Criminal Law I March 8,1922 People vs.
March 8,1922 People vs. Santiago authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the
Police Power Justice Romualdez
Carmela V. Salazar
FACTS:
 Petitioner Gregorio Santiago was driving ( 30 miles/hour) his car when he ran over
Porfirio Parondo, a 7-year-old boy, which instantly caused the latter’s death.
 The appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by slowing his
machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the circumstances an
ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid possible accidents that might occur.
 He was then found guilty of homicide with reckless negligence, was sentenced to suffer
one year and one day or prision correccional, as well as to pay the costs of the trial.
 However, defendant contended that Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional, and therefore, the
trial court did not have jurisdiction over his person and the subject matter of the
complaint
 .This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General Orders
No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not
authorized to amend General Orders No. 58.
SEC. 2. Act No 2886” All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of
the People of the Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense."
G. O. No. 58, Sec. 2 “All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name
of the United States against the persons charged with the offenses.”
 The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore
sentenced to the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the
costs of both instances.
ISSUE:
1. W/ON the philippine legislature is authorized to amend General Order No 58 through the
enactment of Act 2886 wherein the name of the plaintiff in criminal cases will be People of
the Philippines against persons charged with public offenses
YES. For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the
Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within
the realm of public statutory law.
 That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States,each State has the
rules of criminal procedure.
 This power (police power) of the States of the North American Union was also
granted to its territories such as the Philippines, thus giving the Philippine
legislature the discretion to create and define criminal offenses.And in the exercise
of such powers the military government of the army of occupation, functioning as
a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to establish new rules of procedure in
criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No. 58.
 Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the
power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident.These amendments repeatedly
made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our present Legislature are perfectly
within the scope of the powers of the said legislative bodies as the successors of the
Military Government that promulgated General Orders No. 58.
2. W/ON Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the present case was filed, is valid and
constitutional.
YES.Act No. 2886 is valid and constitutional because:
 The Philippine government who enacted Act No 2886 has the authority to define and
punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure by virtue of the Police
Power delegated to it by the States
 Not expressly repealed by the congress
 It does not violate any provision of the Federal Constitution/Phil. Organic Act
 There is no constitutional provision applicable to the PH precribing the name to be
employed as party plaintiff in criminal cases. Furthermore, its main purpose is limited
to criminal procedure inasmuch as its intention is to give to its provisions the effect of
law in criminal matters
.
  penalized with 2 years 4 months imprisonment, to pay a fine of 1000 and pay
ISSUE:
Criminal Law I October 17, 1916 US vs ANDRES PABLO
Police Power Justice Torres
Carmela V. Salazar
FACTS:
 Andres Pablo,a policeman of municipality of Balanga ,with companion Tomas de
Leon went to Barrio Tuyo to raid a jueteng game at about noon of Oct 21, 1915.
 Upon arrival, he found tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls). He also saw
Francisco Dato(gambler), Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo(both are cabecillas
or ringleaders) but only Dato was arrested by Andres Pablo.
 In his memorandum, Pablo stated that he saw the gambler Dato and the 2 cabecillas
mentioned above.
 In consequence, chief of Police Jose D. Reyes filed a complaint in the court of justice
of the peace charging the 3 accused of violation of municipal ordinance no, 5 by
gambling through Jueteng.
 Before the trial in the justice of the peace of court, Andres Pablo accepted payment of
P15.00 from Malicsi and Rodrigo in the house of Valentin Sioson.He was instructed
not to testify against the two accused. Agreed payment was 20 pesos to be delivered
thru Gregorio Ganzon.
 Nov 6,1915- Trial. By denying his former statement, the 2 accused were acquitted.
 Dec 1, 1915 - Pablo was charged with perjury in the Court of First Instance of Bataan
fiscal
 Dec 28,1915 - Convicted under Act 2657 and penalized with 2 years imprisonment,
to pay a fine of 100 and pay costs (RTC)
costs (SC)
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of the crime of perjury or of false testimony
under art. 318 to 324 of the Revised Penal Code
 YES. The respondent is guilty of such crime under Article 318 to 324 of the penal
code since such articles are not expressly repealed by the Administrative code
when it repealed Act No. 1697.L
 Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the Novisima Recopilacion states that, “All laws… not
expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed ai nd the
excuse that they are not in use cannot avail.”
Said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are properly applicable to crimes
of false testimony.
Given that the Administrative Code does not provide for any penalty against the crime
of perjury,should it go unpunished
 NO. Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court in its decisions, was
deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal Code relating to
false testimony, comprised within the term of perjury) did not expressly repeal the
said articles of the Penal Code; and as the said final article of the Administrative
Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not explicitly provide that the
mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also repealed,
 The Penal Code provisions are deemed to be in force.This manner of
understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of false
testimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3,
of the Novisima Recopilacion which says::
“All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other
subsequent laws, must be literally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use
cannot avail; for the Catholic kings and their successors so ordered in numerous
laws, and so also have I ordered on different occasions, and even though they were
repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the decree which I issued in
conformity with them although they were not expressly designated. The council will
 be informed thereof and will take account of the importance of the matter”
 it is imperative that society punish those of its members who are guilty of perjury
or false testimony, and it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go
unpunished or be freely committed without punishment of any kind, it must be
conceded that there must be in this country some prior, preexistent law that
punishes perjury or false testimony.The right of prosecution and punishment for a
crime is one of the attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instinctively charged by the common will of the members of society to look after,
guard and defend the interests of the community, the individual and social rights
and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
Criminal Law I Sept. 20,1901 448- US vs SWEET
Sec 56 (6),Act No. 136 Justice Ladd
Carmela Salazar
FACTS:
Defendant/Appellant: Philip Sweet (Theofilus B. Steele)
Complainant/Appelee: US ( S.G. Araneta)
 Defendant was an employee of the US Military authorities in the Philippine Islands
when he committed an offense against a prisoner of war .
 Furthermore, he argued that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction.
First,Sweet contended that he was “acting in line of duty” at the time of the alleged
assault and it should not be construed as an offense under the Penal Code. He also
asserted that even if is is an offense under the Code, the military character sustained
by the character charged EXEMPTS him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals
 He was found guilty and was was given a penalty of Arresto Mayor and a fine of
P325 to P3,250 pesetas
ISSUE:
3. W/ON the Court of First Instance(City Tribunals) have jurisdiction to try offenders
charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial even though the said
offenders sustained a military character
YES. This is in accordance with section 56 (6) , Act. No. 136 which states that Courts of First Instance
are given original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six
months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed."
There is no provision in the legislation of Congress and in the local legislation, which has
the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United States military establishment, the
general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136 of the
United States Philippine Commission
The case is therefore open to the application of the general principle that the
jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character
of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in the law of
England and America and which must, we think, prevail under any system of jurisprudence
unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary
COOPER, J., concurring:
I concur in the result of the decision of the court, but am not prepared to assent to all that is
said in the opinion. An offense charged against a military officer, acting under the order
of his superior, unless the illegality of the order is so clearly shown on its face that a
man of ordinary sense and understanding would know when he heard it read or given
that the order was illegal, and when the alleged criminal act was done within the scope
of his authority as such officer, in good faith and without malice, and where the offense
is against the military law — that is, such law as relates to the discipline and efficiency
of the Army, or rules and orders promulgated by the Secretary of War to aid military
officers in the proper enforcement of the custody of prisoners — is not within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government. (In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149.) The
civil courts, however, may examine the evidence for the purpose of determining whether the
act alleged to be criminal was done in the performance of duty under the circumstances above
indicated, but should cease to exercise jurisdiction upon such facts appearing.
 Rule of Land Warfare, Sec 1. Rule 102 Rules of Court J. HILADO
(Habeas Corpus)
Carmela Salazar

FACTS:

 By virtue of the proclamation issued by General of the Army MacArthur,

petitioners were arrested by the 306 CIC and detained under security
commitment order No 385.

 Thepetitioners Raquiza, Tee Han Kee, and Infante were charged with
Espionage activity with the Japanese, active collaboration with the enemy
respectively.

 Power for Commander of the US

Army to proclaim by virtue of military necessity is not questioned. He based
proclamation on the reasons that the apprehended have violated due allegiance
to the US and it is a military necessity. Petitioners move for writ of Habeas
Corpus.

 Petitioners:

Lily Raquiza- A Emma Link Infante- A1 Haydee Tee Hankee-A2

HQ of 6th ARMY, 306th US ARMY FORCES- In HQ of 6th ARMY, 306th

Far East 493rd CIC
Counter Intelligence Counter Intelligence
Corp Detachment Corp Detachment

March 13, 1945 April 10, 1945 Feb 25 1945

Espionage Act. For Active Collaboration with Active Collaboration with

Japanese the Japanese the Enemy
Criminal Law I Sept 13 1945 RAQUIZA v. BRADFORD
 Detained under Lt. Cor. LJ Bradford and Capt. Ynez Twidle iSSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to afford relief to the
petitioners.

HELD: Yes. The affirmative and dissenting vote is based on the following
ISSUE: considerations.

Whether the war terminated within the meaning of that part in the proclamation?
[Note: The power of commander in chief of the US Army to issue a proclamation
providing for military measures to be taken upon the apprehension of Filipino citizens
who voluntarily have given aid, comfort and sustenance to the enemy, cannot be
seriously questioned.]
First, the right to due process of law is an immanent and alienable right of every
person which cannot be dispensed either in time of war or in time of peace.
Second, the assailed proclamation is either a bill of attainder or a military order that
apprehends and held in restraint violators without a trial by a military tribunal.
Third, the petitioners being illegally confined without due process are entitled to be
discharge under habeas corpus (Sec 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court).

No. “The war, in the legal sense, continues until, and terminated at the same time of, Petition was dismissed. (Six members of the Court voted for the negative and three for
some formal proclamation of peace by an authority competent to proclaim it. It is the the affirmative).
province of the political department, and not the judicial department, to determine if
war has ended. The fact that delivery of certain persons under custody of the US
Army has already begun does not mean that the war has, in the legal sense, already
terminated, which clearly it has not. Delivery within the power of military authorities to
make even before was terminates.
Criminal Law I Sept 13 1945 125865- JEFFREY LIANG
2. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction or legal power to afford relief to the (HUEFENG),
petitioners in the sad and sorry plight to which they have been and are being petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF
subjected? THE PHILIPPINES,
Due Process of Law YNARES-SANTIAGO
No. Civil Courts should not interfere. A foreign army permitted to march through a
friendly country or to be stationed in it, is exempt from civil and criminal jurisdiction of Carmela Salazar
the place. Grant of free passage implies a waiver of all jurisdiction over troops during
passage (let them exercise their own discipline). Any attempt by our civil Courts to Facts:
exercise jurisdiction over US troops would be a violation of our country’s faith. On the
other hand, petitioners may have recourse to proper military authorities.  JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) is an economist working with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against
fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as
DISSENT:
Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171.
 After fixing petitioner’s bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him
to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB.
 The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity (NOT BINDING
IN THE COURT) from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Governmen: “
“ Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:
. a.)immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.”
 Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases.
 The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its
motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorariand mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings
and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued.
 after the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases
were filed in court.
Issue:
W/ON the the MeTC erred in dismissing the 2 cases against the petitioner upon receipt of the
ffice of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is
covered by immunity from legal process
Held:
 YES. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a
certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect
in courts.
 It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of
the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time.1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of
the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
W/ON the petitioner was immuned from any legal process as stated in Sec. 45 of the
Agreement
Held
 NO. The statement states that immunity is granted with respect to acts performed by the
officials of the Bank in their official capacity. Slandering a person could not possibly be
covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty
 The commission of a crime is not part of official duty.It is well-settled principle
of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope
of his authority or jurisdiction.
W/ON the conduct of preliminary investigation is imperative
Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when
specifically granted by law.7 The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary
investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.8 Besides, the
absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor does it impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.9