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FORT MONRO~, VIRG INIA
See distribution
SEP 4 1963
. ACCESSION NO_ _ _ _ __
PO REG ISTR_ _ _
-
·7~/~'.1'--,'7
/
_ _ _ _
1 Incl
(S) Annex A .
History (U) ·,
Cy No a7 of 80 copies
CN: l°offi2
DISTRIBUTION:
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USAES
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USARIS
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USAPHS 163712
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WHEN SEPARATED FROM
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DISTRI EUTION: (Cont)
Comdt
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USASESCS
USA SWS
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USAWC
Ch, USA ADGRU, Air Univ
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f ,r A Instr, Amph Tng Comd, ·
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Sr A Instr & LO, Educ Cen,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PURPOSE 1
Birth of Military Aviation 1
Emergence of Tactical Air Power 1
Definition of Close Air Support 2
The Issue 2
Beginning of U.S. Military Aviation 4
Emerging Opinions 5
Doctrine of the Times 7
CAS Doctrine of the Forties 14
Post War Doctrine 37
National Securjty Act - 1947 40
War in Korea 42
Unofficial CAS Working Doctrine · 51
CONARC - TAC Doctrine 55
JCS CAS Policy 58
CINCSTRIKES Approach to CAS 58
Army Study of CAS Continued 60
.-. i -..,- )
~. ..,r· ...
'Ji·
8 10~~ ~
COPY ~1
-.;a-=..... -
OF / r) .
........--------
COPIES
1b:r 1
3 .. 227-CAS-340
~~-----.,,,,.-'
1. ( U) PURPOSE:
size and clarify the evolution of CAS doctrine over the years. By
such means, it is hoped that greater insight into the CAS subject .will
be gained.
2. ( tf HISTORICAL REVIEW:
but military aviation was soon a lively topic with U.S. military lead
it is in the fire power that can be brought to bear on the enemy from
strategic and tactical air power is being resolved gradually with the
163Tl'
R:EGRADIED UNOLAs:91 PIED ORDER
SEC AR:MY BY TAG PER S l ()
454
considered inherent to the overall tactical air mission. Though not a
DEFINITION OF CAS
Usage) defines close air support as "Air action against hostile tar
gets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which re
quires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
the combat zo~e at the request of the field army commander against
friendly forces."
THE ISSUE
This is the nub of the problem. Who gets what, where and when?
Air Force and Army leaders are in degree rather than in principle.
air mission, properly executed, will result in control of the air and
2
Ground force commanders are interested primarily in getting
air d·e li vered ordnance when and where they want _it. They measure CAS
They recognize the great striking power of Air Force weapons and that
fire power and not having such means under their control,_J,h~ r ~ a£_e_
ness of CAS. Some, but not all, are pilot training, number and type
of aircraft, training of Army and Air Force personnel who operate the
trol should ground commanders have over CAS, if any? There are two
basic questions. (1) How much should Counter Air and Interdiction
impinge upon the ground commander's CAS requirements, and (2) who
stone for the long look into the future. A review, therefore, of
Army and Air Force CAS concepts of the past may be helpful. Such a
opinion regarding CAS that may have had and perhaps still have an
3
BEGINNING OF U.S. MILITARY AVIATION
It was not until 1 Aug 1907 that the U.S. Army Signal Corps
jects" and took the first step to build an air army. Congress, in 1914,
Army Aviation was less than ten years old and insignificant in
size when the U.S. entered World War I. There were 131 officers, 1087
enlisted men and fewer than 250 planes, none of which were classified
trine was non-existent. Its initial and basic role was to "serve as
the eyes of the ground force and shoot out the eyes of the enemy!t±/
tion about the post war organization of the air arm. The concept of
a separate Air Force had captured the imagination of some from the
in Congress. Between that date and the National Security Act in 1947,
'2J Ibid
)/ Ibid
.Y/ Kent Roberts Greenfield, '~rmy Ground Forces and the Air-Ground
Battle Team, Study No. 35!' Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1948
.Q/ Ibid
4
_,,.
EMERGING OPINIONS
power in the decade following World War I. One group contended that
forces)./
The third point of view, and the one expressed by most air
officers, visuali.z ed a great future for air power and supported the
ports. They saw no need for a separate air force until aircraft
that air power was an offensive weapon to gain command of the air and
/
World War I lessons applied to Italy's strategic position, Douhet
Mitchell believed that an entire new set of · rules for the con
the conduct of war. 11 No longer," he said, "is the making of war gauged
merely by land and naval forces. Both of these old, well und~rstood
I
Mitchell deplored the fact that all the great nations except
the U.S. had adopted a definite air doctrine di•s tinguis ha:1from sea
throughout all the services and noted that other nations were tending
to centralize their aviation efforts despite the fact they all started
6
; Congress, however, agreed with Secretary of War Baker and Gen
eral Pershing who said, "an air force acting independently can of its
own aceount neither win a war at the present time nor, so far as we
can tell, at any time in the future." But, in 1920, the legal status
rol,e of military aviation in the U.S. Army,- support of the Army re-
Principles for the Employment of the Air Service," dated 26 Jan 1926,
for example, sta.t ed that the organization and training of air units
a.id. the ground forces to gain decisive success.. Some uni ts always
'·
-----
temporarily attached to ground units or may cooperate by indirect
from. 1112./
•air commanders had two hats, i.e., (1) tactical command over air units
but not over air units attached or assigned to subordinate units and
arate Air Department included. The Morrow Board recommended that the
Q
0: Air Service be re-named the Air Corps for prestige purposes but remain
within the Army. Congress concurred and the Air Service became the
12/
TR _440-15,. ~ar Departinent, "Fundamental Principles for the
Employment of the Air Service," 26 -January 1926
8
,_
.;. warfare directed at the enemy's will to resist. The three arms were
on 1 March 1935, GHQ AF was directly under the Chief of Staff and was
the air combat arm. The Air Corps retained administrative and log
did caution against frittering away air power against minor or second
_g!f/ Ibid
.6.2,/' A. Goldberg, op. cit., Page 1
Z2/ TR 440-15, War Department, "Employment of the Air Forces of
the Army", 15 October 1935
n./ Ibid
~ Ibid
9
Doctrine in 1935 concentrated air effort on reconnaissance,
=
interdiction, harassment and attack on deep targets.~ It advised
power tactics.
tiated from ground tactics doctrine with support by air power, became
evident. The doctrine stated that "complete control of the air can be
of surface forces, and the success of field forces may depend in large
~ Ibid
JQ/ Ibid
1J/
FM 1-5, War Dept, Air Corps Field Manual, "Employment of
Aviation of the Army" dated 15 April 1940,
E/ Ibid
10
area is the normal zone of action of support aviation operations to
weapons)]./
passage. Alluding to the fact that aircraft and men are expensive,
quotation was followed with the statement, "Support Aviation may thus
ed unit ~,]2/
his Acting Deputy Chief of Staff (for air) .in November 1940 following
directed both the Air Corps and the GHQ AF until a more satisfactory
fj} Ibid
J.!±/ Ibid
12/ Ibid
J2/ Ibid
11
AIR CORPS BECOMES AIR FORCE
:::
Department established the Army Air Fo~ces. This gave the nation's
of command over the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command (the
former GHQ).~
the air arm became co-equal with the Army Ground Force and the Army
Service Forces. The Army Air Forces had attained a degree of autonomy
published 29 June 1942. This was the doctrine, with which the U.S.
frame of reference. The air forces had a larger mission than the
The purpose of the air forces was to "deny the establishment of and
destroy existing hostile bases from which the enemy can conduct
~ Ibid
12/ Ibid
12
-- . - ---·-
But, close support of ground forces was not a dead issue, for
FM 100-- 15 listed "Close Cooperation with the other arms of the mobile
importance.~
Still not clear was the question of whether the most effective
manual, Air Corps FM 1-10, 20 Nov 1940. It was a point of Army Air
.
F orce d isagreement during the war and was not used in FM 100-15. .Y1/
The doctrine of the earlier 1941 FM 100-15, on "Operations"
indicated that ''the hostile rear area might frequently be the most
whether air power should be employed in "the hostile rear area". or "in
W Ibid
.Y:.Y) Ibid
~ Kent Roberts Greenfield, op. cit., Page 4
W FM 100-15, op. cit., Page 12
13
Regarding control, FM 100-15 stated only that "All combat
\.) must be commanded by its own commanders in all but the most unusual .
- ..
circumstances . .5.Q/
ing tactical cooperation between air and ground forces until publication
bomber and observation elements with only the latter organic to it.
of higher authority.
.w Thus, air force flexibility was safeguarded.
5J/ Ibid
14
,. normally find his opposite number. With his collaboration, the army
commander would decide on the air support required and plan its alloca-
normally no lower than corps level but could be at division level when
Ground units requiring air support would have an air liaison element
A request for air support from a ground unit was passed through
If the request was in accordance with the air-ground plan, the air con
parties.9S1./
trol of support aviation was kept by air commanders, and only they
jjJ Ibid
15
could issue orders to air units. The capability to mass air power was
required" and whether or not an air mission was to be ordered was the
'- - -
dficision of the ground commander . .Q]/ The decision of the ground
· TROUBLED YEARS
1942, General McNair, Commanding General, Army Ground Forces was re
sponsible for the organizing, training, and equipping of the ground
the team. General McNair believed two conditions must be met if the
.Q]/ Ibid
.§.g/ Ibid
fw' Kent Roberts Greenfield, op. cit., Page 4
~ Ibid
16
:.
and responsibility of command.
w An intensive air-ground training
ground must and will travel together before we can face the enemy
f2f2/
decisively."
trouble is that the air side of the set-up has been too sketchy to
cism in the 1942 air-ground training program in that too often they
failed to use available aircraft and/or use them properly. By the end
f2j/ Ibid
2f2/ Address to Graduating Class, C&GSC, Ft. Leavenworth, 12 Sept
1942, McNair Papers, AWC Records.
17
training in air-ground operations. And worse, those scheduled to go
Brig General Pa~l McD Robinett, C.G., CCA, 1st Armored Division,
He added,
program was not a thumping success, regardless of where the fault lay.
22/ Ibid
7S2/ Ibid
11/ Ibid
18
Early in the Tunisian Campaign, friendly air forces were out
numbered and could not keep German aircraft from hitting US troop
deployments. Army sources assert that even when US Air Forces attain
the air helped the ground in Tunisia far less than in World War I -
this in spite of the fact that the German air had been driven from
the skies." General McNair made this statement just as he had been
He added,
w Ibid
7.J/ Ibid
.7.1±/ Ibid
19
started in Europe proved to be a trying task. U.S. air power was
spread thin.
On the other side of the coin, Air Force sources agreed that
The Air Force explanation was that: (1) the Germans operated from
German dive bombers, felt they were being neglected by friendly air;
unsuitable obje ct ives and (4) fighters, instead of taking the initia
Ti} Ibid
'lf2/ Lt General Lawrence S. Kuter, "American Air Doctrine", given
at Squ_~ dron Officers School, Air University (Nov 9, 1954), Page 5
20
implied the battle was lost due to control of the air from the ground.
pared at the Air War College, indicates that the battle of Kasserine
was fought one month after the Air Force aquired co-equal status as set
forth at the Cat ablanca Conference. Also, the battle took place about
roots" level were taken by the air and ground forces to improve communi
disputes because they were convinced that before the war was over air
.
power would become critically important.
w
One observer said in substance that in the long run, the
DOCTRINE OF CO-EQUALITY
The Air Force's GAS doctrine was stamped "Official" with ,,cl ~
I
publication of FM 100-20, "Command and Employment of Air Power" in
July 1943, the month the Tunisian victory was completed. It was, in
that air forces should operate under unity of air command and under
air leaders.
zz/ Charles H. Tay.l or, Colonel, USAF, "The Tactical Air Contro
versey, Past, Present, and Future." Thesis No. 1195, Air War College,
Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 1956 ( ).
21
11
(1) LAND POWER AND AIR POWER ARE CO-EQUAL AND JNTERDEPENDENT FORCES;
ment ~f the enemy or his supplies into the theater of operations and/or
fill Ibid
22
of air and ground forces in the battle area to gain objectives
doctrinal door shut. The airman would not necessarily agree that
they did.
army point of view, airmen had sold their philosophy on how to win
wars, and CAS had become a tactical stepchild competing with two
in favor of the Air Force. The decision makers did not share the fear
of ground commanders that if air support was not subject to their con
_.,., trol, air commanders oriented on air war would never feel they had
~ Ibid
fill Ibid
~ Kent Roberts Greenfield, op. cit., Page 4
23
The Air Force, alarmed by the demands of ground commanders
say that the ground commanders were satisfied. The basic air-ground
early in World War II. It is true that ground commanders made mistakes
in the use of air, but they also had erred in use of armor. Experience
undoubtedly would have improved their air support skills just as it did
was the (1) unfavorable reaction of the ground forces to air support
(4) the Air Force's attempt to gain control of organic field artillery
air observation.~
to air-ground problems. This was what McNair and Arnold had hoped for
in 1942.w
. Africa, the Fifth Army and XII Air Support Command came up with a
W Ibid
~ Ibid
.[Z;l Ibid
24
:,
command posts, exchange of Air Force and Army personnel, and Army
evaluation of air support requests from its own units. fil1I It was
air support by a ground commander when the Fifth Army went into Italy
at Salerno i n September 1943. He told Mr. McCloy that "he was getting
a great deal of air help on his immediate front in the way of close
~- '
bombardment, but" he added, "the machinery for close support in
an unqualified accolade in view of the fact the nation had been at war
Group in England. This army group (later redesignated the 12th Army
Group) assumed responsibility for the training for combat of the ground
forces.21/
The First Army Group CAS plan provided for: (1) adjacent
headquarters for each army and its cooperating tactical air command;
fil1/ Ibid
W Ibid
2Q/ Ibid
21/ U.S. Military Academy, A. Military History of World War II.,
Vol 1, U.S.M.A., West Point, N.Y. 1956
25
)_.,
officers, of the army (G2 Air and G3 Air) under the same roof; (3)
naissance missions, by the field army, and (4) the nightly planning
conference between army and air staffs to agree on the next day's
schedule of · missions.2£/
forward air controllers with VHF radios. Also, pilots served with
The air forces were responsible for communication between ground and
corps to army from lower units by ground telephone. (This system was
eventually adopted _by the First, Third and Ninth Armies) . .2J/
The report stated that the overall plan to breach the defense
air force. Accordingly, , "it was agreed that the successful application
with the military plan; (2) the air power applied should achieve maximum
effect and (3) War Department doctrine on air matters would be adhered
2.2/ Ibid
26
Ct SSIFIED 1
::.,
States' Strategic and Tactical Air Forces in Europe." The Air Force
and Army Group commanders worked closely together,as did their staffs.
921
The Ninth Air Force eventually consisted of the IX, XIX, and
XXIX Tactical Air Commands which supported the First, Third and Ninth
The basic command and control arrangments for the 12th Army
Group and the Ninth Air Force, as well as other ETO Air-Ground Teams,
tactical air commands to the field army level. The AF commander had
for coordination and liaison between air and ground forces if CAS was
~ Ibid
91} Ibid
W The Army Air Forces Evaluation Board in the European Theater
of Operations, "The Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations
in the European Theater." 5 May 1944 - 8 May 1945, August 1945
representatives."lOl/
evident that the World War II air-ground liaison system did not con
were made available -- but the theme was "cooperation" between air and
C
ground. While the arrangement was complimented by the 12th Army Group
end of the war in Europe, twenty four per cent were in close support
Air
Su12eriority . Interdiction Close Su1212ort Total
Bomber Sorties 18,459 114,536 30,611 163,606
Fighter Sorties 10.22261 D42658 862844 ,225246,2
Total Sorties 122,420 249,194 117,455 489,069
Average Sorties
Per Day 364 742 350
Average Sorties
Per Div Per
Day (28 Divs) 13 .0 26.5 12.5
-lt(Author' s note: There are some indications that scr ties flown
in World War II were not noted in detail for CAS historical purposes.
was generally complimentary regarding CAS provided the 12th Army Group
during the 1944-45 period. The. committee reported that "an equal
each of IX, XIX and XXIX TAC's was available for close support of the
.ifil7 Ibid
29
--
The comrni t tee added, "while us,u ally adequate, at times the
106/
strength was insufficient for all demands."
The Bradley Air Effects Committee had no quarrel with the first
by tactical air force of the air over the front in second and third
107/ Ibid
30
·.,
reported only a few years earlier that "when those · responsible for
did not wishthe term 'air ground team' to be used, and that it was
enough for ground troops to learn to recognize airplanes and mark their
Chief of the Air Branch, G-3 Section HQ Army Ground Forces. He found
agr eement among ground commanders that CAS had been excellent - day
and night reconnaissance and night support were the only efforts con
sidered unsatisfactory.llO/
cooperation between air and ground in the Pacific and Far East was
.i,g_g/ Ibid
111/ Ibid
31
No specific part of the theater air force was allotted to CAS
but Kenney meant it when he said, "all the air in the theater was avail
able and ready for direct support of ground operations if, when, and in
(1) air superiority was readily achieved and maintained; (2)' tempting
strategic bombing targets were lacking and (3) ground targets were
gene;rally those that the Air For,c e was interested in from the stand
operations resulted in little need for quick CAS response time. For
hours. Generally, the air-ground team may not have received a demand
ing test. Be that as it may, mutual good feeling and cooperation were
army ground units by naval air. Army ground commanders were impressed
refined CAS system between Air Force and Army as late as the date of
Japans surrender. There was a tactical air force but no tactical air
commands. The air parties of FM 31-35 were used down to division level
there were no tactical air commands, requests for GAS .were sent directly
llY Ibid
1lJ/ Ibid
.ill/ Ibid
32
inadequate and to speed up response time, Sixth Army adopted the policy
The Fifth and Thirteen Air Forces dropped 22,815 tons cf bombs
in Luzon between 6 Jan - 15 Mar 45. Twenty-two per cent of this tonnag e
The Fifth Air Force flew 3,231 attack sorties in the Leyte
over sixty per cent. Also, 19,958 interdiction flights were made.
nine per cent were flown against enemy ground elements; 5,683 were
his 1962 Air War College thesis, reports that ground commanders were
117/
dissatisfied with CAS in World War II for the following reasons:
,_
~ . ill/ Ibid
33
"Ground commanders would request missions that
air commanders regarded as unprofitable.
testimony regarding the effect iveness of CAS in that war. The names
~
and Eisenhower are among those who praised World War II CAS - (See TAB ~
C).ll2/
118/ James A. Huston, "Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II:
The Army Experience, "Military Affairs Vol 14 (1950)
34
One of the most interesting comments is that of General Dwight
mentary, he too recognized the need for CAS for ground forces as well
viewpoint, the problem was solved because the need was recognized.
said,
120/ Ibid
35
There is no question but what World War II experience proved
..
that tactical and strategic air were required. Basically, the issue
remaining was the old refrain, "how much, where and when? 11 Or, what
Army leaders wanted more CAS and under the operational control
and, for that reason, it augurs well for the student of CAS to exercise
to say that CAS was ineffective. The percentages of sorties flown and
because of other requirements? Also, how many typical CAS targets were
would more CAS have won the war sooner or with fewer casualties?
has no organic aerial firepower for close air support among its combat
and they believe this mission still receives a third priority rating.
Further, the only connecting link to insure unity of effort between the
36
On the other hand, Army thinking is that during World War II,
Though ground force commanders did not control air units in the later
days of the war, they and the air force commander with whom they co
ordinated wore the same uniform of the same combat team. Unity of
arrangements.
ground commanders wanted all the time, i.e., air support when, where
standard system. Its adoption was encouraged but not mandatory. Use
Air-Ground Liaison Sections (AGLS) replaced G-3 Airs and G-2 Airs at
theater, army group, army, corps and division headquarters. These sec
37
Training Circular No. 30 was published _in July 1945. The =
flexible air force (the tactical air force), to permit the massing
location of the tactical air command and army headquarters; (2) the
and (5) the forward controller and delegationfu him of voice control
ground training and cooperation that would have been helpful in the
prosecution of the long war which was about over when they were
published.
- 12.il
The 1942 FM 31-35, "Aviation in Support of Ground Forces"
and ground forces, each operating under its own command, to achieve
ill/ Ibid
~ Ibid
1Q,/ Ibid
38
maximum effectiveness, as directed by the theater commander, in defeat-
126/
ing the enemy."
Ground Team and the relationship of forces. Essentially, army and air
forces, operating under their own commanders a.s components of the air
The command relationship of ground and air forces was the same
as the 9th Air Force - 12th Army Group concept. Air Force and ground
down the parallel chainsof command, i.e., army group with tactical air
1281
command and field army with tactical air force. (See Fig. 4)
port. The system called for G-2 and G-3 Air representatives at ground
forc e and air force headquarters. Other personnel of the system, known
as ground liaison teams, represented army group and army at the air
. . . 1J.Q/
bases of suppor t ing air units.
that drew together the A-2 and J's and G-2 and G-3 Air representatives
127/ Ibid
128/ Ibid
]£21 Ibid
1J.Q/ Ibid
39
from the tactical air force, theater ground force, tactical air command
of the air side of the JOC, and Tactical Air Direction Centers (TADC)
Air and Air Defense Commands. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) was given
was approved by President Truman on 26 July that year. The Army Air
dent United States Air Force -- completely co-equal with the Ar my and
tQe Navy. At this point the U.S. Army lost its air arm and became the
1.W Ibid
w Ibid
1141 Ibid
1J.i.l Ibid
40
c. Establishing local air superiority
where and as required.
Yet, though that historic Executive Order spelled. out Air Force
Staff College, reported than an official 1948 Air Command and Staff
Publication contained the following stat~ment:..l:2.2/
iif,7 William C. Boehm, Maj or, USA "Should The Army Have Its Own (l,
Close Support Aircraft," Air Command and Staff College, 17 Apr 1959.
(Based on Air Command and Staff School Pamphlet No. 36, Operations
Division, "Tactical Air Operations", July 1948.
41
to the air force commander; it relieves him of .;
In December, 1948, TAC lost its air units and became an opera
tion and planning headquarters under the newly formed Continental Air
Command (CONAC). TAC's former 9th and 12th Air Force were controlled
by CONAC.1J1/
The battle for the budget dollar saw Strategic Air Command
getting the lion's share with the other air elements picking up the
tab for the strategic air power advocates. In late 1948, TAC had
eleven groups and 31,731 men. After two years under CONAC with
neither units nor aircraft, TAC had a headquarters staff of about 150.
~
WAR IN KOREA
operations. As one Air Force writer observed, one major problem was
had been either forgotten or the personnel were working in some other
field. 11 112/
The same observer added, "Individuals, both Army and Air
Force, were being sent to Korea without the faintest idea of how the
the USAF Air Ground Operations School was · established in 1950 to iEach
~ Ibid
.lliQ/ Ibid
4-2
Some time prior to 25 June 1950, Lieutenant General George E.
Stratemeyer, Commander Far East Forces (FEAF) had been aware of the
tensions building up in Korea. FEAF, part of the Far East Command (FEC)
FEAF . mission, in the event of war in Korea, was the evacuation of U.S.
141/
nationalsfrom the battle area.
outbreak of war. And, _because strateaic air power played a minor role
the first combat .test since World War II, there was no working CAS
The first major clash between U.S. and North Korean ground
forces occured in July 1950 when Major General William F. Dean's 24th
Taejon. A JOC was established at Taejon on 5 July and two air control
later.1!±!±,/
1!±!±,/ Ibid
43
h. · .
The entire FEAF Fifth Air Force supported the 24th Division in
its defense of the city and during subsequent holding actions in July.
The Fifth Air Force is credited with devoting 61.5 per cent of its
effort to II close battle field support." General Dean praised the air
effort highly and said, "the Air Force definitely blunted the initial
mitted the Eighth U.S. Army to set up its historic defense at Pusan.
General Walker, who assumed command of the Eighth Army in July, received
;.
strong support from the Fifth Air Force. The Air Force is credited with
delivering 340 fighter bomber sorties per day during the period 1-10
August. General Walker expressed his appreciation and praised the pilots
of the Fifth Air Force for their "all-out" support of the Eighth Army.
He said, " ... they have destroyed enemy tanks that had penetrated our
lines ..• their effort has been of tremendous value to our forces and
25th Infantry Division, said, "the close air support strikes rendered
by Fifth Air Force again saved this division, as they have many times
During the defense of the Pusan perimeter, the Fifth Air Force
Generals Walker and Partridge, the Eight Army and 5th Air Force
achieved.~
1!±3/ Ibid
1Y:.,Q/ Ibid
1!!1/ Ibid
~ Ibid
44
In an "all or nothing at all" effort, the North Koreans
the next six days, elements of six enemy divisions attacked the U.S.
2d and 25th Infantry Divisions. The Fifth Air Force, supporting the
both~
ai1; support:. As was the case in World War II, CAS operations were
461,554 combat sorties, of which 92,603 (20 percent) were GAS sorties."
This study also reported the 1st Marine Air Wing as flying 107,939
sorties, of which 37,385 (35 per cent) were CAS. It went on to say
that in the last two years of the war ; (witbfriendly troops in a def
ensive posture) FEAF, Navy and Marine flew 23,416 CAS sorties. About
thirty per cent of all sorties flown in the last two years were CAS.
_JjQ/
.ifiii' Ibid
_JjQ/ U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, op. cit., Page '28
45
U~CLAS f I £0
AVERAGE GAS FOR A DIVISION
No. Aircraft on
Situation Sorties Per Day 3 hours sorties*
Korea (Army) 13 16
J
Korea (1st Marine) 37 45
W.W.II (U.S.) 7 8
*One aircraft on one mission equals one sortie. These figures "
represent the number of aircraft required to neutralize the target with ' .,,.
GAS can depart rather radically from "averages" under particular battle
.
circums t anC!es. .ill/
Chinese Intervention 27 25
r e port, said the average time "required for army divisions to obtain a
close strike was 35 minutes. For marine divisions, GAS was obtained
;;, and friendly troops was 0.9 miles for the Marines; 3 to 4 miles for
questions. They are:(1) what were the total quantitative and qualita
::
tive close air support requirements, and (2) what was the capability
ill/ Ibid
praised FEAF highly for its support. Others felt Air Force support
and the Marine Corps are almost identical. The difference, in his
Marine Aviation in Korea on the basis that FEAF was air defense oriented,
initially, whereas M9.rine Aviation was executing its GAS mission from
the outset.
1221
A~other Air Force writer has stated that it was following the
critical days of 1950 through the summer of 1951 that criticism of the
Far East and his Army and Air Force Commanders had decided that the
air effort and had agreed to limit close support across the Eighth
V.
v>'l_O'f.-
1 .
Army front to 96 per day. The letter went on to state that should I
able tilose support targets appear at any time, the Fifth Air Force
12j/ Ibid
·1221 Ibid
47
General Ridgeway, United Nations commander, had this to say
~
about CAS in Korea.
"While the close air support in Korea has been successful, it is capable
the Fifth Air Force Commander. He made another request to CINCFE but
asked that the Marine Air Wing, then under Fifth Air Force, be placed
under operational control of Eighth Army with one squadron per corps.
Army division. These were the views, also, of the Army Chief of Staff,
160/
General J. Lawton Collins.
Forces, felt strongly enough about the subject to address CAS in detail
160/ Ibid
48
General Hodge introduced the CAS problem by stating that the
by the Chief of the Army Field Forc 6\, in 1952, was the result of a
that the time was 11 not now appropriate" for such a sweeping change in
ifil:i7 Letter to U.S. Army Chief of Staff from John R. Hodge, USA,
Chief, Army Field Forces, Subj: Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces,
17 May 52.
162/ Ibid
lli1I Ibid
W±,,1 Ibid
4-9
concept. He, therefore, submitted a plan to decentralize tactical air .;
l22/
within the then existing doctrine of co-equal command. (See Tab D)
and Hodge indicated a continuation of the Army position that air power,
the support that our tactical air has given our ground troops in Korea
. 167/
has perhaps never been equalled in the history of modern war."
Thus, as was the case during and following World War II, post
Korea comments regarding GAS effectiveness were many and mixed. Actually,
the basic issue between the Army and the Air Force remained unchanged.
The issue revolved about the doctrinal point of who should control
tactical air.
=
l22/ Ibid
50
UNOFFICIAL CAS WCRKING DOCTRINE
Army Field Forces and Headquarters Tactical Air Command. Its title
The theme of the 1950 JTD kept the three missions of tactical
tion" basis with counterpart army units. Thus, the "tactical air
. command" would work with the army g r oup and the tactical air force
12:Y
with the field army.
the facility was located at the field army - tactical air force headquar
ters. The tactical air fo r ce manned the combat operations section side
The Air Force sent liaison officers to each corps and division and
1zt/ Ibid
170/ Ibid
51
The Army had Ground Liaison Officers at air fields; and G-2 and •
G-3 Air Officers at division, corps and army level. The Army provided
CAS requests. These requests were passed through channels from front
line battalions to the field army where, if approved, they were given
The JOC tied the Army and the Air Force together. Here, joint
planning took place and agreement was reached as to what CAS require
ments could be met. The JOC was, in reality, a large war room composed
As one air force writer described it, "it had become too large and
The Army and the Air Force, using their respective agencies,
.:5-/a;.- 1
TAC and CONARC; stated joint planning in 1954 for a major joint ex-
The Army and the Air Force did agree to conduct SAGEBRUSH in
accordance with the 1950 JTD. Many recommendations came at the con
clusion of the maneuver. It was agreed, for instance, that the JTD
172/ Ibid
52
procedures were too cumbersome and time consuming. Moreover, it was
Army and Air Force participants agreed that the Air-Ground Operat ions
lDI
JTD should be revised.
with the Army, to establish new CAS procedures. The Commander of TAC
hundred miles across and extending some five hundred miles to the rear.
iii7 Ibid
174/ Ibid
112,/ Ibid
176/ Ibid
53
headquarters, normally some distance further to the rear than the field
army headquarters.
field army headquarters. The facility would be more compact and mobile
than the old JOG and (2) an army staff agency to be called the Tac
control over the tactical air effort designated for field army support
,in accordance with army group commander priorities. ASOC would then be
tactical air support oriented, only, leaving to the AOC all other air
177/
operations. The Army, "accepted this concept-. 11 ·
would be made available to the army group commander for further alloca
further that the army group commander could change his aircraft or
The Air Force would not accept this concept as it would give
177/ Ibid
178/ Ibid
17:11 Ibid
54-
,
each ASOC based on army group commander priorities. The ASOC Director
agree. The best they could come up with was to continue the status
quo. The Air Force would keep operational control of its CAS aircraft.
/
181/
;.
The joint meetings ceased .in January 1957.
Thus, seven years after the publication of the 1950 JTD a new
stated:
180/ Ibid
181/ Ibid
182/ Ibid
55
11 ••• The methods of employment are developed
It should be noted that two new terms were introduced into the
system, i.e., TSC and ASOC. The Air Force ASOC and the Army TSC were
were to flow through army channels to the field army TSC. Those
Tu!f,;7 Ibid
.ill/ Ibid
56
The ASOC director was then responsible for the proper employment of
186/
available air power to meet the requirements.
was established back in the army group area to control all tactical
air operations. It was the AOC, based on the tactical air force
was still no one Air-Ground System. There were two. The two were
(and still are) the Army-Air-Ground System" and the "Tactical Air
system. The ground rules were essentially the same. CAS requests
is non-existent.
Tuf,/ Ibid
187/ Ibid
188/ Ibid
57
.f
Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) JCS Pub 2. That JCS document
include: (1) providing air forces for CAS; (2) conduct of uni
from the inability of the Air Force and Army to agree to a mutually
58
u
The "STRICOM" investigation of ways to improve CAS, admittedly,
ter (DASC) at corps level : It is essentially the old JOC located one
command level lower. Front line units send requests for immediate
CAS strikes thru battalion directly to the DASC via USAF communica
Division monitors and acknowledgas, however, and many pre-empt the IJ-
request. If division does not stop the r~que~t..1- the DASC scrambles
has generated interest in the Army. The interest stems not from the
procedures being tested but from the Army-Air Force command relation
designated CONUS combat-ready forces of the U.S. Army and the U.S.
chain of command runs through the JCS, to the Secretary of Defense and
to the President.
59
0 ?
cluded that: (1) the location , selection and attack of targets affect
include CAS -and Interdictio~, and (2) the Army must be permitted to
develop or be provided with CAS means read ily available and immediately
1211
responsive to the tactical situation.
(1) Army- Air Forc e CAS joint operational planning should be decen
12f Ibid
;,
IF I ED'
requirement; (3) air units allocated to the close support mission must
(4) air units designated to support CAS tasks must be equipped with
ill/
aircraft designed for ground attack as a primary mission.
ing effort within the ' limits permitted by accepted tactical practices
~
of the service_ of the supporting force.'' The supporting air
para 30277, JCS Pub 2, between the army force and tactical air force
(ti The Fort Leavenworth study stressed also that the tactical
I
support, having been made on the basis of need, should not be withdrawn
i2iJ US Army Command and General Staff College, "Close Air Support,
Command Relationships and Control System" (U), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
5 July 1961
ml Ibid
122/ The JCS, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), op. cit., ..
6I
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S POSITION (1961)
(~ That the Army position on CAS had not softened was evi-
from General Whi(e re an Army decision concerning off the shelf air
of the specific aircraft was not the major problem from our point of
1211
view. 11
have close air support where we need it, when we need it, and under
needs. This means that such close support must be a primary and not
Staff by outlining the CAS areas where improvement was needed the most.
12W Ibid
12.9/ Ibid
there should be a aircraft than
"\.•
the Air Force and that it should include a close support type air-
200/
craft.
specifically asked that a look be taken at: (1) the number of fighter
and (3) the procurement program for single purpose aircraft and the
201/
type that should be procured.
stated position that their prime concern was with the responsiveness
of tac tical air to the needs of the ground commander. He added, "the
Army was .willing to leave the choice of the aircraft to the Air Force."
.?Q1I
201/ Ibid
202/ Ibid
(&f In that memorandum, Mr. Stahr cited the Army's CAS require
(ij The Army Secretary advised Mr. Zuckert that there was no
that the Army wanted CAS when and where needed, and under a system
206/ Ib:i.d
tact with ground commander and deliver a full ordnance load; (5) all
~ Ibid
210/ Ibid
211/ Ibid
./ ~ - ,-- ; ---
I .
(40) =
structure.
(tr) The Air Force disagreed with the Army's estimated quanti
tative requirement for GAS aircraft. The Air Force said the Army
figures of 11
40 targets per division per day based on World War II and
USAF, the per day/per division sortie average was 21 in World War II
and 28 per day in a peak month in Korea when 65% of missions flown were
to those of the 1962 Army Study but also one conducted in January 1959.
The earlier studY, also based on 40 sorties rer day, called for one
212/ Ibid
.?.Uf Ibid
.w±/ Staff Study~"The Army Requirements for Reconnaissance and Close
Air Support, FY 59-60 (U)", Jan
(tf) That Army's Requirements for Reconnaissance
even through precise data on Korean and World War II CAS missions was
limited, the 40 sortie figure was higher than the average, over a
long period. The idea was advanced that the average reflects periods
of high and low activity and perhaps some times when divisions were in
~
reserve.
per day during Pusan Perimeter Period and 27 per day when Chinese
-- ---
intervened). It was submitted, moreover, that Korean and World War II
(U) The authors of the 1959 report asserted, also, that the
1st Marine Wing in Korea was under the control of the Fifth Air Force
J0C except for two campaigns, Inchon and Wonson. Just as the 1st Marine
Division was an integral .part of the 8th Army, the Marine Wing was
~ Ibid
216/ Ibid
217/ Ibid
s -
.;
ate? 11 To this question, 23% answered yes'; 10% generally yes; 6% gen
fall of 1950 than in later months, when air support machinery, JOC,
"Adequate air support was provided uring the period that the
(ti) QUESTION: "Do you consider that the close air support
furnished your unit in Korea was adequate?" 11% answered yes, 13% gen
greatest deficiencies."
corps commander."
218/ Ibid
"Upon arrival in Korea, I was greatly disappointed to find
close air support had retrogressed since W.W. II. This retrogression
"If the Air Force will not develop suitable aircraft for
ground support and will not emphasize ground support training many
times more than they are now doing, we are not being loyal to our own
in Korea."
by the ground tactical commander is essential for both troop safety and
220/
effective utilization of available fires."
220/ Ibid
I!'
support requirements for the Army. That group, also, recommended
long held position that there was room for improvement in CAS.
vide its own close air support, reconnaissance and airlift, stems from
the low national priority which these missions have enjoyed in recent
policy during the past two years have highlighted the need to improve
along lines of (a) setting forth clear, realistic close air support
gation, did ask the Army and Air Force to examine several specific
(See Tab G)
altitude flying.
line which said, "Army and USAF should consider further organization
changes, including those at Army Staff and Air Staff level, which
227/
would tend to improve close air support operations."
22:!i/ Ibid
2'J.6/ Ibid
227/ Ibid ·~Ji~.
.;\~~t
,.
Mr. McNamara's continuing interest in CAS and his directive
calling for a "critical and imaginative approach" to the problem
and the Air Force, acting through CONARC and TAC, respectively, estab
from all over the world, assembled in April at Fort George G. Meade,
Thus, CAS history may have come full circle in the fifty-six
years since the Wright Brothers' first flight. Initially, and for
many years, the ground forces kept a tight rein on airmen and aircraft.
USAF became a co-equal service. The Army's lack of organic GAS air
craft and its reliance on another service for such fire power support
has resulted in oft repeated requests by the Army for better GAS, more
recognized the need for GAS improvement and inferred that it no longer
72
l
,
1
SOURCE: Army Ground Forces And The Air-Ground Battle Team, Study #35,
Kent Roberts Greenfield, Historical Section, AGF, 1948
COMMANDERS COMMENTS
(1) "I believe that we will have to come to some simple sy stem
1943). ·
(2) "We can't get the stuff when it's needed and we're catching
hell for it. By the time our request for air support goes through
channels the target's gone or the Stukas have come instead." (Maj Gen
(3) "I noticed that, in action, when my tanks started rolling, .or
the Stukas would be over in twenty minutes ..... by contrast, our calls
at all, got no real results for hours ... The system of calling through
two or three different headquarters for air support simply will not
give the support desired at the time desired. Adequate air support can
only be obtained by direct call from the division to air. Any other
bombing. Failure of this air support presents the weakest link in our
tactical team today." (Maj Gen Charles W. Ryder, commanding the 34th
time required to fly the mission was added to the original delay, the
Tab A to Annex A
result was ineffective support." (Report from AFHQ, 2 July 1943).
(5) "Air missions took too long to accomplish even after the
planes had been moved to Sicily. Authority to fly this mission could
be obtained in about three hours whereas the mission itself took only
21 July 1943).
(6) "The air support has not worked satisfactorily ... At times it
has been fairly prompt; at other times the time has been excessive.
There is a great deal that must be worked out before we get what we
want when we want it. The matter of who has the control, the matter
A
SOURCE: Omar N. Bradley, Military Advisor, Air Effects Committee,
12th Army Group, "Effect of Air Power on Military Operations,
Western Europe"
Ninth Air Force - 12th Army Group tactical team had a direct and
mystery with which even now some authorities tend to surround air co
simplicity.
an operational capacity.
parallel echelons of the air and ground forces were located together.
Since the actual tactical control of the air force or the tactical air
Operations!! center was formed there. Into this center went the G-3
(Air) and G-2 (Air) from the ground forces to function alongside the
briefings kept the air force fully informed on the ground battles. It
the ground force plan of action. Jointly with the air operations
Tab B to Annex A
the inter-change between ground and air units of all the necessary
of those forces.
sources on suitable air objectives and with G-3 (Air') and the air
attack thereof.
lent air force headquarters such as at army group and armies. Never
theless, the principle of the "Combined Operations 1' was extended for
ward in the close association of the G-3 (Air) and a Tactical Air
ed from the tactical air command, and was provided with suitable HF
and VHF radio equipment for transmitting air requests to the TAC Head
positions with the supported ground force units. This afforded the
nel and of joint planning, the ground forces provided a ground liaison
liaison officer maintained maps and reports for the pilots and crews,
and briefed them on bomb lines, army plans, problems, and tactics.
They gathered information of the enemy obtained through air crew in
terrogation, which was passed to the ground forces through the G-3
echelon.
B
cooperation in this theater. Without adequate, reliable and often
and ground could not have been maintained. To achieve this the tacti
cal air liaison officers with ground units were provided with radio
and wire lines to " combined operations". Air forces and army tele
phone and teleprinter lines supplemented the air force radio channels
to ground units.
situations the radio became most necessary since wire lines to the
radio communication between the forward ground units and the combined
column cover.
mation and request was a basic principle. When this principle was not
adhered to, or the channels were not adequate, the efficiency of air
not "Urgent, 11 and time did not permit their routine handling through
joint operations. Aids for close bombing indicated not only a regard
for troop safety, but for bombing accuracy. The ground contributed
colored smoke, and "line of flak," The air furnished forward radio
B
were developed to the point of an SOP. Both forces participated in a
crew rotation program whereby pilots shared foxholes with the doughboy,
4
B
SOURCE: USAF Historical Division, "Close Air Support and Commanders
Quotes". Feb 1963
COMMANDERS QUOTES
Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley
CG, 12th Army Troop
inside the Normandy sector to tear up railroads and halt all enemy
motor movement ... So successful was this air mission that one enemy
division was forced to walk the last 100 miles into combat ... By June _4
every railroad bridge had been knocked out across the Seine between
Rouen and Paris. By June 6 not only had the northwestern corner of
France been isolated, but the bombing campaign had demoralized the
~ "throughout the operation, our Air has kept the sky clear and
Command, to send some fighter bombers to stop it. The bombers were
unable to find the column, because it actually was the 4th Armored
some very effective work; knocking out enemy 'resistance ahead of the
4th Armored Division and this was the precursor of many other such
jobs. It was love at first sight between the XIX Tactical Air Command
Tab C to Annex A
The Sweep through Northern France
"For about two miles the road was full of enemy motor transport
and armor, many of which bore the unmistakable calling card of a P-47
armor and air can work together in this way, the results are sure to
be excellent. Armor can move fast enough to prevent the enemy having
time to delay off the roads, and so long as he stays on the roads the
"Five tanks of the 4th Armored were being attacked by some twenty-
;.
five German tanks, and the only thing we could send to their help was
General Weyland ordered two squadrons to attack. This they did, being
ground. Having located the enemy they skip-bombed and also strafed
him. While this fighting was going on the pilots had no idea that
they could even land and yet carried out their job magnificently. 11
"The eighteenth was a great day for the Air. The XIX Tactical
Air Command started flying at dawn and flew until well after dark;
then they sent out their night fighters which attacked some fifteen
"The tanks of the 6th Armored were moving forward against the
southern flank of two villages, from which they were receiving con
siderable fire, .while in the background the P-47's of the XIX Tactical
audacity and speed of your advance on the ground; while from the air,
C
attack upon the disorganized enemy."
particularly their ability to pick out isolated motor transport and hit
it. l1
In Retrospect
across France, I used to notice from the air innumerable fox holes on
each side of the main roads. On inquiry, it turned out that, in order
had to be provided, so that when our bombers came on them they could
In Retrospect
we did, and with as few casualties, without the wonderful air support
this Corps along the St. Lo - Periers road, had a devastating effect.
~ The moral factor was truly shattering. There can be no question that
the bombing was a decisive factor in the initial success of the break
through .•. 11
defended river line. Here again air superiority is mandatory. The air
3
C
forces provided their greatest assistance in these operations by pro
tecting our troops from enemy aerial attack and by disrupting hi s com
the Commanders and pilots of the XII Tactical Air Command during the
confident that our suc cess in breaking through the se defens es during
(them)."
tration."
controlled from near the head s of columns were largely responsible for
armored units. Best targets are enemy armored vehicles and artillery."
PUNYO, HILL MASS in Southern LUZON. It was the last stronghold of the
FUJI HEIDEN (Southern LUZON Defense Force) and was extremely well de~
"The 8th Fighter Group was requested to bomb the hill prior to the
attack. The troops of the division had fought their way to a position
400 yards from the hill and were reluctant to withdraw from terrain so
4
C
dearly won. Because of the proximity of the troops to the target, the
decision was made to cancel the strike, but the troops requested that
pound bombs, hit the hill. At the end of the second strike, the Com
pany Commander reported that the concussion had given his men nose
Infantry, pushed off and assaulted and seized Hill 2610 without re
~-
sistence. Hardly had they gained the top when 124 stunned Japs
emerged from their caves to man their defense guns. They were
"We of the division are grateful for this support, and are proud
that our confidence in Air Support has reached the point where we are
splendid support, and for the lives saved on Hill 2610 by this
"The Allied air force in Italy broke the grip of winter on the
15th Army Group front by striking almost daily at the German communi
cation lines. The Airmen did a great job .•.. The enemy could move
troops only slowly, usually on foot and at night, whereas in the past
action very successfully and included the working over of towns in the
C
area, bombing of strong points, destruction of enemy columns on the
the ground forces and shortened the time required to .actually pene
results of air participation were evidenced by the fact that the pur
suit was very rapidly accomplished until Third Army units were con
tacted in Neunkirchen.
The general plan of this operation called for very close co
operation of the air forces and ground forces due to the tenacious re
tanks on the ground and close-in support from the air. This com
bination spelled disaster for the Germans and greatly reduced the time
required for the operation. In one case, after a group of woods had
been bombed and strafed, over one hundred and thirty (130) Germans
ing the Alastain Plain. Air attacks were very successful and played an
and the enemy's problem of resupply and evacuation was made very
difficult by air attacks which were carried out under extremely poor
conditions of weather.
rapidly to the Rhine River in conjunction with the attack of the Third
C
Army coming from the North, fighter-bombers in close ~pport and armed
recon~aissance played the biggest part of the air effort once the
program.
lized even though the pillboxes were not destroyed. This enabled
gap."
Aitape) was the greatest that had so far been undertaken in SWPA. The
C
"This air support was controlled by Army Air Forces officers on
board ' the command ship and AAF ·liaison officers accompanied the
I felt it was better to use gunfire and bombing liberally than expose
C
~ONFl·DENTl,\t i FIE D
entire tactical air control system have been the subject of continuous
study and tests by Army Field Forces, both unilaterally and in conjunc
TAB D TO ANNEX A
'-- eeNl'ID!NllAL
decant.r9.llzation tJf ope.r--ati~nal ,J ontrol to ground cor:nnande:-:-s doi.,m to
with the basic principles set forth in letter from Chief, Army Field
air power where it is most needed at any given time. Under the present
-G8NFIBENTIAL.
eeur1 BENTIAI: u A Sif ifll
joint action in the air operations section established in the Corps
FSCC. In addition, the provision for a TACC t ype organi zation at each
corps allows for the tactical dispersion of vital Air Force control
the present flexibility of air power under current doctrine and give to
the ground forces the close support when it is needed and where it is
s/ .John R. Hodge
JOHN R. HOD3E
1 Incl Lieutenant General, USA
Plan for Decentralization Chief, Army Field Forces
of Tactical Air w/1 Incl
3
D
QQNFIDENTIAL .
eeNFIBENTIAL u SIFIED
1. GENERAL
interdiction.
2. ORGANIZATION (Incl 1)
JOC-TACC at the army-air force level and similar, but less complex
elements.
operations system.
Incl l 1
composed of Army and Air Force personnel, coordinates with the FDC
control in the event that the JOC-TACC at the army-air force level
is destroyed or damaged.
to a tacti•~al air di I'(;G tLon cent,s r (TADC), type unit located within
1951.
an'.i armored ·o at ta lions shJuld have a staff officer with the primary
3. PLANNING
iown to the battalion with its forward air controll,3 r (FAC), the
INCL l
-eeNFIBENTIAL
-68Nlll 9ENTIAL ·
best continuing results fro m the svai l abl e ai r and ground for ces.
planning.
or sortie basis.
4. OPERATIONS
any army level of command and down to the battalion. Procedu~es will
3
IK CL 1
~HFIBENTIAL
pre-planned missions into an over-all corps air plan for the su~seque~t
executing unit.
inelud13:
p~ograrn.
requirements.
INCL l
\l eoNFIDEN=FIAL.
ORGANIZATION PLAN FOR DECENTRALIZATION OF TACTICAL AIR
ALLOCATION- RE
ALLOCATION
TACC JOC DEEP OPERATIONS
AND AIR DEFENSE
CORPS FSCC
TACC AIR CLOSE SUPPORT
...,.._---.OPERA FDC PLANNING AND
(TYPE
TIONS MISSION CONTROL.
ORGN)
SEC
AIRCRAFT WARNING .
STRIKE CONTROL
JCS PUB 2
With respect to close comM:t air s- J.pport o.f ground. for::::es, the
1
of ground forces.
doctrines and procedures for close combat air S1J.pport of ground r"'orc·es,
by Air Force forces in close combat air sup·p ort of gromld forces.
to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, for the following, in connec ~
TAB E to ANNEX A
( 5) Review of publications covering the conduc~t of
foregoing, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force sbnll follow the
the Army, the Navy ::J.nd the .'.v1arine Corps in the development of doc
of those Services.
2
E
contact, and mutual agreement between the ~ommand3rs concerned. Any
Forces.
own force.
3
E
-
OPS PL WP
Final Draft - 21 Nov 1962
Lt Colonel Millhouse X741 64
The Department of the Army developed the present close air sup
t er f r om the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force to the Chief o.f Staff,
U.S. Army, in which the Air Force proposed a Plan to retain eleven
General White, the then Air Force Chief of Staff encumbent, also
staterl that the Air Force woulri equip these squadrons with any
General.
air suPPOrt o.f ground forces engagerl. in combat. The Army feels that
compatible air anrl groun~ weapons systems. We .feel that close sup
TAB F to ANNEX A
lst. Sunporting systems must be capable of being nrenlannen
battlefielrl.
(CHART 1 OFF)
within this area which will require attack by aircraft utilizing their
ness. To insure that close air suonort is available, when anrl where
supnort.
F
Technical Criteria for Aircraft Furnishing Close Air Support.
air support for ground troops is a matter of decision for the know
represented. Visits were made to Air Force and Naval Bases and air
craft such as the Air Force F-104 and F-105, the so-called NATO
►·
fighters N-156 and G-91, and the Navy F4H and A4D were checked out.
tne Army concluded that selection of the specific aircraft was not
the major problem from our point of view. The Army's requirement is
to have close air support where we need it, when we need it, and under
Army needs. This means that such close support must be a primary and
role."
understanding with the Air Force based upon our qualitative require
Performance Required.
The Army de.sires these characteristics of aircraft used in the
3
F
close air support role:
reliable and simple fire control system suitable for visual target
engagement is required.
(CHART 2 OFF)
Organization Concepts.
the close support role is the organizational and operational con cepts
for employment.
4
F
organized into joint or combined commands and that close supoort
weapons and to extend fire support beyond the range of these weapons.
, Operational Concepts.
Quantitative Requirements.
5
F
battlefield, the relationship of Army surface-to-surface missiles
and close air support, the use of close air support to assist re
( CHART 3 ON)
over and over again that there were never enough aircraft available
for close air support. Note that the Marines had available up to 37
sorties per day while the average Army division received only 13. In
~uring the Chinese intervention the average was 25 sorties per day
or a total of 35 aircraft.
( CHART 3 OFF)
(CHART 4 OFF)
F
Therefore in terms of past experience we can determine a quantitative
chart. Before showing you the chart, however, let me add that any
use. This added capability will help soften th e enemy for our attack
and help save the lives of our ground soldiers. I reiterate that
our past commanders have repeatedly stated that adequate close air
( CHART 5 ON)
round off to a total of three squadrons required for each front line
(CHART 5 OFF)
Interdiction.
F
Interdiction Objectives
( CHART 6 ON)
route.
of all weapons and weapon systems assigned to land, sea and air
( CHART 6 OFF)
Interdiction Concept
F
Technical Criteria
Statement of Requirement
facilities in being.
(CHART 7 OFF)
Organizational Concept
9
F
war, air and ground units will be integrated into joint or combined
the interdiction mission with the action of his own force. The
combined commander.
Operational Concept
will attack targets which are beyond the range of the Army Commander's
force.
10
F
Summary
close air support from the Air Force to augment and supplement the
close air support where we need it, when we need it and under a
needs."
quantitative requirement.
11
F
the air-ground commander.
Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force to train
Air Force has the primary responsibility; and with the procedures
12
F
,
3. HIGH SURVIVABILITY
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOSE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
1. STOL CAPABILITIES
2. RANGE, SPEED AND lif.J\NEUVERABI LITY
3. OPTIMIZED NON-NUCLEAR ORDNANCE
4. ALL-WEATHER NAVIGATION
5. ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS
6. VERSATILITY
ro
AVERAGE CLOSE SUPPORT FOR A DIVISION
SITUATION #A/C BASED ON
SORTIES PER DAY 3-HOUR SORTIES
KOREA (ARMY) 13 16
WORLD WAR II (US) 7 8
ARTIILERY 8 20
TOTAL 40 100
CHART# 5
QUANTITATIVE REQUIREMENT FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
VI
J
OBJECTIVES OF INTERDICTION
1. STOL CAPABILITIES
2. QUICK DEPLOYMENT
3. ALL-WEATHER OPERATION
16 Feb 63
for fire support systems and indicated that the Air Force should give
the Air Force to study our ability to perform the three tactical
during the time period in which the F-4C would be the dominant type
latter subject.
:;,~ii;;~)
..;:
.;
per year for five years . The need for providing greater mobility to
Army units is definite and urgent. The principal unknown at this time
mobility should resid e in the Army its elf and to what extent this
with Army and Air Force is preparing a plan for joint testing and
clear that joint exe rcises and tests will be r equired to evaluate
to achieve mobility, I do not intend that the large and well developed
Much of the impetus for the Army desire to provide its own close
air support, reconnaissance and airlift stems from the low national
already been noted. For example, new methods and procedures to rr.ak e
close air support more responsive are being dev eloped and tested.
I, therefore, request that the Army and the Air Force jointly
Attachment
(Examples of Proposed Actions)
~
1f:I'.
u
_ ... _ ~- .....-~ .- ~~
Attachment to Memorandum for
'.'Ill!'. • ' Secretary of the Army and Secretary
of the Air Force, Office Secretary
of Defense, 16 Feb 63 , Subj ect:
"Close Air Support"
and to indicated that there are very specific actions which should be
examined and which could improve close air support, without the nec es-
1. The Army should re-examine its close air support needs from
command posts.
ground units.
·changes, including those at Army Staff and Air Staff l evel, whi ch
15TH AF
LEGEND
OPERATIONAL CONTROL. AIR
OPERATIONAL CONTROL.GROUND
BASIC COMMAND ANO CONTROL. SHAEF
AOMNSTRATION. AIR
ADMNISTRATION. GROUND
LIAISON ANC COORDINATION •- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - •
I'/
SHAEF
SHAEF AIR
ii
EQUESTS WHICH CANNOT BE MET
l
BY AIR FORCE ARE FORWARDED TO
It
SHAEF AIR
COMBINED OPS
ARMY G-3 TACTICAL
A-3
G-3 AIR CF ARMY GROUP a ARMY}
COORONATE MISSIONS FROM
GROlH> FORCE ANGLE, PASS
GROUP
AIR
L-------{-'
_ AIR FORCE
I .
-EQUESTS WHCH CANNOT EE
MET BY OC ARE FORWARDED
lO AIR FORCE WHERE IT IS
TARGET INFORMATION AND FILTERED BY BOTH A-3 AND
G-3 AIR
ANNOUNCE PRIORITIES COMBINED OPS
G-3
ARMY A-3 TAC
AIR
.....
~
41111
G-3 AIR OF ARMIES AND OORPS
PLAN Tt£ GROt.t4D FORCE PART
CF AIR REQI.EST lO ACCORD \
WITH AfM'f ANO CORPS PLANS
\
l\
COMBINED OPS
A-3
ARMY A-2 TAC
G-3 AIR
G-2 AIR
TAP
OFFICER
+- THROUGH AIR FORCE CHANNELS
OF COMMUNICATION
CORPS G-3
AIR
NOTE: THIS TYPE OF MISSION SELDOM GOES ABOVE THE ARMY TAC LEVEL DUE TO THE URGENCY OF THE ACTION REQUIRED.
,I
I
I
I
TACTICAL
ARMY GROUP i---------------------
AIR COtlMAND
I
TACTICAL
ARMY - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----
AIR FORCE
,.
9 Oct 1961.
4 Nov 1961.
( ). 13 May 1961.
1951 . :,-..
21 Jul 1943.
TAB H TO ANNEX A
26 Jan 1926.
1 Nov 1961 .
1960.
22 Apr 1963.
25. Army Ground Forces Historical Study Nr. 35, (Unclassified). Army
2
H
26. USACGSC Study, ( l). Close Air Support, Command
Apr 1956.
30. Air University Command and Staff College Special Study Nr. 102-59,
Hill, 1952.
33. Emme, Eugene M. Some Fallacies Concerning Air Power. The Annals
May 1955.
34. Emme, Eugene M. The Impact of Air Power. D. Van Nostrand Co.,
36. Huston, James A. Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II. The
37. Krauskopf, Robert W. The Army and the Strategic Bomber. Military
H S.t. 0~~ .;
COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH kl.8RARY
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3 1695 00701 6645
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