The components of moral psychology have evolved, that is undeniable in some ways.

Morality and being a moral agent are not evolutionary traits. The biological factors that

contribute to moral behavior and the mechanisms by which they work are evolutionary in the

scientific sense. However, moral judgement is not. It is far too simplified to say that it is

evolutionary and there are too many deviations for it to be inherent biologically. By calling

morality evolution, psychologists and philosophers are not advancing the understanding of moral

psychology and confusing the issue.

When describing moral reasoning and moral behavior it must be shown that there is a

difference between moral reasoning and just reasoning. There is strong evidence that the

deductive model of reasoning does not seem to be the way that humans arrive at moral

conclusions (Kelby and Sinnott-Armstrong 213-226). The model equates the way to reach moral

conclusions with any other conclusion, but “formal theories are by themselves neither descriptive

theories about what people do nor normative theories about what people ought to do (Kelby et al

218).” Judgements about things like the world can follow the formula of modus ponens, because

the premises are not based on judgements themselves. The moral reasoner must make a moral

judgement on the premises when making moral judgements, because moral claims are unusual

premises. The premises must be qualified by the person before they can make a moral

judgement. These qualifications are often dependent on each other, the person, and other

seemingly unrelated things, like emotional state. This is also the case for moral normative

cognition. Mallon defines normative cognition as “the capacity to grasp norms and to make

normative judgments” and describes moral cognition as a special type of normative cognition(4).

“In substance, Turiel and colleagues argue that very early on, and panculturally, children

distinguish two types of norms, called “moral norms” and “conventional norms.” Moral norms
are those norms that are judged to hold independently from the authority of any individual or

institution, that are judged to be universally applicable, that are justified by appeal to the harm

done to others, to their rights, or to justice, and whose violations are judged to be serious.

Conventional norms are those norms whose force depends on authority, that are judged to be

only locally applicable, that are justified by reference to convention, and whose violations are

judged to be less serious than the violations of moral norms (Mallon et al 32).” When people are

deciding about what to believe or what they should do, which is arguably the aim of moral

reasoning, the deductive model is not the way people make moral judgements. People distinguish

between moral norms and conventional norms. If moral judgements cannot, or are usually not,

arrived at by the same method that other judgements can then it stands to reason that there is

something different about them.

The reason that moral reasoning is different than their non-moral counterparts is the

importance of emotions in morality. “Emotions motivate or impel us to act morally, and they can

do so in the absence of a moral judgment or as a consequence of a moral judgment (Prinz et al

114).” In nearly all moral theories emotions play a role in formulating moral judgements. The

deductive model of moral reasoning does not always apply, because there is no room in the

deductive model for anything other than formal logic. Anger and guilt play a role in how people

make moral judgements. In humans, anger gets triggered by violations of autonomy norms (Prinz

et al 129). This anger determines the moral judgements made. “In Fehr and Gächter's

experiments, as soon as subjects are told that punishment is available, there is already a huge

leap in cooperation (Prinz et al 131).” Since cooperation is morally valued, this is evidence that

moral behavior is driven by these emotions. Guilt is an emotion that drives moral behavior.

“Like sadness, guilt is often associated with feeling downtrodden” (Prinz et al 136). People try to
act morally to avoid guilt, which is essentially sadness. The implementation of emotions, and

possibly more mental states than are known, in moral reasoning makes it different than

reasoning.

Now that the components that are involved in making moral judgements have been

described, a definition of evolution must be explained to determine if these moral judgements are

a product of evolution. The only means by which evolutionary biologists describe evolution is as

a change of alleles over time. When Darwin described natural selection, he had four postulates

that he described and still hold true today. The individuals within a population differ from one

another. The differences are, at least in part, passed from parents to offspring. Some individuals

are more successful at surviving and reproducing than others. The successful individuals are not

merely lucky; instead, they succeed because of the variant traits they have inherited and will pass

to their offspring (Freeman et al. 91). Natural selection is defined by its heritability. Natural

selection arises out of a mutation, or a spontaneous change in alleles that influence the phenotype

of that organism. They occur on the individual level and are passed down through genes. This

can result in physical changes, morphological changes, changes in hormone production, chemical

balances in the brain, etc. The reproduction and survivability of an organism is determined by

these mutations, but the mutations do not arrive out of a need. Natural selection is not

progressive. “Nonrandom selection as it occurs in nature is, however, completely free of

conscious intent” (Freeman et al. 106-107). The term evolution was created by a scientist and has

been defined in terms of the biological process it details. The only implications that it has outside

of it affecting the individual is that changes of individuals lead to changes in a population.

Many of the components of morality have evolved. The mechanisms that enable us to reason

and the physical components of the brain are evolutionary. The human brain is a product of
many mutations over time that allow for reasoning and cognition. This can be clearly seen in a

phylogenic tree. The further away from us an animal’s common ancestor is from us, in other

words how long ago the animal split off from us, the more capable the animal is to complete

basic reasoning tasks. This is seen in capuchin monkeys and their ability to discern fairness.

Studies by Brosnan show “Capuchin monkeys react negatively when another individual gets a

better reward for the same or less effort on a specific task. This finding suggests that precursors

to inequity aversion are present in animals from which our lineage split millions of years ago”

(Mallon et al. 7). A sense of fairness is evolutionarily beneficial because it ensures that the

organism does not expend too much effort for any given reward. Conserving energy can be

important to the survival of the individual. This sense of fairness is a basic reasoning skill that

helps ensure survival.

Many say that moral emotions have evolved. Anger is a very prevalent emotion in moral

decision making. “Because anger seems to be present in all mammals, and because weasels are

perhaps not typically regarded as having moral emotions, it is tempting for the moral

psychologist to restrict attention to “moral anger” or “moral outrage” (cf. Fessler & Haley, 2003;

Gibbard, 1990)” (Prinz et al 124). Moral emotions like guilt and anger are the products of

evolution in the sense that they are the result of a function of the brain and work in conjunction

with cognition to support decision making. These mechanisms and the means of which they

work together are very complex and a theory of how they work together are explained in

“Predictions in the Brain: Using Our Past to Generate a Future” by Stephen Grossberg. This

process involves the amygdala, present and functioning to some extent in all mammals, that

creates a feedback loop with orbitofrontal cells and the sensory cortex, also present in some

extent in all mammals. This can explain why almost all mammals present anger. It is a biological
function to get angry, but the way humans apply moral emotions to make moral judgements are

not the same. They cannot be broken down to the sum of their parts.

One can apply the deductive model to reasoning, but not moral reasoning, because it is

different. Moral reasoning often arises out of a subscription to the moral norms of a society.

“Henrich and colleagues have documented that there is much cross‐cultural normative diversity

in the norms bearing on the distribution of windfall gains (Henrich et al., 2004, 2005)” (Mallon

8). As Mallon argues, the cross-cultural variation does not show that the trait is not evolved,

which is true, but not evidence that morality evolved. Fairness may be an evolved trait; it is just

basic reasoning and is helpful when distributing limited resources. Morality, regarding fairness,

is not evolutionary. There is guilt felt by some people in American society for performing better

than others or receiving greater rewards for expending the same amount of energy. The

individual can expend more effort on other areas of survivability and reproduction. The guilt felt

is not an evolutionary advantage; it is an evolutionary hindrance This is a moral norm that is in

opposition to natural selection and is developed entirely by culture. Most moral norms in a

society have their basis in genetic advantage, but the development of what those moral norms

are, changes the expression of those genes. They are very different across cultures and time.

Often the evolutionary beneficial genes are in opposition of societal moral norms.

According to Qadeer et al, “there is a significant difference in the frequency distribution of

DAT-1 VNTR alleles in violent criminals and control men of Pakistani origin. The 9R allele of

DAT-1 3' VNTR polymorphism, either in homozygous or heterozygous form, was more

prevalent in murderers than in nonaggressive control subjects. This suggests that 9R allele,

which may influence the levels of dopamine in these criminals, might be one of the predisposing

factors associated with extreme criminal behavior” (Qadeer et al 1). These violent men have an
allele orientation that decrease their hormones and make them prone to aggression. These genes

would be an evolutionary advantage in an ancient or lawless society, because they would lead to

a survivability and reproductive advantage. They would be able to better respond to threats made

against them. However, moral norms, deemed by society, demonize these genes and label the

behaviors they elicit as criminal, so the evolutionary advantage is hindered. This is a good

example of how culture determines moral norms that are not, by evolutions standards, beneficial.

If anything, morality often acts in opposition of natural selection.

Evolutionary traits must be heritable and morality is not. The components of moral evolution

are heritable. Brain chemistry, DAT-1 VNTR alleles, and even function of the amygdala can be

heritable, but morality is not just those things. A society of "Forest Troop," a group of savanna

baboons, had a random event that killed off all the aggressive males in the population. It resulted

in a dramatic shift in the social behavior of the population. “High-ranking males rarely harassed

subordinates and occasionally even relinquished contested resources to them. Aggression was

less frequent, particularly against third parties.” (Sapolsky 5). This behavior was unprecedented

but could be explained by the alleles of the aggressive males disappearing. However, the social

change is still prevalent in their society today. The alleles would have been shuffled back in by

the males that enter from other societies. If the moral norms were determined by evolution then

the society would have reverted back to the way other baboon societies are. Morality is not just

evolutionary, because if you do not use it you lose it. There are different stages in a human

child’s life that are imperative to the development of morality. Wolf boy is a good example of

this. “We have seen well-attested cases of human beings reduced to wolf-conditioning, the

radical thesis still needs a case of a wolf raised to human behaviour and language.’ Zingg

concluded that ‘Deprived too long of human association, or animal-conditioned too strongly, the
sensitive potentialities of human development are permanently inhibited and the traces of animal

conditioning are never completely lost” (Swart 15). Wolf boy prescribed to all the moral norms

of wolf society, which are entirely different than human society. Reintroduction into human

society caused anxiety and failure for wolf boy. If morality could be reduced to evolutionary

traits then he would not have fit into wolf society so easily and he would have been capable of

understanding human moral norms that should have been evolutionarily evident to him. There is

something about morality that is not just reasoning and is not just a compilation of moral traits.

There is something different about moral norms and moral behavior that cannot be reduced to

evolution, in the same way that moral reasoning and normative cognition cannot be reduced to

deductive reasoning. Morality involves emotions, reasoning, and other components we may not

know about. Morality cannot be made to fit the pure logic of evolution and the four postulates of

evolution. Society and culture help determine moral norms that are often in direct violation with

evolutionarily beneficial traits. Although some components involved in moral judgement are

present evolutionarily, that does not allow the conclusion that morality is the product of

evolution. Reducing morality to evolutionary traits, societal norms, or even emotions to justify

moral judgements is convenient, but it is lacking in the explanation of morality. Further studies

need to be done to realize how moral judgements are made and how they arose, if the

evolutionary basis of the components is too heavily relied on then the aim of understanding

morality will suffer

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