory are in perfect
harmony with the tradition of valour and heroism, innate in every Arab heart. In
fact nothing appeals more to the Arab mind than the proud reminiscence of his
forefathers fighting against a foreign enemy in defence of their homes, hearths and
a land that they regarded as their own. This spirit of valour and patriotism runs
through the new national anthem of Qatar7 which was officially adopted in 1996
and runs as follows:

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Swearing by God who raised the sky,

Swearing by God who spread the light,
Qatar will always be free,
by the spirit of the Loyal.
Travel the high road,
advance with the guiding light of the Prophets.
In my heart, Qatar is an epic of our forefather’s glory,
Qatar is land of the foremost men,
who protect us in times of distress.
Doves of peace, warriors of sacrifice...

The Founder of Qatar: More than a war Hero

It is quite evident from the lyrics of the national anthem that Qataris are
seeking to revive the glories of yesterday in order to define who they are today. The
victory of Sheikh Jassim over the Ottoman forces is a cherished memory which
serves to remind the Qatari people of their love for freedom and their valour in its
defence. In this sense Sheikh Jassim and his victory of the Turks remain immortal
in the annals of Qatar. He is deservedly called the Founder of the nation of Qatar.
However, I would contend that Sheikh Jassim was more than a war hero. His
achievements were much more than that of success in the field of battle. In addition
to the manner that is already acknowledged and celebrated, the Founder of modern
Qatar contributed to the idea of Qatari identity in a much more profound way.
Apart from his martial glory in what other way Sheikh Jassim contributed to the
Qatari national identity is the irreducible minimum of this research paper.
Before I proceed to elaborate upon what possible increment this paper can
make to the existing corpus of knowledge regarding the national identity of Qatar,
I shall give a brief sketch of the career of the Founder of modern Qatar, Sheikh
Jassim Al Thani and his clash with the Ottoman authorities.

The Rise of Sheikh Jassim bin Thani and His Run-in with Ottoman Rule
Sheikh Jassim Al Thani began his political career as a vassal ruler of the
Ottoman Empire, of which the territory of present day Qatar was a part. Following
the death of his father Sheikh Mohammad bin Thani8 in 1878 he was conferred
the position of Qaim-maqam (The Sub-Governor of a Provincial District of the
Ottoman Empire) of Qatar. Relations between Jassim and his Ottoman overlords,
however, soon became fraught. A series of incidents, debilitating to the prestige of

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Jassim, began to alienate him from the Sublime Porte, the metonym with which
the Ottoman Central Government was referred to in official and popular discourses.
In November 1879, the Sheikh of Bahrain instigated the Al-Bu Kuwara tribe to
move from al-Bida and settle in Fuwairet and Sheikh Jassim could do little to
stem this migration. Again, in 1880, the Beni Hajir, a leading tribe of al-Hasa,
made a series of raids on Doha.9 They were joined in their depredations by the
Naim tribesmen in 1881. Sheikh Jassim requested Ottoman help throughout these
disturbances. The help, unfortunately, never came.
Sheikh Jassim’s relations with the Ottomans worsened in 1882 when his
expedition to Khor-al-Obaid failed due to the lack of Ottoman assistance. Jassim
was further chagrined by the Ottomans’ continued support for Mohammad Abdul
Wahab who attempted to seize al-Ghuriyah from Sheikh Jassim’s control in 1886.
Abdul Wahab, in fact, even tried to wrest the Qaim-maqamship of Qatar from
Sheikh Jassim. At the end of his tether, Sheikh Jassim resigned from the Qaim-
maqamship of Qatar on 25 February 1886.10 The Sublime Porte, however, refused
to accept his resignation. Despite this, Sheikh Jassim could not be persuaded to
be well disposed towards the Sublime Porte. Sheikh Jassim’s bitterness was
exacerbated when the Ottomans decided to open a customs house at al-Bida
disregarding his opposition. In order to frustrate the plans of his overlords, he
retired at Ras al-Zaayen in the desert. He subsequently declared that he is no more
responsible for the administration of al-Bida.
The Ottomans disappointed Sheikh Jassim once again in 1888 when 250
Bedouins from Abu Dhabi raided al-Bida11 and killed twenty-four men, one of
them a son of Sheikh Jassim. Shakih Jassim sought Ottoman support to avenge
the death of his son and, when it was not forthcoming, embarked to raid Abu
Dhabi territory on his own. In 1889, British intervention put an end to Sheikh
Jassim’s adventures. In the years that followed, a cross Jassim withheld the payment
of taxes to the Ottomans and also opposed the administrative reforms that they
sought to implement in Qatar.12
The Sublime Porte decided to chasten Sheikh Jassim and sent the Wali
(Governor), Mehmed Hafiz Pasha, to Nejd with 200 fighters in October 1892. In
February 1893, the Wali proceeded with his forces to al-Bida. Fearing that the
Wali will kill or imprison him, Sheikh Jassim retreated to Wajbah, about twelve
miles south-west of al-Bida. Soon, Mehmed Hafiz Pasha demanded that Sheikh
Jassim meet him and profess his loyalty for the Ottoman Empire. The Pasha also
asked Jassim to disband his tribal followers. Not only did Sheikh Jassim refuse
to comply, he took retaliatory measures against the Wali. He cut off the al-Bida
garrison’s land links with al-Hasa and took to seizing the Wali’s messengers as

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well as official correspondence. On 25 March, the piqued Wali arrested the younger
brother of Sheikh Jassim bin Thani along with some leading Qataris and imprisoned
them aboard his ship Merrikh. Jassim requested the Wali to return them in exchange
of ten thousand Liras. The Wali refused and dispatched a column of troops to
destroy Sheikh Jassim’s fortress at Wajbah. In the ensuing engagement (25 March
1893) immortalized in Qatar’s history as the battle of Wajbah, the Wali’s forces
were routed. 13 Talbot informed the Foreign Secretary of Jasim’s victory but did
not apprise him of its scale and decisiveness. Talbot wrote –
Letter of the 30th March from Bahrain received yesterday, states Turks lost a
colonel and 130 cavalry on the 25th in an action near Dauha with Jasim-bin-Thani,
who cut off their water supply until Wali released his brother Ahmed.14
Talbot might have been unforthcoming in furnishing the details of the engagement
between Jasim and the Wali but the Residency Agent at Bahrein was not. A letter
written by him to the Political Agent for the Persian Gulf helps us grasp the
completeness of Jasim’s victory.15

The QUIP Project

And now I shall make a transition from distant to recent past in order to
discuss the background of this paper. In this regard it is imperative to briefly
dwell upon the QUIP Project which marked the genesis of the idea which I wish to
present. The Qatar Unified Imaging Project (QUIP) was a project financed by the
Qatar Foundation to consolidate all primary source material related to the history
of Qatar scattered all over the world. The Project had its inception in 2010. Since
then researchers associated with the project have delved into archives, museums
and libraries in UK, India, Denmark and France in search of documents that can
elucidate Qatar’s past. Till now, the biggest stash of such documents has emerged
from the National Archives of India. The National Archives of India, formerly the
Imperial Records Department, is the custodian of the official records of the East
India Company which had significant trading interests in the Persian Gulf.16 The
vaults of the NAI, thus, have yielded a great diversity of documents pertaining to
Qatari history. Most of them are apparently discrete and will need to be pored over
by historians before they yield a coherent narrative. In the year 2012-15, I myself
was a member of the QUIP research team working in NAI, New Delhi.
Of all the materials that I came across while working as a member of research
team, meticulously collecting and compiling all the relevant documents pertaining
to the history of Qatar, a letter written by Sheikh Jassim Al Thani captured my
attention. The correspondence was made by Sheikh Jassim Thani to Colonle
Talbott (C.I.E. British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf) shortly after celebrated

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battle. By its sheer historic value and rich information content this letter deserves
to be preserved in the annals of Qatari history. However, this apart, this letter
reveals an entirely new dimension of the character and Sheikh Jassim which, in
my opinion had a very significant impact on the creation of Qatari identity. This,
precisely, is the irreducible minimum of this paper.

The letter of Sheikh Jasim to Colonel Talbot

On 2 May 1893, in a letter17 to Colonel Talbott, Sheikh Jasim described in
great detail the course of events which had led to the scrimmage between his and
the Wali’s forces. In the letter, Jasim claimed to have done everything to avoid
armed conflict. The Wali, on the other hand, was depicted as a cruel, cavalier and
trigger happy individual. Being very interesting and extremely rich in information
Jasim’s letter to Talbot is quoted in its entirety here –
“I beg to represent to you that I endeavoured to the utmost of my power to
advise serve, and protect the Government of which I am a subject, and none
of its officers experienced the slightest opposition from me. In former days
both I and my father were amongst the Sheikhs of the littoral, having treaties
with you; but when the Turkish Government came towards Nejd I elected to
give my allegiance to it, while other Sheikhs did not. I and my father were
Walis of Katr and its dependencies; but on my becoming a subject of the
Turkish Government I was reduced to the place of a Kaimakam, and I
remained in its service 24 years. Formerly I had only a small police force
given me, and I protected it and the people of Katr. When the people of Hasa
and others revolted and committed treason, I served with obedience and
offered no opposition. I served gratuitously. Walis, Mutaserrifs, and
Inspectors came to me, but they did not find in me the slightest fault; on the
contrary, they returned with feelings of the deepest gratitude towards me.

When the present Wali, Hafiz Pasha, arrived he made a terrifying

demonstration, by moving land forces both regular and of Police and
irregulars, and ships of war by sea. He also asked the help of the Sheikhs
of Koweit, of the Ajman and Al Murrah tribes, against me. When I saw that
he was advancing by land in this manner and other forces were following
him, and I found no reason for such an attitude, I began to fear, as I had
offered no opposition nor stirred rebellion. I became sure that his advance
was not that of one coming to make peace and to allay excitement, but was
aimed at destroying peace and raising disorder; for had his object been to
ensure peace and quiet, he would have come in the manner others have
come, seeing that I have been obedient to the Turkish Government and
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obeying its officers out of respect to it. When therefore I saw him come thus
I went away from the country and out of his way, warning all his tribes not
to interfere with him to his detriment, nor to create disturbances against
him. I also warned the townspeople to go out to meet him so as to enable
him to enter the town with the utmost honour and respect; I also told them
that they should wait upon him and obey his orders.
Accordingly the tribes removed themselves from his way and abstained
from interference. And the townspeople went out to receive him. The principal
men waited upon him patiently and asked him for assurances of safety to
ally their apprehensions. The “Aman,” guarantee of safety in the name of
God and then of the Government was accordingly proclaimed by a crier
throughout the town, and the people became quiet and re-assured.
Then the Wali wrote to me for an interview. I replied that I was a servant of
the Sublime Government and its officials, but had become apprehensive on
account of the movement of the troops, and the assistance sought for from
the Arab Sheikhs and tribes; that if he wanted Katr there it was, and its
people, at his disposal – and he could do what he liked and make any
arrangements he chose; that I would not interfere in any affair calculated to
oppose him; that if his object was to have an interview with me I could have
had no excuse to avoid it, had his visit been like those of former Walis – I
would have waited upon him before his inviting me – but that he had
frightened me by his military display, and under the circumstances it was
not possible for me to meet him in the town; that if he wanted to see me he
should come out of the town, alone, to some place, and I would then meet
him.
When I replied in the above sense he asked to see my brother Ahmed. I
asked “Aman” for him, which he gave in the name of God and the Turkish
Government. Accordingly I sent my brother as my deputy, recommending
him to obey orders. So when my brother arrived the Wali broke the promise,
and thus brought into contempt the guarantee of the Turkish Government.
He put a chain around the neck of my brother and ordered his imprisonment
on board. He then seized twelve of the principal men of the town, put chains
round their necks, tied their hands and feet, and subjected them to a rigorous
and painful imprisonment on board. When I saw their fate and that of my
brother my fear increased and the townspeople became terrified and
perturbed at what had befallen their Chiefs. Then the Wali issued a
notification to the obedient tribes of Katr, owning boats and property in the
country, to the effect that they should stop all intercourse. This notification

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spread consternation among the people both by land and seas.

Struck by fear by the course of events, I wrote to him asking him for mercy,
and representing that his action in imprisoning persons after he had given
the guarantee of the Sultan was an act of treachery which is not customary
with Turkish officers; that his imprisoning them would increase the fear of
the people, who would disperse and the country be ruined in consequence.

I then entreated him to release the prisoners, promising to comply with any
demands he might have on me in order to avert a general calamity resulting
from the ruin of the country. He replied that I should surrender myself and
disperse the tribes that were with me. I rejoined that I was willing and
obedient, and that the tribes had not been assembled to fight him; for if I
had done this I should have been fighting against the Turkish Government,
in whose service I am, and to which I owe allegiance. Had I intended to fight
him I would have done so before he entered Katr, and prevented him from
entering it. That the the tribes had assembled on perceiving that the Sheikh
of Koweit-bin-Subah, with his tribes, was marching to Katr to attack them,
and that they had therefore joined to protect their families and their honour.
That if, however, their dispersion was necessary, I would endeavour to effect
that, provided that he should release the prisoners. He replied that I should
comply with his demands and send away the tribes, but the prisoners must
be kept as hostages to provide against future disturbances. He called me a
rebel, and said that I must come to sue for pardon with a rope around my
neck.
When he saw that his reply was against all sense of justice and equity, I
became aware that he wanted to create mischief. So I sent away the tribes
and told them to go wherever they liked. I resolved to leave Katr altogether
myself, taking my servants with me, and to complain against him in high
places. When he learnt that the tribes had dispersed, and that I had resolved
to leave Katr, he collected troops, drew out the guns, and marched by night.
I heard nothing of his movements until the morning of the 6th Ramazan
when I was seven hours distance from the town, when I heard the sound of
cannon and musketry against the houses, and there was so much of it that
even some women and children were killed. Under these circumstances I
was compelled to defend myself, being driven to extremity. When the sound
of the cannonade roused the scattered tribes they advanced against him.
The Wali then retreated and fled on horseback, leaving his troops behind
him, after having raised this mischief and kindled the flames of war. The

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imperial troops which he had hurled against the tribes retreated after him,
and then there happened what has been witnessed. He reched the town at the
close of the day, and could have protected the remaining troops and averted
further mischief between them and the townspeople; but he did not remain
firm – lost his presence of mind, and fled with Tahir Beg to the hisp,
leaving the troops without a commander, and then ordered the ship’s people
to fire on the townspeople, who, despairing of ever receiving justice, and
being deprived of protection, and, moreover, learning that the Wali was
aiming at their destruction, fled and the town became deserted. The troops
on shore seeing the ship firing, also commenced to fire at the people with
muskets, and to plunder the town. Then a rising followed which is beyond
all description. I heard this news when I was at my quarters in the interior;
so I went within a short distance from the suburbs of the town, and sent
persons to stop the people from further fighting with the troops, and to
remove them out of the town.
The people then came to me and asked that I should endeavour to have their
chiefs released, which I promised to do in order to ensure the safety of the
remaining troops. The Wali delayed matters for three days, with the object
of causing the destruction of the people and of the remaining troops. I
therefore wrote to him informing him that if he did not release the prisoners
great disaster would happen to all. He then preferred his demands, one of
which was that I should arrange for the safe transit by land to El Hasa of
the cavalry and the irregulars; the other, that I should restore to him in the
ship his horse, treasure, and luggage, as well as other horses and things
which he said were missing after the fight.
When he released the prisoners after having killed one, and put out the eyes
of another, I complied with all his demands. I sent off to him the things he
claimed, and also arranged for the safe passage of the cavalry by land, by
sending with them persons who would be responsible for their safety until
they reached Hasa. I also arranged for the passage of those he wanted to
send away by sea, by embarking them in boats.
The Wali remained on board the steamer facing the town, and threatened
every passer by saying that he had asked the Turkish Government to despatch
a man-of-war and large forces, and that his object was to destroy Katr and
its people, and to raze the town to the ground.
When the people heard this they became reluctant to remain in the town,
and my endeavour to dissuade them failed, and they all left to a man. The
town became deserted to an extent never witnessed before. After this I went
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to the troops that were remaining in the town, and arranged for their
protection. I kept some Arab watchmen to look after them and promised to
give them anything they wanted for their sustenance until orders arrived
from the Sublime Government. I remained in the mainland behind them to
protect them against injury or molestation at the hands of anyone. The
people have dispersed, some amongst villages, and others to the suburbs
of Katr.
I have now represented my case to the mercy of the Sublime Government,
imploring it to consider my case with justice, as regards the loss and
destruction of my property consequent upon the ruin of the town. I have
lost what I possessed, and the little which the people owed me has been lost
owing to their dispersion. I am now expecting to receive mercy from the
Sublime Government. If I receive justice against Hafiz Pasha who began the
quarrel, sacrificed the lives of people and soldiers, destroyed property and
country, scattered the subjects, and disturbed the tribes, well and good. But
if the Sublime Government does not attempt and repair the damage, then
there is no doubt that the breach will be widened.”
In a letter dated May 7, 1893, addressed to the Secretary of State, Government
of India, Foreign Department, Colonel Talbott attested the veracity of the claims
made by Sheikh Jasim. Among other things, Talbott mentioned in his
correspondence as to how Sheikh Jasim was driven into a corner and had actually
taken the field against the Ottoman Wali until the latter had rejected all compromise
and had threatened his personal liberty.18 It is quite natural to assume that Col.
Talbott had corroborated the claims made by Sheikh Jasim through some other
source. Yet, it would not be too illogical to conclude that the disarming frankness
and persuasive language of Sheikh Jasim’s correspondence did considerably induce
the British Agent to make a sympathetic assessment of Jasim and his cause.

An analysis of the letter of Sheikh Jassim al Thani

A careful perusal of the letter highlights certain unique traits of Sheikh Jassim’s
character and personality as well his tactics of real politicking. Throughout the
letter Sheikh Jassim portrayed himself not only as a pacifist but also as a submissive
vassal to his Turkish overlord. Thus far from an audacious display of debonair
machismo and reckless valour, the letter, in every passage underscores the point
that Jassim took every pain to ensure peace and avoid a violent face off with the
Turks. The Turkish Wali, on the other hand was portrayed as a haughty, overbearing
bully who pushed Jassim to the wall and made a final military showdown between
the two inevitable.

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Now, what intrigues us is the fact why on earth was Sheikh Jassim, a victorious
conqueror, speaking in so meek and gentle a tone? What had induced him to talk
like a dove when he had been a hawk in the battlefield? A straightforward answer
to this question would point to the characteristic modesty and humility of Sheikh
Jassim’s character. That might indeed have been the case. However, when analysed
in the light on contemporary political developments in the Gulf region and the
shape events took in future, this letter becomes a crowning testimony of the writer’s
practical diplomacy and farsighted statesmanship.
It has already been described how the relation between the Sublime Porte and
Sheikh Jassim was becoming increasingly frictional before the battle of Wajbah.
The British Raj, at the same time, was desirous of assuming the role of mediator
between the Turks and Jassim. Jassim was prudent enough to comprehend that
the mediation was but a prelude to the establishment of British authority over
Qatar, which, as a matter of fact, indeed happened following the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire and establishment of the Mandate system. Caught between two
behemoths, the Ottoman Turkish Empire and the British Raj, time was not yet rife
for Qatar to declare full independence. The need of the hour was the minimization
of foreign influence and intervention in internal affairs of Qatar on one hand and
gradual nourishment of the idea of Qatari nationalism on the other. This enterprise
would never have been possible by taking sides with the Ottoman Turks. The
Turks were confident masters of Qatar who held sway over the peninsula for above
four centuries. Qatar, to the Turks was a mere province in the Ottoman Empire.
Sheikh Jassim was a mere subordinate chieftain who could, in the instance of
slightest transgression be promptly substituted by a more loyal vassal. For the
British however, Qatar was a terra incognita. There control over Qatar’s territory
and politics was always contingent upon the active help and cooperation of a Chief
who exercised tremendous influence upon the local population.
Sheikh Jassim made one thing very clear to the British authorities that he was
a man of peace and was always willing to strike a compromise. However, despite
his avowed pacifism he would always keep the option of military action open as a
last resort in case his Ottoman overlords were impervious to his logic and peaceful
overtures. He made direct appeals to the British Raj to place him and Qatar under
its protection. The British Resident in the Gulf was thoroughly convinced of the
genuineness of Sheikh Jassim’s offers are the ability of his leadership. Talbot,
thus, was rather impressed by Jassim and recognised his cause as being essentially
just. As to what recommendations he made to his superiors after his confabulation
with Jasim we gather from a letter written by J.A. Godley, Esq., Under-Secretary of
State for India to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on 12 May 1893–

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...
Colonel Talbot recommends that an effort should be made to procure the
withdrawal of Turks from the El-Katr peninsula, and to reinstate on a
footing of independence the El-Katr Chiefs, Jasim and Ahmed. The letter
has been authorised by his brother to settle pending questions with the
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and has undertaken to renew the
Treaty of 1868 on the same terms as those recently entered into with the
Trucial chiefs.19
It is a fact that the Ottoman rule over Qatar did not instantly end following its
defeat in the battle of Wajbah. It continued till Qatar become a mandated territory
of the British Empire following the defeat and dismemberment of the Turkish
Empire in the First World War. What Sheikh Jassim had anticipated finally came
to pass 50 years after his victory over the Turks in the battle of Wajbah.
The predominant spirit in the current Qatari endeavours to define a national
identity from the perspective of Sheikh Jassim’s victory over the Turks at Wajbah
is that of martial valour. What goes overlooked is the skilful tact with which the
Sheikh Jassim dealt with covetous Superpowers of his time and waged a war of
arms as well as propaganda against his adversaries. Qatar may have emerged as a
politically sovereign state in 1971 but the task of consolidating the idea of Qatari
nation began with Sheikh Jassim way back in 1868. An enterprise whose success
strength and valour alone could have never been ensured. Sheikh Jassim’s tact and
wisdom was as effective as his martial prowess in the birth of Qatar. Thus, Sheikh
Jassim the diplomat deserves equal respect from the world in general and the
Qataris in particular as Sheikh Jassim the war hero.

The image of Qatar in the modern times: a Soft Power Giant

In order to comprehend how Qatari national identity is evolving with time and
at what stage of development it has reached today it is necessary for us to understand
the role of Qatar in international politics. Once the policies (both internal and
foreign) and actions of the sovereign state of Qatar vis-a-vis the world in general
and Arab World in particular are carefully studied, it will be evident that the nation
has become something of the sort of a fountainhead of soft power and cultural
diplomacy in modern times.20 This endeavour of the Qatari Government is manifest
in more than one way. They are briefly discussed as follows:
The most important aspect of Qatari cultural diplomacy is the activities of the
Al Jazeera News Network. Ever since its inception on 1996 by the Government,
this news channel has been a phenomenal success all over the world. By challenging
the monopoly of giants like BBC and CNN, Al Jazeera has successfully created a
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convincing and powerful perspective of looking at the affairs of the world. To a

global audience accustomed to seeing and understanding the world through Western
eyes, narration and analysis of events from the Arab perspective is at once
enlightening as well as refreshing. That apart, the State patronage to higher education
and all kinds of intellectual and academic exercises are yet another endeavour in
the direction of consolidation and soft power advocacy. Currently Qatar has the
highest literacy rate in the Arab world. More laurels in this line are expected in the
days to come with Reputed US and European universities like Carnegie Mellon,
Georgetown University of Foreign Services, Stenden, Texas A & M, University
College of London, Virginia Commonwealth University, Weill Cornell Medical College
and many more have opened campuses in Qatar and offering same education and
degree/diploma as their American and European counterparts. As a matter of fact,
the entire complex has been set up for availing all these campuses with their entire
manifestation. With Professors and experts from different parts of world are
recruited as faculties, these institutions are attracting students not only from
Qatar but also from surrounding Arab countries. That apart, the regular
organization of seminars, Symposia, Work-shops and other academic activities
and collaborations with top most universities are pooling in Qatar the best of
brains from all over the world.
The role of Qatar as a diplomat and negotiator has been manifested more than
once in the recent times (Ulrichsen: 2014, Kaussler: 2015). Of late, the Afghan
militant group Taliban has been offered to open an office in Qatar to facilitate
talks between them and the Hamid Karzai Government on one hand and Americans
on the other. Likewise the opposing Palestinian factions, the Hamas and the Fatah
have been brought together in the discussion table in Qatar by the Qatar Government
more than once in recent times. Political dissidents from Syria and Libya (before
the fall of Col. Muammar Gaddafi) have also found safe shelter in Qatar.
Thus, it is evident that Qatar is on its way to become the diplomat and the
thinking man of the Arab World. With the military alliance with the US Government
ensuring the nation’s safety from internal and external threats and oil reserve
ensuring a robust economy, Qatar has all the time and more importantly, inclination
to invest all its energy and enterprise to carve out its own niche at global stage.21
This effort, as already mentioned, is in direction of intellectual exercises and
diplomatic manoeuvring. With increasing influence in international affairs the day
is not far when Qatari presence will be a sine qua non in every multilateral forum
in the Arab World. On the academic front, the country will witness an ever increasing
flux of scholars and researchers. At this rate, the day is not far when Doha will
become the intellectual hub of the modern Arab World, just as Florence and
Baghdad was in the Middle Ages and Athens in Antiquity.
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Sheikh Jassim’s contribution to the spirit of the Qatari nation

The epithet “Father of the nation” is generally reserved for an individual who
plays a very crucial role in the birth of the land. In this sense great men like
Mahatma Gandhi, Kemal Ataturk, Jose de San Martin and George Washington
have been honored as the fathers of their respective nations. Though the title “
Founder” instead of “Father” is employed while referring to Sheikh Jassim, his
memory is cherished by modern Qataris exactly in the same way as that of Mahatma
Gandhi in India or Mustafa Kemal in Turkey. When the memory of the victory of
the Battle of Wajbah is evoked, no wonder Qatris see Jassim as a heroic figure
who fought bravely and won against the foreign tyrant. But a father of a nation
does more than inflicting a crushing defeat on the enemy. His wisdom, vision and
ideals are bequeathed upon his countrymen as a legacy for ages to come. The
grateful nation inherits his legacy and assimilates into its very collective
consciousness. Qataris today are probably not even fully aware as to how the
legacy of Sheikh Jassim has become a defining characteristic of the Volkgeist of
their nation. Sheikh Jassim’s genius can never be confined to the field of battle
alone. His skills in real politicking, his diplomatic tact in dealing with superpowers
of his time, combined with his military genius to steer Qatar out of troubled
waters during a crucial stage of world history. The way Qatar carries herself today
in the field of international relations represents a mature stage in the evolution of
a unique perspective of policy formulation and execution whose foundations were
laid long ago by Sheikh Jassim. The amicable overtures made by Sheikh Jassim
eventually eased the process of inclusion of Qatar as a British mandated territory.
This not only ensured the territorial integrity of the nation and the safety of the
citizens in at the incipient stages of nationhood but also provided sufficient time
for the national identity to crystallize. The political alliance of modern Qatar with
the US is but a continuation of the tradition initiated by Sheikh Jassim. In the
efforts of journalists of Al Jazeera to tell the world an Arab version of the events
we hear but an echo of Sheikh Jassim’s voice to tell Colonel Talbott, Nay, to the
entire world about the unheard tale of the blood and toil of the Qatari people
under the yoke of foreign oppression. This intellectual enterprise which began as a
trickle with the efforts to Sheikh Jassim in course of his diplomatic maneuvering
with the Ottoman Turks and British Raj is fast assuming the dimension of a
gigantic deluge in today’s Qatar. The Soft Power diplomacy of Qatar in the
international arena along with the vigorous support and encouragement of the
State in the field of academic research bear testimony to this fact. At this rate in
near future the term Qatari would be synonymous with “the intellectual of the Arab
world”. Once that aspect of their national identity assumes a concrete shape Qatari
people should look back in time and deliver a second round of collective gratitude
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to the illustrious founder of their nation.

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References:

Primary Sources:
National Archives of India, New Delhi
a. Foreign Department, External Branch, Part-A, August 1890, Proceedings
Nos.296-297, Proceedings of Shaikh Jasim-bin-Thani of El-Katr.
b. Foreign Department, External Branch, Part-A, August 1890, Proceedings
Nos.81-83, p.237, Affairs of El-Katr and Al-Hasa.
c. Foreign Department, Branch-K.W., Part-A, January 1890, Proceedings Nos.12-
13, Sheikh Jasim bin Thani.
d. Foreign Department, External Branch, Part-A, February 1890, Proceedings
Nos.69-70, Intrigues of Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani of El-Bida on the Arab
Coast.
e. Foreign Department, Branch-Secrete External, July 1893, Proceedings
Nos.124-231.
f. Foreign Department, External Branch, Part-A, August 1890, Proceedings
Nos.201-202, p.257, Affairs of Al-Hasa and Katr. Alleged intention of the
Turks to abandon the latter place.
g. Foreign Department, Branch-Secret External, January 1894, Proceedings
Nos.14-43, El Katr affairs, Registration by Shaikh Jasim bin Muhammad
bin Thani of the Kaim Mukamship of El Bidaa in favour of his brother
Shaikh Ahmed.
CIA World Factbook ‘Qatar’ 2012.
Bhargva, K. D. (ed) (1958). An Introduction of the National Archives. New
Delhi: The Director of Archives, Government of India
Lorimer, J. G. (1986). Gezetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia,
6 vols. London: Cambridge Archive Edition
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). Qatar Year Book, Doha

Secondary Sources:
Kaussler, Bernd (2015). “Tracing Qatar’s Foreign Policy and its Impact on
Regional Security.” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, Qatar
Rahman, H. (2005). The Emergence of Qatar: The Turbulent Year 1627-1916.
London: Kegan Paul
Ulrichsen, K.C. (2014). “The Gulf States and the Rebalancing of Regional and

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Global Power.” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University.
Houston, Texas
Zahlan, R. S. (1979). The Creation of Qatar. London: Croom Helm

Footnotes
1 http://www.gulf-times.com/story/413070/Qatar-s-first-National-Identity-
Seminar-discusses
https://www.vodafone.qa/pressrelease/qatar-s-first-national-identity-seminar-
kicks-off 20 March 2016
2 Source: CIA World Factbook ‘Qatar’ 2012
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). Qatar Year Book, Doha.
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/scotland/history/articles/battle_of_bannockburn/
5 https://archive.org/stream/simonbolivarelli00petruoft/simon bolivarelli
00petruoft_djvu.txt
6 The Ottomans gave up Qatar in 1913. Three years later, in 1916, Abdullah
bin Jasim al Thain, son of Shaikh of Jasim bin Thani, signed a treaty with
the British which brought Qatar under the trucial system. Qatar, thus,
renounced its autonomy in foreign affairs and the right to cede territory in
exchange of British protection.
7 http://www.nationalanthems.info/qa.htm April 12, 2016
8 Refer to Appendix I for the al Thani family tree.
9 S e e The Creation of Qatar pp. 39-44
10 Foreign Department, Branch-Secret External, January 1894, Proceedings
Nos.14-43, El Katr affairs, Registration by Shaikh Jasim bin Muhammad
bin Thani of the Kaim Mukamship of El Bidaa in favour of his brother
Shaikh Ahmed.
11 Foreign Department, External Branch, Part-A, February 1890, Proceedings
Nos.69-70, Intrigues of Sheikh Jasim-bin-Thani of El-Bida on the Arab
Coast.
12 Foreign Department, External Branch, Part-A, August 1890, Proceedings
Nos.81-83, p.237, Affairs of El-Katr and Al-Hasa.
13 See The Emergence of Qatar, pp.99-108.
14 Foreign Department, Branch-Secrete External, July 1893, Proceedings
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Nos.124-231.
15 Ibid.
16 Government of India, The Director of Archives (1958). An Introduction of
the National Archives, p.9
17 Foreign Department, Branch-Secrete External, July 1893, Proceedings Nos.
124-231.
18 Foreign Department, Branch-Secrete External, July 1893, Proceedings
Nos.124-231
19 Ibid.
20 Kaussler, Bernd (2015). “Tracing Qatar’s Foreign Policy and its Impact on
Regional Security.” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha,
Qatar.
21 Ulrichsen, K.C. (2014). “The Gulf States and the Rebalancing of Regional
and Global Power.” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of
Rice University, Houston, Texas.

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