FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR.

,
IRENE M. ARANETA, IMEE M. MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO
ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS, NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by its President,
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS,
CATALINO MACA-RAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO,
FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National
Defense and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.
Political Law; Bill of Rights; Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel; The right to return to one’s
country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, though it may well
be considered
_______________

*
EN BANC.

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as a generally accepted principle of international law which is part of the law of the land.—The
right to return to one’s country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our wellconsidered view that
the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution]. However, it
is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,against being “arbitrarily deprived” thereof
[Art. 12 (4)].

Same; Same; The constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners are not absolute and
inflexible, they admit of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public
interests.—The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to
the country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid
and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The
constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the
preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits
and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1988].

Same; Separation of Powers; Executive Powers; The grant of execu-tive power means a grant
of all executive powers.—The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the
three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], “the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government.” [At 157]. Thus, the 1987 constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines” [Art. VI, Sec. 1], “[t]he executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines” [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and “[t]he judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law” [Art. VIII, Sec. 1].
These provisions not only establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to
limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil.
626, (1910)] pointed out “a grant of the legislative power means a
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grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial
power which may be exercised under the government.” [At 631-632.] If this can be said of the
legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined membership of more than
two hundred members and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can
equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official—the President.

Same; Same; Same; The President; The powers granted to the President are not limited to those
powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution.—It would not be accurate, however, to state that
“executive power” is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head
of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the
laws is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not
involve the execu-tion of any provision of law, e.g.,his power over the country’s foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the
exercise of specificpowers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as
within the scope of “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be
limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power
is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Commander-In-Chief Powers: The President can exercise
Commander-In-Chief powers in order to keep the peace and maintain public order and security even
in the absence of an emergency.—More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President’s
powers as protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The Ameri-can Presidency.] The power of the President
to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President
is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds
of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way disminished by the relative
want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President
commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presi-dent’s
exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of
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the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusor declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; The President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcoses from returning to our country.—That the President has the power under the Constitution to
bar the Marcoses from returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is
manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its
members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines “as a genuine
unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence
to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws.” [House
Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not question the President’s power to bar
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President’s sense of
compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country. What we are saying in effect is that
the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately
addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to
the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context,
such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

Same; Same; Same; Power of Judicial Review; Political Question Doctrine; The present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry.—Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Goverment.” [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] Given this wording, we cannot
agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court to decide. The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there
remain issues beyond the Court’s jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for
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the President, for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We
cannot, for example, question the President’s recognition of a foreign government, no matter how
premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though
it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the
Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved
to the people.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In the exercise of the power of judicial review, the function of the
court is merely to check, not to supplant the Executive.—There is nothing in the case before us that
precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of
judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them.
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by
law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining “judicial power,” which specifically empowers
the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in
Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 448] that: Article VII of the
[1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of
powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of
checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the
privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the
authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in
this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the
Court is merely to check—not to supplant—the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to
determine the
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wisdom of his act. . . . [At 479-480.]

Same; Same; Same; Same; The President did not act arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically
in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare,
and in prohibiting their return.—We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents
were represented, there exist factual basis for the President’s decision. The Court cannot close its
eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a wellorganized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power,
urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to
mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers to
destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in thisponenciabolsters the conclusion that the return of the
Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and
instigate more chaos. As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained.
The military establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular
groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial
final straw that would break the camel’s back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to
have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

FERNAN, C.J., Concurring

Political Law; Executive Department; Presidential Power; Presidential powers and

prerogatives are not fixed and their limits are dependent on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.—Presidential powers and
prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not derived solely from a particular constitutional
clause or article or from an express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.
History and time-honored principles of constitutional law have conceded to the Executive Branch
certain powers in times of crisis or grave and imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied
to these powers: “residual,” “inherent,” “moral,” “implied,”
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“aggregate,” “emergency.” Whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as
they must if the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and
efficiently. It is in this context that the power of the President to allow or disallow the Marcoses to
return to the Philippines should be viewed. By reason of its impact on national peace and order in
these admittedly critical times, said question cannot be withdrawn from the competence of the
Executive Branch to decide.

GUTIERREZ, J., Dissenting

Political Law; The President; The Judiciary; Power of Judicial Review; Political Question; For
a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power exclusively vested in the
President or Congress, the exercise of which the courts should not examine or prohibit. The issue as
to the propriety of the President’s decision to prohibit the Marcoses from returning is not a political
question.—The most often quoted definition of political question was made by Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr., who penned the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr (369 US
186, 82 S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962]). The ingredients of a political question as formulated in
Baker v. Carr are: “It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the
settings in which the questions arise may describe a political question, which identifies it as
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or potentiality of
embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” For a
political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the
President or Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of
plenary or inherent power against a civil right which claim is not found in a specific provision is
dangerous. Neither should we validate a roving commission allowing public officials to strike where
they please and to override everything which to them represents evil. The entire Government is
bound by the rule of law. The respondents have not pointed to any provision of the Constitution
which commits or vests the determi-
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nation of the question raised to us solely in the President.
 Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Liberty of Abode; The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a lawful order of the court, not of an
executive officer, not even the President.—Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the
liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law may be impaired only
upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even by the President. Section 6
further provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out of or back
into the Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court has the last word when it comes to Constitutional
liberties.—There is also no disrespect for a Presidential determination if we grant the petition. We
would simply be applying the Constitution, in the preservation and defense of which all of us in
Government, the President and Congress included, are sworn to participate. Significantly, the
President herself has stated that the Court has the last word when it comes to constitutional liberties
and that she would abide by our decision.

Same; The Judiciary; Judicial Power; Political Questions; The constitutional provision defining
judicial power was enacted to preclude the Court from using the political question doctrine as a
means to avoid controversial issues.—The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides: “Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.” This new provision was enacted to
preclude this Court from using the political question doctrine as a means to avoid having to make
decisions simply because they are too controversial, displeasing to the President or Congress,
inordinately unpopular, or which may be ignored and not enforced. The framers of the Constitution
believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during the Marcos years
to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of
consequences or a fear that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it
refused to examine and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two
of the respondents and their counsel were among the most vigorous
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critics of Mr. Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the political question doctrine. The
Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing to
invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the political question doctrine. We
are compelled to decide what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting
earlier fundamental charters. This is not to state that there can be no more political questions which
we may refuse to resolve. There are still some political questions which only the President, Congress,
or a plebiscite may decide. Definitely, the issue before us is not one of them.

Same; Same; Bill of Rights; Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel; The right to come home must be
more preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel.—With all due respect for the majority
opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the right to travel. I do not think we should differentiate the
right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at all, the
right to come home must bemore preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel. It was
precisely the banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito
Salonga, and scores of other “undesirables” and “threats to national security” during that unfortunate
period which led the framers of our present Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the
declaration of this right. Media often asks, “what else is new?” I submit that we now have a freedom
loving and humane regime. I regret that the Court’s decision in this case sets back the gains that our
country has achieved in terms of human rights, especially human rights for those whom we do not
like or those who are against us.

Same; Same; Same; Opposition to the government, no matter how odious and disgusting is not
sufficient to deny or ignore a constitutional right.—It is indeed regrettable that some followers of the
former President are conducting a campaign to sow discord and to divide the nation. Opposition to
the government no matter how odious or disgusting is, however, insufficient ground to ignore a
constitutional guarantee.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Denial of travel papers is not among the powers granted to the
government; There is no law prescribing exile to a foreign land as a penalty for hurting the nation.—
Of course, the Government can act. It can have Mr. Marcos arrested and tried in court. The
Government has more than ample powers under existing law to deal with a person who transgresses
the peace and imperils public safety. But the denial of travel papers is not one of those powers
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because the Bill of Rights says so. There is no law prescribing exile in a foreign land as the
penalty for hurting the Nation.

CRUZ, J., Dissenting

Political Law; Bill of Rights; Petitioner, as a Filipino, is entitled to return to or live or die in his
own country.—It is my belief that the petitioner, as a citizen of the Philippines, is entitled to return to
and live—and die—in his own country. I say this with a heavy heart but say it nonetheless. That
conviction is not diminished one whit simply because many believe Marcos to be beneath contempt
and undeserving of the very liberties he flouted when he was the absolute ruler of this land.

Same; Same; Same; The government failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos, dead or
alive, would pose a threat to national security.—In about two hours of briefing, the government
failed dismally to show that the return of Marcos dead or alive would pose a threat to the national
security as it had alleged. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures
of political and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up
their apprehensions. Amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist
“factual bases for the President’s decision” to bar Marcos’s return. That is not my recollection of the
impressions of the Court after that hearing.

Same; Same; Same; Marcos is entitled to the same right to travel and liberty of abode that
Aquino then invoked.—Like the martyred Ninoy Aquino who also wanted to come back to the
Philippines against the prohibitions of the government then, Marcos is entitled to the same right to
travel and the liberty of abode that his adversary invoked. These rights are guaranteed by the
Constitution to allindividuals, including the patriot and the homesick and the prodigal son returning,
and tyrants and charlatans and scoundrels of every stripe.
PARAS, J., Dissenting

Political Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Travel; The former President, as a Filipino citizen, has
the right to return to his own country, except only if prevented by the demands of national safety and
national security.—There is no dispute that the former President is still a Filipino citizen and both
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, he
has the right to return to his own country exceptonly if prevented by the demands
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Marcos vs. Manglapus
of national safety and national security. Our Armed Forces have failed to prove this danger.
They are bereft of hard evidence, and all they can rely on is sheer speculation. True, there is some
danger but there is no showing as to the extent.

PADILLA, J., Dissenting

Political Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Travel; Police Power; With or without restricting
legislation, the right to travel may be impaired or restricted in the interest of national security,
public safety and public health; Power of the state to restrict the right to travel finds abundant
support in police power.—Petitioners contend that, in the absence of restricting legislation, the right
to travel is absolute. I do not agree. It is my view that, with or without restricting legislation, the
interest of national security, public safety or public health can justify and even require restrictions on
the right to travel, and that the clause “as may be provided by law” contained in Article III, Section 6
of the 1987 Constitution merely declares a constitutional leave or permission for Congress to enact
laws that may restrict the right to travel in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health. I do not, therefore, accept the petitioners’ submission that, in the absence of enabling
legislation, the Philippine Government is powerless to restrict travel even when such restriction is
demanded by national security, public safety or public health. The power of the State, in particular
cases, to restrict travel of its citizens finds abundant support in the police power of the State, which
may be exercised to preserve and maintain government as well as promote the general welfare of the
greatest number of people. And yet, the power of the State, acting through a government in authority
at any given time, to restrict travel, even if founded on police power, cannot be absolute and
unlimited under all circumstances, much less, can it be arbitrary and irrational.

Same; Same; Same; The government failed to present convincing evidence to defeat Marcos’
right to return to this country.—I have given these questions a searching examination. I have
carefully weighed and assessed the “briefing” given the Court by the highest military authorities of
the land last 28 July 1989. I have searched, but in vain, for convincing evidence that would defeat
and overcome the right of Mr. Marcos as a Filipino to return to this country. It appears to me that the
apprehensions entertained and expressed by the respondents, including those conveyed through the
military, do not, with all due respect, escalate to proportions of national security or public safety.
They appear to be more speculative than real, obsessive rather
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 than factual. Moreover, such apprehensions even if translated into realities, would be “under
control,” as admitted to the Court by said military authorities, given the resources and facilities at the
command of government. But, above all, the Filipino people themselves, in my opinion, will know
how to handle any situation brought about by a political recognition of Mr. Marcos’ right to return,
and his actual return, to this country. The Court, in short, should not accept respondents’ general
apprehensions, concerns and perceptions at face value, in the light of a countervailing and even
irresistible, specific, clear, demandable, and enforceable right asserted by a Filipino.

SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting

Political Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Travel; The right to return to one’s own country cannot
be distinguished from the right to travel and freedom of abode.—I also find quite strained what the
majority would have as the “real issues” facing the Court: “The right to return to one’s country,”
pitted against “the right of travel and freedom of abode,” and their supposed distinctions under
international law, as if such distinctions under international law, in truth and in fact exist. There is
only one right involved here, whether under municipal or international law: the right of travel,
whether within one’s own country, or to another, and the right to return thereto. The Constitution
itself makes no distinctions; let, then, no one make a distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemus.

Same; The President; Bill of Rights; While the President may exercise powers not expressly
granted by the Constitution but may necessarily be implied therefrom, the latter must yield to the
paramountcy of the Bill of Rights.—While the Chief Executive exercises powers not found expressly
in the Charter, but has them by constitutional implication, the latter must yield to the paramountcy of
the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando: “A regime of constitutionalism is thus unthinkable
without an assurance of the primacy of a bill of rights. Precisely a constitution exists to assure that in
the discharge of the governmental functions, the dignity that is the birthright of every human being is
duly safeguarded. To be true to its primordial aim, a constitution must lay down the boundaries
beyond which lies forbidden territory for state action.” My brethren have not demonstrated, to my
satisfaction, how the President may override the direct mandate of the fundamental law. It will not
suffice, so I submit, to say that the President’s plenitude of powers, as provided in the Constitution,
or by sheer constitutional implication, prevail over express constitutional commands. “Clearly,” so I
borrow J.B.L. Reyes, in his own right, a
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titan in the field of public law, “this argument . . . rests . . . not upon the text of the
[Constitution] . . . but upon a mere inference therefrom,” For if it were, indeed, the intent of the
Charter to create an exception, that is, by Presidential action, to the right of travel or liberty of abode
and of changing the same—other than what it explicitly says already (“limits prescribed by law” or
“upon lawful order of the court”)—the Charter could have specifically declared so. As it is, the lone
deterrents to the right in question are: (1) decree of statute, or (2) lawful judicial mandate. Had the
Constitution intended a third exception, that is, by Presidential initiative, it could have so averred. It
would also have made the Constitution, as far as limits to the said right are concerned, come full
circle: Limits by legislative, judicial, and executive processes.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the new Constitution, the right to travel may be
impaired only within the limits provided by law; The President has been divested of the implied
power to impair the right to travel.—Obviously, none of the twin legal bars exist. There is no law
banning the Marcoses from the country; neither is there any court decree banishing him from
Philippine territory. It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, the right to travel is worded as
follows: Sec. 5. The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health. Under
this provision, the right may be abated: (1) upon a lawful court order, or (2) “when necessary in the
interest of national security, public safety, or public health.” Arguably, the provision enabled the
Chief Executive (Marcos) to moderate movement of citizens, which, Bernas says, justified such
practices as “hamletting,” forced relocations, or the establishment of free-fire zones. The new
Constitution, however, so it clearly appears, has divested the Executive’s implied power. And, as it
so appears, the right may be impaired only “within the limits provided by law.” The President is out
of the picture.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The determination of whether Marcos’ return poses a threat to
national security should not be left solely to the Chief Executive, the Court itself must be satisfied
that the threat is not only clear but also present.—Admittedly, the Chief Executive is the “sole”
judge of all matters affecting national security and foreign affairs; the Bill of Rights—precisely, a
form of check against excesses of officialdom—is, in this case, a formidable barrier against
Presidential action. (Even on matters of State security, this Constitution prescribes limits to
Executive’s powers as commander-in-chief.) Second: Assuming, ex hypothesi, that the President
may legally act, the
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Marcos vs. Manglapus
question that emerges is: Has it been proved that Marcos, or his return, will, in fact, interpose a
threat to the “national security, public safety, or public health?” What appears in the records are
vehement insistences that Marcos does pose a threat to the national good—and yet, at the same time,
we have persistent claims, made by the military top brass during the lengthy closed-door hearing on
July 25, 1989, that “this Government will not fall” should the former first family in exile step on
Philippine soil. Which is which? At any rate, it is my opinion that we can not leave that
determination solely to the Chief Executive. The Court itself must be content that the threat is not
only clear, but more so, present.