FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. MTJ-98-1147. July 2, 1998]

JESUS S. CONDUCTO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ILUMINADO C. MONZON, respondent.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a sworn letter-complaint dated 14 October 1996,[1] complainant charged respondent Judge Iluminado C.
Monzon of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, San Pablo City, with ignorance of law, in that he deliberately
refused to suspend a barangay chairman who was charged before his court with the crime of unlawful
appointment under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code.
The factual antecedents recited in the letter-complaint are not controverted.
On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang Panlungsod of San Pablo City
against one Benjamin Maghirang, the barangay chairman of Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse of
authority, serious irregularity and violation of law in that, among other things, said respondent Maghirang
appointed his sister-in-law, Mrs. Florian Maghirang, to the position of barangay secretary on 17 May 1989 in
violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code. At the same time, complainant filed a complaint for
violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City Prosecutor against Maghirang,
which was, however, dismissed[2] on 30 September 1993 on the ground that Maghirangs sister-in-law was
appointed before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, which prohibits a punong
barangay from appointing a relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as barangay
secretary. The order of dismissal was submitted to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon.
On 22 October 1993, complainant obtained Opinion No. 246, s. 1993[3] from Director Jacob Montesa of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, which declared that the appointment issued by Maghirang to his
sister-in-law violated paragraph (2), Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code prior to the Local
Government Code of 1991.
In its Revised Resolution of 29 November 1993,[4] the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
dismissed the case, but ordered Maghirang to replace his sister-in-law as barangay secretary.
On 20 December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
reconsider[5] the order of 29 November 1993, in light of Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 of Director Montesa.
Acting on the motion, Francisco Samala, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order[6] on 8 February 1994 granting the motion for reconsideration and
recommending the filing of an information for unlawful appointment (Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code)
against Maghirang. The recommendation was duly approved by Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.
In a 3rd indorsement dated 4 March 1994,[7] the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon transmitted the record of
the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City and instructed the latter to file the corresponding
information against Maghirang with the proper court and to prosecute the case. The information for violation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was forthwith filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities in San Pablo
City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 26240. On 11 April 1994, the presiding judge, respondent herein,
issued a warrant for the arrest of Maghirang, with a recommendation of a P200.00 bond for his provisional
liberty.
With prior leave from the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, on 4 May 1995, the City Prosecutor
filed, in Criminal Case No. 26240, a motion for the suspension[8] of accused Maghirang pursuant to Section 13
of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, which reads, in part:
 SEC. 13. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under
this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a single or as complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in Court, shall be suspended from office.
In his Order of 30 June 1995,[9] respondent judge denied the motion for suspension on the ground that:
[T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code was
committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirangs] terms (sic) of office from 1989 to 1994 and said accused was
again re-elected as Barangay Chairman during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence, offenses
committed during previous term is (sic) not a cause for removal (Lizarez vs. Hechanova, et al., G.R. No. L-
22059, May 17, 1965); an order of suspension from office relating to a given term may not be the basis of
contempt with respect to ones (sic) assumption of the same office under a new term (Oliveros vs. Villaluz, G.R.
No. L-34636, May 30, 1971) and, the Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his
present term of office. To do otherwise would deprieve (sic) the people of their right to elect their officer. When
the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct (sic), if he had been guilty if
any.(Aguinaldo vs. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 94115, August 21, 1992).
The prosecution moved for reconsideration[10] of the order, alleging that the court had confused removal as
a penalty in administrative cases and the temporary removal from office (or suspension) as a means of
preventing the public official, while the criminal case against him is pending, from exerting undue influence,
intimidate (sic) witnesses which may affect the outcome of the case; the former is a penalty or sanction
whereas the latter is a mere procedural remedy. Accordingly, while a re-elected public official cannot be
administratively punished by removing him from office for offenses committed during his previous term, said
public official can be temporarily removed to prevent him from wielding undue influence which will definitely be
a hindrance for justice to take its natural course. The prosecution then enumerated the cases decided by this
Court reiterating the rule that what a re-election of a public official obliterates are only administrative, not
criminal, liabilities, incurred during previous terms.[11]
In his order of 3 August 1995,[12] respondent denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
There is no dispute that the suspension sought by the prosecution is premised upon the act charged allegedly
committed during the accused [sic] previous term as BarangayChairman of Brgy. III-E. San Pablo City, who
was subsequently re-elected as Barangay Chairman again during the last Barangay Election of May 9,
1994. Certainly, had not the accused been re-elected the prosecution will not file the instant motion to suspend
him as there is no legal basis or the issue has become academic.
The instant case run [sic] parallel with the case of Lizares vs. Hechanova, et al., L-22059, May 17, 1966, 17
SCRA 58, wherein the Supreme Court subscribed to the rule denying the right to remove from office because of
misconduct during a prior term.
It is opined by the Court that preventive suspension is applicable only if there is [sic] administrative case filed
against a local official who is at the same time criminally charged in Court. At present, the records of the Court
shows [sic] that there is no pending administrative case existing or filed against the accused.
It was held in the concluding paragraph of the decision by the Honorable Supreme Court in Lizares vs.
Hechanova, et al., that Since petitioner, having been duly re-elected, is no longer amenable to administrative
sanctions for any acts committed during his former tenure, the determination whether the respondent validly
acted in imposing upon him one months suspension for act [sic] done during his previous term as mayor is now
merely of theoretical interest.
Complainant then moved that respondent inhibit himself from Criminal Case No. 26240. In his order of 21
September 1995,[13] respondent voluntarily inhibited himself.The case was assigned to Judge Adelardo S.
Escoses per order of Executive Judge Bienvenido V. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City.
On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Court
Administrator.
In his comment dated 14 February 1997, filed in compliance with the resolution of this Court of 27 January
1997, respondent asserted that he had been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential
development [sic] in the law since he passed the 1955 Bar Examinations; and that he issued the two
challenged orders only after due appreciation of prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, citing authorities in
support thereof. He thus prayed for dismissal of this case, arguing that to warrant a finding of ignorance of law
and abuse of authority, the error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad
faith or that the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision. [14] He emphasized, likewise, that the error had to
be so grave and on so fundamental a point as to warrant condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or
negligent;[15] otherwise, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and that would be intolerable.[16]
Respondent further alleged that he earned complainants ire after denying the latters Motion for the
Suspension of Barangay Chairman Maghirang, which was filed only after Maghirang was re-elected in 1994;
and that complainant made inconsistent claims, concretely, while in his letter of 4 September 1995 requesting
respondent to inhibit from the case, complainant declared that he believed in respondents integrity,
competence and dignity, after he denied the request, complainant branded respondent as a judge of poor
caliber and understanding of the law, very incompetent and has no place in Court of Justice.
Finally, respondent Judge avowed that he would not dare soil his judicial robe at this time, for he had only
three (3) years and nine (9) months more before reaching the compulsory age of retirement of seventy (70);
and that for the last 25 years as municipal judge in the seven (7) towns of Laguna and as presiding judge of
the MTCC, San Pablo City, he had maintained his integrity.
In compliance with the Courts resolution of 9 March 1998, the parties, by way of separate letters, informed
the Court that they agreed to have this case decided on the basis of the pleadings already filed, with
respondent explicitly specifying that only the complaint and the comment thereon be considered.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommends that this Court hold respondent liable for
ignorance of the law and that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. In support thereof, the OCA makes the following findings and
conclusions:
The claim of respondent Judge that a local official who is criminally charged can be preventively suspended
only if there is an administrative case filed against him is without basis.Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) states that:
Suspension and loss of benefits Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a
complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall
be suspended from office.
It is well settled that Section 13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan (or the Court) to
suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of this law, Book II, Title 7 of
the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed in court. The court
trying a case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent
the accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. All that is required is for the court to make a finding that the accused stands charged
under a valid information for any of the above-described crimes for the purpose of granting or denying the
sought for suspension. (Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 110503 [August 4, 1994], 235 SCRA 103).
In the same case, the Court held that as applied to criminal prosecutions under RA 3019, preventive suspension
will last for less than ninety (90) days only if the case is decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue
for ninety (90) days.
Barangay Chairman Benjamin Maghirang was charged with Unlawful Appointment, punishable under Article
244, Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, it was mandatory on Judge Monzons part,
considering the Motion filed, to order the suspension of Maghirang for a maximum period of ninety (90)
days. This, he failed and refused to do.
Judge Monzons contention denying complainants Motion for Suspension because offenses committed during the
previous term (is) not a cause for removal during the present term is untenable. In the case of Rodolfo E.
Aguinaldo vs. Hon. Luis Santos and Melvin Vargas, 212 SCRA 768, the Court held that the rule is that a public
 official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term since his re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct committed during a prior term, to the extent
of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal
cases x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise, it was specifically declared in the case of Ingco vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. L-23220, 18 December 1967,
21 SCRA 1292, that The ruling, therefore, that when the people have elected a man to office it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct if he had been guilty of any refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a
criminal case. (Underscoring ours)
Clearly, even if the alleged unlawful appointment was committed during Maghirangs first term as barangay
chairman and the Motion for his suspension was only filed in 1995 during his second term, his re-election is not
a bar to his suspension as the suspension sought for is in connection with a criminal case.
Respondents denial of complainants Motion for Reconsideration left the complainant with no other judicial
remedy. Since a case for Unlawful Appointment is covered by Summary Procedure, complainant is prohibited
from filing a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition involving an interlocutory order issued by the
court. Neither can he file an appeal from the courts adverse final judgment, incorporating in his appeal the
grounds assailing the interlocutory orders, as this will put the accused in double jeopardy.
All things considered, while concededly, respondent Judge manifested his ignorance of the law in denying
complainants Motion for Suspension of Brgy. Chairman Maghirang, there was nothing shown however to
indicate that he acted in bad faith or with malice. Be that as it may, it would also do well to note that good faith
and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free respondent from liability.
This Court, in the case of Libarios and Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48, ruled:
In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge done in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts may be erroneous. But, while judges should not be
disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet, it is
highly imperative that they should be conversant with basic principles.
A judge owes it to the public and the administration of justice to know the law he is supposed to apply
to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than a cursory acquaintance with the statutes
and procedural rules. There will be faith in the administration of justice only if there be a belief on the
part of litigants that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of a deficiency in their grasp of
legal principles.
The findings and conclusions of the Office of the Court Administrator are in order. However, the penalty
recommended, i.e., reprimand, is too light, in view of the fact that despite his claim that he has been
continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in law ever since he passed the Bar
Examinations in 1995, respondent, wittingly or otherwise, failed to recall that as early as 18 December 1967
in Ingco v. Sanchez,[17] this Court explicitly ruled that the re-election of a public official extinguishes only the
administrative, but not the criminal, liability incurred by him during his previous term of office, thus:
The ruling, therefore, that -- when the people have elected a man to his office it must be assumed that they did
this with knowledge of his life and character and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct if he
had been guilty of any -- refers only to an action for removal from office and does not apply to a criminal case,
because a crime is a public wrong more atrocious in character than mere misfeasance or malfeasance committed
by a public officer in the discharge of his duties, and is injurious not only to a person or group of persons but to
the State as a whole. This must be the reason why Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which enumerates the
grounds for extinction of criminal liability, does not include reelection to office as one of them, at least insofar
as a public officer is concerned. Also, under the Constitution, it is only the President who may grant the pardon
of a criminal offense.
In Ingco, this Court did not yield to petitioners insistence that he was benefited by the ruling in Pascual v.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija[18] that a public officer should never be removed for acts done prior to his
present term of office, as follows:
 There is a whale of a difference between the two cases. The basis of the investigation which has been
commenced here, and which is sought to be restrained, is a criminal accusation the object of which is to cause
the indictment and punishment of petitioner-appellant as a private citizen; whereas in the cases cited, the subject
of the investigation was an administrative charge against the officers therein involved and its object was merely
to cause his suspension or removal from public office. While the criminal cases involves the character of the
mayor as a private citizen and the People of the Philippines as a community is a party to the case, an
administrative case involves only his actuations as a public officer as [they] affect the populace of the
municipality where he serves.[19]
Then on 20 June 1969, in Luciano v. The Provincial Governor, et al.,[20] this Court likewise categorically
declared that criminal liabilities incurred by an elective public official during his previous term of office were not
extinguished by his re-election, and that Pascual v. Provincial Governor and Lizares v. Hechanova referred
only to administrative liabilities committed during the previous term of an elective official, thus:
1. The first problem we are to grapple with is the legal effect of the reelection of respondent municipal
officials. Said respondents would want to impress upon us the fact that in the last general elections of November
14,1967 the Makati electorate reelected all of them, except that Vice-Mayor Teotimo Gealogo, a councilor prior
thereto, was elevated to vice-mayor. These respondents contend that their reelection erected a bar to their
removal from office for misconduct committed prior to November 14, 1967. It is to be recalled that the acts
averred in the criminal information in Criminal Case 18821 and for which they were convicted allegedly
occurred on or about July 26, 1967, or prior to the 1967 elections. They ground their position on Pascual vs.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466, and Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17 SCRA 58.
A circumspect view leaves us unconvinced of the soundness of respondents' position. The two cases relied upon
have laid down the precept that a reelected public officer is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for
acts committed during his former tenure. But the present case rests on an entirely different factual and legal
setting. We are not here confronted with administrative charges to which the two cited cases refer. Here
involved is a criminal prosecution under a special statute, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic
Act 3019).
Then again, on 30 May 1974, in Oliveros v. Villaluz,[21] this Court held:
I
The first question presented for determination is whether a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019
committed by an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a subsequent term in the
event of his reelection to office.
Petitioner concedes that "the power and authority of respondent judge to continue trying the criminal case
against petitioner may not in any way be affected by the fact of petitioner's reelection," but contends that "said
respondent's power to preventively suspend petitioner under section 13 of Republic Act 3019 became
inefficacious upon petitioner's reelection" arguing that the power of the courts cannot be placed over that of
sovereign and supreme people who ordained his return to office.
Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija that "each term
is separate from other terms and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced.
The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt with administrative
liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not to criminal liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco vs.
Sanchez the Court ruled that the reelection of a public officer for a new term does not in any manner wipe out
the criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term.
In Luciano vs. Provincial Governor the Court stressed that the cases of Pascual and Lizares are authority for the
precept that "a reelected public officer is no longer amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed
during his former tenure" but that as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by reelection of the public officer,
since, inter alia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is perpetual disqualification from public office and
it "is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act . . . that an
official may amass wealth thru graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase reelection and
thereby launder his evil acts."
 Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and the body politic. The small segment
of the national electorate that constitutes the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to condone
a crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body politic. Reelection to public office is not
provided for in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a
public officer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the Anti-Graft Act imposes as one of the
penalties in case of conviction perpetual disqualification from public office and Article 30 of the Revised Penal
Code declares that such penalty of perpetual disqualification entails "the deprivation of the public offices and
employments which the offender may have held, even if conferred by popular election."
It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault or misconduct during a previous expired term by
virtue of his reelection to office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative and not to
his criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General (now Associate Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's
memorandum for the State, "to hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability would in effect
transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official from the court to which it was lodged
by law into the changing and transient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while his
constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by returning him back to office, a criminal action
initiated against the latter can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious act having been
committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would
erode the very system upon which our government is based, which is one of laws and not of men."
Finally, on 21 August 1992, in Aguinaldo v. Santos,[22] this Court stated:
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official cannot be removed from administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application
to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine enunciated in the above-mentioned
cases. If respondent has truly been continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development [sic]
in the law, it was impossible for him to have missed or misread these cases. What detracts from his claim of
assiduity is the fact that he even cited the cases of Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of
his 30 June 1995 order. What is then evident is that respondent either did not thoroughly read these cases or
that he simply miscomprehended them. The latter, of course, would only manifest either incompetence, since
both cases were written in plain and simple language thereby foreclosing any possibility of misunderstanding
or confusion; or deliberate disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced by this Court.
While diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a commendable virtue of judges --
and, of course, members of the Bar -- comprehending the decisions is a different matter, for it is in that area
where ones competence may then be put to the test and proven. Thus, it has been said that a judge is called
upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that
he be conversant with basic legal principles and aware of well-settled and authoritative doctrines.[23] He should
strive for excellence, exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice
and the Rule of Law.[24]
Needless to state, respondent was, in this instance, wanting in the desired level of mastery of a revered
doctrine on a simple issue.
On the other hand, if respondent judge deliberately disregarded the doctrine laid down in Ingco v.
Sanchez and reiterated in the succeeding cases of Luciano v. Provincial Governor, Oliveros v.
Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos, it may then be said that he simply wished to enjoy the privilege of overruling
this Courts doctrinal pronouncements. On this point, and as a reminder to all judges, it is apropos to quote
what this Court said sixty-one years ago in People v. Vera:[25]

As already observed by this Court in Shioji vs. Harvey [1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent cases if
each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there
would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result. A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious
realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the
nation.
Likewise, in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Court of Appeals:[26]
The spirit and initiative and independence on the part of men of the robe may at times be commendable, but
certainly not when this Court, not once but at least four times, had indicated what the rule should be. We had
spoken clearly and unequivocally. There was no ambiguity in what we said. Our meaning was clear and
unmistakable. We did take pains to explain why it must be thus. We were within our power in doing so. It would
not be too much to expect, then, that tribunals in the lower rungs of the judiciary would at the very least, take
notice and yield deference. Justice Laurel had indicated in terms too clear for misinterpretation what is expected
of them. Thus: A becoming modesty of inferior court[s] demands conscious realization of the position that they
occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation. [27] In the constitutional
sense, respondent Court is not excluded from such a category. The grave abuse of discretion is thus manifest.
In Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras,[28] this Court affirmed that by tradition and in our system of
judicial administration, this Court has the last word on what the law is, and that its decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution and laws form part of this countrys legal system. [29] All other courts should then be
guided by the decisions of this Court. To judges who find it difficult to do so, Vivo v. Cloribel[30] warned:
Now, if a Judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the application of
a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or against his conscience, he may
state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the case in accordance with his personal views he
must first think that it is his duty to apply the law as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any
deviation from the principle laid down by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary
inconveniences, delays and expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge, still believes
that he cannot follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he
could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.), and he has only
one legal way to do that.
Finally, the last sentence of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics directs a judge to administer his office
with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of
arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of law.
That having been said, we cannot but conclude that the recommended penalty of reprimand is not
commensurate with the misdeed committed. A fine of P5,000.00, with a warning that a commission of similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely is, at the very least, appropriate, considering respondent is
due for compulsory retirement on 29 November 2000 and that this is his first offense.
WHEREFORE, for incompetence as a result of ignorance of a settled doctrine interpreting a law, or
deliberate disregard of such doctrine in violation of Canon 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent
Judge Iluminado C. Monzon is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned
that the commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982

BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,

vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:

In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a
judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muñoz
Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred
on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:

Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales,
Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita
R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the
plaintiff and defendant.

In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa
R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were
defendant Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and
the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the
properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no
properties were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any partition to be made,
those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to
defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of
the deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two marriages.

On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a

preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders judgment (1)
Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only children legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3)
Declaring Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot 1145
as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and
Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304 and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to
the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5)
Declaring that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being
the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa Espiras, as the exclusive owner of
one-half of each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the
remaining one-half (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene Ondez to be the exclusive owner
of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No.
3416; the remaining one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz;
(8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a
manner as to give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes
Diaz, a hereditary share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining
portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of
plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent of
two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the other plaintiffs and the
defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive equal shares from
the hereditary estate, (Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro,
O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment
shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project of partition of
the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated, and in such manner as the
parties may, by agreement, deemed convenient and equitable to them taking into
consideration the location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved;
(10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant Bernardita R. Macariola
to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third (1/3) by the first named and
two-thirds (2/3) by the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the
parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].

The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition
was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was
not signed by the parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion
approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:

The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for approval
the following project of partition:

COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case, to this
Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:

l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively to Bernardita
Reyes Macariola;

2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the eastern
part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;

4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the western
part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;

5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;

6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions
awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares,
provided, however that the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively
to Priscilla Reyes.
 WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition indicated above
which is made in accordance with the decision of the Honorable Court be approved.

Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.

(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City

(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City

While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed this
Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of the respective
parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had been made
after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the
above Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the Court that
they are given full authority to sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court,
therefore, finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law,
hereby approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such
papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of
the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to the respective
parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the respective
properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform
such other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of Partition.

SO ORDERED.

Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.

The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority
to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the
respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U).

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of
15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco
Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all
surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees
caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).

Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1),
while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon
(Exh. 2) who was issued transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh.
12).

On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq.
meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the
latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).

On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot
1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the
stockholders of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge
Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as
the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc." which we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6, 1968 alleging
four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil
Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case
No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce,
Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of
judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised
himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is
not a member of the Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for
ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).

Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on October 16,
1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia
Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be
reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second
cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in
business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be
exonerated.

The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted
an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R.
Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of
partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge
approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It
appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio
Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed,
having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the
remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against defendant
Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time the
aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr.
Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc.
Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez,
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and
Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed with the
conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was directed and
authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense
Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two
Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;

(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;

(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral
damages;
 (b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary
damages;

(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and

(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.

B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR

HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the deceased
Gerardo Villasin;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the
cost of the suit.

C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL.,

WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010 —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.
Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.

D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO —

(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]

It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection
of the appeal on February 22, 1971.

WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of
action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No.
3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action,
either in person or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers
and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].

The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of
litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or
assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The
Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA
641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed
an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.
Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended
order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8,
1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the
plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case
No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and
the same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold
on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the same for
taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of
their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in
which respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision
in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.

While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders
approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is
of no moment.

The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his
two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer
subject of litigation.

The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the
aforesaid facts — that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and
consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.

Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not
during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.

It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this
connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:

And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the acquisition by
respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS" of
which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary, was intimately related to the Order
of respondent approving the project of partition, Exh. A.

Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions between the
Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence
whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him
and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's Memorandum).

xxx xxx xxx

On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing that Dr.
Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses.
Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I
 believe him when he testified that he bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration
from the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp.
391- 394, rec.).

On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the project of partition
although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as
follows:

1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the parties more
particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was done in good faith as according to
Judge Asuncion he was assured by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola,
That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24,
January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented by
respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of respondent, his
affidavit being the only one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs.
Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh.
A, and that she gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:

1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral
Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of
title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly entered
and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);

2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola
on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco
Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of
said one-fourth share, the same having been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her
father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No.
3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).

In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project of partition
dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an
amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs.
Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22,
1963, several days after the preparation of the project of partition.

Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share in Lot
1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth
of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth
was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not
adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4).
Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of
partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other
reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as
per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the
cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr.
Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been
kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project of partition.

Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the properties adjudicated
to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any
direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of
the real properties when she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area,
location, kind, the assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence there is
 nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of
complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).

Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in
acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him
to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that:
"A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach."
And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to
have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused
it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One
who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of
the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be
such as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular
case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his actuations
open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his
court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife
were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his
official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the
lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the
integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).

II

With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1
and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in
business. Said Article provides that:

Article 14 — The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can they
hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:

1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in
active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of judge
or prosecuting attorney.

xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a determinate
territory.

It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is
part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the
relationship between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.

Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the
governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public
corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code
of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some
modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the
Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic
of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where
there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the
new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign.

Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:

By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either following a
conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the
prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion,
Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).

While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new
sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the
political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior
sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be
continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief
during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26
U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:

On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of
the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the
government which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their
country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the
intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in force, until altered by the
newly- created power of the State.

Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general principle of the
public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "

There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of
Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the
Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to
the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.

It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No.
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business,

contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from
having any interest.

Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no showing that
respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent
participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not
that kind where respondent intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was
held in one case involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition
on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it is his
official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by
reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in
contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A.
40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).

It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage in its business
operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or
another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the different
branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant
except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the
complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that
Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge
Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his
interest therein on January 31, 1967.

Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in both the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary
from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.

It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not
contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage
in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of the district
judge concerned.

Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is, as heretofore
stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is
political in nature.

Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by judges of a
property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent
Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil Case No.
3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of
litigation.

In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959
prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or
law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in
private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt
practice as defined by law.

On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules,
We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder,
particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department
..."

It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act
No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the President of the
Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own motion,
or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly,
the aforesaid section defines the grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.

And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can discipline judges of
inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.

It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ... violation of the
existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any
subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one year
without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII
is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service officers and employees.

However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial
Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law itself
state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and
under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973
Constitution). Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action
against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for the
discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their
removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.

Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service who has
original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all
administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as provided
by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating
to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and
regulations governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge belong
to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not
covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No.
2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-
Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619 [1963]).

Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is
clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are apt to be
involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them
without serious loss. It is desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his
judgment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...

WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967
from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid
corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation
of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized
that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife
therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it
became involved in any court litigation

III

With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter
disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that respondent
Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of
her report which reads as follows:

The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent associated and closely
fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising
attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not
appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and claims that all
the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for
disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that Dominador Arigpa
Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with
his name and the words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but
natural for respondent and any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face
value. "Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of fraternizing with
Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at
baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of violating any canon
of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence
his official actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible
convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa
Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations with respondent, or
that he used his influence, if he had any, on the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor
said Dominador Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from
maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to avoid
suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship constitute an element in determining his
judicial course" (par. 30, Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in
itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social
relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends (pp. 403-405,
rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did not violate any
law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by
joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he should be
reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities, because his conduct as a member of the
Judiciary must not only be characterized with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS HEREBY

REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.

Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

 Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote for respondent's unqualified exoneration.

BARREDO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I vote with Justice Aquino.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General

Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)[1] dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.
The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for
further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates
and close associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may
be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft
Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[2]
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth
of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued
a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is
also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City.The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by
elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO
Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by
respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the
amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los
Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in
the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces
and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four
(4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and is supported by respondent
for she was formerly a mere secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in her house on March 3,
1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth
Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence
of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military
Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been
known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the Boards
consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed that respondent
has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the
amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[3]

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA
No. 1379) [4] against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an
Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the PCGG,
as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano
(Dimaano) as co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit,
Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February
1979. The Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close
associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.[5]
 The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found
reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. [6]The Amended Complaint
prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of
the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim
to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a
residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of
proportion to his salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu
City and the cash, communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of
Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-
typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,[7] the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November
1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of
preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court
reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x.[8]
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state
when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject
matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner
should proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to
present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence
already presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the
monies or properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly
because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its
preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered
petitioner to prepare for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further
evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to
conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan,
however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might
take under the circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it
had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted
petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned
petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The
Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military
officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former
President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as to costs. The
counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and
land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture
cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint
Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS
EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS
NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY
CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS
AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH
CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING
BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF
THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
 B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN
BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH
THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are clearly not
applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was cured and/or
waived by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were filed after
commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even before the latter was
allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND

THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT,
JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF
RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE
EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.[12]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[13] and Republic v. Migrino.[14]
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and
cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA
No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make
the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based
on its findings.[16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under
Section 3 of EO No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to
carry out the purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover
and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to
time.
 x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO
No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate
or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x
x;[17] or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President
assigns their cases to the PCGG.[18]
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the
PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the
PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a
subordinate of former President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with
former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the term subordinate. The
Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos,
their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws,
2nd Ed., 203].

[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former President Marcos and/or his
wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate,
dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.

xxx

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during the administration of former
President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General[19] does not suffice to make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO
No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close
associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies,
agents or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is
manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten
wealth by the deposed President or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
 This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner
argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP
Board conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No.
1379. Petitioner asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of
investigating crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of
the former President.However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the
Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of
Unlawfully Acquired Property.[20]

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without
any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments
proves fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and
necessarily its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that
the properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of
his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income
without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President
Marcos.Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that
Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines did not categorically
find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or
relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal.The resolution of the
Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated
in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;[21] (Emphasis
supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-
gotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on
PCGG. EO No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-
gotten wealth amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent
behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of
the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,[24] 14,[25] 14-A:[26]

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14,
shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under Republic Act No.
1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections
or relationships; and
 (b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-gotten wealth as
contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling under the foregoing categories,
require a previous authority of the President for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with
Section 2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other duly
authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and
his assistants and the state prosecutors.(Emphasis supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while
the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General. [27] The
Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.[28]
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the
absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos. The
petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the
PCGG to investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its
amendments apply to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint
state that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have
recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary
investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent for violation
of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that
may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only
the powers granted to it.

Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in
the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to
it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President,
PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and
cronies.[29] Without these elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and
prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement
of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private
respondents only filed their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that
the parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. [30] Thus, we hold that there
was no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an
action.[31]
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct
the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation
for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with
the Sandiganbayan.[32] The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not
subject to prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]
 Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion
of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner
has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has
been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its
Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only beganto present its evidence on 17 April
1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence,
petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. [34] The motion sought to
charge the delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to
forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since
petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has been ready for trial for over a
year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for
trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of
evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged failure to move cases
such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with
a situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate
action could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic. [35]

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary
investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379. [36] The
PCGG prayed for an additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The
Sandiganbayan granted this request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March
1990. However, on the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner
until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of what lies
ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x x. [37] Still on the date set, petitioner failed to
present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint.[38] The
Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for years would revert to its
preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete
the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to
finish the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet
petitioner ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would
only prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan
to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence.This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence
against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against
private respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid
but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items notincluded in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these
items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber
.45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land
titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution. [39] Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people.[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that
all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the
same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President
Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.[41] The resulting government was indisputably a
revolutionary government bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that
the revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of
power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up
to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether
the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during
the interregnum.
 We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and
the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With
the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law
higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum,
a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a
constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno:[42]

A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by those who were
previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system, usually effected with
violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs
whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the people power revolution that
the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the
Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers,
change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal
and constitutional methods of making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said
that the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived the right of the people to
abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.

xxx

It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in
violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the
winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by
little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other key officers of the administration,
the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then
in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the
interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders,
which direct the freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance
without judicial action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of
Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the
Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption
of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as
contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,[43] petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom
Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration
orders, thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and
takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have
received constitutional approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the
power and duty of the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed
by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing
of assets or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the
authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to
include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse
by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is
instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, of which all
of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal.
This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that
argument. On the other hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal
niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The answer is
clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for
exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos
remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate
and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten constitutional
normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We
cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full
functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian
protestation of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we begin to
backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report asks for extraordinary
exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this
longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is asking for is that we
should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to think that they have a
vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of
consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is very disturbing. When
it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch
Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the
PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will
be sold. Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your
private safe.
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will
release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process
in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is
not for sale to the highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only
if it would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8 of the committee
report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it
can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale
of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not
sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what another Christian replied
when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my
nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should delete
Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
 Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment
excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,[44] Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution
were fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process
under the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the
interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights,
would clearly render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during
the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration,
almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a
signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights [45] recognized in the present
Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not
intend it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.[46] Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the
rights[47] of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under
the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the
Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it
repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under
international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives
and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if
contravened, rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted
verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.[48] The Provisional Constitution served as a self-
limitation by the revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by
the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued
by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them
by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the
Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the
warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon
proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with
respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else,
aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries,
land titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not
mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why
they also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the
money and other jewelries were contained in attach cases and cartons with markings Sony
Trinitron, and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the
steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open these containers only to find out that
they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team
seized this money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along
also the money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they
will bring that because they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items,
your Honor.[49]

Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before
the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby
armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES

Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your
Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or
contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the
communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application
 for search warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence about
that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons
were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.[50]

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how
many ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office
who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum
Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for
instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the
jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought
along also these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just
learned that these were taken because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search
warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be
contained in attach cases. These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols or
other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be
money. So the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if
they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team,
like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.[51]
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. [52] Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per
se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized
[53]

them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that
the search and seizure warrant could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any
tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result. I concur with Mr. Justice Vitug in his concurring opinion.
Puno and Vitug, JJ., see separate opinion
Panganiban, J., in the result.
Quisumbing and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., in the result. I concur in the separate opinion of J. Reynato Puno.
Tinga, J., separate opinion reserved.