EN BANC

[G.R. No. 3810. October 18, 1907. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAMIAN ORERA (alias KIM CUAN), Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted by the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, of the crime charged in the complaint, namely, of
having falsified, to the damage of a Chinese theatrical company of the Philippine Islands, called Eng Ning, "a Chinese theater ticket which entitled
the bearer thereof to admission to a performance held in the theater of the above company at Manila, on the 7th of October, 1906, by
counterfeiting and simulating the signature and rubric of Eng Ning on the said ticket, and stamping, writing and placing on the said ticket the same
figures, letters, dragons, ornaments, and signatures, as placed by Eng Ning and the above-mentioned Chinese theatrical company . . ." The accused
was sentenced to be imprisoned at the Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period of six months and one day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, Philippine
currency, and the costs of the suit, from which judgment the accused appealed.

The appeal having been heard, this court holds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. That, in effect, as argued by the appellant, he could not be convicted of the falsification of six tickets, as declared and held in the judgment
appealed from, inasmuch as the complaint was restricted to one ticket only.

2. That the court below did not err in qualifying such ticket as a document in order to prosecute and punish the crime of falsification, the subject-
matter of the complaint, because if, according to the authority cited by the appellant, a document is "a deed, instrument or other duly authorized
paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth," and a private document is, according to another authority cited by the same
appellant, "every deed or instrument executed by a private person, without the intervention of a public notary or of other person legally
authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set forth," it follows that the ticket in question, being an
authorized document evidencing an agreement for the rent of a place in a theater to enable the possessor to witness a theatrical performance, is a
private document.

The error has been in the penalty imposed, an error which necessarily must be remedied by this court in the present appeal, in order that the
judgment may be in conformity with the law. Said penalty, according to the provisions of article 304 of the Penal Code, should be that of presidio
correccion in its minimum and medium degrees, and a fine, plus the corresponding indemnification for the damage caused, which in the present
case was P1 the price of the true ticket.

We, therefore, sentence Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) to one year, eleven months, and twenty-one days of presidio correccional, and to pay a fine
of 625 pesetas, as imposed in the judgment, With the accessory penalty provided for in article 58, the indemnification of P1 to the offended party,
or, in default thereof, to subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

[ G. R. No 24086, March 25, 1926 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. BENITA DOMINGO ET AL., DEFENDANTS. BENITA DOMINGO,
APPELLANT.

DECISION
OSTRAND, J.:

Benita Domingo, Zacarias Modesto, Mary Doe (alias Hilaria de Leon), and Jane Doe (alias Josefa de Leon) were accused of the crime of estafa
through falsification of a public document upon the following information:
"That on or about August 22, 1924, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the above named defendants conspiring together and acting under a
common agreement, did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally defraud one Moises Buzon in the sum of P5,000, Philippine currency, equivalent to
25,000 pesetas, through falsification of public document as follows:

"That on or about July 8, 1924, the defendant Benita Domingo, having learned that one Estanislao Sanchez, executor and judicial administrator of
the testate estate of Josefa de Leon, was desiring to alienate, sell, or mortgage a fishery situated in the municipality of Bocaue, Province of
Bulacan, Philippine Islands, pertaining to said estate, for the purpose of paying the debts and lawful expenses of the administration, presented
herself to said administrator as real estate broker, and through false and fraudulent representations to the effect that she, that is, the aforesaid
Benita Domingo, had found a person who had stated his desire to purchase said fishery, and wanted to examine first the title deed and other
documents relating to said property, succeeded in obtaining possession of Torrens certificate of title No. 340 of the office of the register of deeds
of the Province of Bulacan, issued in the name of Josefa de Leon and her sister Hilaria de Leon relative to said fishery; and once in possession of
said certificate of title, she did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally for the purpose of defrauding and injuring said Moises Buzon, have an
understanding with her codefendants Zacarias Modesto, Mary Doe, and Jane Doe and among them they devised a plan and then presented
themselves to said Moises Buzon, Mary Doe, as Hilaria de Leon, and her codefendant Jane as Josefa de Leon, and offered to sell him said fishery for
P5,000 upon the condition that he could repurchase the same within the period of one year, and Moises Buzon having agreed upon the price and
the thing, they did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, directly induced by their codefendants Zacarias Modesto and Benita Domingo, said
defendants Mary Doe and Jane Doe representing themselves the first as Hilaria de Leon and the second as Josefa de Leon, appear oh August 22,
1924, before Domingo Sandoval, notary public for the City of Manila, and under the names of Hilaria de Leon and Josefa de Leon and
representing themselves to be the owners of said fishery, the defendants Mary Doe and Jane Doe did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally execute, subscribe, and ratify before said notary public, Domingo Sandoval, a deed of sale with right of repurchase of the aforesaid
fishery in favor of Moises Buzon in consideration of the sum of P5,000 which the latter did then and there pay to said defendants, the defendant
Zacarias Modesto having taken part in the execution and ratification of said deed of sale by assuring and guaranteeing the identity of each of said
defendants, thereby causing it to appear that said defendants Hilaria de Leon and Josefa de Leon intervened, when in fact they did not, in the
execution and ratification of said deed, wherein said defendants falsified the truth in the narration of the facts in stating therein that they were
absolute owners of said fishery, the defendants Benita Domingo, Zacarias Modesto, Mary Doe, and Jane Doe having made use of said falsification
and misrepresentations to injure and defraud, as they in fact did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally defraud and injure Moises Buzon in the sum of
P5,000, Philippine currency, which said defendants appropriated, converted, and applied to their own use, to the damage and prejudice of
Moises Buzon in the aforesaid sum equivalent to 25,000 pesetas."
The case was tried with respect to the accused Benita Domingo and Zacarias Modesto only, the other two accused with assumed names not
having been found. The court below acquitted Zacarias Modesto but found Benita Domingo guilty as charged in the information and sentenced
her to imprisonment for four years, two months, and one day of prision correccional, to indemnify Moises Buzon in the sum of P5,000, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay a proportionate part of the costs. Upon appeal to this court the appellant Benita
Domingo presents only one assignment of error, namely, that the court below erred in not absolving her from the complaint for insufficiency of
proof.

It appears in evidence that Hilaria de Leon and Josefa de Leon died on January 20, 1913, and November 22, 1923, respectively, leaving, among
other things, a Torrens registered fishpond in the municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan.

One Estanislao Sanchez was appointed administrator of the estate of Josefa de Leon. Having learned that Sanchez wanted to sell or mortgage the
fishpond in question for the payment of debts of the estate, the accused Benita Domingo went to his house in the City of Manila on July 4, 1924,
and, representing herself to be a real estate broker, offered to look for a purchaser for which purpose she requested that she be given temporary
possession of the plan of the property. As Sanchez was in need of funds with which to pay certain debts of the estate, he gave her the plan, fixing
the price of the property at P22,000. A few days afterwards, Benita returned to Sanchez house and stated that she had received ah offer in the
amount of P20,000 for the fishpond and that the prospective purchaser desired to see the certificate of title to the property. Sanchez handed her
the certificate on condition that she should return it in the afternoon of the following day. She failed to return the document as promised by her,
and when seen by Sanchez in her house in Malabon, Rizal, told him that it was then in the possession of the prospective purchaser, but that at 4
o'clock in the afternoon of that day she would return it to him at his house in Manila. Again she failed to fulfill her promise to return the
certificate, and though Sanchez made diligent search he was thereafter unable to find her.

Shortly afterwards Estanislao Sanchez was informed by one Pedro del Rosario that the accused Zacarias Modesto was trying to mortgage the
fishpond. He, therefore, went to see Zacarias Modesto at the latter's house on Antipolo street, Manila, but was told by Zacarias that he did not
have the certificate of title to the property. On or about August 3, 1924, Zacarias, accompanied by one Simplicio de los Santos, called on Moises
Buzon and offered to sell him the same fishpond, which, after some negotiations, Buzon finally agreed to purchase under pacto de retro for P5,000.
Zacarias then left the aforementioned certificate of title with Moises in order that the deed might be prepared and the sale registered. The deed
was signed at the office of Attorney Domingo Sandoval on August 22, 1924, by two women who were represented by Zacarias Modesto as the
owners of the fishpond, Buzon paying the women the sum of p5,000 as the price of the property. Before the parties left the office of Attorney
Sandoval, the supposed vendors gave a certain amount of money to the accused Zacarias Modesto, presumably as commission. The sale with
pacto de retro was afterwards entered by way of memorandum on the back of the original certificate of title.

The testimony of the accused Benita Domingo is to the effect that she did not know her co-accused Zacarias Modesto; that she never had the
certificate of title in her possession and had never seen it before the trial; and that while she had received the plan of the property from
Estanislao Sanchez, the same was subsequently returned to him because she could find no purchaser for the fishpond.

The crime charged in the information and conclusively established by the evidence falls under article 301, as amended by Act No. 2712, in
relation to articles 537 and 89 of the Penal Code. That it could hot have been committed if its perpetrators had not been in possession of the
certificate of title is obvious and it has been proven beyond a shadow of doubt that the appellant was the person who obtained the certificate
from Sanchez. It is true that there is no direct evidence that she delivered it to the two women who signed the deed, but in view of the fact that
she offered no explanation as to what she did with the certificate and even denied that she received it, there is no escape from the inference that
she placed the certificate in the hands of her confederates. If she had not been a co-conspirator, she would have revealed the name of the party
to whom the certificate was delivered. Her position is analogous to that of a person who immediately after a larceny has been committed is found
in possession of the stolen goods and offers no explanation.

"Those who cooperate in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished" are guilty as principals
(paragraph 3, article 13 of the Penal Code). As we have already stated, the certificate of title was one of the indispensable means in the
commission of the crime and the appellant is therefore guilty as principal and the appropriate penalty is from five years, four months, and
twenty-one days to six years of prision correccional.

The judgment appealed from is accordingly hereby modified by increasing the term of imprisonment to five years, four months, and twenty-one
days, and by imposing a fine of P200. In all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38948 November 18, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TOMAS MANANSALA, ET AL., defendants.
GALICANO ALON and RICARDO CABRALES, appellants.

VICKERS, J.:

The appellants Galicano Alon ( alias Grego), and Ricardo Cabrales ( alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro
Mendoza, were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of estafa, committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of February, 1932, in the municipalities of Pasay and Caloocan, Province of Rizal, within two and a half miles from the
city limits and within the jurisdiction of this court, and in the City of Manila proper, Philippine Islands, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud one Perfecto Abordo in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false and fraudulent representations which may made to the said Perfecto Abordo to the
effect that they had for sale six hundred (600) tins of opium, a prohibited drug, and that they would deliver the same to him upon paying them
P600 in advance and by means of other similar deceit, induced the said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver to them, as in fact he gave and
delivered to them, the said sum of P600, in consideration of which the accused gave him a gasoline can which they represented to contain the 600
tins of opium, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, the said can contained only six small tin cans containing a black substance
which was not opium, the accused thereby wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defrauding the said Perfecto Abordo in the sum of P600 to his
damage and prejudice in said amount.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That the accused Tomas Manansala y Velasco and Galicano Alon y Ponce ( alias Grego) have each once been convicted of the crime of estafa; and
the accused Ricardo Cabrales y Pelorina ( alias Maning) and Isidro Mendoza y Santos Sollo are habitual delinquents, the first having been convicted
once for robbery, once for theft and three times for estafa, having served his last sentence on February 4, 1927, and the second having been
convicted one of estafa and once of robbery, having served his last sentenced on October 30, 1922, all of said convictions having been rendered by
virtue of final judgments of competent courts.

After the prosecution had rested, the information was dismissed as to the defendants Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza for
lack of evidence to show that they had taken part in the commission of the crime. Upon the termination of the trial, Judge Pedro Concepcion found
the defendants Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa, in accordance with the provisions of article 354, No. 2, of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 3244, and sentenced each of them to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, to indemnify the offended party, Perfecto Abordo, in the sum of P600, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the proportionate part of the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trial judge's findings as to the facts as follows:

With respect to the other accused, Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales, the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently shows that about a week prior
to February 19, 1932, the former who gave his name as "Grego" and the latter known by the name of "Maning" in company with another person
whom they called "Pepe" offered to sell Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of opium at P1.50 each telling him that he could sell them for P10 a
tin. Tempted with the prospect of an enormous profit, Mr. Perfecto Abordo agreed to buy the merchandise, and the accused agreed to sell it to
him in lots of 1,000 tins at P600 lot. It was agreed that the delivery of P1,000 tins would take place at P5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft Avenue
Extension and Vito Cruz within the jurisdiction of this city. Attorney Perfecto Abordo accordingly went to the place indicated with the money, and
there waited for them. The accused Galicano Alon arrived alone in an automobile and invited Abordo to go with him to the place where the 1,00
tins of opium were kept. trusting Gallicano Alon, who always called Abordo "brother" because he claimed to be a Mason like Mr. Abordo, the latter
went with him in his automobile to the rotunda of Rizal Avenue Extension. Chauffeur Jose Jonsay was at the wheel. It was already twilight when
they arrived at the rotunda, and there they met Maning, or the accused Ricardo Cabrales, who, in company with others, was waiting for Abordo in
another automobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortly thereafter appeared Pepe who was ordered by Cabrales to get the tins of opium.
Pepe got from a lot nearby the can Exhibit A, the top of which was ordered by Cabrales in order to show Abordo the six tins of opium contained in a
wooden box, Exhibit B, which Abordo saw when the top of said Exhibit A was opened. Finding that said tins really contained opium, Abordo
believed that the rest of the contents of the can also consisted of tins of opium. He handed the six hundred pesos to Maning, who, after receiving
the money, immediately went to the automobile where his companions were waiting. At the same time Abordo returned to his car with the
accused Galicano Alon and the person named Pepe, carrying the can. While proceeding towards Taft Avenue Extension Abordo noticed that the
accused Cabrales was following in his automobile, and that when they were nearing the corner of Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz the car in
which Cabrales was riding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Galicano Alon told Attorney Abordo that those in the other automobile were
constabulary men and it would be better to get rid of the can Exhibit A. The accused Cabrales, whom Attorney Abordo was able to recognize very
well, and the companions of the former whom Abordo was not able to identify because it was already dark, approached his car saying that they
were constabulary agents and told Abordo that he was under arrest. Knowing that they were not constabulary agents and that their purpose was
to get possession of the can Exhibit A, Abordo drew his revolver and ordered his chauffeur to proceed. Cabrales and his companions again followed
him in their car and for the second time tried to head off Abordo somewhere before the intersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but
Abordo proceeded until he arrived at his house. There he opened the can Exhibit A and inside he found the wooden box Exhibit B, but the rest of
the contents of the can was sand. He bore a hole in one of the tins and found that it only contained molasses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

The accused tried to give, by their testimony and that of Miguel Rosales, who had been convicted twelve times of estafa, a long story to the effect
that Abordo engaged the accused Cabrales, through the intervention of Miguel Rosales, to prepare 1,000 tins of molasses resembling tins of opium,
that on the afternoon agreed upon for the payment of the value of said tins, Abordo refused to deliver the money on the pretext that the
purchaser of said tins had not arrived, and invited the accused to his house in Pasay in order to make the payment inasmuch as they insisted upon
collecting from him; but before arriving in Pasay Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile and required the latter to hand over the money, at the
same time placing at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which he said contained the 1,000 tins of molasses asked for by
Abordo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is hardly necessary to state that this story is a sheer fabrication.

The attorney for the appellants makes the following assignments of error:

I. El Juzgado incurrio en error al declarar que las pruebas demuestran que Ricardo Cabrales y Galicano Alon, en compañia de otro individuo llamado
"Pepe", vendieron al abogado Perfecto Abordo mil latas de opio falsificado por el precio de P600.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
II. El Juzgado incurrio en eror al no declarar que el supuesto ofendido, Perfecto Abordo, por medio de Miguel Rosales, encomendo a Ricardo
Cabrales la confeccion de mil latas de opio al precio de P0.60 cada lata poniendo como contenido melaza, para venderlas como opio
legitimo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

III. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no declarar que aun en el supuesto de que realidad Ricardo Cabrales vendio a Perfecto Abordo dichas mil latas de
opio por el precio de P600, el acusado Galicano Alon nada tiene que ver con dicha venta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

IV. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no absolver a los acusados apelantes, apreciando cuando menos en favor de los mismos y sobre todo en favor del
apelante Galicano Alon, el beneficio de la duda racional.

The assignments of error raise only questions of fact, depending on the credibility of the witnesses. No reason has been adduced that would justify
us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge. As to the contention of the appellants, the trial judge found it to be a mere fabrication and worthy of
no credit. The witnesses for the defense were Miguel Rosales and the appellants themselves. The evidence shows that Miguel Rosales had been
convicted of the falsification of commercial documents in twelve cases. The appellant Galicano Alon had been convicted of estafa, and the other
appellant, Ricardo Cabrales, had been convicted once of robbery, once of theft, and three times of estafa. The trial judge was fully justified in
disbelieving the improbable story of said witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The crime committed by the appellants is that of estafa as defined in article 315, paragraph 1 ( a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
any person who shall defraud another through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything of
value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal
consideration. The amount of the fraud being P600, the penalty applicable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional in its
minimum period, and it appearing that the appellant Galicano Alon has already been convicted of estafa, he is therefore a recidivist, and the
penalty applicable to him should be imposed in the maximum degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was alleged in the information that Ricardo Cabrales was a habitual delinquent because he had been convicted once of robbery, once of theft,
and three times of estafa, and that the last penalty for estafa was extinguished by him on February 4, 1927. These prior convictions were admitted
by him in open court. He is therefore a habitual delinquent, but his prior convictions can not be taken into consideration also as an aggravating
circumstance for the purpose of increasing the principal penalty, which should therefore be imposed in the medium
degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As the additional penalty, the Solicitor-General recommends the medium degree of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or from six
years and one day to seven years and four months. This is erroneous. It is apparently based upon the mistaken idea that only the prior convictions
of this appellant for estafa are to be taken into account. The correct interpretation of the law is that all prior convictions of any of the crimes of
theft, robbery, estafa, or falsification should be taken into account when a person is convicted of any one of these crimes and of being habitual
delinquent. To hold otherwise, a person might be twice convicted of each of these four crimes, and still not be a habitual
delinquent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant Galicano Alon is sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and one day of prision correccional, and the
appellant Ricardo Cabrales is sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional, and said defendants are jointly and severally
sentenced to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P600, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
appellant Ricardo Cabrales having been previously convicted five times of theft, robbery, or estafa, he is sentenced as a habitual delinquent to
suffer an additional penalty of eleven years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision mayor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the
law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither
because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic.
This case is an illustration.

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No.
10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of
absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3

By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the
portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his
wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.4

On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was
dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen .5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. 6

The trial court * also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice
of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the
requirement of the law. 7

In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot,
which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was
staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents
were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10

It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the
petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that
the area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by them from the other. co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the
permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.

The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by
both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:

Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated
to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice
would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held
that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was required.

Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property
subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in
writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. "

In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given
by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the
prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied
by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must
be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.

The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot
argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088
can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired
in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in
fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them
so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience
to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command
without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the
power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that
vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.

The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is
within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not
within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a
thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 14

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such
notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to
pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.

The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and
1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked
by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of
redemption.

Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was
a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the
complaint was filed in 1977?

In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother
and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably
false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are
duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in
1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.

Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?

While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years
and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day
period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs
made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already
been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired.

The following doctrine is also worth noting:

While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the
facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth
were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the
inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This
certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain
the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was
already too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably
applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court
in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What
we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the
30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without
the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish continues
to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker,
to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any
pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public
document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:

That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his position as such
Municipal Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An
official communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by law in order to support the appointment of a
certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and making it
appear in said document that there was such a position existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused
well-know (sic), there was no such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor
was there any special ordinance creating said position and appropriating the necessary funds therefor.

x x x

[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) are as follows:

It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused
Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor. Earlier, she
and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she
went to see the accused in his house.

The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter,
however, was not there. Even so, the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be included in the
budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for
work.

One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the accused, she was told to
go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her appointment papers.

She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused.

x x x

Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the
accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil
Service, Manila (Exh. "C").

x x x

Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work on the same day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00.
She rendered services for the months of July, August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-5"). She was
not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money
yet. In November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer. She went to the treasurer who told her that there
was no money. because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information
regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete
appointment papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint is addressed to Governor
Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").

It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the
Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-
1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of
Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.

In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation
for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of the Municipal
Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 1974- 1975, was filled up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused
when he appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a Clerk to the office of the
Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the
accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the
accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l").

x x x
[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]

After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and decreed:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document as charged in
the information, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00)
PESOS.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused-
appellant.

SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]

Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the
respondent court has decided a question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of the trial court
convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following

A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, shows the absence of criminal intent on
the part of the accused.

B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor when he made the allegedly falsified
certification.

C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.

D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his absence despite a
pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]

Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.

The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any public officer, employee or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful statements
in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur:

(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.

All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being then the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan,
Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the appointment
of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public
document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the certification was
addressed received the document issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms
prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a
public document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available for the position to
which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated
therefor.

Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is not meritorious. The
respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows:

Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of facts stated but by
the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p. 362].

From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant that 'funds for the position are available' does not require
the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify that funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic) to refer to the budget
and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocated therefor.

In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no position and funds therefor referred to in the certification,
the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41).

It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and
therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel
(Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as
Clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is
no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his
certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of
colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it can be seen
that the first and third requirements laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.

The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of
Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be filled up is required to
be signed by the head of office or any officer who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this certification
which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him
in said certification which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled up.

Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document is a public
document. This has already been authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The Court in the
aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the
crime of falsification of public document. The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public and private documents has been
stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary
that there be present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra
at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the public
character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes
immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].

Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his part must be denied.
While this Court has declared good faith as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly
been shown to exist in the case at bar.

Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the municipal council
[Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c), Revised
Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal
Council of Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that
under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal secretary.
His knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these documents; i.e.
Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in
issuing a certification of the availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal
year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted
by the municipal council.

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false certification as to the
availability of funds for the subject position. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a narration of facts in
a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the
person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the
presumption that petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands
unrebutted.

Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position in falsifying the document should likewise be rejected.
This essential element of falsification of a public document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use the influences
prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is
considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing
or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in
the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.

Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in the absence of the
petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the record
reveals that petitioner had been afforded due process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable
the defense to present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its case as early as December 7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et
seq.]

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard
[Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion to determine
whether an accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded due process of law:

. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a
constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v.
Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.]

Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated,
unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the
Revised Rules of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]

It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of the petitioner's urgent
motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to appear [See Order
dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial
court that he was - withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason that he has lost contact with the latter who already went abroad [See
Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the
prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185195 March 17, 2010
VIOLETA BAHILIDAD, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28326, convicting petitioner
Violeta Bahilidad and co-accused Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta of the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents.

Acting on a complaint filed by a "Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province" with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian,
Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants and donations using funds of the provincial government, a
special audit was conducted in Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its investigation from June 1 to July
31, 2003, and submitted the following findings:

1. Release of financial assistance intended to NGOs/POs and LGUs were fraudulently and illegally made thus local development projects do not
exist resulting in the loss of ₱16,106,613.00 on the part of the government.

2. Financial Assistance were also granted to Cooperatives whose officials and members were mostly government personnel or relative of the
officials of Sarangani Province resulting to wastage and misuse of government fund amounting to ₱2,246,481.00.2

Included in the list of alleged fictitious associations that benefited from the financial assistance given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), People’s Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in the amount
of ₱20,000.00, issued in the name of herein petitioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof.

Based on its findings, the Special Audit Team recommended the filing of charges of malversation through falsification of public documents against
the officials involved. Thus, the following Information was filed:

That on January 24, 2002, or prior or subsequent thereto in Sarangani Province, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-ranking public officer, being the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Maria D. Camanay, Provincial
Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial Board Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, Executive Assistant III, all accountable public officials of the
Provincial Government of Sarangani, by reason of the duties of their office, conspiring and confederating with Violeta Balihidad, private individual,
the public officers, while committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their respective positions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and misappropriate the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in public
funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by falsifying or causing to be falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher No.
101-2002-01-822 and its supporting documents, making it appear that financial assistance had been sought by Women in Progress, Malungon,
Sarangani, represented by its President Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, when in truth and in fact, the accused fully knew well that no financial assistance
had been requested by the said group and her association, nor did Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta and her association receive the aforementioned
amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) through
encashment by the accused at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 36481 dated January 24, 2002 issued in the name of Violeta
Bahilidad, which amount they subsequently misappropriated to their personal use and benefit and despite demand, the said accused failed to
return the said amount to the damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest of the aforesaid sum.

Upon arraignment, accused Constantino, Zoleta and Bahilidad pled not guilty to the charges, while Camanay and Diaz did not appear and remain at
large to date. Thereafter, during the pendency of the case, Constantino died. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to dismiss the
case against him. As regards Zoleta and Bahilidad, they posted bail and the case against them proceeded to trial.

The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of the following persons:

1. Helen Cailing, a State Auditor IV at the Commission on Audit (COA) and leader of the Special Audit Team (SAT) of Sarangani Province. Cailing
testified that the SAT, composed of herself and three (3) members, in the course of the audit, discovered that the voucher issued by the Office of
the Vice-Governor to the WIP violated specific COA Guidelines 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.10 and 4.4. The guidelines required the monitoring, inspection
and evaluation of the project by the provincial engineer if an infra-project and by the provincial agriculturist if it is a livelihood project. Cailing
further testified that, based on their audit, WIP appeared to be headed by Zoleta, who was the daughter of Vice-Governor Constantino, and
simultaneously an Executive Assistant III in the latter’s office.

2. Luttian Tutoh, Region XII Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), testified on the certification3 she issued that WIP and
Women in Development (WID) were not registered cooperatives. Tutoh further testified that (1) the certification was based on the listing prepared
by the Assistant Regional Director; (2) the Certification was issued upon the instruction of the CDA Chairman, who received an inquiry from the
Office of the Ombudsman on whether WIP and/or WID were cooperatives registered with the CDA; and (3) she had not come across a registered
cooperative named WIP.

3. Mary Ann Gadian, Bookbinder II, designated as Computer Operator III at the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani from July 1993
to August 2002, who acted as state witness, admitted in open court that she took part in the preparation and processing of a disbursement voucher
and its supporting documents involving a cash advance for WIP sometime in 2002. Gadian, likewise, testified that she saw accused Constantino,
Camanay, Diaz, and Zoleta sign the documents, and she merely followed Zoleta’s directive and instructions on the preparation of the disbursement
voucher. Gadian further admitted antedating and changing the date of a January 24, 2002 letter-request from WIP to January 7, 2002 in order to
make the letter appear authentic.
4. Sheryll Desiree Jane Tangan, Local Legislative Staff at the Office of the Vice-Governor in 2002, who also acted as state witness, admitted in open
court that, upon orders of Zoleta, she helped prepare and process the request of WIP. Tangan disclosed that she was used to signing for other
persons, as instructed by Zoleta, whenever their office had legal transactions; in this instance, she forged the signature of Melanie Remulta, the
purported secretary of WIP. Tangan then recounted that she accompanied petitioner Bahilidad to claim and encash the check for WIP. After
encashment, Bahilidad gave her a white envelope containing the ₱20,000.00 cash. She noticed Bahalidad’s uneasiness. She was told by Zoleta that
Bahilidad was merely a dummy for that disbursement. Tangan gave the money to Zoleta who told her that she would take care of Bahalidad.

The defense presented, as witnesses Bahilidad, Zoleta and Remulta. On the whole, the defense denied the prosecution’s charge of malversation.
The witnesses testified that WIP and WID were registered cooperatives. To support her contention that WIP and WID were legitimate cooperatives,
Bahilidad presented a Certification from Barangay Captain Jose Mosquera containing a list of the supposed officers of these cooperatives. Bahilidad
insisted that the amount of ₱20,000.00 that she received from the Office of the Vice-Governor was, in turn, properly distributed by WIP as loans to
its members. Remulta corroborated Bahilidad’s story on this point. As for Zoleta, she completely denied knowing Bahilidad.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner Bahilidad and Zoleta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents, and disposed, as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, accused Amelia C. Zoleta ("Zoleta") and Violeta Bahilidad ("Bahilidad"), are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Malversation
of Public Funds thru Falsification of Public Documents under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171[,] par[.] 2[,] and Article
48 of the same Code and are sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 14 years[,] 8 months and 1 day to 16 years[,] 5 months and 11 days of
reclusion temporal. They also have to suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any public office and to pay back the Province of Sarangani the
amount of Php 20,000.00 plus interest on it computed from January 2002 until the full amount is paid.

No pronouncement is made for or against Constantino, said accused having died during the pendency of this case, his personal and pecuniary
penalties and liabilities were totally extinguished upon his death. This Court has already ordered the dismissal of the case against him.

Since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the other accused, Teodorico Diaz and Maria Camanay, the case as it pertains to
them is in the meantime archived. It shall be revived when the Court acquires jurisdiction over their person. Let an alias warrant of arrest be then
issued against them.

Costs against accused Zoleta and Bahilidad.4

Hence, this appeal by Bahilidad, questioning her conviction by the Sandiganbayan.

We find for petitioner.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court are given great respect. But when there is a misappreciation of facts as to compel a
contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual findings of the trial court. In such a case, the scales of justice must tilt in favor
of an accused, considering that he stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction. The Court must be satisfied that the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court, leading to an accused’s conviction, must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials in the commission of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents. The trial court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. The Sandiganbayan
explained petitioner’s complicity in the crime, to wit:

The facts taken together would prove the existence of conspiracry. Zoleta, as president of an inexistent association and a co-terminus employee at
the office of her father, [accused Constantino,] initiated the request for obligation of allotments and certified and proved the disbursement
voucher. There is no doubt that accused Constantino facilitated the illegal release of the funds by signing the questioned voucher. Without the
signatures of accused Constantino, Zoleta and Bahilidad, the amount could not have been disbursed on that particular day. When the voucher with
its supporting documents was presented to accused Constantino, Diaz and Camanay for approval and signature, they readily signed them without
further ado, despite the lack of proper documentation and non-compliance of the rules. Zoleta had contact with the payee of the check, Bahilidad,
and received the amount. Their combined acts, coupled with the falsification of the signature of Remulta, all lead to the conclusion that the
accused conspired to defraud the government.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
need not be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,
which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is
present when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. It
may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

The circumstances that Zoleta placed her initials on the voucher knowing that there was really no WIP, that the other accused likewise signified
their approval to the disbursement and allowed payment, and that payee received and encashed the check out of the fund of the provincial
government instead of depositing it, shows that there was connivance between the accused. The unavoidable conclusion is that the accused were
in cahoots to defraud the provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by using a dummy organization as a payee.5

There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy
is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While
conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For
conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the
part of the cohorts. 6

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime
committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his
co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.7 Hence, the mere
presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for
purposes of conviction.81avvphi1
In the instant case, we find petitioner’s participation in the crime not adequately proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private
individual, had no hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her name. A cursory look at the disbursement
voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals the following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz certifying that the cash advance is
necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision; signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and
propriety of the supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash advances; signature of Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of
Provincial Treasurer Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is available; signature of Constantino, with the initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name,
certifying that the disbursement is approved for payment, and with petitioner’s signature as the payee.9

The SAT reported that the check was payable to the alleged Treasurer, Bahalidad, instead of to Women in Progress; that the check was encashed
when it should have been for deposit only; and that there was also failure of the provincial agriculturist to monitor and submit an evaluation report
on the project.10 Based on this SAT report, the Sandiganbayan particularly pointed to petitioner’s indispensable participation in the crime, being
the payee of the check, because without her signature, the check would not have been encashed, and the funds would not have been taken from
the coffers of the provincial government. Other than her being named as the payee, however, there were no overt acts attributed to her adequate
to hold her equally guilty of the offense proved. There was no showing that petitioner had a hand in the preparation of the requirements submitted
for the disbursement of the check. There was no evidence presented that she was instrumental to the issuance of the check in favor of WIP, nor
was there any showing that she interceded for the approval of the check. Why the check was issued in her name and not in the name of WIP is
beyond cavil, but this was not incumbent upon her to question.

On being informed by Melanie Remulta that WIP’s request for financial assistance was granted, petitioner went to the provincial capitol to claim
the check, because the check was issued in her name as the Treasurer of WIP. She later encashed the check and distributed the proceeds to the
different members of WIP. There were acknowledgment receipts dated February 7, 2002, signed by the different members of the cooperative, in
varying amounts of ₱3,000.00, ₱2,000.00 and ₱500.00, all of which prove that the amount of ₱20,000.00 was disbursed for the benefit of the
members of the cooperative.11

The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence
is unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioner’s name and, as payee, she had the authority to encash it. The Disbursement
Voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) clearly states that she is the WIP treasurer, and the purpose of the voucher is "to cash advance financial assistance
from grants and donations for Winds Malugon, Sarangani as per supporting papers hereto attached." Petitioner’s action cannot, in itself, be
considered as specious. There was no showing that petitioner had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed in the processing and disbursement
of the check,12 or that the COA Rules required that the check had to be deposited in the bank first, or that an evaluation report from the provincial
agriculturist had to be submitted. Evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can
be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer
from felonious responsibility.13

All told, there is reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an accused must be acquitted even though his
innocence may not have been fully established. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, exoneration must be granted as a matter of right.14

Finally, we reiterate what we have long enjoined:

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and corruption in the government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must
be cut and the offenders punished. However, this objective can be accomplished only if the evidence presented by the prosecution passes the test
of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the Court is mandated to uphold the presumption of innocence guaranteed by our
Constitution to the accused.15

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR — CAR, Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene
A. Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ
Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal
Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE
OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?

Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform — Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President
Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqued's death on May
19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.

The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the
Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, 1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification
of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts.
He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single
vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that
Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he
claimed everyday.

In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA)
rules and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash
advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government "by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash
advances through the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of other officials' under code 8-70-600 of
accounting rules."

The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, 3 charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent,
her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.

The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting
Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued.
The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial
Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit
their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.

The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992.
Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private
respondent's complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.

In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, 4 Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent
public servants like him, and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno
Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondent's execution of an affidavit of desistance. 5

Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted, however, that such consumption was warranted
as it was the aggregate consumption of the five service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional
Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the
DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to him by
drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his
signature on the receipts only to signify that the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official transactions of the
DAR-CAR could be carried out.

Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya
on their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing
shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost
of the gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990. 6 With
respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount
was actually only P6.60. Any error committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal error or
accountability.

To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of
P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a certification 7 of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash
advances on record as of December 31, 1989.

In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that private respondent was not terminated from the
service but was merely relieved of her duties due to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required
applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of her application for leave of
absence. He allegedly rejected her second application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office
or upon her return to work. He also asserted that no medical certificate supported her application for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and dishonest because a COA examination revealed that
her cash accountabilities from June 22 to November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned the
amount on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued asserted that she should be relieved from her
duties and assigned to jobs that would not require handling of cash and money matters.

Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing
date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither
Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.

On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was
forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently because
the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992, 9 State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:

The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing,
which date was upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of
his confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel. The records likewise do not show that efforts were
exerted to notify the Committee of respondent's condition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23,
1992, respondent was already being assisted by counsel.

Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit
together with the documentary evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted is
already possible.

Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.

Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992, 10 finding Lumiqued liable for all the
charges against him. It made the following findings:

After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant
sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.

That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly
established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different gasoline
stations where the respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15" show that the actual average purchase made by the respondent is
about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at
a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the
value of what he actually spends. While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and the
scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government has, nevertheless, been established.

That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for
the payment of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he
also admitted having signed the receipts.

Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high
degree but also a criminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.

This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in violation of established office
and auditing rules. His cash advances totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the
vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot
therefore rebut these concrete evidences (sic).

On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent's act in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional
Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges against
her (sic). The recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the
respondent's order relieving the complainant was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she filed
constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of the respondent who is a head of office.

The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if
only to have the cases against him dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.

Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the
appropriate criminal charges against him.

Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V.
Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added that the filing of the affidavit of desistance 11 would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the
matter considering that what was at stake was not only "the violation of complainant's (herein private respondent's) personal rights" but also "the
competence and fitness of the respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office." He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call for "a
punitive action against the respondent on the initiative of the DAR."

On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of "the findings of the Committee" with the DOJ. 12 Undersecretary Ramon S.
Esguerra indorsed the motion to the investigating committee. 13 In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating committee
informed Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee "had no more authority to act on the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that
the matter has already been forwarded to the Office of the President" and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased when they
transmitted their report to the
DOJ. 14 Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee could no longer act on his motion
for reconsideration. He added that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary
Drilon's recommendation. 15
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits.
Thus:

That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and accountant of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held
liable is untenable. The receipts in question were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly issued by the
commercial establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official business for which it was intended.

This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want us to do.

The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not
satisfactorily established.

In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his
former position "with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations." This petition was basically premised on the
affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the falsification
of gasoline receipts and attested to petitioner Lumiqued's being an "honest man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he (Dwight) turned
over to him were "altered." 18

Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.

Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to
counsel during the hearing. 19 On May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, 21
Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of
Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued
by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994." 22

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his
right to counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have
suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the
committee should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.

These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused
in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he
could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro
states thus:

In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee to conduct the formal investigation of the
administrative complaint for oppression, dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director, Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region,
is hereby created . . . 24

As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced
when, after finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through falsification of public
documents in its report and recommendation.

Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation 25 conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that
the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the
correctional system, 26 conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform such other functions as may be provided
by law," 27 prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws,
a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. 28 In an administrative
proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This
is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260 29 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39,
paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 30 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued 31 clearly show that he
was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

Furthermore, petitioners' reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of
Administrative Investigation stating that a respondent in an administrative complaint must be "informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel
of his choice," 32 is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to cases brought before the Civil Service Commission. 33
Secondly, said resolution, which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation,
34 much later than the July 1992 hearings of the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee was
not remiss in the matter of reminding Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus, at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of his
option to secure the services of counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against Director Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued is present. The complainant is present, Janet Obar-Zamudio.
Complainant has just been furnished with a copy of the counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you have a counsel, Director?

DIR. LUMIQUED:
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to see him, he told me, Sir, that he has already set a hearing, morning and afternoon today.

RSP EXEVEA:
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your counsel? You are willing to proceed with the hearing even without your counsel?

DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident. . .

CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?

DIR. LUMIQUED:
That is my concern. 35 (Emphasis supplied)

In the course of private respondent's damaging testimony, the investigating committee once again reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel.
Thus:

CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with this even without your counsel?

DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.

CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to proceed with the assistance of counsel but you said that you can take care of yourself so
we have no other alternative but to proceed. 36 (Emphasis supplied).

Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:

CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting for the supplemental affidavit you are going to present to us. Do you have any request from
the panel of investigators, Director Lumiqued?

DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to assist me and was the one who prepared my counter-affidavit is already engaged
for a hearing and according to him he is engaged for the whole month of July.

RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .

CP BALAJADIA:
Why don't you engage the services of another counsel. The charges against you are quite serious. We are not saying you are guilty already. We are
just apprehensive that you will go through this investigation without a counsel. We would like you to be protected legally in the course of this
investigation. Why don't you get the services of another counsel. There are plenty here in Baguio . . .

DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I will try to see, Sir . . .

CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are only given one month to finish the investigation, Director Lumiqued.

RSP EXEVEA:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or without counsel, we will proceed.

CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we asked for and Director Lumiqued, if you have other witnesses, please bring them
but reduce their testimonies in affidavit form so that we can expedite with the proceedings. 37

At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of counsel. Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:

FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being represented by a counsel. The last time he was asked to invite his lawyer in this
investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer to represent him in this investigation?

DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told me that he had set a case also at 9:30 in the other court and he told me if there is a
possibility of having this case postponed anytime next week, probably Wednesday so we will have good time (sic) of presenting the affidavit.

FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this to the panel. The charges in this case are quite serious and he should be given a
chance to the assistance of a counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been furnished him only now and this has several documents attached to it so I think we
could grant him one last postponement considering that he has already asked for an extension.

DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment. 38

The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital. Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not
inform the committee of his confinement. Consequently because the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had already
submitted his counter-affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-
changed in his right to due process.

Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government, graduated from the University of the Philippines
(Los Baños) with the degree of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent training
seminars both here and abroad. 39 Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This,
apparently, was the thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, "That is my concern," one could detect
that it had been uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or skepticism implicit in the question, "You are confident that you will be
able to represent yourself?" despite his having positively asserted earlier, "Yes, I am confident." He was obviously convinced that he could ably
represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of
his ability to defend himself, the investigating committee could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink.

The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General, 40 the Court
said:

. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that,
without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or
violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. 41 An actual
hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. 42 As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course;
he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 43 Moreover, this
constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 44
Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the
committee. 45

The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. 46 In the early case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of
Rizal 47 the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public
trust or agency. This jurisprudential pronouncement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1, on accountability of
public officers, as follows:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited
sense; hence, the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is
the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency. 48 In this case, it has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.

The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above,
fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is
the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence is not overwhelming or
preponderant. 49 The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 50

Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee's recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be deemed
tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity.
Strong evidence is not necessary to rebut that presumption, 51 which petitioners have not successfully disputed in the instant case.

Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service." The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the
"payment of retirement benefits and other benefits," plus back wages from the time of Lumiqued's dismissal until his demise, must, therefore, fail.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24187 March 15, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TAN BOMPING, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendants Tan Bomping, Leon Galindo, Policarpo Tambor, Lucio Macalisang and Andres Burias are accused of the crime of falsification of
public documents, it being alleged in the information upon which the case went to trial "that on or about the 21st and 22d of November, 1923, in
the municipality of Jimenez, Province of Misamis, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused,
confederating together and cooperating with one another, did willfully, unlawfully and criminally prepare and cause to be prepared eight fictitious
and simulated documents acknowledged before a notary public wherein the accused Tan Bomping conveys to his co-accused Leon Galindo,
Policarpo Tambor, Lucio Macalisang and Andres Burias eight parcels of land belonging to said accused Tan Bomping, making it to appear in said
documents that the same were executed on previous dates, about the years 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922 and August of 1923, when as a matter of fact
said documents were executed and signed by all the five defendants on November 21, 1923, and acknowledged by them before a notary public on
November 22d of the same year."

Upon trial Court of First Instance found all of the defendants guilty of the falsification of private documents and sentenced Tan Bomping to suffer
one year, eight months and twenty-one days of presidio correccional and to pay a fine of 625 pesetas. Each of the other defendants was sentenced
to six months of arresto mayor with the same fine as that imposed on Tan Bomping. All of the defendants appeal to this court.

The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Tan Bomping, in order to escape the attachment of his property in a civil action
then pending, on the 21st of November, 1923, executed eight deeds of conveyance various parcels of land, of which he was the owner, to his
codefendants, and that he intentionally antedated the documents. Duly certified copies of the deeds are in evidence and are marked Exhibits A to
H, inclusive. Two of them, Exhibits A and B were executed in favor of Leon Galindo and given the date of January 15, 1920. These documents were
witnessed by Policarpio Tambor and Andres Burias. Two other deeds, Exhibits C and D, were made out in favor of Policarpo Tambor and dated
October 10, 1921, and October 15, 1920, respectively, and were witnessed by Leon Galindo and Andres Burias. Exhibits E and F were executed in
favor of Andres Burias, dated August 15, 1923, and witnessed by Leon Galindo and Policarpo Tambor. Exhibits G and H were executed in favor of
Lucio Macalisang and dated January 20, 1919. The subscribing witnesses were Leon Galindo and Policarpo Tambor. On the following day Tan
Bomping took the documents to a notary public and acknowledged them in the usual manner. The notary, observing that the documents bore
earlier dates, apparently became suspicious and at his instance, Tan Bomping stated under oath that they were executed and signed on the dates
therein stated.

Upon the facts stated, Tan Bomping is manifestly guilty of the falsification of public documents and not merely of private ones as found by the trial
court; he not only falsified the documents, but was also directly instrumental in causing them to be made public documents. The case against his
codefendants is not quite as clear and there is room for a reasonable doubt as to their knowledge of the true character of the transactions
described. The majority of the members of this court are therefore of the opinion that said codefendants should be acquitted.

In his assignments of error, counsel for the appellants raises several questions of law which we shall briefly discuss. In the original information filed
in the present case, the defendants were accused of the crime of estafa with falsification of public documents. A demurrer to this information was
sustained and the present a new one. In compliance with this order, the fiscal amended the information so as to charge falsification of public
documents only and counsel for the appellants now argues that under section 23 of General Orders No. 58 the court may order the filing of a new
information, but has no power to order an amendment. This contention must be regarded as having been set at rest by the case of United States
vs. Muyot (2 Phil., 177), in which this court held that the trial court has authority to direct amendments to an information or complaint in a criminal
case. There is in fact no difference in substance between an amended information and a new one, and whether the information upon which the
case goes to trial is styled "New Information" or "Amended Information" is wholly immaterial.

Counsel for the appellants also argues that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence certified copies of the falsification documents instead of
the originals. It appears, however, that the originals were in the hands of the defendants; that the fiscal made demand upon them for the
production of the documents in court; and that the defendants refused to comply with this demand. In these circumstances the duly certified
copies were clearly admissible (see sections 321 and 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure). No proposition of law is better established than the rule
that secondary evidence is admissible whenever primary evidence is not obtainable, and this rule applies to criminal as well as to civil cases (Allen
vs. State, 21 Ga., 217; Commonwealth vs. Jeffries, 7 Allen, 548).

The case of United States vs. Gregorio and Balistoy (17 Phil., 522), cited by counsel for the appellants in support of his contention, is not in point. In
that case it does not appear that a reasonable effort was made to procure the original of the document alleged to have been falsified. The
statement in the decision that "in criminal proceedings for falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and courts have before
them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited, or falsified" is much too broad if it is thereby meant that the production of the
original of the document is indispensable in all criminal prosecutions for falsification. In any event, the statement can only be considered obiter
dicta.

As we have already stated, the court below erred in holding that the crime committed was falsification of private documents. A deed
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document and the fact that the false dates were written into the documents here in question
before said documents were presented to the notary, does not alter the case if they were so presented by the parties who committed the
falsification or at their instance.

For the reasons hereinbefore stated, the appellants Leon Galindo, Policarpo Tambor, Lucio Macalisang and Andres Burias are hereby acquitted of
the crime charged in the complaint with their proportional shares of the costs de oficio.

We find the appellant Tan Bomping guilty of the crime of the falsification of public documents and hereby sentenced him to suffer prision
correccional for the term of four years, nine months, and eleven days, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay one-fifth of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 2607. February 2, 1906. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FERNANDO NIETO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

Fernando Nieto, the appellant in this case, was charged with the falsification of a public document, with abuse of his office as municipal president.

It appears that the accused, who at that time was president of the municipality of Meycauayan, bought a typewriter for the use of the said
municipality for which he paid $90, gold, and at the same time caused the vendors to sign a receipt and a reimbursement voucher setting out the
facts connected with the sale of the machine and the amount paid therefor. It appears further that the accused changed the amount as set out in
the receipt and voucher from $90, gold, to $95, gold, and on the presentation of these falsified documents, recovered from the treasurer of the
municipality the sum of 190 pesos, Philippine currency, in reimbursement of his expenditure in the purchase of the machine.

The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of falsification of a private document, without aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced him to one year eight months and twenty-one days imprisonment (presidio correccional), and to the payment of a fine of 625 pesetas,
and to the restitution to the municipality of Meycauayan of the sum of $5, gold, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and the payment of
the costs of the trial.

We think the evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court, and we are agreed that the documents in question at the time when
they were falsified were private and not public documents, and that the offense was not committed with abuse of a public office. In the purchase
of the machine the accused was acting as a private person and not in his official capacity as municipal president, and the receipt and voucher at the
time when they were altered were merely evidenced of a private transaction between the accused and the vendors of the machine. They did not
emanate from any public office; they were not a part of any public or official record, nor were they certified by any person authorized to certify
public documents. The mere fact that they were intended for use in support of a claim against the public funds could not of itself raise them to the
dignity of public documents before they had become a part of some official record, and prior to their certification by some public official clothed
with authority for that purpose.

The accused admitted that he had made the alterations in the documents as alleged, but attempted to justify or rather to explain his action by
stating that at the time when he bought the machine he also bought $5 worth of typewritter supplies; that at the time when he recovered the
amount paid for the machine he had mislaid his receipt for these supplies, and believed that without that receipt he could not recover the price
paid therefor; and that he altered the receipt and voucher so as to include this $5, not with any intention of defrauding the municipality, but
merely for the purpose of recovering from the municipality the full amount he had expended on its behalf.

Taking this view of the case counsel for the appellant insists that as there was really no loss (perjuicio) to the municipality resulting from the
alteration of the document, there can be no conviction for that alteration, as loss or damage to a third person is an essential requisite to the crime
of falsification of a private document, as defined in article 304 of the Penal Code.

We, however, are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that as a matter of fact the accused did not pay $5 for the typewritter supplies as he
pretends, and that these supplies were included in the purchase price of the machine, for which he took the original receipt and disbursement
voucher, and therefore it is not necessary to consider what would have been the legal effect upon the transaction as a criminal offense had his
explanation contained a true relation of the facts.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Willard, JJ., concur.

Johnson, J., reserves his vote.

[ G.R. Nos. 22642-22644, December 19, 1924 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO A. PACANA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
MALCOLM, J.:

These are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of public documents and estafa committed by means of falsification of public
documents, in which the accused are Pedro A. Pacana, secretary of the provincial board of Misamis, Isidro Adorable, member of the provincial
board of Misamis, and Vicente P. Castro, member of the provincial board of Misamis. Should convictions be sustained, Pacana will receive
sentences totalling forty-four years and five days imprisonment, and Adorable and Castro for the alleged unlawful taking of P25 each will receive
sentences of ten years and one day imprisonment.

The charge in the first numbered case against Pedro A. Pacana relates to the falsification by the accused of minutes of the meeting of the provincial
board on June 9, 1923, for the alleged purpose of permitting the district engineer to incur illegal expenses in the reconstruction of a provincial
road. The charge in the second case against the same accused relates to the falsification of minutes of the provincial board on June 16, 1923. The
charge in the third case against the same accused relates to the falsification of an excerpt from the minutes of the provincial board of June 9, 1923.
And the last two cases, one against provincial board member Isidro Adorable and Pedro A. Pacana, and the other against provincial board member
Vicente P. Castro and Pedro A. Pacana, relate to the crimes of estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents, whereby it is alleged
Adorable and Castro were each able to collect the sum of P25 as per diems for two fictitious meetings of the provincial board. Since the first three
cases were tried together and the last two together, and since the facts of all of them are closely interwoven, for convenience sake a general
statement will first be made, leaving for special mention certain circumstances affecting particular cases.

The provincial board of Misamis is made up of Segundo Gaston, governor, and Isidro Adorable and Vicente P. Castro, members, with Pedro A.
Pacana as secretary. The board as thus1 composed left on an inspection trip of the province on May 23, 1923. A session of the board was held in
the municipality of Tulisan, Misamis, on June 4, 1923. It returned to Cagayan, Misamis, the provincial capital, on the morning of June 18, 1923.
Following the arrival of the board at the provincial capital, it was kept busy during the succeeding days' because on June 19, 1923, the Governor-
General landed at the port of Cagayan, because on that day was the Rizal birthday celebration, because on June 20, 1923, the Governor-General
departed, and because on the same day there arrived the Quezon-Roxas-Osmena- Gabaldon-Guevara party which left on June 21, 1923. These
facts are not disputed.

It is likewise admitted that the documents on which the prosecutions are based, Exhibits C, D, Q-3, Y, and X, are actually in existence. It is the
theory of the prosecution that said documents were prepared by the provincial secretary with the connivance of the members of the provincial
board for illegal purposes. To substantiate this theory, attention is concentrated on the following prominent facts:

Exhibits C and D were seen by the chief clerk of the district auditor, Juan Callante, in the office of Pacana on the afternoon of June 18,1923. Copies
of Exhibits C and D were made by a clerk in the office of the district auditor, Juan Borja, on the morning of June 19,1923. An excerpt from Exhibit C
containing resolution No. 224 was received in the office of the provincial treasurer of Misamis before 5:50 o'clock on the afternoon of June
19,1923. Another excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 225, Exhibit Q-3, the basis of the third prosecution, was received in the office of
the district engineer on June 27, 1923, and when the chief clerk of this office noted the date June 9, 1923, on the minutes and brought it to the
attention of the provincial secretary, the date wag changed to June 16, 1923. The mistake of the secretary was attempted to be rectified by the
provincial board on September 20, 1923, by changing the dates of the excerpts to June 16, 1923, and thus another error was perpetrated. (Exhibit
B-2.) The originals of Exhibits C and D have disappeared, possibly through the machinations of the provincial secretary. The provincial board of
Misamis could not have celebrated a session at Cagayan before June 18, 1923, because of its absence on an inspection trip, and could not have
celebrated a session on the afternoon of June 19, 1923, as claimed by the defense, because of a velada held on the same afternoon in the
intermediate school of Cagayan at which the provincial governor and member Castro were present. And finally, before the district auditor, the
three accused reaffirmed the fact that sessions' of the provincial board were held on June 9 and 16, 1923. (Exhibits J, K, L.) The theory of the
defense is diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution. Defendants' thesis is simple and is to the effect that on account of the carelessness of
the provincial secretary and the amount of work thrown on his inexperienced shoulders, error was committed, and that, instead of meetings of the
provincial board being held on June 9 and 16, 1923, meetings were in reality held on June 19 and June 21, 1923. To bulwark this stand, the defense
relies on the following facts:

Meetings of the provincial board were actually had on the afternoons of June 19 and June 21, and to this effect is the testimony of the members
present, the secretary, and a clerk. Subjects were treated in these two sessions which could not possibly have come to the attention of the
provincial board prior to the sessions. The preoccupations of the provincial secretary due to the inspection trip of the provincial board and the
arrival and departure of the parties of the Governor-General and of the Legislature, were the cause of the mistakes. Errors of a similar character
appear in dther meetings of the provincial board. The excerpts of the meetings transmitted to the offices of the district engineer and district
auditor, respectively, were prepared by a clerk in the office of the provincial governor and were merely signed as a matter of form by the provincial
secretary. The book in which the minutes were kept was obtained by the district auditor so that the original minutes could have disappeared while
in his possession. The accused all signed the statements before the district auditor not understanding what the investigation was about. As soon as
the mistakes in dates were discovered and before the criminal prosecution was begun, the provincial board corrected its minutes. (Exhibits 8, 10.)

Certain other points in relation with the questioned documents are helpful in resolving these cases. Turning first to Exhibit C, on which the first case
is exclusively founded, and related to three of the other cases, it is interesting to take note of its contents. It is headed "Regular Meeting of the
Provincial Board of Misamis Held at Cagayan on Thursday, June 9, 1923." As a matter of fact, June 9 fell on a Saturday. Then after showing who
were present and who were absent and the authority for the meeting, under the general heading "Resolutions" comes a resolution concerning the
payment of the real property tax. Further on, the letter of His Excellency (Exhibit 4) informing the board of his disapproval of resolution No. 207 of
the board, current series, is again mentioned. As a matter of fact, this letter was dated at Manila, on June 11,1923, and probably was not received
at Cagayan until June 19, 1923. Next following in the minutes mention is made of a "letter dated June 14, 1923, of the district engineer." Obviously,
a "letter dated June 14, 1923," could not have been acted upon at a meeting held on June 9, 1923. Next following in the minutes, comes a
resolution having to do with a communication of the district engineer "dated June 16, 1923." Obviously, again, a communication of the district
engineer "dated June 16, 1923," could not have been approved at a meeting of the provincial board held on June 9, 1923. Also in the same minutes
are found data as to letters of the district engineer of June 8, 1923, of the Chief of the Executive Bureau, and of the Public Utility Commissioner. So
much for Exhibit C.

As for Exhibit D, on which the second case is founded and having connection with two other prosecutions, it shows on its face a regular meeting of
the provincial board of Misamis held at Cagayan on Saturday, June 16,1923. It discloses action taken on about fifty resolutions of municipal
councils. Included therein is approval of a resolution of the municipal council of Salay of June f5, 1923. According to the witness Sabas Abao,
municipal secretary of Salay, this resolution was not placed in the mails until June 16, 1923, and according to the postmaster of Balingasay, could
not have left for the provincial capital until June 20,1923.

As to Exhibit Q-3, the basis of the third prosecution, it purports to be an "excerpt from the minutes of the regular meeting of the provincial board of
Misamis held at Cagayan on Thursday, June 9, 1923." The provincial secretary then certifies to the correctness of a resolution concerning a "letter
dated June 14, 1923, of the district engineer." The utter impossibility of such approval needs no discussion.

Exhibits Y and X, approved by the provincial governor and certified to as correct and just by the two members of the provincial board, respectively,
are provincial vouchers in the usual form calling for services rendered as members of the provincial board during the period June 9, 16, 23, and 26,
inclusive, at P12.50 a meeting.

According to the prosecution, the motive for the criminal acts was, first, the desire on the part of the provincial secretary to fabricate resolutions
probably with the connivance of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board, which would placate the American engineer, Mr.
Allen. The motive in the second place, according to the prosecution, was to permit the members of the provincial board to collect a total of P50 not
legally due them. On the other hand, according to the defense, the cause of the prosecution is the enmity existing between the district engineer
and the district auditor, and has been brought about as an act of vengeance by the district auditor. Political intrigue is also insinuated.

Up to this point, we have endeavored to state briefly and fairly the salient facts of record as they are pressed upon us by the opposing sides. No
comment of any importance has been proffered. Having progressed thus far, the case comes down to a determination of whether there was an
intentional and deliberate falsification of public documents on the part of the accused, or whether there was merely a human error committed, in
which criminal intent was wholly lacking.

It must be admitted that the physical facts are mostly in favor of the accused. The documents, Exhibits C and D, could not have been fabricated on
June 9 and June 16, if the matters to which they relate were not then before the provincial board for action. Unless by supernatural means, that
would be an utter impossibility. Just how we can reconcile these circumstances with the strong oral testimony, mostly circumstantial in nature,
presented by the prosecution, is hard to say, unless there was exaggeration on the part of some of the witnesses.

Now as to the motive, recognizing that a quarrel was on between two provincial officers, and that possibly the provincial board was siding with the,
district engineer and against the district auditor, just why was it necessary to make meetings out of the air to serve this purpose when actual
meetings' would have served the same purpose just as effectively? The resolution approving of the acts of the district engineer had to be" made
public and copies of it had to be sent to the proper authorities. Just why two members of the provincial board would care to certify to the
correctness of meetings which were never held, in order to benefit themselves in the paltry amount of P26 each, when they could have recovered
the same amount for actual meetings, is also difficult to understand.

The whole case impresses us as a job bunglingly performed by the provincial secretary. He is a man who should not be entrusted with official
responsibility. He has none of the qualifications which fit one for public office. But it is a far cry from hopeless ineptitude and hopeless stupidity to
criminal intent and criminal responsibility. Still, even under the most favorable aspect, the facts skirt perilously near to the Penal Code crime of
reckless imprudence.

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime. Actus non facfc reum, nisi men sit rea. There can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and Teal, will, as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal
responsibility. The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal
intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence.

A decision of the supreme court of Spain of December 23, 1885, is in point. It appeared that one of the clerks in the office of the district court, in
spreading upon the record the proceedings taken for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for certain minor children and the declaration of
heirship in their favor, entered such proceedings as of a date anterior to the date on which they were actually entered. The clerk, for this act, was
charged with the falsification of a public document, was convicted of imprudencia temeraria in the court of first instance, and appealed to the
supreme court of Spain, which tribunal in reversing the judgment said in part:

"Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary
that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, it must, nevertheless,
be borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to change the effects which it would
otherwise produce; for, unless "that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by
article 1 of the Penal Code; considering that the fact that Don Augustin Montes Moreno set out the proceedings as of a date prior to that on which
they actually occurred, and therefore incorrectly, the remaining part of the document being true, * * * neither affected the integrity or truth of said
proceedings nor affected in any essential way their results or effects, it is necessary to conclude that the criminal intent mentioned in the previous
observation was absent; considering that, even though the accused consciously attached incorrect dates to the proceedings, nevertheless that act
does not take on the character of a crime, and for that reason the Audiencia de Huelva erred in convicting the accused * * *." (See further decision
of supreme court of Spain of February 25, 1885; U. S. vs. Mateo [1913], 25 Phil., 324, 334; U. S. vs. Reyes [1902], 1 Phil., 341; U. S. vs. Ah Chong
[1910], 15 Phil,, 488; U. S. vs. Catolico [1911], 18 Phil., 504; and Guevara's Penal Code, 2d edition, pp. 1-3, 401-406.)

It is a serious matter to be responsible for sending the accused to prison for long terms. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and
not crime should be indulged in to the benefit of the prisoners at bar. The Government has suffered no loss. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the
other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. (U. S. vs.
Maafio [1903], 2 Phil., 718.) We cannot bring ourselves to find these accused guilty on the facts of record.

It results, therefore, that we must, as we hereby do, reverse the judgments appealed from and acquit the accused of the charges laid against them,
with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns., and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5563. July 31, 1953.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SERGIO MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

Sergio Mendoza was charged with falsification of a public or official document. The information reads thus —

"That on or about the 27th of July 1949, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then employed as inspector of the Division of
Sanitary Engineering, of the Office of the City Health Officer, in said City of Manila, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
various acts of falsification on a public and official document, to wit: Official Receipt No. 188903-V, issued by the City Treasurer’s Office, City of
Manila, by then and there erasing the name "Elena Manansala" and the figure "P1.00" therein and afterwards, writing, inserting and intercalating,
or, causing it to be written, inserted and intercalated thereon in such a way as to change its import and meaning, the words "Roberto B. Almaden,"
"forty-six only" and the figure "46" thereby making it appear that said receipt was issued to the said Roberto B. Almaden and that the latter paid
the sum of P46 to the City Treasurer’s Office, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, Official Receipt No. 188903-V was in the
name of Elena Manansala as aforesaid and said receipt was issued to her when she paid the amount of P1 to the Department of Engineering and
Public Works, in said City, for the issuance of a duplicate copy of a building fee."cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon arraignment he entered a plea of not guilty, but on 18 February 1952, the date set for the trial of the case, with the consent of the trial court
and the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty for the crime of falsification described and punished in
the last paragraph of article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Thereupon, the court sentenced him to suffer 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, to
pay a fine of P50, or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs. From this sentence the defendant has appealed.

On 14 June 1952, Vicente T. Velasco, Jr., the attorney de oficio appointed by the court, filed a motion stating that he could not find a way to
question the legality of the penalty imposed, which is the only question raised by the appeal. By resolution the court directed that the motion of
the attorney de oficio be considered as the appellant’s brief. On 17 June 1952, attorney Carlos Perfecto appeared and gave notice of the
withdrawal of the appeal stating that the appellant was ready and willing to serve the sentence imposed on him by the trial court. Acting on this
petition the court ordered that a copy thereof be furnished the appellant who was required to comment thereon within ten days from notice. On
16 July 1952 copies of the notice of withdrawal of appeal and of the resolution of the court requiring the appellant to comment within ten days
from notice were served on him in the municipal jail, Manila Police Department, but he has failed to do so. On 4 August 1952 the Solicitor General
filed the brief for the appellee and the case was set for hearing on 1 October 1952 but no one appeared at the hearing. In his brief the Solicitor
General recommends that the penalty be not less than 1 month and 1 day nor more than 4 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, and not less
than 1 year and 1 day nor more than 1 year and 8 months of prision correccional, as maximum, because the penalty imposed by the lower court is
below the range provided by law.

The trial court allowed the defendant to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense for that of not guilty to a more serious crime previously entered
under and pursuant to section 4, Rule 114. The substitution of plea could not lawfully be made taking into consideration the fact that the crime
charged in the information is falsification of a public document. Falsification of a public document by a public officer or employee or by a private
person is a very serious crime punished with prision mayor to its full extent and with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
respectively, and in both with a fine not to exceed P5,000. Being an employee or inspector of the Division of Sanitary Engineering of the Office of
the City Health Officer the defendant was not a private person. He could be considered as such if notwithstanding his government employment he
took no advantage thereof in committing the falsification. The crime of falsification described and punished in article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by a private individual who does any of the falsifications described in the next preceding article in any public or official document or
letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and by a person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such
damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article. The last paragraph of article
172 punishes a private person who introduces in evidence in any judicial proceeding and uses any of the false documents embraced in the next
preceding article or in any of the subdivisions of the article. For that reason the crime of falsification defined and punished in the last paragraph of
article 172 is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information for falsification of a public document by a public officer or
employee or by a private individual. The crime punished in the last paragraph of article 172 of the Revised Penal Code may be a lesser offense but it
certainly cannot be deemed necessarily included in the crime of falsification of a public document by a public officer or employee or by a private
person. Hence section 4, Rule 114, was misapplied. Under the view we have taken of the case, neither the penalty imposed by the trial court nor
that recommended by the Solicitor General is in accordance with law. The penalty should be not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, and not less than 3 years, 6 months and 21 days and not more than 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum,
the accessories of the law and a fine of P50, or subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and costs.

As a general rule, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee’s brief is allowed and granted. The presumption is that attorney
Carlos Perfecto had the authority to appear for the appellant. The latter was given an opportunity to disown what his attorney had done but has
failed to do so. His silence leans towards confirmation rather than toward disavowal. Consequently, the motion for dismissal of the appeal is
granted.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991
MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:

On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner Michael T. Dava, then holder of non-professional
driver's license No. 14744271 with official receipt No. 7023037,2 bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing
death to former and physical injuries to the latter.

As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police headquarters where his driver's license was confiscated by Cpl. Daniel
Severino who later submitted Dava's driver's license to the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal. license was thereafter presented as prosecution evidence in
criminal case for homicide and serious physical injuries reckless imprudence filed against Dava in the then Court First Instance of Rizal in Pasig.3

On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car
with plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to
Dava, Roxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license.4 The Ministry of
Defense later indorsed Roxas' request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG).

At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya of the CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car
described by Roxas parked in front of the Uniwide Department Store near the then Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver and his
companion arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the driver for his license. They were shown non-professional driver's license No.
27068875 with official receipt No. 06058706 issued by Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his
license, Dava informed them that his officemate had secured it for him.

Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon City for questioning. Dava refused to give a statement upon the advice of
his lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot report to Col. Maristela stating therein that "subject had violated Section 31 of RA 4136 for false
representation in the application of a driver's license intended to be used as a legal license."7 In his affidavit of apprehension dated November 16,
1978, Lising stated that he was 'about to book him for violation of Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when subsequent investigation revealed that the
Driver's License above-mentioned is a Fake and a Falsity' and therefore a case for falsification and use of falsified documents under Section 172 of
the Revised Penal Code should be filed against Dava.8 Lising concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he compared it with the
xerox copy of Dava's license which was attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and the dates of birth indicated in the
two licenses did "not tally."9

Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed against Dava in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at
Quezon City.10 One of the prosecution witnesses was Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). He
testified that hen was then the registrar of the said office when Dava's driver' license was brought to him by lawyer Jose Francisco who was
interested in knowing whether it was genuine or fake and if was issued by the Angeles City agency of the BLT. He examine it and found out that it
was "fake or illegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was one of the fifty (50) forms which had been reported missing from their office
sometime in November, 1976 and that it was never issued to any applicant for a license.11 He added that any license that was not included their
office index card was considered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency."12

Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was genuine,13 the signature of the issuing official was fake.14 He "believed" certain
persons had been apprehended for "plasticization" of licenses outside their office15 and that sometime November, 1976, agents of the National
Bureau of Investigation raided the house of a certain person who had in his possession some of the forms which had been missing from office.16
He concluded that the license was fake because the form was issued by the central office to the Angeles agency, the license appeared on its face to
have been issued the San Fernando, Pampanga agency.17

Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of Appeals18 which affirmed the lower court's decision on January 29, 1982.
Dava filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision contending that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case. On April 27, 1982,
the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its decision and issued a resolution the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set aside, and another judgment shall be entered annulling the proceedings in
the court a quo without prejudice to the refiling of the charges with the proper court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)

Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 47 at San Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422. The
information for falsification of a public document reads as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MICHAEL T. DAVA, a private individual, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's license with Serial No. 2706887 covered by
Official Receipt No. 0605870, dated January 24, 1978, a public document, by making it appear that the signatories therein who are officials of the
Pampanga LTC Agency participated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they did not so participate and the accused made use of
the same knowing it to be falsified.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified on how he saw Dava driving a car and that, knowing that Dava's license had
been confiscated as a result of the filing of the homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence case, he thereafter sought the
assistance of then Minister Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license.19 For his part, Domingo Lising, who apprehended Dava,
narrated in court how he first saw Daya driving a car along Banahaw and N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon City until he finally confronted Dava at the
vicinity of the Araneta Coliseum and confiscated his driver's license. As earlier stated, he conclude that the driver's license shown to him by Dava
was fake because he noticed that, when compared with the license attached to record of the criminal case filed against Dava, the license
confiscated bore a different signature and date of birth.20

Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he investigated the traffic incident along Shaw Boulevard on October 19, 1975
which involved Dava and the two relatives of Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated Dava's no professional driver's license No. 1474427 which he
later turn over to the fiscal's office.21

In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed the court that, upon a resolution of the Court of Appeals, Dava was allowed by
the lower court having jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 16474 to withdraw his driver's license 1474427 from the records of said case.22 When
confronted by the court, Dava volunteered that he withdrew said license in December, 1982 and surrendered it to the BLT Western District Office
so that he could renew his license.23 Hence, the evidence presented before the Court was a mere xerox copy of said license24 which also bears a
notation that Dava received original driver's license and its receipt on December 15, 1982.25

Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando Pampanga branch of the BLT and whose name appears registrar thereof in official
receipt No. 0605870 which was supposed to be attached to Dava's driver's license No. 270688 admitted that the form of the said license was
genuine although he could not tell whether its contents were likewise genuine because it was "opened" and "spliced."26 He asserted, however,
that since the said form "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed" over his name, said license was "not OK".27

Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT regional office that the number in the license was one of "the numbers
requisitioned by (the) Angeles City agency."28 He affirmed that drivers license No. 2706887 "was not issued by (their) agency"29 although when
recalled to the stand, he admitted that the "2L" filled in the space for "Agency Code No." on the face of license No. 2706887 referred to the San
Fernando agency.30 Martin also confirmed the genuineness of official receipt No. 0605870 although it was his assistant who signed it for him31
and affirmed that the amount of P10.00 indicated therein had been collected and received by his office.32

Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City office of the BLT to see its chief and inquire about the number of driver's license
issued to Dava and whether said office had indeed issued them. According to him, the head of the office, Caroline Vinluan, advised him to verify
from the index card in the possession of the License Division head whether the Angeles City agency had indeed issued Dava's license.33 Thereafter,
the officer-in-charge of the License Division of the BLT in East Avenue, Quezon City, Leonardo R. Medina, issued a certification dated December 24,
1979 to the effect that non-professional drivers license No. 2706887 in the name of Dava was "not registered in (their) Index Card."34

Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former head of the Angeles City BLT agency, had died on May 12, 1980.35 He offered
in evidence Vinluan's death certificate as Exh. J.

Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of Carolino Vinluan which was taken on
January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-10759 before the then Court of First Instance Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. It was marked as
Exh. K said exhibit was part of the record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was transmitted to the Regional Trial Court Pampanga.36

The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava and his former co-trainee at the Sandoz Philippines, a pharmaceutical
firm, Manalili testified that Dava quested him to secure a driver's license for him because he had none. Manalili went to the San Fernando office of
the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) where he used to secure own license. At the LTC branch office, he was "approached"37 the fixers who
roamed around the compound. When he as them how much it would cost to secure a driver's license, he told that it would amount to P70 .00.38
He agreed to pay amount and gave the fixers the personal data of Dava.39

After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside a plastic jacket. (Manalili identified the license as Exh. B.) He examined it and
found out that it looked "like a genuine and authentic driver's license" to him. The license, which opened and unsealed, bore a signature in the
portion which showed the name Romeo Edu and contained all the personal data of Dava. Because it did not bear the signature of Dava Manalili
immediately gave the license to Dava and told him to sign it immediately. Dava did so in Manalili's presence.40

On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision41 finding that the license in question was "fake or spurious", that was not duly issued by
any proper government licensing age and that the accused directly participated in the commission of the falsification or caused said falsification.
The court took into account the facts that Dava was "in dire need' of a license because of his work as a detailman; that he received his genuine
license from the court only on December 15, 1982, and that Dava himself personally requested his friend, Manalili, to secure the license for him. It
arrived at the conclusion that since Dava was the possessor or user of the fake license, he himself was the forger or the one who caused its forgery
or falsification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Michael T. Dava guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the came of Falsification
of a Public Document, as defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correecional as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as
maximum; and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus the costs of this suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court,42 which on September 30, 1985 affirmed in in toto the decision of the trial court. On
February 27, 1986, the appellate court denied Dava's motion for the reconsideration of said decision finding that no new grounds had been raised
therein. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the testimony of Carolino Vinluan on the ground that being a part of the annulled
proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-10759, it may not be considered as admissible in evidence as it cannot qualify as a "testimony at a former trial"
under the provisions of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR, expressly
annulled the proceedings had in Criminal Case No. Q-10759 for lack of jurisdiction of the Quezon City court over the case. That ruling is founded on
solid jurisprudence. We had time and again held that in the absence of proof that the party raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by
estoppel,43 a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is a total nullity.44 Being worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded upon it are
equally worthless.45 Hence, the testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in evidence but may well be considered as totally nonexistent.
With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is there sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of petitioner for the crime
charged?

The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his driver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga
LTC agency participated" in in-preparation and with having used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified. The charges therefore are
found on the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any private individual who shall commit any the falsification
enumerated in Article 171 specifically paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have
participated in any act proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava with having knowingly used a false
document under the last paragraph of Article 172.

The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's license, asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him.
Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get his own driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure petitioner's
driver's license No. 2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in said locality.46 On January 24, 1978, petitioner
renewed his license at the said office by paying the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued official receipt No. 0605870.47

In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt showing that at the previous year the licensee had paid
for his driver's license to any agency of the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve the issuance of "another
form," a driver did not have to fill up an application form for the renewal of a license. The said agency would then issue an official receipt
evidencing the renewal of the license but the driver's license itself would not be changed.48

Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt No. 86432149 were presented to the San Fernando LTC
agency, the personnel therein issued official-receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not personally signed by
office registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt50 was genuine and the amount indicated therein was actually paid to and collected by
the San Fernando agency.51 The driver's license itself may not have been issued by said agency52 but its form was likewise genuine. However,
according to Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his name therein.53
Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of the license Division of the Bureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non-
professional driver's license No. 2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is not registered" in their index card.54

Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the actual
falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and made use of
the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so.

The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last
paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced
in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the
false document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage.55 Except for last, all of these elements have
been proven beyond reason doubt in this case.

It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any
time been issued a driver's license.56 Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a
driver's license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner,
to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license
in so short a without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire
to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license
even if the legal fee then was only P15.00.57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers,
the fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is,
beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the commission of said crime.

Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license No. 2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license,
he knew that it was not legally possible for him to secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for him to misrepresent to his
friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license. But even with this misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe
that Manalili would be able to secure a driver's license through legal means in about an hour's time.58 The patent irregularity in obtaining driver's
license No. 2706887 was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and
authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that he himself was surprised when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license of
Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the fixer's assistance.59 In those days, all plastic jackets emanated from the
LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in the release of the license applied for. Under these circumstances, no "reasonable and
fairminded man" would say that petitioner did not know that his license was a fake.60

A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document
the moment it is accomplished.61 Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the
region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document.

The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in
his possession and it was what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car,
it is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner used driver's license No. 2706887.

The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least an intent to cause such
damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein.62

In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego,63 should be applied in his favor:

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby,
the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so
closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have
close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People
vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28: People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one
who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs. Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the exception that the
accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a false document.64 His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it
consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not have acted on his own accord without the
prodding of petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in government agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who
could do things fast for the right amount. He is "not necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification of official documents" and he
shares his fees with "insiders."65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why they proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our
bureaucracy but also on our own people. While not all fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators," they
nonetheless provide sources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who transact business with the government and for corruption of
the gullible government employees. Their unwanted presence must be dealt with accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our
government agencies the better for all of us.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed. Let a copy of this decision be served on that Department of
Transportation and Communication. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013
CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the December 12, 2006 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with modification the June 25, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in
Criminal Case Nos. 98-163806-10 finding Carlos L." Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents. Likewise questioned is the CA's September 6, 2007 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.6

Factual Antecedents

On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against petitioner. The said
Informations portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the
checks and promissory notes involved and the dates and amounts thereof, viz:

That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru falsification of commercial document, the METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented
by its Legal officer, Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in the following manner: herein accused, being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF
METROBANK located at the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up or
caused to be prepared and filled up METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters and figures reading "BD#083/97" after the letters
reading "PN", with figures reading "07.24.97" after the word "DATE", with the amount of ₱16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other
words and figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing to be typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading "ROMEO TAN", feigning and
forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof
purportedly to show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan, thereafter preparing and filling up or causing to be
prepared and filled up METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date reading "July 24, 1997", with the
name reading "Romeo Tan" as payee, and with the sum of ₱15,362,666.67 in words and in figures, which purports to be the proceeds of the loan
being obtained, thereafter affixing his own signature thereon, and directing the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his signature on the said
check, as authorized signatories, and finally affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and forged four (4) times at the back
thereof the signature of said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation, execution
and signing of the said Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK and that he obtained a loan of
₱16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not
obtain such loan from METROBANK, neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of the said promissory note and signing
and endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK, much less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and affix his signature in the said
documents; that once the said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused released, obtained and
received from the METROBANK the sum of ₱15,363,666.67 purportedly representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his
possession, with intent to defraud, he misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of the said METROBANK in the same sum of ₱15,363,666.67, Philippine currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea.9 The cases were then consolidated and
jointly tried.

The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows:

During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that accused was the branch manager of Metrobank
Commercio Branch from July 1997 to December 1997, no other stipulations were entered into. Prosecution marked its exhibits "A" to "L" and sub-
markings.

xxxx

The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory notes and cashier’s checks in the name of Romeo
Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has substantial deposits in his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from
the bank. Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s check as branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or
caused to be signed the signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that the latter had
indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for encashment. Once said documents
were forged and falsified, appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same to his
use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the
Head Office of Metrobank, during which appellant signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit "N") in the form of questions and answers.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:

Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he conducted and interviewed the appellant in
January 1998; that in said interview, appellant admitted having committed the allegations in the Informations, specifically forging the promissory
notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received by the appellant although it should be the client of the bank who should
receive the same; and that all the answers of the appellant were contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and
signed by him (Exhibit "N").
Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing on the promissory notes were not the signatures of
Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not bear her signature although it is required, due to the fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her
manager accommodated valued clients; that she signed the corresponding checks upon instruction of appellant; and that after signing the checks,
appellant took the same which remained in his custody.

Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the signatures appearing on the promissory notes and specimen
signatures on the signature card of Romeo Tan were not written by one and the same person.

Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several cashier’s checks were issued in favor of Romeo Tan;
that appellant instructed her to encash the same; and that it was appellant who received the proceeds of the loan.

For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree from the Asian Institute of Management, and was
the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with
Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmariñas Branch, Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to
day operations of the branch, solicited accounts and processed loans, among others.

Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he was the branch manager of Metrobank Commercio. As a
valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit line for forty million pesos (₱40,000,000.00) by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a fictitious
account for his personal use and was assisted personally by appellant in his dealings with the bank. In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a
fictitious account and used the name Jose Tan. Such practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the bank to hide their finances due to
rampantkidnappings or from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.

According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes) for five (5) times on the following dates: 1) 24 July 1997
for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for six million pesos (₱6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three million pesos
(₱3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December 1997 for two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00). On
all these occasions except the loan on 24 July 1997 when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions regarding the loan
through the telephone. Upon receiving the instructions, appellant would order the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory note and send the same
through the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office, which was located across the street. The latter would then return to the bank, through his own
messenger, the promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt of the promissory note, appellant would order the preparation of the
corresponding cashier’s check representing the proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the bank’s messenger to the office of Tan,
and the latter would return the same through his own messenger already endorsed together with a deposit slip under Current Account No. 258-
250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashier’s Check dated 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00) was not endorsed and deposited
for, allegedly, it was used to pay the loan obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory
notes and the cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of Tan although he never saw the latter affix them thereon.

In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26
January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day.
When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7) other people present: two (2) senior branch officers, two (2)
bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank,
Valentino Elevado.

Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the audit investigation; that he inquired what he was
made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be brought to the
precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and that "just to get it
over with" he signed the paper which turned out to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable
to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.10

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision11 dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crimes charged, the decretal
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents charged in each of the five (5) Informations filed and hereby sentences him to suffer the following penalties:

1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law.

2. In Criminal Case No. 98-163807, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of
₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 November 1997 until fully paid.

3. In Criminal Case No. 98-163808, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱6
Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 27 October 1997 until fully paid.

4. In Criminal Case No. 98-163809, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱2
Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 22 December 1997 until fully paid.

5. In Criminal Case No. 98-163810, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱3
Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 12 November 1997 until fully paid.

Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.

As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of the sentence imposed shall not be more than threefold the length
of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him and such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.
SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23653. On December 12, 2006, the CA
promulgated its Decision13 affirming with modification the RTC Decision and disposing of the appeal as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30
convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee on five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents is hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further ordered to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million with interest at
18% per annum counted from 24 July 1997 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.14

On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its September 6, 2007 Resolution.16

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the basic issues of: (1) whether the CA erred in
affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written statement based on its finding that he was not in police custody or under
custodial interrogation when the same was taken; and, (2) whether the essential elements of estafa through falsification of commercial documents
were established by the prosecution.17

The Parties’ Arguments

While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was only forced to sign the
same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not
have been admitted in evidence against him.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that petitioner’s written
statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context of
private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus prays for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.

Our Ruling

We find the Petition wanting in merit.

Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon
the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be
informed of the two other rights above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement
authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the
constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent case
of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:21

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.22

Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection with an
anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to the courts below in
admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its admissibility.

Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim
lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress and
intimidation.

Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of
proving the contrary."23 Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his written statement was found to have been executed
freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime
could furnish. The details contained therein attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which could only be supplied by appellant. The
statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot be associated with a mind to which intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers
to questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein. The response to every question was
fully informative, even beyond the required answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints.24

In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of petitioner’s extrajudicial statement is that it contains
many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have supplied without the knowledge and information
given by him."

Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against the investigator and the two
policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled
rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his
supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been
voluntarily executed.26

Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his signature thereon "just to get it over with"
prop up the instant Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational institution and had been a bank manager for
quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand and comprehend the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate
that he did not exercise due diligence in the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.

Forgery duly established.

"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s name with intent to defraud."27 It can be established by
comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or genuine one. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of
government handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts. A trial judge is not precluded but is even authorized by law28
to conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory notes and cashier’s checks was not anchored
solely on the result of the examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document Examiner. The trial court also made an
independent examination of the questioned signatures and after analyzing the same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing
in the promissory notes are different from his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on
file with the bank. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA. A rule of long standing in this
jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the
said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed conclusive and binding to this Court.

No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the matter. His non-presentation created the
presumption that his testimony if given would be adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus contends that the prosecution suppressed
its own evidence.

Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the
discretion as to how it should present its case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the
evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution.30 In the present case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness
who could exculpate him from liability by establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent thing to do
is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory process to secure Tan’s attendance during the trial pursuant to
Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the Constitution. The records show, however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no
suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.

Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.

The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans covered by the promissory notes and the
cashier’s checks were personally transacted by Tan against his approved letter of credit, although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature
thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established evidence. "It is settled that denials which are
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters."32 The chain of events in this case, from the
preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of the cashier’s checks, as narrated by the prosecution witnesses and based on petitioner’s
own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.

Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers to falsification by a
private individual or a public officer or employee, who did not take advantage of his official position, of public, private or commercial document.
The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public
officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article
171 of the RPC;33 and, (3) that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.

All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts of falsification consisted in
petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to appear that the same is true and genuine in all
respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification
was committed in promissory notes and checks which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general, documents or
instruments which are "used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions."34 Promissory notes facilitate
credit transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s
check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature appear thereon to encash the check and
withdraw the amount indicated therein.35

Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.

When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary
means to commit another crime like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two
classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as
a necessary means for committing another.

In Domingo v. People,36 we held:

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed.
Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means
to commit estafa.

"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit, and (b) the offended party
or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation."37 Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."38

The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan requested him to process purported loans on the latter’s behalf,
petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the cashier’s checks.1âwphi1 Through these, petitioner succeeded in withdrawing
money from the bank. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter invested the same in Eurocan Future Commodities. Clearly,
petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the money, misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and these
resulted to the damage and prejudice of the bank in the amount of about ₱43 million.

Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have withdrawn the money without falsifying the questioned documents. The
falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa, and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified documents
were used to defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document by the
lower courts was thus proper.

The Proper Imposable Penalty

The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the RPC is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and
a fine of not more than ₱5,000.00.

The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period39 if the amount defrauded is over ₱12,000.00 but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount involved
exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year
imprisonment for every ₱10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.

Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document. The crime of
falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case
should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the
crime of estafa, being the more serious offense than falsification.

The amounts involved in this case range from ₱2 million to ₱16 million. Said amounts being in excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable should
be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years of prision mayor, adding one (1) year for
each additional ₱10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the additional penalty of one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00 would surely
exceed the maximum limitation provided under Article 315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed the maximum term of
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.

There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA in each case respecting the minimum term of
imprisonment. The trial court imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum which is
beyond the lawful range. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty should be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Petitioner is therefore sentenced in each case to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and
September 6, 2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be
imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 216146, August 24, 2016
ALFREDO L. CHUA, TOMAS L. CHUA AND MERCEDES P. DIAZ, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the Resolutions dated September 23, 20142 and January 6, 20153 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36764. The assailed resolutions affirmed the Decision4 dated March 27, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 107079 and Judgment5 dated November 23, 2012 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 43, which sentenced herein petitioners Alfredo L. Chua (Alfredo), Tomas L. Chua (Tomas) and Mercedes P. Diaz (Mercedes) (collectively
referred to as the petitioners) to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days of imprisonment for violation of Section 74,6 in relation to Section 144,7 of
the Corporation Code.

Antecedent Facts

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) aptly summed up the antecedents leading to the filing of the Complaint-Affidavit8 of Joselyn Chua
(Joselyn) against the petitioners:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[Joselyn] was a stockholder of Chua Tee Corporation of Manila. x x x [Alfredo] was the president and chairman of the board, while [Tomas] was the
corporate secretary and also a member of the board of the same corporation. x x x [Mercedes] was the accountant/bookkeeper tasked with the
physical custody of the corporate records.

On or about August 24, 2000, Joselyn invoked her right as a stockholder pursuant to Section 74 of the Corporation Code to inspect the records of
the books of the business transactions of the corporation, the minutes of the meetings of the board of directors and stockholders, as well as the
financial statements] of the corporation. She hired a lawyer to send demand letters to each of the petitioners for her right to inspect to be heeded.
However, she was denied of such right to inspect.

Joselyn likewise hired the services of Mr. Abednego Velayo (Mr. Velayo) from the accounting firm of Guzman Bocaling and Company to assist her in
examining the books of the corporation. Armed with a letter request[,] together with the list of schedules of audit materials, Mr. Velayo and his
group visited the corporation's premises for the supposed examination of the accounts. However, the books of accounts were not formally
presented to them and there was no list of schedules[,] which would allow them to pursue their inspection. Mr. Velayo testified that they failed to
complete their objective of inspecting the books of accounts and examine the recorded documents.9 (Citations omitted)
In the Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Quezon City Prosecutors' Office, Joselyn alleged that despite written demands, the petitioners conspired
in refusing without valid cause the exercise of her right to inspect Chua Tee Corporation of Manila's (CTCM) business transactions records, financial
statements and minutes of the meetings of both the board of directors and stockholders.10chanrobleslaw

In their Counter Affidavits,11 the petitioners denied liability. They argued that the custody of the records sought to be inspected by Joselyn did not
pertain to them. Besides, the physical records were merely kept inside the cabinets in the corporate office. Further, they did not prevent Joselyn
from inspecting the records. What happened was that Mercedes was severely occupied with winding up the affairs of CTCM after it ceased
operations. Joselyn and her lawyers then failed to set up an appointment with Mercedes. Joselyn, through counsel, then sent demand letters to
inspect the records. Not long after, Joselyn filed two cases, one of which was civil and the other, criminal, against the petitioners.

On July 4, 2001, an Information12 indicting the petitioners for alleged violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code
was filed before the MeTC of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 107079, raffled to Branch 43.

The Proceedings before the MeTC and the RTC

On January 30, 2002, the petitioners filed before the MeTC a Motion to Quash13 the Information filed against them. They argued that CTCM had
ceased to exist as a corporate entity since May 26, 1999. Consequently, when the acts complained of by Joselyn were allegedly committed in
August of 2000, the petitioners cannot be considered anymore as responsible officers of CTCM. Thus, assuming for argument's sake that the
petitioners actually refused to let Joselyn inspect corporate records, no criminal liability can attach to an omission to perform a duty, which no
longer existed. The MeTC, however, denied the petitioners' Motion to Quash.

Arraignment, pre-trial and trial then ensued. The prosecution offered the testimonies of Joselyn and Abednego Velayo (Velayo). On the other hand,
the petitioners neither presented witnesses, nor filed any documentary evidence.14chanrobleslaw

On November 23, 2012, the MeTC rendered its Judgment15 convicting the petitioners as charged, sentencing them to surfer the penalty of 30 days
of imprisonment, and directing them to pay the costs of suit. The MeTC cited Ang-Abaya, et al. v. Ang16 to stress that in the instant case, the
prosecution had amply established the presence of the elements of the offense under Section 74 of the Corporation Code, to wit: (a) a
stockholder's prior demand in writing for the inspection of corporate records; (b) refusal by corporate officers to allow the inspection; and (c)
proofs adduced by the corporate officers of the stockholder's prior improper or malicious use of the records in the event that the same is raised as
a defense for the refusal to allow the inspection.17 Further invoking Gokongwei, Jr. v. Securities and Exchange Commission,18 the MeTC explained
that a stockholder's right to inspect corporate records is based upon the necessity of self-protection.19 Thus, the exercise of the right at reasonable
hours during business days should be allowed.

In the Order20 dated March 26, 2013, the MeTC denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.21chanrobleslaw

The petitioners filed an appeal, which the RTC denied in the Decision22 rendered on March 27, 2014. The RTC agreed with the MeTC's ruling and
stated that the petitioners should have presented their evidence to contradict or rebut the evidence presented by the prosecution that has
overcome their constitutional right to be presumed innocent, before the lower court.23chanrobleslaw

In its Order24 dated July 4, 2014, the RTC denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.25cralawredchanrobleslaw

The Proceedings before the CA

The petitioners filed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. On September 23, 2014, the CA outrightly dismissed
the petition on technical grounds, i.e., failure to submit (a) true copies or duplicate originals of the MeTC's Judgment dated November 23, 2012 and
Order dated March 26, 2013, and (b) a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing Alfredo to file the petition and sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of Tomas and Mercedes.26chanrobleslaw

On October 15, 2014, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,27 to which they appended their belated compliance with the formal
requirements pointed out by the CA. Pending resolution of the motion, Rosario Sui Lian Chua (Rosario), mother of the now deceased Joselyn, filed
an Affidavit of Desistance28 dated December 11, 2014, which in part stated that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
After taking stock of the situation of the [petitioners] in the above-captioned case, and considering moreover that [Alfredo and Tomas] are both
uncles of [Joselyn], and are brothers of my now also-deceased husband, I and the rest of my family, have decided to condone any and all possible
criminal wrongdoings attributable to [the petitioners], and to absolve the latter of both civil and criminal liabilities in connection with the above-
captioned case;

In any event, we have reason to believe that the filing of the instant criminal case was merely the result of serious misunderstanding anent the
management and operation of [CTCM], which had long ceased to exist as a corporate entity even prior to the alleged commission of the crime in
question, rather than by reason of any criminal intent or actuation on the part of the [petitioners].29
On January 6, 2015, the CA issued the second assailed Resolution30 denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Issue

Unfazed, the petitioners filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of the propriety of their conviction
for alleged violation of Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code.31chanrobleslaw

The petitioners reiterate their stance that since CTCM had ceased business operations prior to Joselyn's filing of her complaint before the MeTC,
there was no longer any duty pertaining to corporate officers to allow a stockholder to inspect the records.32 The petitioners also aver that the
prosecution failed to prove by competent evidence that they had actually prevented Joselyn from exercising her right of inspection. They point out
that when Joselyn was cross-examined, she admitted that the petitioners had allowed her to see the records. However, since she had designated
her accountant to conduct the inspection, she was not able to physically view the records. Hence, she had no personal knowledge as to whether or
not the inspection of the specific records she requested was allowed or denied.33 Further, Velayo himself stated during the trial that the letters
demanding for inspection of the records were addressed to CTCM and not to the petitioners. Velayo also declared that he had no personal dealings
with the petitioners.34 Besides, Rosario's Affidavit of Desistance proves the frivolous nature of Joselyn's complaint and the unjustness of the
petitioners' conviction by the courts a quo.35chanrobleslaw

In its Comment,36 the OSG points out that under Section 122 of the Corporation Code, a corporate entity, "whose charter expires by its own
limitation" shall continue as "a body corporate for three (3) years after the time when it would have been so dissolved, for the purpose of
prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs." It follows then that CTCM continued as a body
corporate until May of 2002.37 Moreover, the board of directors is not rendered functus officio by reason of the corporation's dissolution.38
Liabilities incurred by officers shall not be removed or impaired by the subsequent dissolution of the corporation.39 It follows therefore that a
stockholder's right to inspect corporate records subsists during the period of liquidation.40chanrobleslaw

The OSG also emphasizes Velayo's testimony that upon his visit to CTCM's corporate office, the books of accounts were not formally presented and
no schedule was offered as to when the requested inspection can be conducted.41chanrobleslaw

Ruling of the Court

The Court affirms the conviction but directs the payment of fine, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the, courts a quo.

Procedural Matters

The CA's outright dismissal of the petition for review filed before it

The CA outrightly dismissed on technical grounds the petition for review filed before it under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Thereafter, the
petitioners filed their belated compliance to correct the procedural flaws referred to by the CA. They explained that their failure to immediately
submit the requisite SPA authorizing Alfredo to sign the verification and certification against non-forum shopping, and act in behalf of Tomas and
Mercedes was due to the fact that the latter two were out of the country when the petition was filed. Anent the petitioners' non-submission of
true copies or duplicate originals of the MeTC judgment and order, they admitted their negligence, and prayed for the court's
indulgence.42chanrobleslaw

Fuji Television Network, Inc. v. Espiritu43 summarizes the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping,
viz.:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1)
A distinction must be made between non[-]compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non[-]compliance with
the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2)
As to verification, non[-]compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its
submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with
in order that the ends ofjustice may be served thereby.
3)
Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.
4)
As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5)
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be
dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping
substantially complies with the Rule.
x x x x44 (Italics and underscoring deleted)
In the case at bar, the petitioners complied with the procedural requirements belatedly, defectively, or substantially. They explained the reasons
for their lapses and begged for the court's understanding. It likewise bears noting that the petitioners share common interests and causes of action
as regards the petition for review filed before the CA.

Tible & Title Company, Inc., et al. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, et al.45 is emphatic that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Courts are not slaves or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that on balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.46
(Italics in the original)
Prescinding therefrom, the Court finds that the CA had committed reversible error in outrightly dismissing the petition filed before it. The Court
does not perceive intentional disregard of procedures on the part of the petitioners. The circumstances, thus, call for a relaxation of the rules in the
interest of substantial justice.

The effect of an Affidavit of Desistance executed after an action has already been instituted in court

"By itself, an affidavit of desistance or pardon is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once the action has been instituted in
court."47chanrobleslaw

In the case at bench, Rosario's affidavit, which was executed during the pendency of the petition for review before the CA, did not abate the
proceedings. This properly springs from the rule that in a criminal action already filed in court, the private complainant loses the right or absolute
privilege to decide whether the charge should proceed.

On Substantive Matters

Despite the expiration of CTCM's corporate term in 1999, duties as corporate officers still pertained to the petitioners when Joselyn's complaint
was filed in 2000.

Yu, et al. v. Yukayguan, et al.48 instructs that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

[T]he corporation continues to be a body corporate for three (3) years after its dissolution for purposes of prosecuting and defending suits by and
against it and for enabling it to settle and close its affairs, culminating in the disposition and distribution of its remaining assets. x x x The
termination of the life of a juridical entity does not by itself cause the extinction or diminution of the rights and liabilities of such entity x x x nor
those of its owners and creditors. x x x.49chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, Sections 122 and 145 of the Corporation Code explicitly provide for the continuation of the body
corporate for three years after dissolution. The rights and remedies against, or liabilities of, the officers shall not be removed or impaired by reason
of the dissolution of the corporation. Corollarily then, a stockholder's right to inspect corporate records subsists during the period of liquidation.
Hence, Joselyn, as a stockholder, had the right to demand for the inspection of records. Lodged upon the corporation is the corresponding duty to
allow the said inspection.

It is beyond the ambit of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to recalibrate the evidence considered in the proceedings below.
However, the Court notes circumstances justifying the modification of the assailed resolutions.

The Court notes that in the course of the trial, the petitioners presented neither testimonial nor documentary evidence to prove their innocence.50
The MeTC rendered a judgment of conviction, which the RTC and the CA affirmed in toto.

It is settled that "a re-examination of factual findings is outside the province of a petition for review on certiorari,"51 especially in the instant
petition where the MeTC, RTC and CA concurred in convicting the petitioners of the charges against them.

Be that as it may, the Court takes exception and notes the following circumstances: (a) during cross-examination, Joselyn admitted that permission
was granted for her to see the documents, but she was unable to actually view them as she was represented by her accountant; (b) Joselyn lacked
personal knowledge as to whether or not the petitioners in fact allowed or denied the checking of the records she had requested; (c) Velayo stated
that the letter requesting for the examination of CTCM's records was addressed to the Accounting Department, and he and his colleagues did not
have personal dealings with the petitioners.52chanrobleslaw

From the foregoing, it is apparent that a complete examination of CTCM's records did not occur resulting to an effective deprivation of Joselyn's
right as a stockholder. However, from Joselyn and Velayo's testimonies, it can be inferred that permission to view the records was granted, albeit
not fully effected. The petitioners, on their part, explained in the Counter-Affidavit filed before the Quezon City Prosecution Office that they never
prevented Joselyn from exercising her right of inspection, but when the latter made her request, Mercedes was too occupied in winding up the
affairs of CTCM.53chanrobleslaw

While a cloud of doubt is cast upon the existence of criminal intent on the part of the petitioners, it is jurisprudentially settled that proof of malice
or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses punishable by special laws, which are mala prohibita.54chanrobleslaw

In the case at bar, the petitioners were charged with violations of Section 74, in relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code, a special law.
Accordingly, since Joselyn was deprived of the exercise of an effective right of inspection, offenses had in fact been committed, regardless of the
petitioners' intent. The Corporation Code provides for penalties relative to the commission of offenses, which cannot be trivialized, lest the public
purpose for which they are crafted be defeated and put to naught.

No exceptional grounds exist justifying the reversal of the conviction previously rendered by the MeTC, RTC and CA. However, in lieu of the penalty
of 30 days of imprisonment, the Court finds it more just to impose upon each of the petitioners a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
considering the reasons below. First. Malicious intent was seemingly wanting. Permission to check the records was granted, albeit not effected.
Second. Joselyn had predeceased Alfredo and Tomas, her uncles, who are in their twilight years. Third. Joselyn's mother, Rosario, had executed an
Affidavit of Desistance stating that the filing of the complaint before was "merely the result of [a] serious misunderstanding anent the management
and operation of [CTCM], which had long ceased to exist as a corporate entity even prior to the alleged commission of the crime in question, rather
than by reason of any criminal intent or actuation on the part of the [petitioners]."55chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the conviction of Alfredo L. Chua, Tomas L. Chua and Mercedes P. Diaz for violations of Section 74, in
relation to Section 144, of the Corporation Code is AFFIRMED, but MODIFIED to the extent that in lieu of the penalty of thirty (30) days of
imprisonment, a FINE of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) each is imposed upon the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perlata, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 11159, August 07, 1916 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEEE, VS. MANUEL B. ASENSI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
JOHNSON, J.:

This defendant was charged with the crime of estafa. The first complaint was presented on the 31st of March, 1915. Later, on the 10th of April,
1915, an amended complaint was presented, which alleged:
"That on or about October 1, 1914, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused, being an employee of the Compañia General de
Tabacos de Filipinas, a corporation duly organized and established in the said city, did, in the following manner, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
defraud the said corporation Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas, of which he was an employee, to wit: the said accused, being an employee
of the said corporation Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas, and, by reason of his employment having obtained and received, at and in the
aforesaid time and place, from the cashier of the said corporation, the sum of three thousand, four hundred and eighty-seven pesos and fifty
centavos (P3,487.50), Philippine currency, belonging to the said corporation, for the purpose of employing it in the purchase of internal-revenue
stamps for the use of the said company in its mercantile transactions in its distillery La Clementina, did spend in the acquisition and purchase of the
said stamps only the sum of P3,087.50, Philippine currency, retaining, appropriating to himself and diverting the sum of P400, Philippine currency,
from the sum aforementioned, to the harm and prejudice of the said corporation Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinos, to the extent of the
said sum of P400, Philippine currency, equivalent to 2,000 pesetas; an act committed with violation of law."
Said complaint was duly sworn to. Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arraigned and tried. After hearing the evidence adduced during the
trial of the cause, the Honorable James A. Ostrand, judge, found that the same showed that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged in the
complaint beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of four months and one day of arresto mayor, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 534 of the Penal Code, in relation with paragraph 5 of article 535 of the same Code, to
indemnify the offended corporation in the sum of P400, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions
of the law, and to pay the costs.

From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court. The appellant alleges that the lower court committed the following errors:

"1. The court erred in admitting in his decision the existence of any person injured by the commission of the crime under prosecution, when in fact
no evidence whatever was presented tending to show the personality of the company alleged to have been prejudiced.
"2. The court erred in holding that the defendant appropriated to himself the difference between the sums received by him for the purchase of
stamps and the sums spent for this purpose.

"3. The court erred in holding that the defendant appropriated to himself the difference aforementioned, notwithstanding the contradictory
evidence of record of the defendant's having an open current account in which the sums he received were charged, the court failing to give due
legal consideration to such debit charges.

"4. The court erred in admitting in evidence against the defendant, Exhibit E, the same having been obtained by insidious machinations consisting
of a promise of exemption from punishment."

With reference to the first assignment of error, the appellant cites many provisions of the various Codes in support of his argument that there was
no proof showing that the offended corporation was legally constituted. From an examination of the record we find:

First: That the defendant recognized the existence of the offended corporation by having been in its employment for a period of twenty to twenty-
five years.
Second: He further recognized the existence of the of fended corporation in a letter signed by him and directed to said corporation, dated the 19th
day of March, 1915, a few days before the complaint in the present cause was presented.

Third: The defendant further recognized the existence of said offended corporation by a certain receipt marked Exhibit C, in which he
acknowledged that he had received from said corporation the sum of P3,487.50.

Fourth: The existence of the corporation is further supported by the testimony of Damian Urmeneta, who swore positively that the offended
corporation is "a corporation duly registered in the mercantile register of the Philippine Islands; that it resided in Manila, with its head office in
Barcelona; that it had existed and had done business in the Philippine Islands for a period of thirty years."

The testimony of Damian Urmeneta was admitted without objection. If the appellant was not satisfied with the character of the proof presented,
he should have presented his objection in the court below and thereby have given the prosecution an opportunity to have presented other and
additional proof. The proof adduced was sufficient to satisfy the lower court upon that question. In view of the admission of the defendant, in the
manner indicated above, we are not now inclined to modify the conclusion of the lower court, by reason of the said alleged error. When the
existence of a corporation is alleged in a complaint in a criminal action, it is not necessary to present its articles of incorporation for the purpose of
proving the legal existence of said corporation. It is sufficient ordinarily to prove that said corporation existed and had been doing business as
such. After the defendant had recognized the existence of the corporation for a period of twenty to twenty-five years, and had received money
from it in large sums, he should not be heard to dispute the existence of said corporation. When it is proven that an individual has dealt with a
corporation, thereby recognizing its existence, he will be, under facts such as are proved in the present case, estopped to deny the corporate
existence of said corporation. (Tipton Fire Company vs. Barnheisel, 92 Ind., 88; Lakeside Ditch Company vs. Crane, 80 Cal., 181; Skinner vs.
Richardson, etc., Co., 76 Wis., 464.)

The appellant insists, under the provisions of the various Codes which he cites, that the law requires the said corporation to do many things before
it was authorized to exist and to do business within the Philippine Islands. Admitting that the law does require it to do many things which were not
proved during the trial of the cause, yet there is a presumption in favor of the corporation that all of the requirements of the law had been
complied with. (Par. 31, sec. 334, Code of Civ. Proc.) The presumption is that the provisions of law have been complied with by the corporation.
(Sargent vs. Webster, 13 Metcalf (Mass.), 497; Ashtabula, etc., R. R. Co. vs. Smith, 15 Ohio St., 328; Bank of Minneapolis vs. Griffin, 168 111., 314.)

Taking into consideration the proof adduced during the trial of the cause, together with the fact that the defendant himself had dealt with the
offended corporation as such, we are not inclined to modify the sentence of the lower court by reason of the first assignment of error.

With reference to the second assignment of error the appellant contends that the lower court committed an error in its finding of facts in holding
that he appropriated the difference between the sum of money received from the offended corporation for the purchase of stamps and the
amount which he actually used in the purchase of stamps. The evidence shows that the defendant represented to the offended corporation that he
needed the sum of P3,487.50, for the purpose of purchasing internal revenue stamps. Upon his representation the offended corporation executed
and delivered a check payable to the Collector of Internal Revenue, in the sum of P3.487.50 (Exhibit D) on the 1st of October, 1914. On the same
day (October 1, 1914) the defendant signed a receipt (Exhibit C) acknowledging that he had received from the offended corporation the sum of
P3,487.50 to be used for the purchase of internal-revenue stamps. It was a part of the duty of the defendant to purchase internal-revenue stamps
for the offended corporation, and in order to do that it became his duty to make a report to the proper officers of the offended corporation, from
time to time, showing the number of stamps which were necessary. By reference to Exhibit A it will be found that he made a representation to one
of the officers of the corporation, on October 1, 1914, upon a blank furnished by the internal-revenue department, showing the number of stamps
which were necessary. Exhibit B is a stub in the book from which Exhibit A was taken, and shows exactly the same facts with reference to the
number of stamps necessary to be purchased, as represented by the defendant. The amount which the defendant claimed was necessary in both
Exhibits A and B was P3,087.50. On the reverse side of said Exhibit C the defendant indicated again the number of stamps which were necessary to
be purchased. In his representation concerning the number of stamps necessary to be purchased, as it appears on the back of Exhibit C, it will be
noted that in that representation he claimed that he needed the sum of P3,487.50 instead of P3,087.50, as he had theretofore represented in
Exhibit A. Comparing the two statements, with reference to the number of stamps which he claimed were necessary, as represented by Exhibits A
and 0 and that which appears upon the back of Exhibit C, it will appear that in the second item on Exhibit A the sum was represented as P800, while
the second item on the back of Exhibit C is P1,200; in other words, when he made his representation to the officer of the corporation who
delivered to him the check, he represented that he needed the sum of P3,487.50, whereas he had theretofore represented to other officers of the
corporation who had nothing to do with the delivery of the money to the defendant that he needed the sum of P3,087.50, and the fact is that he
purchased stamps amounting to P3,087.50 only. The record further shows that the defendant presented Exhibit A to the receiving teller of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, together with the check Exhibit D, and received the number of stamps represented by Exhibit A, amounting to the sum
of P3,087.50, and received from said receiving teller the difference between the amount paid for the stamps and the amount of said check
(P3,487.50),. or the sum of P400, in bank notes. The record further shows that the stamps thus purchased were delivered to the offended
corporation, but no account is given or explanation made, except that which is found in the confession made by the defendant in his letter Exhibit E
concerning the P400 in cash which he received as change from the receiving teller. So far as the record shows the P400 is still in his possession. He
has neither offered to return the same to the offended corporation nor to account for it.

In the third assignment of error the appellant contends, in fact, that the defendant had an open account with the offended corporation and that
there was still due him on said account certain sums of money. The fact that there was an account between the offended corporation and the
defendant is not denied. It is asserted, and the record sustains the contention, that there was no account between the offended corporation and
the defendant with reference to the "stamp account." The record shows that the offended corporation, from time to time, upon the
representation of the defendant, delivered to him certain sums of money for the purpose of purchasing the necessary internal-revenue stamps;
that the checks issued to him from time to time were always for the exact number of stamps necessary and that the delivery of the stamps always
balanced the particular account. There was no open account with reference to the "stamp account" between the defendant and the offended
corporation. The "stamp account" was closed when the check was made to the Collector of Internal Revenue and the stamps were delivered. The
check was made out to pay for a certain number of stamps, which number the defendant had theretofore represented as necessary. The defendant
was not charged with that amount nor with any other amount relating to the stamps. It was his duty simply to ascertain the number of stamps
required from time to time, to obtain a check for the amount necessary, payable to the Collector of Internal Revenue, and to use the same in their
purchase. Thereafter his responsibility was to purchase the necessary stamps. When he, by the method adopted by him in the present case,
appropriated to his own use any of said amount or sum he committed a crime against his employer, the offended corporation.

With reference to the fourth assignment of error, it may be noted that the sentence of the lower court is not based upon the confession of the
defendant, as found in Exhibit E. The lower court was convinced that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged, without reference to said
confession. The alleged confession is found in Exhibit E. Exhibit E is a long letter written and signed by the defendant directed to the offended
corporation. The letter bears date of the 19th of March, 1915, and was written several days before the complaint in the present case was
presented. The complaint was not presented until nearly twelve days after said letter was addressed to the employer of the defendant. In said
Exhibit E the defendant admits that he and another employee had from time to time, from the 12th of July, 1911, until the 8th of March, 1915,
appropriated money belonging to the offended corporation, in the sum of more than P40,000. Said Exhibit E contains a description of the method
by which said illegal appropriations were made. If his statements in said letter are true, the method adopted in the present case by which he
appropriated the sum of P400 is substantially the same method which he had adopted in the illegal appropriation of the other large sums.

The appellant alleges that said confession was given under a promise of immunity. The record does show that some subordinate employees of said
offended corporation did suggest to the defendant that an open confession from him, together with a return of the funds misappropriated, might
relieve him from prosecution on the part of the offended corporation. Perhaps the confession was made under the hope that it would relieve him
from criminal responsibility. There is nothing in the record, however, which shows that the inducement offered was sufficient to estop the
offended corporation from asking for the prosecution of the defendant for his crime. Neither was it made by any person having authority sufficient
to bind said corporation. We are fully persuaded that the confession found in Exhibit B was made freely and without a promise or a hope of
reward, and is therefore admissible as evidence against him. Moreover, we find from a careful examination of the entire record that the evidence
adduced during the trial of the cause, without considering said Exhibit E, is sufficient to show that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged in
the complaint in the manner and form therein described.

Having found that none of the alleged errors assigned by the appellant were committed by the lower court and that the evidence is sufficient to
show the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion and so hold that the sentence of the lower court should be and
is hereby affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

Torres, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., concurs in the result.
[ G.R. No. 2116, March 16, 1906 ]
BERNARDINO CACNIO ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. LAZARO BAENS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

DECISION
TORRES, J.:

The defendant, Lazaro Baens, brought an action in the court of the justice of the peace of Tambobong against the plaintiffs herein for the recovery
of several tracts of land, and judgment having been rendered against the said plaintiffs, they appealed to the Court of First Instance. The plaintiffs,
now appellants, alleged that they were the absolute owners of their respective building lots in the barrio of Hulong Duhat of the said town of
Tambobong and described the boundaries of each particular tract, asked that they be declared to be entitled to the ownership and possession of
their respective lots; that they be awarded the sum of 600 dollars damages and the costs of proceedings; and as a special remedy prayed for a
preliminary injunction to stop further proceedings in the action for ejectment which had been brought against them, alleging in support of their
petition that the land belonging to Bernardino Cacnio had a superficial area of 11 ares 95 centares and 15 square centimeters, and that belonging
to Severino de la Cruz had 4 ares 60 centares and 55 square centimeters, which said land they acquired by inheritance from their respective
parents, who had been in possession of the same for more than forty years; the defendant, Baens, never having been in possession of the same.

The preliminary injunction prayed for in order to stay the execution of the judgments which might have been entered in the actions in which the
plaintiffs, Cacnio and Cruz, were interested, until the final disposition of the other action for title and possession, having been issued, the
defendant demurred and in his answer to the complaint, filed immediately thereafter, generally and specifically denied all of the allegations
contained therein. The denial of the second paragraph of the complaint was limited to the statement contained in the same that without just cause
the defendant had brought the action, and that in view of the ruling upon the said demurrer, the defendant reproduced his former answer.

Counsel for plaintiffs asked that the fourth paragraph of the complaint be amended so as to read that the plaintiffs acquired the possession and
ownership of their respective lands by inheritance from their father, Severino de la. Cruz, and his wife, Bernardina Cacnio, and asked that the
inscription of the said land made in favor of the defendant, Haens, be declared null and void.

The defendant stated that he had no objection to the allowance of these amendments, but that he specifically denied each and all of the
allegations contained therein.

Counsel for plaintiffs limited himself to impugning in writing the probatory force of the documents presented by the defendant, but did not discuss
the materiality of the same. Counsel for defendant, therefore, asked the court to consider the proof presented by him as having been duly allowed.
The court reserved his decision upon the question of the admissibility of these documents offered in evidence by the defendant, directed that the
case proceed and the evidence be taken; and after hearing the same, judgment was rendered on the 8th day of September, 1903, declaring that
the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover the lands claimed by the defendant, and vacating the preliminary injunction theretofore issued in favor of
the plaintiffs, who were taxed with the costs.

First of all and for the purpose of this decision, we should state that to the order of the court of the 30th of October, 1903, denying the motion for
a new trial, no exception was taken by counsel for plaintiffs as required in paragraph 3, section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We can not,
therefore, review the evidence, nor can we draw from the facts proved the necessary conclusions to render a final judgment; as justice and equity
require, to quote the law itself.

Consequently this court, following the general provision contained in the first paragraph of above-cited section 497, will only pass upon the
question of law decided by the court below.

The plaintiffs brought an action to recover title to certain parcels of land then in their possession. The defendant denied the title and possession
which the plaintiffs claimed to the land in controversy. The question then arises, Which of the parties has the better title to the land?

The title deeds presented, by the defendant were issued by the Direccion General de Administration Civil on the 25th of October, 1891, to him as
the owner of a larger tract of land in which the land in question is included, the defendant having acquired the same by composition with the
Government. This deed or patent was recorded in the Registry of Property on the 14th of November, 1891, as found by the court below, and as is
admitted in the printed briefs presented to this court and in the record of the documentary proof presented by the defendant. Counsel for
plaintiffs denied the validity of the said deed, giving his reasons therefor, but did not deny the fact that the document had been actually recorded,
nor did he ask the court to disallow and reject the documentary evidence thus presented. The court, after considering this evidence, dismissed the
action, and decided the same in favor of the defendant.

Public instruments, that is to say, those instruments authorized by a notary public or by a competent public official with all the solemnities required
by law, are admissible in evidence even against a third party as to the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (Arts.
1216 and 1218 of the Civil Code.)

In the registry of real estate there should be recorded, according to articles 1 and 2 of the Mortgage Law, among others, all instruments of
conveyance of real estate or any interests therein, all instruments relating to the acquisition of such property or property rights owned or
administered by the State, and other "entities referred to in number 6, article 2 of the said law.

As has been seen, the deed presented by the defendant to prove his title to the land in question is a public instrument, it having been authorized
by the Director of Civil Administration of the Spanish Government, who was the competent official empowered to issue such instrument, and was
duly recorded in the Registry of Property in accordance with the law. Consequently it is competent proof and may prejudice third persons who for
the purpose of this law are those who did not participate in the execution of the instrument of contract thus recorded. (Arts. 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27
of the Mortgage Law.)

The inscription, therefore, of the instruments in question prejudices the plaintiffs, Cacnio and Cruz, notwithstanding the fact that they did not
participate in the proceedings relating to the composition of the said land between the State and the defendant, and in view of the provisions of
article 27 of the Mortgage Law there can be no doubt that the said plaintiffs should be considered as third persons, whom the execution of the
deed or instrument of the defendant and the inscription thereof in the Registry of Property affected and prejudiced.

It has not been shown that the deed or patent issued by the Direccion General de Administration Civil had any substantial defect which would
render it null and void, nor has it been proved that the party failed to publish the necessary notice as to the possession of the land to which the
said deed refers; and under paragraph 31 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it must be presumed that this was done in accordance with
the law until the contrary is shown.
The defendant having complied with all the requisites and solemnities prescribed by law for the registration of the said deed, and there being no
proof of any defect which would render such instrument null and void, it can not be held to be void, and it was so decided by the court below in its
judgment.

The question is raised as to whether the parol evidence introduced by the plaintiffs for the purpose of showing that they bad acquired title to the
land, the recovery of which is now sought, by extraordinary prescription under article 1959 of the Civil Code was sufficient to overcome and defeat
the right of the defendant based upon a deed issued to him by the State and duly recorded in the Registry of Property. The court below in deciding
this question held that the deed or patent issued by the Direccion General de Administracion Civil showed that the defendant had a better right
than the1 plaintiffs to the land in question, and that the latter had no right to claim the ownership thereof. This ruling of the court should, in our
opinion, be sustained, and can not in this case be reviewed, according to section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Further, it should be borne in mind that the court below, in the exercise of its discretion as to the veracity of the witnesses and the manner in
which they testified, followed the provision of section 273 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure, and no valid reason has been assigned to support
a finding that the court below committed an error in rendering the decision appealed from.

For the reasons hereinbefore stated we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, and the defendant acquitted
of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs, with the costs of this instance. After the expiration of twenty days, let judgment be entered in accordance
herewith, and let the cause be remanded to the Court of First Instance for execution of the judgment. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson, and Willard, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9460. April 23, 1957.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SANTIAGO UY, Defendant-Appellee.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

This is an appeal from the order of the Manila court of first instance dismissing the information filed against Santiago Uy on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did not constitute the crime of falsification of an official document with which he was charged. The pertinent allegations were
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 14th day of January, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being a field agent of the National Bureau of
Investigation of the Department of Justice, duly appointed, qualified and acting as such and hence a public officer, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify or caused to be falsified and commit acts of falsification in the Personnel Information Sheet of the said office
which is a public and official document, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, well knowing that having been born of Chinese parents,
he is a Chinese citizen and as such is not qualified to hold a public office of confidential and delicate nature, in the Philippine Government, but
having somehow obtained employment as field agent of the National Bureau of Investigation but desiring to continue in such employment, filled
up or caused to be filled up the blanks in the said Personnel Information Sheet of said office stating therein that he was a naturalized Filipino
citizen, a first grade civil service eligible and attended the first year law course of the Far Eastern University in 1942 when in truth and in fact as said
accused fully knew those statements were false and untrue and made solely to convince the authorities of the said office that he was fit and
qualified to continue in such employment, thus making untruthful statements in the narration of facts, and once the said Personnel Information
Sheet was falsified in the manner above set forth, the said accused, in pursuance of his desire to mislead the authorities so that he may be retained
as field agent in the said office, executed an affidavit on the last page of said Personnel Information Sheet . . .’ (Italics ours.)

Two main reasons were cited by the Judge in his order of dismissal: (a) the position of an N.B.I. agent (National Bureau of Investigation) was
confidential in nature, not requiring citizenship nor civil service qualifications, therefore the untruthful statements did not violate the integrity of
the document; and (b) defendant made the statement as to Filipino citizenship in good faith, because he honestly believed he was such, inasmuch
as he was born in 1918 at which time the principle of jus soli prevailed.

For the purposes of this decision we have to assume that the following allegations of fact or partly of fact in the information are true, or could be
proven by the prosecution at the trial:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The document was an official document; 2. The accused had no civil service eligibility, but stated therein that he was a first-grade eligible; 3. He
never attended the first-year-law course but he stated therein he had attended that course in the Far Eastern University; 4. He wrote therein he
was a naturalized citizen, although he was not; 5. He made the statements solely to convince the authorities that "he was fit and qualified to
continue in the employment" and to mislead the authorities into retaining him as field agent.

In view of the allegations in No. 5 which must be admitted in a motion to quash, we find it was error to hold the falsities were immaterial or did not
violate the integrity of the document. Precisely because the position was confidential in nature, the authorities had a leeway in the matter of
appointing or retaining field agents of the N.B.I. (National Bureau of Investigation); therefore the facts falsely stated by him could very properly be
considered by the authorities, and if the allegations of the information must be believed, they were really and actually considered. In the
circumstances the courts could not declare such facts to be prima facie immaterial. Indeed, as the Civil Service itself admits the appointing officer’s
right to demand civil service requirements and/or citizenship for confidential positions, the prosecution might prove in support of its allegation as
to defendant’s purposes that in the National Bureau of Investigation there is the practice (or a regulation) making civil service eligibility or
citizenship 1 a matter of importance in the selection of field agents.

Anyway, defense contends, as the accused was already a field agent of the N.B.I. he could not be discharged whatever his qualifications might be,
for the reason that section 3 of Republic Act No. 157 provided "that the present personnel of the Division of Investigation shall be transferred to,
and form the nucleus of the new Bureau (N.B.I.) ." Supposing the accused was a part of the "present personnel" 2 referred to in the said section 3,
the provision however must be read in the light of its first part which says "the composition and size of the personnel of the Bureau of Investigation
shall be determined by the Director of the Bureau of Investigation" which means that although this defendant had been transferred to the Bureau
he was not thereby assured permanent retention as "field agent" without regard to the other plans of the Director of the N.B.I. The Director could,
under section 3 make the accused a mere desk man, or office assistant, not necessarily a "field agent." And herein lies the materiality of the
information sheet with its contents. The prosecution alleges this defendant made the false statement for the purpose of inducing his retention as
field agent; and such purpose is not precluded by a mere inference from section 3 of Republic Act 157 drawn by defendant — inference which is
inconclusive. It should be underlined in this connection that as the law expressly gives preference to law graduates (section 4) it is not illogical to
believe that law students may likewise enjoy preference; hence defendant’s false statement about having attended first-year law, far from being
entirely innocent, materially affected the document.

The court of first instance held the sheet to be a public document. The defendant however maintains it is not. He has a right to support the
appealed order of dismissal with reasons different from those of the court a quo; he is not bound by them. However, it can not be seriously
contended that a document required by a Bureau to be filled by its officers for purposes of its record and information is not an official document.

The provision allegedly violated by defendant is Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code which partly reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who; taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x"
That the defendant took advantage of his position may be gathered from the fact that he himself filled the information sheet which obviously was
to be submitted by each and every officer or employee of the N.B.I.

Last contention of the defendant is the court’s lack of jurisdiction. It is based on his opinion that the crime was a mere falsification of a certificate of
merit under Article 174 of the Revised Penal Code. This contention must be overruled, because as above stated the violation is prosecuted under
Article 171.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed order is revoked and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. So ordered.

Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23614 February 27, 1970
PEDRO M. BERMEJO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

ZALDIVAR, J.:

These two cases, being interrelated, are decided together.

These are appeals from the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, rendered on June 3, 1964, dismissing two petitions for certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction: one filed by petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo against City Judge Isidro Barrios and City Fiscal Quirico Abela
of Roxas City, docketed as Special Civil Case No. V-2721; and the other filed by petitioner Jovita Carmorin against the same respondents, docketed
as Special Civil Case No. V-2723.

In G.R. No. L-23614, petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo and Julia "Doe" (her identity at the time was unknown) were charged in the city court of Roxas
City, on August 22, 1963, of the crime of falsification of public or official document in an information filed by the city fiscal. It was alleged in the
information that on or about the 25th day of February 1963, in Roxas City, the two accused, being private individuals, conspired and confederated
together and mutually helped each other, and willfully and feloniously prepared and executed a document consisting of an amended petition for
habeas corpus entitled "Pedro M. Bermejo and Jovita Carmorin, petitioners, vs. Jose M. Bernales and Wilfredo Bernales, respondents", which
petition Pedro M. Bermejo signed while Julia "Doe" placed her thumbmark over the name "Jovita Carmorin", which petition was subscribed and
sworn to by the two accused before the Clerk of Court, and filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 2669,
thus the two accused stated and made it appear in the amended petition that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita Carmorin as one of the
petitioners when in truth and in fact the said Jovita Carmorin never signed and swore to it, because it was in fact the accused Julia "Doe" who
signed and swore to that petition as Julia Carmorin.

Relying on the certification of the city fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been conducted by him and that he had examined the witnesses
under oath before filing the information, the City Judge, Hon. Isidro O. Barrios, issued, on August 24, 1963, an order for the arrest of accused
Bermejo. To prevent his incarceration, said accused put up the necessary bond.

Upon arraignment, Bermejo filed a motion to quash the information alleging in substance: (1) that the information did not charge an offense
because the amended petition for habeas corpus (in Special Proceeding No. V-2669 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz), allegedly falsified, is not
a document contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and that in a previous judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz in the habeas corpus proceedings it was declared that the thumbmark in the amended petition was that of Jovita Carmorin; and
(2) that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because the warrant issued for his arrest was illegal, Judge Barrios having issued the
same without first examining the witnesses under oath and in the form of searching questions and answers as required under Republic Act 3828.

The city fiscal filed his opposition to the motion to quash, contending that the petition for habeas corpus is a public document; that the provisions
of Republic Act 3828 are applicable only to municipal judges and not to city judges; and that the principle of res judicata, or conclusiveness of
judgment, cannot be invoked by the accused. After Bermejo had filed a supplement to his motion to quash and a reply to the city fiscal's
opposition, respondent City Judge, on October 5, 1963, issued an order denying the motion to quash.

On October 14, 1963, Bermejo filed his motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied for lack of merit. Thereupon he filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Capiz, naming as respondents City Judge Isidro Barrios
and City Fiscal Quirico Abela, contending that City Fiscal Abela committed a grave abuse of discretion in filing an information against him without
conducting the proper preliminary investigation, and that the City Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash,
raising practically the same issues that he raised in the motion to quash before the city court, and praying that respondent City Judge be enjoined
from hearing the criminal case against him during the pendency of the special civil action in the Court of First Instance.

In G.R. No. L-23615, Jovita Carmorin was charged by respondent City Fiscal Quirico Abela with perjury, on August 23, 1963, in the same city court of
Roxas City (Criminal Case No. 4452) for allegedly having "subscribed and swore to an affidavit ... that she was really the one who signed with her
thumbmark as Jovita Carmorin ... the amended petition for habeas corpus ... when in truth and in fact, as she very well knew, she had not done
such act of signing with her thumbmark said petition and it was another person, who signed with a thumbmark said petition as Jovita Carmorin ... ."
The city fiscal also certified that he had conducted the preliminary investigation in accordance with law before filing the information.

On the basis of the certification by the city fiscal that he had conducted the proper preliminary investigation, respondent City Judge Barrios issued
an order for the arrest of accused Carmorin. After posting a bond, said accused, thru her counsel, Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo (the same person
accused in the falsification case), filed a motion to quash the information, alleging substantially, that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over
her person because the warrant of arrest issued for her arrest was improvidently issued, the respondent City Judge having issued the same without
examining the witnesses personally in the form of searching questions and answers in violation of "Republic Act 3828, and that no offense was
committed by the accused because it had already been declared by the Court of First Instance of Capiz in the habeas corpus case (Special
Proceedings No. V-2669) that the thumbmark appearing in the petition for habeas corpus was the true thumbmark of accused Carmorin.

After the city fiscal has filed his opposition to the motion to quash, and the accused, her reply, on October 15, 1963, City Judge Barrios issued an
order denying the motion to quash. Carmorin's motion for reconsideration having been denied, she likewise filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, also naming as respondents City Judge Barrios and City Fiscal
Abella, imputing abuse of discretion on the part of City Fiscal Abella in filing an information against her without conducting the proper preliminary
investigation, and on the part of respondent Judge Barrios in denying her motion to quash, raising the same questions raised by her in her motion
to quash before the city court and also praying that respondent City Judge be enjoined from hearing the case pending decision of the special civil
action.

On November 22, 1963, respondent city fiscal filed answers to the two petitions, admitting some of the allegations in the petitions, and denying
others; and setting up the affirmative defense that the orders of respondent City Judge in the criminal cases against the two petitioners cannot be
the subject of the petitions for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of First Instance of Capiz because the city court of Roxas City issued said
orders in the exercise oaf its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, so that the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain
the petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before it, pursuant to Section 87, paragraph (e) of Republic Act 296, as amended by Section 6 of
Republic Act 3828.

Herein petitioners filed their replies to respondents' answers, asserting that the Court of First Instance of Capiz has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the two cases for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. After the parties had filed their memoranda in support of their
respective contentions regarding the jurisdiction of the court, the Court of First Instance of Capiz issued an order, on January 6, 1964, declaring that
it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the two special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the court set the
hearing of the two cases for January 24, 1964.

During the hearing of the two cases, which was held jointly, Atty. Bermejo appeared and testified in his behalf and in behalf of his co-accused
Carmorin, while Fiscal Quirico Abella testified for the prosecution. Thereafter, the parties filed their memoranda. On June 3, 1964, the Court of First
Instance of Capiz rendered a decision dismissing the two petitions, without pronouncement as to costs. Their joint motion for reconsideration
having been denied, herein petitioners brought the present appeals to this Court.

Before resolving the questions posed in these appeals, We consider it necessary to rule on the matter regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of First
instance of Capiz to take cognizance of the two petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction — a question that was properly raised by the respondents in the court below, although this question is not now raised in the appeals.
We hold that the Court of First Instance of Capiz erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions. Section 6 of Republic Act 3828, amending Section
87, paragraph (c) of the Judiciary Act. of 1948, provides in part, as follows:

Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and subprovinces and judges of municipal courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First
Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both, and in the absence of
the district judge, shall have like jurisdiction within the province as the Court of First Instance to hear applications for bail.

All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with justices of the peace of capitals and municipal court judges shall be tried and decided on
the merits by the respective justices of the peace or municipal judges. Proceedings had shall be recorded and decisions therein shall be appealable
direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be.1

The crime of falsification of a public or official document by a private individual, of which petitioner Bermejo is charged in the city court of Roxas
City in Criminal Case No. 4451, is punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, while the crime of perjury of which
petitioner Carmorin is charged in Criminal Case No. 4452 before the city court of Roxas City is punishable with arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period.2 Undoubtedly, these two cases fall within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court of Roxas City
and the Court of First Instance of Capiz. This Court, interpreting the aforequoted provision of Republic Act 3828, ruled that "[w]here the municipal
court (city court of Manila) has taken cognizance of a criminal case in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance, appeal must be
taken direct to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; and where the Court of First Instance has taken cognizance of such appeal in its
appellate jurisdiction and refused to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals, said Court of First Instance acted without jurisdiction.3 And this rule
applies even if the order is not a judgment on the merits because in cases of this nature the Court of First Instance exercises no supervisory
jurisdiction over the city court, and having concurrent jurisdiction the city court acts with "like jurisdiction" as the Court of First Instance.4 It is Our
view, therefore, that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723, now appealed to this Court, is null
and void because said court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of those cases. The two special civil actions against the City Judge and the City
Fiscal of Roxas City should have been filed with the Court of Appeals in aid of the latter's appellate jurisdiction over direct appeals from the decision
or order of the city court. We note, however, that the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz is correct insofar as it had dismissed the two
petitions in question.

Be that as it may, however, We believe that the error of the petitioners in filing their petitions for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz and the error of the latter court in taking cognizance of those petitions should not deter Us from
ruling on the questions raised in the present appeals. The record shows that these proceedings have been pending for more than six years, and
were We to remand these cases to the courts below so the petitions for certiorari should be brought up to the Court of Appeals, our action would
only cause further delay.

We shall, therefore, decide whether herein petitioners are right in assailing the correctness or legality of the proceedings in the city court of Roxas
City in connection with the two criminal cases filed against them, as they now contend in the present appeals.

While petitioners maintain in the court below that the City Fiscal of Roxas City has no power to initiate the investigation of cases without a previous
complaint by an offended party, they now admit in their brief that under the existing laws he can commence such preliminary inquiry.5
Nevertheless, petitioner Bermejo contends that before the city fiscal can conduct such preliminary investigation, there must be a violation of the
law, and in the instant case he avers that there was no violation of law. Basis of his argument is that the petition for habeas corpus not being a
document as contemplated in Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the city fiscal is precluded from conducting the preliminary investigation,
much less from filing the information, because Bermejo could not be prosecuted for falsification of the alleged public or official document.

The contention of Bermejo is untenable. In the case of U.S. v. Orera,6 a "document" is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly authorized
paper by which something is proved, evidenced or set forth. In U.S. v. Asensi,7 this Court held that any instrument authorized by a notary public or
a competent public official, with the solemnities required by law, is a public document. Section 38, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court,8 enumerates
the following as public writings:

(a) The written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial
and executive, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private writings.

The same principle also obtains in the United States, that "defendant's pleadings and papers, which were involved in civil actions and which were in
custody of county clerk as ex-oficio clerk of superior court in which action was pending, were 'public documents' and were within scope of subject
matter of statute making alteration of court records an offense."9 Considering that the petition for habeas corpus (Special Proceedings No. V-2669)
alleged the illegal confinement, or deprivation of liberty, of one Soterania Carmorin, and that said petition was duly subscribed and sworn to before
Clerk of Court Leopoldo B. Dorado and filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, forming, therefore, a part of the court records in said
proceedings, it cannot be disputed that said petition is a public or official document as contemplated in Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner Bermejo, therefore, cannot say that he committed no crime if it can be shown that, as charged in the information, he connived or
conspired with a certain Julia "Doe" in falsifying said petition by making it appear that Jovita Carmorin placed her thumbmark therein when in fact
she did not do so.

Petitioner Bermejo likewise complains that notwithstanding his request to be present at the preliminary investigation, the same was conducted in
his absence or behind his back thus denying him his day in court. We find however, in the record — and the court a quo so found too — that on
March 11, 1963, a subpoena was issued to Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo requiring him to appear at the office of the city fiscal of Roxas City on March 14,
1963 in an investigation. This subpoena was received by Bermejo on March 12, 1963, and on the same day he sent a letter to the city fiscal, which
was received by the latter in the afternoon of the same day, requesting that the investigation be postponed to March 19, 1963 because he Bermejo
had to attend to another case which was scheduled to be heard on the same date. The city fiscal acceded to his request, but because the fiscal's
office failed to notify him of the hearing on March 19, 1963, Bermejo was not present when the investigation was conducted on that day. The
preliminary investigation was conducted on the very day requested by Bermejo, and after finding that there was a prima facie case the city fiscal
filed the information against him on August 22, 1963.

It appears, therefore, that while the city fiscal failed to notify petitioner Bermejo that his request for postponement was granted, which should
have been done, it can also be said that Bermejo was not entirely blameless if the preliminary investigation was conducted in his absence. It was he
himself who set the date of the investigation in his request for postponement, but he did not bother to come on the date he fixed. Neither did he
try to find out what action the city fiscal had taken on his request for postponement, on any day before the date of the hearing set by him,
although he is living in Roxas City where the city fiscal holds his office. Moreover, the information was filed five months later, and this petitioner
never inquired, at least as to the status of his case. This behavior of petitioner cannot merit Our approval. It is obvious that he failed to employ the
standard of care or reasonable diligence that is expected of him. His unwarranted absence on the day of the hearing which he himself requested,
coupled with his seeming indifference or unconcern about his case, is a clear indication that he was guilty of gross negligence in the protection of
his rights. If he did not have his day in court, it was because of his own negligence. If he was really interested to attend the investigation, as he now
pretends, he should have taken pains to communicate with the city fiscal. This Court had ruled that in the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard. 10 Since petitioner Bermejo was
afforded the opportunity to appear at the preliminary investigation but did not take advantage of it, he has no one to blame but himself. Anyway,
said petitioner's rights can still be amply protected in the regular trial of the case against him in the city court where he can cross examine the
witnesses and present his evidence. 11

Furthermore, even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify petitioners, but had conducted the preliminary investigations ex parte, their rights to
due process could not have been violated for they are not entitled as of right to preliminary investigation. The numerous authorities 12 supporting
this view are not rendered obsolete, as claimed by petitioners, because Section 14, Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court invoked by them has no
application in their cases, it appearing that the new Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964 while the preliminary investigations conducted by
the city fiscal were conducted in 1963. 13 The Rules of Court are not penal statutes, and they cannot be given retroactive effect. 14

Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent city fiscal did not abuse his discretion in conducting the preliminary investigations and that he
filed the informations against herein petitioners in accordance with law, there is, therefore, no merit in the assertion of petitioners that the
warrants of arrest issued for their arrest were illegal. Besides, granting arguendo that the orders of arrest were tainted with irregularity, still the
posting by petitioners of their bail bonds amounted to a waiver of the effect of said defects.

There is merit in the assertion that the warrant of arrest was irregularly issued. Section 87 of the Judiciary Act as amended by Republic Act 3828
requires that the Municipal Judge issuing the same, personally, examine under oath the witnesses, and by searching questions and answers which
are to be reduced to writing. Here, instead of searching questions and answers, we have only the affidavits of respondent and her one witness.
Moreover, said affidavits were sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant of arrest.

However, the giving of bail bond by petitioner constitutes a waiver of the irregularity attending her arrest. Besides, by her other personal
appearances before the municipal court and the court a quo, petitioner voluntarily submitted herself to the court's jurisdiction. Hence, the absence
of preliminary examination becomes moot already, the court having acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and could therefore
proceed with the preliminary investigation proper." (Doce v. Branch II, Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al., supra; Luna v. Plaza, L-27511,
November 29, 1968).

The other point raised by petitioners in their contention that the respondent City Judge abused his discretion in denying their motion to quash is
that there was a judicial declaration in the habeas corpus case (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that the thumbmark appearing in the petition was
the genuine thumbmark of Jovita Carmorin, and that pronouncement is now conclusive so that they cannot be prosecuted for falsification or
perjury, as the case may be. This particular question should rather be submitted and threshed out in the city court during the trial. The record of
the habeas corpus proceeding is not before Us, and We have no means of knowing what actually transpired in that proceeding. The proper
determination of this question will involve not only the introduction and consideration of evidence, but also calls for a detailed inquiry on the
principle of estoppel by, or conclusiveness of, judgment.

Also devoid of merit is the other error pointed to by petitioners with respect to the alleged admission by respondents that they acted illegally,
capriciously, or in excess of jurisdiction. A cursory examination of their answers would reveal that what was admitted by respondent was the fact of
the filing by petitioners of their pleadings, but not the allegations contained therein, for, as shown in the record, respondents have staunchly
defended their acts and insisted that their actuations are legal or in accordance with law.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723 is set aside for having
been rendered by the court without jurisdiction, and the instant appeals are dismissed. We declare that the warrants of arrests issued, and the
informations filed, in Criminal Cases Nos. 4451 and 4452 of the City Court of Roxas City, are in accordance with law, and these cases should be
remanded to the City Court of Roxas City for trial on the merits. No pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41200 March 26, 19351
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIANO CU UNJIENG, JOHN DOE, and MANUEL CARLOS, defendants.
MARIANO CU UNJIENG, Appellant.

DIAZ, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

This case was brought to this court by virtue of the appeal taken by Mariano Cu Unjieng from the judgment rendered therein by the lower court
which sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor,
reserving to the Hong kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, which was said to have been damaged in the sum of P1,411,312.80, the right to
institute the proper separate civil action for the recovery of damages, with costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The crime with which said appellant was charged jointly with John Doe, whose identity, as alleged in the corresponding information, could not be
established, and Manuel Carlos, was estafa through falsification of commercial documents, it being alleged in the complaint that during the period
between the month of November, 1930 and July 6, 1931, said appellant and his two co-accused, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, after conspiring
together with Rafael Fernandez who was accused in a separate case, and aiding one another, forged and falsified, in the City of Manila, 128
warehouse receipts covering a total of 179,572 piculs of sugar, and 50 sugar crop loan contracts involving 140,000 piculs; that they later made it
appear, by using said documents, that they had a deposit, to their credit and at their disposal, of 179,572 piculs of sugar in the warehouses of the
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., a corporation engaged in the sugar business and domiciled in the municipality of San Fernando,
Province of Pampanga; and that they also had, by virtue of said 50 sugar crop loan contracts, a credit covering 140,000 piculs of sugar, knowing
positively that they had neither deposit of sugar in said warehouses of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., in the amounts set forth
in the 128 forged and falsified warehouse receipts, nor any credit by reason of the sugar crop loan contracts, of the amount and importance alleged
in said contracts; that by means of this artifice and forgery, they induced the manager of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation to
believe that they really had said goods, credit and imaginary transactions, and to grant them, because they so requested, an overdraft or
disposable credit in the amount of P1,411,312.80, in excess of the money they had in said bank, under the security of the forged and falsified
documents above stated; and after they had obtained said credit in the aforementioned deceitful manner, they began withdrawing from said bank,
by means of checks, various sums in the total amount of P1,411,312.80, to the damage of the bank in question, as it did not recover any part of said
amount.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trial proceeded only with respect to the appellant because his co-accused Manuel Carlos was discharged in order to be used as witness for the
Government and because the third accused, named John Doe, was not found nor could his identity be established before the
trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

So extraordinarily voluminous is the record of the case and so numerous are the documents introduced in evidence during the trial both by the
prosecution and the defense, particularly by the latter, that it would be a difficult and unnecessarily tedious, not to say impossible, task to consider
and analyze one by one even the most insignificant facts and details mentioned and discussed in the three volumes of which the brief for the
defense consists. This is the longest case known in the annals of the judicial history of this country and the one that has taken the longest time to
try. The brief for the appellant alone contains nearly two thousand pages, excluding the appendices thereof consisting two thousand pages,
excluding the appendices thereof consisting of two volumes, and that for the appellee consists of a volume of 1,339 pages. The transcript of the
stenographic notes is composed of 22,996 pages and the documentary evidence or exhibits, some of which contain many pages, amount to more
than 46,000.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It being unnecessary, we shall not touch or mention in this decision those facts which, far from helping to clarify the points in controversy, rather
serve to confuse them and to befog that which is in itself clear and which we so believe, after a conscientious study of the
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The entire evidence shows that Rafael Fernandez, who was charged in criminal case No. 42244 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, with a crime
of the same nature as that with which the appellant Mariano Cu Unjieng and his two co-accused are charged in this case ( estafa of P1,411,312.80
through falsification of several sugar warehouse receipts and stock certificates of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company Inc., wherein the
alleged injured party is also the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation), and with whom, according to the information, the three conspired
in order to commit the complex crime of estafa and falsification described therein, had had long before June 16, 1931, several sugar transactions
with Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., a corporation doing business in this city. Five days prior to said date, Rafael Fernandez approached the manager of said
corporation to ask him whether they could sell in the United States the sugar which Fernandez then had here and whether they could further
advance him funds to assist him in the sugar business in which amongst others, he was engaged. He was told that Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., could take
charge of selling his sugar provided he gave satisfactory securities, that he would faithfully comply with the contract which said company might
enter into in his name; but at the same time he was told that the company was unable to advance him any money for his said business. It was
suggested to him, however, that he might perhaps obtain the money from the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation of this
city.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Rafael Fernandez accepted the suggestion and went with the manager of Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., to said bank to explain his wishes. As a result he
was allowed by said bank to open an account known as Account No. 1, and later on he opened another account designated as Account No. 2. The
conditions for the opening of said two accounts were that the credit which was to be granted him, as overdraft, would be for an amount equivalent
to the price of the sugar which he bound himself to sell in the United States, at the rate of a P6 a picul. In view of this understanding, Smith, Bell &
Co., Ltd., who from that time had the assurance that the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation would advance money to Rafael Fernandez
at the stipulated rate, and as said Fernandez, on the other hand, had obligated himself to pay said company a commission and to defray all the
shipping, freight and insurance expenses, accepted Fernandez's proposal to sell his sugar in the United States and, without losing time, sent
cablegram Exhibit 836 to Henry W. Peabody & Co. of Boston, requesting said company of offer for sale four thousand tons of centrifugal sugar
which was precisely what Fernandez wanted to sell.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was on June 16, 1931, when Rafael Fernandez's No. 1 Account in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation was opened. He gave as
security for the payment of the credit of P359,700 granted to him on said date, the warehouse receipts Exhibits A, A-1 to A-63 which called for a
total of 63,967 piculs of sugar. Three days later, or on June 19, 1931, at his request he was granted another credit of P302,614 on his said No. 1
Account, and on this occasion he gave the warehouse receipts Exhibits B, B-1 to B-26 which called for a total of 53,780 piculs of sugar, as security
for the payment thereof; and a few days later, that is on June 24, of said year, he again asked for and was granted another credit of P350,468 on his
same No. 1 Account, the secure the payment of which he gave the warehouse receipts referred to in this case as Exhibits C, C-1 to C-36 which
called for a total of 61,726 piculs of sugar. (Exhibit V.)chanrobles virtual law library
In the following month, and to be more accurate, on July 6, 1931, Rafael Fernandez opened another account in the same bank "The Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation", which account was designated as Account No. 2. In this account Rafael Fernandez obtained a new credit of
P464,750 (Exhibit V-2), and to secure the payment of said credit he assigned to said bank his rights as creditor stated in the 22 sugar crop loan
contracts for the 1932 milling season which were issued in his name and apparently approved by the sugar central of the Pampanga Sugar
Development Company, Inc., and in 28 other contracts of the same nature which were also issued in his name but guaranteed by said central,
according to a footnote thereon. (Exhibits D, D-1 to D-49.) All said documents call for a total of 140,000 piculs of sugar subject to the conditions
therein stated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The understanding and conditions for the opening of said Account No. 2 for Rafael Fernandez were that the credit or overdraft to be granted him
should not exceed 50 per cent of the value of the 1932 sugar crop loan contracts approved by the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc.,
nor be more than 80 per cent of the value of the loans of the same nature, the payment of which was guaranteed by said central. In this manner
was said account, in fact, opened, inasmuch as the amount of P464,750 in question represents 50 per cent of the value of the approved loans
(Exhibits D, D-1 to D-15) and 80 per cent of the value of the guaranteed loans (Exhibits D-16 to D-49).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The total amount withdrawn by Rafael Fernandez from his said two accounts Nos. 1 and 2 from the opening thereof until shortly before the filing of
this case was P1,749,263.47.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court declared it established, and the evidence supports its conclusion, that Rafael Fernandez disposed of the money which he had
withdrawn from time to time from his said two accounts Nos. 1 and 2 in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, as follows:

He gave to GUILLERMO A. CU UNJIENG (Exhibits W-39, W-34, W-31 and W-29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

P325,000.00
Id. to GUILLERMO A. CU UNJIENG through THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK (Exhibits W-33, W-21 and W-6) . . . . . . . . . . P350,000.00
Id. to MARIANO CU UNJIENG (Exhibit W-41) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,000.00
Id. to THE YEK TONG LIN FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE CO., LTD. (Exhibit W-32) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,457.47
Id. to CU UNJIENG & FERNANDEZ INVESTMENT CO. (Exhibits W-37 and W-7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11,000.00
Id. to EASTERN THEATRICAL ENTERPRISES (Exhibit W-13) . . . 6,000.00
Id. to THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK (Exhibits W-36, W-26, W-22, W-17 and W-3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
480,000.00
Id. to PEOPLE BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (Exhibits W-40, W-38, W-30, W-20, W-19, W-5 and W-4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
227,882.30
Id. to PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (Exhibits W-23, W-11 and W) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70,687.70
Id. to CHINA BANKING CORPORATION (Exhibit W-1) . . . . . . . . . . . 150,000.00
Id. to PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY (Exhibits W-16 and W-2). . . 90,000.00
Id. to NUEVA ECIJA SUGAR MILLS (Exhibit W-35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000.00
Id. to MARIA LOPEZ MENA (Exhibit W-28) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 708.33
Id. to MARCELINA JOVEN (Exhibit W-18) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500.00
Id. to CRISANTO ELIZALDE (Exhibit W-8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,896.72
Id. to JOAQUIN GONZALEZ (Exhibit W-25) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,200.00
Id. to ESTEBAN MEDINA (Exhibit W-24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,625.00
Id. to SMITH, BELL & CO., LTD. (Exhibit W-15) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83.50
Id. to JOSE SYQUIA (Exhibit W-14) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000.00
Id. to E. PE�AFIEL (Exhibit W-12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,713.32
Id. to ROBERTO LAPERA (Exhibit W-10) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000.00
Id. to RAFAEL MORALES (Exhibit W-9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000.00
and he paid for interest and two checks books (Exhibits V, V-1 and W-27) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,509.13
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1,749,263.47
It appears from the evidence, however, that on different dates Rafael Fernandez made certain deposits amounting to P337,950.67 on his Account
No. 2, and consequently it is just that he be credited with said amount.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It likewise appears from the evidence that the money which the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation failed to recover from the loans and
advances granted by it to Rafael Fernandez in the manner indicated, for the reason that not only the warehouse receipts but also the sugar crop
loan contracts which had been given to it as security for the payment of said loans and advances, were false, amounts to the large sum of
P1,411,312.80 and said sum exactly represents the amount of damages sustained by said corporation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Exhibits A, A-1 to A-63, B, B-1 to B-26 and C, C-1 to C-36 which apparently are warehouse receipts of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company,
Inc., calling for a total of P179,473 piculs of sugar supposed to be deposited in the warehouses of said central, and Exhibits D, D-1 to D-49 which
also apparently are sugar crop loan contracts entered into between various persons and Rafael Fernandez, the latter as creditor of the former, are
not what they convey or purport to be on their face, the first being mere limitations and forgeries of the genuine warehouse receipts of said
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., and the last simulations of sugar crop loan contracts. The appellant does not question this fact and it
may be said that he impliedly admitted it at the trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was Manuel Carlos who forged said documents imitating, with rare ability, the signatures of the manager and accountant of the sugar central in
question, simulating their intervention in the execution of the said documents and making it appear in the sugar crop loan contracts Exhibits D, D-1
to D-49, facts and acts which have never taken place or not true. If the testimony of this witness is to be given credit, he committed said forgeries
and simulations for the sum of P6,000 (t. s. n., p. 5391), at the instance and under instructions of the appellant Mariano Cu Unjieng, who, according
to the theory of the prosecution, conspired with this witness and Rafael Fernandez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The lower court in mentioning in its decision the case with which said Manuel Carlos imitates signatures, states the fact that at the trial said witness
dexterously and easily imitated, one after another, the signatures of the manager and accountant of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company,
Inc., named W. Trinidad and F. Cayetano, respectively; that of Sabina Sioco Viuda de Escaler, mother-in-law of Rafael Fernandez; and those of Jose
L. de Leon and Augusto Gonzalez, president and secretary-treasurer, respectively, of said sugar central.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Therefore the conclusion of said court with respect to the nature of said documents Exhibits A, A-1 to A-63, B, B-1 to B-26, C, C-1 to C-36, and D, D-
1 to D-49, and that it was Manuel Carlos who forged them, are conclusively supported by the evidence and are completely in accordance with the
facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Manuel Carlos also forged the documents referred to in the case as Exhibits CC-1 and CC-2; DD-1 to DD-44; EE-1 to EE-45; FF-1 to FF-40; GG-1 to
GG-16; HH-1 to HH-68; II-1 to II-24; LL-1 to LL-61; MM-1 to MM-128; NN-1 to NN-112; OO-1 to OO-45; XX-4 to XX-8; XX-20 to XX-23; XX-47 to XX-64;
XX-81 to XX-104; and ZZ, ZZ-1 and ZZ-2 which are supposed to be quedans of sugar deposited in the warehouses of the Pampanga Sugar
Development Company, Inc.; Exhibits QQ-1 to QQ-7; XX-13 to XX-19; AA-1, AA-2 and AA-3; ZZ-5 to ZZ-11; 1, 2, 3 and 4 which are supposed to be
stock certificates of said sugar central; Exhibits G, H, K, R-1, S-1, T-1 and U-1 which are supposed to be letters or answers to the manager of said
central to certain letters addressed to him by the Malabon Sugar Company, Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd., and the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation; Exhibits 588; ZZ-35-1 and ZZ-35-A-1, and others which shall be discussed later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

By means of the warehouse receipts Exhibits CC-1 and CC-2, DD-1 to DD-44, EE-1 to EE-45, FF-1 to FF-40, GG-1 to GG-16, HH-1 to HH-68 and II-1 to
II-24, the appellant, on November 19, 1930 (t. s. n., p. 300), acting as attorney in fact of his father, G.A. Cu Unjieng, succeeded in having the latter's
No. 2 Account in the National City Bank of New York opened (Exhibit CC). The condition imposed upon him for granting him the credit applied for
was that the securities to be given by him, - and this is precisely what he himself had proposed - would consist of stock certificates of the Pampanga
Sugar Development Company, Inc., and quedans of sugar already sold (t. s .n., pp. 289 to 300); and it was due to this means that he was able to
withdraw or obtain from said bank the sums stated in said account, which reached the total amount of P822,035.58 (t. s. n., p. 300; Exhibit JJ). It
must be noted that these transactions took place during the period between November 19, 1930, and April 23, 1931, which coincides with the
period within which, according to the allegations of the information, the criminal acts therein imputed to the appellant were
committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An important fact related to these transactions is that when Shaw, manager of the National City Bank of New York, asked the appellant, in the
course of the latter's negotiations with the former prior to the opening of the account in question, to produce the documents which the appellant
was to pledge to the bank, he excused himself saying that he could not show them because they were contracts of a confidential nature. This
means that the lower court was right in stating in its decision as follows:

It will be noted that the defendant did not find it necessary to consult with Fernandez before refusing to exhibit the sales contracts. The natural
thing for him to have done, when Mr. Shaw asked to see the sales contracts, if he had really told Mr. Shaw that the quedans belonged to Fernandez
and were merely held by his father in pledge, was to have replied that he would have to see Mr. Fernandez about the matter. Indeed, if the
quedans were really held in pledge by his father, even though he had not told Mr. Shaw that this was the case, it would have been natural for him
to refer the question to Fernandez before refusing to exhibit them to Mr. Shaw. The facts, therefore, that he refused to exhibit these contracts
without referring the question to Fernandez in any way persuade the court beyond any doubt that he knew at the time that he negotiated with Mr.
Shaw for the opening of this account that the Pampanga Sugar Development Company's quedans which were to be pledged to secure the account
were to be forged and spurious; that there was no sales contracts covering the same; and that there was no sugar behind those quedans. (Printed
decision, pages 82, 83.)

In addition to that stated by the lower court these other facts may be mentioned:chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant, in order to obtain from the National City Bank of New York, on January 27, 1931, the loan of P22,700 (Exhibits II and II-24), upon the
security of quedans of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., which according to him, formed part of the quedans (some of them
genuine and the others forged) with which Rafael Fernandez guaranteed to him the loan referred to in Exhibit 586, which is dated one day earlier
(January 26, 1931), pledged precisely the forged quedans, so that it may be truthfully said that he knowingly selected them for that purpose; and it
is very stranger, comparing the forged quedans of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., which were accepted by the appellant from
said Rafael Fernandez as security for the alleged loans which he had been making to him from November 25, 1930, to February 10, 1931 (Exhibits
581, 581-A; 582, 582-A, 582-B; 583, 583-A; 584, 584-A, 584-B; 585, 586, 586-A, 586-B, 586-C, 586-D; 587, 587-A, 587-B, and 587-C), with the other
genuine quedans of the other centrals which he received at the same time for the same purpose, that the piculs of sugar stated in the former are in
round numbers, particularly those for large quantities as 1,000, 2,000, 3,000, 4,000, 5,000 and 6,000, and the piculs of sugar in the genuine
quedans are stated in numbers ending in a unit and sometimes in a fraction of a unit. Furthermore in practically all the genuine quedans the lien to
which the sugar referred to therein is subject, appears, while not the least mention of said lien is made in the forged quedans. Further still, all the
forged quedans show on their face that the sugar covered thereby would be withdrawn from the warehouses of the Pampanga Sugar Development
Company, Inc., on or before May 1, 1931, and not later. The appellant, however, withdrew none, either before, after or at any time, in spite of the
fact that Rafael Fernandez failed to pay his accounts in connection with which the quedans in question had been pledged to him. If the appellant
did not know the nature of the forged quedans, the facts just mentioned would have been more than sufficient to put him on his guard and refuse
to accept them, much less pledge them himself on the same date on which he received them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Prior to the opening to G.A. Cu Unjieng of his No. 2 Account in the National City of Bank of New York, the appellant, as the former's attorney in fact,
assured the manager of said bank that the securities that he would give them would consist of quedans of the Pampanga Sugar Development
Company, Inc., covering sugar already sold and ready for delivery in May, 1931; and it was for this reason that the manager of said bank, Shaw, in
his cablegram of November 10, 1930, to his bank's central office in New York, asking for authority to grant the credit applied for, stated as follows;

May we advance up to P500,000 to G.A. Cu Unjieng against sugar quedans Pampanga Sugar Development Company on basis 75 per cent market
value. We are assured only sold sugar will be pledged. Advance will be fluctuating but entirely liquidated by end of May. (Exhibit 32.)

Furthermore, in Mariano Cu Unjieng's letter of January 8, 1931, to the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation where he also succeeded in
opening an account which was designated as No. 2 Account of G.A. Cu Unjieng, of whom he was the attorney in fact (Exhibit L), the appellant,
referring to the check Exhibit L-I, for the sum of P193,500 which he had drawn against said bank, and to the quedans therein pledged by him which,
as the quedans Exhibits A, A-1 to A-63, turned out to be forged, used the phrase "my sugar quedans". Said letter literally reads as follows:

I have the pleasure to confirm, hereby, that I have today issued a check against you for the amount of P193,500 under my account No. 3, being the
equivalent of 75 per cent of the market value at P7 per picul of my sugar quedans amounting to 34,888.58 piculs delivered to your goodselves.

Yours truly,

G.A. CU UNJIENG
By (Sgd.) MARIANO CU UNJIENG

This coupled with the fact that the appellant acquired 245 shares of the Central Azucarera de Ilocos in 1930, and the Central de Bataan in May,
1931, as will later be stated more in detail, not only refutes his contention that neither he nor his father was interested in the sugar business but
also supports the testimony of Rafael Fernandez that he and the two Cu Unjiengs (the appellant and his father) had in fact been associated in the
sugar business, the elder Cu Unjieng binding himself to be the capitalist partner and he and the appellant as industrial partners; proving at the
same time, in connection with the other facts also to be mentioned later, that the understanding among the three was that the profits derived
from the business would be distributed as follows: One-half to G.A. Cu Unjieng, and the other half to the appellant and Rafael Fernandez, in equal
shares. This association in the sugar business between the two Cu Unjiengs (the appellant and his father) on the one hand, and Rafael Fernandez,
on the other, began with the 1929-1930 milling season. At the beginning it was composed of the appellant and Rafael Fernandez but in order to
give it greater impulse and the appellant's father seeing that by associating with the two he would find a means of increasing the capital invested
by him in the exchange business in which he was then actively engaged, he joined them at the invitation of the appellant, about January 20, 1930
(Trans., p. 15,773; Exhibit 1436 - Schedule 2), with the understanding that inasmuch as he was to supply all the necessary capital, the profits would
be distributed in the manner already indicated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, we are led to the conclusion that such association among the three really existed under the above stated conditions by the following
facts and evidence, to wit:

( a) Exhibits YY-67, YY-68, 1114, 1115, 1485, 1486, 105, 106, 147, 149, 148, 150, 124, 125, 173, 174, 190, 191, 204, 205, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237,
2242 and 2243 which are checks issued by Fernandez in favor of G.A. Cu Unjieng and the appellant show that he in fact gave them their respective
shares of some of the profits obtained and that when he gave the former a check for a certain amount, he also gave the latter another check for
one-half of said amount, which discloses that the distribution among the three of the profits obtained, was made in said cases on the basis of 50
per cent for G.A. Cu Unjieng and 25 per cent for the appellant. Fernandez's share does not appear in said documents, nor is there any other
documentary evidence thereof because it is natural that he did not have to issue checks to himself for his share, having the funds in his possession.
On this point the lower court very correctly said in its decision as follows:

The theory of the defense that the sugar business belonged to Fernandez alone and that he convinced them that he was willing to tie up large
amounts of capital in sugar for indefinite periods, in order to enable himself to get equal or less amounts of capital does not bear analysis, in view
of the fact that no advantage would accrue to Fernandez from such an operation, but on the other hand, many disadvantages would result
therefrom. Thus, he would be subjected to the interest charges on the transaction, the storage and insurance charges on the sugar thus tied up,
and such deterioration as the sugar might suffer when in storage. In addition, he would be subjected to the dangers arising from the fluctuation of
the market. It is not believed that the Cu Unjiengs, shrewd businessmen as they were, could be fooled by any such representation on the part of
Fernandez. (Printed decision, p .31.)

( b) The appellant's letter of February 1, 1930 (Exhibit ZZ-435-2), addressed to Albino Sy Cip, through whom said appellant succeeded in contacting
the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., of Shanghai, to obtain the four loans of G$50,000 each, alluded to therein, has the same effect; and
it should be well noted that in said letter the appellant speaks in plural, and in order to persuade said bank to grant them the subsequent
G$100,000 of said four loans, he tells Sy Cip that the arrangement be conditioned on an option on their part to take or not to take the loans,
agreeing, in the latter case to give the necessary notice two days in advance, and the reason given by him therefor is as follows:

The sugar market is getting firmer and naturally there are few sellers for the time being," thereby making it understood that he and his associates
were truly engaged in the sugar business and that they would use the money to be supplied to them in said business. It should be stated, in
passing, because it does not fail to exert some influence on the decision of this case, that Exhibits 1287-10-A to 1287-10-E; ZZ-435-7, ZZ-435-8-A;
ZZ-436-4, ZZ-436-5; ZZ-437-2, ZZ-437-4 and ZZ-437-5-A which are cablegrams, contracts, promissory notes, and other documents related to said
loan, show that all the money obtained as loans from the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., of Shanghai, went into the possession of
Mariano Cu Unjieng who transferred it to Cu Unjieng e Hijos, and this company, in turn, deposited the money to its account in the International
Banking Corporation (now National City Bank of New York) and the Mercantile Bank of China (Exhibits 1287; ZZ-329-217-A; ZZ-329-291-A; ZZ-329-
303-A; ZZ-329-p. 8; ZZ-329-p. 10; ZZ-329-p. 11); and it should be borne in mind that this last fact necessarily disproves the appellant's contention
that neither he nor his father may be considered co-owners of the sugar covered by the quedans mentioned by him in his letters Exhibits ZZ-435-8-
B, ZZ-436-6, ZZ-437-4-A AND ZZ-437-5-B, because it is clearly stated therein that he told Albino Sy Cip that the loans were not for him but for Rafael
Fernandez exclusively. This is all the more certain because the appellant's explanation of his intervention in the obtainment of said loans from the
Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., that he merely acted as guarantor of Rafael Fernandez is not satisfactory nor may it be seriously taken
into consideration because it may be inferred from Exhibits ZZ-435-8-A, ZZ-436-5, ZZ-437-4 and ZZ-437-5 that it was not Rafael Fernandez alone
who signed the promissory notes relative to said loans but also the appellant who signed not as a mere guarantor but as a solidary
debtor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If we are to believe the other reason given by the appellant that in order to obtain said loans he merely negotiated the same quedans which
Fernandez had pledged to them as security for the payment of the pending obligations or accounts which Fernandez then had with them (the Cu
Unjiengs) by also pledging the quedans, therefore the true debtor or person primarily liable in said transactions with the Shanghai Commercial &
Savings Bank, Ltd., would be the appellant or his father of whom he is the attorney in fact, not Rafael Fernandez. It is absurd to believe that
Fernandez obligated himself or agreed to obligate himself for the same debt, that is, the debt which the appellant imputes to him and for which he
pledged said quedans to the Cu Unjiengs - assuming for the moment that such imputation is founded - and that created by the loans granted by the
Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., relative to which the same quedans were again pledged to said bank. Therefore the testimony
Fernandez should be given credit when, in reply to a question asked him whether or not he knew that Albino Sy Cip whom the appellant had
approached as a means to contact the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., for the purpose of obtaining a loan, had suggested that the loan
be applied for and granted to him, not to Cu Unjieng, he said as follows:

A. - I had no knowledge of that fact; all I know was that Mr. Cu Unjieng approached me one day and told me that he was going to borrow from the
Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank several gold credits and told me that I would sign the promissory notes because the gold credits were needed
by his father for his exchange transactions so his father would not need to sign the promissory notes, and as Mr. Sy Cip and the Shanghai
Commercial & Savings Bank required that the gold credits be extended only for genuine commercial purposes (obviously they wanted to prevent,
or appear to prevent, the lending of money for the purpose of speculating in exchange) he resorted to discounting the quedans that were bought
by him through me, and making me sign the notes and he receiving the proceeds of the notes; he made me sign the notes but he received the
proceeds of the notes, because he said the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank would not grant them facilities unless those facilities were used
for genuine commercial transactions, and one of those genuine transactions was the purchase of sugar and as Mr. Sy Cip knew very well the
purchase of sugar and as Mr. Sy Cip knew very well I was the one buying sugar in the market so perhaps he required my signature. (Trans., p.
20,653.)
( c) The securities Exhibits 1377, 1378 and 1379 which are supposed to be promissory notes executed by Fernandez and which provide, among
other things, that Fernandez was to deliver to Cu Unjieng e Hijos sugar of the kind and in the quantities stated therein, prove the same fact, that is,
that the appellant and his father were engaged in the sugar business. Said documents appear to have been executed in the month of April,
1930.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

( d) Exhibit 585 which, as Exhibits 581, 582, 583, 584, 586, 587, 1734, 1735 and 1736, purports to be a promissory note executed by Rafael
Fernandez on January 17, 1931, and secured by forged quedans of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., proves exactly the same
thing. Therefore, the appellant's excuse that neither he nor his father was ever engaged in the sugar business is unfounded.

It cannot be doubted that the forged quedans Exhibits A, A-1 to A-63 came from the appellant because aside from the testimony of Perfecto Padilla
to this effect, which is corroborated by the check for P705 (Exhibit 351) which bears the same date on which said quedans were negotiated by
Rafael Fernandez in the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, June 16, 1931, and by A. C. Hall said Rafael Fernandez assured that he
received them from the appellant through said witness Perfecto Padilla. This shows that even disregarding the testimony of Manuel Carlos, who
stated that he had forged said quedans under instructions of the appellant, the latter was not ignorant of the nature of said documents nor of the
others as Exhibits B, B-1 to B-26, C, C-1 to C-36, D, D-1 to D-49, CC-1, CC-2, DD-1 to DD-44, EE-1 to EE-45 etc., as being forged and spurious for the
reasons already set forth and for the other reasons which will hereafter be stated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant's contention that before he obtained the four loans of G$5,000 each from the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., Rafael
Fernandez already owed him, his father, and Cu Unjieng e Hijos various sums, is not supported by the evidence if certain checks enumerated in
Exhibit 1436, Schedule 2, which they had been issuing to Fernandez are excluded. Fernandez executed no promissory note or document for any of
these alleged obligations imputed to him by the appellant to show that he ever acknowledged them. Neither does it conclusively appear that he
had pledged to the appellant the quedans which the latter gave as security for the payment of said four loans obtained from the Shanghai
Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., of Shanghai. On the contrary, the evidence shows that on the occasions when G.A. Cu Unjieng, Cu Unjieng e Hijos
or the appellant, through the latter, loaned money to Fernandez, as claimed by them, they required him to execute in their favor promissory notes
with clauses setting forth in detail the securities given by him and the obligations he assumed for the payment thereof; and this is shown by the
promissory notes Exhibits 581, 582, 584, 585, 586, 1374, 1375, 1376, 1377, 1378 and others, which we shall not enumerate in order to avoid being
tedious, dated in and after April, 1930, which discloses to us the singular fact that instead of the relations between the appellant and Rafael
Fernandez becoming closer and instead of more mutual confidence existing between them with the passing of the time, in view of the many
transactions which the two formerly had, what took place is precisely all to the contrary. It seems as if the appellant had confidence in Fernandez in
some cases, and in others no. Hence his attitude of being on guard, requiring Fernandez to give him and his father securities and
collaterals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It cannot be said that the appellant, his father or Cu Unjieng e Hijos returned to Fernandez the promissory notes which the appellant claims
Fernandez had issued in their favor and in connection with which the latter had given him as security the quedans which he (the appellant) later
pledged to the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., in order to obtain the aforesaid loans from the bank in question, after said loans had
been obtained, because it would have been stupid and imprudent of them to do so and it cannot be assumed that they had committed such
imprudence because judging from their books, they were overcautious and full of foresight. It did not suit them to return the promissory notes to
Fernandez because the appellant had signed them as evidencing said loans together with Fernandez, having bound himself as no less than a joint
and solidary debtor. Prudence, and above all his experience as a business man, should have counselled him to keep said promissory notes because
if Fernandez failed to pay said loans, inasmuch as he had to pay them and in fact he did pay them in the end, he would not lack tangible evidence
on which to base an action against Fernandez for the recovery of the latter's old obligation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In addition to the foregoing, there is another consideration to be made on the same point. The loans granted to the appellant by the Shanghai
Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., were not paid by Fernandez but by Cu Unjieng e Hijos of which the appellant was the attorney in fact and
manager, this fact being evidenced particularly by Exhibit ZZ-435-13 wherein it appears that the appellant had shown Albino Sy Cip the necessary
document to prove that he had paid one of said loans to the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., of Shanghai, and that the payment thereof,
as well as that of the other three, was made with gold purchased by him from the Insular Treasury. (Exhibits ZZ-341, ZZ-342, ZZ-329-291-B and ZZ-
329-30-B.)chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant's explanation that upon receipt of the loans of G$50,000 each from the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., he credited Rafael
Fernandez's account with the amount represented thereby, deducting the same from the obligations of Fernandez which were still pending
payment (Exhibit 1436, Schedule 2), far from finding support in the evidence, is disproved thereby, because it appears from said Exhibits ZZ-341,
ZZ-342, ZZ-329-291-B and ZZ-329-30-B which are precisely the checks with the proceeds of which the appellant bought gold from the Insular
Treasury, as stated, for the purpose of sending it abroad in payment of said loans, that it was the Cu Unjiengs who paid them, not Fernandez. If the
appellant's action, as he contends, was a mere innocent discounting operations on quedans pledged to him by Fernandez, - which cannot be
believed because the quedans of the Mabalacat Sugar Central, Nos. 121, 138 and 156 (Exhibits ZZ-436-6 and ZZ-436-12-A) which formed part of
those pledged appeared to have been issued in favor of said central by Rafael Fernandez, as judicial receiver (Exhibits ZZ-393, ZZ-394-90 and ZZ-
394-91), and he should have known that Fernandez could not pledge them without the authority of the court inasmuch as it was through his efforts
that Fernandez was appointed as such receiver by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga - there was no necessity of debiting Fernandez with the
amount paid by the Cu Unjiengs for said loans. (Exhibit 1436, Schedule 2.) If they did so without Fernandez having received the benefit or proceeds
of said loans, it means that they, or at least the appellant, as manager and attorney in fact of the Cu Unjiengs merely used him as a conscious and
voluntary tool in order to obtain the loans in question by means of his name and of the alleged securities which, according to said appellant,
Fernandez had given them; and it should be noted that in order to give the entries in his books regarding Fernandez's alleged sugar accounts the
semblance of truth, the appellant was not contended with merely debiting him the original amount of said four loans but also had the sum of
P954.11 charged against him for each of said loans.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The fraud under consideration was discovered by the officials of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation about July 9, or 10, 1931. The
discovery thereof was brought about by Fernandez's inquiries about sugar purchaser in Hawaii, a thing altogether incomprehensible to them, and
the rumor that something anomalous had happened in the National City Bank of New York. After a conference between the managers of said two
banks, the manager of the former sent one of its officials to the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., to verify the genuineness of the
documents pledged to them by Fernandez as security for the credits which had been granted him with the result that all of them were found to be
forged. Prior to this, other frauds had been perpetrated against the Peoples Bank and Trust Company and the National City Bank of New York and
the discovery thereof took place about May 27th and July 7th of said year, respectively. The appellant and his father G.A. Cu Unjieng had timely and
full knowledge of said discovery, particularly that of the fraud committed against the former, because Rafael Fernandez informed them thereof as
soon as Douglas of said bank told him that the quedans which Fernandez had pledged to said bank as security for the overdrafts and loan granted
to him and Guillermo A. Cu Unjieng, through the appellant, with the help of Fernandez, were forged the spurious. (Exhibits XX, XX-1, XX-3, 4, 5 to
XX-10; Trans., pp. 828 et seq. and 6875 et seq.) Instead of being on their guard, inasmuch as the Cu Unjiengs then had various business ventures
and transactions in common with Rafael Fernandez and the appellant could have reasonably said to himself that perhaps Fernandez had treated
them in the same manner, the appellant, although feigning no knowledge of any of the frauds in question, with the cooperation of his father,
extended to Fernandez, but in a reserved way, all the help possible, trying of course, to place themselves in a safe position, the appellant having
gone even to the extent of engaging the services of an attorney for that purpose in order to save some of Fernandez's property, and of inducing the
latter to sign, as he in fact signed, deeds of transfer, cancellation of liens, affidavits, antedated promissory notes or undertakings of payment, and
some documents in blank; and the appellant encouraged Fernandez telling him not to worry because he and his father would fix everything.
(Trans., pp. 2001, 2004, 6875 to 6880.)chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant attempted to prove that he and his father were as innocent victims of Rafael Fernandez as the other creditors of the latter, and that
the sugar transactions which they had with Fernandez were only those of mere lenders who supplied him with money for said transactions.
However, his behaviour, as already stated, and his passive attitude at several meetings which the creditors of said Fernandez held after the
discovery of the frauds for the purpose of finding means to safeguard their respective rights, and the steps taken by him as soon as he learned
what had been agreed upon at said creditors' meetings, are highly incompatible with his claim that he was a total stranger to said frauds. (Trans.,
pp. 1999 et seq.)chanrobles virtual law library

What has been stated, that is that the appellant advised and helped Rafael Fernandez to save many of his properties, is proven by Exhibit A,
Exhibits B and C which are attached as appendices to Exhibit ZZ-33, and Exhibits ZZ-34, ZZ-35-1, ZZ-35-A-1, ZZ-36, ZZ-37, ZZ-38, ZZ-39, ZZ-40, ZZ-41
and ZZ-42 which falsely stated that Rafael Fernandez had transferred for a consideration certain rights which he had in the properties described in
said documents to the persons whose names appear therein, who, in turn, after a few days, assigned and transferred them, directly in some cases
and indirectly in others, to the Cu Unjiengs, also without consideration; and that Fernandez's mother-in-law Sabina Sioco Viuda de Escaler, his
sister-in-law Carolina Escaler, and his wife Josefa Escaler de Fernandez had received from Guillermo A. Cu Unjieng, on July 11, 1931, a loan in the
sum of P500,000 with the obligation to pay the latter in the City of Manila, on demand, the sum in question, with interest at 12 per cent per
annum, and an additional sum equivalent to 10 per cent thereof in case of litigation. (Trans., p. 6888.)chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant's behavior is still more incompatible with his said contention if we bear in mind the established fact that when the Peoples Bank and
Trust Company did not honor Fernandez's check for P75,000 which the latter had drawn on his account in said bank in favor of Guillermo A. Cu
Unjieng, the appellant's father, and Guillermo A .Cu Unjieng negotiated it with the China Banking Corporation because the drawer did not have
sufficient funds to meet the amount of the check, the appellant instead of being alarmed or taking some action against Fernandez, which was the
most natural thing for any other person to do, knowing as he then knew the circumstances in which Fernandez was found for he was already aware
that Fernandez had been discovered pledging forged quedans, on the contrary instructed his brother Cu Chen Yan, who was employed under him
in the firms Cu Unjieng e Hijos and G.A. Cu Unjieng, to retain said check (Exhibit TT-21; Trans., p. 12,314), and in the meantime he and his father,
through him, gave Fernandez the sum of P350,000 the appellant testifying at the trial that it was a loan (Exhibit 96 for P200,000; Exhibit 576 for
P50,000; and Exhibit 460 for P100,000; Trans., p. 3597); and Fernandez, upon instructions of the appellant, deposited said sum in his current
account in the China Banking Corporation on May 27, 1931, and immediately thereafter withdrew P300,000 and P32,000 on the following day to
pay something on account to the Peoples Bank and Trust Company in order to be able to withdraw, as he in fact withdrew from said bank, several
of the forged documents which he had pledged thereto. (Trans., p. 1077; Exhibits YY-2594 and YY-2393.) This, which is evidently contrary to
prudence and good judgment, qualities which the appellant is supposed to possess to a high degree, being then no less than the general manager
and vice-president of the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Ltd., and the Yek Tong Lin Loan Company, Ltd., which are two corporations with
a corporate capital of P500,000 each, and attorney in fact and manager of Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a company with a capital of P1,000,000, and also
attorney in fact of G.A. Cu Unjieng, seems to prove necessarily that the appellant was not only aware of but was in no way a stranger to the frauds
committed by Rafael Fernandez who obtained money here and there under the security of quedans and other documents which, while they
apparently represented great value in sugar and stock of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., were in fact absolutely valueless
because they were forged, simulated and spurious. If the appellant was not in such a situation, he would have been very careful not to give
Fernandez not only the large amounts in question but even one centavo, which was the most that he could have done for Fernandez inasmuch as
he had refrained from taking any steps to the latter's prejudice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant contends that as G.A. Cu Unjieng's attorney in fact he gave the sum in question to Rafael Fernandez because the latter, in addition to
having executed in his favor, as such attorney in fact, the promissory note Exhibit 588, which is false as will be shown later, gave securities by
pledging to him the stock certificates of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., specified therein, which are Exhibits 588-A to 588-I, the
first six of them being the same as Exhibits QQ-1 to QQ-6 which are as spurious as the former, which Rafael Fernandez had pledged to the National
City Bank of New York on April 5, 1931, and the appellant believed that said documents were good. This, apparently, is a good argument but it is
destroyed by the following facts:chanrobles virtual law library

According to the appellant's evidence, Exhibit 1437, Schedule 1, which is accountant Hwang's report on the status of accounts Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of
Rafael Fernandez with G.A. Cu Unjieng as of May 27, 1931, the former owed P1,174,789.35 to the latter who virtually had in his possession
securities given by said Fernandez consisting of quedans calling for a total of 152,841.679 piculs of sugar valued at approximately P1,222,733.43, at
the rate of P8 a picul, which value as may be seen, exceeded Fernandez's indebtedness by P107,944.08 (Exhibits CC, DD to II inclusive). It will be
remembered that when the appellant negotiated with the National City Bank of New York the opening of his father's No. 2 Account in connection
with which he pledged some of the quedans which, he claims, had been previously pledged to him by Rafael Fernandez, he assured that said
quedans represented sugar already sold and ready for delivery in the month of May, 1931. On said date, May 27, 1931, G.A. Cu Unjieng's No. 2
Account in said bank showed a balance against him in the amount of P790,801.88 (Exhibit JJ) and several demands had already been made upon
him to liquidate the same. (Trans., pp. 428, 429.) If this is the case, we ask: Why did the appellant, as G.A. Cu Unjieng's attorney in fact, instead of
giving Rafael Fernandez P350,000, not pay said amount, or at least P262,500 to the National City Bank of New York where he had said account the
payment of which had been demanded, in order to pay something on account and redeem some of Fernandez's quedans the value of which did not
exceed P350,000, and deliver them to Fernandez for him to withdraw the sugar covered thereby and thus save P87,500, which his father needed
very badly in his exchange business? And granting that it did not occur to him to withdraw any of the quedans in question, why did he did not
deduct from the amount of P350,000 wanted by Fernandez the sum of P75,000 represented by the check which the latter had drawn in his favor
(Exhibit TT-21) the previous day, and which was dishonored by the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, for lack of funds? And why did he retain in his
possession during the months of June and July, 1931, Fernandez's quedans, granting, for the moment, that they were given to him as security for
previous obligation, without withdrawing the sugar covered thereby, knowing that said sugar was already sold and ready for delivery since May of
said year? And, lastly, why did he not produce the contracts of which he spoke to Shaw of the National City of Bank of New York, when he
negotiated therein the opening of his father's No. 2 Account, if it is true that his transactions with Rafael Fernandez were legitimate? The answer to
these questions must necessarily be adverse to the appellant because everything indicates that he was aware of the nature of said documents, that
is that they were absolutely worthless because they were spurious. The circumstances placed him in such a position that he had to give money to
Fernandez in order to enable the latter to withdraw from the Peoples Bank and Trust Company the forged quedans which might incriminate both
of them; and in order to give such disbursement the semblance of a loan, he conceived Exhibit 588 and the pledging of the stock certificates
therein enumerated. It is useless to say that had the appellant been aware of the spurious of said documents he would not have accepted them as
security nor would he have given Fernandez any money, because if they were worthless to him, they were worth, at least, enough to enable him to
secure money from the banks by pledging them thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Furthermore, when on July 8, 1931, the frauds against the National City Bank of New York were discovered by its manager, Shaw, and the latter,
upon insistent requests of Rafael Fernandez that the appellant be called to inform him thereof, called the appellant and informed him upon his
arrival of what had occurred, that is, that the quedans and other documents which Fernandez had pledged to secure the payment of the credits
which had been granted him as well as those that had been pledged as security for the payment of the loan granted to the appellant's father were
forged, the appellant merely feigned surprise saying that he could not understand how it all had happened. However, when he was no longer
within view of Shaw but still in the latter's office, he told Fernandez not to worry because he would fix everything; and on the following and
subsequent days, in order to make good and comply with his promise, he had the transfers, cancellation of liens, promissory notes or obligations of
payment and documents in blank above stated prepared. Conduct of this nature surely is not indicative of innocence on his part but, on the
contrary, complicity; and more than complicity, it reveals cunning and craft because he thereby wished to conceal his complicity and because such
act discloses his desire to be in a position where, in addition to being able to free himself from all liability, it would be possible for him, in case of
necessity, to keep the property alleged to have been transferred to him and his father of whom he was the attorney in fact, by means of the
simulated documents above stated, with absolutely no consideration. And there is nothing strange in his having so acted, with foresight, because,
as the lower court, which had ample opportunity to observe him closely, stated, he is a man "of surpassing intelligence and as hard and shrewd a
man as this court has ever had occasion to observe." It was upon the appellant's instructions and suggestion that Fernandez decided to obtain
credits by way of overdrafts from the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and Fernandez did so thus making himself the appellant's tool,
in order to provide the latter, himself and G.A. Cu Unjieng who was then feverishly engaged in the exchange business, with funds necessary for the
operation of their pressing obligations which they had with other banks, secured by forged and spurious sugar quedans and stock certificates of the
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. This is clearly shown by the fact that from the funds withdrawn by Rafael Fernandez from his Nos. 1
and 2 accounts with the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, P703,457.47 went, as already stated, into the possession of the appellant,
his father and principal G.A .Cu Unjieng, and into the business in which they were interested, or at least, it was they who were most benefited by
said sum because P325,000 thereof were paid to the appellant, as attorney in fact of his father G.A. Cu Unjieng (Exhibits W-39, W-34, W-31 and W-
29); P350,000 were applied to the payment of the balance of said Guillermo A. Cu Unjieng's No. 2 Account in the National City Bank of New York,
an account which could be opened only through the appellant's efforts (Exhibits W-33, W-21 and W-6; Trans., pp. 289, 299, 302 and 304); P10,000
went to the appellant (Exhibit W-41); and the sums of P11,000, P6,000 and P1,457.47 went into the companies stated in Exhibits W-37 and W-7, W-
13, and W-32 all of which are associations or companies managed, directed and maintained with the Cu Unjiengs' money, without excluding the
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It should be stated at this time that said No. 2 Account of G.A. Cu Unjieng in the National City Bank of New York was secured by the appellant with
quedans and stock certificates of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., and said quedans and stock certificates which are exactly of the
same manufacture, source and nature as the forged quedans Exhibits A, A-1 to A-63, B, B-1 to B-26, C, C-1 to C-36, etc., are likewise forged and
spurious. They are the aforesaid Exhibits CC-1 and CC-2, DD-1 to DD-44, EE-1 to EE-45, FF-1 to FF-40, GG-1 to GG-16, HH-1 to HH-68, II-1 to II-24 and
AA-1 to AA-3, the same documents which the appellant, without disclosing his identity at the beginning, tried to recover from the National City
Bank of New York, but failed, by reason of circumstances independent of his will. The reason for this is that the fraud perpetrated against said bank
and that perpetrated against the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation from which the money for the redemption of the documents in
question was to be obtained, had already been discovered, and furthermore said documents were delivered to the city fiscal's office upon demand
of said office. In connection with this incident, the fact is worth mentioning that when the appellant, who had gone to settle his father's account
with the National City Bank of New York and at the same time to express to the manager thereof his desire to withdraw the documents in question,
was informed that said documents had been delivered to the city fiscal's office, he was greatly alarmed and could not repressed nor even
dissemble his excitement (Trans., pp. 743 and 744), and the reason is not hard to guess; he did not have a clear conscience. The appellant's
testimony that he informed the manager of the National City Bank of New York (Shaw) that the quedans with which he was to secure his father's
No. 2 Account would belong to Fernandez, cannot be given credit because said manager categorically denied it. Shaw's testimony deserves more
credit from the court because it is supported by the evidence. It will be remembered that, as stated on page 14 of this decision [original], when the
appellant approached Shaw to ask for the opening of his father G.A. Cu Unjieng's No. 2 Account, Shaw immediately sent the cablegram which is
quoted on said page. Now then, in said cablegram Shaw did not tell to his bank's central office in New York that the quedans with which G.A. Cu
Unjieng was to secure his loan by way of overdraft would belong to Rafael Fernandez or to another, not to him. We entirely concur in the lower
court's reasoning that "if Mr. Shaw had been advised that G.A. Unjieng's interest therein (referring to the quedans) was merely that of pledgee, he
would have notified his head office to that effect because of its bearing upon the soundness of the security offered." (Printed decisions, p. 81.) The
loan or overdraft involved was not for a negligible sum but for half a million pesos which, after it had been granted, amounted to P822,035.58 in
April, 1931 (Exhibit JJ).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The first time mention was made to said witness (Shaw) that the quedans which were to be pledged as security belonged to Fernandez and that the
latter had pledged them to G.A. Cu Unjieng, was after May 31, 1931. Shaw's testimony on this point was as follows:

The name of Rafael Fernandez was never mentioned to me in connection with this account. After May 31, when I began to press Mariano Cu
Unjieng for the payment of this account was when he mentioned that Rafael Fernandez had any connection therewith. (Trans., p. 312.)

The appellant's conduct may well be explained by the fact that a few days before, or on May 27, 1931, he already knew that the fraud perpetrated
in the Peoples Bank and Trust Company has been discovered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant's contention that the promissory notes Exhibits ZZ-35-1 and ZZ-35-A-1 of which Exhibits ZZ-35 and ZZ-35-A are mere photographs, for
P250,000 each, are authentic and were executed for cause by Sabina Sioco and the other persons who signed them, is untenable, not only for the
reasons already stated, that is, that they are spurious, but also because the obligation, the payment of which it was desired to secure by said
promissory notes, was of the nature stated in Exhibit 588; and it so happens that this document, Exhibit 588, as said Exhibits ZZ-35-1 and ZZ-35-A-1,
is forged and spurious, and that it was prepared at the suggestion and upon instructions of the appellant after having had an understanding with
Rafael Fernandez. The name of Sabina Sioco Viuda de Escaler appearing in said document was placed there by Manuel Carlos (Trans., p. 5381), and
said document was delivered by the appellant to Manuel Carlos for him to fill in with the widow's name. Exequiel Floro affixed his signature to said
document in the presence of the appellant and Rafael Fernandez and, according to said witness, neither the alleged signature of Sabina Sioco Viuda
de Escaler nor that of Rafael Fernandez was there at that time (Trans. pp. 3535 and 3536). Professor Beyer, who testified as a handwriting expert,
assured that the alleged signature of Sabina Sioco Viuda de Escaler above stated is not the same as said woman's authentic signatures given him for
purposes of comparison, are written by a hand other than that which wrote the signature appearing in the exhibit in
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There can not be the least doubt that Exhibit 588, which is a promissory note claimed by the appellant to have been given to him by Fernandez as
evidence that Fernandez had received from the appellant the P350,000 which he deposited in the China Banking Corporation on May 27, 1931, is
forged, for the following reasons:
(1) If it is true that Rafael Fernandez was given the P350,000 by means of the three checks: Exhibit 460, dated May 27, 1931, for P100,000 drawn
against the Bank of the Philippine Islands by G.A. Cu Unjieng through the appellant as his attorney in fact, and deposited by the same drawee in the
China Banking Corporation on the same date; Exhibit 96 for P200,000 drawn against the China Banking Corporation on the same date of May 27,
1931, and collected by Rafael Fernandez; and Exhibit 576 for P50,000 drawn also on the same date against the International Banking Corporation
and in favor of Rafael Fernandez, it is also true that he did not use the money in question for himself alone because, acting under the appellant's
instructions, he used said money to pay the pending obligations which he and G.A. Cu Unjieng, through said appellant, had in the Peoples Bank and
Trust Company, after it had been discovered that the quedans which Fernandez and the appellant had pledged therein were forged. On this point
the appellant contends that inasmuch as he had absolutely no knowledge of the fact that Rafael Fernandez, in order to succeed in making the
Peoples Bank and Trust Company grant to G.A. Cu Unjieng, of whom he was the attorney in fact, the loan of P150,000 for which Fernandez had
applied in the name of G.A. Cu Unjieng about the beginning of November, 1930 (Exhibit XX), was to give on his own account security consisting of
forged quedans, as Fernandez, according to the appellant, approached the later upon knowing that he was in need of money to tell him that
Fernandez could help him obtain said loan and that it would be easy for said Fernandez to obtain it because he was a stockholder of said bank and
was, furthermore, a friend of Mullen's, the manager thereof, the discovery by said bank that the said quedans were really forged could not have
exerted any influence on his mind. This argument of the appellant has little weight because knowing, as he in fact knew, that the first half of the
loan - for he requested that the same be given him in two parts - or the sum of P75,000 was secured exclusively by the 1,000 shares of the Yek Tong
Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., and by the other 1,000 shares of the Yek Tong Lin Loan Company, Ltd., stated in Exhibit XX-2, he must have
necessarily known that the other half, which was given to him later, was also secured by other securities necessarily distinct from the said shares of
the two Yek Tong Lin companies; and it is incredible that he could have even supposed that no other securities were required of him or that none
was given, because it was clear to him that his shares in the Yek Tong Lin companies enumerated in said Exhibit XX-2 served only and exclusively to
secure the first half of the loan. No other conclusion can be inferred from the unequivocal terms of the letter of the appellant's father (Exhibit XX-
121), dated November 12, 1930, addressed to the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, which reads as follows:

I wish to confirm the action of my son, Mr. Mariano Cu Unjieng, in signing as my attorney in fact a collateral note for P75,000 dated November 12,
1930 payable in 90 days, with interest at 9 per cent payable monthly, secured by 1,000 shares of Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd.,
and 1,000 shares of Yek Tong Lin Loan Company, Ltd., as I have given him full power to borrow money for me and to pledge, mortgage and
hypothecate my property, real or personal, on accordance with the attached copy of power of attorney executed by me in his favor on June 23,
1926. I also confirm his action in signing powers of attorney in favor of the Peoples Bank and Trust Company to sell, assign, transfer and make over
my Stock Certificates Nos. 102, 103, 127, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 and 101 of Yek Tong Lin Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., and Stock 99 of Yek
Tong Lin Loan Company, Ltd.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

I furthermore wish to confirm that in the future and until further advice from me Mr. Mariano Cu Unjieng has my authority to borrow money in my
name and to sign corresponding promissory notes, mortgages, pledges or other documents.

(2) Exhibits 590, 589 and 589-A considered together, show that the first does not state the facts as they really occurred. On the contrary, they
prove that the appellant who, as was seen, excels Rafael Fernandez, to a great extent as to foresight and craft, although the latter was his teacher
for sometime while he was studying in the Jose Rizal College, made Fernandez prepare said document in his own handwriting for the purposes
which said appellant already had in mind, this fact being evidence from the circumstance that the check of P300,000 to which said documents
Exhibits 589 and 589-A refer, was not drawn on the date appearing on its face, June 15, 1931, but several days earlier, notwithstanding the fact
that it bears said date. The document in question, Exhibit 590, shows from the date it bears that it was prepared on June 10, 1931, and it should be
noted that in its last paragraph Rafael appears as saying that he was paying G.A. Cu Unjieng with a check for P300,000, referring undoubtedly to the
check dated June 15, 1931, which is the same check referred to in Exhibits 589 and 589-A. With respect to this fact, Fernandez testified that on May
27, 1931, after the appellant, as attorney in fact of G.A. Cu Unjieng, had given him the sum of P350,000 for the purpose of settling the anomaly
discovered in the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, said appellant requested him to draw in his favor a check for P300,000 and it was then agreed
between them that said check should not be negotiated until money had been obtained from the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,
but that as said check had been prematurely presented for payment by one of the appellant's employees because he was not given the necessary
instructions as to how and when to negotiate it, same was dishonored by the bank for lack of funds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

(3) The checks Exhibits W-39 and W-34 for P200,000 ad P100,000, respectively, with which Rafael Fernandez substituted the check for P300,000
(Exhibits 589 and 589-A) which was rejected or dishonored for lack of funds and with which the appellant now shields himself, has no connection
whatsoever with Exhibit 588 because the latter attributes an obligation of P350,000 to Rafael Fernandez and those who signed said document with
him, while the former checks are only for the sum of P300,000; and just as the appellant could ask Fernandez to draw a check for P300,000 in his
favor, so also could he have asked Fernandez to draw in his favor a check for a larger sum; as P350,000 for instance, instead of only P300,000,
because the obligation referred to in Exhibit 588 amounted to P350,000. If the appellant did not do so, it was for the reason that it was never
thought of that said Exhibits W-39 and W-34 would be in payment of the credit expressed in said promissory noted Exhibit 588. On the other hand,
the appellant testified that the understanding between him, on the one hand, and the signers of Exhibit 588, on the other, was that payment was
to be made ten days after the execution thereof (Trans., p. 16,640). The Exhibit in question, however, does not say so; the condition therein stated
is "On demand", that is, with no fixed date. What has been stated is supported by the fact that Exhibit 588 was not cancelled, nor were the stock
certificates alleged to have been given as security for the payment of said sum of P350,000 returned to Fernandez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

(4) When the appellant requested Fernandez to draw in his favor the check which proved useless because it was dishonored for lack of funds, he
did not tell Fernandez that it was in payment of the obligation stated in Exhibit 588.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(5) When said postdated check of Rafael Fernandez (Exhibits 589 and 589-A) was dishonored by the bank on which it was drawn for the reason
already indicated, the appellant should not have granted Fernandez further credit, because any other person in his place would have so acted
under the circumstances; but the evidence shows that the appellant granted him further credit without the least hesitation or reservation, giving
him P30,000 without any security (trans., p. 16,675); andchanrobles virtual law library

(6) If there was really no understanding between Rafael Fernandez and the appellant, or if the sugar business of one was not also the other's, it
would be inexplicable why after the check for P300,000 had been dishonored and after the appellant's experience with Exhibit TT-21, which is
Rafael Fernandez's check for P75,000 which was likewise dishonored for lack of funds on May 26, 1931, said appellant did not take any action
against him, or did not learn a lesson at least, but on the contrary gave him disinterestedly and with no security another loan of P30,000, knowing
that Fernandez was still in default in the payment of the balance of P50,000 which he owed, because, assuming that the P300,000 referred to in
Exhibits W-39 and W-34 were in payment on account of the P350,000 referred to in the alleged promissory note Exhibit 588, Fernandez would
naturally be still indebted in the said sum of P50,000.
If the appellant considered himself innocent of the crime with which he is charged in the information, it is inexplicable why he has gone to the
extent of resorting to falsification. If he did so, it was because he wanted, as Rafael Fernandez, and undoubtedly with more determination that the
latter, to erase that which did not suit him and mislead everybody; and this act of his excludes the idea that he did not cooperate in the
perpetration of the forgeries and frauds charged. It is true that the rule is well settled and it has repeatedly been reiterated in this jurisdiction that
the testimony of an accomplice or of one who admits having taken part in the commission of a crime should be accepted with the greatest care and
caution, in view of the polluted source thereof, in order to be used in evidence against an accused; but this does not mean that said evidence
should necessarily be rejected for not being the best evidence. The more reasonable and better rule is that when two coprincipals or coparticipants
in the commission of a crime agree in their narration to explain what they and others or a third person did to commit the said crime, and their
testimony is reasonably true and is furthermore corroborated by other evidence, such narration is in itself a competent and admissible evidence.
(U.S. vs. Bagsic, 35 Phil., 327; People vs. Giray and Ananias, G.R. No. 35834, 56 Phil., 847; U.S. vs. Remigio, 37 Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Ambrosio and
Falsario, 17 Phil., 295.) The testimony of Rafael Fernandez and Manuel Carlos is precisely of this nature and is supported by the documents above
stated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The fact that the appellant conceived the preparation of said Exhibits 588, ZZ-35-1 and ZZ-35-A-1 cannot but be considered foresight and craft
because he must have then thought that if the latter two documents did not produce the desired results by reason of the circumstance that they
were prepared after the discovery of the frauds committed against said three banks, Peoples Bank and Trust Company, the National City Bank of
New York and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (July 11, 1931), the former which is dated May 27, 1931, would, and the appellant
would then have something tangible to shield himself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant, his father and Rafael Fernandez had many things in common, and, notwithstanding the appellant's testimony of the contrary, the
three were interested in each other's business although some to a greater extent than the others. The appellant and Rafael Fernandez were doubly
godfathers ( compadres) because each was sponsor in the baptism of the other's son. The two were inseparable friends; they were associated in
their work as well as in their diversions, and, according to the appellant's own admission, were very intimate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

In the two corporations the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., and the Yek Tong Lin Loan Company, Ltd., the majority shares of which
was, and still are in the hands of the Cu Unjiengs, Rafael Fernandez was one of the important stockholders, and in Rafael Fernandez's business
known as Micpi, the appellant was a very powerful stockholder because his will would have prevailed over that of any other stockholder in view of
the fact that the had acquired 1,300 shares thereof in addition to the 30 shares which he formerly had (Exhibit 622) and the properties of the
business described in the deeds of transfer (Exhibits 605 and 606). It is true that the appellant disclaimed all knowledge of said transfers prior to
the trial, having testified thereat that Fernandez made said transfer behind his back in order to save his property upon discovery of his fraudulent
acts; but it is no less true that the documents in question were delivered to him after they had been duly executed, by the notary public before
whom they were ratified, nor is it less true that the appellant gave instructions to said notary to prepare the necessary documents. (Exhibit 622;
Trans., p. 6,434; Exhibit 1587; Trans., p. 21,1769.) The notary public in question so testified (Trans., p. 21,754), and there is no reason for doubting
his testimony because there is nothing of record showing partiality on his part in favor of Fernandez or against the appellant. If the appellant's
allegation that Rafael Fernandez owed them many hundreds of thousands of pesos is true - and it should be borne in mind that all his efforts were
directed to prove this fact - then his excuse proves childish and absurd, because Fernandez, in order to save his properties, would not have placed
them in the name of the Cu Unjiengs, they being his biggest creditors, but in that of another, as for example a relative or a friend. From all the
foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the appellant had full knowledge of the transfers in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

It is timely to state at this juncture, because it has relation to one of the appellant's points of defense by contradicting it, that by reason of said
transfers the appellant credited nothing to Rafael Fernandez in connection with the latter's alleged accounts with the Cu
Unjiengs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

When G.A. Cu Unjieng, through the appellant, desired to foreclose his mortgage on the Mabalacat Sugar Central about the first semester of the
year 1929 (Trans., p. 17,187), said appellant recommended to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga where the action to that effect was
instituted, that Rafael Fernandez be appointed receive, as he was in fact until shortly after June 9, 1931. (Exhibit ZZ-174.)chanrobles virtual law
library

The two, the appellant and Rafael Fernandez, were interested to the same extent in two concessions of the Carnival Association in the years 1930
and 1931, and they obtained very substantial profits from said enterprise. (Trans., pp. 16,879, 21,183 and 6,181.)chanrobles virtual law library

They were also interested in the acquisition of shares of the Central Azucarera de Ilocos about the latter part of the year 1930, and, as a matter of
fact they later managed said central, the appellant acting as president thereof with 245 shares (Exhibits 1576, 1576-A to 1576-D); Rafael Fernandez
as manager with 531 shares; and Leopoldo Cu Unjieng (the appellant's brother) and Castor P. Cruz, as directors, with 5 shares each. (Exhibit ZZ-
320.) All the expenses incurred in the acquisition of said 786 shares were defrayed with money obtained from the credits granted to Rafael
Fernandez in the Peoples Bank and Trust Company. (Exhibits YY-3906, YY-1181, YY-541, YY-4272, YY-3854, YY-3867, YY-3910, YY-3957, YY-3961, YY-
3960, YY-3912, YY-3959, YY-3913, YY-3911, YY-3956, YY-3907, YY-3958, YY-3909, YY-3914, YY-3908, YY-3962, YY-3963.) Although it may seem a
disgression, it is not out of place to state herein, inasmuch as mentioned has been made of the Central Azucarera de Ilocos, that the following
consideration of the lower court appearing in its appealed decision are very well founded, to wit:

In addition to this financing through the bank accounts in Fernandez's name, the central secured a loan from the China Bank in the sum of twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000) and overdraft facilities with the Peoples Bank in the same amount. Both of these accounts were guaranteed by the Yek
Tong Lin Company. (Exhibits 1225, 1225-A, ZZ-313, ZZ-314, and ZZ-315.) These guarantees were signed by the defendant in behalf of the Yek Tong
Lin Company. The proceeds of the loan from the China Bank were deposited in the overdraft account in the Peoples
Bank.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After the discovery of the fraud, the Peoples Bank called the overdraft and the defendant assumed joint and several liability with the Yek Tong Lin
Company for the account, in consideration of an extension, the account then amounting, with interest, to twenty-one thousand five hundred
eighty-one pesos and seventy-four centavos (P21,581.74). (Pages 9561, 9562; Exhibit ZZ-312.) The account was paid on July 24, 1931, by the Yek
Tong Lin Company and this latter company thereupon took judgment against the Ilocos Central without including Mariano Cu Unjieng, its manager
and co-guarantor, as a defendant, on November 23, 1931, while this case was being tried. (Page 9566, Trans.) Through this judgment, naturally, the
Cu Unjiengs have acquired complete control of the central and do not need to assert their share control for such
purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is very significant in connection with the story of this central that, notwithstanding the fact that the shares were held in the name of Mariano Cu
Unjieng and Fernandez, the central was financed so heavily by means of the overdraft account standing in Fernandez's name in the Peoples Bank
and Trust Company. If Fernandez's story is accepted, all the shares purchased in his name were transferred to Mariano Cu Unjieng. Cu Unjieng
himself admits that he was the owner of two hundred forty-five (245) shares thereof. As president of the company, he must have known the extent
to which Fernandez was financing the company from the overdraft account in the Peoples Bank. (Printed decision, pages 43, 44.)

It should be borne in mind that the credit which Fernandez had in the Peoples Bank and Trust Company in those days was obtained by means of
pledging forged quedans.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 16, 1931, the appellant and Rafael Fernandez organized the partnership known as C. & F. Investment Company, that means Cu Unjieng
and Fernandez Investment Company, which began functioning with a capital of P244,763.20 owned by both of them in equal parts, according to
the provisions of the partnership agreement thereof, Exhibit XX-120. It is likewise timely to state at this juncture, in connection with said
partnership C. & F. Investment Company because it proves that after the discovery of the frauds, the appellant induced Rafael Fernandez to
transfer his properties without any consideration in order to prepare his defense, that the books and documents of said partnership contain data to
the effect that all the contributions given to the partnership by Fernandez amounted to P254,063.69. (Exhibits YY-3690, YY-4277, YY-1220, YY-4243,
YY-3288, YY-3361, YY-3804, YY-3057, YY-3394, YY-4118, YY-3803, YY-1129, YY-2333, 1245, YY-3526, YY-3073, YY-3074, YY-3794, YY-3833, YY-4104,
YY-4132, YY-4220, YY-4231, YY-1977, YY-376, YY-244, YY-266, YY-621, YY-656, YY-871, YY-884, YY-1829, YY-910, YY-924, YY-941, YY-2174, YY-232,
YY-538, 388, YY-955, YY-1024, YY-60, YY-91, YY-956, YY-918, YY-138, W-37, W-7, 1585, YY-2117, and YY-1180; testimony of Fernandez, trans., pp.
5974 to 6355, 6390 to 6450, 8371 to 8395; and of the appellant himself, trans., pp. 16490 et seq., and 19,501 et seq.) according to the appellant's
evidence, however, Rafael Fernandez parted with all his rights and interests in the C. &F. Investment Company in favor of the Cu Unjiengs for the
sum of only P140,000. (Exhibits ZZ-36 dated July 1, 1931.) This cannot but arouse suspicion on the veracity of said evidence and the following
excerpt from the appealed decision does not fail to give additional reason for not taking it into consideration:

There is a conflict in the testimony as to the real date of the execution of this document. Cu Unjieng testified that it was executed on the date it
bears. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that it was not executed until July 10 ( page 6080, Trans.). In this he is corroborated by the admitted
fact that no effort was made to register it until after the discovery of the fraud. (Printed decision, pp. 51, 52.)

We fully agree with the lower court and we are of the opinion that the exhibit in question is but one of the several documents prepared at the
suggestion of the appellant after the discovery of the frauds, in order to help Fernandez to save some of his properties, to protect the appellant
himself, and erase all traces of his complicity with said accused and witness Rafael Fernandez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

About the month of July, 1930, the appellant employed Rafael Fernandez general manager of the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., in
this company's fire insurance activities. The appellant was then at the head of said company and as the lower court correctly said in its decision:

Prior to that time they had had separate offices. Upon receiving this appointment, Fernandez took offices on the second floor of the Yek Tong Lin
Building at 320 Dasmari�as, on the ground floor of which Mariano Cu Unjieng had his office s. These offices were arranged in such a way that
Fernandez had to pass through Cu Unjieng's offices to go upstairs to his own offices. This brought them into daily contact with each other. (Exhibits
504, 504-A, 506, and pages 2056 and 2059, Trans.). (Printed decision, p. 40.)

About the month of May, 1931, the two embarked in another sugar business by acquiring the sugar central known as Bataan Central with money
from the credit which Fernandez had opened in the National City Bank of New York by pledging forged quedans therein. As in the case of Central
Azucarera de Ilocos the appellant was made president of the company and Fernandez its manager. The following excerpt from the appealed
decision is fully supported by the evidence:

The shares were purchased for five hundred pesos (P500) each, which was their par value, and of the two hundred sixty-six (266 shares purchased
two hundred sixty-four (264) were put in the name of Exequiel Floro on the instructions of Mariano Cu Unjieng (page 8040. Trans.). Exhibit 588-J is
the share certificate for these shares. This certificate was produced by the defense at the trial (page 3278, Trans.). The evidence is contradictory as
to how it came to be in the possession of the defendant at that time. Fernandez testified that on the instructions of Mariano Cu Unjieng the share
certificate was put in the name of Floro when purchased, and was thereupon immediately indorsed in blank and given to him (pages 6421, 8083
and 8040). Floro testified that he knew nothing about these shares when they were purchased; that he had never had the certificate therefor in his
possession; that he first learned of the fact that those shares had been purchased in his name when he received a notice of a stockholder's
meeting; and that he thought that that certificate was among the documents he endorsed after the discovery of the fraud. (Pages 3536-3538,
Trans.) On the other hand, the Cu Unjiengs testified that this share certificate was being held by them as a counter-guarantee for the Yek Tong Lin
Fire & Marine Insurance Company at the time of the discovery of the fraud. (Page 16,672, Trans.) In any case, it is certain that this share certificate,
the money for the purchase of which, or one hundred thirty-two thousand pesos (P132,000), was obtained by Fernandez as a result of a fraud upon
the National City Bank, similar to the fraud perpetrated upon the Hongkong Bank which forms the subject matter of this case, turned up in the
hands of the Cu Unjiengs after the discovery of the fraud.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The purchase of these two small centrals was associated by Fernandez with the pending foreclosure proceedings against the Mabalacat Sugar
Central. He explained that the Cu Unjiengs knew that they were going to get three or four other small centrals, for the purpose of putting them
under one management and giving them the benefit of one good technical man, thus spreading the resulting overhead. (Pages 6125 and 8028,
Trans.)chanrobles virtual law library

These investments demonstrate that the defendant had a far deeper interest in the sugar business than that of a mere lender of money upon sugar
quedans as security. (Printed decision, pp. 45, 46.)

In June, 1930, they also organized the corporation known as the Eastern Theatrical Enterprises. The appellant was the president of the corporation
and Rafael Fernandez its treasurer. The facts relative to this enterprise and the conclusion arrived by each of the therein, which facts ad conclusion
are supported by the evidence, have been set forth in the appealed decision as follows:

The first installment on the subscriptions for these two share certificates at the rate of six thousand two hundred twenty-five pesos (P6,225) each,
or twelve thousand four hundred fifty pesos (P12,450) in all, was paid by the check. Exhibit YY-3404, drawn by Fernandez on the Peoples Bank &
Trust Co. in favor of the Eastern Theatrical Enterprises (Exhibit YY-3404 and pages 6303, 6587, 16907 and 19357. Trans.). Mariano Cu Unjieng never
drew any check to reimbursed this payment. Fernandez drew various checks, Exhibits 849-866, as treasurer of this concern, and deposited the
same in various accounts standing in his name in the local banks. Most of these checks were prepared by Leopoldo Cu Unjieng, the brother of
Mariano Cu Unjieng, who was himself the cashier of the Eastern Theatrical Enterprises (pages 4161, 4162 and 19,424-19,426, Trans.) While the
defendant denied any knowledge that this was being done (pages 17,151, 17,155, Trans.), Fernandez testified that he signed none of these checks
or any other check in behalf of the Eastern Theatrical Enterprises without the prior approval of the defendant, as the president of the corporation.
(Page 4161, Trans.) In view of the fact that the defendant's brother prepared most of these checks for Fernandez's signature, the court finds that
the Fernandez's version of these transactions is undoubtedly the true one. (Printed decision, p. 47.)

The appellant and Rafael Fernandez likewise embarked in another business which was originally known as the Manila Motor Works and later as the
Eastern Motor and Iron Works for the manufacture and sale of what came to be known as "gas-saving manifold" and automobile repair work.
Fernandez testified that he organized it in partnership with the appellant and his testimony deserves credit because it is corroborated, in the first
place, by that of the witness William S. Irey, inventory of the gas-saving manifold (trans., pp. 3459, 3473); and, in the second place, by Exhibit 604,
which is a deed of transfer of said business, executed by Rafael Fernandez in favor of the appellant. The evidence supports the following statement
of facts and considerations made by the lower court in its appealed decision in connection with the said business:

The disbursements from the bank accounts in Fernandez's name for the purpose of establishing and operating this business amounted to seventy-
seven thousand two hundred eleven pesos and seventy-six centavos (P77,211.76). In view of the fact that the checks are numerous, the court is
attaching a list of the same to this decision as Annex B. Receipts from this business, or checks payable thereto and indorsed to and deposited by
Fernandez, aggregated one thousand six hundred and two pesos and thirty-two centavos (P1,602.32). (Pages 6819-6821, 6834-6837, 6678, Trans.)
The result is that this business, which either belonged to Cu Unjieng from the beginning or was transferred to him in February, 1930, without any
real consideration, cost the bank account standing in the name of Fernandez the net sum of seventy-five thousand six hundred nine pesos and
forty-four centavos (P75,609.44).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On February 14, 1931, Fernandez executed a transfer of all his interest in this business to Mariano Cu Unjieng for a recited consideration of sixty
thousand pesos (P60,000), no part of which has ever been paid (Exhibit 604, pages 3327, 6178 and 21,214, Trans.). As in the case of the Micpi land,
Mariano Cu Unjieng disclaimed any knowledge of this transfer which was made about the same time, until the trial of the case. (Page 17,099-
17,104, Trans.) However, Cipriano de los Reyes, who was the lawyer who prepared the original of Exhibit 604 and the notary before whom it was
executed and acknowledged, testified positively that he delivered that original to Mariano Cu Unjieng personally upon the execution thereof (pages
21, 752-21, 756, Trans.). The document was executed as a public document and the inherent uselessness of the execution of such a document
without the knowledge of the transferee and the delivery thereof to him, is apparent. Furthermore, the testimony of Cipriano de los Reyes was
given without hesitation and in such a straightforward way as to convince the court that he was telling the truth. The court finds, therefore, that
the original of the document, Exhibit 604, was really delivered to Mariano Cu Unjieng by Cipriano de los Reyes upon the execution thereof and that
Mariano Cu Unjieng testified falsely when he denied all knowledge thereof until the trial. (Printed decision, pp. 61, 62.)

In the year 1930, the two bought lottery tickets and speculated in the foreign exchange business at the expense of Guillermo A. Cu Unjieng on at
least two occasions in October and December, 1930. On this particular business, the lower court upon the evidence of record makes the following
statement and consideration:

The first of those occasions was in connection with a 400,000 Amoy Dollar deal with the defendant's father, which took place in October, 1930, and
the second was a 400,00 Shanghai Taels deal with the defendant's father, which took place in December of the same year. (Pages 16,777-16,779,
inclusive, 16,804, 18,659-18,667, 19,007-19,013 and 20,742-20,745 and Exhibits 578-A and 601.)chanrobles virtual law library

It is noteworthy in its bearing upon the defendant's character that although he acted as his father's attorney-in-fact in connection with these
exchange transactions, and held his father's power of attorney, he concealed from his father the fact that he was splitting the profits on those
transactions with Fernandez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, with reference to the 400,000 Amoy Dollar transaction he testified in response to questions put to him by this court, as follows:chanrobles
virtual law library

"Q. Did your father G.A. Cu Unjieng know that you were interested with Fernandez in that deal? - A. I do not believe I hold father about it at that
time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"Q. He did not now that you made some 8,000 odd pesos on that deal? - A. No sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"Q. You never did tell him? - A. I believe I told him that after, much after.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"Q. After this case began? - A. I believe so yes, sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"MR. DEWITT: Q. After this case started? - A. Yes, sir." (Page 16,778, Trans.)chanrobles virtual law library

And with reference to the 400,000 Shanghai Taels transaction, he testified:chanrobles virtual law library

"Q. Before this 400,000 Shanghai Taels proposition about which you have testified, did you talk to your father about it? - A.
Naturally.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

"Q. Did you tell your father that you were going to share in the profits with Fernandez? - A. No, sir." (Page 186,659, Trans.)chanrobles virtual law
library

These exchange transactions resulted in a profit on the exchange phase of sixteen thousand and fifty-three pesos and twenty centavos
(P16,053.20) on the Amoy Dollar transaction (page 19,042), and forty-four thousand two hundred four pesos and eighty-eight centavos
(P44,204.88) on the Shanghai Taels transaction (page 18,663), making a total profit on the two transactions of sixty thousand two hundred fifty-
eight pesos and eight centavos (P60,258.08), made by the defendant in secret partnership with Fernandez at the expense of his father. (Page
19,059.) (Printed decision, pp. 62-64.)

On June 19, 1930, they embarked in another enterprise, buying 100 shares of the Fox Films and 100 shares of Warner Brothers Pictures through
the National City Bank of New York. As the lower court very correctly said:

The margin amounted to eleven thousand seven hundred pesos (P11,700), or for thousand eight hundred fifty pesos (P5,850) for each of the two
men. Fernandez paid this entire margin by his check Exhibit YY-3430 drawn on the Peoples Bank, in favor of the National City Bank, in that account.
There is no check whereby Mariano Cu Unjieng reimbursed this payment. (Exhibits ZZ-271 to ZZ-271-J, inclusive, ZZ-272 to ZZ-272-A, inclusive,
pages 7617-7619, 7697-7698, 7703-7715 and 16,906-16,907, Trans.) (Printed decision, p. 65.)
Everything just stated regarding the business ventures in which the appellant and Rafael Fernandez were equally interested before and during the
period stated in the information proves the close and intimate relation that existed between the two. It likewise proves, in addition to the other
facts and reasonable already stated, that they were absolutely identified with one another in the sugar business in which, for the purpose of
obtaining profit, they used forged quedans and stock certificates; and lastly, it proves how groundless and frail is the appellant's excuse that he and
his father intervened in said sugar business only as mere money lenders. Undoubtedly they were not so for the reasons already stated,
notwithstanding the appellant's claim by means of the entries appearing in his books Exhibits 1293 to 1336 of some of which Exhibits 1372, 1373,
1380, 1384, 1388 to 1397 are claimed to be the translations, because said entries do not state that Fernandez has received from the Cu Unjiengs
any loan for his sugar business or that he ever paid them anything on account of said loan. What appears in said books as "KEE", a Chinese word
which was translated by the witnesses for the defense as signifying "loan to Fernandez", means nothing more than "debit", and what appears
therein as "LAI", another Chinese word which, according to the translators for the defense, means "repayment" or "payments on account made by
Fernandez", merely signifies "credit". It was so stated by the witnesses for the prosecution and their testimony seems to us more acceptable and
more worthy of credit because they are not interested in either of the parties concerned in this case. Considering said entries in the above stated
books in accordance with the testimony of said experts, it may be said that far from contradicting Rafael Fernandez they corroborate him, there
being, therefore, no reason to doubt that G.A. Cu Unjieng supplied the capital for the business and appellant and Rafael Fernandez their industry.
The amounts entered in the "debit" column in some of said books represent those which Fernandez had received from G.A. Cu Unjieng and the
appellant, and those which appear in the "credit" column are the amounts which said Fernandez had delivered to them during their
association.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is not strange that the appellant and his father should have associated with Rafael Fernandez or made use of him for the purpose of obtaining
money from the banks in question, in the manner already indicated, said appellant pledging forged quedans in combination with Fernandez,
because as G.A. Cu Unjieng was engaged in the exchange business and his obligations with the local banks (Exhibits 1291, 1290, 1289, 1288, 1287,
JJ, AA, BB) as well as with the foreign banks as the China Banking Corporation of Amoy (Exhibit ZZ-362), the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank,
Ltd. (Exhibits 363 and 1456) and the Hongkong Bank, Ltd. (Exhibit ZZ-364) were so enormous that they then amounted to 5,187,974.31 Shanghai
Taels, 1,208,586.07 Amoy Dollars and 1,289,963.32 Philippine pesos, it was necessary for him to have ready money so that he could continue with
his exchange business where he pinned his hopes of obtaining large profits in the end. Perhaps everything would have been well with him had not
the frauds perpetrated against the National City Bank of New York and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation been untimely discovered;
but the unexpected happened and his plans miscarried thus frustrating his hopes. The appellant, as a good son and attorney in fact of his father,
naturally wanted to help the latter; hence the reason for taking, certainly not a secondary part in said frauds.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The defense, in order to rebut the evidence for the prosecution and show that the appellant had no motive to commit the acts imputed to him, by
conspiring with his co-accused and Rafael Fernandez for that purpose, made great efforts to prove, in addition to the facts already stated above,
these others facts:

1. That about the time of commission of the forgeries and estafa in question, the appellant had in his own right a fortune of about P600,000 with a
monthly income of more than P5,000 excluding his share of the profits from Cu Unjieng e Hijos of which he is a partner; and that he was a man who
knew how to save and invest his savings in profitable business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. That by reason of his marriage in 1928, he had received from his father, G.A. Cu Unjieng, the large sum of P200,000 Shanghai taels as a marriage
gift; andchanrobles virtual law library

3. That the payments which Rafael Fernandez had been making to him during the years 1929 and 1930 were no other than interest and
commission on loans which Fernandez had obtained through the appellant's intervention, from Cu Unjieng e Hijos, G.A. Cu Unjieng, and the Yek
Tong Lin Loan Company, Ltd., secured by the Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd.

None of these facts, however, is true. They are not shown by the evidence. The appellant did not have the fortune and income which he claimed to
have, nor did he in fact receive the gift allegedly given to him by his father by reason of his marriage in 1928. His income tax returns for the years
1929, 1930 and 1931 (Exhibits ZZ-491, ZZ-492 and ZZ-493) constitute the strongest refutation of his allegation that he was in reality worth about
P600,000. Exhibit ZZ-491 shows that his income in 1929 was only P18,206.200, or an average of a little over P1,500 a month Exhibit ZZ-492 shows
that his losses in 1930 were P42,534.67, and Exhibit ZZ-493 certainly discloses that he had an income of only P9,711.98 during the year
1931.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

During the appellant's cross-examination before the prosecution made any mention of the latter's income tax returns for the three years above
stated, said appellant emphatically declared over and over that he had entered therein all the payments which Rafael Fernandez had made to him
by way of interest and commission. However, when he was confronted with said income tax returns which clearly showed his lack of veracity, he
had to content himself with the strange excuse that he made no entries of said payments in said income tax returns to avoid being prosecuted for
usury. This, which in itself clearly reveals the ease with which the appellant changes his testimony, shows his lack of scruples and that "he is a man
who would not hesitate to sacrifice the truth provided he can protect his interests and conceal any material gain which he obtained for himself,
even if the same is unlawful." These are not the only reasons proving his lack of scruples. In civil case No. 39570 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila entitled "Manila Export Corporation vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng" (Exhibits ZZ-500 and ZZ-500-A), it was conclusively shown, and the lower court
as well as this court to held (G.R. No. 38278, 2 Exhibit ZZ-50-A), that the promissory notes with which the appellant sought to support and prove his
counterclaims in said case here absolutely forged, spurious and fraudulent. In said case the appellant attempted to counteract the action of the
Manila Export Corporation to recover from him the sum of P118,737.85 representing a credit against him which Ty Camco Sobrino had assigned for
value to said company (Manila Export Corporation), by filing two counterclaims for the sum of P111,547.02 and a third addition counterclaim for
P20,000, and making efforts to prove them by means of the same promissory notes which, as already stated, were declared fraudulent, spurious
and forged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The defense contends that the judgment in said case of Manila Export Corporation vs. Cu Unjieng lower court, nor can it now be taken into
consideration in this instance, and bases his contention on the provisions of section 342 of Act No. 190 which reads as follows:

A witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, or by evidence that his general reputation for
truth, honesty, or integrity is bad; but not by evidence, of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the examination of the witness,
or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime.

When said Exhibits ZZ-50 and ZZ-500-A consisting in the bill of exceptions and the decision in said case were offered in evidence, the only reason
given by the appellant for opposing the admission thereof was that they were irrelevant or impertinent because the questions raised therein were
different from those raised in this case and furthermore there was not the least relation between the two cases. It happens, however, that while
the appellant was testifying on his behalf in this case, he mentioned the real existence and validity of the promissory notes with which he wanted
to support his counterclaims in said case against the plaintiff Manila Export Corporation, insisting that said promissory notes formed part of his
assets, which, according to him amounted approximately to P600,00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Said Exhibits ZZ-500 and ZZ-500-A were undoubtedly admissible in evidence not only for the purpose of disproving the appellant's claim that they
formed part of his assets but also for the purpose of showing the ease with which he distorts the truth and his fondness for doing so, because in all
cases of fraud deceit, as the ones under consideration, when it is necessary to prove that the accused had knowledge of said acts (fraud or deceit),
any evidence disclosing other fraudulent acts committed at or near the same time of the commission thereof in competent evidence. It was so
stated in the following excerpt from page 746 of volume 22 of the Corpus Juris, citing among other authorities the decisions mentioned in the case
of Newton Centre Trust Co. vs. Stuart (20 Mass., 288; 87 N. E., 630), and in that of Gurley vs. Armentraut (27 Oh. Cir. Ct., 199):

So also the commission of acts similar to that involved may be relevant as bearing on the probability of the act in issue having been committed. In
actions based on fraud and deceit, where it is necessary to prove scienter, fraudulent acts similar to those charged and done at or near the same
time may be shown, . . . .

And in the case of Butler vs. Watkins (13 Wall., 456; 20 Law. ed., 629), the Supreme Court of the United States held:

Actual fraud is always attended by an intent to defraud, and the intent may be shown by any evidence that has a tendency to persuade the mind of
its existence. Hence, in actions for fraud, large latitude is always given to the admission of evidence. If a motive exist prompting to a particular line
of conduct, and it be shown that in pursing that line a defendant has deceived and defrauded one person, it may justly be inferred that similar
conduct towards another, at about the same time and in relation to a like subject, was actuated by the same spirit.

The appellant's testimony that his father G.A. Cu Unjieng gave him a marriage gift of 200,000 taels while he was in Shanghai on his honeymoon trip,
is of no weight, because said gift was merely nominal. The appellant could not dispose of said gift, neither could he have done so however much he
would have to, because it was given as a security for a certain obligation which his father had with the China Banking Corporation of Amoy. All that
he could do after receiving it was to deposit it in the Shanghai Commercial & Savings Bank, Ltd., in his name it is true, but without withdrawing it
therefrom because he could not do so in view of the fact that it was subject to his father's aforesaid obligation; and in fact it remained therein until
the creditor bank took the same in payment of its credit against G.A. Cu Unjieng, the appellant's father, who was unable to pay it otherwise.
(Trans., page 17,208.)chanrobles virtual law library

The defense also made efforts to prove, by means of the appellant's testimony, that when the latter succeeded in obtaining credit for his father in
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and G.A. Cu Unjieng's No. 3 Account was opened therein during the early part of January, 1931,
he made it clear to the manager of said bank, Johnston, and the accountant thereof, Gordon, that the quedans with which he was to secure the
payment of said credit were those which Rafael Fernandez had pledged to them. The letters exchanged between the appellant and the bank in
question as well as Exhibits M, N, Q, O and Y, omitting the testimony of said manager and accountant, contradicting him, that when the appellant
obtained the credit in question he told them that the quedans with which he secured said credit were his, without then mentioning at all the name
of Rafael Fernandez, prove that his excuse deserves no credit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In Exhibit M dated January 8, 1931, which was already quoted in its entirety on page 15 of this decision [original], the appellant appears as saying
that the quedans were his, his exact words being: "My sugar quedans."chanrobles virtual law library

In Exhibit N which is the bank's letter to G.A. Cu Unjieng on January 27, 1931, in reply to the letter written to the bank by the appellant as G.A. Cu
Unjieng's attorney in fact, it was stated as follows:

We acknowledge receipt of your letter of date enclosing quedans for 20,000 piculs of centrifugal sugar. Your cheque for P120,000 drawn against
same has been paid and as the overdraft now amounts to P307,915.29 we shall be obliged if you will settle exchange with us for the documentary
bills of exchange to be negotiated through us against the sugar to be exported.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We also refer to your letter of 30th, January 1930 regarding that overdraft of P66,500 against the security of 332 shares Yek Tong Lin Loan
Company, Ltd., and 333 shares Yek Tong Lin Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd., and shall be glad to receive your cheque for P66,500 tomorrow 28th
instant in full liquidation of the account as arranged.

In Exhibit O which the bank again wrote to G.A. Cu Unjieng on March 19, 1931, in view of the latter's silence, not having answered the bank's letter,
Exhibit N, he was told as follows:

We note that you have not yet settled exchange for your sugar shipment nor deposited the Letter of Credit covering same which you gave us to
understand would be done in March and on which understanding we granted you an overdraft in No. 3 account.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

We shall be glad to hear from you in this matter.

Upon receiving this letter, G.A. Cu Unjieng, through the appellant, wrote his answer Exhibit Y which bears the same date and is couched in the
following language:

DEAR SIRS:chanrobles virtual law library

In reply to your letter of today, I am pleased to advise you that the sugar shipment as well as the exchange will be settled with you within this
month, as arranged.

Yours truly,

G.A. CU UNJIENG
By (Sgd.) MARIANO CU UNJIENG

From all of these letters it cannot be inferred, much as one may so desired. nor is there any word or sign therein which permits inference, that the
quedans in question which proved to be forgeries, belonged to Rafael Fernandez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As G.A. Cu Unjieng was pressed by said letter Exhibit O to comply with his agreement with the bank prior to the granting of the credit related to his
No. 3 Account, the appellant, as his attorney in fact, first sent check No. 530419-(C. B. C.) for the sum of P250,000 as payment on account, together
with his letter Exhibit 14 dated March 20, 1931, which reads as follows:

DEAR SIRS:chanrobles virtual law library

I have the pleasure to enclose herewith my C. B. C. check No. 530419-GG for P250,000 as partial payment against my Account No. 3, for which
please deliver to bearer 40,000 piculs of sugar deposited in your bank as security of said obligation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

As to the balance of said Account No. 3, please be advised that same will be liquidated tomorrow. The latter of credit will be arranged on April 7th,
either by Warner, Barnes, Manila or Lamborn, New York.

Yours truly,

G.A. CU UNJIENG
By (Sgd.) MARIANO CU UNJIENG

A few days later, the appellant again sent to said bank his check Exhibit 1291-2395 for the sum of P313,500 for the same purpose, and thus G.A. Cu
Unjieng's Account No. 3 was closed on April 24, 1931, except with respect to an item about interest which was paid on the following
day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In compliance with the request of the appellant, as G.A. Cu Unjieng's attorney in fact, contained in his said letter Exhibit 14, the quedans with which
his credit had been secured were returned to him, having been delivered to Rafael Fernandez who was the bearer referred to in said letter. In
connection with this particular incident, the lower court, upon the evidence, correctly stated as follows:

The quedans pledged by Mariano Cu Unjieng to secure No. 3 Account in the Hongkong Bank are undoubtedly the very quedans which were pledged
by Fernandez on April 24, the day they were obtained from the Hongkong Bank, and April 29, five days later, as security for the overdraft account in
his name in the National City Bank (Exhibits H and I). Fernandez testified that he gave these quedans to Mariano Cu Unjieng when he got them out
of the Hongkong Bank and later in the same day he got quedans from Mariano Cu Unjieng and pledged them to the National City Bank on April 29,
he got other quedans from Mariano Cu Unjieng which he also pledged in the National City Bank, all by instruction of Mariano Cu Unjieng (pages
3847, 3848, 3871-3873, 4983, 4984, and 21,058, Trans.). Mariano Cu Unjieng took the position that he never saw those quedans after he pledged
them in the Hongkong Bank and that he permitted Fernandez to keep them, because Fernandez told him he needed them for Warner, Barnes &
Company (page 16,624). He was of course, enabled to take this position by having sent Fernandez to the Hongkong Bank with the check to close
the account and get the quedans, not a usual way, to say the least, to close an account such as this.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

In any case, the quedans pledged by Fernandez on April 24, 1931, Exhibits MM-1 to MM-128, inclusive, together with the quedans pledged on April
29, being Exhibits NN-1 to NN-112, inclusive, covered together 54,888.5937 piculs, almost exactly the same number as those pledged by Mariano
Cu Unjieng in the Hongkong Bank, as was seen above. There is no doubt, therefore, that these are the very quedans which were pledged by
Mariano Cu Unjieng in behalf of his father in the Hongkong Bank. These quedans were forged and spurious (pages 4609-4610 and 5175, Trans.).
(Printed decision, pp. 95, 96.)

(NOTE. - Exhibits H and I referred to by the lower court are Exhibits MM and NN, respectively. They were marked as Exhibit H and I in the criminal
case against Fernandez, No. 42,244, in the same lower court.)chanrobles virtual law library

They are in fact the same because the quedans pledged by the appellant as G.A. Cu Unjieng's attorney in fact or the opening of said No. 3 Account
called for a total of 54,888.58 piculs (Exhibits M and N), and those pledged by Rafael Fernandez in the National City Bank of New York from which
he obtained the money, after his April, 1931, accounts had been opened therein (Exhibits MM and NN) also called for a total of 54,888.6437 piculs.
This is not and cannot be a mere coincidence because, as Fernandez testified, the quedans pledged by him in the National City Bank of New York
had been given to him by the appellant, and he had delivered to said appellant the quedans which he had received from the Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant lays great stress on the value which he believes Exhibits 595 and 595-A, which are telegrams exchanged between him and Rafael
Fernandez, have in favor of his cause. Said telegram read as follows:

MANILA, June 3rd, 1931

RAFAEL FERNANDEZ
Baguio

Glad to know that comadre is improving may God hear our prayers sorry to bother you but Tiaoqui and Medina demanding payment of obligations
due today please arrange immediately stop father reminds you tenth instant pay obligation and take delivery sugar without fail he just remitted
one million pesos to Shanghai where conditions not good likewise he requests you pay one hundred twelve thousand advanced to National City
since April twenty-third because of another coming remittance please wire Gutierrez David to urge Mabalacats case regards.

MARIANO CU UNJIENG

BAGUIO June 4/31

MR. MARIANO CU UNJIENG

320 Dasmari�as Manila

Am leaving tonight. Read your telegram will follow fathers wishes please tell Medina and Tiaoqui that their transaction is the thirtieth transaction
and only now we have delay because of inevitable circumstances do not pay them tell them to wait till Saturday I will pay for any interest due.

RAFAEL FERNANDEZ
We are of the opinion that not much credit can be given to said documents because they bear all the earmarks of having been prepared
beforehand, in a more or less disguised form, for the protection of the appellant against whatever suspicion that might be cast upon him, and the
reason therefor is given by Fernandez in his testimony appearing on pages 2956, 2961 et seq. of the transcript of stenographic
notes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The dates of the documents Exhibits 595 and 595-A show that the appellant and Rafael Fernandez sent them to each other a few days after the
discovery of the fraud perpetrated upon the Peoples Bank and Trust Company. It should be borne in mind that after the appellant and his father
G.A. Cu Unjieng had been informed of said discovery, seeing that things were taking a bad turn, they gave Fernandez the sum of P350,000 (Exhibits
460, 96 and 576), which the latter deposited to his current account in the China Banking Corporation, withdrawing therefrom as the very same day
the sums stated in Exhibits YY-2594 and YY-2393 for the purpose of redeeming some of the forged quedans pledged in said bank. After the
discovery of the fraud in question, Rafael Fernandez realized clearly that although the appellant had not directly participated therein, appearances
pointed at him as the person solely responsible because the documents which he had been executing in favor of said bank so recited, and he
naturally thought himself lost. However, as the Cu Unjiengs, who did not consider themselves strangers to the fraud in the presence of Fernandez,
kept their promise to give him the necessary help by delivering to him the said sum of P350,000, and furthermore promised him other things,
Fernandez, under the circumstances, considered it his duty to answer the telegram Exhibit 595 in the manner expressed in Exhibit 595-
A.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

According to all indications, the appellant and Rafael Fernandez exchanged the two telegrams in question, both simply guessing the purpose
intended by them without being sure thereof, because it was not true that Medina's promissory note was then due, said document showing on its
face that payment thereof would not be due until twenty days after sight (Exhibit 694-F), and at the time the appellant sent Rafael Fernandez his
telegram Exhibit 595, no demand had yet been made on Fernandez for the payment thereof. If anything may be inferred from this fact, the
inference should be that said telegrams were but a part of a preconceived plan to prepare a defense for the appellant in case he should ever be
implicated in the fraud.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant likewise lays great stress on the value which he believes Exhibit 640 also has in favor of his cause. This is a receipt from Fernandez
which literally reads as follows:

I received the sum of P91,000 from Mr. G.A. Cu Unjieng to buy 2,000 shares Pasudeco to be delivered to said gentlemen as soon as possible within
one week.

Aug. 11, 1930.

(Sgd.) RAFAEL FERNANDEZ

The appellant testified that Rafael Fernandez, in pursuance of the obligation contracted by the latter under said receipt, delivered to him among
other stock certificates of the Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., which is also known by the abbreviated name Pasudeco, stock
certificates Nos. 1480 for 400 shares, 1493 for 347 shares, and 1495 for 392 shares (Exhibits AA-1, AA-2 and AA-3) which proved spurious; that
upon receiving them, he believed in good faith that they were genuine and it was in this belief that his father, G.A. Cu Unjieng, through him,
happened to pledge them to the National City Bank of New York on November 3, 1930, to secure the payment of the loan which was granted to his
father (Exhibit BB).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Rafael Fernandez's version of this particular transaction is different. He testified that he had never completed the 2,000 shares of the Pampanga
Sugar Development Company, Inc., which the Cu Unjiengs wanted, and that he had so told the appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

Fernandez's version is to us more worthy of credit because if, as the appellant claims, Fernandez in fact had succeeded in completing the number
of shares which he was asked to buy for G.A. Cu Unjieng, it certainly cannot be explained why he failed to require from the appellant the return of
his receipt Exhibit 640, nor why it was not returned to or cancelled by him. If said exhibit continued to be in the appellant's possession, it was
undoubtedly because it still had some value to him and the Cu Unjiengs and it was his desire to make use thereof as they deemed necessary for the
purpose of demanding from Fernandez, in due time compliance with the terms thereof or, at least, the return of a proportional part of their
money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The appellant, to give some explanation why Exhibit 640 remained in his possession and why he had in the meantime pledged the forged share
certificates in question (Exhibits AA-1, AA-2 and AA-3), to the National City Bank of New York, testified that it was due to the fact that Fernandez
had collected the dividends corresponding to said shares; and to give force and the semblance of truth to his testimony, he presented Fernandez's
letter consisting of two pages, Exhibits 641 and 641-A. Said letter starts right off, without any formality, and with a small letter. It bears neither
address nor date, nor does it observe the usual rules of leaving a left-hand margin and beginning the first line with a capital letter, which is how
even persons of ordinary learning usually write a letter. The first lines of the letter in question reads as follows:

asked him to include those in my dividend check and if cannot buy those shares, he will think I am a big bluff. I believe in all what you say. I have
never doubted that you will give me the shares and dividends but please give me a note where Augusto Gonzales will see that he was justified in
believing men. . . .

We know from the evidence that Fernandez is a learned man, having obtained diplomas in the University of the Philippines and the University of
Harvard, in the United States, and was instructor of banking in the University of the Philippines and also a professor of economics in the Jose Rizal
College. We also know from Exhibits 542, 874, 590 and 640, which are in his own handwriting, that when he writes, he is in the habit of strictly
observing the above stated rule relative to a margin. This necessarily means that said letter (Exhibits 641 and 641-A) is mutilated, with the previous
page or pages lacking. For this reason we find the following conclusion arrived at by the lower court fully justified, to wit:

The defense maintains that these two exhibits constitute a complete note (page 16,346, Trans.). The first of these exhibits, Exhibit 641, begins with
the word "asked," the "a" being a smaller letter. The court cannot conceive of a complete sentence that could begin with this word. The effort to
make the court believe that these two sheets of paper constitute a complete note, is a reflection upon the court's intelligence and merely serves to
persuade the court that a portion of the note is being deliberately suppressed for the reason that it would destroy the story of the defense about
these forged shares.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In any case, that portion of the note marked Exhibit 641-A fails to bear out the contention of the defendant, inasmuch as it shows that Fernandez
proposed to keep the dividends on the shares which from the subject matter of the discussion in the note, and not to pay them over to the Co
Unjiengs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defense contends that G.A. Cu Unjieng received two dividends from Fernandez in connection with these forged shares, one being represented
by the Peoples Bank check No. E-126103 in the sum of three thousand five hundred seven pesos (P3,507) (this check not having been presented),
and the other being represented by the check Exhibit YY-172 dated the 19th of May, 1931, for three thousand four hundred seventeen pesos
(P3,417). (Pages 16,355-16,364.) Fernandez testified that he merely drew these checks from the joint fund at the request of Mariano Cu Unjieng,
without knowing that it would be claimed that they were dividends on these three share certificates, and without realizing that Exhibit YY-172
would be the exact amount of the dividends thereon, at the rate of ten per cent (10%) of the par value thereof (page 20, 722,
Trans.).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An examination of these checks drawn by Fernandez on May 19th, 1931, Exhibits YY-171, YY-172, YY-173, YY-174, and YY-175, discloses that three
of these checks are in consecutive serial numbers and two of them were in favor of G.A. Cu Unjieng and one in favor of Mariano Cu Unjieng. The
court does not believe that if Fernandez had known that this check Exhibit YY-172 was in the exact amount of the dividends on these forged shares,
and that the shares were forged, he would fail to incorporate that the sum in the other check drawn in favor of G.A. Cu Unjieng on that date,
Exhibit YY-173 in the sum of one thousand two hundred seventy-five pesos (P1,275), so as to conceal that fact. (Printed decision, pp. 37, 38.)

In view of the established facts and the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conclusion arrived at by the lower
court finding that the appellant had conspired with his co-accused and with Rafael Fernandez to commit the crime alleged in the information, on
the date, place and circumstances therein stated, and that he is, therefore, guilty of said crime, is very well-founded. The fraud perpetrated against
the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation is in fact but the culmination, or rather a continuation of the frauds and forgeries of which the
Peoples Bank and Trust Company and the National City Bank of New York were the victims. There is abundant evidence that the appellant in fact
conspired with Rafael Fernandez and Manuel Carlos and this is necessarily so if, bearing in mind the facts and reasons already stated, the rules on
conspiracy which are summarized in volume 5, page 1088, paragraph 37, of the Ruling Case Law, are also taken into consideration, to wit:

Conspiracies need not to be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite
acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a
matter of inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an apparently criminal or unlawful purpose in
common between them. The existence of the agreement or joint assent of the minds need not be proved directly. It may be inferred by the jury
from other facts proved. It is not necessary to prove that the defendants came together and actually agreed in terms to have the unlawful purpose,
and to pursue it by common means. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one
performing one part and another part of the same so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, the jury will be justified in
the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. If, therefore, one concurs in a conspiracy, no proof of agreement to
concur is necessary in order to make him guilty. His participation in the conspiracy may be may be established without showing his name or giving
his description.

It having been proven that the appellant conspired with Rafael Fernandez and with Manuel Carlos, he must necessarily answer for the acts of the
two as he must answer for his own acts; for, as it was stated in the cases of United States vs. Remigio (37 Phil., 599); United States vs. Ipil (27 Phil.,
530); and People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64), the act of a conspirator is imputable to each and every one of his co-
conspirators.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The act committed by the appellant undoubtedly constitutes the complex crime of estafa and multiple falsification of mercantile documents.
Taking into consideration the fact that the crime in question was committed before the Revised Penal Code went into effect, it becomes imperative
that said crime be dealt with in conformity with the provisions of article 89 in connection with articles 301 and 534 of the old Penal Code, the two
latter articles as amended by Acts Nos. 2712 and 3244, respectively, in view of the provisions of article 366 of the Revised Penal Code which reads
as follows:

Without prejudice to the provisions contained in article 22 of this Code, felonies and misdemeanors, committed prior to the date of effectiveness
of this Code shall be punished in accordance with the Code or Acts in force at the time of the commission.

Of the two crimes of falsification of mercantile documents and estafa, the latter crime is the more serious because under the provisions of article
89, the penalty which should be imposed upon the author thereof, taking into consideration the fact that the amount defrauded was
P1,411,312.80, is presidio mayor in its minimum period, that is six years and one day to eight years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The provisions of said articles 89, 301 and 534 of the old Penal Code are more favorable to the appellant than those of the corresponding articles
48, 172 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code, because the last of the first three articles in question prescribes only the penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum degree to prision mayor in its minimum degree for the crime of estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds fifty thousand pesetas;
and article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, although it prescribes the same penalty for the same crime when the amount defrauded exceeds
twenty-two thousand pesos, provides, however, that the penalty shall be increased by adding one year for every ten thousand pesos in excess of
the twenty-two thousand pesos fixed, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed twenty years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Therefore, the penalty which should be imposed in the case at bar, bearing in mind said provisions of article 89 of the old Penal Code, is from six
years, eight months and twenty-one days to eight years of prision mayor, the medium period of which is from seven years, one month and twenty-
four days to seven days, six months and twenty-seven days. This medium period of said penalty should be imposed as maximum according to the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103), because in the commission of the complex crime charged in the information and
established at the trial, no generic circumstance of any kind was present. The minimum of said penalty, under said Act, would be from five years,
five months and eleven days of prision correccional to six years, eight months and twenty days of prision mayor, for the reasons stated in the
decision and judgment rendered in the case of People vs. Gayrama (60 Phil., 796), and in the judgments rendered in the cases therein
cited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, following the doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Mallari and Lao Yu (60 Phil., 400), the judgment appealed from is modified by
imposing upon the appellant the indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days,
affirming the same in all other respects, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Avance�a, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
[ G. R. No. 36979, November 23, 1932 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MIGUEL BENITO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Benito Natividad of the Court of First Instance of Davao, finding the defendant guilty of the crime of
estafa through the falsification of commercial documents and sentencing him to suffer five years, four months, and twenty-one days of prision
correctional and the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 8,000 pesetas, 'and to indemnify the International Harvester Company of
the Philippines in the sum of P15,000.01, or suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The appellant makes the following assignments of error:

"I. The court a quo erred in finding that as cashier of the International Harvester Company it was the duty of the accused to deposit at the Davao
branch of the Philippine National Bank all the money received by him belonging to the said company. "II. The court a quo erred in not finding that
persons other than the accused also deposited money of the company at the said bank. "III. The court a quo erred in declaring that the accused
falsified the 'reconcilement statements' and the 'monthly statements' of the Davao branch of the Philippine National Bank corresponding to the
month of August by making it appear at the foot of Exhibit C-1 that the total was P29,674.45 instead of P15,024.45 which was alleged to have
appeared on the said exhibit. "IV. The court a quo erred in declaring that the accused had caused the disappearance of the 'pass book'
corresponding to the period from November, 1930 up to September, 1931, and also the monthly statements that the Philippine National Bank,
Davao branch, sent to the International Harvester Company with the object of hiding the fact that he did not deposit the money that he received
for the company. "V. The court a quo erred in finding that the accused had appropriated the sum of P15,000.01 belonging to the said International
Harvester Company for his own use and benefit. "VI. The court a quo erred in not granting to the accused the benefit of reasonable doubt. "VII. The
court a quo erred in holding that the accused has committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. "VIII. The court a quo
erred in not absolving the accused from the crime charged in the complaint."
The defendant was charged with the crime of estafa through the falsification of commercial documents, committed as follows:

"Que en diferentes fechas y ocasiones que comprenden el periodo de tiempo desde el mes de noviembre de 1930 al mes de septiembre de 1931,
en el Municipio y Provincia de Davao, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este juzgado, el referido acusado, siendo cajero de la
'International Harvester Co. of the Philippines', una casa comercial debida y legalmente establecida en dicho Municipio de Davao, y siendo su deber
y obligacion, como tal cajero, depositar en la Agenda del Banco Nacional Filipino, en dicho Municipio de Davao, todas las cantidades que llegaran
en su poder, pertenecientes a dicha 'International Harvester Co. of the Philippines', y habiendo recibido por razon de su cargo varias cantidades
que ascienden a la suma de P15,000.01 correspondientes a los fondos de dicha compaña que debian ser ingresadas y depositadas por el mismo
acusado, en dicha Agenda del Banco Nacional Filipino, y con abuso de confianza y de su cargo, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente, por medio de
engano, estratagema y con animo de lucro, dejo de depositar en la mencionada Agencia del Banco Nacional Filipino la referida cantidad de
P15,000.01, equivalentes a 75,000 pesetas, habiendose apropiado de la misma cantidad para su uso y beneficio personales, en per-juicio de
tercero, principalmente 'de la referida 'International Harvester Co. of the Philippines'; y que el mismo acusado, para cometer el delito de estafa,
arriba expuesto, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente, con animo de lucro y por medio de engano y con abuso de confianza y de su cargo, alterd y
falsifico los 'reconcilement statements' y algunos 'statements' de dicha Agencia del Banco Nacional Filipino, haciendo1 constar y figurar en los
mismos cifras y cantidades completamente falsas, haciendo desaparecer en los archivos de dicha compaña y ocultandolos los 'statements' de la
Agencia del Banco Nacional Filipino sobre los depositos de la referida 'International Harvester Co. of the Philippines', asi como tambien el 'pass
book' donde se anotaban los depositos diarios de la misma compania, cuyos 'statements' y 'pass book' estaban y debiaji estar en poder del acusado
por razon de su cargo.

"Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley, especialmente de los articulos 534 y 535, tal como fueron reformados por la Ley No. 3244, y 301, en
relacion con el articulo 89 del Codigo Penal."

It appears from the evidence that the defendant was the cashier of the Davao branch of the International Harvester Company of the Philippines,
and that it was his duty to receive and receipt for the money paid to the company and to deposit it in the Philippine National Bank at Davao. During
the period from November 1, 1930, to September 6, 1931 the defendant received P59,486.06, but deposited only P44,486.05, leaving a balance of
P15,000.01 unaccounted for. The sums received by the defendant are evidenced by the "cash files", and the sums deposited by the deposit slips.
Both the "cash files" and the deposit slips were prepared by the defendant. Exhibit A shows how the defendant from time to time manipulated his
receipts and deposits. The difference between the total amount collected and the total amount deposited, or P15,000.01 was appropriated by the
defendant to his own use.

The evidence further shows that the defendant falsified the bank reconciliation statements (Exhibits E-1 to E-11) and the statement of the
Philippine National Bank for August, 1931, in order to cover up the fact that he had misappropriated certain sums and to prevent discovery thereof.

We find no merit in the assignments of error.

The information clearly charges two crimes, estafa and the falsification of certain commercial documents. A demurrer to the information was filed,
but it was withdrawn before it was submitted to the court, and the defendant went to trial on the information as presented. The defendant should
therefore be convicted of both estafa and the falsification of commercial documents. The two offenses committed by the defendant 'cannot be
regarded as a complex crime, because the falsification of the commercial documents was not a means for the commission of the crime of estafa,
but for the purpose of concealing it.

It was held by this court in the case of People vs. Miana (50 Phil., 771, 777), that when the defendant in a criminal cause goes to trial under a
complaint or information which contains a description of more than one offense, he thereby waives the objection and may be found guilty of, and
should be sentenced for, as many offenses as are charged in the complaint and proven during the trial.

We find the defendant guilty of the crime of estafa, and sentence him to suffer five years, five months, and eleven days of prision correctional and
the accessory penalties provided by law, and to indemnify the International Harvester Company of the Philippines in the sum of P15,000.01, or to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty. We also find the defendant guilty of
the crime of the falsification of commercial document in violation of article 301 in relation with article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act
No. 2712, and giving the accused the benefit of article 172 of the Revised Penal Code sentence him to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-
one days of prision correctional and the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay. a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-19403, 19404, 19405 January 30, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDORO LERMA, defendant-appellant.

MALCOLM, J.:

Three criminal cases grew out of the manipulation of funds through the purchase of German marks, by Isidoro Lerma, chief of the foreign
department of the Philippine National Bank. The first prosecution (No. 23463 below; here, No. 19403) was for the crime of estafa in the amount of
P37,573.90. The second prosecution (No. 23478 below; here, No. 19404) was for the crime of estafa committed by means of falsification of private
documents in the amount of P38,359. And the third prosecution (No. 23594 below; here, No. 19405) was, likewise, for the crime of estafa through
falsification of private documents in the amount of P14,333. Convicted in all three cases after separate trials, defendant Lerma has appealed to this
court.

The cases can be more accurately resolved by considering the facts and the law pertaining to each, separately.

I. R. G. No. 19403

Between September 27, 1919, and October 9, 1919, both dates inclusive, the New York branch of the Philippine National Bank bought 1,850,000
marks at P0.092125, P0.0796, and P0.076 per mark. Of these marks 1,780,000 were sold to different persons at prices ranging from P0.10 to
P0.1175 per mark, or a total of P193,625. This latter sum, Isidro Lerma, chief of the foreign department of the Philippine National Bank, should
have turned in and credited to the bank. Instead of doing this, only the sum of P154,477.50 was credited. The difference between the sum which
should have been actually set up on the books of the bank and the sum which apparently was set up represents the sum of P39,147.50, which
Lerma is alleged to have misappropriated.

The device conceived and executed by Lerma was something as follows: Soon after notice was received by the Philippine National Bank that the
marks ordered had been purchased and remitted to its Berlin correspondent, Lerma transferred the entire lot to the account of one Nicanor Carag,
although this person in fact ordered no marks and made no deposit for their purchase. Lerma made it appear that Carag bought the marks at prices
slightly greater than the purchase price. This done, the numerous orders for marks were filled at prices allowing a considerable margin of profit,
which was entered in the books as deposits made by N. Carag.

The explanation offered by defendant Lerma was as follows: On September 27, 1919, N. Carag ordered the purchase of one million marks and
deposited P5,000 to safeguard the bank against all possible fluctuation in the price of the mark. This transaction was approved by Manuel
Conception, Secretary of the Philippine National Bank. Lerma then claims that he had authority from Carag to resell the marks at advantageous
terms. Since at that time no other marks were available in the Manila market, the customers of the bank had to be served by selling them the Carag
marks.

Predicated on the testimony of the defendant, counsel claims that he should only be held guilty of having violated business ethics. But sad to
relate, defendant's version of the transaction does not ring true. In the first place, there is no record of a written contract between N. Carag and
the Philippine National Bank. In the next place, the so-called deposit by Carag was not entered in the books of the bank. Finally, Carag was not
called upon to testify that such contract really existed, or that such deposit was really made, or that he collected or received the profit which
resulted from the speculation. There are a number of other reasons which might be cited, all going to disprove the testimony of the defendant, but
sufficient has been said to demonstrate the untenability of his position.

What really happened, therefore, is that Lerma, taking advantage of his position in the bank, created, in so far as the transaction was concerned, a
fictitious purchaser of marks and a fictitious depositor. While as a bank official he was not prohibited from speculating with his own money in
foreign exchange, he was not authorized as a bank official to purchase marks for the bank and then to so manipulate their sale as to gain a
compensation for himself personally. The real clients of the bank believed at all times that they were of knowing that he merely held himself out as
an intermediary and as a private speculator.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty of the crime of estafa as punished by article 535, paragraph 5, in relation to article 534, paragraph 3, of
the Penal Code. The judgment was that defendant Lerma be sentenced to two years, eleven months, and ten days' imprisonment ( presidio
correccional), with suspension from all public professions, offices, and rights during the time of the sentence, to indemnify the National Bank in the
sum of P31,147.50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The Attorney-General suggests that the indemnity
should be P39,147.50, in place of P31,147.50. This, however, cannot be, since the information only alleges a misappropriation in the amount of
P37,573.90, the limit of reimbursement which can be imposed. With this slight modification, we agree in all respects with the decision of the trial
judge.

II. R. G. No. 19404

On October 18, 1919, Isidro Lerma, chief of the foreign department of the Philippine National Bank, received advices from the New York branch of
the bank that one million marks had been purchased at the rate of P0.073 a mark, and remitted to Berlin to the account of the Philippine National
Bank. Between October 22 and October 25, 1919, 938,000 of these marks were sold to different persons at rates varying from P0.10 to P0.115 a
mark, for a total of P105,251. Lerma, however, only turned over to the Philippine National Bank P78,000, the difference, P27,251, being the
amount which he is alleged to have misappropriated to his own use.

N. Carag was made the purchaser of the million marks. Entries in the surety account of the Philippine National Bank dated October 22, 23, 24, and
25, 1921, credited Carag with deposits in payment of marks at the rate of P0.078 a mark, when in fact these purchases and these payments were
made by other persons at higher rates. The difference between P0.078 and P0.10 or P0.115 a mark, as the case might be, was then accumulated in
two accounts; one in the name of C. Reyes and the other in the name of P. Rivera. Afterwards, the sum placed to the credit of these two accounts
were withdrawn by means of a check in the name of Sergia Lerma, the daughter of the accused.

Lerma in his own defense stated that it was only a mistake of his which caused him to transform N. Carag into a purchaser of marks, when the truth
was that the purchasers were C. Reyes and P. Rivera. The defendant further testified that he did not know the identify and residence of Reyes and
Rivera. He further said that he drew the check in favor of his daughter, for the purpose of delivering the amounts due to the said C. Reyes and P.
Rivera, when they are encountered.

Nicanor Carag, who was called as a witness in this case, testified that he never dealt in marks. No effort was made to secure the presence of C.
Reyes and P. Rivera, if indeed any such persons existed.

Counsel argues that the book, Exhibit LL, called surety account, is not a mercantile document. We do not find this claim sustainable and are of the
opinion that the surety account is just as much a commercial document as journal books, ledgers, etc. (2 Viada, Codigo Penal, p. 419.)

The trial judge found the defendant guilty of the complex crime of estafa committed by means of falsification of a mercantile document as
punished by article 301 of the Penal Code, as amended, in relation with articles 535, paragraph 1, and 89, of the Penal Code. The judgment was
that the defendant should suffer six years' imprisonment ( prision correccional), should pay a fine of 250 pesetas, and should indemnify the
Philippine National Bank in the sum of P27,251, or in case of insolvency, should suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and the costs. This is correct, with the rather insignificant change that instead of 250 pesetas, which is the
minimum fine provided by the Code, a somewhat higher fine should be imposed, in order to comply with the law; we fix this fine at P200.

III. R. G. No. 19405

On October 30, 1919, 1,100,000 marks were ordered from New York at P0.0644 per mark by the Philippine National Bank and sent to Germany. All
but 10,000 of these marks were sold later in Manila to two persons; 750,000 at P0.0693 a mark, and 340,000 at P0.11 a mark, making in all
P89,375. But Lerma caused it to appear in the books of the Philippine National Bank that the entire 1,090,000 marks were sold to one C. Reyes at
P0.0689 a mark of for a total of P75,901. The difference of P14,274 was the sum misappropriated by the accused.

C. Reyes was not called to testify, and the lower court pronounced him a fictitious person created by the defendant to cloak his misdeed.

The trial judge in this case found the defendant guilty of the crime of estafa with falsification of a mercantile document, in accordance with article
301 of the Penal Code, as amended, in relation to article 535 of the Penal Code. The judgment was that the defendant be sentenced to five years,
four months, and twenty-one days' imprisonment ( prision correccional), to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, and to indemnify the Philippine National
Bank in the sum of P15,007, or to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, and the costs. This is correct, except that again a fine of P200 must be substituted for the fine of 250 pesetas, and that the indemnity must be
fixed at 14,274.

JUDGMENTS

We find, therefore, that notwithstanding the arguments advanced by counsel for the defendant, who has done all possible for his client, the
defendant and appellant has been proved guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the crimes alleged in the three informations. We also find no
reversible error present, and that the law has been correctly applied to the facts. We find finally that the judgments are substantially correct, with
the minor changes previously indicated.

The judgment in case No. 19403 is affirmed, with the sole modification that indemnity shall be P37,573.90, in lieu of P31,147.50. The judgment in
case No. 19404 is affirmed, with the sole modification that the fine shall be P200 in lieu of 250 pesetas. The judgment in case No. 19405 is affirmed,
with the sole modifications that the fine shall be P200 in lieu of 250 pesetas, and the indemnity shall be P14,274, in lieu of P15,007. The cost of
each of the three cases shall be taxed against the appellant. So ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-30012-30015 March 9, 1929
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH L. WILSON and ALFREDO DOLORES, defendants-appellants.

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant Alfredo Dolores was accused with Joseph L. Wilson in criminal cases Nos. 35408 (G. R. No. 30012), 35426 (G. R. No. 30013), and
35447 (G. R. No. 30014) of the crimes of falsification of a telegraphic dispatch, estafa through falsification of mercantile document, and falsification
of a mercantile document, respectively. In the information filed in the criminal case No. 35408, it is alleged that "on or about the 26th day of
September, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused being then employees of the San Carlos Milling Company, a business
from doing business in this city, conspiring and confederating together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, with grave abuse of
confidence and with intent of gain, falsify a cable or telegraphic dispatch, to wit: a cablegram in the following manner: the said accused, taking
advantage of their positions as employees of the aforesaid San Carlos Milling Company of which Alfred D. Cooper was then the manager, prepared
and caused to be prepared on the front page of a cablegram form used by the Commercial Pacific Cable Co., of said city, the following code
cablegram:

SCARLOSCO HONOLULU

WYSUXMOOJL.

which, deciphered, reads as follows:

SCARLOSCO — San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.

HONOLULU — Honolulu

WYSUX — Deposit Irving Bank — Columbia Trust Co., New York for account China Banking Corporation, Manila, account San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.,
$———; instruct Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co., advise Manila of deposit by cable.

MOOJL — 100,000

and wrote on the back thereof in typewriter at the space provided for the name and address of the sender the following:

ALFRED D. COOPER

By (Sgd.) ALFREDO DOLORES

227 David, Manila

thereby causing it to appear that the above-mentioned cablegraphic message was prepared and sent by and under the authority and with the
knowledge and consent of Alfred D. Cooper, then manager of the San Carlos Milling Company wherein the said accused were then employed, when
in truth and in fact, as the said accused very well knew, the said Alfred D. Cooper never authorized, nor had any knowledge of, nor gave his
permission to the preparation and sending of the said cablegraphic message; that the said accused, once having forged and falsified the above-
mentioned cablegraphic message in the manner above described, presented the same to the office of the Commercial Pacific Cable Company for
the due transmission.

The information filed in criminal case No. 35426 charges that "on or about September 29, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the above
named defendants, who were then employees or clerks of a mercantile concern known as "San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.," duly organized in this
locality, with grave abuse of confidence and with the intention to defraud and prejudice said institution and the local banking institution known as
"Bank of the Philippine Islands," acting upon a common agreement, and cooperating with each other and conspiring together, falsified a mercantile
document, to wit, a check against the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the sum of two hundred thousand pesos by forging and simulating at the
bottom and in the indorsement of said check the signatures of Newland Baldwin, Manager of the San Carlos Milling Co., Inc., and falsely causing it
to appear that said Newland Baldwin intervened in said check, when in fact said Newland Baldwin never had such intervention, so that the
aforesaid check, once falsified, reads as follows:

No. A-352046

THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

OFFICIAL DEPOSITORY OF THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT

MANILA, P. I., September 29, 1927

Pay to San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., or order Pesos Two Hundred Thousand & 00/100 only (P200,000), Philippine currency.

SAN CARLOS MILLING CO., LTD.

By NEWLAND BALDWIN

For Agent

that once said check was falsified, prepared, and drawn as above stated, the said accused, containing the collusion and conspiracy plotted by them,
presented it for payment to the Bank of the Philippine Islands, falsely and fraudulently stating and representing to said bank and its officers that
the check was authentic and duly signed by Newland Baldwin, manager of said company, San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., in the ordinary course of its
business, the accused herein having succeeded, through said falsification and deceitful representations, in collecting the amount of the check
aforesaid in the Bank of the Philippine Islands, to wit, two hundred pesos (P200,000), which said defendants misappropriated and converted to
their personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said institutions, to wit, the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., and the Bank of the
Philippine Islands, in the aforesaid sum of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), Philippine currency, equivalent to 1,000,000 pesetas.

The information filed in the criminal case No. 35477 reads as follows:

That on or about September 28, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the above named defendants, who were then employees or clerks of
a mercantile concern known as San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., of this locality, with grave abuse of confidence and with the intention to prejudice said
institution, acting upon a common agreement and cooperating with each other and conspiring together, did willfully, unlawfully and criminally
falsify, in a mercantile document, to wit, the "Manager's Check" No. 17444 of the China Banking Corporation, of September 28, 1927, is issued in
favor of the San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., for the sum of two hundred thousand and one pesos (P200,001), the signature of one Newland Baldwin,
Manager of said San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd., by forging, simulating, and imitating it in the indorsement on the back of said document, and falsely
causing it to appear in said indorsement that Newland Baldwin intervened therein, when in fact said Newland Baldwin never had such intervention,
so that, once falsified, said indorsement reads as follows:

For deposit only with Bank of the Philippine Islands, to credit of account of San Carlos Milling Co., Ltd.,

By NEWLAND BALDWIN
For Agent

Upon being arraigned on the above-quoted informations, the defendant Alfredo Dolores pleaded not guilty and, upon motion by the prosecution,
and with the conformity of the attorneys for the defense, a joint trial of the above-mentioned cases with respect to the defendant Alfredo Dolores
was had.

The trial court found the defendant Alfredo A, Dolores guilty as principal, by direct participation and in conspiracy with Joseph L. Wilson, of the
crimes alleged in the informations filed in criminal cases Nos. 35408, 35426 and 35447, and sentenced him in a criminal case No. 35408, for the
crime of falsification of a telegraphic dispatch with the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, to four years, nine
months, and eleven days of prision correccional, to the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings; in
criminal case No. 35426, for the crime of estafa through falsification of a mercantile document, to eight years of presidio mayor, to the
corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings; and in criminal case No. 35447, for the crime of falsification
of a mercantile document, with the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, to four years, nine months, and eleven days
of prision correccional, to pay a fine of 12,500 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to the corresponding accessory
penalties, and to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings. From these judgment the defendant Dolores appealed.

The evidence fully sustains the findings of the court below and leaves no doubt whatever as to the appellant's guilt, but his counsel insists that the
court erred (1) in holding that "in preparing and in sending the false cablegram, Exhibit A (case No. 35408), as well as in preparing and in
negotiating the check no less false, Exhibit C (case No. 35426) and in later collecting its value, and in likewise preparing the false commercial
documents, Exhibits A and B, of the criminal case No. 35447, it was the idea of the said accused to benefit himself and damage another," and (2) in
holding that the defendant Alfredo Dolores wanted to defraud and damage or, more correctly, defrauded and damaged the San Carlos Milling Co.,
Ltd., and the Bank of the Philippine Islands.

Under the first assignment of error, counsel argues that the defendant Dolores did nothing but carry out the orders of his superior, Joseph L.
Wilson, and that he, consequently, is exempt from criminal responsibility. This argument is entirely groundless. In order to work exemption from
criminal responsibility for obeying the orders of a superior, it must be shown that the person who gives the order and the person who executes it
acting within the limitations prescribed by law. That is not the case here. In his brief, the Attorney-General well and truly says:

The evidence of record clearly shows that the defendant Alfredo Dolores took direct part in, and cooperated with his codefendant Joseph L. Wilson
by means of acts prior to, and simultaneous with, the perpetration of the crimes in question. He cooperated in the drafting of the checks and other
documents for the falsification of which he is now prosecuted, and he was the one who cashed said check and withdrew the money from the bank.
He furthermore received from Joseph L. Wilson the sum of P10,000 as his share in the embezzled amount. It cannot be maintained, therefore, that
Alfredo Dolores merely obeyed his superiors, and that he was not informed of the fact that his codefendant, Joseph L. Wilson intended to embezzle
said money.

Moreover, the behavior of the defendant Alfredo Dolores subsequent to the commission of the crimes in question clearly shows his guilt. It is
proven that after the withdrawal of the amount of P200,000 from the Bank of the Philippine Islands, he was seen in secret conversation with
Joseph L. Wilson in Calle Herran, Paco; that from that day he had been hiding from the authorities; that he had registered at the Plaza Hotel under
the name of Jose Gil; that he went to Sorsogon and Albay, where he represented himself as Patricio Lopez; that in Albay he attempted to Board a
foreign vessel, but did not succeed in his attempt. The flight of a person after the commission of an offense, while it does not constitute a
presumption of guilt, is nevertheless a circumstance indicative of his guilt (U. S. vs Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486; U. S. vs. Virrey, 37 Phil., 618).

The second assignment of error evidently relates to case G. R. No. 30013 (estafa through falsification of a mercantile document) and requires no
refutation. The conspirators carried away P200,001, and, of course, someone suffered the loss. Whether the loss fell on the San Carlos Milling Co.,
Ltd., or on the Bank of the Philippine Islands is immaterial; it is sufficient that it was sustained by a person or persons, other than the perpetrators
of the crime. It is to be observed that the trial court, at the request of the interested parties, made no pronouncement as to the indemnity and
that, therefore, the civil responsibility is not involved in the cases before us.

The judgment appealed from are affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
IN BANC
GR No. L-46786 November 25, 1940

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
OCTAVIO MARASIGAN, accused and appellant.

IMPERIAL, J .:

The defendant Octavio Marasigan was tried in the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio for the crime of murder in virtue of the following
allegations of the complaint filed against him:

That on or about the 23d day of October, 1938, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above-named accused Octavio Marasigan, being then and there armed with a big double-bladed knife or balisong, a deadly weapon, did, with
intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of his superior strength and while riding on a running engine vehicle while
was Taxi No. 1335 of the Royal Garage, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack and stab many times with said knife one
Elisa Jereos, thus inflicting upon her a mortal; stabbed wound on the right chest, penetrating the third intercostal space and cutting the pulmonary
vessels and bronchus; another mortal, penetrating wound on the xipoid, cutting the diaphragm, liver and lesser omentum; a stabbed wound on the
right shoulder; an incised wound on the left forearm; a penetrating, stabbed wound on the left interscapular region; a nonpenetrating, stabbed
wound on the same region; a nonpenetrating, stabbed wound on the mid-dorsal line about the level of the eleventh vertebra; and numerous
wounds on the fingers and hands, which mortal wounds and other injuries produced acute hemorrhage and directly caused the death of said Elisa
Jereos almist instantaneously.

In the commission of the above described murder, the aggravating circumstances (1) that it was committed with treachery, (2) evidence
premeditation and (3) abuse of superior strength and (4) by taking advantage of a running motor vehicle, were attendant .

The defendant waived his right to be informed of the complaint, but the Court noted in the file his declaration of not guilty. The defendant
admitted during his testimony the fact of having killed the deceased, but I claim that the death was the result of the mutual agreement they had
made to commit suicide. His defense argues that the crime that has been committed is that of murder mitigated by the extenuating circumstances
that will later be considered. The accused appeal of the sentence that he found guilty of the crime of murder in the person of Elisa Jereos and
condemned him to life imprisonment, to the accessory of Law, to compensate the heirs of the occure in the amount of P2,000, and to the payment
of the costs.

The appellant was a student of commerce at the Ateneo de Manila. The occide was studying in the University of Santo Tomas the preparatory
course of medicine. In June 1938, the appellant arrested the woman and accepted her the following month, and since then they had exchanged
love affairs, writing daily. Before accepting the appellant the Occupy already maintained love relations with the cadet Ramon Gelvezon and this was
considered as one of the suitors of that. On the morning of October 20, 1938 the appellant, the Madonna and her friend Monserrat Montelibano
went to the City of Baguio in the Ilocos Express. Upon his arrival, the appellant stayed in room No. 21 of the Zigzag Hotel and the Madonna and her
friend in the room No. 19. Both rooms were separated by another. Around 5 in the afternoon of the same day the three went to the Teachers'
Camp and alla Gelvezon was presented by the occident to Monserrat and the appellant. On the afternoon of the 22nd of the same month the three
went again to the Teachers' Campand there they were entertained by Gelvezon in a game of basketball. At dusk of the same day Gelvezon phoned
the occident and after having conversed both, this delivered the device to the appellant. In the conversation he had with his rival Gelvezon both
were gallant and offered to reciprocate to continue courting the occi. Shortly after the phone conversation the occident went to the Teachers'
Camp, accompanied by Gelvezon, where they stayed until about 9 o'clock at night. The appellant and Monserrat went in search of the occident and
as they found her leaving the show building, they took her to the hotel and on the way the appellant reproached her that if it was what he was
going to continue doing, he would prefer to see her dead before What a waste. On the morning of October 23 of the same year the appellant and
the occident went to church together and heard mass. When leaving the church, at about 6 o'clock , they both boarded a taxicab and the appellant
instructed the driver to take them to the Mines View Park. When the car was going to go to that site and ordered the driver to turn around and
take him to the hotel, but the appellant instructed the driver again to continue in the direction of the Mines View Park. When being in front of the
Post Office the driver stopped the car because he heard that the door had been opened and seeing that the occident was the one who opened it, I
ask who of the two passengers was going to obey. On that occasion the driver noticed that the lady was pale and tried to jump through the door
unless he was taken to the hotel. The driver took them to the Zigzag Hotel. Before arriving at the hotel, the occide accepted the appellant's
invitation to go for a walk at 5 o'clock in the afternoon. About 1:30 of the siesta of the same day the patient felt a heart attack and the doctor who
treated her gave her an injection and prescribed rest and did not go out. Shortly after the visit of Gelvezon who remained in his room until 4 o'clock
in the afternoon. During this time the occi was lying in her bed and the appellant entered five times inside the rooms while Gelvezon was inside
her. Before leaving the hotel, Gelvezon, the appellant, the occi and Montelibano went to the hotel lounge and in the Gelvezon and the occident
they danced to the beat of a phonograph. When Gelvezon and Montelibano were to address a tea that was going to be given in theTeachers' Camp
, the occident meant their desire to accompany them, to which the appellant told her not to do such a thing and that she should not go. As soon as
Gelvenzon and Montelibano had left the hotel, the appellant called a taxicab, which was immediately driven by the driver Nicomedes Abonejar.
The appellant embarked on the car followed by the occident and instructed the driver to take them to the Teachers' Camp . When they were along
the Leonard Wood Road , near the Teachers' Camp, Abonejar suddenly heard that the occident exclaimed full of fear and terror. He looked at the
mirror in front of him and saw that the appellant stabbed the deceased with a double-edged knife that was marked as Exhibit "AA." He stopped the
car and when he looked inside he saw that the appellant wounded the occident in the chest with the penknife and that it stopped the blows with
his hands. Abonejar got out of the car and saw that the appellant was hurting himself with the same weapon. Abonejar stop another taxicabWhat
happened and I beg the driver who handled it to report the incident to the police. After a taro, a group of policemen headed by Sergeants
Bugayong and Floresca arrived at the place. The policemen found the dead woman lying on her back on the floor of the car, with her head towards
the left door, and the appellant sitting in the back seat, crouching over the body of the woman. The wounds that had the appellant and the occide
were bleeding profusely and inside the car they found the double-edged penknife bloodied as well as the bag of the occi. The appellant and the
corpse of the deceased were taken to the Baguio hospital. The corpse of the occide had two serious and fatal wounds in the chest, one in the right
shoulder, three in the back, another in the right forearm, several on the fingers of both hands, in addition to a contusion on the left name and
scratches on the right forearm and arm. The appellant had two wounds that infirmed himself, which forced him to hospitalize for a long time.

As has already been said, the appellant admitted killing the woman and the defense maintains that the crime that has been committed is that of
simple homicide and not murder. The Court considered the concurrence of the circumstance of treachery that in his opinion qualified the offense
turning it into murder. In the third error statement it is intended that said qualifying circumstance has not been proven and in the fifth error
statement it is reiterated that the crime is simple homicide. Regarding the manner in which the aggression was executed by the appellant, there is
no other proof than the statement given by Nicomedes Abonejar, the driver who handled the taxi in which the crime was committed. According to
this witness, the first time he noticed that something extraordinary happened in the car was when he noticed that the left door had opened and
saw that the occident was trying to jump out. Then he saw that the appellant was stabbing the occipher with the double-edged knife, and she was
defending herself with her hands. He stopped the car and it was when he saw that the occi had fallen inert in the car and had received the mortal
wounds and the appellant, equally wounded, was crouched down towards the body of the victim. All this happened in a very short time. If you
consider that the occident full of terror tried to jump out of the car and immediately afterwards she was attacked and injured repeatedly by the
appellant, It is undeniable that the aggression was unexpected and sudden and the appellant made it without any risk of his person in view of the
fact that the occident could not defend itself or offer any resistance given the very small space of the car where both were. The fact that the
occident stopped some of the blows with her hands did not change the circumstances under which the aggression took place, since she did it
instinctively and it was not an adequate means to constitute a defense to evade the armed aggression. The circumstance revealed is treacherous
(article 14, 16, of the Revised Penal Code) and the Court did not err in considering it as qualifying for the crime of murder. The fact that the
occident stopped some of the blows with her hands did not change the circumstances under which the aggression took place, since she did it
instinctively and it was not an adequate means to constitute a defense to evade the armed aggression. The circumstance revealed is treacherous
(article 14, 16, of the Revised Penal Code) and the Court did not err in considering it as qualifying for the crime of murder. The fact that the
occident stopped some of the blows with her hands did not change the circumstances under which the aggression took place, since she did it
instinctively and it was not an adequate means to constitute a defense to evade the armed aggression. The circumstance revealed is treacherous
(article 14, 16, of the Revised Penal Code) and the Court did not err in considering it as qualifying for the crime of murder.

The Court appreciates the premeditation known as an aggravating circumstance that I compensate with the appellant's youth, which I consider as a
mitigating circumstance. In the second error statement it is alleged that the facts do not support the conclusion that there was known
premeditation. In the commission of the crime details abound that in our opinion clearly demonstrate the presence of such an aggravating
circumstance. It will be remembered that in one of the letters of Gelvezon that the occide delivered to the appellant, he read a certain intimate
passage that aroused jealousy. According to the appellant himself, he conceived the idea of killing the occident on the night of October 22, 1938
when the alleged covenant of committing suicide had been agreed upon as a result of the serious displeasure he had received due to the conduct
of the occi On the morning of the 23rd of the same month, the appellant persisted in the idea of the crime when he boarded the occide in a taxi
and instructed the driver to take them to the Mines View Park. The occide must have suspected in the sinister plan of the appellant when he
insistently resisted going to that place and barely managed to get him back to the hotel. Before committing the crime, the appellant wrote letters
to his parents, brothers and sisters and to a priest, and in them he discarded all of them. Finally, in the last note that he wrote in his own
handwriting, he and the occident were buried both in Negros or Batangas and that on his grave the following epitaph was inscribed: "They love
each other so much that they can not afford to be separated. " All these circumstances conclusively demonstrate that the crime is perpetrated by
the appellant with premeditation (article 14, 13 of the Revised Penal Code). The aggravating circumstance of known premeditation must be
appraised when the crime has been reflexively meditated by the guilty party; when he has prepared in advance the means that he has purposely
believed to execute him, and when he has had the necessary time to coolly take charge of his subsequent consequences (Sentences of the
Supreme Court of Spain of December 26, 1887 and September of 1893;against Eulalio Cornejo, 28 Jur. Fil., 476).

It is pretended that there was no known premeditation or allegation because between the appellant and the occide a pact of committing suicide
had been celebrated both. We believe that the Court correctly acted in rejecting such defense. The tests have not shown such a suicide pact. But
even if it had existed, it would not be a justification for the crime or distort the premeditation and treachery that have occurred. The death of the
occident was not a suicide because it was caused directly by the appellant and article 253 of the Revised Penal Code considers the act of helping to
commit suicide a crime.

It is argued in the first error statement that it should be estimated in favor of the appellant the attenuating 6th of Article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code for having acted by such powerful stimuli that naturally produced rapture and obduracy. We believe that the attenuant has concurred,
because it appears that jealousy was the motive that induced the appellant to commit the crime. As was said in the United States case against
Vicente Santillan, 4 Jur. Fil., 170, "resentment for rivalry in love relationships with a woman is a powerful stimulus to jealousy, so apt to produce
rapture and stubbornness."

We find unfounded the claim of the defense stated in the fourth error statement to the effect that the condition of the appellant at the time it was
apprehended by the authorities is a similar circumstance and analogous to the voluntary submission referred to in article 13, 2, of the Revised
Penal Code. The voluntary presentation to the authorities that is considered by the Revised Penal Code as a circumstance that mitigates the
criminal act executed by the guilty party, recognizes as a basis his repentance that in this case can not be compared to the condition in which the
appellant was at the time of his apprehension.

For the reasons stated below, the theory stated in the sixth and final error report that the appellant is a creditor of an indeterminate sentence
pursuant to Law No. 4103, as amended by Law No, is also untenable. 4225.

The Court appreciated the appellant's youth as a mitigating circumstance that mitigated his criminal liability and compensated it with the
aggravation of known premeditation. The Attorney General is of the opinion that said mitigation has not occurred, because when the crime was
committed, the appellant was over 18 years of age. Article 13, 2, of the Revised Penal Code provides that the circumstance of being guilty under 18
or over 70 years of age shall be considered mitigating. No proof has been presented about the age the appellant had on the date on which the
offense was committed; However, when I declare May 8, 1939, I state that I was 19 years old. In the preliminary investigation carried out on
November 25, 1938, the same appellant stated that he was 19 years old. Accepting that this was his exact age, It turns out that when he committed
the crime he was 18 years and 11 months. The Court took into account, when assessing the age of the appellant as an attenuating circumstance,
the fact that according to article 320 of the Civil Code, as amended by Law No. 1891, a person does not consider himself qualified to exercise his
rights or to be bound but since he turns 21 and has since become of age, and argued that the youth of the appellant contributed greatly to not
working with the maturity of judgment of an adult. This question has already been resolved in the El Pueblo case A person does not consider
himself / herself capable of exercising his / her rights or being obligated until he / she reaches the age of 21 and has since become of age. He / she
maintained that the youth of the appellant contributed in a great way to not working with the maturity of an adult judgment. . This question has
already been resolved in the El Pueblo case A person does not consider himself / herself capable of exercising his / her rights or being obligated
until he / she reaches the age of 21 and has since become of age. He / she maintained that the youth of the appellant contributed in a great way to
not working with the maturity of an adult judgment. . This question has already been resolved in the El Pueblo caseagainst Macario Sera Josefa, 52
Jur. Fil., 213, where this Court said:

With respect to the age that the defendant had when committing the crime, 19 years and 6 months, it is true that for the full exercise of his civil
rights he was not then qualified for being under age according to the Civil Code. But it must be borne in mind that the degree of discernment that is
required of a person to respond to their actions criminally is not the same as that required for the full exercise of rights in civil matters. And within
the penal sphere, delinquency has its degrees correlated to the age of the individual. It is true that, as is obvious, the reason for such degrees of
delinquency by age, based on less or greater discernment, is difficult for Constitutional Law to set the limits of such degrees; however, it is not up
to us to resolve these legislative issues. Our function is to apply the law, the constituted right as it is, and positive law, in the criminal field, requires
full responsibility to who, like the accused, is already 18 years of age. We are not authorized to take into account as a mitigating factor the 19 years
and 6 months of age that the defendant had when committing the crime. Neither can we consider it, under the eighth circumstance of Article 9 of
the Penal Code, as having the same entity analogo to the previous ones in said article. More than equality or analogy in the entity, what there is is
gradation, and gradation marked by the law. To consider such age of the defendant as an attenuating circumstance would be to amend the age
limit set in the second circumstance, article 9 of said Code. It demands full responsibility to who, like the accused, is already 18 years of age. We are
not authorized to take into account as a mitigating factor the 19 years and 6 months of age that the defendant had when committing the crime.
Neither can we consider it, under the eighth circumstance of Article 9 of the Penal Code, as having the same entity analogo to the previous ones in
said article. More than equality or analogy in the entity, what there is is gradation, and gradation marked by the law. To consider such age of the
defendant as an attenuating circumstance would be to amend the age limit set in the second circumstance, article 9 of said Code. It demands full
responsibility to who, like the accused, is already 18 years of age. We are not authorized to take into account as a mitigating factor the 19 years and
6 months of age that the defendant had when committing the crime. Neither can we consider it, under the eighth circumstance of Article 9 of the
Penal Code, as having the same entity analogo to the previous ones in said article. More than equality or analogy in the entity, what there is is
gradation, and gradation marked by the law. To consider such age of the defendant as an attenuating circumstance would be to amend the age
limit set in the second circumstance, article 9 of said Code. We are not authorized to take into account as a mitigating factor the 19 years and 6
months of age that the defendant had when committing the crime. Neither can we consider it, under the eighth circumstance of Article 9 of the
Penal Code, as having the same entity analogo to the previous ones in said article. More than equality or analogy in the entity, what there is is
gradation, and gradation marked by the law. To consider such age of the defendant as an attenuating circumstance would be to amend the age
limit set in the second circumstance, article 9 of said Code. We are not authorized to take into account as a mitigating factor the 19 years and 6
months of age that the defendant had when committing the crime. Neither can we consider it, under the eighth circumstance of Article 9 of the
Penal Code, as having the same entity analogo to the previous ones in said article. More than equality or analogy in the entity, what there is is
gradation, and gradation marked by the law. To consider such age of the defendant as an attenuating circumstance would be to amend the age
limit set in the second circumstance, article 9 of said Code.

In the case of Pueblo against Macabangon, RG No. 44783, promulgated on October 26, 1936, this Tribunal, dealing with the same mitigation, said:

We declare that the fact that the defendant is only 19 years old is not an attenuating circumstance according to No. 2 of said article, nor can it be
considered as similar under No. 10, since, the law grants the benefit only to the minor of 18 or over 70 years old. The cars do not provide any detail
that indicates that the age of the defendant has infused in a favorable sense for the commission of the crime. There is no proof that even because
of his age he did not have the maturity of an adult's judgment.

We conclude that the appellant's age is not an attenuating circumstance that should be estimated in his favor.

Summarizing the circumstances under which the crime was committed, the Attorney General maintains that the aggravating circumstances of
known premeditation have been attended, in which the cunning is embedded (People against Madrid, RG No. 41967), abuse of trust and use of
vehicle of engine, without any mitigating factor that can compensate for any of the mentioned aggravations. The abuse of trust should be
estimated in this case, because being the appellant boyfriend of the occident he overstepped the confidence that this had deposited; and the use
of the motor vehicle is another aggravating circumstance that must be assessed because the crime is perpetrated in the taxi that was called and
used by the same appellant.

The offense committed by the appellant is that of murder for being qualified by the crime and is punishable by article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code with temporary imprisonment in its maximum degree to death; and having concurred in his commission the aggravating circumstances of
known premeditation, abuse of confidence and use of motor vehicle and having to compensate one of these with the attenuating of outburst and
stubbornness, it is appropriate to impose the penalty indicated in its maximum degree to the capital punishment. But, due to the lack of unanimity
of the votes of the members of this Court, the penalty that is immediately inferior to the capital penalty must be imposed, which in this case is life
imprisonment, in accordance with the provisions of the last paragraph of Article 133 of the Constitution. Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Article 2 of Law No.

The sentence appealed is confirmed, with the costs of this instance to the appellant. This is how it is ordered.

Avanceña, Pres., Diaz, Laurel and Moran, MM., Are satisfied.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-10364 and L-10376 March 31, 1958
RUFINO T. SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Rufino T. Samson was jointly charged with Amado L. Cruz and Bonifacio Vergara and two others whose names are unknown in two separate
informations with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of two checks of the Philippine National Bank before the Court of First Instance
of Manila (Cases Nos. 12802 and 12803). On a plea of not guilty, they were tried and found guilty as charged, the court sentencing each of the
three defendants to suffer in each case a penalty of not less than 6 years and 1 day and not more than 9 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision
mayor, to pay a fine of P2,500 and the costs. In addition, they were sentenced to indemnify the Philip-pine Ryukyus Command, the payee of the
checks, in the sum of P5,417.11 in each of the two cases.

The trio appealed from the decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the same but with a reduced penalty with regard to appellants Cruz and
Vergara. Appellant Samson was only found guilty of committing the crime through gross imprudence and was accordingly sentenced to 4 months of
arresto mayor in each of the two cases.

Dissatisfied with his conviction, Samson sued out the present petition for review contending (1) that the acts done by him, as found by the Court of
Appeals, do not constitute gross imprudence; (2) that there is no such offense as estafa through (falsification by) negligence; and (3) that the Court
of Appeals erred in denying his motion for new trial.

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are: "Espiridion Lascaño, father of the late Felipe Lascaño, a lieutenant of the USAFFE, who died during
the last World War, and his widow Rosanna Paras, through the latter filed, is Felipe Lascano's only legitimate surviving heir, their claim papers with
the Red Cross Chapter in the Province of Sorsogon in the early part of 1946.

"On October 2, 1948 Amado L. Cruz asked the help of his former classmate Rufino T. Samson in getting the checks of the two claimants who were
with him at Camp Murphy by approaching an officer of the Philippine Army who could identify said persons assuring Samson that he had known
said claimants for a long time. Having been assured twice of the identity of the supposed claimants and after examining their residence certificates
attached to the claim papers, Samson accompanied by Cruz and the supposed claimants went to talk to Lt. Manuel Valencia and requested him to
act as guarantor to secure the claimants check. Believing in the representations made by Samson, Lt. Valencia accompanied them to the Deceased
Check Delivery Section, Finance, AFP, and secured the release of PNB Check No-754497J, Exhibit C, in favor of Rosalina Paras for the sum of
P6,417.11 and the PNB Check No. 754498J, Exhibit D, in favor of Espiridion Lascaño for the sum of P6,417.10. Thence, the party repaired to the
Bureau of Treasury, Finance Building, where again through the help of Rufino T. Samson on, the two checks above-mentioned were cashed by the
teller Rosario Mallari who knew Samson. In accordance with the regulations of the Bureau of Treasury to payee Rosalina Paras, not knowing how to
write or sign her name, was required to thumbmark on the back of the check, Exhibit C, and below her thumbmark Rufino T. Samson and Francisco
Ordoñez signed as witnesses. Espiridion Lascaño who knows how to sign his name was asked to do so on the back of the check, Exhibit D, and
below his signature Samson signed not as a witness but as the last indorser. The accounts called for in said two checks were delivered to a son and
Cruz, who, as will be shown hereafter, was the person who signed as Francisco Ordoñez, counted the money and delivered it to the supposed
claimants. The party then proceeded to the Aristocrat Restaurant where together with about eleven others took their lunch for which Vergara paid
P60, besides giving Samson P300 sup-posed to be paid to the officers who helped them in securing the checks plus P10 for Samson's taxi fare.
Samson left the party and went to the movie to meet a friend from Camp Murphy.

"On October 4, or just two days after cashing the checks, while at Camp Murphy Samson was informed by Severino Anda, one of those who were
with the party which cashed the checks, thus said cheeks were delivered to the wrong parties. Worried by such news he left for Sorsogon the
following day to locate the real claimants. While on the train he saw an old couple whom he suspected to be the fake claimants because they had
been throwing furtive glances at him. Upon arriving at Sorsogon he reported the matter to the matter to police and caused to be taken the couples
finger prints names and address. At about 10 a.m., October 6, he went to look for the house of the Lascaño family. He found Espiridion Lascaño, too
old and weak to leave the house. He saw Rosalina at the school where she was teaching and inquired from her whether she had received a check
from Camp Murphy as well as the cheek of the old man and he was answered in the negative. He returned to Manila the following day and on
October 8 reported the matter to Sgt. Luis Balignasan, G-2 PC, who after taking his affidavit promised to help him and conduct the necessary
investigation. He submitted a copy of the finger prints of the suspects."

Analyzing the criminal responsibility of appellant Sam-son, the court made the following comment:

Coming now to appellant Rufino T. Samson, we believe that the following facts are admitted; that on the strength of the assurances given by
Amado L. Cruz that the supposed claimants were the real ones he requested the help of Lt. Manuel Valencia to act as guarantor and Valencia,
relying on his representations, accompanied him and the claimants to the Delivery Window and secured the checks for them; that again Rufino T.
Samson helped Amado T. Cruz and the supposed claimants by signing as witness together with Cruz so that the supposed claimant Rosalina Paras
could cash her check and went to the extent of signing as last indorser on the back of the check, Exhibit D, in favor of Espiridion Lascaño and then
later at the Aristocrat Restaurant accepted from Vergara and Cruz the sum of P300 to be paid to the officers who helped them and the further sum
of P10 for his tax fare. There is no evidence that he was aware that the supposed claimants were not the real ones and his subsequent conduct
shows it to be true; but although he did not know them personally he induced another friend of his, Lt. Manuel Valencia, to believe in the identity
of said claimants thus helping his co-accused Amado L. Cruz, Bonifacio Vergara and John Doe and Maria Doe to perpetrate the crime of estafa
through falsification. It is unbelievable that he would accept as his share the meager amount of P310 if he were a co-conspirator in the commission
of a fraud amounting to over P12,000. We see nothing strange in his acceptance of P310 as a token of gratitude on the part of the claimants, but he
has undoubtedly acted with reckless imprudence for having taken no precaution whatsoever in assuring himself that the supposed claimants were
the real ones. The mere assurances given him by Amado L. Cruz were not sufficient to justify his acting in the manner he did.

We find no error in the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the appellant herein acted with gross negligence in assuring Lt. Valencia
and the Cashier of the identity of the supposed claimants, as a result of which the impersonators managed to secure possession of the checks in
question and to cash the same. Appellant was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand
pesos, and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said
amounts, since they we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would certainly not be a satisfactory identification
to justify disbursement of such a large amount if the funds belonged to appellant; and we see no justification for him treating government fund is
with less care and diligence than if they were his own. Nor does the submission to this appellant of residence certificates constitute adequate
identification, since these certificates are tax receipts and not means of establishing the identity of persons; and appellant as a Lieutenant of the
Army is sufficiently intelligent and educated to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged or stolen.

There is no question that appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by
acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability. Even
assuming that he had no intention to defraud the offended party if his co-defendants succeeded in attaining the purpose sought by the culprits,
appellant's participation together with the participation of his co-defendant the commission of the offense completed all the necessary for the
perpetration of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document (Article 17, Revised Penal Code). Anyway and for the
purposes of the penalty that was actually imposed upon appellant, it is immaterial that he be considered only guilty of falsification of a commercial
document through reckless negligence, because the penalty for the crime of falsification of a commercial document under Article 172, No. 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00 which under the provisions
of Articles 25 and 26 of the same Code is a correctional penalty. Consequently, if in the cases at bar the crimes of falsification were due to reckless
imprudence, the corresponding penalty would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 365, opening paragraph of the Revised
Penal Code), which comprehends the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals upon appellant.

Under the facts found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of appellant constitute in each case the crime of estafa through falsification of a mercantile
document by reckless imprudence, because in so far as the falsification is concerned, his acts of endorsing the respective checks by way of
identification of the signatures of the payees entitled to said checks and their proceeds, constituted a written representation that the true payees
participated in the indorsement and cashing of the checks aforesaid, when in truth and in fact the true payees had no direct intervention in the
proceedings (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code). Even if such indorsement and identification were extraneous to the official duties of appellant, he
would be nevertheless liable as a private person under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court of
Spain assert the juridical standing of the crime of falsification by imprudence since in falsifying public or mercantile document, of intent to cause
damage is not required because what the law, seeks to repress is the prejudice to the public confidence in these documents.

An act executed without malice or criminal purpose, but with carelessness, negligence, or lack of precaution, which causes harm to society or to an
individual, should be classified as either reckless negligence or simple imprudence; the person responsible therefor is liable for such results could
have been anticipated, and for acts which no one would commit except through culpable indifference.

The courts heretofore dealing with acts punishable under the Penal Code of Spain which, with slight modifications, is practically the same as the
one in force in these Islands, have heard and decided cases involving falsification of documents with reckless negligence. They therein applied the
provisions of article 581 of the Spanish Code, which is identical with article 568 of the Code in force in these Islands, as may be seen among others,
in judgments in cessation of July 8, 1882, December 21, 1885, November 8 1887, and December 7,1896; also in case No. 2818, United States vs.
Mariano Vega, decided by this Court. (U.S. vs. Maleza, 14 Phil., 468).1

It is however contended that appellant Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason that
the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part. Nor can it
be said, counsel argues, that the alleged imprudent act includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the information because a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence.

The rule regarding variance between allegation and proof in a criminal case, is: "When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged, is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that
which is proved" (Section 4, Rule 116. Rules of Court). As a complement we have also the following rule: "An offense charged necessarily includes
that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And the offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proves, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute
or form a part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, Idem.).

While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor,* G.R. No. L-6641,
July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that conviction for the former
can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser
offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the evidence submitted by
the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did
not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an
ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful, falsification but which turned out to be not
willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the
cases decided by this Tribunal.

Under a charge of forcible abduction, the defendant may be convicted of illegal detention if the evidence does not show that the kidnapping was
with lewd designs. (People vs. Crisostomo, 46 Phil., 775.)

The crime of theft is included necessarily in that of robbery and therefore a defendant can he convicted of the former, notwithstanding that he was
charged the latter offense. (U.S. vs. Birueda, 4 Phil., 229; People vs. Rivera, 54 Phil., 578 )

The crime of robbery en cuadrilla is necessarily included in that of bandolerisimo (brigandage),and therefore the defendants can be convicted of
the former on an information charging the latter. (U.S. vs. De la Cruz 4 Phil., 430.)

Where the information charges brigandage, but the evidence fails to show that the crime was committed by an armed band, the defendants can be
convicted of robbery. (U.S. vs. Mangubat. 3 Phil., 1.)

Under a charge of malversation a public official may be found guilty of estafa. (U.S. vs. Solis, 7 Phil., 195.)

Moreover, Section 5, Rule 116, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the essential elements of the offense charged in the information be
proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established to constitute the crime proved. This
conclusion is strengthened by the provisions of Section 9, Ruled 113, of the Rules of Court under which appellant could no longer be prosecuted for
estafa through falsification of commercial documents by reckless negligence were we to acquit him in the cases at bar on the obviously technical
theory of the dissenters.
The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency
appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the
falsification has been willful, it would be incongrous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal
intent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.

With regard to the motion for new trial filed by appellant for the purpose of introducing an allegedly newly discovered evidence which consists of
an affidavit of one Emiliano Salangsang-Salazar, it appearing that the same if admitted would only be corroborative in nature and would not have
the effect of altering the result of the case, the same is denied.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Endencia, JJ., concur.

[ G. R. No. 34516, November 10, 1931 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MELECIO A. REYES, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:

The information filed in the Court of First Instance of Laguna against Melecio A. Reyes, reads as follows:
"The undersigned charges Melecio A. Reyes with the crime of 'estafa through falsification of a private document,' committed as follows:
"That during the period from July 1, 1929, to July 31, 1929, both dates inclusive, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the accused above-named, being then employed as timekeeper of the Calamba Sugar Estate,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with animus lucrandi and the deliberate intent of defrauding and injuring said Calamba Sugar Estate, made it
appear in the time book prepared by said accused for the aforementioned period of time, to wit, from July 1, 1929 to July 31, 1929, both dates
inclusive, that the day-laborer Ciriaco Sario had worked twenty-one days, whereas he was fully aware that Ciriaco Sario had worked but eleven
days only during that period of time; thereby committing a falsehood in the narration of facts in said time book, and by means of this falsification,
the aforesaid defendant appropriated the sum of ten pesos to his own use and personal benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Calamba
Sugar Estate in that amount, which is equivalent to fifty pesetas,

"Contrary to law."
The accused in this case was in charge of entering the laborers' workdays in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate. He is accused of having
falsified the time book by making it appear that the laborer Ciriaco Sario worked twenty-one days during the month of July, 1929, when in reality
he had only worked eleven; and having charged the wages of said laborer for twenty-one days, at the rate of Pi a day, he prejudiced the Calamba
Sugar Estate in the amount of P10.

The evidence shows the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But he defends himself, alleging that it was one Erquiza, who collected the
wages appertaining to Sario. This individual, however, was not produced to testify in the case. At any event, it appears that the accused, knowing
that Ciriaco Sario worked only eleven days, altered and falsified the time book, putting down twenty-one workdays for Ciriaco Sario, and this
constitutes the crime of falsification of a private document to the prejudice of a third person. The trial court found the accused guilty of the
crime of estafa through falsification of a private document, and sentenced him to four years, two months, and one day of prision correctional, with
the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, and to indemnify the Calamba Sugar Estate in the sum of P11, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency with reference to the fine and the indemnity.

The Attorney-General recommends the affirmance of the judgment appealed from with the modification that the fine should be imposed in the
maximum degree, i e., in the amount of 6,250 pesetas, and that the indemnity be P10, taking into account article 89 of the Penal Code, in view of
the fact that the offense is estafa, as defined and penalized in article 304 in connection with article 300, paragraphs 2 and 4, as amended, and
article 535 of the Penal Code.

The accused appealed from the judgment and his assignments of error refer to the weight of the evidence, with the exception of the fifth, which
relates to the penalty of four years, two months, and one day of presidio correctional, and the fine of 250 pesetas.

There is no question as to the facts. The only difficulty in this appeal lies in the interpretation to be given to article 304 of the Penal Code. This
article provides:
"Any person who, to the damage of another, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in article three hundred shall suffer the penalty of presidio correctional in its minimum and medium degrees and be fined
in a sum not less than six hundred and twentyfive and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas."
This article has been interpreted by this court in several cases, apparently from different points of view.

In United States vs. De Castro and Aragon (18 Phil., 417), the accused was charged with the crime of estafa through falsification of a private
document; he was convicted of estafa, and in imposing the penalty, the court took article 89 of the Penal Code into account. In the course of
the decision, this court said:
"The information alleges and the proofs show that the appellant in this case committed two distinct crimes, one of estafa, defined and punished
under subdivision 1, article 535, of the Penal Code, and, the crime of falsification of a private document, defined and punished in article 304 of
said Code. Inasmuch, however, as the one crime was a necessary means of committing the other, the accused can not be punished for both
offenses. Under the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code, he must be punished in the maximum degree of the more serious crime.
Falsification of a private document is the more serious of the two inasmuch as it is punished not only by presidio correctional in its minimum
and medium degrees, as estafa is punished, but also by a fine of from 625 to 6,250 pesetas. The maximum degree of presidio correctional in its
minimum and medium degrees is from two years, eleven months, and eleven days to four years and two months. The penalty imposed by the
learned trial court is, therefore, within the law."
United States vs. Victoria (9 Phil., 81) was decided otherwise. The accused was charged with falsification of a private document with prejudice
to a third person, according to article 304 of the Penal Code, and was convicted and sentenced to the penalty fixed in said article, i. e., one year,
eleven months, and twenty-one days of presidio correctional and a fine of 625 pesetas, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,
and to pay the costs. In the course of the decision, the court said:
"The fact that the agent informed his employer that the cost of the installation was P10, while he told the person desiring the installation that it
would cost P30, subsequently altering the former's bill in order to recover a larger sum from the latter in pursuance of his deceitful purpose,
involves the characteristics of the crime of estafa, besides that of falsification which served as the means for its commission, because by
adopting deceitful means he obtained a price which he would not otherwise have secured by telling the truth." However, the offense was not
considered to constitute the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document, nor was the rule contained in article 89
applied, so as to impose the penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum degree.

In United States vs. Chan Tiao (37 Phil., 78), the accused was prosecuted for the crime of estafa through falsification of a private document and
sentenced to two years, eleven months, and ten days of presidio correctional (maximum of the medium degree) the accessories of the law, a fine
of 2,000 pesetas, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P315, which is the value of twenty-three sacks of sugar not recovered, and to
pay the costs.
Chan Tiao, desiring to profit in the amount of P2,055, which is the value of one hundred and fifty sacks of sugar belonging to the firm Smith, Bell
& Co., forged the document Exhibit A, purporting to be signed by the manager of the Chinese firm Ortiga Hermanos, presenting it with an
authentic document of guarantee to the vendor firm, which would undoubtedly have refused to deliver the sugar on ten days' time, but for said
forged document, for it was not issued by the manager of Ortiga Hermanos, and the signature appearing on it is not legitimate or genuine, which
act certainly constitutes the crime of falsification of a private document, to the prejudice of the firm Smith, Bell & Co., the owner of the sugar, a
crime defined and penalized in article 304 of the Penal Code. In the course of the decision, the court said:
"The crime committed should be classified only as that of falsification of a private document, for the reason that the fraudulent gain obtained by
the falsifier is involved in the harm caused an essential and indispensable ingredient for the existence of the crime of falsification of a private
document; and it cannot be classified as estafa with falsification, nor may the penalty for a more serious crime be applied, pursuant to the
provision of article 89 of the Penal Code, inasmuch as the harm occasioned or intended by the perpetrator of the crime does not constitute
estafa,"
And in People vs. Rosales (G. R. No. 19723, not reported)1, the accused was prosecuted for the crime of estafa through falsification of a
private document. The court convicted him of the crime of estafa, but without applying the rule established in article 89 of the Penal Code. In
the course of the decision, the court said:
"The Attorney-General contends that the foregoing facts constitute the crime of falsification defined in article 305 (should be 304) and that of
estafa defined in article 535 of the Penal Code, the first as a necessary means for committing the second. Although the facts may constitute one
or the other of these crimes, they cannot constitute both. As falsification according to article 305, an essential element of which is the animus
lucrandi or the prejudice to a third person, it involves the crime of estafa. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, April 10, 1889.) As estafa, of
which deceit is the essential element, it also involves falsification under article 305, as the determinant of this deceit.

"The foregoing facts only constitute the crime of estafa defined and penalized in article 535, paragraph 1, in connection with article 534, paragraph
3, of the Penal Code, because the appellant appropriated the 2,500 electric light bulbs specified in this forged order, the value of which is 6,798.75
pesetas.

"Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the appellant sentenced to one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of presidio
correctional, to indemnify the offended corporation in the amount of P1,359.75. or to undergo the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs of the trial."
Viada, in his Commentaries on the Spanish Penal Code, article 318 (related to 304 of our Code), 5th ed., vol. 4, p. 130, propounds the following
question:
"When a private document is forged to defraud a third person, is the crime FALSIFICATION under article 318, and also ESTAFA under article 548?
The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, when it quashed a judgment of the Audience of Barcelona, holding the contrary :
'Whereas, considering the offense at bar as falsification of a private document, article 90 of the Code, in connection with No. 1, article 548, is not
applicable, because the falsity and the fraud, or intent to prejudice another, are elements of the crime defined in article 318 so indispensably
and precisely conjoined that they cannot be segregated, considering the falsification as a means to commit the estafa, and thereby raising the
penalty to the maximum degree, etc.' (Decision of February 18, 1891, Gaceta of August 22.)
"The same doctrine appears in a subsequent case:
'Whereas, in view of the falsification of a private document with the intent to prejudice a third person, the offense committed by German
Gonzalez is merely the crime defined and penalized in article 318 of the Code, which in itself combines the two elements of falsity and prejudice
to a third person; whence the trial court, holding that there are two crimes: falsification and estafa, one being the means of committing the
other, has erred in point of law, etc., (Decision of November 22, 1893, Gaceta of August 17, 1894.)" (See also, the decision of April 19, 1905.)
A careful examination of the cases cited will show that in the De Castro case, supra, the court considered the accused guilty of two different
crimes: Estafa, defined and penalized in paragraph 1, article 535 of the Penal Code; and falsification of a private document, defined and penalized
in article 304 of said Code. And, applying article 89 of the Penal Code, the court imposed the penalty fixed in article 304 in the maximum degree.
In the Victoria case, article 304 of the Penal Code was applied, without taking into account the complex nature of the crime, or the provisions of
article 89 of the Penal Code. In the Chan Tiao case, the penalty provided in article 304, Penal Code, was imposed but without taking article 89 into
account, and in this case it was held that the prejudice occasioned or intended by the offender, does not constitute the crime of estafa. And in
the Rosales case, the accused was sentenced to the penalty fixed in article 534 of the Penal Code, but without applying article 89 of the Code.

Therefore, where the defendant is accused of estafa with falsification of a private document, or falsification of a private document with
prejudice to a third person, the weight of authority favors the doctrine that there are not two distinct crimes committed, estafa and falsification,
and that article 89 of the Penal Code is not applicable. And this is the doctrine followed by the Supreme Court of Spain in construing article 318
of the old Spanish Penal Code (art. 304 of ours). But it should be observed that although articles 304 and 534, paragraph 3, of our Penal Code,
provide the same personal penalty, i. e., presidio correctional in the minimum and medium degrees, the first of these articles further provides a
fine ranging from 625 to 6,250 pesetas; and that article 534 was amended, on November 28, 1925, by section 2 of Act No. 3244, which adds
paragraph 4, providing the penalty of presidio correctional in the maximum degree to presidio mayor in the minimum, if the fraud exceeds fifty
thousand pesetas. In view of this amendment, we are of the opinion that if an information is filed charging the accused with the crime of estafa
through falsification of a private document, and the value of the fraud exceeds 50,000 pesetas, all of which is proved at the trial, the proper
penalty would be that fixed in paragraph 4, article 534, of the Penal Code.

By virtue of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold that the defendant's falsification of the time book, with the intent of gain
at the expense of the Calamba Sugar Estate constitutes the crime of falsification of a private document with prejudice to a third person, defined
and penalized in article 304 of the Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the accused sentenced to one year,
eight months, and twenty-one days of presidio correctional, with the accessories of the law, a fine in the amount of 2,501 pesetas, and to
indemnify the Calamba Sugar Estate in the amount of P10, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency with reference to the fine and the
indemnity, not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Romualdez, Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 2829. September 19, 1906. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PIO CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

It was proven at the trial of the case on the morning of the 2d of December, 1905, the appellant Pio Castillo, presented a check for the sum of 56
pesos, Philippine currency, to Chinese merchant named Lim Ponso; that the said check was made payable to bearer and purported to be drawn by
one James J. Watkins; that the amount of the check was paid to Pio Castillo; that the signature of the drawer upon said check was a forgery made
in imitation of the genuine signature of James J. Watkins, sheriff of the city of Iloilo, and that, in fact, the said James J. Watkins never signed or
issued the said check; that the blank upon which the check was written was stolen from a book of blank checks between the hours of 12 noon on
the 1st of December, 1903, and 11 a. m. on the 2d of December, 1903, when the check was presented for payment; that this blank check book was
kept in a drawer in the office of the said James J. Watkins, and that Pio Castillo was one of three clerks employed by Watkins in the office; that
Castillo was in the office on the evening of December 1 and early in the morning of December 2, and that he was the last person let alone in the
office on the evening of December 1, he having locked the office after all the other clerks had gone.

Castillo went on the witness stand in his own behalf and swore that he had never seen the forged check prior to the trial; that he was not at the
business place of the Chinese merchant, Lim Ponso, on the 2d of December, 1903; and that he never received the money which it is alleged was
paid him upon the check; but the falsity of all these statements, in every particular, was conclusively established by the testimony of a number of
disinterested witnesses for the prosecution.

Upon this evidence the trial court held that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of falsification, but found the accused guilty of the
crime of knowingly using with intent to gain a falsified mercantile document as defined and penalized in article 302 of the Penal Code, and
sentenced him to five months imprisonment (arresto mayor) with the accessory penalties.

We think the evidence in the case was sufficient to sustain a finding that the accused was guilty of the crime of falsification as charged. The
question involved is stated as follows in Wharton’s Criminal Law (vol. 1, par. 726):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Does the uttering of a forged instruments by the particular person justify a jury in convicting such a person of forgery? The question, if nakedly
put, must, like the kindred one as to the proof of larceny by evidence of possession of stolen goods, be answered in the negative. The defendant is
presumed to be innocent until otherwise proved. In larceny this presumption is overcome by proof that the possession is so recent that it becomes
difficult to conceive how the defendant could have got the property without being in some way concerned in the stealing. So it is with uttering. The
uttering may be so closely connection with the forgers that it becomes when so accomplished, probable proof of complicity in the forgery."cralaw
virtua1aw library

See, as the main substantiating this view, U. S. v. Britton (2 Mason, 464, 1826); Spencer v. Com. (2 Leigh, 751, 1830); State v. Morgan (2 Dev. & Bat.,
348, 1837); State v. Outs (30 La. An., Pt. II, 1155, 1878); Cohn v. People [(Colo.) 2 West Coast Rep., 528, 1884].

In Massachusetts, wherein it has been held that the mere fact of uttering is not proof of forgery (Com. v. Parmenter, 5 Pick., 279, 1827), it has been
decided, nevertheless, that "possession of a forged instrument by a person claiming under it is strong evidence tending to prove that he forged it or
caused it to be forged." (Com. v. Talbot, 84 Mass. (2 Allen), 161.) In several jurisdiction it has been held that one found in the possession of a forged
order issued in his own favor is presumed either to have forged it or procured it to be forged. (Hobbs v. State, 75 Ala., 1; State v. Britt, 14 N. C. (3
Div.) , 122.)

For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to hold, and we do not hold, that the mere fact that the accused uttered the check in question is
proof of the fact that he also forged it or caused it to be forged, but we do hold that the utterance of such an instrument, when unexplained, is
strong evidence tending to establish the fact that the utterer either himself forged the instrument or caused it to be forged, and that this evidence,
taken together with the further evidence set out above and brought out on the trial of the case, establishes the guilt of the accused of the crime
with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is urged on appeal that the information filed in this case is fatally deficient because it charges the accused with falsification and further alleges
that he received the sum of money realized as a result of said falsification, and it is contended that the accused was thus charged as principal and
as accessory after the fact. It is sufficient answer to this connection to say no objection was raised on this ground at the trial; and it is further to be
observed that this allegation was not in fact or intention a charge against the accused as accessory after the fact, and appears to have been set out
in the information merely to fix the civil responsibility upon which the court is required to pass, under the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code.

The trial court was of opinion that the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and abuse of confidence should be taken into consideration in
fixing the penalty to be imposed, but we agree with the Solicitor-General that premeditation is inherently involved in crimes of this nature, and
since it does not appear that the check book was under the control or intrusted to the care of the accused, the crime can not be said to have been
committed with "abuse of confidence" within the meaning of circumstance 10 of article 10 of the Penal Code.

We therefore reverse the judgment and sentence of the trial court and find the accused, Pio Castillo, guilty of the crime of "falsification of a
mercantile instrument," as charged, and it appearing that the accused, at the time of the commission of the crime, was less than 18 though more
than 15 years old, we impose upon him the penalty immediately inferior to that prescribed for that offense, and there being no aggravating or
extenuating circumstances, we sentence the said Pio Castillo to four years’ imprisonment (presidio correccional) with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to the payment of the costs in both instance and the indemnification of the injured party in the sum of 56 pesos, Philippine
currency.

After the expiration of ten days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and at the proper time let the case be remanded to the court
below for proper action. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Willard, and Tracey, JJ., concur.

[ G. R. No. 40945, August 15, 1934 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO ASTUDILLO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from the following decision of Judge Pedro Tuason in the Court of First Instance of Benguet:
"Antonio Astudillo is charged with estafa through falsification of commercial documents' alleged to have been committed as follows:

" 'That on or about the 27th day of May, 1933, in the City of Baguio, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above named
accused did with intent to defraud and through misrepresentation, voluntarily, maliciously and feloniously falsify, issue and use Phil. National Bank
Check No. 637030 by making it appear in said check as if same had been properly drawn and issued by the Manager and Treasurer of the
Pangasinan Transportation Co. and indorsed by Jose Ramos, when in truth and in fact said accused Antonio Astudillo well knew that said manager
and Treasurer of the Pangasinan Transportation Co. and Jose Ramos did not issue or participate in the making, issuing, signing and indorsing said
check and by virtue of said falsification, deceit and misrepresentation, said accused Antonio Astudillo was able to cash, obtain and receive the
amount of P250.75 which is the value of the check from one Ka Satoh of Baguio. The said amount of P250.75 which is the face value put on the
check was appropriated by said accused Antonio Astudillo for his own use and benefit to the prejudice of said Ka Satoh in the said amount of
P250.75

" 'All contrary to law.'

"When this case was tried on October 24, 1933, the accused was assisted by counsel. The trial was discontinued for the reason that some of the
important witnesses for the prosecution were absent. When the trial was resumed today, the accused appeared alone and expressed his
willingness to plead guilty provided the minimum penalty be imposed on him. He afterwards said that his attorney had told him to plead guilty if he
were found guilty by this court in another case (closely related to this one) for malicious mischief.

"It appears from the evidence that the defendant came to Baguio from Manila on or about the 24th day of April, 1033, with Felix Valencia on a car
belonging to the latter 'a father. Shortly after arriving here, the accused, thru the driver of the car named Simeon Zamora, bought two tires from K.
Satoh, agent in Baguio for the Firestone Rubber Company, for P51 and gave a check drawn on the Philippine National Bank for the sum of P250.75.
The check was accepted and the accused, through Zamora, received not only the two tires but also the change in cash in the sum of P199.75. It
later turned out that the check was falsified.

"This check purported to have been issued by one Jose L. Klar as manager of the Pangasinan Transportation Company in favor of one Jose Ramos
and to have been indorsed by the latter. Klar denied that he had issued that check or that the signature appearing thereon was his. Ramos did not
testify as no return of the subpæna with respect to him had been made up to the date of the trial. The testimony of Ramos was not deemed
necessary as the falsity of the check was admitted.

"The only question presented for the consideration of the court is whether Zamora received the check from Astudillo, the accused, and gave the
change to the latter. Upon this point there is the positive and convincing testimony of both Simeon Zamora and Felix Valencia, which tile defendant
barely made any attempt to deny. Aside from this testimony there is the fact that while Astudillo was under detention in the city jail of Baguio for
this offense, he detached from the record of the case in the justice of the peace court the cheek which he was accused of falsifying and concealed
or destroyed it. Astudillo has been charged with malicious mischief for this act and found guilty by this court. The statements of the accused in the
course of the trial regarding his desire to plead guilty upon certain conditions is another proof of his guilt. The accused, it may be noted, is an
educated man and according to his testimony, was formerly the publisher and editor of the 'Philippine Motor Review'.

"The court therefore finds the defendant guilty of the complex crime of estafa committed through the falsification of a commercial document and,
in accordance with article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, he is sentenced to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)-days of prision
correccional, with the accessories provided by law, to pay Ka Satoh the sum of P250.75 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs."

Appellant's attorney de oficio alleges that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of estafa by means of the falsification of a
mercantile document, although not all the facts constituting the crime alleged in the information were proved.

It is the contention of the attorney for the defendant that the automobile tires in question were, not used on the automobile of Felix Valencia, jr.,
until he and the defendant had returned to Manila, and that the testimony of Simeon Zamora and Felix Valencia, jr., is insufficient to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant delivered the check in question to Zamora to be cashed when he bought the tires, or that the difference
between the amount of the check and the price of the tires was delivered to the defendant.

In our opinion the testimony of Zamora and Valencia duly proves that the defendant ordered Simeon Zamora to buy two tires and gave him the
check in question to be cashed, and left him in front of the store of Iwama; that Iwama did not have the tires, and suggested that Zamora go to the
store of Ka Satoh, the offended party; that Zamora bought the tires in question for P51 from Satoh, delivered to him the check for P250.75, and
received in cash the difference between the amount of the check and the cost of the tires, or P199.75; that the tires were delivered to Zamora at
the Vallejo Hotel, where the defendant and Valencia were staying; that Valencia returned to the hotel ahead of the defendant, and Zamora handed
the P199.75 to Valencia, who delivered it in turn to the defendant when he returned to the hotel.

The testimony of these witnesses is corroborated by the offer of the defendant prior to and during the trial to plead guilty to a charge of simple
estafa.

The only difficulty which the case presents is whether or not the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the defendant for the falsification
of the check in question. We are constrained to think that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain that finding. The check in question, No. 637030
of the Philippine National Bank, purported to be issued by Jose L. Klar as manager of the Pangasinan Transportation Company in favor of Jose
Ramos. Jose L. Klar testified that no such check had been issued by him, and that his company was not using checks of that series. Jose Ramos, in
whose favor the check was drawn, and by whom the check purported to be indorsed, was not presented as a witness.

No evidence was presented to prove that the check in question was in the handwriting of the defendant. The check could not be exhibited at the
trial, because it disappeared from the record while the case was pending in the justice of the peace court.
The Solicitor-General states in his brief that according to the testimony of Jose L. Klar the defendant obtained the check book, from which the
check in question was taken, from the Philippine National Bank by falsifying the signature of Klar and by ordering a seal similar to that of the
Pangasinan Transportation Co., and argues that this testimony, coupled with the fact that the defendant cashed the forged check, is sufficient
proof of his guilt of the forgery. An examination of the record, however, does not seem to bear out this statement. It appears that the check in
question was not included among the checks to which Klar was referring. His testimony related to certain forged checks amounting to a little more
than P800 which were charged to the current account of the Pangasinan Transportation Company with the Philippine National Bank. It was then
found that said checks had not been issued by the Pangasinan Transportation Company. When the check in question was described to the witness,
he stated that he had never seen it; that the amount thereof had not been deducted from the current account of the Pangasinan Transportation
Company; and 'that he had never heard of the check in question until he was subpoenaed as a witness in this case (pp. 7 and 8, steno. record).

The Solicitor-General cites in support of his contention People vs. De Lara (45 Phil., 754) and People vs. Domingo (49 Phil., 28). The facts of those
two cases are materially different from the facts of the present case, and the decisions in those cases are not controlling in the case at bar.

In the De Lara case a forged check, dated April 5, 1923 and drawn to the order of J. U. Lim for P8,750, and another on April 6 for P5,600, and a third
on April 12 for P9,800, were presented to the bank by the defendant on the respective dates of issue, and the amount thereof paid by the bank to
the defendant on the purported indorsements of the checks by J. U. Lim to the defendant. The defendant admitted the receipt of all the money
evidenced by the forged checks, and as a defense said that he was in the employ of J. U. Lim, who indorsed and gave the checks to him personally,
with the instructions to cash them at the bank, and that he either delivered the money to Lim personally or to one Suaco upon the written order of
Lim.

Rejecting defendant's explanation as unworthy of credit, this court held that the facts brought the case within the rule laid down in the case of the
United States vs. Castillo (6 Phil., 453, 455), where it was said:

"For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to hold, and we do not hold, that the mere fact that the accused uttered the check in question is
proof of the fact that he also forged it or caused it to be forged, but we do hold that the utterance of such an instrument, when unexplained, is
strong evidence tending to establish the fact that the uttered either himself forged the instrument or caused it to be forged, and that this evidence,
taken together with the further evidence set out above and brought out on the trial of the case, establishes the guilt of the accused of the crime
with which he was charged beyond a reasonable doubt."

The evidence in the Castillo case showed that the blank upon which the forged check was written was stolen from a book of blank checks between
the hours of 12 noon on the 1st of December, 1903 and 11 a. m. of the 2d of December, 1903 when the check was presented for payment; that this
blank check book was kept in a drawer in the office of James J. Watkins, by whom the check was purported to be drawn, and that the defendant
was one of three clerks employed by Watkins in his office; that the defendant was in the office on the evening of December 1st, and that he locked
the office after all the other clerks had gone. The defendant testified that he had never seen the forged check prior to the trial; that he was not at
the business place of Lim Ponso, who cashed the check on December 2, 1903; and that he never received the proceeds of the check. The trial court
found, however, that defendant's statements were false, and convicted him of knowingly using with intent to gain a falsified mercantile document,
but this court reversed the judgment and convicted the appellant of the crime of falsification of a mercantile instrument.

In the Domingo case it appears that under the pretext of trying to find a purchaser for a fishpond belonging to the estates of two deceased sisters,
the defendant obtained from the administrator the possession of the certificate of title on the condition that she should return it the next day. She
failed to return the certificate, and shortly afterwards a deed of sale of the fishpond was executed by two women that represented themselves to
be the registered owners. The forged deed and the certificate of title were presented to the register of deeds, who cancelled the original certificate
of title and issued a new certificate in the name of the vendee. At the trial the defendant denied having received the original certificate of title from
the administrator and offered no further explanation. This court held that the evidence was conclusive that the defendant had obtained possession
of the certificate as alleged in the information; that the crime could not have been committed if the perpetrators had not been in possession of the
certificate of title; that not having offered any explanation as to what she did with the certificate, the position of the appellant was analogous to
that of a person who immediately after a larceny has been committed is found in possession of the stolen goods and offers no explanation; and
that the possession of the certificate of title being one of the necessary means of committing the crime in question, she was guilty as principal.

In the present case the defendant denied having the forged check in his possession, and as the testimony of Jose L. Klar does not refer to the check
in question, there is nothing in the record to show how the defendant obtained possession of the check.

The defendant undoubtedly knew the check in question to be false. If he had believed it to be authentic, he would not have destroyed it after the
complaint was filed, as the evidence shows he did, or denied ever having it in his possession.

Is the fact that the accused uttered the check in question, knowing it to be false, proof that he forged it or caused it to be forged? We think it is not.
The decisions cited do not go that far, and this is the answer given in Wharton's Criminal Law (vol. 1, par. 726), where it is said:

"Does the uttering of a forged instrument by a particular person justify a jury in convicting such a person of forgeryP This question, if nakedly put,
must, like the kindred one as to the proof of larceny by evidence of possession of stolen goods, be answered in the negative. The defendant is
presumed to be innocent until otherwise proved. In larceny this presumption is overcome by proof that the possession is so recent that it becomes
difficult to conceive how the defendant could have got the property without being in some way concerned in the stealing. So it is with the uttering.
The uttering may be so closely connected in time with the forging, the utterer may be proved to have such capacity for forging, or such close
connection with the forgers that it becomes, when so accomplished, probable proof of complicity in the forgery."

In the Castillo case the uttering was so closely connected in time with the forging, and the utterer was proved to have such capacity for forging as
to constitute probable proof of complicity in the forgery.

The forgery in the Domingo case could not have been accomplished without making use of the certificate of title that was in the possession of the
defendant.

In the De Lara case, although some of the language used might lead one to believe that the writer of the opinion regarded the mere uttering of the
forged checks as proof of their falsification, the conviction of the defendant does not rest upon that fact alone, because at least one of the
circumstances mentioned by Wharton as constituting probable proof of the utterer's complicity in the forgery was present. The uttering was closely
connected in time with the forging. The application for the check book was received by the Philippine National Bank on April 3d. The checks, which
were issued on April 5th, 6th, and 12th, and purported to be indorsed by the payee to the defendant, were promptly cashed by the defendant at
the bank. This court found that the defendant had confederates, and that one of them was an employee of the bank.
The defendant claimed that he was employed by J. U. Lim, the person in whose favor the checks were drawn; that Lim, who was staying at the
Hotel de France in Manila, delivered the checks to him, with instructions to cash them and bring back the money. If that be true, it shows that the
defendant had a close connection with the forger of the checks, if not an opportunity of forging them himself.

In the case at bar none of the circumstances mentioned by Wharton as showing the utterer's complicity in the forgery is present. As already
pointed out, the evidence does not show how or when the defendant came into the possession of the check in question, the date of which was not
alleged in the information or proved at the trial.

Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

"Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

"1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or
letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

"2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts
of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

"Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause
such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article,
shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree."

The acts of the defendant constitute a violation of the second paragraph under No. 2 of the foregoing article, because the defendant knowingly
made use of the false document in question to the damage of the offended party. The penalty applicable to the offense committed by the
defendant is arresto mayor in its maximum degree to prision correccional in its minimum degree, and there being present no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance the defendant is sentenced to suffer one year and 8 months of prision correccional, and to indemnify the offended party in
the sum of P250.75, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and in accordance with Act No. 4103 the minimum
sentence of the defendant is fixed at four months of arresto mayor.

As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Avancena, C. J., Street, Abad Santos, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-5805. September 16, 1910. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOAQUIN ROMERO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

On April 24, 1908, Joaquin Romero, as postmaster in charge of the post-office and telegraph station in the pueblo of Paniqui, Province of Tarlac,
received from one named Eugenio two telegrams for their transmission — one to Olongapo, addressed to Mariano de la Cruz, and the other to Los
Banos, addressed to Severino Maguigao. The telegram sent to Cruz in Olongapo was drawn up in the following terms: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. — Sr.
Mariano de la Cruz. — Olongapo. — Aver is hay dinero necesita porque estoy enfermo manda si puede, Eugenio." (See whether there is money. I
need it because I am sick. Send if you can. Eugenio.) This telegram consists of twenty-one words and was transmitted by the telegraph operator
Romero in the following form: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. — Mariano de la Cruz. — Olongapo, — Mandame dinero pronto, estoy enfermo Eugenio."
(Send me money soon, am sick. Eugenio.) The original telegram was thus reduced to nine words, and twelve words were omitted. The telegraph
operator Romero received for the transmission of the said telegram P1.26, the price charged for the twenty-one words which it contained, and by
the reduction gained P0.72, corresponding to the twelve words omitted.

The second telegram was originally worded as follows: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. — Sr. Severino Maguiago. — Los Banos. — Haga el favor de remitir lo
que me debe estoy muy enfermo y necesita el dinero. — Eugenio." (Please remit what you owe me. I am very sick and need to money. Eugenio).
The operator omitted eight words from this telegram, which was reduced to the following: "Paniqui, April, 24-08. — Severino Maguigao. — Los
Banos. — Remitame dinero, necesito estoy enfermo. — Eugenio." (Remit me money. Need. Am sick. Eugenio.) By the reduction of words made, the
telegraph operator Joaquin Romero gained the price corresponding to the difference of eight words, to wit, P0.48.

On August 24, 1908, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, based upon the above facts, charging Joaquin
Romero with the crime of falsification of telegrams. The case having come to trial, the judge, in view of the evidence adduced thereat, sentenced
the accused, on January 13, 1909, to the penalty of three years and seven months’ prision correccional, crediting him with one-half of the time he
was held as a detention prisoner, to the accessory penalties provided by law, and to the payment of the costs. From this judgment the defendant
appealed.

From the facts related, which were duly proved in this cause, it is found that the crime of falsification of telegrams sent from the Paniqui station
and addressed, one to Mariano de la Cruz residing in Olongapo, and the other to Severino Maguigao residing in the pueblo of Los Banos, La Laguna,
was committed, since, with the intent of gain, the number of words contained in each telegram was diminished or reduced and alterations were
made therein in such a way as to pervert the truth in the narration of the facts, and statements different from those contained in the telegrams,
delivered at the telegraph station by the sender Eugenio, were transmitted by wire. This crime is provided for and punished by article 303 in
connection with article 300 of the Penal Code, which article 303 reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A public official in charge of the telegraph service who shall originate or falsify a telegraphic message shall incur the penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum degrees."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is unquestionable, in this cause, that the defendant Joaquin Romero was a public official in charge of the post-office and the telegraph station of
the pueblo of Paniqui, Province of Tarlac, was appointed by the Government to discharge the said positions, and as such official received salary
from the public treasury.

The said defendant is the sole confessed and convicted perpetrator, by direct participation, of the crime mentioned. No motive, other than that of
intent of gain, can be ascribed as having determined him to reduce or diminish the number of words contained in each of the telegrams deposited
with their cost at the telegraph station under his charge, inasmuch as, by the reduction of the first telegram, addressed to Olongapo, the defendant
appropriated to himself P0.72, the cost of the twelve words therein omitted, and in the second telegram he gained P0.48, the amount received for
the eight words omitted. The defendant only affixed to the first telegram stamps to the value of P.054, and to the other stamps to the value of
P0.60, while he received P2.34 as the total charge for the twenty-one words of the first telegram and for the eighteen of the second message.

It is a fact, admitted by the defendant, that he changed the wording of the telegrams which he received, by omitting several words in each of them;
and the record of the cause shows no proof of his allegation that he made an error in recounting the amount received for each one of the
telegrams, owing to the number of words they contained, and that he was therefore obliged to diminish the number of words of each of them.
Such allegation is negatived by the proven facts that he affixed stamps only to the value of P.054 to one of the telegrams, and of P0.60 to the other,
and as he received P2.34 for the dispatch of the two messages, it is evident that the surplus money must have remained in his possession, since, on
striking a balance, instead of a surplus it was found that there was a shortage of P3 in the postal funds, as the defendant himself confesses in his
official letter of April 25, 1908 (p. 39 of trial record). From all of which it is concluded, as aforesaid, that the defendant obtained profit from the
remainder of the sum received by him, equivalent to the price of the words omitted by him from the two telegrams before mentioned.

The defendant, therefore, with manifest violation of a prohibitive law perpetrated the unlawful act in question and has thereby incurred the
penalty which he merits for his criminal acts. In view of the fact that no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance enters into the commission of the
crime, the punishment should be imposed upon him in the medium degree of the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
degrees.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors attributed to the judgment appealed from have been decided, it is proper, in our opinion, to affirm
the said judgment and we hereby affirm the same, with the costs of this instance against the defendant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Moreland, and Trent, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1766. April 29, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. JUAN ANGEL MICHELENA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

In an application to the Civil Service Board for examination, a document printed in accordance with the form prescribed by said Board, and in that
part thereof which contains recommendations of the applicant, certificate No. 3 appears to be subscribed by Frank N. West, the latter having
neither subscribed it nor written the contents thereof, the same not being correct in some respects, viz, as regards the age of the party certifying
and the length of time which he knew the candidate recommended. The crime was fully proven. The candidate, now the defendant, failed to
present himself for examination, notwithstanding having in his possession the ticket of admission.

The judge in his judgment qualifies this fact as an attempt at falsification of a public document. It is an attempt because the examination did not
take place, and not having taken place the document was not put on record, for which reason it never became a public document. Therefore, the
court sentenced the defendant to six months’ arresto mayor and a fine of 1,000 pesetas, or the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment.

The prosecution in this instance considers the fact as a consummated crime of falsification of a public document comprised within article 301, in
connection with paragraphs 2 and 4 of article 300 of the Penal Code, and asks that the defendant be sentenced to the penalty of presidio mayor
and a fine of 1,250 to 12,500 pesetas which, according to it, is the penalty provided for the crime in its minimum degree. The act done by the
defendant is simply the falsification of a certificate of merit provided for in article 311 of the Penal Code and punished with arresto mayor. This is
the crime and this is the penalty which must be applied in its medium degree.

Therefore we sentence Juan Angel Michelena to two months and one day of arresto mayor, crediting him with one-half of the time of his detention
already suffered, and the costs in both instances. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 4411. August 31, 1908. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUFINO DELOSO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :

Rufino Deloso, in order to take part in the municipal elections that were to be held about the 1st of December 1904, in the town of Jimenez, called
at the municipal building and stated under oath, to the municipal secretary, that he was a resident of the said town, and that at the date of the
next municipal election he would have resided therein for a period of six months; and that he was in every way entitled to vote.

At the municipal elections held in the town of Oroquieta, in the same province, on the 5th of December, 1905, the said Rufino Deloso was elected
by a majority vote to the office of municipal president. The election was protested by several residents of the town on the ground that the
successful candidate had no legal residence therein. In his defense Deloso stated under oath on the 4th of January, 1906, before Vicente Fortich,
notary public of Oroquieta, that he had been, and was at the time, a resident of the said town, and that he had resided therein from the month of
April, 1902, until the above-mentioned date. From documents marked "A" and "B," offered in evidence by the provincial fiscal, it appears from the
first that Rufino Deloso, who signed both of them, had resided in Oroquieta since April, 1902, and continued to live there until the date of the
document, January 4, 1906; that he was a candidate for the municipal presidency of Oroquieta at the elections of December, 1903, that, although
he paid frequent visits to the pueblo of Jimenez, he always returned to Oroquieta, the place where he resided; that he never voted for municipal
officers in the pueblo of Jimenez. The first document was signed under oath in the presence of Notary Vicente Fortich, and the second, marked "B,"
is a municipal form No. 10, wherein the accused stated under oath that he was a resident of Jimenez.

A complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging Rufino Deloso with the crime of falsification of official documents, and the court below, in
view of the evidence adduced at the trial, found him guilty of the crime defined and punished by article 311, in connection with article 310, of the
Penal Code, and sentenced him to the penalty of four months of arresto mayor, to suffer the accessory penalties and to pay costs. From this
judgment the accused has appealed.

From the above stated facts, fully established in the case, it appears that the crime of falsifying a certificate issued by a public officer was
committed by a private person, who used it, perverting the truth in the narration of facts, when exercising the right of suffrage at the municipal
elections held in December, 1904, in the pueblo of Jimenez, Province of Misamis.

Article 310 of the Penal Code provides that —

"A public official who shall issue a false certificate of merit or service, of good conduct, of property or of other similar circumstances, shall be
punished with the penalties of suspension in its medium and maximum degrees and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas."cralaw virtua1aw library

Article 311 of the said code prescribes that —

"An individual who shall falsify a certificate of the kinds mentioned in the preceding articles shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor.

"This provision is applicable to the person who shall knowingly make use of such false certificate."cralaw virtua1aw library

The document offered in evidence as Exhibit B, issued by the municipal secretary of Jimenez, is not, strictly speaking, a public document, but it
belongs to the class of documents the falsification of which is specially punished by articles 306 to 311 of the Penal Code; therefore, the provisions
of articles 301 and 302, in connection with article 300 of said code, are not applicable to the present case.

The said document or certificate was used with a knowledge that its contents were false, in that Deloso was not a resident of Jimenez. The falsity of
the statement, made by him to the municipal secretary of said pueblo, was proven by another notaries document executed by the same Deloso
who also stated under oath, that he was a resident of Oroquieta both before and after the year 1904; it is therefore unquestionable that the
accused has incurred the penalty imposed by article 311 of the Penal Code, above quoted.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and alleged that he signed the document marked Exhibit B, without having read it, and that he was not
acquainted with the provisions of the Municipal Code as to the residence required of an elector. These allegations can not be sustained. nor do
they constitute an exemption of the accused, inas much as, according to article 2 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law does not excuse a person
from compliance therewith. Furthermore, in view of the degree of education and intelligence of the accused who, as appears in the proceedings,
assisted a resident of the pueblo of Jimenez in his complaint against the municipal president for violation of the Municipal Code, there can be no
doubt but that he was acquainted with the said code, and that he maliciously and knowingly made use of the certificate issued by the municipal
secretary of Jimenez, containing the false declarations made by himself, in order to exercise the right of suffrage at the elections in that town,
although he was well aware that he was neither a resident of Jimenez nor entitled to participate in such elections.

No mitigating nor aggravating circumstance being present in the commission of the offense, the adequate penalty should be applied in the medium
degree.

For the foregoing reasons, and accepting the findings of the court below in the judgment appealed from, it is our opinion that the same should be
and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the accused. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 150918 : August 17, 2007]
NEGROS MERCHANTS ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails the September 7, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65127, which annulled
and set aside the September 22, 2000 and March 19, 2001 Orders3 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 41 in Civil Case No. 99-10707,
as well as the November 12, 2001 Resolution4 denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On August 23, 1993, petitioner Negros Merchants Enterprises, Inc. (NMEI), through its President and General Manager, Jacinto Y. Tan, Jr., applied
for an P8 million Credit Accommodation with respondent China Banking Corporation (CBC), with terms "ONE YEAR LOAN LINE, RENEWABLE AND
RE-AVAILABLE ANNUALLY THEREAFTER."5 The loan was secured by a real estate mortgage6 over its properties covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-1390957 and T-139096.8 On December 21, 1994, petitioner, through Tan, applied for an additional Case-to-Case Loan worth
P1,500,000.00.9 Both loans were respectively paid on January 31 and March 27, 1996.

Meanwhile, beginning March 19, 1996, petitioner allegedly re-availed the P8 million credit line under the original Credit Accommodation through
promissory notes executed by Tan.10 Petitioner failed to settle the obligation, hence respondent sent a demand letter11 with warning to foreclose
on the real estate mortgage. Petitioner, through its counsel Atty. Raphael A. Diaz, sent two letters12 to respondent requesting a detailed statement
of account and to hold in abeyance any legal action. The latter replied that said statement could not be released without proper board resolution
or authorization.13 Subsequently, petitioner's properties were extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction, with respondent as the highest
bidder. On March 6, 1998, the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale14 in favor of
respondent.

On March 16, 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment of Foreclosure Sale with Damages and Preliminary Injunction.15 Respondent moved
to dismiss16 the same on the ground that petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that it is entitled to the relief sought in the
complaint. Petitioner later filed an Amended Complaint17 impleading Tan and his spouse, Corazon V. Tan, as well as respondent's Bacolod Branch
Manager Ainalea Lim-Cortez. Respondent again sought to dismiss18 the amended complaint for failure to state cause of action and for failure to
comply with the rules on non-forum shopping.19

Meanwhile, title over TCT Nos. T-139095 and T-139096 were consolidated20 in favor of respondent. On September 15, 1999, the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46, granted respondent's Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession for the said properties.21

On September 22, 2000, the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 41, denied respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Respondent moved for
reconsideration22 but was likewise denied.

Thereafter, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of the trial court denying the motion to
dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. On September 7, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the writs prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. The Orders dated
September 22, 2000 and March 19, 2001 which were both issued by respondent Judge RAY ALAN T. DRILON of Branch 41 of the Regional Trial court
of Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 99-10707, entitled "Negros Merchants Enterprises, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation, Spouses Jacinto Y. Tan, Jr.
and Corazon V. Tan and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental" are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge, who is hereby
permanently ENJOINED from enforcing the said Orders dated September 22, 2000 and March 19, 2001, is hereby ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No.
99-10707 insofar as petitioner China Banking Corporation is concerned.

Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.23

The Court of Appeals held that the Amended Complaint should have been dismissed because the accompanying certification against forum
shopping which was signed by petitioner's corporate secretary, Amelito Lizares, was defective, for lack of authorization from the board of directors;
that the allegations in the amended complaint were insufficient to establish a cause of action; that petitioner defaulted in paying the loan, thus
respondent rightfully foreclosed the mortgaged properties; that petitioner cannot validly claim ignorance of the foreclosure proceedings; that the
alleged collusion between Tan and respondent's Bacolod branch manager lacks basis because petitioner expressly authorized Tan to enter into loan
transactions in its behalf with the latter; and that the trial judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied for lack of merit; hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari .

Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals departed from jurisprudential and procedural law when it entertained respondent's Petition for
Certiorari questioning the two interlocutory orders issued by the trial court as the same shall be reviewed only when an appeal is taken from the
judgment of the trial court; that since no actual hearing was yet conducted, there is no evidence which the appellate court could use as basis to
resolve the case on the merits or to determine whether the trial judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction.

Petitioner also argues that trial courts have the authority to determine whether the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of
action and that they have the discretion to resolve a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action based only on the
complaint or based on other pleadings submitted by the parties. Thus, petitioner concludes that the trial judge acted within his discretion and
authority in denying the motion to dismiss.

Petitioner likewise claims that the amended complaint cannot be considered an initiatory pleading which requires an accompanying certification
against forum shopping. Since respondent's first motion to dismiss did not raise in issue the alleged defective certification, it is deemed to have
waived any objection thereto, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.24 However, in the event the certification is found to be
defective, petitioner maintains that it substantially complied with the rules and that the substance of the complaint should not be subordinated to
procedural lapses.

Finally, petitioner asserts that the full payment of the P8 million loan accommodation on January 31, 1996 rendered the mortgage contract and
other documents connected thereto without force or effect. Accordingly, the mortgage contract should be deemed cancelled, and the properties
subject thereto deemed released, instead of using them as security for the loans fraudulently obtained by Tan, and subsequently foreclosing them
when the latter failed to pay. Petitioner, thus, prays for the reinstatement of the complaint against respondent for further proceedings.

The petition lacks merit.

In Españo, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,25 the Court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not
appealable, nor can it be the subject of a Petition for Review on Certiorari . Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an
appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.26

Thus, when the trial court denied respondent's motion to dismiss, its next course of action would have been to file an answer and proceed with the
trial of the case. It therefore erred when it filed instead a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, while indeed respondent erred in filing a Petition for Certiorari before the appellate court, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
petitioner's Amended Complaint should have been dismissed due to its defective verification and certification against forum shopping.

It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory and that the failure to comply with this requirement
cannot be excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that
there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.27 In a case where the plaintiff is a private
corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on behalf of the said corporation, by a specifically authorized person, including its retained
counsel, who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be established by the documents.28

In the present case, the Verification and Certification attached to the original and amended complaints of petitioner Negros Merchants Enterprises,
Inc. reads as follows:

I, AMELITO LIZARES, after being duly sworn, depose and state:

1. That I am the Corporate Secretary of Negros Merchants Enterprises, Inc. the plaintiff in the above-entitled case;

2. That I have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint; and that all the allegations contained therein are true of my own personal
knowledge;

3. That I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other actions or complaint involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or different Division thereof or any court or tribunal or agency, and to the best of my knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending
in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or different Division thereof or any court or tribunal or agency; that in the event that a similar action or
preceding [sic] has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or different Division thereof, I hereby bind myself to notify
the Court, tribunal, or agency within five (5) days from such notice.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 16th day of March, 1999/12th day of October 1999, at Bacolod City, Philippines.

(Sgd.)
AMELITO LIZARES29

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, there was no allegation that petitioner Negros Merchants Enterprises, Inc., through a board resolution,
authorized Lizares to execute the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Moreover, no such board resolution was appended to the
complaint or amended complaint.

In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals,30 we held that if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the
complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.31

In the instant case, Lizares was not authorized to file the complaint for and in behalf of petitioner corporation. Thus, the complaint is not deemed
filed by the proper party in interest and should be dismissed.

Indeed, there is jurisprudence where the Court allowed substantial compliance with the rule on certification of no-forum shopping; however, the
exceptional circumstances and/or social justice considerations present in those cases are wanting in petitioner's Complaint or Amended Complaint.
The words used in petitioner's verification and certification of no-forum shopping clearly state that Lizares solely caused the preparation of the
present case, without even averring that he had done so in behalf of petitioner. There was no belated filing of a proper verification and
certification, or even a copy of the board resolution or a secretary's certificate attesting that Lizares was authorized to file said complaint or the
amendment thereto. Instead, petitioner merely declared without qualification or explanation in its Opposition to Motion to Dismiss that "there was
sufficient compliance as could be gleaned from the complaint."32 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

There is likewise no merit in petitioner's assertion that the amended complaint was not an initiatory pleading. Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court clearly provides that an amended complaint supersedes the complaint that it amends.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 7, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65127, which annulled and
set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 41 denying the motion to dismiss, and ordering the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City, Branch 41, to dismiss Civil Case No. 99-10707, as well as the November 12, 2001 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46656 June 26, 1940
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELIPE MAGPALE, defendant-appellant.

LAUREL, J.:

A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe Magpale in the justice of the peace court of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, charging him with a
violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:

That, on or about the 25th day of March, 1938, in the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, feloniously, knowingly and without lawful purpose, have in his possession, custody
and control one brand of the municipal government of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to wit:. . . ., with the intent of using it for falsifying the official brand
of the said municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in public documents, to wit: Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. All contrary to law.

The preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace was marked by the presentation of evidence by the prosecution and by the
waiver of the defense to present any evidence in rebuttal. Convinced, from the evidence before him, that there was reasonable ground to believe
that the defendant committed the crime complained of, the justice of the peace remanded the records of the case to the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija for further proceedings. In the latter court, the defendant was informed against by the provincial fiscal as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of March, 1938, in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva Ecija, P. I., and within the jurisdiction of this court,
the above-named defendant, Felipe Magpale, did then and there voluntarily, maliciously, illegal and criminally make an iron brand purported to be
of the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, with the intention of using it knowingly in the falsification of certificates of ownership of large cattle,
said manufactured brand having been found in the possession of said accused. All contrary to law.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered a decision the dispositive part which reads:

Wherefore, the court finds the defendant Felipe Magpale guilty of a violation of article 176 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four months and one day of arresto mayor to two years, four months and one day of prison correccional, to
pay a fine of P100 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to the accessories of the law and to pay the costs.

The case is before this court on appeal by the defendant and appellant, who makes the following assignment of errors:

1. The lower court erred in overruling the demurrer interposed by the defendant that the said court has no jurisdiction over the case on the ground
that the accused is deprived of the right to preliminary investigation on the information charged.

2. The lower court erred in finding the acts imputed to the defendant punishable, as coming within the purview of article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code.

3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged in the information, and in not acquitting him of the same.

In varying phraseology, but conveying the same central thought, this court has set out the purposes of a preliminary investigation as follows: "The
object of a preliminary investigation, or a previous inquiry of some kind, before an accused person is placed upon trial, is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from unless and expensive prosecutions." (U. S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 18 Phil., 122.)
"Preliminary investigations are intended to secure the right to every person charged which crime to be free from the inconvenience, expenses and
burden of defending himself in the course of a formal trial until the reasonable probability of his guilt has been passed upon in a more or less
summary proceeding by a competent officer designated by law for that purpose; and that they are intended further to guard the state from the
burden of unnecessary expense involved in holding trials based on false, frivolous or groundless charges." (U.S. vs. Marfori, 35 Phil., 666.) "A
preliminary investigation is not a trial or any part thereof and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe the accused guilty thereof." (U.S. vs. Yu Tuico, 34 Phil., 209.) In the case at bar, it will be noted that the
officer charged in the complaint and that alleged in the information are defined and penalized by the same article 176 of the Revised Penal Code,
and are so related that an inquiry into one would have elicited substantially if not precisely the same facts that an inquiry into the other would have
brought into light. It will further be noted, that in the notices sent out by the justice of the peace in connection with the preliminary investigation of
the complaint, he did not specially refer to only one of said offenses but to both, as he invariably spoke of a violation of article 176 of the Revised
Penal Code, thus giving the appellant a chance, and putting him on his guard, to defend himself not only against the charge of illegal possession of
the iron brand but also against that of making or ordering the making thereof. But the appellant has seen fit to waive his right to present any
evidence at said investigation, and we cannot now entertain his last-minute defense that he should have been investigated anew for the crime
alleged in the information. To grant him such a belated remedy would not be in obedience to, but in disregarded of, the prime purposes for which
preliminary investigations are ordained by law and sanctioned of the decisions.

Granting, however, that he was entitled to a second preliminary investigation, still his right thereto was invoked after he pleaded not guilty when
arraigned. In People vs. Solon, (47 Phil., 443, 448), it was intimidated that "Whether said motion was made or after the arraignment, is of some
importance for the reason that if it was not made before the arraignment or before the plea of the defendants was entered, it would indicated that
they have waived their right to a preliminary examination, and for that reason the court a quo would have been justified in denying the said
motion." After his motion contesting the jurisdiction of the trial Court was denied, the appellant should have brought the appropriate proceedings
to compel the trial court to grant him another preliminary investigation, this right being a substantial one. Instead, the appellant folded his arms
and went forward with the trial, at which the prosecution presented who brought in testimony, without any objection on the part of the appellant,
establishing the fact that the appellant was the one who ordered the making of the iron brand in question.

As to the last two assigned errors, article 176 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows:

ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not to exceed 10,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make or introduce into the Philippine Islands
any stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or implemented intended to be used in the commission of the offenses of counterfeiting or
falsification mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter.

Appellant himself admits that the ordered the questioned iron brand to be made, wherefore, he is criminally liable for the making thereof. (Article
17, Revised Penal Code.) It also appears that the said brand is an exact imitation of that owned and used by the municipality of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija, to brand its own large cattle and to counterbrand large cattle belonging to its inhabitants.

The offense committed by the appellant under the aforecited article of the Revised Penal Code is penalized with prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, and a fine to exceed P10,000, imposable in its medium period (three years, six months, and twenty-one days to four years,
nine months, and ten days) because unattended by any modifying circumstances. The judgment is thus modified and the defendant sentenced,
under Act No. 4103, to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is four months and one day of arresto mayor, and the maximum three
years, six months and twenty-one days of prision correccional. As thus modified, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs to the defendant
and appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.