1)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 100643 December 12, 1995

ADEZ REALTY, INCORPORATED, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Br.
79, Morong Rizal, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR QUEZON CITY, and AGUEDO
EUGENIO, respondents.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 30 October 1992 the Court found movant, Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a
material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals, which he appealed to this Court on certiorari,
thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the apparent purpose of misleading
this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was disbarred from
the practice of law.1

On 20 November 1992 movant filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Leave to Offer Evidence Re
Charge of Unauthorized Intercalation in a Judicial Record dated 18 November 1992. He claimed that
the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft of the
petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when
the latter formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which
he was found guilty considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the
President for appointment as regional trial judge.2 But the Court on 3 December 1992 denied the
motion for want of a compelling reason to justify a reversal of the questioned resolution.3

On 23 February 1994 movant Dacanay filed a Motion to Lift (Disbarment) stating that he was already
62 years old, has learned his lesson from his mistake, was terribly sorry for what he had done, and
in all candor promised that if given another chance he would live up to the exacting demands of the
legal profession. He appended to his motion certifications of good moral character from: Fr. Celso
Fernando, Parochial Vicar, Parish of St. Michael Archangel, Marilao, Bulacan; Fr. Lauro V. Larlar,
OAR, Rector, San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Sis. Aniceta B. Abion, EMM, Chairperson, Center
for Housing and Ecology Development Foundation, Inc.; Dean Rufus B. Rodriquez, College of Law,
San Sebastian College-Recoletos; Judge Pedro T. Santiago, Executive Judge, RTC, Quezon City;
Judge Teodoro P. Regino, RTC-Br. 84, Quezon City; Judge Antonio P. Solano, RTC-Br. 86, Quezon
City; and Judge Gregorio D. Dayrit, MTC-Br. 35, Quezon City.4 However, on 11 August 1994 the
Court denied the motion.5
On 1 December 1994 movant again filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment alleging among
others that he had been deprived of his means to life; he had pursued civic, religious and community
work, especially for the poor and the underprivileged short of extending legal assistance because of
his incapacity; he had admitted "with profound regret and with utmost humility his commission of an
unpardonable mistake and ask(ed) that he be given another chance;" and, he was "remorseful for
what he has done and comes to this Honorable Court with a contrite heart."6

His wife Norma M. Dacanay likewise wrote the Court on 1 December 1994 saying that while she did
not condone what her husband had done, it had been her fervent wish that the Court took a second
look into its decision disbarring her husband as her entire family had been traumatized by his
disbarment.7

On 6 March 1995 movant sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of
the Court reiterating his Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment of 1 December 1994. Thus —

I am truly penitent for the serious offense I committed and admit full responsibility for
it. I realize it was dishonest and unfair to pass the blame to my secretary who was
merely following my instructions. The intercalation was my own act and I am justly
punished for it.

Your Honors, I do not question your decision but I only beg for your mercy. I have a
wife and children to support but my only means of livelihood has been withdrawn
from me. I am destitute and desperate and can only turn to you for relief . . . .

Looking back, I cannot imagine how I could have even thought of blackening the law
profession, to which I owe so much. Please let me redeem myself by admitting me
back to its precincts, where I swear to live strictly according to its canons . . . .8

On 21 March 1995 the Court noted the letter of 6 March 1995 of movant Dacanay.

On 4 August 1995 movant again prayed for his reinstatement —

It has been 33 long months since my disbarment, during which time I have been
struggling to make both ends meet to provide for my wife and three children. Please
give me the chance to prove that I am a reformed offender who will henceforth do
nothing whatsoever to dishonor the legal profession.9

On 12 September 1995 the Court noted respondent's 4 August 1995 letter.10

On 17 November, 1995 movant once more wrote the Court —

I humbly acknowledge again that I committed a grievous offense for which I was
justly punished at the time with the extreme sanction of disbarment.

I have been suffering much since my disbarment more than 36 months ago, but it is
my wife and children who have suffered more for my transgression. Although
innocent, they bear with me the stigma and burden of my punishment.11

The disbarment of movant Benjamin M. Dacanay for three (3) years has, quite apparently, given him
sufficient time and occasion to soul-search and reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself
and prove once more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the
legal profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show
that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its
practitioners. Accordingly, the Court lifts the disbarment of Benjamin M. Dacanay. However he
should be sternly warned that —

[T]he practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required
for remaining a member of good standing of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to
practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to discipline its members is not only
a right, but a bounden duty as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members . . .12

WHEREFORE, the disbarment of BENJAMIN M. DACANAY from the practice of law is LIFTED and
he is therefore allowed to resume the practice of law upon payment of the required legal fees. This
resolution is effective immediately.

SO ORDERED.

2)

[G.R. No. 120348. December 3, 1948.]

In re Investigation of ANGEL J. PARAZO for alleged leakage of questions in some subjects in the
1948 Bar Examinations.

Felixberto M. Serrano for Respondent.

Enrique M. Fernando and Francisco A. Rodrigo, Abelardo Subido, and Arturo A. Alafriz (for the
Philippine Lawyers’ Association) as amici curiæ.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AUTHORITY OF SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES FOR ADMISSION TO

THE PRACTICE OF LAW; SUPREME COURT CONDUCTS BAR EXAMINATIONS. — Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice
of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule,
this Court conducts the Bar Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by
one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar
and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.

2. STATUTES; WORDS AND PHRASES; "INTEREST OF THE STATE" EXPLAINED AND CONSTRUED. — We do
not propose to define or fix the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the
phrase "interest of the state" cannot be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public
safety" alone. These synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not
uncommon terms and we can well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public
safety," is used in Article III, section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the
privacy of communications and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or
when public safety and order require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution
provides that the President may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion,
insurrection, etc., when the public safety requires it.

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had meant to
limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the state," i. e.,
"national security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of similar
phrases like "public safety," "national security," or "public security" of which it must have been familiar.
 Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of the
legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of the
exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

4. ID.; ID.; ID. — The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more
general and broader than "security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public
interest" which may include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT TAKES CHARGE OF ADMISSION OF LAWYERS; BAR

EXAMINATIONS, HOW GIVEN AND CONDUCTED. — Under constitutional provision, Article VIII, section 13,
Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes charge of the admission of members to the
Philippine Bar. By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the qualifications of the candidates to the Bar
Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subjects of the said Bar Examinations. Every year, the
Supreme Court appoints the Bar Examiners who prepare the questions, then correct the examination papers
submitted by the examinees, and later make their report to the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination
candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice
law.

6. SUPREME COURT; MAINTENANCE OF HIGH STANDARD OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. — The Supreme
Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession, both in
academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving
this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest,
possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this
Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner.

7. ID.; LEGAL PROFESSION AS THE MOST POPULAR IN THIS JURISDICTION; CONDUCT OF BAR
EXAMINATIONS IMBUED WITH GENERAL INTEREST AND NATIONAL IMPORTANCE. — It is of public
knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions obtaining in this country, or the great
demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other professions, is the most popular in
these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar, schools and colleges of law as
compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one important thing to bear in mind
is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships
and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the Government, draw exclusively from the
Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of Bar
Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and national importance.

8. ID.; BAR EXAMINATIONS ANOMALY AS WITHIN THE MEANING OF "INTEREST OF THE STATE." — The
present case falls and may be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state," involving as
it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of the entire
legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the Committee
of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connection with said
examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three coordinate
and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

9. ID.; JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, SUPREME COURT AS; DUTY AND NECESSITY TO ADOPT MEASURES TO
PRESERVE INTEGRITY OF LEGAL PROFESSION. — In support of if not in addition to the power granted by
section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 to this Court, we have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of
the Supreme Court as representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to
preserve their integrity, and render possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the
present case, the investigation of charges of error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates,
including lawyers, who are officers of the Court.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
The present case had its origin in a story or news item prepared and written by the defendant, Angel J.
Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, that appeared on
the front page of the issue of September 14, 1948. The story was preceded by the headline in large letters
— "CLAIM ’LEAK’ IN LAST BAR TESTS," followed by another in slightly smaller letters — "Applicants In
Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored," under the name — "By Angel J. Parazo of the Star
Reporter Staff." For purposes of reference we quote the news item in full: jg c:chan roble s.com.p h

"Leakage in some subjects in the recent bar examinations were denounced by some of the law graduates
who took part in the tests, to the Star Reporter this morning.

"These examinees claim to have seen mimeograph copies of the questions in one subject, days before the
tests were given, in the Philippine Normal School.

"Only students of one private university in Sampaloc had those mimeographed questions on said subject
fully one week before the tests.

"The students who made the denunciation to the Star Reporter claim that the tests actually given were
similar in every respect to those they had seen students of this private university holding proudly around the
city.

"The students who claim to have seen the tests which leaked are demanding that the Supreme Court
institute an immediate probe into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test
papers of the students of the particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations.

"The discovery of the alleged leakage in the tests of the bar examinations came close on the heels of the
revelations in the Philippine Collegian, official organ of the student body of the University of the Philippines,
on recent government tests wherein the questions had come into the possession of nearly all the graduates
of some private technical schools." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

To the publication, evidently, the attention of the Supreme Court must have been called, and Mr. Justice
Padilla, who had previously been designated Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners for this year, by
authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano,
Clerk of Court to cite Mr. Parazo for questioning and investigation. In this connection, and for purposes of
showing the interest of the Supreme Court in the news item and its implications, it may here be stated that
this Court is and for many years has been, in charge of the Bar Examinations held every year, including that
of this year, held in August, 1948. Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes
this Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations
yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year,
acts on the report of the committee and finally, admits to the Bar and to the practice of law, the candidates
and examinees who have passed the examinations.

The investigation of Mr. Parazo was conducted on September 18, 1948, on which occasion he testified under
oath and, answering questions directed to him by Messrs. Cruz and Soriano admitted that he was the author
of the news item; that he wrote up the story and had it published, in good faith and in a spirit of public
service; and that he knew the persons who gave him the information which formed the basis of his
publication but that he declined to reveal their names because the information was given to him in
confidence and his informants did not wish to have their identities revealed. The investigators informed
Parazo that this was a serious matter involving the confidence of the public in the regularity and cleanliness
of the Bar Examinations and also in the Supreme Court which conducted said examinations, and repeatedly
appealed to his civic spirit and sense of public service, pleading with and urging him to reveal the names of
his informants so that the Supreme Court may be in a position to start and conduct the necessary
investigation in order to verify their charge and complaint and take action against the party or parties
responsible for the alleged irregularity and anomaly, if found true, but Parazo consistently refused to make
the revelation.

In the meantime, the writer of this opinion who was appointed to the Supreme Court as associate Justice in
the latter part of August, 1948, was designated to succeed Mr. Justice Padilla as Chairman of the Committee
of Bar Examiners when the said Justice was appointed Secretary of Justice. The writer of this opinion was
furnished a copy of the transcript of the investigation conducted on September 18, 1948, and he made a
report thereof to the Court in banc, resulting in the issuance of the resolution of this Court dated October 7,
1948, which reads as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"In relation with the news item that appeared in the front page of the Star Reporter, issue of September 14,
1948, regarding alleged leakage in some bar examination questions, which examinations were held in
August 1948, Mr. Jose de la Cruz, as Commissioner, and Mr. E. Soriano, as Clerk of Court, were authorized
by Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla then chairman of the committee of bar examiners to conduct an investigation
thereof, particularly to receive the testimony of Mr. Angel J. Parazo, the reporter responsible for and author
of said news item. An investigation was conducted on September 18, 1948; stenographic notes were taken
of the testimony of Mr. Parazo, and Mr. Justice Marceliano R. Montemayor, the new chairman of the
committee of bar examiners, has submitted the transcript of said notes for the consideration of this Court.

"From the record of said investigation, it is clear that Mr. Parazo has deliberately and consistently declined
and refused to reveal the identity of the persons supposed to have given him the data and information on
which his news item was based, despite the repeated appeals made to his civic spirit, and for his
cooperation, in order to enable this Court to conduct a thorough investigation of the alleged bar examination
anomaly, Resolved, to authorize Mr. Justice Montemayor to cite Mr. Parazo before him, explain to him that
the interests of the State demand and so this Court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his
information and of his news item, and to warn him that his refusal to make the revelation demanded will be
regarded as contempt of court and penalized accordingly. Mr. Justice Montemayor will advise the Court of
the result."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

Acting upon this resolution, the writer of this opinion cited Mr. Parazo to appear before him on October 13,
1948. He appeared on the date set and it was clearly explained to him that the interest of the State
demands and this court requires that he reveal the source or sources of his information and of his news
item; that this was a very serious matter involving the confidence of the people in general and the law
practitioners and bar examinees in particular, in the regularity and cleanliness of the bar examinations; that
it also involves the good name and reputation of the bar examiners who were appointed by this Court to
prepare the bar examinations questions and later pass upon and correct the examination papers; and last
but not least, it also involves and is bound to affect the confidence of the whole country in the very Supreme
Court which is conducting the bar examinations. It was further explained to him that the Supreme Court is
keenly interested in investigating the alleged anomaly and leakage of the examination questions and is
determined to punish the party or parties responsible therefor but that without his help, specially the
identities of the persons who furnished him the information and who could give the court the necessary data
and evidence, the Court could not even begin the investigation because there would be no basis from which
to start, not even a clue from which to formulate a theory. Lastly, Parazo was told that under the law he
could be punished if he refused to make the revelation, punishment which may even involve imprisonment.

Because of the seriousness of the matter, Parazo was advised to think it over and consider the
consequences, and if he need time within which to do this and so that he might even consult the editor and
publisher of his paper, the Star Reporter, he could be given an extension of time, and at his request, the
investigation was postponed to October 15, 1948. On that date he appeared, accompanied by his counsel,
Atty. Felixberto M. Serrano. The writer of this opinion in the presence of his counsel, several newspapermen,
Clerk of Court Soriano, Deputy Clerk of Court Cruz, and Mr. Chanliongco made a formal demand on Mr.
Parazo to reveal the identities of his informants, under oath, but he declined and refused to make the
revelation. At the request of his counsel, that before this Court take action upon his refusal to reveal, he be
accorded a hearing, with the consent of the Court first obtained, a public hearing was held on the same day,
October 15, 1948 in the course of which, Attorney Serrano extensively and ably argued the case of his
client, invoking the benefits of Republic Act No. 53, the first section of which reads as follows:
jgc:cha nro bles.c om.ph

"SECTION 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of
general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in
said publication which was related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a
House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

This Court has given this case prolonged, careful and mature consideration, involving as it does interesting
and important points of law as well as questions of national importance. Counsel contends that the phrase
"interest of the state" found at the end of section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 means and refers only to the
security of the state, that is to say — that only when national security or public safety is involved, may this
Court compel the defendant to reveal the source or sources of his news report or information. We confess
that it was not easy to decide this legal question on which the conviction or acquittal of Parazo hinges. As a
matter of fact, the vote of the Justices is not unanimous.

In an effort to determine the intent of the Legislature that passed Republic Act No. 53, particularly the
Senate where it originated, we examined the record of the proceedings in said legislative body when this
Act, then Senate Bill No. 6 was being discussed. We gathered from the said record that the original bill
prepared by Senator Sotto provided that the immunity to be accorded a publisher, editor, or reporter of any
newspaper was absolute and that under no circumstance could he be compelled to reveal the source of his
information or news report. The committee, however, under the chairmanship of Senator Cuenco inserted an
amendment or change, by adding to the end of section 1 of the clause "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the public interest." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

When the bill as amended was recommended for approval on second reading, Senator Sotto, the author of
the original bill proposed an amendment by eliminating the clause added by the committee — "unless the
court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest," claiming that said clause would kill the
purpose of the bill. This amendment of Senator Sotto was discussed. Various Senators objected to the
elimination of the clause already referred to on the ground that without such exception and by giving
complete immunity to editors, reporters, etc., many abuses may be committed. Senator Cuenco, Committee
chairman, in advocating the disapproval of the Sotto amendment, and in defending the exception embodied
in the amendment introduced by the Committee, consisting in the clause: "unless the court finds that such
revelation is demanded by the public interest," said that the Committee could not accept the Sotto
amendment because there may be cases, perhaps few, in which the interest of the public or the interest of
the state requires that the names of the informants be published or known. He gave as one example a case
of a newspaperman publishing information referring to a theft of the plans of forts or fortifications. He
argued that if the immunity accorded a newspaperman should be absolute, as sought by the Sotto
amendment, the author of the theft might go scott-free. When the Sotto amendment was put to a vote, it
was disapproved. Finally, Senator Sotto proposed another amendment by changing the phrase "public
interest" at the end of section 1 as amended by the Committee be changed to and substituted by the phrase
"interest of the state," claiming that the phrase public interest was too elastic. Without much discussion this
last amendment was approved, and this phrase is now found in the Act as finally approved.

In view of the contention now advanced, that the phrase "interest of the state" is confined to cases involving
the "security of the state" or "public safety," one might wonder or speculate on why the last amendment
proposed by Senator Sotto, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state," was approved
without much discussion. But we notice from the records of the deliberations on and discussion of the bill in
the Senate that the phrase "public interest" was used interchangeably by some Senators with the phrase
"interest of the state." For instance, although the bill, as amended by the Committee presided by Senator
Cuenco, used the words "public interest," when Senator Cuenco sponsored the bill before the Senate he
used in his speech or remarks the phrase "interest of the state" (interes del Estado). Again, although the
bill, as sponsored by the Cuenco Committee and discussed by the Senate, used the words "public interest,"
Senator Sebastian referred to the exception by using the phrase "interest of the state." This understanding
of at least two of the Senators, who took part in the discussion, about the similarity or interchangeability of
the two phrases "public interest" and "interest of the state," may account for the readiness or lack of
objection on the part of the Senate, after it had rejected the first Sotto amendment, to accept the second
Sotto amendment, changing the phrase "public interest" to "interest of the state." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In referring to a case wherein the security of the state or public safety was involved, such as the theft of the
plans of fortifications, Senator Cuenco was obviously giving it only as an example of what he meant by
"interest of the state;" it was not meant to be the only case or example. We do not propose to define or fix
the limits or scope of the phrase "interest of the state;" but we can say that the phrase "interest of the
state" can not be confined and limited to the "security of the state" or to "public safety" alone. These
synonymous phrases, — "security of the state" and "public safety," — are not uncommon terms and we can
well presume that the legislators were familiar with them. The phrase "public safety," is used in Article III,
section 1(5) of the Constitution of the Philippines, where it says that "the privacy of communications and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or when public safety and order
require otherwise;" and Article VII, section 10(2) of the same Constitution provides that the President may
suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, in case of invasion, insurrection, etc., when the public
safety requires it.

The phrase "national security" is used at the beginning of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, thus: Title I, —
Crimes against National Security and the law of Nations, Chapter I, — Crimes against National Security.
Then, more recently, the phrase "national security" was used in section 2, and the phrase "public security"
was equally used in section 19, of Commonwealth Act No. 682 creating the People’s Court, promulgated on
September 25, 1945. If, as contended, the Philippine Congress, particularly the Philippine Senate, had
meant to limit the exception to the immunity of newspapermen only to cases where the "security of the
state," i.e., "national security" is involved, it could easily and readily have used such phrase or any one of
similar phrases like "public safety," "national security," or "public security" of which it must have been
familiar. Since it did not do so, there is valid reason to believe that that was not in the mind and intent of
the legislators, and that, in using the phrase "interest of the state," it extended the scope and the limits of
the exception when a newspaperman or reporter may be compelled to reveal the sources of his information.

The phrase "interest of the state" is quite broad and extensive. It is of course more general and broader
than "security of the state." Although not as broad and comprehensive as "public interest" which may
include most anything though of minor importance, but affecting the public, such as for instance, the
establishment and maintenance of barrio roads, electric light and ice plants, parks, markets, etc., the phrase
"interest of the state" even under a conservative interpretation, may and does include cases and matters of
national importance in which the whole state and nation, not only a branch or instrumentality thereof such
as a province, city or town, or a part of the public, is interested or would be affected, such as the principal
functions of Government like administration of justice, public school system, and such matters like social
justice, scientific research, practice of law or of medicine, impeachment of high Government officials,
treaties with other nations, integrity of the three coordinate branches of the Government, their relations to
each other, and the discharge of their functions, etc.

We are satisfied that the present case easily comes under the phrase "interest of the state." Under
constitutional provision, Article VIII, section 13, Constitution of the Philippines, the Supreme Court takes
charge of the admission of members to the Philippine Bar By its Rules of Court, it has prescribed the
qualifications of the candidates to the Bar Examinations, and it has equally prescribed the subjects of the
said Bar Examinations. Every year, the Supreme Court appoints the Bar examiners who prepare the
questions, then correct the examination papers submitted by the examinees, and later make their report to
the Supreme Court. Only those Bar Examination candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade
are admitted to the Bar and licensed to practice law. There are now thousands of members of the Philippine
Bar, scattered all over the Philippines, practising law or occupying important Government posts requiring
membership in the Bar as a prerequisite, and every year, quite a number, sometimes several hundreds, are
added to the legal fold. The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high
standard for the legal profession, both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and
fair dealing. The Court and the licensed lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high
standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble profession only
those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and
knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar Examinations honestly and in the
regular and usual manner. It is of public knowledge that perhaps by general inclination or the conditions
obtaining in this country, or the great demand for the services of licensed lawyers, law as compared to other
professions, is the most popular in these islands. The predominantly greater number of members of the Bar,
schools and colleges of law as compared to those of other learned professions, attest to this fact. And one
important thing to bear in mind is that the Judiciary, from the Supreme Court down to the Justice of the
Peace Courts, provincial fiscalships and other prosecuting attorneys, and the legal departments of the
Government, draw exclusively from the Bar to fill their positions. Consequently, any charge or insinuation of
anomaly in the conduct of Bar Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general interest and
national importance.

If it is true that Bar Examination questions, for some reason or another, find their way out and get into the
hands of Bar examinees before the examinations are actually given, and as a result thereof some examinees
succeed in illegally and improperly obtaining passing grades and are later admitted to the Bar and to the
practice of law, when otherwise they should not be, then the present members of the legal profession would
have reason to resent and be alarmed; and if this is continued it would not be long before the legal
profession will have fallen into disrepute. The public would naturally lose confidence in the lawyers, specially
in the new ones, because a person contemplating to go to court to seek redress or to defend himself before
it would not know whether a particular lawyer to whom he is entrusting his case has legally passed the Bar
Examinations because of sufficient and adequate preparation and training, and that he is honest, or whether
he was one of those who had succeeded in getting hold of Bar Examination questions in advance, passed the
Bar Examinations illegally, and then started his legal career with this act of dishonesty. Particularly, the Bar
examinees who, by intense study and conscientious preparation, have honestly passed the Bar Examinations
and are admitted to practice law, would be affected by this anomaly, because they would ever be under a
cloud of suspicion, since from the point of view of the public, they might be among those who had made use
of Bar Examination questions obtained before hand. And, incidentally, the morale of the hundreds of
students and graduates of the different law schools, studying law and later preparing for the Bar
Examinations, would be affected, even disastrously, for in them may be born the idea that there is no need
of much law study and preparation inasmuch as it is possible and not difficult to obtain copies of questions
before the examinations and pass them and be admitted to the Bar.
The cloud of suspicion would, equally, hang over the Bar examiners themselves, eight eminent lawyers who
in a spirit of public service and civic spirit, have consented to serve on the Committee of Examiners at the
request and designation of this Court. They would be suspected, — one or two or more of them — that
through negligence, or connivance, or downright corruption, they have made possible the release if they
have not themselves actually released, before examination day, the questions they had prepared. The
employees of the Supreme Court in charge of the Bar Examinations, specially those who copy or
mimeograph the original copies furnished by the Bar examiners, would all be under suspicion. And, lastly,
and more important still, the Supreme Court itself which has the overall supervision and control over the
examinations, would share the suspicion, as a result of which the confidence of the people in this High
Tribunal, which public confidence, the members of this Court like to think and believe, it still enjoys, might
be affected and shaken. All these considerations of vital importance, in our opinion, can and will sufficiently
cause the present case to fall and be included within the meaning of the phrase "interest of the state,"
involving as it does, not only the interests of students and graduates of the law schools and colleges, and of
the entire legal profession of this country as well as the good name and reputation of the members of the
Commitee of Bar Examiners, including the employees of the Supreme Court having charge of and connection
with said examinations, but also the highest Tribunal of the land itself which represents one of the three
coordinate and independent branches or departments of the Philippine Government.

In support of if not in addition to the power granted by section 1 of Republic Act No. 53 to this Court, we
have the inherent power of courts in general, specially of the Supreme Court as representative of the
Judicial Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render possible
and facilitate the exercise of their functions, including, as in the present case, the investigation of charges of
error, abuse or misconduct of their officials and subordinates, including lawyers, who are officers of the
Court. (Province of Tarlac v. Gale, 26 Phil., 350; 21 C.J.S. 41, 138.) As we have previously stated, the
revelation demanded of the respondent, of the identity of his informants, is essential and necessary to the
investigation of the charge contained in the publication already mentioned.

It will be noticed from Parazo’s news item as quoted in the first part of this decision, that, his informants,
law graduates and bar examinees, were denouncing the supposed anomaly — consisting of the alleged
leakage of the Bar Examination questions — to the Supreme Court for due investigation. If those persons
really meant and intended to make a bona fide and effective denunciation, with expectation of results, the
right place to air their grievance was the Supreme Court itself, not a newspaper; and if they truly wanted an
investigation, they should have come forward and furnished or stood ready to furnish the facts on which to
base and from which to start an investigation, instead of concealing themselves behind the curtain of press
immunity.

Examining the news item in question, it is therein claimed and assured that Bar Examination questions in at
least one subject had been obtained and used by bar examinees coming from a certain university, one week
before the examinations were actually held. Parazo in his statements and answers during the investigation
said that examination questions in several subjects were involved in the anomaly. But no copy or copies of
said examination questions were furnished us. No one is willing to testify that he actually saw said alleged
copies of examination questions; that they were actually and carefully compared with the legitimate
examination questions given out on the day of the examination and found to be identical; no one is ready
and willing to reveal the identity of the persons or bar examinees said to have been seen with the said Bar
Examination questions, although they as well as the university where they came from, was known; and even
the law subjects to which the questions pertained are not disclosed; and, lastly, we are not allowed to know
even the identity of respondent Parazo’s informants who claim to have seen all these things.

In this connection it may be stated that in the last Bar Examinations held in August, 1948, approximately
nine hundred candidates took them, each candidate writing his answers in a book for each subject. There
were eight subjects, each subject belonging to and corresponding to each one of the eight bar examiners.
There were therefore eight sets of bar examination questions, and multiplying these eight sets of questions
by nine hundred candidates, gives a total of seven thousand two hundred (7,200) examination papers
involved, in the hands of eight different examiners. The examination books or papers bear no names or
identifications of their writers or owners and said ownership and identification will not be known until the
books or papers are all corrected and graded. Without definite assurance based on reliable witnesses under
oath that the alleged anomaly had actually been committed, - evidence on the identity of the persons in
possession of the alleged copies of questions prematurely released or illegally obtained and made use of, the
law subjects or subjects involved, the university from which said persons come, this Court does not feel
capable of or warranted in taking any step, such as blindly and desperately revising each and every one of
the 7,200 examination books with the fond but forlorn hope of finding any similarity or identity in the
answers of any group of examinees and basing thereon any definite finding or conclusion. Apart from the
enormity of the task and its hopelessness, this Court may not and cannot base its findings and conclusions,
especially in any serious and delicate matter as is the present, on that kind of evidence. Under these
circumstances, this Court, for lack of basis, data and information, is unable to conduct, nay, even start, an
investigation; and, unless and until the respondent herein reveals the identities of his informants, and those
informants and or others with facts and reliable evidence, aid and cooperate with the Court in its endeavor
to further examine and probe into the charges contained in the news item, said charges are considered and
held to be without basis, proof or foundation.

When the Supreme Court decided to demand of the respondent herein that he reveal the names of his
informants, it was not impelled or motivated by mere idle curiosity. It truly wanted information on which to
start an investigation because it is vitally interested in keeping the Bar Examinations clean and above board
and specially, not only to protect the members of the Bar and those aspiring for membership therein and the
public dealing with the members thereof and the Bar Examiners who cooperate with and act as agents of
this Court in preparing the examination questions and correcting the examination papers, but also, as
already stated, to keep the confidence of the people in this High Tribunal as regards the discharge of its
function relative to the admission to the practice of law. These, it can only do by investigating any Bar
Examination anomaly, fixing responsibility and punishing those found guilty, even annulling examinations
already held, or else declaring the charges as not proven, if, as a result of the investigation, it is found that
there is insufficiency or lack of evidence. In demanding from the respondent that he reveal the sources of
his information, this Court did not intend to punish those informants or hold them liable. It merely wanted
their help and cooperation. In this Court’s endeavor to probe thoroughly the anomaly, or irregularity
allegedly committed, it was its intention not only to adopt the necessary measures to punish the guilty
parties, if the charges are found to be true, but also even to annul the examinations themselves, in justice
to the innocent parties who had taken but did not pass the examinations. We say this because in every
examination, whether conducted by the Government or by a private institution, certain standards are
unconsciously adopted on which to base the passing grade. For instance, if, as a result of the correction of
many or all of the examination papers, it is found that only very few have passed it, the examiner might
reasonably think that the questions he gave were unduly difficult or hard to understand, or too long, as a
result of which he may be more liberal and be more lenient and make allowances. On the other hand, if too
many obtain a passing grade, the examiner may think that the examination questions were too easy and
constitute an inadequate measure of the legal knowledge and training required to be a lawyer, and so he
may raise his standard and become more strict in his correction of the papers and his appreciation of the
answers. So, in a case where examinees, especially if many, succeed in getting hold of questions long before
examination day, and study and prepare the answers to those questions, it may result that when the
examiner finds that many of the examinees have easily and correctly answered the questions, he may think
that said questions were too easy, raise the standard by being strict in his correction of the papers, thereby
giving a grade below passing to a number of examinees who otherwise would have validly passed the
examinations.

In conclusion, we find that the interest of the state in the present case demands that the respondent Angel
J. Parazo reveal the source or sources of his information which formed the basis of his news item or story in
the September 14, 1948 issue of the Star Reporter, quoted at the beginning of this decision, and that, in
refusing to make the revelation which this Court required of him, he committed contempt of Court. The
respondent repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons
who furnished him the information. In other words, he omitted and still refuses to do an act commanded by
this Court which is yet in his power to perform. (Rule 64, section 7, Rules of Court.) Ordinarily, in such
cases, he can and should be imprisoned indefinitely until he complied with the demand. However,
considering that cases like the present are not common or frequent, in this jurisdiction, and that there is no
reason and immediate necessity for imposing a heavy penalty, as may be done in other cases where it is
advisable or necessary to mete out severe penalties to meet a situation of an alarming number of cases of a
certain offense or a crime wave, and, considering further the youthful age of the respondent, the majority of
the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and confinement
in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court the
revelation demanded of him. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting: c hanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry
The facts in this case, as narrated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, justify conclusively the
finding of the majority that respondent is guilty of contempt for his stubborn refusal to obey an order of this
Court.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53, invoked by respondent in his defense, does not protect him. It would
protect him only if we could agree with his theory that the words "interest of the state" used in the law
should be read to mean security of the state or public safety. But there is nothing in the whole text of
Republic Act No. 53 and/or in the intention of those who drafted and enacted it, as can be gleaned in the
Senate journal, or in the grammatical, rhetorical, or philosophical meaning of the words in question, that can
justify the limiting or narrowing of the scope of the ideas that they embrace within the small circle of public
security or safety of the state.

The word "interest" in the phrase "interest of the state" represents a world of ideas and concepts within
which the ideas of security or safety occupy a place, however privileged, insignificant in magnitude. There is
no legal basis for us to reduce the purpose of the law, as conveyed by its very words, to a minimum that, if
given effect, would virtually amend the law without the benefit of congressional enactment. Such would be
violative of the Constitution.

In the tug of war between the theory of absolute privilege of the author of the original bill and the Senate
committee that would limit the privilege up to the point where it runs in conflict with the wide area of public
interest, the opposing sides arrived at a meeting ground in which the line of limitation was pushed up to the
place where the privilege may be in conflict with the interest of the state. No one is authorized to push that
line of limitation still farther to the fence surrounding the safety of the state. We have to stop at the line of
limitation set by Congress. To hurdle it is to transgress the law.

No matter how much we may agree with the side maintaining the absolute privilege or reducing any
limitation to an imaginable minimum, or how much we may sympathize with its failure in the Senate or in
Congress, we are powerless to retrieve that side from its plight. We are not authorized to inject in the
statute a law of our own creation, or make of a legislative failure a success, and thus defeat the legislative
intent. There is no alternative for the losing legislative side except to bide for time and wait for a more
respective mood of Congress.

Contempt of court is an offense that should not be left unpunished, especially if it consists in the
disobedience of a judicial order. The orders of a court demand obedience for their effectiveness.
Administration of justice is impossible with unenforceable judicial orders. The effectiveness of judicial orders
is the elan vital of the administration of justice. To disobey an order of court is a terrible thing because it
means sowing the seeds of anarchy and chaos. The Supreme Court, if it can help it, will never allow such a
thing to obtain.

Anyone may imagine a state or a human society smoothly functioning without an executive department or
without a legislative department. As a matter of fact, in this Republic, Congress functions only one third of
the year. During the remaining two thirds of the year the life of the nation does not suffer any impairment.
It can even be said that during those two thirds of the year there is more normalcy than during the
Congressional session when legislative reforms and the enactment of new laws cannot but produce some
public uneasiness, sometimes, amounting to a real crisis in the way of life of the people. No one can imagine
the possibility of an orderly human society without some effective system of administration of justice,
functioning without long interruptions.

While we cannot overemphasize the importance of upholding judicial authority to its full measure and this
Supreme Court will never take lightly any disobedience to or defiance of its orders, and it should mete out to
all affected parties the tremendous weight of its power and will punish, without fear or favor, the guilty
parties, regardless of who they may be, in the present case we are constrained to disagree with the penalty
imposed upon Respondent.

Respondent is punished under section 7 of Rule 64, the same section we have already declared invalid in our
opinion in the Harden case, 81 Phil., 741. The provision of law applicable to respondent is contained in
section 6 of Rule 64, under which a person guilty of contempt may be fined in a sum not exceeding P1,000
or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both. Considering that there are mitigating circumstances
that attenuate respondent’s responsibility, — youthfulness, honest but wrong belief in the existence of a
privilege, absence of substantial harm, — we should not impose upon respondent a stiffer penalty than that
which we imposed in the case of Benito M. Sakdalan, L-278 1 , the very one which, as can be gleaned from
the Senate journal, prompted the enactment of Republic Act No. 53.

We cannot agree with the proviso in the majority opinion leaving to respondent the discretion to reduce the
imprisonment imposed by the simple process of making the revelation exacted from him. The penalty should
be measured by the responsibility, and that measure cannot be left at the discretion of the guilty one. His
future revelation will not diminish or in any way affect his responsibility for the offense he has already
perpetrated. His past disobedience cannot be attenuated by a future action. The past cannot be remade.
What has been done cannot be undone. These are verities no one can eloign.

We vote to impose upon respondent two days of imprisonment.

PARAS, J., dissenting: chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary

If, as insisted by the respondent, he wrote up and published in the newspaper Star Reporter the story
(Claim "Leak" in Last Bar Tests) quoted in full in the decision of the majority, in good faith and in a spirit of
public service, he voluntarily should have revealed the identities of his informants, thereby enabling this
Court, conformably to the alleged demands of denouncing bar examinees, to "institute an immediate probe
into the matter, to find out the source of the leakage, and annul the test papers of the students of the
particular university possessed of those tests before the examinations." If he was in fact motivated by a
spirit of public service, he should at least have tried to secure their consent to the revelation. The point I
want to underscore is that newspaper reporters should be fearless as well in publishing stories as in
substantiating their truth. And if I am constrained to dissent from the ruling of the majority, it is only
because the respondent, in my opinion, cannot legally be compelled to make the revelation, in view of
Republic Act No. 53 — which this Court is bound to enforce — providing that "the publisher, editor or duly
accredited reporter of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to
reveal the source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was related in
confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a House or committee of Congress finds
that such revelation is demanded by the interest of the state." I have no hesitancy in believing that the
phrase "interest of the state," as used in the Act, refers exclusively to matters affecting the security or
safety of the state.

In this connection, it is necessary to remember that the original bill sponsored by Senator Sotto provided for
absolute immunity. The committee on revision of laws, however, inserted an amendment by adding the
clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded by the public interest." Senator Sotto’s
attempt to suppress this clause failed, after which, in view of the remarks of the Chairman of the committee
presently to be mentioned, Senator Sotto proposed to change the words "public interest" into "interest of
the state," a proposal that was readily accepted. Hence, the use of the latter phrase in Republic Act No. 53.

Our task now is to discover the meaning and scope of the phrase "interest of the state," as intended by the
lawmakers. In this task, it is important to recall that the original intention of the author of the bill was to
provide for absolute immunity, and this purpose should not of course be unduly defeated by any subsequent
exception, especially when the limited sphere of the change is apparent from the deliberations of the
lawmakers. For instance, in explaining the reason of the committee for opposing Senator Sotto’s advocacy of
absolute immunity and of the suppression of the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is
demanded by the public interest," added to the original bill, Senator Cuenco gave the example of a
newspaperman who publishes an information regarding theft of plans of forts and fortifications, in which
case Senator Cuenco believed that "el interes publico y el interes mismo del Estado requieran que se
publique el nombre del informante." Again, after proposing the change of "public interest" to "interest of the
state," Senator Sotto, when asked by Senator Garcia as to the essential difference between the two phrases,
explained that "La diferencia esta en que puede haber un caso de espionaje, como el citado por el Senador
Cuenco, delito en que esta interesado el Estado y no se puede discutir al autor, y la frase ’public interest’ es
muy elastica. En cambio, si se pone ’interest of the state,’ claramente se entenderia que mediando el interes
del Estado, el periodista estara obligado a revelar la fuente de su informacion." Last but not least, it should
be noted that the Act in question was prompted by the desire of its sponsor to prevent the repetition of the
case of Benito Sakdalan, a reporter who was imprisoned for refusing to reveal the source of the information
contained in a news item admittedly not affecting, like the story published by the respondent, the security or
safety of the State. It logically follows that the phrase "interest of the state" was intended to be limited to
cases portrayed by the examples (theft of plans of forts and fortifications and espionage), given during the
deliberations which solely affect the security or safety of the state.

It is immaterial whether the law did not employ phrases like "public safety," "national security," or "public
security," or whether "public interest" and "interest of the state" were interchangeably used in the
discussions, as long as in using the phrase "interest of the state" in Act No. 53, the lawmakers definitely
knew and accordingly recorded, by specific examples, what they intended to convey. Conjectures cannot
prevail over the clear legislative intent.

The exception provided in the Act in question should be strictly construed so as not to frustrate the main
purpose of the law. This would further make the law more consonant with the spirit of the constitutional
provisions that "the privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the Court or when public safety and order require otherwise" (Article III, section 1, paragraph 5),
and that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of the press (Article III, section 1, paragraph 8).

It may not be amiss to add that the refusal of the respondent to disclose the source of his information does
not absolutely prevent this Court from verifying, by any reasonable and feasible means, the truth of the
alleged anomaly; and it is certainly not required, by the mere publication of the story in question, to admit
the accuracy of said story if its investigation should fail because of lack of evidence or of the refusal of those
who know to come out and testify.

In my opinion, the respondent has not committed any contempt of this Court.

3)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989

NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,

vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso
Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and
breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of
fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law
to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that
respondent, who was their counsel in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had
compromised that case without their authority.

In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and
prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T.
Almonte, to conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and
recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15
July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the
case.

On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead
appointed the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on
15 June 1983.

Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from
hearing the case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both
motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the
Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report
and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.

On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June
1988. In as Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor
General presented the following:

FINDINGS

Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of
P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C,
Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records). In the said Real Estate Mortgage
lâwphî1.ñèt

document, however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by

complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent assured
complainants that said document was a mere formality, and upon such assurance,
complainants signed the same. The document was brought by complainant Narciso
Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave
the document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted from
complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is beyond dispute usurious
interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously paid the obviously usurious
interest for three months: September, October and November, 1975. Then they
stopped paying due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts
as interest, respondent prepared a new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate
Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing
the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum
indicated in said new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at
19% per annum. In this new Real Estate Mortgage, a special power of attorney in
favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at
public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May
30, 1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants,
respondent insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance that
the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of respondent,
complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again brought
the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document was
notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.

Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real
Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the
status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the
obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position
Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of
mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was
transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to
Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.

When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March
1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of
case), and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the second
Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not believe that
title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had
already sold the same to a third person.

Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of
P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation,
hoping that they could redeem their property, although three years had already
lapsed from the date of the mortgage.

Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants
a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which indicated that the
total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The computation was made in
respondent's own handwriting. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and
with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for disbarment against
respondent filed on October 5, 1979.

Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what

appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they
obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May
7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount
of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan,
respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00
loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino Villanueva, which loan
had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of P10,000.00, as
appearing on said document. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of
10% a month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the fact that
complainants were able to secure a loan from the Insular Bank of Asia and America
(IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the property, at the time
complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any
encumbrance, since complainants had already paid the original loan of P5,000.00
obtained from respondent; that complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said
mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property in question was in accordance with
their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any
right of the complainants.

After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against
respondent.

While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual
cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00
appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied to interest
considering that not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to interest,
computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31,
1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30, 1975,
October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December 31,
1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the second Real Estate
Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P
3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr.
Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this
amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first mortgage
results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second Real Estate
Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have

been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such terms, and,
therefore, there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except
in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by
the pleadings;

(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.

There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages
covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00,
respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is that
when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they
have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is
not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.

However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted.

One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties, applies in this case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear that the
complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the false
and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents
was a are formality.

While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a
lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of the
provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing him as
the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of
complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the
notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of
common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through the desired practice.
Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a demand
letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at
public auction as per their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that
he knew fully wen that complainants were trying their best to raise money to be able
to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by complainants from
the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that complainants, per
advice of respondent himself, returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank
immediately on April 30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from
said bank was only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from
respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would already have
earned interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).

Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00,
and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the
bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the title (T-
2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first
Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was
only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14,
rec.).

Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000. 00
as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have readily
accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for only
P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious.

Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the
simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the
execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent
demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three
years, as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper
(Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2). lâw phî1.ñèt

In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth
quoting:

In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this
particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the
complainants or the version of the respondent.

In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the
present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and
considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the
complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as
counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent
extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former.
However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the respondent in
spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the
respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially, socially and
intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were only compelled to
file the above entitled complaint against the respondent because they felt that they
are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It is for this reason
therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants
rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could
really see to it that the transaction between the complainants and himself on papers
appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample evidence in the records of its case
that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and
that the interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money
lenders during the time of the transactions in question'

Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was
their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against
accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the accused without their
consent and received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the amicable
settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the Id amount nor informing
them of said settlement and payment.

Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was
with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].

We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.

It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo
Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00. At this stage,
relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet strained, and
respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that complainants
were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent on his own volition
talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted
the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then the only amount carried by
the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda
(Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent did not inform complainants about
this advance payment, perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the
payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the whole amount to complainants.

At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00 to
respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the
money was all about.

On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had
already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing
what happened to their lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to accept the
Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso Melendre[z] saw
the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500.00 that had
been given to respondent. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt
(Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance payment for the supposed
settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants against him.

Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a
motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent
as their counsel.

The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses
in testifying, had this to say:

With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from
Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the respondent
agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in connection with a
criminal case wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that
Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of
the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent
received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda as an advance payment of
an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the
respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge and
consent of the complainants. If it is true as alleged by the respondent that he only
 received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance payment of an amicable
settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it
that it was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How
come that as soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the
respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel
on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that
complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they
should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they
resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the respondent as their
private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying the claim
of the respondent.'

Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena
are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be
suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist
of misconduct in either his professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral
in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are punishable by law. The doing
of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs.
U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).

A parting comment.

All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.

Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. They
did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and considering that
they admitted they did not understand the contents of the documents, they did not
bother to have them explained by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable person in
their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they did not bother to ask for
respondent the status of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Their complacency or
apathy amounting almost to negligence contributed to the expedient loss of their
property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's
liability merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)

and made the following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be

suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 3

The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings
during the investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to
hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out
of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the
complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-
examined by the counsel for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was
accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the
administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the
investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring
the parties to submit their respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their
position paper which consisted of their separate sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was
in a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos.
Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in
support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of
the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves
to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer dated 17 December 1986
declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had become final and
executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper, not
having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the non-submission of the
complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due
process.

We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has
been violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the
witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other
witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position
paper) had he wanted to, but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances
which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had
in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had
eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances
where respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date
of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent
eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to cross-examine the
complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986.
Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the
complainants and their witnesses.

After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by
both parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.

The following acts of respondent:

1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount
loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;

2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;

3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan
extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;

4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and
inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were merely for
purposes of "formality";

5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before

effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and

6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate
mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem
the foreclosed property within a certain period of time.

constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with
the Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless
of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being
"contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard required from members of the
Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even
so, respondent's conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute — the anti-
usury law.

The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is,
done at a time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against
accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent
Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda
without the consent and approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the
amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of
that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts
show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and
consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the
P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these
matters. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the P500.00. Respondent is presumed
to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients'
litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in
cash.6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as
partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his
clients.

Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal
or non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings
becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession,
the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of
the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of
members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge
of professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt,
renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 8

In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the
complainants in his private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of
interest, considered together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent
attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is
indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be
stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar
Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., in Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grñ;no-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
4)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40224 September 23, 1980

FRANCISCO C. TOBIAS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CASTRENSE C. VELOSO, Judge, CFI of Iloilo, Br. III & TOMAS C. LUJAN, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In this Petition for Review by Certiorari, petitioner, Mayor Francisco C. Tobias, seeks a reversal of
the judgment of respondent Judge Castrense C. Veloso of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch 111, in Civil Case No. 9706 entitled Tomas C. Lujan vs. Mayor Francisco C. Tobias, a
mandamus proceeding, wherein respondent Judge ruled:

xxx xxx xxx

There is no question that petitioner (respondent Tomas Lujan herein) has a clear
legal right to his back salaries during the period of his suspension and respondent's
(petitioner Mayor herein) obligation to approve and/or sign petitioner's voucher is
properly enforceable by means of the peremptory writ of mandamus.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, the writ of mandamus prayed for is granted, with costs against
respondent. The respondent is hereby ordered to pay petitioner P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees.

Respondent's counterclaim is dismissed for lack of evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

We shall now delve into the facts,

Private respondent, Tomas C. Lujan, was appointed Chief of Police of Cabatuan, Iloilo, on
December 1, 1971. On October 19, 1972, petitioner Mayor charged him with Bribery and Corrupt
Practices (Administrative Case No. 2890, or, the Bribery Case, for short) before the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) for having allegedly demanded P1,370.00 for the extrajudicial settlement
of a criminal case for Robbery in Band Pending before the Municipal Court of Cabatuan (Crim. Case
No. 974) while respondent was still Acting Chief of Police of said municipality.
On a date that does not appear of record, the Mayor also charged respondent before NAPOLCOM
with Grave Misconduct and Serious Irregularities for the loss through theft on November 27, 1971 of
the service pistol issued to him by the municipality (Administrative Case No. 2997).

As a consequence of those charges, respondent was suspended from office by the NAPOLCOM
Chairman effective on December 20,1972.

On August 9, 1973, in the Bribery Case, the NAPOLCOM ruled that although respondent was not
liable for Bribery and Corrupt Practices since his acceptance of the amount was for delivery to the
offended party, such an act was improper, and held:

WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, respondent Tomas C. Lujan is

hereby reprimanded and warned that repetition of the same act would invite drastic
disciplinary action. The Municipal Mayor of Cabatuan, Iloilo, is hereby authorized to
administer the reprimand.

In the administrative case for Grave Misconduct, respondent was exonerated by NAPOLCOM on
March 9,1973.

On October 2, 1973, NAPOLCOM lifted respondent's suspension.

On February 11, 1974, the Mayor administered the reprimand in Executive Order No. 25, Series of
1974, approved by the Provincial Board on February 27, 1974.

Upon reporting for duty on November 13, 1973, respondent submitted to the Mayor vouchers for the
payment of his back salaries in the sum of P2,984.42 covering the period of his suspension from
December 21, 1972 to November 12, 1973. The Mayor endorsed the same to the Provincial Auditor
of Iloilo for pre-audit in a 1st Indorsement dated December 21, 1973. In a 2nd Indorsement dated
January 10, 1974, the Provincial Auditor gave the opinion that respondent's salary during the period
of suspension could be claimed by him upon the authority of the Municipal Council. 1 Petitioner
Mayor then transmitted the papers to the Municipal Treasurer. 2 The latter, in his letter dated
February 4, 1974, requested for authority from the Municipal Council to pay the back salaries of
respondent. 3 Acting upon said request, the Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 160 in its
regular session on February 6, 1974, authorizing the Municipal Treasurer to pay respondent his back
salaries but deducting therefrom the amount of P1,000.00 as a deposit for the lost service pistol,
plus a fine of P40.00 under Executive Order No. 186, Series of 1939. 4 Said Resolution however,
was not ultimately signed because of the intended veto by petitioner Mayor communicated in writing
to the council on Feb 11, 1974. 5

In the meantime, the Mayor addressed a formal inquiry to the NAPOLCOM Chairman anent the
entitlement of respondent to his back salaries during the period of his suspension in view of the
reprimand imposed on him. 6 On February 11, 1974, he also submitted a memorandum to the
Municipal Council signifying his intention to veto Resolution No. 160 as he was still waiting for the
opinion of the NAPOLCOM Chairman on his official query. 7

On February 11, 1974, respondent reiterated his request for the approval of his voucher as the
authority of the Municipal Council had already been given. 8 He followed this up with another letter
dated February 14, 1974, inquiring about the action taken on his request, 9 attaching thereto a
certification by the Municipal Treasurer as to the availability of funds 10 No action was taken by
petitioner.
On March 25, 1974, respondent filed a Petition for mandamus and Damages with Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to compel the latter to
approve the voucher covering the payment of respondent's back salaries, with a claim for moral and
exemplary damages. During the pendency of the suit, petitioner reiterated his query to the
NAPOLCOM Chairman. 11

The Mayor traversed the Petition by contending that payment of back salaries to respondent was of
doubtful legality under the Police Act since respondent was not exonerated but was reprimanded;
that Municipal Council Resolution No. 160 (or No. 14) was not duly approved by the Council
because of an impending veto by the Mayor, as shown by a Certification of the Municipal Secretary
dated April 22, 1974; and that the reason why he had failed to act on respondent's request was
because he was still awaiting the official reply to his query dated February 5, 1974 from NAPOLCOM
in the best interest of the Municipality and because public funds were involved. 12 By way of
counterclaim, the Mayor prayed that respondent be ordered to pay the current market value of his
lost service pistol plus damages in the total amount of P2,000.00 and the administrative fine of
P40.00, pursuant to the 2nd Indorsement dated February 21, 1973 of the Auditor General. 13

On July 31, 1971, the trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Chief of Police as set
forth at the outset.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration as he had already received the reply of Deputy Executive
Commissioner Vicente G. Carag dated July 23, 1974 to the effect that since respondent was not
exonerated in the Bribery Case but "was ordered reprimanded (guilty) ... it is evident that he is not
entitled to back salaries. 14 Reconsideration was denied by the trial Court on the ground that the
opinion of the said official cannot prevail over Rule XVIII, Section 4(e) of the Civil Service
Rules,providing that "an admonition or a warning whether given by the Commissioner or the head of
Department or agency shall not be considered a penalty."

Petitioner has interposed this appeal directly to this forum with the following posers:

1. Will the Civil Service Act apply to police Service or is it R.A. 4864 (Police Act of
1966 as amended)?

2. Is reprimand a penalty or an exoneration?

3. Will mandamus lie against petitioner who acted in good faith to protect the interest
of the Municipality of Cabatuan?

4. Is the award of attorney's fees against petitioner tenable?

5. Is the dismissal of the counterclaim for lack of evidence proper in view of the
Decision of the Auditor General and the certification of the amount of the Municipal
Treasurer of Cabatuan?

Although we denied the petition on August 22, 1975 for lack of merit, upon motion for
reconsideration of petitioner, we resolved to give due course.

The Petition is meritorious.

The Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act No. 4864 created the Police Commission and was designed to
amend and revise the laws relative to the local police system. Since respondent is a Chief of Police,
he undoubtedly comes within the purview of that Act.

Section 16 thereof specifically provides in its last sentence that:

Suspension of Members of the Police Force. —

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent shall be entitled to his salary for the period of suspension
upon exoneration.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied).

Section 4, Rule X, of the Police Manual reiterates the same proviso:

Sec. 4. Payment of Salary during the Period of Preventive Suspension. — When a

member of a city or municipal police force is exonerated by the Police Commission,
the respondent member shall be entitled to receive the entire salary he failed to
receive during the period of his preventive suspension (Emphasis supplied).

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 12-A promulgated on October 4, 1972 similarly provides:

Members of the Police force who have been preventively suspended, shalt
upon exoneration be entitled to immediate reinstatement and payment of the entire
salary they failed to receive during the period of suspension (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent was not exonerated by NAPOLCOM but was reprimanded. Can a reprimand then be
equated with exoneration? Or, with "warning" or "admonition", which under the former Revised Civil
Service Rules, is not to be considered a penalty?

A negative answer is called for.

A warning, in ordinary parlance, has been defined as "an act or fact of putting one on his guard
against an impending danger, evil consequences or penalties," while an admonition, "refers to a
gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, counselling, on a fault, error or
oversight, an expression of authoritative advice or warning". 15 They are not considered as penalties.
A reprimand, on the other hand, is of a more severe nature, and has been defined as a public and
formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or a body
to which he belongs. 16 It is more than just a warning or an admonition.

A reprimand is an administrative penalty although it may be a slight form of penalty. Section 1, Rule
VIII of the Police Manual on the subject of Discipline includes reprimand as a "discipline
punishment." It is the last in the scale of graduated penalties that may be imposed in administrative
cases list in Memorandum Circular No. 8, series of 1970, paragraph II, of the Civil Service
Commission under the subject of "Guidelines in the Application of Penalties in Administrative Cases
and Other Matters Relative Thereto." It is a penalty that may be imposed for a light offense. 17The
same Circular further provides that "the penalty of reprimand must be in writing", 18 and that
"the penalty of reprimand shall not carry with it any administrative liability." 19 The Civil Service
Decree (PD No. 807) promulgated on October 6, 1975, also lists reprimand as one of the
impossable penalties. 20 In fact, reprimand as provided for in said Circular, has been imposed as a
penalty by this Court in Administrative Case No. P-167, Mendoza vs. Eclavea. 21

The conclusion is inevitable then that since respondent was reprimanded, and reprimand being a
penalty, he is not entitled to his back salaries for the period during which he was under suspension.
A suspended member of the Police force is so entitled only upon exoneration or acquittal. 22

Respondent's argument that he was reprimanded not for the offense of Bribery and Corrupt
Practices but merely for improper conduct in the settlement of a criminal case, hence, he was
cleared of any graft or corrupt practices, is pueril. The act for which he was reprimanded was the
same act which gave rise to the charge of Bribery. While the evidence was insufficient to convict him
for the latter offense, his act was nonetheless considered improper and called for the penalty of
reprimand.

Consequentially, petitioner Mayor cannot be compelled by the extraordinary Writ of mandamus to

pay respondent Chief of Police his back salaries and respondent Judge must be held to have
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing said Writ and in ordering petitioner to pay attorney's
fees. As the chief executive officer of the municipal government he showed prudence and discretion
in withholding the payment of respondent's back salaries until higher administrative authorities had
ruled on its legality.

We come now to the counterclaim for the value of respondent's lost service pistol plus damages in
the amount of P2,000.00. It is true that in Administrative Case No. 2997 for Grave Misconduct and
Serious Irregularities for the loss of respondent's service pistol owned by the Municipality of
Cabatuan, respondent was exonerated on March 9, 1973. However, in respondent's request for
relief from property accountability, the Auditor General in his 2nd Indorsement of February 21,
1973, 23 reiterated on July 25, 1974, 24 found that the loss of respondent's firearm occurred through
the latter's fault or negligence so that his request for relief from responsibility for the loss was denied
and he was required to pay the value of the pistol at its current price plus the administrative fine of
P40.00. The original indorsement was, in turn, indorsed by the Iloilo Provincial Auditor to the
Municipal Treasurer of Cabatuan. 25 Apparently, respondent had failed to pay the same, hence,
petitioner's counterclaim in the case below demanding payment. A Certification from the Municipal
Treasurer, dated September 16, 1974, indicated that according to personal canvass made by him,
the current market price of Pistol Colt Cal. .38 is P2,000.00. 26

There is no ambiguity in the foregoing documents. They belie the trial Court's findings that the
counterclaim had to be dismissed for lack of evidence. Clearly, therefore, respondent should be
made to pay the amount of P2,000.00 for the service pistol which he had lost plus P40.00 as
administrative fine.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial Court granting the Writ of Mandamus, awarding attorney's
fees of P2,000.00 in favor of respondent Tomas C. Lujan is hereby reversed.

On the counterclaim, respondent Tomas C. Lujan shall pay the Municipality of Cabatuan, Iloilo, the
sum of P2,000.00, plus P40.00 as administrative fine.

SO ORDERED.
5)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be
and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.

G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988

ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

The following are the subjects of this Resolution:

1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar
against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in
connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court
dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain
public statements.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.

12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-
00778).

On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987
Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against
petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September
1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177
denying his Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the
"Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan
and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and
authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption
against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal
Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.

On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:

G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan

and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.

The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,

effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and
trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the
Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.

The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R.
No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent.
That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No.
87- 01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against
petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the
Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to
investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No.
79690-707.

In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second
petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary
restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent
thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same
date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.

In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal
Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of
Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of
petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:

G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an
extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within which to
 file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.

Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-

respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as
party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304
entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly,
from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering
respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines
vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the
Sandiganbayan in said case.

The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the
petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto.

On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed
at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having
caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation
to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a
photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987
issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"

Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case

TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar
can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."

What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for
an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily
Globe in an exclusive interview.

Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the
justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that
only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."

Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar
petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed
against him.

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the
latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer
Bonifacio Alentajan.
 Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a
graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the
Sandiganbayan.

While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they
involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez
said.

In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases
against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin
Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil
I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural Communities.

While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme
Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some
people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.

He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that
while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election
time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters who are
entitled to know their candidates.

Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time
could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to
be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny.
(Emphasis supplied)

Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required
respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27
April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The
dispositive portion thereof read:

WHEREFORE, We hereby:

(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and

(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his
Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the
following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his
own Motion:

1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he
was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
 2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report
on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;"
and

3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against
(two Members of the Court)."

Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by
"some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the
Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the
press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the
next several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments
thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:

G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No.
80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).

1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date
of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT
thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the
media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and
disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly or
indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and
degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should
not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions
for making such public statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues
of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the
"Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30,
and May 1, 1988, to wit:

(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had
taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating
cases against some of their proteges or friends;"

(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of
persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to
render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"

(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be
too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on
illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;

(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and

(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.
 3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by three
(3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now form part
of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to
ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto
appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the
same period of ten (10) days.

4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to
respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court
Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the
respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.

Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for
Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988
Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:"
and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to
him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment
with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer
that the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in
the deliberation and resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.

On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this
Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and immediately executory.

Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:

1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988

3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante

Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;

4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion

(a) For Extension of Time

(b) For Inhibition and

(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated
4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the
alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):

5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;

6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and

7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.

In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez
submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before
this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also
submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.

II

We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has
plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the
Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court
over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent
power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial
officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case
before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an
improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the
complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us
here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt.
Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court.
Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme
Court. 35Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over
lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged
also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the
scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the Court
over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A
lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to
share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act
on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.

It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party,
prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez
first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for
alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself
from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process
from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly.
Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of
the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief)
Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:

xxx xxx xxx

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are
the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This
is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the
proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui
generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not
involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein.
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of
the legal profession and the property and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties.
Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers,
the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of
its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if
there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the
individual members thereof—as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to
discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this
power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as
it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it
be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that
fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power
because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all
cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the
imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant,
prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice
against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting
requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit
themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has
burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive
procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge
consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in
the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote
certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to
present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that
those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom
of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and
the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.

III

It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements
set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges
that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39

Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R.
Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act
of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court)
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order
to stop respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme
Court Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of
27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for
Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for
that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per
curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however,
obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the
appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our
country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to
the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose private
punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying
out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the
honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless.
Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to
act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been
questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7)
months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering
the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner
Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987,
upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further
acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the
constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely
have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that
they have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and
friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly
deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the
handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent
attached to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the
consolidated Petitions) win show. It is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise,
that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707
and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at
least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had
deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude,
resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements
made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause among
the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial
institutions of the Republic.

Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich
and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on
the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful"
accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and
small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an
extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is
also suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.

Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or
reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not
without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that
respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing
to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts
arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport
of respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is
unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the
attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered that the
respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their side and submit
evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons for and
an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing
effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in
this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations,
require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 43 "To
be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process. 44

As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements
adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to
transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made,
among others, the following allegations:

(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and
administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice
 and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the resolution
on the Motion for Reconsideration;"

(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of
an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt
citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;

(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is,
respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and
possible administrative charges;"

(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and
obfuscation running riot;"

(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire
Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have
confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely
difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased
demeanor towards him;" and

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and
that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least
prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)

Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to
heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and
statements justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable
of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up
this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and
anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand
how respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be
ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private
feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law
and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or group of persons.

Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this
Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over
members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which
have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of
the Court's authority.

1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a
slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant
with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his
Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the
Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court
by the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the
appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del
Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral
damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for
Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of
the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and
those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:

I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge
Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and
criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the
abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the
City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the
corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work
for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)

Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:

... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is
this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform
the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have
already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God
the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)

The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:

... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and
injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his
contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R.
No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing
injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...

xxx xxx xxx

To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to
the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support
the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty
to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must
always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and
serving in the noble mission of administering justice.

xxx xxx xxx.

As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was
based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied
in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We
 found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both
instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a
case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of
respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their
respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client
cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.

It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of
the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded
to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered
unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if
not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to
enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint
in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of
justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60
SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)

2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel
for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain
statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:

d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-
representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).

e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring
to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover
up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it
is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the
incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision
that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par.
7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21
September 1968 asking

Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect
thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the
Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31,
1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the
latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an
issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-
created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial
 ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the
patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which,
according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial
prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of
'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the
said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:

4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the
Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which
condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote:
"Justices; who may take part—... . Only those members present when any matter is
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ."
This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for
approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable
Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.

xxx xxx xxx

6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its

quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either
raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May
12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and confiscation of
property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial
branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested
rights by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of
law and invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and
benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting
to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held
three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:

1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of
the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court
as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968
as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the
ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined
the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two
justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored
party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the
President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.' In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus
established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by
the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that
lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to
conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case
of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism
and prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that
the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make
their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did
arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that
courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in
our country, 'although the process has already begun.

xxx xxx xxx

What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in
law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we
repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly
from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and
in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from the President.
Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving the
Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in
fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this
country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is
the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to
downgrade this Court.

The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern.
Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an
expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust,
of disbelief.

xxx xxx xxx

The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers.
and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines
and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of
the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice
is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.

xxx xxx xxx

 Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court
and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31,
1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the
motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of
the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World
Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all
aid and benefits to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amount to more than fifty million dollars annually ...

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case'
in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads
return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move to
reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party has
already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear
that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of
the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.

xxx xxx xxx

The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome of
honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the
assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior
so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-
23; emphasis supplied)

3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a
great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender
Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust
judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that
"justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that
"the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the
press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published
statements attributed to him as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who
ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations
of the Constitution with impunity.'
 xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at
565566; emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. His explanation, which in part read:

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf
and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries
for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the
sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons
why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer
to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the
impersonal state of Things and nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to
when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of
this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis
supplied)

was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely
suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that
Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."

4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court,
made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:

The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this

Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of
Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon.
Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the most
important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable
violation which is a ground for impeachment.

... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all
means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives
satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are
violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the
 cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the
premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated
people should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should be
done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the
earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)

The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required
counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later
explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to
express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.

... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees
is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such threats and
disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct
contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People
vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court
of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270,
April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more
deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People
vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-

Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards
the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.

It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and
never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require.
(Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812;
emphasis supplied)

5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so
refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the
following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:

As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to
suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news
published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or
narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders
and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only
remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce
in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of
today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly,
 very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry
from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)

In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation
of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause
why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding
in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse
party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence
of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The
Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an
officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-
602; emphasis supplied)

6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this
court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes
an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular
will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust
all the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very
court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press
publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein
petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the
prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of
the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)

When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty.
Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements
made above, the Court held:
 ... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is
thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws,
the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having abused
its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client,
because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and
mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to
the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy
(Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.

Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in
the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special
way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force
thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases
in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can ever
sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free
exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters, in the
consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion

contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein,
after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he
fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing,
what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the
mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices
against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of
that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the administration of justice and
increase the proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country
a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court
and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did
not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it
may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as
any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its
integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In
re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither
creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called
judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil.
at 727-728; emphasis supplied)

It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this
matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or
administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in
the cases discussed above:

1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);

2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);

3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);

5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907
(1956);

6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);

7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29

April 1955;

8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);

10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco,
67 Phil. 312 (1939); and

11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past
penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is
compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute
contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's
statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust
decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed
their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest
kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme
Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That
respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of subjective intent,
is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then
fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition
of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act
of reprisal against the respondent.

IV

The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional
right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications
and fair criticism in the public interest.

Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to
deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of
speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of
the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between
free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning
and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put it:

... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent

judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable
to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent
judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be vindicated. And one of the
potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50

Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:

The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional
right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence
of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close
to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must
be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press
and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As important
as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of
the citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the
Judiciary cannot be had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court
adopted for good purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean
means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the
embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)

Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to
prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost,
indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held,
persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited
than that of a layman. 52

It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is
also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court
as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.

Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court,
to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of
criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are
worth noting

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
 on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

xxx xxx xxx 54

(Emphasis supplied)

The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is
addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried
out.

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He
will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is
upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2)
explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56

Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been
shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per
curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19
May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is
not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.
Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of
its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the
public pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts
and statements for which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed
resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to
prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of
the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not
be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of
respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of
the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will
dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic
government.

Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this
case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the
remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent
Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is
not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been
falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and
of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of
Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Fernan C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

6)

A.C. No. 6198 September 15, 2006

RENATO M. MALIGAYA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ANTONIO G. DORONILLA, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. of the Judge Advocate General's Service is before us on a charge of
unethical conduct for having uttered a falsehood in open court during a hearing of Civil Case No. Q-
99-38778.1

Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M. Maligaya, a
doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several military officers for
whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19, 2002 hearing of the
case, Atty. Doronilla said:

And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he [complainant Maligaya]
filed before against the same defendants. We had an agreement that if we withdraw the
case against him, he will also withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he
even retired and he is now receiving pension.2 (emphasis supplied)

Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a number
of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in writing and
"file the appropriate pleading."3Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such pleading or
anything else to substantiate his averments.

On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla with
"misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"5 was
referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating
commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.7 Atty.
Doronilla, who took up the larger part of two hearings to present evidence and explain his side,
admitted several times that there was, in fact, no such agreement.8 Later he explained in his
memorandum that his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms
without going to trial"9 and insisted that there was no proof of his having violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath.10 He pointed out, in addition, that his false statement
(or, as he put it, his "alleged acts of falsity") had no effect on the continuance of the case and
therefore caused no actual prejudice to complainant.11
In due time, investigating commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted a report and recommendation
finding Atty. Doronilla guilty of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility12 and recommending that he be "suspended from the
government military service as legal officer for a period of three months."13 This was adopted and
approved in toto by the IBP Board of Governors on August 30, 2003.14

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers who, as officers of the court, participate
in the dispensation of justice, to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.15 The common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth
and to act honestly should not become a common reality.16 To this end, Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility state:

CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS, AND GOOD FAITH TO THE

COURT.

Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty.
Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only that, he violated the
lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and
Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead
the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law."17

Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover, by his obstinate refusal to
acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very beginning of this administrative
case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he had done nothing wrong in the
hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so even after having admitted that he
had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in truth exist. Rather than express remorse
for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to an ill-conceived attempt to evade
responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been meant for the information of Judge Daway
but only as "a sort of question" to complainant regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case.18

The explanation submitted by Atty. Doronilla, remarkable only for its speciousness,19 cannot absolve
him. If anything, it leads us to suspect an unseemly readiness on his part to obfuscate plain facts for
the unworthy purpose of escaping his just deserts. There is in his favor, though, a presumption of
good faith20 which keeps us from treating the incongruity of his proffered excuse as an indication of
mendacity. Besides, in the light of his avowal that his only aim was "to settle the case amicably
among comrades in arms without going to trial,"21 perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that
what he really meant to say was that he had intended the misrepresentation as a gambit to get the
proposed agreement on the table, as it were. But even if that had been so, it would have been no
justification for speaking falsely in court. There is nothing in the duty of a lawyer to foster peace
among disputants that, in any way, makes it necessary under any circumstances for counsel to state
as a fact that which is not true. A lawyer's duty to the court to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor22 forbids recourse to such a tactic. Thus, even as we give Atty.
Doronilla the benefit of the doubt and accept as true his avowed objective of getting the parties to
settle the case amicably, we must call him to account for resorting to falsehood as a means to that
end.

Atty. Doronilla's offense is within the ambit of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which in
part declares:
 A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice x x x.

The suspension referred to in the foregoing provision means only suspension from the practice of
law. For this reason, we disagree with the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Doronilla's suspension
from the government military service. After all, the only purpose of this administrative case is to
determine Atty. Doronilla's liability as a member of the legal profession, not his liability as a legal
officer in the military service. Thus, it would be improper for us to order, as a penalty for his breach
of legal ethics and the lawyer's oath, his suspension from employment in the Judge Advocate
General's Service. Of course, suspension from employment as a military legal officer may well
follow as a consequence of his suspension from the practice of law but that should not be reason
for us to impose it as a penalty for his professional misconduct. We would be going beyond the
purpose of this proceeding were we to do so. Therefore, we shall treat the IBP's recommendation as
one for suspension from the practice of law.

At any rate, we are not inclined to adopt the IBP's recommendation on the duration of Atty.
Doronilla's suspension. We need to consider a few circumstances that mitigate his liability
somewhat. First, we give him credit for exhibiting enough candor to admit, during the investigation,
the falsity of the statement he had made in Judge Daway's courtroom. Second, the absence of
material damage to complainant may also be considered as a mitigating circumstance.23 And finally,
since this is Atty. Doronilla's first offense, he is entitled to some measure of forbearance.24

Nonetheless, his unrepentant attitude throughout the conduct of this administrative case tells us that
a mere slap on the wrist is definitely not enough. Atty. Doronilla, it seems, needs time away from the
practice of law to recognize his error and to purge himself of the misbegotten notion that an effort to
compromise justifies the sacrifice of truthfulness in court.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Antonio G. Doronilla, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for TWO MONTHS. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Court Administrator, the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Commanding General of the AFP Judge Advocate General's Service.

SO ORDERED.

7) @___@

8)

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-51414 : July 31, 1981.]
PAQUITO G. BALASABAS, Petitioner, vs. HON. GREGORIO U. AQUILIZAN, Judge of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, Cotabato City, Respondent.

DECISION
 DE CASTRO,* J.:

These two (2) cases, G.R. No. 51414 and Administrative Case No. 2077, involving the indirect
cra nad

contempt citation and the indefinite suspension from the practice of law, respectively, of
lawyer Paquito G. Balasabas are taken up together as per Resolution of this Court dated
October 5, 1979. 1
In G.R. No. 51414, petitioner Paquito G. Balasabas, in a petition for Certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, seeks to declare as null and void the order 2 which cited him for
indirect contempt and suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law issued in open court
on August 27, 1979 by respondent Judge Hon. Gregorio U. Aquilizan, then judge of the Court
of Agrarian Relations, 16th Regional District, Branch I, Davao City, in CAR Case No. 1912, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Honorable Court cites Atty. Paquito G.
Balasabas for Indirect Contempt of Court under Section 3 (b) Rule 71 of the Rules of
cra nad

Court in consonance with Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and therefore
is indefinitely suspended from the practice of law unless he explains satisfactorily and
meritoriously his failure to comply with the Resolution of the Honorable Court dated
June 19, 1979.
“Copies of this Order shall be properly furnished all courts of justice in Davao Provinces
including that of Davao City as well as the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, National Office, Quezon City.”
“SO ORDERED.”
A temporary restraining order 3 dated September 17, 1979 was issued by this Court after the
petition was filed on September 12, 1979 restraining respondent judge from enforcing his
order dated August 27, 1979 and from acting on his indirect contempt citation against
petitioner in CAR Case No. 1912 Davao-1974, entitled “Edgardo Medrocillo, plaintiff vs. Jose
Bandigan, et al., defendants; and CAR Case No. 3271 Davao-1979, entitled “Jose Bandigan,
et al., plaintiffs vs. Edgardo Medrocillo, defendant”, of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch
I, Davao City or in proceedings related thereto.
Administrative Case No. 2077 is the proceedings before this Court following its receipt of the
copy of the Order of respondent Judge suspending Atty. Paquito G. Balasabas, as quoted
above, which was transmitted by said respondent to this Court, pursuant to Section 29 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
It appears that petitioner was the counsel of record for the plaintiff in an agrarian case entitled
“Edgardo Medrocillo vs. Jose Bandigan, et al,” for unlawful ejectment with preliminary
injunction, damages and attorney’s fees, filed on March 4, 1974, docketed as CAR Case No.
1912 in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Davao City. After trial, the then CAR
Judge (now CFI Judge) Filomeno Gapultos rendered a decision on December 27, 1974 in
cra nad

favor of the plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“(1) Finding plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo an agricultural share tenant in the landholding
in question located at San Ignacio, Manay, Davao Oriental, consisting of 11 and 1/2
hectares, more or less, since 1964, and was illegally ejected from the said landholding
in February, 1974, by defendant;
“(2) Declaring void and illegal that portion of the Order of the Cadastral Court of Mati,
Davao Oriental, issued on August 15, 1973, insofar as it involved the dispossession of
plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo from his tenanted landholding implemented by defendant
 Juan Labasano, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Mati, Davao Oriental, in his
capacity as Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff;
“(3) Ordering defendants Jose Bandigan and his wife Davina Bandigan to reinstate
immediately plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo to the landholding in question and thereby
allowing him to cultivate same, gather the coconuts therefrom and process same to
copra, the proceeds thereof to be divided 70% — 30% in favor of plaintiff;
“(4) Ordering defendants Jose Bandigan and his wife Davina Bandigan to submit to
the court, fifteen (15) days after receipt of this decision, the complete accounting of
c ranad

the proceeds of copra they produced from February, 1974 to the present to be able to
determine the 70% share of plaintiff which he failed to receive;
“(5) Ordering defendants Jose Bandigan and his wife Davina Bandigan to pay to
plaintiff the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as attorney’s fees and another
c ranad

sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as reimbursement of plaintiff’s necessary

c ranad

expenses in protecting his rights in this case;

“(6) Ordering defendant Jose Bandigan and his wife Davina Bandigan to pay to plaintiff
the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as moral damages.”
cra nad

The said decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations was elevated on appeal by Jose Bandigan,
et al. to the Court of Appeals which rendered a decision on July 28, 1976 affirming in toto the
CAR decision.
On July 5, 1978, plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo, thru counsel Paquito G. Balasabas, filed a motion
for execution in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch I, Davao City which was duly opposed
by defendants Jose Bandigan, et al. After hearing the motion and the opposition thereto,
respondent Judge Gregorio U. Aquilizan, Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Cotabato City, who had succeeded Judge Filomeno Gapultos, issued a resolution on November
24, 1978 giving due course to the motion for execution but ordered plaintiff Medrocillo to
render an accounting of the copra sold during the period specified therein.
Plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo, however, failed to comply with the November 24, 1978 resolution
issued by Judge Aquilizan and, so, upon motion of Jose Bandigan, respondent judge, after
hearing, issued an order dated May 14, 1979 requiring plaintiff Medrocillo to appear in court
on May 21, 1979 to explain why he should not be cited for contempt of court for failure to
render an accounting of the copra sold. On the day set, plaintiff Medrocillo and his counsel,
Paquito G. Balasabas, failed to appear, prompting respondent judge to issue another order
dated May 21, 1979 for the arrest of plaintiff Medrocillo.
A motion for reconsideration of the order of May 21, 1979 was filed by plaintiff Medrocillo on
June 2, 1979, but through another counsel, Atty. Leo S. Carillo, stating, among others, that
the only order plaintiff had received from the Honorable Court was the order of May 21, 1979,
and plaintiff has not received any notice of hearing, pleadings and all other motions and orders
pertinent to CAR Case No. 1912 and pointed out that his former counsel who had met a
vehicular accident on February 3, 1979 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental was still recovering and
had not yet reported to his office. Plaintiff likewise, assailed the resolution of November 24,
1978, alleging that it is contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July
28, 1978, hence, null and void. Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the order dated
May 21, 1979, respondent judge issued a resolution 4 on June 19, 1979, declaring thus:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Honorable Court rules:
“1. That the Resolution of November 24, 1978 stands valid and legal and should
be complied with by the plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo to the letter;
 “2. That with respect to the motion to cite plaintiff Edgardo Medrocillo for
contempt of court, the case should be heard on August 1, 1979;
“3. That Attorney Paquito G. Balasabas should be made to explain in writing
why he should not be punished for indirect contempt of court under Section
3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by abandoning the cause of his client
without prior notice and compliance of Section 26 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.”
“SO ORDERED.”
Meanwhile, on June 18, 1979, Jose Bandigan, et al., filed an action for ejectment against
Edgardo Medrocillo docketed as CAR Case No. 3271 in the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch
I, Davao City. On June 22, 1979, respondent judge issued an order consolidating CAR Case
No. 1912 and CAR Case No. 3271, stating as reasons therefor, that CAR Case No. 3271, is a
continuation of CAR Case No. 1912 and the fact that Edgardo Medrocillo refused to abide by
the resolution of the Court of Agrarian Relations dated November 24, 1978. 5 The initial
hearing of the two consolidated cases was set on August 27, 1979.
On the other hand, on August 25, 1979, Edgardo Medrocillo, now a defendant in CAR Case
No. 3271, thru counsel Paquito G. Balasabas, filed a motion to disqualify respondent Judge
Gregorio U. Aquilizan from hearing CAR Case No. 3271 Davao-1979 and CAR Case No. 1912
Davao-1974 alleging that CAR Case No. 1912 has long been terminated, therefore, there is
nothing to be heard; that the latest incident of CAR Case No. 1912 was the motion for
reconsideration of the order of May 21, 1979 which was denied and as a matter of fact the
order has been implemented by the court already; that CAR Case No. 3271 is a new case
which Judge Aquilizan” had not started to hear” since he has been assigned to Cotabato City;
that since a new judge, Hon. Judge Emilio Jacinto, has been assigned in the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch I, Davao City, the new case should be heard by Judge Jacinto pursuant to
P.D. 946 Section 11; 6 that Edgardo Medrocillo has likewise filed an administrative case
against the Presiding Judge Aquilizan before the Supreme Court and the office of the President
and was properly informed of the charges on July 6, 1979. Counsel Paquito G. Balasabas
requested that the said motion be submitted for resolution and approval on August 27, 1979
at 8:30 a.m. without further argument.
On the scheduled hearing of CAR Case No. 1912 and CAR Case No. 3271 on August 27, 1979,
petitioner entered his appearance for Edgardo Metrocillo and argued his motion for the
disqualification of respondent Judge Aquilizan. After hearing, respondent judge issued on that
same day an order, in open court, citing petitioner Paquito G. Balasabas for indirect contempt
of court and indefinitely suspended him from the practice of law unless he explains
satisfactorily and meritoriously his failure to comply with the resolution of June 19, 1979.
Hence, the instant petition raising constitutional and statutory objections against the
questioned order of August 27, 1979, alleging, among others, that respondent judge acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order. After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the petition
was given due course and was deemed submitted for decision by a resolution 7 of this Court
dated May 14, 1980.
In this Certiorari and prohibition proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is, on
the part of the petitioner, an emphatic assertion of violation of petitioner’s constitutional and
statutory rights when respondent Judge issued the questioned order of August 27, 1979 which
cited him for indirect contempt of court and suspended him indefinitely from the practice of
law in total disregard of the fundamental safeguards of procedural due process such as notice
to petitioner that he was to be tried that day for indirect contempt, a reasonable time and
opportunity to submit his written explanation, opportunity to present witnesses in his own
behalf, opportunity to be heard of the charge for indirect contempt because what was heard
on August 27, 1979 was petitioner’s motion for disqualification, violating therefore Rule 71,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:
“Section 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. After charge
in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by
himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
contempt:
“a) . .”
c ra

On the indefinite suspension imposed upon him from the practice of law, petitioner maintained
that respondent Judge took this action without regard to Rule 71, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
“Section 6. Punishment if found guilty. — If the accused is thereupon adjudged guilty
of contempt committed against a superior court or judge, he may be fined not
exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisoned not more than six (6) months, or both; cranad

if adjudged guilty of contempt committed against an inferior court or judge, he may

be fined not exceeding one hundred pesos or imprisoned not more than one (1) c ranad

month, or both, and if the contempt consists in the violation of an injunction, he may
also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such
violation.” (Emphasis supplied).
chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

It is clear from the foregoing provision that the imposable penalty, if the accused is, after
hearing, adjudged guilty of contempt committed against a superior court or judge, is fine not
exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisonment of not more than six (6) months, or both.
cranad

Petitioner also stressed that Rule 138, Section 30 of the Rules of Court mandatorily requires
that “No attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he
has full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel.” No clearer demand for
the observance of procedural process can be imagined before a lawyer is removed or
suspended from the practice of law.
For his part, respondent Judge Gregorio U. Aquilizan, in his comment, pointed out that when
petitioner was asked during the joint hearing of CAR Case No. 1912 and CAR Case No. 3271
on August 27, 1979 as to his reasons for failing to comply with the order of June 19, 1979,
petitioner responded that he did not receive the said order which, according to respondent,
was received on July 11, 1979. Respondent also contended that petitioner promised to submit
the necessary papers substantiating his claim that he never received the resolution of
November 24, 1978 and that of June 19, 1979 within the period of one (1) month but instead
cra nad

decided to argue his case with the Honorable Tribunal.

Respondent judge, noticeably, did not reason out his order of indefinite suspension from the
practice of law in his comment, not until after he filed his opposition to the reply of petitioner
wherein he alleged that it was based on grounds of “willful disobedience of any lawful order
of superior court” as provided for under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court inasmuch
as petitioner continued to ignore the Honorable Court’s resolution, orders, and notices of
hearing claiming not to have received said notices when the records clearly show that he
received all of them. 8 In addition, respondent cited Section 14, P.D. No. 946 in relation to
Section 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court in arguing that the Court of Agrarian Relations,
possessing “all the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the Court of First
Instance,” has likewise the power to suspend a lawyer from the practice of law.
Fundamentally, therefore, the decisive issue in these two (2) cases before Us pertains to the
c ranad

all important issue of procedural due process. Definitely, the inquiry here reflects more on the
manner with which the contempt and suspension powers of courts of justice were exercised
by respondent judge.
From what may be gathered from the records of the instant case, We are convinced of
petitioner’s plea of denial of procedural due process of law; first, on the procedure adopted
for indirect contempt against petitioner; and second, on the procedure followed in his
indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
On the proceedings for indirect contempt against the petitioner, the grave error of the
respondent judge is manifest when, under the circumstances disclosed in the records,
petitioner was denied his right to notice of hearing, to have his day in court and present
witnesses in his behalf, a reasonable time to explain in writing why he should not be cited for
indirect contempt of court.
Petitioner claimed that he did not receive the order dated June 19, 1979 which, according to
the respondent judge, was received on July 11, 1979. While it is beyond Our domain to
ascertain the conflicting factual incidents alleged by both parties, nevertheless, it is arguable
that if petitioner did in fact receive the said order of June 19, 1979, fairness requires that at
least, respondent judge should have given the petitioner reasonable time to explain in writing
why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. An order directing petitioner to explain in
writing or to show cause constitute, under the law, the written charge for indirect contempt
contemplated under Section 3, Rule 71. It is, in reality, a compelling mandate of procedural
due process, with its stress on fairness, that petitioner be afforded a reasonable time and
opportunity by giving a definite period within which to submit a written explanation.
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 71 requires that there must be a hearing of the indirect contempt
charge after notice thereof is validly served on the person charged with indirect contempt. As
adverted to earlier, an order requiring petitioner to submit a written explanation constitutes
the written charge for indirect contempt, and at the same time serves as notice of said charge.
However, such notice cannot by all means, be considered as a notice of hearing itself. The
two notices are different, for they have distinct object and purpose.
At this point, it is noteworthy that during the scheduled joint hearing of CAR Case No. 1912
and CAR Case No. 3271 respondent judge, at the start of the proceedings, inquired from
petitioner Balasabas as to his explanation, and petitioner explained, in open court, that he
was out of office for almost three (3) months and would make it of record that he and his
c ranad

family met a vehicular accident; that he was seriously injured, his brother died, his father is
physically disabled, his mother died last July 1979, his aunt and the helpers were also injured
and that there were 15 of them in the hospital. 9 Inspite of such oral explanation, respondent
judge issued on that same day the questioned order of August 27, 1979. Without being overly
technical, such an oral explanation given by the petitioner sufficiently satisfies, under the
circumstances, what was sought for by respondent in his order of June 19, 1979. In any case,
respondent judge should have given petitioner ample opportunity to substantiate his
explanation.
The non-observance of the fundamental right of due process as enunciated above manifests
arbitrariness, unfairness and injustice. This Court frowns upon proceedings which depart from
the solemn adherence to the tenets of justice and fairness. This Court too has its
responsibility. Regard for the requirements of due process of law inescapably imposes upon
it an exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings. As this Court said, thru
Justice Jose P. Bengzon, the due process clause is designed to secure justice as a living reality,
10 especially so, it may be postulated, when courts exercise this inherent power to punish for
contempt.
A contempt of court has been distinctly described as an offense against the State not against
the judge personally. A judge should always bear in mind that the power of the court to punish
for contempt should be exercised for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is
intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons, but for the functions that they exercise.
11 Rightly then, such power of the courts must be used sparingly in a preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, and must be used on the corrective rather than on the retaliatory
idea of punishment. 12 In this regard, when one is charged with contempt of court, the
proceedings attendant thereto partake of the nature of a criminal action 13 even when the
acts complained of is an incident of a civil action. In the case at bar, the respondent judge
did not observe the procedure outlined in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
That is not all. What is worse, to Our mind, is the fact that respondent judge not only cited
petitioner for indirect contempt in open court; he summarily suspended him indefinitely from
the practice of law in violation of the procedure prescribed under Rule 138 and 139 of the
Rules of Court relative to suspension of lawyers. The petitioner here was indefinitely
suspended unless he explains satisfactorily and meritoriously his failure to comply with the
resolution of the court dated June 19, 1979. Obviously, pending the submission of a
satisfactory and meritorious explanation, he is, under all circumstances, already placed under
indefinite suspension. In the event that he submits an explanation which the court may find
not satisfactory and meritorious, the indefinite suspension would go on. Such an indefinite
suspension meted out as a penalty for alleged indirect contempt is absolutely not permitted
under the law and jurisprudence. It is tantamount to disbarment without due process of law
not sanctioned by the provisions of Rule 138 and Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
The order of June 19, 1979, construed as a notice that petitioner is charged with indirect
contempt, cannot be considered as a notice to explain in writing why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law. As early as 1920, this Court ruled that the notice served
upon a lawyer to appear before a Judge of the Court of First Instance and show cause why he
should not be sentenced for contempt, cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why
he should not be suspended from the practice of his profession. These things are different;
they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. 14
On the other hand, respondent judge should have limited his ruling on the charges of indirect
contempt. Under the provisions of Section 6 Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which prescribe in
categorical language the punishment for contempt, suspension from the practice of law is not
indicated. While it is true that a Court of Agrarian Relations under P.D. 946, like a Court of
First Instance, may suspend a lawyer “for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court” pursuant to Section 27 Rule 138 or may suspend on other grounds other than those
enumerated by said provision, 15 notwithstanding such broad power to suspend, suspension
must not be meted as a punishment for indirect contempt which has its own corresponding
penalty, as provided by the Rules of Court. Granting, arguendo, that suspension falls within
the domain of the inherent power of courts to punish for contempt, nevertheless, respondent
judge should have exercised such broad power in full observance of the rules on suspension
and disbarment specifically provided for under Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
Suspension from the practice of law requires an entirely separate procedure under the Rules
with all the attendant constitutional and statutory safeguards of procedural due process.
Respondent should have applied Section 6, Rule 71 on punishment for indirect contempt not
Section 27 Rule 138 on suspension and removal of lawyers from the practice of law which is
entirely a different matter requiring different procedure as to motion or complaint, service of
motion or complaint, investigation, hearing, confidentiality of investigation, etc. It is clear
that under Section 29 of Rule 138 that upon such suspension by the Court of Appeals or the
Court of First Instance, either court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified
copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make full
investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension,
or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Order issued by the Court of Agrarian Relations
dated August 27, 1979 is declared null and void and is hereby set aside. Accordingly, the
petition in G.R. No. 51414 is granted, and the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 2077
under Section 29, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, by virtue of which the Order of Suspension
was transmitted to this Court, is ordered closed and terminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar,
cr anad Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.

9)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

FERMINA LEGASPI DAROY, LYDIA LEGASPI and AGRIPINO LEGASPI, complainants,

vs.
ATTORNEY RAMON CHAVES LEGASPI, respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

Fermina Legazpi-Daroy, Lydia Legaspi-Acha and Agripino Legaspi of Iligan City, in a verified
complaint dated March 10, 1970, charged Attorney Ramon Chaves Legaspi of Cagayan de Oro City
with malpractice for having misappropriated the sum of four thousand pesos which he had collected
for them. They prayed that the respondent be disbarred.1 (He was 59 years old in 1974. He passed
the 1954 bar examinations with a rating of 75.75%).

The evidence shows that the complainants hired the respondent in May, 1962 to represent them in
the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz
Velez-Gonzaga. The complainants, together with their brother, Vivencio, who was abroad, were
adjudged as one of the six groups of heirs of the late Gonzaga spouses, their deceased mother,
Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi, being a daughter of the spouses. The heirs in a joint petition dated April
11, 1969, which the respondent signed as counsel for the complainants, agreed that the coconut
land left by the decedents would be divided into six equal parts, that the administrator be authorized
to sell the land, and that, after payment of the obligations of the estate, the net proceeds would be
distributed among the six groups of heirs. The probate court approved that agreement in its order of
April 29, 1969 (Spec. Proc. Nop. 640 of the Misamis Oriental CFI, Exh. A).

The land was sold. Fermina Legaspi-Daroy came to know of the sale only when the respondent
wrote a note dated November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo Legaspi, wherein he stated "that the
money we have deposited may be withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock". The respondent
advised Teofilo Legaspito see him on that date so that the money could be withdrawn (Exh. B).
The complainants were not able to get the money on December 8 because the respondent on
December 7 sent to Mrs. Daroy a telegram countermanding his prior advice and directing here to go
to Cagayan de Oro City on December 10, a Wednesday, to receive the money (Exh. C). On
December 9, a certain Atty. Sugamo sent a handwritten note to Mrs. Daroy advising her not to go to
Cagayan de Oro City on December 10 because according to the respondent "his postdated checks
can be paid and/or collected either Thursday or Friday yet" (Exh. D).

In the afternoon of that same day, December 9, Mrs. Daroy received another note, this time from the
respondent himself, "Cousin Ramon". The note contained the disturbing intelligence that Mrs.
Daroy's "Cousin Ramon" had withdrawn the money amounting to P4,000 and had spent it. The
letter, a sort of extrajudicial confession or mea culpa on respondent's part, reads as follows (Exh. E):

Dear Fermina,

I wrote this letter with the hope that you will understand me. I have received
P4,000.00 our share in the case filed and is now in my custody.

Previous (sic) I have a case wherein I was forced to use our money to solve my
problem.

Now to pay the amount I have used, I sold my jeep to Mr. Ricarte Gorospe, an
Employee of the BIR here in Cag. But I am not paid as yet. So, I am waiting as he
will pay at 3:00 p.m. today and it's close as I have promised to give it on the 10th, I
mean our money.

Kindly help me, defer the giving you of the sum or at least until Thursday or Friday, I
bring it to you.

I know, my responsibility on this matter.

Thanks

Cousin
Ramon

It turned out that on October 20, 1969 the respondent, as to "counsel for Fermina Daroy et al.",
received from Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay the said sum of P4,000 as "one (1) share in
participation of my clients Fermina Daroy et al. in connection with (the) order of Judge B. K.
Gorospe" in the aforementioned intestate proceeding. The respondent signed a receipt for that
amount (Exh. L-1). The sheriff paid to Attorneys Angel Quimpo, Leovigildo Tandog, Jr. and
Teogenes Velez, Jr. the respective shares of the other groups of heirs also in the sum of P4,000 for
each group. Those lawyers turned over the amounts withdrawn to their respective clients (Exh. L).

It is evident that the respondent, in writing on November 28, 1969 to Teofilo Legaspi that the money
deposited could be withdrawn on December 8, 1969, acted in bad faith. He had already withdrawn
the money before that date. He concealed that fact from the complainants.

Before the disbarment complaint was filed several demands were made upon the respondent to pay
to the complainants the amount which he had misappropriated. He repeatedly broke his promises to
make payment. As complainants' patience was already exhausted, they filed their complaint for
disbarment on March 13, 1970.2
Atty. Alfredo R. Busico, the lawyer for the complainants, in a letter to this Court's Clerk of Court
dated May 26, 1970, expressed the hope that preferential attention would be given to the case. He
said that he had "reliable information from Cagayan de Oro City" that the respondent "has been
bragging that nothing will happen to this case" (p. 20, Rollo).
1äwphï1.ñët

The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In 1973
he requested the City Fiscal of Iligan City to conduct the investigation. 3 After the investigation was
finished, the case was set for hearing. The respondent did not appear at the hearing.

Respondent Legaspi in his testimony admitted that he received the said sum of P4,000 as shown in
the receipt, Exhibit D dated October 20, 1969. He said that after receiving it he immediately wired
Teofilo Legaspi at Iligan City to see him (the respondent) in his office at Cagayan de Oro City so that
Teofilo Legaspi could tell him "the proper disposal" of that amount.

Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October 21, 1969 and at their conference they
supposedly agreed that the sum of P700 would be deducted from the P4,000 to cover the expenses
which he (Legaspi) described as "expenses involved from the parties litigants, expenses seeking
evidence and other expenses relevant to the case" and "major expenses" in the case (sic); that his
attorney's fees would be equivalent "to a share of the petitioners", an agreement which was later
placed in formal form (referring to 1968 extrajudicial settlement attached to his answer); that the
balance of P3,300 would be divided into six equal parts (six because of the four Legaspi children,
the father Teofilo Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); that under such division each
participant would receive P412 each (P3,300 divided by six gives a quotient of P550 not P412), and
that he gave Teofilo the sum of P412. The respondent did not present any receipt to prove that
alleged payment.

He said that at first Teofilo Legaspi told him to keep the share of Vivencio Legaspi, who was abroad,
but at the end of October or the first week of November, 1969 Teofilo got from him (the respondent)
Vivencio's share. Again, the respondent did not ask Teofilo to sign a receipt for Vivencio's share.
After paying the shares of Teofilo and Vivencio, the balance of the amount left in respondent's
possession amounted to P2,476.

According to respondent's version, the complainants "refused consistently to receive" the said
balance from him because they wanted the full amount of P4,000. He said that he had already paid
to them the sum of P2,000 and that only the sum of P476 was left in his custody. He did not present
any receipt to prove the alleged payment of P2,000. He said that he could deliver that amount of
P476 to the complainants.

Mrs. Daroy, in rebuttal, denied that her father, Teofilo Legaspi, received the sum of P412 from the
respondent. She said that her father never went to Cagayan de Oro City to confer with the
respondent. She said that there was no agreement that the respondent would participate like an heir
in the partition of the sum of P4,000. She denied that the respondent offered to pay her and her
brother and sister the sum of P2,746. She denied that the respondent paid to the complainants
P2,000.

After a careful examination of the evidence, we find that respondent's testimony cannot be given any
credence. In his memorandum he stated that after he received from the sheriff "on October 29,
1969" the sum of P4,000, he "immediately wired" his kinsman, Teofilo Legaspi, to come to Cagayan
de Oro City and that Teofilo "came on October 21, 1969". Respondent meant October 20, 1969, the
date of the receipt, Exhibit L-1.
The truth is that he did not send any such wire. The statement of the sheriff and respondent's office
clerk in their affidavits of March 18, 1975 that such a wire was sent is false. What he sent to Teofilo
Legaspi was a handwritten note dated November 28, 1969 (Exh. B) wherein the respondent made it
appear that the said sum of P4,000 was going to be withdrawn on "December 8, 1969 at nine
o'clock". That the respondent in his testimony and memorandum forgot that note, which is Annex C
of the complaint for disbarment and which he admitted in paragraph 4 of his answer, is an indication
that he does not know the facts of his own case and that he had no scruples in trying to mislead and
deceive this Court.

That note of respondent to Teofilo Legaspi, his telegram and his letter (already quoted) to Mrs.
Daroy dated December 7 and 9, 1969, respectively (Exh. B, C and E) overwhelmingly belie his
fabricated theory that he conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of October or in the first week of
November, 1969. He was tempted to concoct a story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi
because the latter is dead and could not refute him. However, complainants' documentary evidence
refutes his prevarications, distortions and fabrications.

He attached to his memorandum (of which he did not furnish complainants a copy) his Exhibit 2, a
supposed typewritten claim against him which totalled P10,406.05. Exhibit 2 does not bear any
signature. The respondent wants to imply that the complainants were trying to blackmail him. No
probative value can be given to Exhibit 2.

The flimsiness and incredible character of respondent's defense are discernible in his Exhibit 1,
which he attached to his answer to the original complaint.

Exhibit 1 as a carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition executed in 1968 by the four children
of Consuelo Gonzaga, by her surviving husband, Teofilo Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty.
Legaspi, all the six being described in the document as "the legitimate children and sole heirs of
Consuelo Gonzaga, who died on March 12. 1941". Why the respondent was an heir of Consuelo
Gonzaga was not explained.

In that curious instrument, the spaces for the day and month when it was signed and acknowledged
before a notary, the spaces for the description of the fourth parcel of land, the spaces for the shares
adjudicated to the heirs, the spaces for the instrumental witnesses and the spaces for the numbers
of the residence certificates and the dates and places of issue were left blank. Yet the instrument
was signed by the above six persons and duly notarized by a notary whose signature is illegible.

In that extrajudicial partition Consuelo Gonzaga was alleged to have left four parcels of land located
at Barrio Maputi, Initao, Misamis Oriental which she inherited from her father Aquilino Gonzaga.
However, in the order of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental dated April 29, 1969
Consuelo Gonzaga inherited only a one-sixth share in a parcel of land located at Maputi, Initao,
Misamis Oriental.

How Vivencio Legaspi, who, according to the instrument, was a resident of Alameda, California, was
able to sign it and to appear before a notary was not explained.

The incomplete document, far from being of any help to respondent Legaspi, casts a reflection on
his competency and integrity as a lawyer and on the competency and integrity of the notary before
whom it was acknowledged. As already noted, it was made to appear herein that respondent
Legaspi was an heir of Consuelo Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess that status. The
document does not even mention whether the deceased died intestate.
That document has no connection with the P4,000 and does not justify the misappropriation or
breach of trust committed by the respondent.

A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of
his clients that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or
use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for
honesty and fidelity to private trust (Pars. 11 and 32, Canons of Legal Ethics).

Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his clients is held in trust and
must be immediately turned over to them (Aya vs. Bigornia, 57 Phil. 8, 11). 1äw phï1.ñët

Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to a criminal
prosecution.

A lawyer may be disbarred for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in his office as
attorney or for any violation of the lawyer's oath (Ibid, sec. 27).

"The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate,
exacting and confidential character, requiring a high degree of fidelity and good faith" (7 Am. Jur. 2d
105). In view of that special relationship, "lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or
property received by them on behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on money in his hands collected for his clients
does not relieve him from the duty of promptly accounting for the funds received." (Syllabus, In
re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962).

The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a gross violation of general morality as well as
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession, "It deserves severe
punishment" (Sturr vs. State Bar of California, 52 Cal. 2d 125, 338 Pac. 2d 897). 1äwphï1.ñët

A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own benefit through false pretenses
is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct in his office of lawyer. The attorney, who
violates his oath of office, betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client and practices deceit
cannot be permitted to continue as a law practitioner. Not alone has he degraded himself but as an
unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an honorable profession (In re Paraiso, 41 Phil.
24, 25; In re David, 84 Phil. 627; Manaloto vs. Reyes, Adm. Case No. 503, October 29, 1965, 15
SCRA 131; See Cabigao and Yzquierdo vs. Fernando Rodrigo, 57 Phil. 20).

We find respondent Legaspi guilty of deceit, malpractice and professional misconduct for having
misappropriated the funds of his clients. His manufactured defenses, his lack of candor and his
repeated failure to appear at the investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Iligan and at the
hearings scheduled by this Court, thus causing this proceeding to drag on for a long time,
demonstrate his unworthiness to remain as a member of the noble profession of law. (See Capulong
vs. Aliño, Adm. Case No. 381, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 491).

Taking into account the environmental circumstances of the case, we hold that the proper
disciplinary action against the respondent is disbarment. Its salutary purpose is to protect the court
and the public from the misconduct of an officer of the court. It is premised on the assumption that a
member of the bar should be competent, honorable and reliable, a person in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence (In re MacDougall, 3 Phil. 70, 78).
Its objectives are to compel the lawyer to deal fairly and honestly with his client and to remove from
the profession a person whose misconduct has proven him unfit for the duties and responsibilities
belonging to the office of an attorney (6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p.
242). 1äwphï1.ñët

The prayer of the complainants that the respondent be ordered to pay them the said amount of
P4,000 plus attorney's fees and miscellaneous expenses incurred in the prosecution of this case
amounting to more than P1,000 cannot be granted in this disbarment proceeding. That amount
should be recovered in an ordinary action.

WHEREFORE, the respondent is disbarred. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

10)

13)

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4552. December 14, 2004]

JOSE A. ROLDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NATALIO PANGANIBAN

and ATTY. JUANITO P. NOEL, respondents.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Jose

A. Roldan against respondents Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban and Atty. Juanito
P. Noel. Complainant charges that respondent lawyers reneged in their duties
and obligations towards him as their client, especially in the complainants right
to appeal to the higher court after losing his case in the lower courts. The
allegations in the complaint dated February 12, 1996 in support of the [1]

accusations are as follows:

1. Na ako ang plaintiff sa Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A.
Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano, na ang Judge ay si Honorable
Severino De Castro, Jr. na ang kaso ay Recovery of possession with damages. Itoy
iniapila ko sa RTC Branch 43 with Civil Case No. 95-73739 na ang Judge naman dito
ay si Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo ng RTC. Si Atty. Panganiban at Atty. Noel ang
abogado ko.

...

4. Na noong February 6, 1995 bago kami pumasok sa court room ay nagtanong sa

akin si Atty. Noel, ng ganito: Mr. Roldan nasaan nga pala yung resibo na ibinigay ni
Tessie sa iyo na nagbigay ka ng down payment na Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
noong March 1, 1986. Agad akong sumagot at sinabi ko sa kaniya, Atty. Noel lahat po
ng original ay hiningi ninyo sa akin, lahat po ay binigay ko sa inyo kasama iyong
resibo ni Tessie Dalusong, na akoy magbigay ng Ten Thousand Pesos bilang
downpayment sa ipinagbili niyang bahay sa akin. Agad siyang sumagot Wala kang
ibinibigay sa akin!

5. Na kaya nga sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Ibigay ninyo sa akin ang folder at ako ang
hahanap ng resibo ni Tessie Dalusong. Tumulong din si Atty. Noel, at nakita din
namin. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel Sayang hindi na natin maipasok ito, hindi na kasi
pwedeng magpasok pa ng mga ibidensya. Di ko alam kung bakit hindi niya ipinasok
noon pa man. (Ang resibo na nagpapatunay na ako ang unang nakabili ng bahay sa
1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Maynila).

6. Na noong nasa loob na kami ng court room ay handa na ako sa sinasabi ni Atty.
Noel no Rebuttal pero nagtaka ako kinumbinsi ako na diumano ay malinaw na ang
aking deklarasyon at malinaw ang mga ebidensya kaya hindi na raw dapat mag
rebuttal i-waive na lang daw sa Memorandum kaya nga sinabi ng Judge na: Gumawa
kayo ng Memoranda within fifteen days submitted for decision. Noong March 8, 1995
ang memorandum ay submitted for decision;

7. Na noong Abril 7, 1995 sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel, Bakit may ibinigay na zerox
copies ng decision si Robert Montano na aking kalaban sumagot si Atty. Noel, at
sinabi sa akin Tsekin mo sa court. Gayon nga ang aking ginawa. At bumalik ako kay
Atty. Noel, at sinabi ko: Totoo nga na may decision na. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel na:
Ginapang nila yun, sapalagay mo, magkano ang inilagay nila? Sa palagay ko ay hindi
lang trenta mil (P30,000.00) pesos ang magagastos nila sa kasong ito, yun ang
isinagot ko;

8. Na iminungkahi ko kay Atty. Noel na magpayl ng motion for reconsideration,

sinagat ako ni Atty. Noel na: Ginapang na nila yun kaya dapat umapila na lang tayo.
Sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Kung matalo pa rin ako dito, ay dalhin natin sa Supreme
Court para parehas ang laban; Na bilang bahagi nito inilakip ko dito ang decision ng
MTC; at ang apilasyon sa RTC, at ang petsa ng decision ng RTC na tinaggap ni Atty.
Noel.

9. Na noong Abril 24, 1995 umapila ako sa Court of Appeal makaraan ang ilang
buwan ay dumating sa office ni Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban, noong November 13,
1995 ang decision subalit tinawagan ako ng sekretarya nila Atty. Noel at Atty.
Panganiban noon lang November 24, 1995. Tinanong ko ang sekretarya ni Atty.
Panganiban kung nasaan si Atty. Noel, ang sagot ng sekretarya ay Nasa probinsiya
maraming inaasikaso doon. Agad kong sinabi: Hindi ba fifteen days lang para maka-
apila sa Supreme Court. Sumagot si Zeny at sinabi Isang buwan daw yun para sagutin.

10. Na madalas kong tawagan si Zeny (ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban) na

sinasabi kong nakahanda na ang pangbayad gawin na ninyo ang apilasyon sa Supreme
Court, itoy madalas kong sabihin sa sekretarya (si Zeny) kayat ibinigay niya ang
bagong office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco Centre Rm. 134, 1564 Mabini St., Ermita,
Manila.

11. Na madalas akong magpunta sa bagong office ni Atty. Noel gaya noong Dec. 1,
1995, Dec. 4, 1995, Dec. 5, 1995, Dec. 7, 1995, Dec. 8, 1995 at noon pang huling
linggo ng November ay sisimulan ko ng sabihin sa dalawang sekretarya (si Zeny at
Marie Cris) na gawin na ang aking apilasyon sabihin kay Atty. Noel sa Supreme
Court.

12. Na noong December 12, 1995 maaga pa ay nagpunta ako sa office ni Atty. Noel sa
Gedisco 3rd Flr. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila. Tinanong ko ang kaniyang sekretarya
kung nakausap si Atty. Noel, sinagot ako ng sekretarya at sinabing Tinanong ko si
Atty. Noel kung yari na yung apilasyong ipinagagawa ninyo (Jose Roldan) hindi po
niya ako sinasagot.

13. Na kaya agad akong magpunta sa RTC Branch 43 upang alamin ang katotohanan
nabatid ko noon lang, na akoy natalo ng walang kalaban-laban, pagkat nag-laps na o
lampas na ang panahong ibinibigay ng batas para makapag-payl ng apilasyon sa
Supreme Court.

14. Na dahil dito sa mga panloloko, at pagwawalang bahala sa aking kaso ni Atty.
Noel, at Atty. Panganiban ay idinidimanda ko sila ng Damages na halagang one
hundred fifty thousand (P150,000.00) pesos at dapat silang alisan ng karapatan na
makapag-practice sa kanilang propesyon.
 In his Comment dated August 8, 1996, Atty. Panganiban avers that he was
neither aware nor did he participate in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 144860-
CV M.I.T. Branch 25 Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert
Montano and in the appeal of said case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 43; they do not have a lawyer-client relationship because he is on leave
in the practice of law since October 18, 1993 when he was designated Acting
Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and during his incumbency as such, and up to the
filing of this administrative complaint in 1996, he is still on leave as law
practitioner because he was elected Mayor of Laurel, Batangas in the last 1995
election; probably, complainant included him as respondent because he
thought that he is practicing law and is still an associate of Atty. Juanito P. Noel,
due to the fact that on some occasions complainant might have seen him or
they might have talked casually in the law office from which he was on leave in
his practice of law because he drops there from time to time to meet visitors
from Laurel who are living and who have problems in Metro Manila; and he has
not received any single centavo from the complainant.
In his Comment, dated August 29, 1996, Atty. Noel alleges: Sometime in
1994, he agreed to represent complainant in recovering a one-half portion of
the ground floor of a house located at 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Manila which
complainant bought from one Simplicia Villanueva represented by her daughter
Teresita Dalusong on November 28, 1986. A civil complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession was filed on February 8, 1994 with the RTC but upon
the effectivity of the law expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) the case was transferred to the MTC. From the evidence of the
defendant, he honestly saw no need to present a rebuttal evidence. The MTC
rendered a decision dismissing the case on the alleged ground that the identity
of the subject matter of the action was not clearly established. He filed an appeal
in due time to the RTC of Manila (Branch 43) and not with the Court of Appeals
as stated in paragraph 9 of the complaint. On November 13, 1995, he received
a copy of the RTC decision dated October 10, 1995, affirming the decision of
the MTC. Through the telephone, he informed the complainant about the
decision of the RTC. Complainant instructed him to prepare an appeal to the
higher court which actually refers to the Court of Appeals and not with the
Supreme Court as complainant claims. He advised the complainant that he
could find no error in the said decision and a further appeal would be frivolous
and without merit and requested the complainant to come over so that he could
discuss the matter with him. Whenever the complainant went to the law office,
he failed to see him because the latter was still attending court hearings. The
complainant asked for the records of the case which was given by his secretary.
Complainant never returned the case folder to him, neither did he call up by
phone, or see him personally. He then assumed that the complainant had hired
another lawyer to handle the appeal. He was surprised when he received on
July 18, 1996 a copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated June 19,
1996, requiring them to file their comment on the complaint of Jose A. Roldan.
We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation. After hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel A.
Quiambao submitted his Report and Recommendation dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Panganiban and imposing censure to Atty. Noel. In a
Resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP adopted and approved the said
Report and Recommendation.
We shall first resolve the issue of the existence or non-existence of lawyer-
client relationship between Atty. Panganiban and the complainant.
From a careful reading of the records of this case, it appears that Atty.
Panganiban and Atty. Noel used to be law associates. However, Atty.
Panganiban went on leave from the practice of law since October 18, 1993
when he was designated as acting mayor of Laurel, Batangas due to the [2]

indefinite leave of absence filed by the mayor and by reason of his election as
mayor of the said municipality in 1995. The complainant claims that he secured
the services of Atty. Panganiban on January 6, 1994. It is thus clear that Atty.
[3]

Panganiban was not an active associate of the law firm, since at that time, he
was already on leave from the practice of law. Moreover, the complaint filed in
1996 before the RTC for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages
was prepared and signed by Atty. Noel alone and not in any representation of
any law firm. In fact from the filing of the said civil case in the RTC, it was Atty.
Noel who represented the complainant. Not once did Atty. Panganiban appear
for the complainant nor did he sign any document pertaining with the aforesaid
case. Necessarily, the complaint against Atty. Panganiban must be dismissed.
As to the complaint against Atty. Noel.
The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether there was a deliberate
attempt to suppress evidence on the part of Atty. Noel, to the prejudice of
complainant and (2) whether it was correct for Atty. Noel to refuse to file a
further appeal of the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review
despite the manifest desire of the complainant to do so.
Anent the first issue.
Complainant insists that Atty. Noels failure to present in evidence the receipt
dated March 1, 1986 was fatal to his cause. The receipt shows that complainant
made a partial payment of P10,000.00 of the P40,000.00 price of the subject
property. Complainant claims that this piece of document proves that
complainant bought the subject property ahead of the defendants who bought
it only on July 30, 1986. Thus, to the mind of the complainant, the non-
presentation of the subject receipt is suppression of evidence.
Atty. Noel denied receiving the subject receipt and asserts that the same
was mere fabrication of the complainant. He insists that said receipt did not
exist during the preparation and filing of the complaint and even during the
presentation of evidence. Otherwise, he argues that such fact should have been
alleged in the complaint to show that complainant bought the subject property
ahead of the other buyer. Atty. Noel also claims that assuming that the receipt
was given to him, the same cannot be used as evidence because the receipt
shows that it was signed by one Romeo Dalusong who is not a party to the sale;
neither does it appear in the receipt that Romeo was acting in a representative
capacity.
A short historical backdrop is necessary for a clearer insight of this issue.
It appears that the subject property was subjected to a double sale by the
same seller. The Deed of Sale of the complainant is dated November 28, 1986
while that of the other buyer is dated July 30, 1986. But complainant claims that
actually the sale as to him took place on March 1, 1986 as evidenced by the
subject receipt. Complainant however failed to take possession of the subject
property as the same is already in the possession of the other buyer.
Complainant filed an ejectment case against the tenant of the other buyer but
[4]

the same was dismissed for the reason that complainant failed to show that he
had proprietary right over the property in question. Unable to take possession
of the subject property, complainant filed a case against the seller for the
annulment of the contract of sale, the Deed of Sale dated November 28, 1986.
Complainant won and the court awarded him damages of P80,000.00.
Subsequently, the seller and the complainant entered into a Compromise
Agreement. The seller, agreed to sell one-half of her duplex house which is
[5]

the same property that was previously sold to complainant on November 28,
1986, including all her proprietary rights over the land, in the amount
of P80,000.00. Since the Court awarded damages to the complainant in the
same amount, this was set-off against the price of the property. Pursuant to the
said compromise agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer of Right in [6]

favor of the complainant was executed on December 22, 1990 by the seller over
the said property.
Even with the sale on December 22, 1990 over the subject property as a
result of the compromise agreement, complainant still failed to take possession
of the subject property, hence he filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession
and Ownership with Damages against the other buyer. It is in this case that
complainant claims that Atty. Noel failed to present the subject receipt. The
MTC dismissed the complaint and the RTC on appeal, dismissed it again. Upon
failure of Atty. Noel to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals,
complainant filed the present administrative complaint against him.
We find credence to the allegation of Atty. Noel that the subject receipt was
not in existence at the time he prepared the complaint or even at the time of
presentation of evidence. The complaint was verified by the complainant stating
the fact that he caused its preparation, that he read the same and attested that
the contents thereof are true and correct. If complainants allegation that he gave
the receipt to Atty. Noel at that time, and considering the importance of the
subject receipt to his case, he should have called the attention of Atty. Noel that
there was no allegation of the existence of the subject receipt.
We thus hold that Atty. Noel is not guilty of suppressing evidence.
As to the second issue, that is, the issue of propriety of Atty. Noels refusal
or failure to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
It is the contention of the complainant that he lost the right to file a further
appeal because he was not informed immediately of the result of the appeal to
the RTC. Complainant insists that Atty. Noel, through his secretary, called the
complainant only on November 24, 1995 or 11 days after the receipt of the
adverse RTC decision and was given the impression that he has still one month
within which to file an appeal. The complainant also said that he paid the
respondents visits on December 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8, 1995, to follow up the filing of
the appeal to the higher court but that he was not able to talk to Atty. Noel; that
it was only when he went to the RTC that he learned that he lost the case
because the period of the appeal has lapsed.
Atty. Noel contends that he received the RTC decision on November 13,
1995 and on the following day, he instructed his secretary to contact the
complainant to inform him of the adverse RTC decision with the directive for the
complainant to call up Atty. Noel; that when complainant called, he was
instructed by the complainant to prepare an appeal to the higher court; that he
told the complainant that there is no need to appeal the case because, first, the
decision of the court is correct, and second, he is obligated by the code of
professional responsibilities to refrain from filing a frivolous and unmeritorious
appeal; that thereafter, complainant went to his office twice, the last of this
instance was when complainant took all the records of the case and never came
back which led him to believe that complainant will not appeal the adverse RTC
decision. Atty. Noel further states that, in any event, his relationship with the
complainant ended upon the issuance of the decision and that the complainant
should not expect that he would still appeal the case.
 We find for the complainant.
It is noted that the complainant has been very diligent in following up the
status of the case. From the time, complainant filed the case with the MTC up
to the time he appealed with the RTC, complainant was vigilant with his rights
constantly in contact with Atty. Noel. We find it strange therefore that upon
receipt of the adverse RTC decision, it would seem, if Atty. Noels version is to
be given credence, the complainant had lost his zeal and just allowed the time
to appeal to lapse. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner in
his Report:

Here was a complainant who went through several litigations over the same subject
matter, including a case of ejectment, a case of annulment of contract of sale with
damages, a case of action for recovery of ownership and possession, an appeal to the
Regional Trial Court, and he did not seem perturb that he lost it (the appeal) and did
not find it essential to discuss the matter with his lawyer for possible remedial action?
That is, as claimed by his lawyer?

...

As opposed to the general denial given by the respondent about the claim that the
complainant followed up his case several times with his office (outside of the two
occasions that he conceded the complainant did so), the complainant was precise in
detailing the circumstances which described how he tried his best to seek the presence
of Atty. Noel to no avail. There were dates, detailed circumstances, and specific
places. Given the character which had characterized the effort of the complainant to
seek appropriate legal remedies for his complaints, the assertions would be consistent,
that is, that he made great efforts to find Atty. Noel.

We note that the complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision
within the 15-day prescriptive period to appeal. As stated elsewhere, Atty. Noel
received the adverse RTC decision on November 13, 1995 and the complainant
was informed about the adverse RTC decision on November 24, 1995. Hence,
complainant has still four days to file an appeal. However, Atty. Noel failed to
ensure that the client was advised appropriately. Atty. Noel entrusted entirely
with his secretary the duty to inform the complainant about the adverse
decision. And the secretary informed the complainant rather late and worse with
the wrong information that the complainant has still a month within which to file
an appeal. This resulted to the lapse of the prescriptive period to appeal without
complainant having availed of the said remedy.
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable. If only Atty. Noels position of
[7]
not filing an appeal because it would only be frivolous has been properly
communicated to the complainant at the earliest possible time so that the
complainant would be able to seek the services of another lawyer for help, it
would have been commendable. A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate;
and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law
and ethics. But as it was, Atty. Noels negligence as afore-discussed robbed
[8]

the complainant of the opportunity to at least look for another lawyer for
professional help and file an appeal, after all, it is the client who finally decides
whether to appeal or not an adverse decision.
We cannot also accept the reasoning of Atty. Noel that he should not be
expected to file an appeal for the complainant because their lawyer-client
relationship ended with the RTC decision. First, a lawyer continues to be a
counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the
act of his client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such time, the
lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client. Second, Atty.
[9]

Noel admitted that complainant instructed him to file an appeal with the higher
court. Even assuming that their contract does not include filing of an appeal with
the higher courts, it is still the duty of Atty. Noel to protect the interest of the
complainant by informing and discussing with the complainant of the said
decision and his assessment of the same. A lawyer shall represent his client
with zeal within the bounds of the law. It is the obligation of counsel to comply
[10]

with his clients lawful request. Counsel should exert all effort to protect the
interest of his client.
The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant
lawyer involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of
the case. In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court
[11]

consisted of reprimand, fine of five hundred pesos with warning, suspension

[12] [13]

of three months, six months and even disbarment in aggravated case.

[14] [15] [16]

The facts of the case show that Atty. Noel failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that
a suspension from the practice of law for one month is just penalty under the
circumstances.
Complainants claim for damages cannot be entertained in the present
disbarment case as it is not the proper forum. It is not an ordinary civil case
where damages could be awarded. A disbarment case is a proceeding that is
[17]

intended to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers;
to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable, men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence. It has been emphasized in a
[18]

number of cases that disbarment proceedings belong to a class of their own,

distinct from that of a civil or a criminal action.
[19]

Wherefore, the complaint against Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban is

DISMISSED. Atty. Juanito P. Noel is SUSPENDED for one month with a
warning that a repetition of the same would be meted a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondents personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
14)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119714. May 29, 1997]

SALVADOR S. ESQUIVIAS and ALICIA DOMALAON-

ESQUIVIAS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE G.
DOMALAON, ELENA G. DOMALAON and REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF SORSOGON, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

A 6,270-SQUARE METER PARCEL OF LAND in the poblacion of Gubat,

Sorsogon, is the subject of this action for reconveyance and damages.
[1]

Julia Galpo de Domalaon was the owner of a piece of land with an area of
1,260 square meters and the two-storey house standing thereon. In 1950 she
extrajudicially constituted this property into a family home. Alicia Domalaon-
Esquivias, Elena G. Domalaon and Jose G. Domalaon, among other children,
were named beneficiaries thereof. [2]

On 11 March 1974 a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Julia Galpo

de Domalaon in favor of her son-in-law, Atty. Salvador Esquivias, husband of
Alicia Domalaon. Subject matter of the deed was the property constituting the
family home the two-storey house and the residential lot on which it stood, more
particularly described in the deed as
"x x x containing an area corresponding to the ground floor area of the house (136 sq.
m.) plus and including its outside surrounding area of land measuring three (3) meters
from the outside walls on all sides of said house, and including the whole width and
length of the driveway leading from the house to Manook Street. This is likewise part
and parcel of the family home declared in the name of Julia Galpo de Domalaon under
Tax Declaration No. 9021 containing an original area of 1,260 square meters, more or
less, and assessed at P1,070."[3]

On 30 March 1977 the family home was dissolved by Julia Galpo de

Domalaon with the conformity of all her children. Afterwards, another deed of
sale was executed by her dated 12 April 1977 transferring to Jose G. Domalaon
the house and lot which once constituted the family home. The deed indicated
that the property being sold was the entire 1,260 square meters. However, in
[4]

the Affidavit of Confirmatory Waiver of Rights, the area was increased to 2,456
[5]

square meters.
Prior to the sale of the property to him, or on 21 October 1976, Jose already
filed two (2) applications for Free Patent in his name covering the entire
property. When his first application was approved, a certificate of title was [6]

issued on 11 February 1981. His rights over the other application covering the
rest of the property were relinquished by him in favor of his sister Elena. It [7]

turned out later that Elena G. Domalaon also succeeded in her application for
Free Patent and a certificate of title was issued in her name on 18 March 1985. [8]

Alleging that it was only in 1981 that she came to know that the document
she signed in favor of Atty. Salvador S. Esquivias in 1974 was actually a deed
of sale, Julia Galpo de Domalaon filed a disbarment case against Atty.
Esquivias. According to her, being a son-in-law and lawyer of the Domalaons,
Atty. Esquivias took advantage of her trust and confidence and poor eyesight
by representing that the document was a sale of her land in favor of all her
children. But the Solicitor General, who investigated the case, recommended
its dismissal for lack of merit thus

xxxx

The claim of the complainant that respondent took advantage of her trust and
confidence and presented to her for signature a prepared document which he
represented as a distribution of her lands to her children is not credible x x x x It is
inconceivable that from March 1974 up to January 1981, complainant had never
informed her children that she had already signed a document transferring her
ricelands to them x x x x And what is more, it is too much of a coincidence that Elena
Domalaon discovered the document at the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Sorsogon in January 1981 x x x x The only reasonable conclusion is that Elena knew
all along about the existence of said document, which is a genuine deed of sale in
favor of respondent, and she and her mother (complainant herself) only concocted the
alleged misrepresentation committed by respondent just to get even with him x x x
x The settled rule is that the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges proffered and has
performed his duty as a lawyer in accordance with his oath.

Complainant's evidence is obviously insufficient to prove dishonesty on the part of

respondent. Complainant's version is not credible, and respondent has adduced
sufficient evidence to prove motive for the filing of the instant complaint x x x x
[9]

This Court adopted the above Recommendation and dismissed the case. [10]

Upon discovering that the subject lands were already titled in the names of
Jose and Elena, Atty. Esquivias and his wife filed an action for reconveyance
and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. In their complaint
they claimed the entire 6,270 square meters and not just the house and lot they
acquired by purchase from Julia. According to them, when Silvestre Domalaon,
husband of Julia, was still alive he promised to transfer the entire property in
their names as payment of his accumulated debts to them. Thus, they declared
the property in their names and paid the taxes thereon.
After trial, the court ruled in favor of plaintiffs thus

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby orders:

1. That plaintiff Salvador Esquivias and Alicia Domalaon-Esquivias be declared the

owners of the house and the portion of the land it is standing on, with an area of 136
sq.m., plus and including its outside surrounding area of land measuring three (3)
meters from the outside walls on all sides of the house, and including the whole width
and length of the driveway leading from the house to Manook Street;

2. That Jose Domalaon should reconvey to the plaintiffs that property mentioned
above; and for the purpose, a licensed surveyor be commissioned to set off that
particular portion of the property. The fee of such surveyor should be paid by
defendant Jose Domalaon;

3. That the property identified as Lot No. 453 be partitioned by the heirs of Julia G.
Domalaon, and as a consequence, the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon is ordered to
cancel OCT No. P-22729 in the name of Elena Domalaon and issue the corresponding
titles to the portions owned by each heir;
4. That defendants Jose Domalaon and Elena Domalaon should pay to the plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the sum of P5,000 as moral damages, and P5,000 as attorney's
fees;

5. That defendants, likewise, jointly and severally, should pay the costs of this suit.

Not satisfied with the decision, respondents Jose G. Domalaon and Elena
G. Domalaon elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which reversed the
decision of the trial court and dismissed the case on the basis of its finding that
there was no compliance with the mandatory requirements of Art. 222 of the
New Civil Code; hence, the instant petition.
Three (3) issues need to be resolved: (a) Was the appellate court correct in
holding that no earnest effort towards a compromise between members of the
same family was made, in contravention of Art. 222 of the Civil Code? (b) Did
the Report/Recommendation of the Solicitor General in the disbarment case,
which was adopted by the Supreme Court, rule on the validity of the sale
executed by Julia Domalaon? (c) Who has a better right over the subject
property, the Esquiviases or the Domalaons?
Petitioners contend that Atty. Esquivias is only a brother-in-law of Jose and
Elena Domalaon. Atty. Esquivias is not a member of the family of his wife and
is outside the scope and coverage of the law requiring that the same members
of a family should exert efforts to bring about a compromise before the
commencement of a litigation.
We agree with petitioners. Article 222 of the Civil Code provides that no suit
shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but
the same have failed. The reason for the law is that a lawsuit between family
members generates deeper bitterness than one between strangers. Hence, it
is necessary that every effort should be made towards a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. [11]

But this requirement in Art. 222 of the Civil Code applies only to suits
between or among members of the same family. The phrase "between
members of the same family" should be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the
Civil Code under which "family relations" include only those (a) between
[12]

husband and wife, (b) between parent and child, (c) among other ascendants
and their descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters.
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Atty. Salvador S. Esquivias is not
included in the enumeration of who are members of the same family, as he is
only a brother-in-law of respondents Jose and Elena by virtue of his marriage
to their sister Alicia. His relationship with respondents is based on affinity and
not on consanguinity. Consequently, insofar as he is concerned, he is a
stranger with respect to the family of his wife and, as such, the mandatory
requirement of "earnest effort toward a compromise" does not apply to him. In
Magbaleta v. Gonong we ruled that "efforts to compromise" are not a
[13]

jurisdictional prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger

to the family is a party thereto, whether as necessary or indispensable one. An
alien to the family may not be willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less
relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between and among
relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that
the rights of a family be made to depend on a stranger who just happens to
have innocently acquired some interest in a property by virtue of his affinity to
the parties. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find no reason to
give Art. 222 a broader scope than its literal import.
On the second issue, petitioner Salvador S. Esquivias postulates that the
validity of the deed of sale in his favor had already been sustained in the
disbarment proceedings against him. As a consequence, the facts established
therein have become the law of the case and can no longer be disturbed by the
Court of Appeals.
The argument is flawed. In the case of In re Almacen we ruled
[14]

x x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

For this reason, whatever has been decided in the disbarment case cannot be
a source of right that may be enforced in another action, like this case before
us.
 Moreover, what was decided in the disbarment proceedings was the issue
of whether Atty. Esquivias violated his oath by defrauding and deceiving the
complainant into conveying to him the properties in question, and not the issue
of the validity of the deed of sale. When the Solicitor General made a
declaration that the deed was valid, it was only because the same was
incidentally necessary for the prompt resolution of the case. Indeed, in matters
involving questions of genuineness and due execution of documents purporting
to convey properties of considerable value, no less than an action instituted for
that purpose before a court of competent jurisdiction is necessary, rather than
a mere administrative proceeding, like a disbarment case, where the procedure
followed is, more often than not, summary, and where the question on validity
of the instrument is merely a collateral and not the main issue.
Consequently, the judgment on the disbarment proceedings, which
incidentally touched on the issue of the validity of the deed of sale, cannot be
considered conclusive in another action where the validity of the same deed of
sale is merely one of the main issues. At best, such judgment may only be given
weight when introduced as evidence, but in no case does it bind the court in the
second action.
We are convinced, however, that the sale in favor of Atty. Esquivias was
made by Julia with full knowledge of the facts and there appears nothing on
record to warrant a declaration of nullity of the deed from the standpoint of fraud.
It must be emphasized that the bare existence of confidential relation
between grantor and grantee does not, standing alone, raise the presumption
of fraud. A deed will not be set aside merely because the grantor and grantee
sustained a confidential relationship where the evidence shows no fraud or
abuse of confidence. Besides, if Julia really had a cause of action against Atty.
[15]

Esquivias, why did she file only a disbarment case instead of the more
appropriate action for annulment of contract?
As regards the third issue, this Court notes the glaring irregularities that
attended the transfer of the land in question to Jose G. Domalaon and Elena G.
Domalaon: First, the land was sold by Julia to Jose on 12 April 1977. But even
[16]

prior to that date, or on 21 October 1976, Jose already applied for Free Patent
in his name covering the land; Second, during the disbarment proceedings
[17]

against Atty. Esquivias, Elena admitted on cross-examination that she went to

the Register of Deeds of Sorsogon to register another deed of sale one
executed by her mother in favor of her brother Jose over the same house and
lot ahead of the deed of sale executed in favor of Atty. Esquivias. She
succeeded in doing so by using the tax receipt paid by Atty. Esquivias
himself; Third, in the deed of sale of Jose, what was sold to him was 1,260
[18]
square meters. However, in the Affidavit of Confirmatory Waiver of Rights the
area was increased to 2,456 square meters; Fourth, Jose relinquished to Elena
Lot No. 453 with an area of 3,814 square meters. Surprisingly, the records
contain no deed or evidence showing that Julia likewise sold to Jose Lot No.
453. What was sold was 1,260 square meters if we go by the deed of sale, or
2,456 square meters if we base it on the Affidavit of Confirmatory Waiver of
Rights. As aptly observed by the trial court, how could Jose relinquish to Elena
something which he did not own? Fifth, Julia executed an affidavit dated 17
[19]

July 1986 wherein she ceded her rights and interests over Lot No. 453 in favor
of Jose. But it will be observed that such affidavit was not sufficient to transfer
ownership of the subject lot. Even if it did, it was executed only after more than
four (4) years from the date Jose relinquished to Elena his alleged rights over
Lot No. 453.
These circumstances confirm the belief that there indeed was collusion
among the Domalaons to defeat the valid and legitimate claim of the
Esquiviases by consolidating the ownership of the entire property in the names
of Jose G. Domalaon and Elena G. Domalaon. They likewise belie the
Domalaons' profession of ignorance with respect to the existence of the first
sale.
Logically, while the deed of sale in favor of Jose G. Domalaon was
registered earlier, the same cannot prevail over the deed of sale in favor of Atty.
Esquivias because private respondent knew of the prior sale to petitioners, and
such knowledge tainted his registration with bad faith. To merit protection
[20]

under Art. 1544, second par., the second buyer must act in good faith in
[21]

registering his deed.

While we are sustaining petitioners' rights over the house and lot subject of
the 11 March 1974 deed of sale, we cannot find any justification to likewise
award to them the rest of the property. They presented no evidence other than
their self-serving assertion that the entire property was promised to them by the
late Silvestre Domalaon. The fact that such promise was not contradicted by
private respondents does not prove that their claim over the entire property is
valid and subsisting. Furthermore, although the entire property was declared by
petitioners in their names for taxation purposes, it does not by itself constitute
conclusive evidence of ownership. [22]

Finally, while the certificates of title in the names of Jose G. Domalaon and
Elena G. Domalaon are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the
whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest
title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used
as a shield for the commission of fraud; neither does they permit one to enrich
himself at the expense of others. [23]

Although a review of the decree of registration is no longer available on

account of the expiration of the one-year period from entry thereof, an equitable
remedy is still available to the Esquiviases who were wrongfully deprived of
their property, i.e., to compel Jose G. Domalaon in whose name the house and
lot in question had been wrongfully registered, to reconvey the property to the
Esquiviases, provided that the same has not yet been transferred to innocent
persons for value. [24]

The registered property is deemed to be held in trust for the real owners by
the person in whose name it has been registered. In this action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What
is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case, the title thereof,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name,
to its rightful and legal owners.
[25]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals reversing that

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Gubat, Sorsogon, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the latter court in favor of petitioners as quoted
in pages four (4) and five (5) hereof is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs
against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
16)

EN BANC

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Adm. Case No. 2474

Complainant,
Present:

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,

PUNO,
PANGANIBAN,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
*
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
*CARPIO MORALES,
 CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA, and
**
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. LEO J. PALMA, Promulgated:

Respondent.

September 15, 2004

X --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up

to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a
candidate to the bar, the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These
standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer
must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or
removal.[1]

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. filed with this Court the instant complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Leo J. Palma, alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral
conduct.

The facts are undisputed:

 Complainant and respondent met sometime in the 70s. Complainant was
a client of Angara Concepcion Regala & Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA) and
respondent was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Owing to his growing
business concerns, complainant decided to hire respondent as his personal
counsel.

Consequently, respondents relationship with complainants family became

intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad.[2] He frequented their house
and even tutored complainants 22-year old daughter Maria Luisa Cojuangco
(Lisa), then a student of Assumption

Convent.

On June 22, 1982, without the knowledge of complainants family,

respondent married Lisa in Hongkong. It was only the next
day that respondent informed complainant and assured him that everything is
legal. Complainant was shocked, knowing fully well that respondent is a
married man and has three children. Upon investigation, complainant found
that respondent courted Lisa during their tutoring sessions. Immediately,
complainant sent his two sons to Hongkong to convince Lisa to go home to
Manila and discuss the matter with the family. Lisa was persuaded.

Complainant also came to know that: (a) on the date of the supposed marriage,
respondent requested from his (complainants) office an airplane ticket to and
from Australia, with stop-over in Hong Kong; (b) respondent misrepresented
himself as bachelor before the Hong Kong authorities to facilitate his marriage
with Lisa; and (c) respondent was married to Elizabeth Hermosisima and has
three children, namely: Eugene Philippe, Elias Anton and Eduardo Lorenzo.
On August 24, 1982, complainant filed with the Court of First
Instance, Branch XXVII, Pasay City a petition[3] for declaration of

nullity of the marriage between respondent and Lisa, docketed as Civil Case No.
Pq-0401-P. In the Decision[4] dated November 2, 1982, the CFI declared the
marriage null and void ab initio.

Thereafter, complainant filed with this Court the instant complaint[5] for
disbarment, imputing to respondent the following acts:

a. In grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence

reposed in him by complainant and his family and taking undue
advantage of his tutoring sessions with Maria Luisa, respondent
secretly courted her. The great disparity in intelligence, education,
age, experience and maturity between Maria Luisa and respondent
gave the latter an overwhelming moral ascendancy over Maria
Luisa as to overcome her scruples and apprehensions about
respondents courtship and advances, considering that he is a
married man with three (3) children;

b. Respondent courted Maria Luisa with persistence and

determination and even pursued her in her travels abroad under
false pretenses that he was traveling on official business for
complainant. To break down the final resistance of Maria Luisa and
assuage her pangs of guilt, he made representations that there was
no legal impediment whatsoever to his marrying;

c. With his moral ascendancy over Maria Luisa and his

misrepresentation that there was no legal impediment or prohibition
to his contracting a second marriage, respondent succeeded in
inducing and beguiling her into marrying him. Without complying
with the requirements of Philippine law that he should first obtain a
 judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Elizabeth H. Palma
and that the advice of Maria Luisas parents should first be obtained
she being only twenty-two (22) years of age, respondent
succeeded in contracting marriage with her in Hongkong on June
22, 1982 by falsely representing himself before the Hongkong
authorities that he is a bachelor. xx x.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss[6] on the ground of lack of cause of

action. He contended that the complaint fails to allege acts constituting deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct or violation of his lawyers oath. There is no
allegation that he acted with wanton recklessness, lack of skill or ignorance
of the law in serving complainants interest. Anent the charge of grossly immoral
conduct, he stressed that he married complainants daughter with utmost
sincerity and good faith and that it is contrary to the natural course of things for
an immoral man to marry the woman he sincerely loves.

In the Resolution[7] dated March 2, 1983, we referred the case to the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation. Former Assistant Solicitor General Oswaldo D. Agcaoili
conducted the investigation.

Meanwhile, on December 28, 1983, the First Division of this Court issued
in G.R. No. 64538[8] a Resolution[9] (a) setting aside the
CFI Decision dated November 2, 1982 in Civil Case No. Pq0401-P
declaring the marriage between respondent and Lisa null and void ab initio;
and (b) remanding the case to the CFI for proper proceeding and
determination. To this date, the records fail to disclose the outcome of this case.
 On March 19, 1984, respondent filed with the OSG an Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proceedings[10] on the ground that the final outcome of Civil Case No.
Pq0401-P poses a prejudicial question to the disbarment proceeding. It was
denied.

Respondent sought refuge in this Court through an Urgent Motion for

Issuance of a Restraining Order.[11] In the Resolution dated December 19, 1984,
we enjoined the OSG from continuing the investigation of the disbarment
proceedings.[12]

Thereafter, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. On October 19, 1998,
Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo issued the following order:

Considering the length of time that this case has

remained pending and as a practical measure to ease the
backlog of this Commission, the parties shall within ten (10)
days from notice, manifest whether or not they are still
interested in prosecuting this case or supervening events
have transpired which render this case moot and academic or
otherwise, this case shall be deemed closed and terminated.[13]
In his Manifestation,[14] complainant manifested and confirmed his
continuing interest in prosecuting his complaint for disbarment against
respondent.

On the other hand, respondent sought several postponements of hearing

on the ground that he needed more time to locate vital documents in support of
his defense. The scheduled hearing of December 4, 2001 was reset for the last
time on January 24, 2002, with a warning that should he fail to appear or present
deposition, the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.[15] Respondent
again failed to appear on January 24, 2002; hence, the case was considered
submitted for resolution.[16]

On March 20, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan

submitted a Report and Recommendation finding respondent guilty of grossly
immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer. She recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years. Thus:

The main issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not

respondent committed the following acts which warrant his
disbarment:

a) Grave abuse and betrayal of the trust and confidence

reposed in him by complainant;

b) His misrepresentation that there was no legal

impediment or prohibition to his contracting a second
marriage;

c) The acts of respondent constitute deceit, malpractice,

gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral conduct
and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Respondent admits that he married Maria Luisa in Hongkong

representing himself as a bachelor, however, he claimed that the
marriage certificate stated a condition no different from term
spinster with respect to Luisa.

There is no question that respondent as a lawyer well versed

in the law knew fully well that in marrying Maria Luisa he was
entering into a bigamous marriage defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The respondent betrayed
the trust reposed in him by complainant. He was treated as part of
the family and was allowed to tutor Maria Luisa.
 For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a
lawyer, and it is recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of three (3) years.

SO ORDERED.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the above Report and
Recommendation, but it reduced respondents penalty to only one (1) year
suspension.

Except for the penalty, we affirm the IBPs Report and Recommendation.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the law profession does not prescribe
a dichotomy of standards among its members. There is no distinction as to
whether the transgression is committed in the lawyers professional capacity or
in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.[17] Thus, not only his
professional activities but even his private life, insofar as the latter may reflect
unfavorably upon the good name and prestige of the profession and the courts,
may at any time be the subject of inquiry on the part of the proper authorities.[18]

Respondent claims that he had served complainant to the best of his

ability. In fact, the complaint does not allege that he acted with wanton
recklessness, lack of skill and ignorance of the law.
While, complainant himself admitted that respondent was a good
lawyer,[19] however, professional competency alone does not make a lawyer a
worthy member of the Bar. Good moral character is always an indispensable
requirement.
 The ringing truth in this case is that respondent married Lisa while he has
a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. The Certification[20] from the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City shows that he married Elizabeth on
December 19, 1971 at Cardials Private Chapel, Cebu City. On the other hand,
the Certificate of Marriage[21] from the Deputy Registrar of Marriages, Hong
Kong, proves respondents subsequent marriage with Lisa on July 9, 1982. That
Elizabeth was alive at the time of respondents second marriage was confirmed
on the witness stand by Atty. Victor P. Lazatin, Elizabeths classmate and family
friend.[22]

Undoubtedly, respondents act constitutes grossly immoral conduct, a

ground for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him
as a member of the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which is
a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a
second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[23]

This is not the first occasion that we censure immorality. Thus, we have
somehow come up with a common definition of what constitutes immoral
conduct, i.e., that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable
members of the community.[24] Measured against this definition,
respondents act is manifestly immoral. First, he abandoned his lawful wife and
three children. Second, he lured an innocent young woman into marrying
him. And third, he misrepresented himself as a bachelor so he could contract
marriage in a foreign land.

Our rulings in the following cases are relevant:

 1) In Macarrubo vs. Macarrubo,[25] respondent entered into multiple
marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to sever them. There, we ruled
that [S]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our
children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being
of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. As such,
there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred.

(2) In Tucay vs. Tucay,[26] respondent contracted marriage with another

married woman and left complainant with whom he has been married for thirty
years. We ruled that such acts constitute a grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession, warranting respondents disbarment.

(3) In Villasanta vs. Peralta,[27] respondent married complainant while his

first wife was still alive, their marriage still valid and subsisting. We held that
the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to honesty,
justice, decency and morality. Thus, lacking the good moral character required
by the Rules of Court, respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the
bar.

(4) In Cabrera vs. Agustin,[28] respondent lured an innocent woman into a

simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied his lust. We held that respondent
failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of
law.
 (5) In Toledo vs. Toledo,[29] respondent abandoned his wife, who supported
him and spent for his law education, and thereafter cohabited with another
woman. We ruled that he failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of the bar. For this, respondent was
disbarred.

(6) In Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[30] respondent abandoned his lawful wife and
child and resumed cohabitation with his former paramour. Here, we ruled that
abandoning ones wife and resuming carnal relations with a former paramour, a
married woman, constitute grossly immoral conduct warranting disbarment.

The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse
of confidence. It was respondents closeness to the complainants family as well
as the latters complete trust in him that made possible his intimate relationship
with Lisa. When his concern was supposed to be complainants legal affairs only,
he sneaked at the latters back and courted his daughter. Like the proverbial thief
in the night, he attacked when nobody was looking. Moreover, he availed of
complainants resources by securing a plane ticket from complainants office in
order to marry the latters daughter in Hongkong. He did this without
complainants knowledge. Afterwards, he even had the temerity to assure
complainant that everything is legal. Clearly, respondent had crossed the limits
of propriety and decency.

Respondent justified his conduct by professing he really loved Lisa and

since he married her, he cannot be charged with immorality. His reasoning
shows a distorted mind and a brazen regard on the sanctity of marriage. In such
relationship, the man and the woman are obliged to live together, observe
mutual respect andfidelity.[31] How could respondent perform these obligations
to Lisa when he was previously married to Elizabeth? If he really loved her, then
the noblest thing he could have done was to walk away.

Respondents culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was just a 22-
year old college student of Assumption Convent and was under psychological
treatment for emotional immaturity.[32] Naturally, she was an easy prey.

Anent respondents argument that since the validity of his marriage to Lisa
has not yet been determined by the court with finality, the same poses a
prejudicial question to the present disbarment proceeding. Suffice it to say that
a subsequent judgment of annulment of marriage has no bearing to the instant
disbarment proceeding. As we held in In re Almacen,[33] a disbarment case is sui
generis for it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal but is rather an
investigation by the court into the conduct of its officers. Thus, if the acquittal
of a lawyer in a criminal action is not determinative of an administrative case
against him,[34] or if an affidavit of withdrawal of a disbarment case does not
affect its course,[35] then the judgment of annulment of respondents marriage
does not also exonerate him from a wrongdoing actually committed. So long as
the quantum of proof --- clear preponderance of evidence --- in disciplinary
proceedings against members of the bar is met, then liability attaches.[36]

The interdict upon lawyers, as inscribed in Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, is that they shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. This is founded on the lawyers
primordial duty to society as spelled out in Canon 1 which states:
 CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.

It is not by coincidence that the drafters of our Code of Professional

Responsibility ranked the above responsibility first in the enumeration. They
knew then that more than anybody else, it is the lawyers -- the disciples of law -
- who are most obliged to venerate the law. As stated in Ex Parte Wall:[37]

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most

sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant;
and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office
and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic.

Corollarily, the above responsibility is enshrined in the Attorneys Oath

which every lawyer in the country has to take before he is allowed to practice.

In sum, respondent committed grossly immoral conduct and violation of his

oath as a lawyer. The penalty of one (1) year suspension recommended by the
IBP is not commensurate to the gravity of his offense. The bulk of jurisprudence
supports the imposition of the extreme penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, respondent Leo J. Palma is found GUILTY of grossly

immoral conduct and violation of his oath as a lawyer, and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
 Let respondents name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
immediately. Furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts throughout the country with copies of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

17)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 439 April 12, 1961

LEDESMA DE JESUS-PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
QUINCIANO VAILOCES, respondent.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the Philippine bar.

It appears that as member of the bar and in his Capacity as a notary public, Vailoces, on December
14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of
one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, the will was impugned by her surviving spouse and daughter. Consequently the probate
court, finding that the will was a forgery, rendered decision denying probate to the will. This decision
e final. On the basis of this decision a criminal action for falsification of public document was filed
against Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to the will before the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental where after trial, they were found guilty and convicted On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision with regard to Vailocess but modified it with record to his co-accused.
As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification
of public document defined and penalized in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and as
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate Penalty ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
correccional as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prison mayoras maximum, with the accessories of
the law, finest and costs. This sentence having become final, Vailoces began serving it in the insular
penitentiary. As a consequence, the offended party instituted the present disbarment proceedings.

In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment of conviction rendered against him in the
criminal case but contends that the same is based on insufficient and inconclusive evidence, the
charge being merely motivated by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of herein
complainant, and that to give course to this proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in
double jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.
Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as used in this section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice,
honesty or good morals.1 Among the examples given of crimes of this nature by former Chief Justice
Moran are the crime of seduction and the crime of concubinage.2 The crime of which respondent
was convicted is falsification of public document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is clearly
contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence, such crime involves moral turpitude. Indeed, it
is well-settled that "embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote moral
turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving
moral turpitude" (58 C.J.S., 1206).

It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
it is clear that he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under Section 25, Rule 127, of our Rules
of Court. It is futile on his part, much as we sympathize with him, to dispute now the sufficiency of his
conviction, for this is a matter which we cannot now look into. That is now a closed chapter insofar
as this proceeding is concerned. The only issue with which we are concerned is that he was found
guilty and convicted by a final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. As this Court well said:

The review of respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has
become final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. Suffice it to
say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to protect the
administration of justice. (In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings against Narciso N.
Jaramillo, Adm. Case No. 229, April 30, 1957).

The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his conviction of a crime which resulted in the
deprivation of his liberty and of his office as Justice of the Peace of Bais, Negros Oriental would be
tantamount to placing him in double jeopardy is untenable, for such defense can only be availed of
when he is placed in the predicament of being prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense necessarily included therein, within the
meaning of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the case here. The disbarment of an attorney does not
partake of a criminal proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and the public from the
misconduct of officers of the court" (In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and its purpose is
"to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence"
(In repose confidence"(In reMcDougall, 3 Phil. 77).

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby removed from his office as attorney and, to this effect, our
Clerk of Court is enjoined to erase his name from the roll of attorneys.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.

18)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 736 October 23, 1967

MANUEL R. GO, complainant,
vs.
ROMULO CANDOY, Admitted to the Philippine Bar: March 9, 1957, respondent.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative case for disbarment instituted by Manuel R. Go on October 24, 1966
against Atty. Romulo Candoy on the basis of acts committed by the latter allegedly constituting
"deceit and grossly immoral conduct".

The complaint recites that by virtue of a "previous agreement" between the complainant Go and the
respondent Candoy over "Lot 11, Block 16 (LRC) Psd-1210 Magallanes Village P-1 with an area of
350 sq. m. located at Makati, Rizal," Go gave to the Makati Development Corporation1 on March 4,
1964 his personal check for P7,140, which sum represents the initial payment on the said lot plus
the required cash bond; that by virtue of this payment, the corporation executed an "Agreement to
Purchase and Sell" in favor of Candoy; that on the same date, "in view of the foregoing consideration
and the additional amount of P2,000 in cash given" by Go to Candoy, the latter executed an
"Agreement to Purchase and Sell" in favor of Go; that on March 31, 1964 Go gave to the corporation
another personal check for P16,337.01, which amount represents the "unpaid balance of the
purchase price of the said lot"; that in view of this last payment, the corporation on the same date
executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Candoy; that on August 30, 1965 Candoy and his
wife, by virtue of a "Contract to Sell", sold the land to the spouses Amado Barrientos and Astrid N.
Barrientos; that to protect his rights, Go instituted a civil case (9047, CFI of Rizal) against Candoy
and his wife, the spouses Barrientos and the corporation, as well as a criminal prosecution
for estafa (15756, CFI of Rizal) against Candoy; and that both cases are now pending adjudication.

In answer to the complaint, Candoy admits the existence of the "Agreement to Purchase and Sell" in
favor of Go as well as the "Deed of Absolute Sale" executed by the corporation in his (Candoy's)
favor. He likewise admits having executed a "Contract to Sell" in favor of the spouses Barrientos, but
avers that he did so only "after the petitioner (complainant) had defaulted and after the respondent
had given him all the opportunity to comply but nevertheless, the petitioner failed, so the respondent
was compelled to rescind his agreement with the petitioner and it was only then that the respondent
sold the lot in question to the spouses Amado Barrientos and Astrid Barrientos". As a special and
affirmative defense, he asserts that there was no deceit, much less any immoral conduct, on his part
in rescinding the sale to Go and selling the land to the spouses Barrientos, because he gave Go "all
the opportunity to comply with their agreement and it was only after the petitioner refused to comply
with their agreement that the respondent decided to rescind the agreement."

The case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On
January 23, 1967 Candoy, with the conformity of Go, moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
they had reached an amicable settlement. On March 17, 1967 the Office of the Solicitor General,
without any hearing had in the case, submitted his report and recommendation, the pertinent
portions of which read as follows:

Although this case may be disposed of in the light of the joint motion for dismissal filed by the
parties and their counsel, it appears from the very answer of respondent that the double sale
complained of was occasioned by a very trivial alleged violation of the first vendee of the
condition of the sale, namely, the alleged non-payment of association dues in the amount of
around P52.50 which in the mind of the undersigned should not have been taken advantage
of by respondent. Besides, it is hard to believe the denial made under oath by respondent of
receipt of P2,000.00 as additional consideration of the land sale as alleged in paragraph 3 of
the petition;
 Under the circumstances, in order that lawyers may be restrained from doing any act which
in any manner may be tainted with some degree of unfairness or oppressiveness, albeit
legal, which, in this case is doubtful because the alleged lesion was not serious, it is
advisable that the respondent be correspondingly admonished.

Commenting on the foregoing recommendation, Candoy in his memorandum expressed surprise "as
to how the Solicitor General has arrived at the conclusion that 'it is hard to believe the denial made
under oath by the respondent of receipt of P2,000.00 as additional consideration' when there was no
investigation whatsoever conducted and the complainant has not presented any evidence to prove
his allegation." Candoy argues that even on the assumption that the violation committed by Go is
trivial, the fact remains that the latter committed a breach of contract justifying rescission of their
agreement; and that such rescission cannot in any manner be regarded as constituting "deceit and
grossly immoral conduct" on Candoy's part.

Notwithstanding the joint motion to dismiss filed by the parties, this Court can still hold the
respondent Candoy accountable for breach of professional conduct, if he has committed any relative
to his contractual relations with the complainants. A lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in
issue, should satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in
the Bar. He can not dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law
profession. For this reason, a case of suspension or disbarment may proceed "regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant."2 It is of no moment, therefore,
that the parties herein "have considered this matter closed with the termination of the transaction
had" by them. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven.

It is quite elementary that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. To be made the basis for suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him
must be established by convincing proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which
compels the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of the act done
as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated.3

Coming back to the case at hand, it is our view that the Solicitor General erred in concluding that "it
is hard to believe the denial made under oath by the respondent of receipt of P2,000 as additional
consideration of the land sale". Apart from the bare allegation that the complainant gave the
respondent "the additional amount of P2,000.00 in cash", which allegation was squarely traversed by
the latter under oath the record is absolutely bereft of any proof that the said amount was in fact paid
to, and received by, the respondent. It was easy enough for the complainant to prove payment of the
amount of P2,000 by the mere tender of the corresponding receipt. Since there was no investigation
conducted in the case, and the complainant has not at all presented any evidence of payment by
him of the said amount, the respondent was under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.

In his report and recommendation, the Solicitor General observed "that the double sale complained
of was occasioned by a very trivial alleged violation of the first vendee of the condition of the sale,
namely, the alleged non-payment of association dues in the amount of around P52.50," and
concluded that the rescission of the contract by the respondent was tainted with some degree of
unfairness or oppressiveness." We disagree. The Solicitor General overlooks the fact that the breach
of the "Agreement to Purchase and Sell" committed by the complainant did not embrace alone "non-
payment of association dues" but as well and, more importantly, failure to pay the fall consideration
of the sale of the lot in question. In the said agreement, the complainant bound himself to "pay to
Makati Development Corporation the balance of P19,460.00 on or before April 1, 1965 including
12% interest per annum on the said balance". The complainant paid the sum of only P16,337.01,
leaving, therefore, the sizeable unpaid balance of P3,122.99. Although the question of rescission is
now academic, the parties having settled their differences amicably, this Court is not prepared to say
that in rescinding the agreement the respondent acted with "unfairness and oppressiveness", as he
merely exercised a power explicitly conferred upon him by the said agreement, this power being one
of the special stipulations and covenants thereof "strict and full compliance" with which the
complainant unequivocally bound himself.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint for disbarment against Atty. Romulo Candoy is hereby dismissed.

19)

EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657. February 23, 2004]

HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, respondent.
[1]

DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:

May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without the requisite
notary commission more than twenty years ago be disciplined therefor? This is
the novel issue presented for resolution before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated March 21,
2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondents appointment as RTC
judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX A, was not duly commissioned as notary
public until January 9, 1984 but still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular
basis) notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980
uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.

a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986 to December 31st 1987
and January 6th 1988 to December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at
the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December 31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after the expiration of his
commission in December 1989.[2]
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order respondent:

1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept any delaying tactics from
Judge Santos or any agency and or public servants involved in this administrative
case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this administrative case.

and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based on the
premises. [3]

The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly

Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the
following:

THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and available in this
office, the following data appear:

1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly commissioned notary public in
the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos
submitted his notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b. February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial documents under the name
Atty. Anthony Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos
was on January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.[4]
 In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge categorically
denied the charges against him. He also submitted a certification from Clerk of
[5]

Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted
notarized documents/notarial register. The respondent further averred as
follows:

That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized and submitted
by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said notarized
documents and therefore not the proper party to raise the said issues;

That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-334 entitled
Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and
Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding
Judge. The undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs. [6]

Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator

recommending the need to resort to a full-blown investigation to determine the
veracity of the parties assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated September
10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint;
and (b) refer the case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of
Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation. [7]

In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the
complainant requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro City. Justice
Cruz initially denied the request but upon the complainants insistence, the
matter was forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in a
Resolution dated July 8, 2002. The complainant presented his evidence in
[8]

Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S.

Quimbo. [9]

In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice Edgardo

P. Cruz made the following recommendation:

It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002) be found guilty
of violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing documents without commission; (b)
tardiness in submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial
register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these
infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred from being
commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his present commission, if any,
be revoked. [10]
 According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not adduce
evidence in his defense, while the complainant presented documentary
evidence to support the charges:

It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he was
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of
the first certification. He merely alleged that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register. And, as already observed, he presented no evidence,
particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983 (assuming he was so
commissioned) and submission of notarial reports and notarial register.

On the other hand, the second certification shows that there were only two Record
Books available in the notarial section of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de
Oro City); and that the (f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission contains
items on the Name, Date Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of
the notary public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982.

If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the first book would disclose
so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not present said book.
Neither did he present a certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis
Oriental, or documents from his files showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to
1983. Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of appointment for all those years.
Under Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and
forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor General, together
with the oath of office of the notary public.
[11]

Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence presented

by the complainant, that the respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983
without being commissioned as a notary public therefor, considering that his
earliest commission of record was on January 9, 1984. [12]

The Procedural Issues

Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint, a brief
backgrounder.

On the Applicability of
Resolution A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC
 On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, to [13]

wit:

Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.

In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as
a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.

Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and disbarment

cases against members of the bar who were likewise members of the court
were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule, administrative cases
against erring justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers
in the government service may be automatically treated as disbarment
cases. The Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that
it shall supplement Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to
administrative cases already filed where the respondents have not yet been
required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing resolution, since
the respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.

The Procedure To Be Followed

In Disbarment Cases Involving
A Retired Judge For Acts
Committed While He Was Still
A Practicing Lawyer

The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired judge;
(2) the complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the
ground for disbarment were committed when the respondent was still a
practicing lawyer, before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent
is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member
of the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission
therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and Discipline
of Attorneys provides:

Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may

be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state
clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of
persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in the government
service: Provided, however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax
Appeals and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall be filed
with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed against Justices and
Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their appointment to the
Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for disposition and
adjudication.[14]

The investigation may thereafter commence either before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule
139-B, or before the Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14,
thus:

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings initiated motu proprio by

the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any
officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation
shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the
review of the report shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.

Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated

Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor
General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit to the
Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and recommendations together
with the record and all the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action
of the Supreme Court.
 It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is cognizable
by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court
may refer the complaint for investigation, report and recommendation to the
Solicitor General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court, on which
the Court will thereafter base its final action. [15]

Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he is still
considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune to the
disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6 of the[16]

1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
respondent was still the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court itself,
as the Rule mandates that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of
Tax Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme
Court. [17]

The Substantive Issues

The Retirement Or Resignation

Of A Judge Will Not Preclude
The Filing Thereafter Of An
Administrative Charge Against
Him For Which He Shall Still
Be Held Answerable If Found
Liable Therefor

The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated from the
service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the
veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority
over members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v. Cordero: [18]

The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint
was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the
respondent public official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A
contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of
his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and
faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty
proper and imposable under the situation. [19]
 However, recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious
administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes
of harassment, we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which took effect on
[20]

November 3, 2003. It reads in part:

1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court Administrator,

an administrative complaint against any Justice of the Court of Appeals or
Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts filed in connection with a case in
court is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the
respondent, such a finding should be included in the report and recommendation of
the Office of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or affirmed
by the Court, the complainant may be required to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer, he may further be required
to show cause why he or she should not be administratively sanctioned as a member
of the Bar and as an officer of the court.

2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a
Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before
such filing and (c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it
must forthwith be recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the
Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10)
days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and
recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall
act on the recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the
respondent, or if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date
without prejudice to the release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the
Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action
alleged in the complaint.

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or retired

judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory
retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have occurred at
least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint
was intended to harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001 was
received by the Office of the Court Administrator on March 26, 2001. The [21]

respondent retired compulsorily from the service more than a year later, or on
May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action alleged
to have been committed by the respondent did not occur a year before the
respondents separation from the service. Furthermore, and most importantly,
the instant complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and
intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case
does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.

A Judge May Be Disciplined

For Acts Committed Before His
Appointment To The Judiciary

It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary. In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this,
[22]

as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for disposition
and adjudication of charges against justices and judges before the IBP,
including those filed prior to their appointment to the judiciary. It need not be
[23]

shown that the respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained
of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on the
respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act complained of must
be continuing in order for the respondent judge to be disciplined therefor.
In Sevilla v. Salubre, the respondent judge was charged with violating Canon
[24]

16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts committed while he was

still a practicing lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds
of his client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he was
appointed as a judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that the
respondents subsequent appointment as a judge will not exculpate him from
taking responsibility for the consequences of his acts as an officer of the court. [25]

In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson, we held that proof of prior immoral

[26]

conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if

he is not charged with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated,
thus:

...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from
the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and
tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who
aspires for the exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must
pay a high price for that honor - his private and official conduct must at all times be
free from the appearance of impropriety. ...[27]

The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove the charges
by substantial evidence. The complainant therein presented evidence
[28]
pertaining to the respondents previous indiscretion while still a practicing
lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to prove that the latter continued
to engage in illicit acts after being appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent
was exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to present
evidence that the indiscretion continued even after the respondent was
appointed to the judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public interest that it is both
the right and duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to promote the
public welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and regulation in this
Court. The Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate
[29]

disciplinary power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a
bounden duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded
of its members. [30]

Notarizing Documents Without

The Requisite Commission
Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime
Of Falsification Of Public
Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
public. Notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
[31]

public one, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary

proof of its authenticity and due execution. [32]

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must

not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has characterized a
[33]

lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore

as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also the crime
of falsification of public documents. For such reprehensible conduct, the Court
[34]

has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,

revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such,
and even disbarment. [35]

In the case of Nunga v. Viray, the Court had the occasion to state -
[36]

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a

time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the
Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which
the lawyers oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.[37]

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot, therefore, be over-

emphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is
at stake in every aspect of that function. [38]

The Charge Against The

Respondent Is Supported By
The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainants formal offer of evidence,
prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the basis of the
pleadings filed. Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary
[39]

public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first
certification. The respondent merely alleged in his answer that there was no
proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro
nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register. Furthermore, as
found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no evidence of his
commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof of
submission of notarial reports and the notarial register. [40]

The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer the charges
and to controvert the evidence against him in a formal investigation. When the
integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. [41]

The respondents allegation that the complainant was not a party in any of
the documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced thereby, is
unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which include the statutory
grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Any
[42]

interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary

proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to the
attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public officers which citizens
feel are incompatible with the duties of the office and from which conduct the
citizen or the public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. [43]

An Administrative Complaint
Against A Member Of The Bar
Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which is not
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. This qualification is
not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but its
continued possession is essential to maintain ones good standing in the
profession. It is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore
does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into
any question concerning ones mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer. The rule is[44]

settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even
if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral
character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law. [45]

Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their

own, distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases. As we held in the leading case of In re Almacen:
[46] [47]

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there
is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question
for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. ....
[48]

In a case involving a mere court employee the Court disregarded the Court
[49]

Administrators recommendation that the charge for immorality against the

respondent be dismissed on the ground that the complainants failed to adduce
evidence that the respondents immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from
being found guilty of illicit conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of
dishonesty for falsifying her childrens certificates of live birth to show that her
paramour was the father. The complaint in this case was filed on August 5,
1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair ended. The Court held that
[50]

administrative offenses do not prescribe. [51]

Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an

administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed
as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members
of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated
from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of
this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the
administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time
of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the
complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining
arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous
members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct,
or the Lawyers Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering the
seriousness of the matter involved - the respondents dishonesty and the
sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of the
offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint, will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes documents without the
requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The
Institution Of The
Administrative Case Would
Merely Mitigate The
Respondents Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high
sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a
member of the bar. By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such
[52]

standards; he undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents

[53]

and thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which

requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. The respondent also violated
Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In representing that he was
[54]

possessed of the requisite notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so

authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from
the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it, we will
likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case,
[55]

considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed twenty-four
years after the commission of the act complained of; that there was no private
[56]

offended party who came forward and claimed to have been adversely affected
by the documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-
earned retirement benefits. The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified
[57]

in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found GUILTY of
notarizing documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor. He is
hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

20)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

A.M. No. 1628-CAR January 31, 1978

EMILIANO C. VALDEZ, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MIGUEL T. VALERA, CAR, BRANCH II, Santiago, Isabela respondent.

A.M. No. 1676-CAR. January 31, 1978

BENEDICTO OLAYA, DOMINADOR CASTILLO, EXEQUIEL ANTONIO and JUAN RICARDO,

complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MIGUEL T. VALERA, CAR, BRANCH 11, Santiago, Isabela respondent.
 RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

Respondent Judge Miguel T. Valera of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch II, Santiago, Isabela,
is charged by the complainants in Administrative Matter No. 1676 of forcing them to sign a
Compromise t and forthwith approving the same in violation of Sections 31 and 36 of the Agrarian
Reform Code, and, in Administrative Matter No. 1628, for violation of Presidential Decrees No. 27,
316 and 583.

In Administrative Matter No. 1676, complainants Benedicto Olaya, Dominador Castillo, Exequiel
Antonio and Juan Ricardo alleged, inter alia, that they are tenant-farmer cultivating the landholding
of Artemio C. Nuesa located at Aurora, Isabela; that on January 15, 1974, while said Judo was then
hearing CAR Cases Nos. 3177 to 3185 for the enforcement of Ieasehold tenancy, fixing of rentals
and reliquidation of previous harvests, they were directed to appear before him at the Municipal
Building of Aurora, Isabela and while there, he requested them to sign a Compromise Agreement in
the Above-mentioned cases, which was amity prepared, and when they refused to sign the same,
"the respondent Judge got mad at us and we were forced to sign the same" and forthwith and on the
same day, the respondent Judge judgment thereon, approving the Compromise Agreement and
ordering compliance therewith It is claimed that the Compromise Agreement contained stipulations
violative of Sections 31 and 36 of the Agrarian Reform Code.

Commenting on the charge, the respondent Judge denied these imputation and explained that his
decision dated January 15, 1974 which was based on the Compromise Agreements of December 9,
1973 and January 14, 1974 had become final and executory on December 11, 1975, and that the act
of Benedicto Olaya, et a. questioning the validity of said decision has been elevated to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-06088 where it is still pending; and denied that he ever issued any order
or process directing the ejectment or removal of the complainant from their respective landholdings.

In Administrative Matter No. 1628, complainant Emiliano C. Valdez alleged, inter alia that he is a
tenant-lessee by virtue of a decision rendered by the Court in CAR CASE No. 390 NV-'71 captioned
"George Danguilan vs. Emiliano Valdez"; that on November 29, 1972, an ejectment case was filed
against him by Fredesvinda Alayu in CAR Case No. 423; that on March 13, 1973, he was declared
in default and was ordered to vacate his landholding; that he filed a petition for relief from judgment
which was granted on February 8, 1974, but on June 10, 1974, respondent Judge reverted to his
original decision ejecting complainant from his landholding and as a result thereof, he remains
ejected, that the action of respondent Judge is violative of Presidential Decrees Nos. 27, 314 and
583; that the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-03241-R, entitled "Fredesvinda P. Alayu vs.
Emiliano Valdez, on July 20, 1976, enjoined the Agrarian Court "to proceed" to hear the case in
accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316 as implemented in DAR Memorandum Circular No. 29.

In his comment to the complaint on June 27, 1977, respondent Judge adverted to the fact that the
judgment against the complainant in CAR Case No. 423 was a judgment by default which,
accordingly, was decided on the evidence adduced, which judgment "was implemented before the
effectivity of Presidential Decrees Nos. 316 and 583." and, granting arguendo, that he committed an
error in the application of the law, the same is merely an error of judgment.

Compainant and his spouse, in a joint affidavit, dated November 3, 1976, disowned authorship of the
letter complaint against Judge Valera, respondent and that the same be ignored as they had nothing
against hint As per certification of the Clerk of Court, complainant was actually reinstated to the
landholding on March 22, 1977.

In Administrative Matter No. 1676, it is significant to note that the Compromise Agreement dated
December 9, 1973 which was approved by the Agrarian Court on January 15, 1974 appeared to
have been entered into by the complainants with the assistance of their counsel Atty. Pacifico S.
Paas, of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance. It is highly improbable that said counsel would
have signed this Compromise Agreement if his clients were coerced into the same. The purpose of
this Compromise Agreement was to settle the indebtedness of the tenant-lessees with the
landowner and to provide an equitable manner for their settlement. While it is stipulated that if the
tenant-lessee fails to meet his obligation of paying his back rentals in three equal (annual)
installments to the landowner he shall be considered to have voluntarily surrendered his landholding,
this proviso is not per se illegal since it must be applied in harmony with existing law. In other words,
should the tenant-lessee refuse to vacate the landholding voluntarily, he cannot be forcibly ejected
because of the prohibition contained in Presidential Decree No. 316. In any event, a that respondent
Judge committed the error of approving such compromise, such error is merely an error of judgment
for which he cannot be administratively or criminally punished.

It is well-settled that malfeasance in office cannot be charged except for breach of a positive
statutory duty or for the performance of a discretionary act with an improper or corrupt motive.
Certainly, judges cannot be subjected to liability — civil, criminal or administrative — for any of their
official acts, no matter how erroneous, so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act
fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be held criminally or administratively
responsible.

It is important to note that although the acts of the respondent Judge which gave rise to these
complaints allegedly occurred sometime in 1973 and 1974, it is only on the eve of his retirement
from the Bench that they were instituted against hint It has been observed that an unreasonable
delay in the institution of a complaint creates suspicion concerning the motives of the complainant In
the case at bar, no explanation has been given for the unusual delay in the institution of these
complaints.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the charges against respondent Judge Miguel T. Valera
are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

21) @_____@

22)

EN BANC

[CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA
INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY.
ROSENDO MENESES III, respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III was initiated
by a complaint-affidavit[1] filed by Atty. Augusto G. Navarro on June 7, 1994 before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, the
Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. Herein
complainant charges respondent Meneses with the following offenses, viz.: (1)
malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a public defender; (2) dereliction of duty,
by violating his oath to do everything within his power to protect his clients interest; (3)
willful abandonment; and (4) loss of trust and confidence, due to his continued failure to
account for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant
for the amicable settlement of a pending case.[2]
The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc., a
group of companies which includes Pan Asia International Commodities, Inc., through its
Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services of respondent Atty.
Meneses. While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled various cases and was
properly compensated by his client in accordance with their retainer agreement.[3] One of
the litigations handled by him was the case of People vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson
Lai, and Arthur Bretaa, pending before Branch 134, Regional Trial Court of Makati. On
December 24. 1993, respondent received the sum of P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the
accused in said case, to be given to therein offended party, a certain Gleason, as
consideration for an out-of-court settlement and with the understanding that a motion to
dismiss the case would be filed by respondent Meneses.
Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to present to his client the
receipt acknowledging that Gleason received said amount. A verification made with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati revealed that no motion to dismiss or any pleading in
connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable settlement was not
finalized and concluded.Despite repeated demands in writing or by telephone for an
explanation, as well as the turnover of all documents pertaining to the aforementioned
case, respondent Meneses deliberately ignored the pleas of herein complainant.
The case was assigned by the Commission to Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for
investigation. Respondent was thereafter ordered to submit his answer to the complaint
pursuant to Section 5, rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.[4] Two successive ex parte motions
for extension of time to file an answer were filed by respondent and granted by the
Commission.[5] On November 14, 1994, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, [6] instead of
an answer.
In said motion, respondent argued that Atty. Navarro had no legal personality to sue
him for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. because his legal
services were retained by Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc.; that Navarro had
not represented Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. in any case nor had been
authorized by its board ofdirectors to file this disbarment case against respondent; that
the retainer agreement between him and Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc.
had been terminated as of December 31, 1993 according to the verbal advice of its
Administrative Officer Estrellita Valdez; that the case of Arthur Bretaa was not part of their
retainer agreement, and Bretaa was not an employee of Frankwell Management and
Consultant, Inc. which retained him as its legal counsel; and that the settlement of said
case cannot be concluded because the same was archived and accused Bretaa is
presently out of the country.
Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, [7] stresses that
respondent Meneses is resorting to technicalities to evade the issue of his failure to
account for the amount of P 50,000.00 entrusted to him; that the respondents arguments
in his motion to dismiss were all designed to mislead the Commission; and that he was
fully aware of the interrelationship of the two corporations and always coordinated his
legal work with Estrellita Valdez.
On November 28, 1994, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez resolved to
deny said motion to dismiss for lack of merit and directed respondent to file his
answer.[8] On January 2, 1995, respondent filed a manifestation that he was adopting the
allegations in his motion to dismiss his answer.[9] When the case was set for hearing on
February 9, 1995, respondent failed to attend despite due notice. He thereafter moved to
postpone and reset the hearing of the case several times allegedly due to problems with
his health.
On the scheduled hearing on June 15, 1995, respondent again failed to attend. The
commissioner accordingly received an ex parte the testimony of complainants sole
witness, Estrellita Valdez, and other documentary evidence. [10] Thereafter, complainant
rested its case. Respondent filed a so-called Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration
with Motion to Recall Complainants Witness for Cross-Examination[11] which was granted
by the Commission.[12] Estrellita Valdez was directed by the Commission to appear on the
scheduled hearing for cross-examination.
Several postponement and resetting of hearings were later requested and granted by
the Commission. When the case was set for hearing for the last time on May 31, 1996,
respondent failed to attend despite due notice and repeated warnings. Consequently, the
Commission considered him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense
and declared the case submitted for resolution.[13]
On February 4, 1997, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through its Investigating
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, submitted its Report and Recommendation [14] to the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Commission ruled that
the refusal and/or failure of respondent to account for the sum of P50,000.00 he received
from complainant for the settlement of the aforestated case of Lai Chan Kow and Arthur
Bretaa proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that he misappropriated the same, hence
he deserved to be penalized.
 The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he suspended from the
practice of the legal profession for a period of three (3) years and directed to return
the P50,000.00 he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
resolution. It further provided that failure on his part to comply with such requirement
would result in his disbarment.[15] The Board of Governors adopted and approved the
report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in its Resolution No. XII-
97-133, dated July 26, 1997.[16]
On August 15, 1997, the Court received the Notice of Resolution, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and the records of this case through
the Office of the Bar Confidant for final action pursuant to Section 12 (b) of Rule 139-
B.[17] It appears therefrom that respondent was duly furnished a copy of said resolution,
with the investigating commissioners report and recommendation annexed thereto.
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that respondent Meneses misappropriated the money entrusted to him and
which he has failed and/or refused to account for to his client despite repeated demands
therefor. Such conduct on the part of respondent indicating his unfitness for the
confidence and trust reposed on him, or showing such lack of personal honesty or of good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, constitutes a ground for
disciplinary action extending to disbarment.[18]
Respondent Meneses misconduct constitute a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer
which, inter alia, imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. He blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client. Respondent was merely holding in trust the
money he received from his client to used as consideration for amicable settlement of a
case he was handling. Since the amicable settlement did no materialize, he was
necessarily under obligation to immediate return the money, as there is no showing that
he has a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously careful in handling money
entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a high degree of fidelity and good
faith on his part is exacted.[19]
The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is
unavailing. Section 1 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
Court motu propio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon the verified
complainant of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined
to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for
judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The evidence submitted by
complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution
and recommended sanctions.
It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may
wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment[20] subject however, to
the provision of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[21] Once he agrees
to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed to him.[22] Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the
obligation to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable
time to his clients request for information. Respondents failure to communicate with his
client by deliberately disregarding its request for an audience or conference is an
unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status
of its case.
On January 7, 1998, the Bar Confidant submitted to the Court a copy of the letter of
Atty. Augusto G. Navarro, dated December 18, 1997, to the effect that although a copy
of the aforestated Resolution No. XII-97-133 was personally delivered to respondents
address and received by his wife on October 9, 1997, he had failed to restitute the amount
of P50,000.00 to complainant within the 15-day period provided therein. Neither has he
filed with this Court any pleading or written indication of his having returned said amount
to complainant. In line with the resolution in this case, his disbarment is consequently
warranted and exigent.
A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The dispositive
portion thereof provides that:
x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to
return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to
comply will result (i)n his DISBARMENT. [23]

In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or disbarment,

depending on whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed
from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended, subject to the condition
that he should make restitution as prescribed therein.
Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in criminal
cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the
alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties,[24] not can such penalty be
subject to a condition.[25] There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law should
not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive
sanctions.
Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of respondent, the only possible
and equivalent rule is in malversation cases holding that the restitution of the peculated
funds would be analogous to voluntary surrender if it was immediately and voluntarily
made before the case was instituted.[26] The evidently is not the situation here. Also the
implementation of the penalty provided in the resolution will involve a cumbersome
process since, in order to arrive at the final action to be taken by this Court, it will have to
wait for a verified report on whether or not respondent complied with the condition
subsequent.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to respondents personal records in this Court and furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, together with all courts in the county.
 SO ORDERED.

25)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 585 December 14, 1979

EMILIA E. ANDRES, petitioner,

vs.
STANLEY R. CABRERA, respondent.

GUERRERO, J.:

In a resolution of this Court dated October 11, 1979, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera. a successful
bar examine in 1977 and against whom a petition to disqualify him from membership in the Bar is
pending in this Court in the above-entitled case, was required to show cause why he should not be
cited and punished for contempt of court.

The above citation for contempt against the respondent was issued by the Court following the
persistence of the respondent in the use of, abusive and vituperative language despite the Court's
admonition implicit in Our previous resolution of June 5, 1979 deferring the oath-taking of
respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and conformed to the use of polite,
courteous and civil language.

The petition to disqualify respondent from admission to the Bar was filed by Atty. Emilia F. Andres,
Legal Officer II in the Office of the Minister, Ministry of Labor on the ground of lack of good moral
character as shown by his propensity in using vile, uncouth, and in civil language to the extent of
being reprehensively malicious and criminally libelous and likewise, for his proclivity in filing
baseless, malicious and unfounded criminal cases.

It appears that Atty. Emilia E. Andres, designated as Special Investigator to investigate the
administrative charge filed by Mrs. Presentacion R. Cabrera, mother of the respondent, against one,
Atty. Benjamin Perez, former Hearing Officer of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Unit, Region
IV, Manila, for alleged dishonesty, oppression and discourtesy, recommended the dismissal of the
charge even as the records of two relevant Workmen's Compensation cases were not produced at
the hearing, notwithstanding the request of the respondent. When the Minister of Labor dismissed
the charges upon Atty. Andres' recommendation, respondent filed with the City Fiscal of Manila
criminal charges of infidelity in the custody of documents. falsification of public documents, and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against the investigator.
Supporting these criminal charges are affidavits of respondent Stanley R. Cabrera wherein Atty.
Andres. now the petitioner, points to the vile, in civil and uncouth language used by respondent, as
shown in the following excerpts:

9. That the moronic statements of Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres are the
product of moronic conspiracy to conceal the said falsified, fraudulent and
unauthorized document in the sense that how can the CARS conduct a diligent
search tor the aforesaid document when according to the moronic excuse of the
Chief of the said office which took over the functions of the defunct WCC considering
that it is easier to resort to the list of the inventory of cases before conducting a
diligent search unless both are morons with regards to their public office ...
(emphasis supplied).

10. That due to the fact that Acting Referee Benjamin R. Perez, Alfredo Antonio, Jr.,
Atty. Ernesto Cruz and Atty. Emilia Andres has perpetrated a moronic but criminal
conspiracy to conceal the falsified fraudulent and unauthorized petition ... (emphasis
supplied).

... And to show beyond reasonable doubt that that the letter is a manufactured
evidence respondent Atty. Andres in another demonstration of
her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public functions moronically failed to
affix her signature to further aggravate matters said manufactured evidence
was moronically received upon unlawful inducement by respondents Atty. Cruz and
Atty. Andres in furtherance of the criminal conspiracy by the Idiotic with regards to
the discharge of public functions ... (emphasis supplied)

The same words and phrases are used in respondent's other affidavits supporting the criminal cases
against the petitioner such as the following:

Her moronic but criminal participation as a conspirator

another demonstration of her unparalleled stupidity in the discharge of her public

functions moronically failed to affix her signature

said manufactured evidence was moronically received by unlawful inducement by

respondents

idiotic receiving clerk of CAR

unparalleled stupidity of chief respondent

On April 28, 1977, this Court required respondent to file an answer to the petition to disqualify him
from admission to the Bar and ordered at the same time that his oath-taking be held in abeyance
until further orders. In his answer, respondent admits the filing of criminal cases in the City Fiscal's
Office against the petitioner but he claims that his language was not vile uncouth and un civil due to
the simple reason that the same is the truth and was made with good intentions and justifiable
motives pursuant to respondent's sense of justice as cherished under the New Society, aside from
being absolutely privileged. Respondent's answer, however, repeats his former allegations that "Atty.
Emilia Andres is not only a moron" and reiterates "the moronic discharge of public functions by
complainant Atty. Emilia Andres."
The records show repeated motions of respondent dated October 21, 1977 and February 22, 1978
for the early resolution of his case and in his letter dated April 11, 1978 addressed to then Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, respondent sought, in his very words "some semblance of justice from the
Honorable Supreme Court of the Philippines" and another letter to the Chief Justice dated August
17, 1978 making reference to the "avalance of the sadistic resolution en banc," "the cruel and
inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed upon undersigned respondent," "the Court
does not honor its own resolution," and closing his letter thus — "A victim of the Court's inhuman and
cruel punishment through its supreme inaction."

We referred the petition of Atty. Emilia Andres to the Legal Investigator of the Court for investigation,
report and recommendation which was submitted on May 24, 1979. Acting on said report, the Court
resolved to defer the oath-taking of respondent pending showing that he has amended his ways and
has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language. Thereafter, respondent filed on
September 3, 1979 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to annul Our resolution of June 5, 1979 and to
reinvestigate the case, preferably giving opportunity to respondent to argue his case orally before
the Court or to allow him to take his oath of office as an attorney. We denied the motion.

On September 11, 1979, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court, praying the
Supreme Court to cite complainant Atty. Emilia Andres for contempt of court, alleging that her false
and malicious accusations coupled with her improper and obnoxious acts during the investigation
impeded, obstructed and degraded the administration of justice. Under paragraph 2 of said motion,
he states:

2. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous, and civil language" is
a degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that the same is bereft of
legal foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J.
Sevilla, whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is
authenticated by his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the
transcript of records of this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of
the "Cold and neutral impartiality of a judge" tantamount to lack of due process of
law; (emphasis supplied).

We noted that the above paragraph is a repetition of paragraph 4 in respondent's previous Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion dated September 3, 1979 which also states:

4. That with all due respect to this Court, the aforestated resolution en banc to
DEFER my oath-taking as an attorney pending showing that "he has amended his
ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous and civil language" is a
degradation of the administration of justice due to the fact that same is bereft of legal
foundation due to the fact that the investigation conducted by Atty. Victor J. Sevilla,
whose supreme stupidity in the discharge of his official functions is authenticated by
his overt partiality to the complainant as authenticated by the transcript of records of
this case thus depriving undersigned respondent-movant of the "cold and neutral
impartiality of a judge, " tantamount to lack of due process of law: (emphasis
supplied).

We also took note in respondent's Urgent Motion for Contempt of Court the language used by him in
praying this Court "to impose upon said Emilia E. Andres imprisonment commensurate to the
humiliation and vomitting injustice undersigned respondent-movant suffered and still suffering from
this Court due to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres' wanton dishonesty."
It is obvious and self-evident that respondent has not amended his conduct despite the Court's
admonition. Respondent persists and keeps on using abusive and vituperative language before the
Court. Accordingly, We resolved in Our resolution of October 11, 1979 to require respondent to show
cause why he should not be cited and punished for contempt of court.

Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated September 27, 1979 wherein he tried
to assure the Court that he has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of polite, courteous
and civil language and prayed that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath. We denied it on October
16, 1979.

Thereafter, respondent submitted a pleading entitled "Subrosa" dated October 22, 1979 and
answered the citation for contempt against him in the following wise and manner:

3. That without prejudice to my Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 27,
1979, undersigned respondent respectfully states to this Court that the respondent
charges that the Court's Resolution of June 5, 1979 is a "degradation of the
administration of justice, " was never intended as a defiance of this Court's authority.
nor to scandalize the integrity, dignity, and respect which this Court enjoys, but was
an statement made with utmost good faith out of frustration out of respondent's
inability to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation at the
illegalities perpetrated by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigator
Victor Sevilla, both members of the Bar which are evident with a cursory perusal of
the typewritten transcript of the stenographic notes of the hearings conducted by
Legal Investigator Sevilla which this Court adopted; (emphasis supplied).

We reject totally respondent's supposed humble apology "for all his non-conformity to the use of
polite, courteous and civil language in all his pleadings filed with the Court and on his solemn word
of honor pledges not to commit the same hereinafter" and his disavowal of intent of "defiance of (the)
Court's authority nor to scandalize (its) integrity, dignity and respect which this Court enjoys." Such
apology and disavowal appear to be in sincere, sham and artful for respondent in the same breadth
contends that his statement calling the Court's resolution of June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice" was made "with utmost, good faith out of frustration of respondent's inability
to take his lawyer's oath since April, 1977 and in justifiable indignation of the illegalities perpetrated
by both complainant Emilia E. Andres and Legal Investigation Victor Sevilla."

Although respondent is not yet admitted to the legal profession but now stands at the threshold
thereof, having already passed the Bar examinations, it is as much his duty as every attorney-at-law
already admitted to the practice of law to ..observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20, (b), Rule 138, Rules of Court) and "to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged" (Sec. 20, (f), Rule 138). According to
the Canons of Professional Ethics, it is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the Judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend themselves, are
particularly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust criticism and clamor. This duty is
likewise incumbent upon one aspiring to be a lawyer such as the respondent for the attorney's oath
solemnly enjoins him to "conduct myself as a lawyer according to to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the Courts as to my client.

The power of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt is inherent and extends to suits at law as
well as to administrative proceedings as in the case at bar for it is as necessary to maintain respect
for the courts, in administrative cases as it is in any other class of judicial proceedings. Under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, a person guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for contempt, and the
reason is that respect for the courts guarantees their stability and permanence Without such
guaranty, the institution of the courts would be resting on a very loose and flimsy foundation, such
power is essential to the proper execution and effective maintenance of judicial authority.

Respondent's use of vile rude and repulsive language is patent and palpable from the very words,
phrases and sentences he has written and which are quoted herein. 'They speak for themselves in
their vulgarity, insolence and calumny. Specifically, respondent's direct reference to the Court on the
..sadistic resolution en banc, " "the cruel and inhuman punishment the Court has speedily bestowed"
upon him, that "the Court does not honor its own resolution," that he is "a victim of the Court's
inhuman and cruel punishment through its supreme inaction," and that he is suffering "humiliation
and vomitting in justice" from this Court is not only disrespectful but his charges are false, sham and
unfounded.

'There is no excuse, much less plea or pretext to brand ultimately the Court's resolution deferring
oath-taking of the respondent as a new lawyer issued June 5, 1979 as "a degradation of the
administration of justice." By his improper conduct in the use of highly disrespectful insolent
language, respondent has tended to degrade the administration of justice; he has disparaged the
dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and authority of the Court. He has committed contempt
of this Court.

WHEREFORE respondent Stanley Cabrera is found guilty of contempt and he is hereby sentenced
to pay this Court within ten days from notice hereof a fine of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) or
imprisonment of fifty (50) days.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to respondent's personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant.

SO ORDERED