SO407 Politics and Society

Formative Essay
Topic: Why is democracy able to survive in some countries but not in others?
LSE ID: 201409095 (Peter Yu Chi WONG)

Word Count: 2,496

Introduction
Studies of social prerequisites of democracy have been an indispensible direction in
politics. Undoubtedly, there are numerous factors affecting the prosperity of
democracy. As Samuel Huntington suggests, there are indeed 27 independent
explanatory variables in democratisation literatures (1991, cited in Lipset 1994, p.17).
Given the large volumes of social determinants in democracy, the essay limits its
scope of focus to outline the sole importance of political culture in the survival of
democracy with case studies of Indonesia and Thailand.

Therefore, a supportive political culture is crucial for democratic survival in counties.

The paper argues that democracies, like Indonesia, where a supportive political
culture is established tend to undergo democratic survival; countries, like Thailand,
where a supportive culture for democracy is unpopular fail to build sustaining
democratic regimes. In other words, due to heterogeneous impacts of political
culture in different countries, probabilities of democratic survival hence vary cross
states.

Democracy, Democratic Survival and Political Culture

Before beginning our discussions, clarifications of related concepts drawn from
literature are rudimentary.

Firstly, democracy represents a political regime in which competitive elections and

civil liberties broadly prevail. As O’Donnell and Schmitter note, liberalisation (civil
liberties) and democratisation (competitive elections) have been closely linked in
history of transitions of political regimes (1991, p.9). Dahl similarly showcases
democratisation is made up of public contestation (civil liberties) and the right to
participate (competitive elections) (1971, p.5). In the words of Rueschemeyer et al,
democracy can be categorised by (1) free and fair elections of representatives with
universal suffrage; (2) responsibility of state apparatus to the elected parliament; and
(3) freedom of expression and association as well as protection of individual rights
(1991, p.43). Since the second element is often the product of the first, they two can
thus be grouped into the broad concept of competitive elections. As a result, William
Case summarises civil liberties like free speech, press and assembly; and free, fair,
regularly held and meaningful elections are constituents of democracies (2002, p.6).

Secondly, democratic survival simply indicates existences of democracies after

transitions from previous authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. That said, after
transitions, democracies experience processes of consolidations and continue to exist
without being reverted to non-democratic systems.

Thirdly, political culture is fundamental for democracy. Scholars reckon a supportive

culture for democracy often entails ‘the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites’
of principles underlying civil liberties and competitive elections (Almond 1956, Pye
1965, Dahl 1971, Bobbio 1987, Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1990, cited in Lipset 1994,
p.3). Alternatively political culture, the beliefs and values concerning politics, is
prevalent within the elites and public. A democratic culture is highly correlated with
democratic stability (Diamond et al 1995, p.19).

So how political culture impacts on democracy of countries?

Put it straight, political culture shapes political actions of collective actors, which
ultimately decides regime types. As seen in Figure 1, (1) factors determining beliefs
lead to (2) political beliefs. Such beliefs define (3) political actions which eventually
decide (4) regimes type (Dahl 1971, p.124). Alternatively, emergences of either
democratic or non-democratic regimes depend on political attitudes and thoughts of
members of society. Particular culture thus causes formation of particular regimes.

Figure 1 Logics of Political Culture on Political Regimes

(1) Factors determining beliefs  (2) Political Beliefs  (3) Political Actions  (4)
Probabilities of Regimes

Source: Dahl (1971).

A supportive culture for democracy is therefore crucial for its survival. Dahl believes
beliefs guide actions not only because they influence the more distinct goals and
values of individuals but also because beliefs determine people’s knowledge of
actions. ‘Knowledge of the rules of a game’ of people has both normative and
cognitive effects on political actions thus governing collective actions and then the
structure and functioning of institutions like democracies (1971, p.125-6). In other
words, political actions and regimes are reflections of political beliefs. Democracies
then underline values of competitive elections and civil liberties beyond the support of
the polity.

A democracy-favouring culture has to be installed among elites in society in order for

the polity to sustain. As Dahl writes, democracies would be difficult to survive if
political leaders strongly believe a hegemonic regime is more desirable than any
single alternatives (1971, p.126). Supporting Dahl’s view, Diamond et al pinpoints the
‘skilful, innovative, courageous, and democratically committed political leadership
must be for democracy to survive’ (1995, p.16). With loyalty to democracy, leaders
reject use of violence and illegal or unconstitutional means for pursuit of power and
refuse to tolerate antidemocratic actions appeared in society (Diamond et al 1999,
p.16). Hence ‘inefficacious, weak, and often militant and uncompromising political
leadership has contributed to democratic breakdowns’ in various countries (Diamond
et al 1999, p.16). Needless to say, a democratic culture must be fostered amongst
political elites so as to avoid democratic recessions.

Likewise, a similar culture entails to be established in the public. Democracies require

‘a much more wide-spread belief in the general desirability of the system’ than
non-democratic regimes (Dahl 1971, p.126). Similarly political consciousness,
democratic practices and mobilisations of organisations must be developed among the
mass society for sake of democratic survival (Diamond et al 1995, p.20).
Consequently, growth of democratic values rooted in national history and cultural
traditions in the populace succeeds in giving rise to democratic fruits in developing
countries (Diamond 1995, p.19-20). Furthermore, foundation of democratic culture
prevailing in the public provides democratic regimes with social bases of support.
Under such a circumstance, citizens tend to reject antidemocratic regimes which could
eventually lead to the collapse of the polities.

Apparently, importance of political culture on democratic survival can by no means

be rebutted insofar as the existence of democracy-leaning values and norms in society
tends to produce democratic regimes. With such a proven relationship between the
two, state of democracies in regions like Southeast Asia is clear.

Indonesia
Indonesia has undergone a massive transformation from authoritarianism since the fall
of the Suharto regime in 1998.With a constant position in the ‘free’ category in
Freedom in the World from 2006 to 2013, in which both political rights and civil
liberties are well protected, Indonesia is by all means a democracy (Freedom House
2013). Bertrand thus describes the country as a relatively healthy democracy (2013,
p.59). Aspinall notes that Indonesia is a story of democratic success too (2010, p.20).
Undeniably the presence of a democracy-friendly culture supports democratic
survival in the country.
First of all, such a culture has been successfully cultivated among elites, promoting
democratic survival in Indonesia. Democratic thoughts and values have long been
hailed in the minds of elites. Even before the collapse of Suharto, elites had already
expressed such a culture. Due to the belief that democracy is more desirable than
non-democratic systems, elites opt for democratisation, which leads the country to
experience enduring democratic success. In the 1990s, the Indonesian Association of
Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) led by B.J. Hibibie emerged as a group of urban and
educated Muslim middle class pressuring the old regime for liberalisation and
democratisation, for instance (Bertrand 2013, p.56). Hibibie later became president
after the fall of Suharto and he democratised the political system by relaxing
restrictions on political parties and media, and introducing free and fair elections
(Bertrand 2013, p.58). Since then, free and fair elections have been organised
regularly in which winning candidates serving as presidents govern the country
according to laws. No matter who the presidents are, be them Megawati or
Yudhoyono, the country is ruled constitutionally. The elites have doubtlessly accepted
democracy as the rules of the game in Indonesia and thus respected the outcome of
democracy without institutional interventions since 2001. Even elites look for
rent-seeking activities, they still obey the framework of democracy. Such a situation
has been maintaining as the newly elected president Joko Widodo could successfully
undertake his office earlier this month without much interferences from elites. As
Case writes, there is a recognition among Indonesian elites that their relationship can
accommodate one another’s interests within a democracy (2009, p.257).
Subsequently, a culture for democracy has been fostered among elites who have
followed rules of the game within democracy benefiting democratic survival in
Indonesia.

It can be said that the democratic culture has been similarly prevalent among the mass
populace. A number of survey results confirm a pro-democracy political culture does
exist among the public. In the Asia-Europe Survey (ASES), European and Asian
countries including Indonesia and Thailand were studied in terms of political culture.
In that survey, more than 89% of the 1,000 Indonesian respondents consider their
votes decide how the country is run, which is the 2nd highest among 7 Asian countries
on the table (2001, cited in Sinnott 2006, p.24). This showcases the belief of
Indonesians that their electoral choices do matter in politics. Also, 67% of Indonesian
respondents express their confidence in their parliament, which is the 3rd highest and
leads fellow states by a large margin (ASES 2001, cited in Sinnott 2006, p.40). This
implies the prevalent faith in democratic system among Indonesians. Recognising the
merits of democracy, the society in Indonesia had an active role to play in toppling
Suharto demanding democratisation by mass movements (Uhlin, cited in Paul 2010,
p.48). Artists, journalist, professionals and consumer groups were specifically
participatory in the democratic transition period (Case 2002, p.61). Even now, after
more than a decade of the transition, democratic culture is still dominant among the
public. The extremely high voter participation with usually 60 to 70 per cent of
registered voters in elections is a good illustration (Paul 2013, p.49). Because of the
democratic culture, political actions of the mass populace intend to preserve
democracies, determining its survival in the country.

Thailand
Contrary to the democratic stability in Indonesia, Thailand’s democracy has
experienced instability characterised by frequent military coups. Since Thailand has
transformed to be a constitutional monarchy, there have already been 19 coups with
the latest one featuring the exit of Yingluck Shinawatra by the military in May this
year (Pavin 2014). Case hence describes Thailand as an unconsolidated democracy
(2002, p.147). Bertrand notices a semi-democracy in the country (2013, p.133). The
newest status of Thailand as ‘partly free’ in Freedom of the World (Freedom House
2014) reaffirms the undemocratic politics in the country. Due to the unpopularity of
democratic culture in society, democracy fails to flourish in Thailand.

First and foremost, a supportive culture for democracy has been rejected among elites,
destabilising democracy in Thailand. As Paul correctly observes, ‘Thailand’s political
culture is constructed on discipline and submission to the monarchy and the worship
of a “just and virtuous” paternal figure as leader and protector of the people’ (2010, p,
109). Therefore, political actions of elites including the military, businessmen and
politicians often tend to develop an alliance with the palace on order to exert influence
on politics. The monarchy has then become a higher authority ‘above’ normal politics
being ‘on top of’ or supervising normal politics (Thongchai 2008, p.20). A ‘network
monarchy’ in which the King and his proxies like the former Prime Minister Prem
Tinsulanond actively intervened in politics hence appears in Thailand (McCargo 2005,
p.499). The nature of such politics is harmful to Thai democratisation as the Thai
monarchy is long dedicated to resisting democratic change (McCargo 2005, p.504).
Given the huge vested interests in the political system, although Thailand has been a
constitutional monarchy since 1932, the network monarchy, a coalition between the
elites and the palace, would hence actively interfere with politics in order to protect
their benefits which are the royal prestige and influence. Under such a system,
democratic institution would be hampered by military coups, in which the military
allies with the palace for interests, for example. The coup against the Thaksin
Shinawatra government in 2006 is a perfect example. Due to the high electoral
popularity of Thaksin, the royal institutions were worried that Thaksin would be in a
position to ‘mount a historic assault’ on their reserve domains which is absolutely
against the dominant political culture and interest among elites that the King remains
as the supreme authority in Thai politics (Ferrara 2014, p.32). The army thus decided
to topple the regime. Obviously, an antidemocratic culture has been prevalent among
elites, making democracy less favourable to power holders. The instability of
democracy in the country has been consolidated with elites preferring non-democratic
means to maintain interests.

Moreover, a supportive culture for democracy fails to be instilled into the mass public,
creating the long political turmoil in Thailand. There is a nationalist ideology that
emphasises a ‘hierarchical’ understanding of ‘the nation’ which justifies the position
of the monarchy as the ultimate arbiter in politics (Ferrara 2014, p.27). That the King
is continuously involved in public services targeting the underprivileged has
popularised the palace. Repeated images of the monarch participating in such
programmes are common in media, public buildings and private homes (Thongchai
2008, p.21). As a result, ordinary Thais develop a weak sense of democratic systems.
In the Asia-Europe Survey, only 38% of 1,000 Thai respondents express their
confidence in national parliament and merely 25% of respondents assure their faith in
political parties (2001, cited in Sinnott 2006, p.40). Thais thus favour a political
system in which the monarchy is untouchable. Any actions, even they are democratic,
cannot violate such a belief. Consequently, a hyper-royalism involving popular
participation and integrating into daily life of the public has emerged that civil
societies are active in suppression of criticism and scepticism of the palace
(Thongchai 2014, p.92). For instance, as Thongchai continues, there are some
volunteers recruited by the government in the ‘cyber-scout’ project tracking, hunting
and hacking critics of monarchy on cyberspace (2014, p.92). In this sense, civil
liberties are undoubtedly undermined, worsening democracy in Thailand. Likewise,
because of the pro-monarchy culture, Thais would support the current political system
which witnesses the influence of the King. The social base provided by the public
undeniably fails to limit the political impact of network monarchy, not to mention
achieving a full democratisation in Thailand. With the wide spread of an
antidemocratic among the public, democracy cannot completely evolve as a result.

Conclusion
Political culture is one of dimensions of democratisation. A supportive culture for
democracy must be nourished among both elites and public in order for democracy to
survive. Cases of Indonesia and Thailand best depict the essence of political culture in
terms of democratic survival. It is noteworthy the omission of factors determining
political culture suggested by Dahl is present. Due to the limitation of this essay, this
issue is impossible to be address. Therefore a more comprehensive research is
necessary.

Nevertheless, we should also notice culture is changeable and evolutional. As

Diamond et al indicates, political culture is plastic and malleable and it does change
in response to new institutional incentives, socioeconomic development and historical
development (1995, p.21). Given the nature of political culture in democratisation, it
is expected that political change follows cultural change. Undoubtedly, with change
occurring in political culture, a more supportive culture for democracy would emerge
to push for greater democratisation across countries in a general sense.
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