Basic structure doctrine

The basic structure doctrine is an Indian judicial princi- widespread acceptance and legitimacy due to subsequent
ple that the Constitution of India has certain basic features cases and judgments. Primary among these was the im-
that cannot be altered or destroyed through amendments position of a state of emergency by Indira Gandhi in
by the parliament.[1] Key among these “basic features”, 1975, and her subsequent attempt to suppress her pros-
are the fundamental rights granted to individuals by the ecution through the 39th Amendment. When the Kesa-
constitution.[1][2][3] The doctrine thus forms the basis of a vananda case was decided, the underlying apprehension
limited power of the Supreme Court to review and strike of the majority bench that elected representatives could
down constitutional amendments enacted by the Parlia- not be trusted to act responsibly was perceived as un-
ment which conflict with or seek to alter this “basic struc- precedented. However, the passage of the 39th Amend-
ture” of the Constitution. The basic structure doctrine ment by the Indian National Congress' majority in central
applies only to constitutional amendments. The basic fea- and state legislatures, proved that in fact such apprehen-
tures of the Constitution have not been explicitly defined sion was well-founded. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj
by the Judiciary, and the claim of any particular feature Narain and Minerva Mills v. Union of India, Constitu-
of the Constitution to be a “basic” feature is determined tional Benches of the Supreme Court used the basic struc-
by the Court in each case that comes before it. The ba- ture doctrine to strike down the 39th Amendment and
sic structure doctrine does not apply to ordinary Acts of parts of the 42nd Amendment respectively, and paved the
Parliament, which must itself be in conformity with the way for restoration of Indian democracy.[3]
Constitution. The Supreme Court’s position on constitutional amend-
The Supreme Court’s initial position on constitutional ments laid out in its judgements is that Parliament can
amendments was that no part of the Constitution was un- amend the Constitution but cannot destroy its “basic
amendable and that the Parliament might, by passing a structure”.
Constitution Amendment Act in compliance with the re-
quirements of article 368, amend any provision of the
Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights and ar- 1 Definition
ticle 368. The “basic features” principle was first ex-
pounded in 1964, by Justice J.R. Mudholkar in his dis-
sent, in the case of Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. The “basic features” principle was first expounded in
He wrote, “It is also a matter for consideration whether 1964, by Justice J.R. Mudholkar in his dissent, in the case
making a change in a basic feature of the Constitution of Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan. He wrote, “It is also
can be regarded merely as an amendment or would it be, a matter for consideration whether making a change in a
in effect, rewriting a part of the Constitution; and if the basic feature of the Constitution can be regarded merely
latter, would it be within the purview of Article 368?" as an amendment or would it be, in effect, rewriting a part
of the Constitution; and if the latter, would it be within
In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decisions the purview of Article 368 ?"[6]
in Golaknath v. State of Punjab. It held that Fundamental
Rights included in Part III of the Constitution are given The basic features of the Constitution have not been ex-
a “transcendental position” and are beyond the reach of plicitly defined by the Judiciary. At least, 20 features have
Parliament. It also declared any amendment that “takes been described as “basic” or “essential” by the Courts in
away or abridges” a Fundamental Right conferred by Part numerous cases, and have been incorporated in the basic
III as unconstitutional. By 1973, the basic structure doc- structure. In Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Naraian and
trine triumphed in Justice Hans Raj Khanna's judgment also in the Minerva Mills case, it was observed that the
in the landmark decision of Kesavananda Bharati v. State claim of any particular feature of the Constitution to be a
of Kerala.[4] Previously, the Supreme Court had held that “basic” feature would be determined by the Court in each
the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution was case that comes before it. Some of the features of the
unfettered.[1] However, in this landmark ruling, the Court Constitution termed as “basic” are listed below:
adjudicated that while Parliament has “wide” powers, it
did not have the power to destroy or emasculate the basic 1. Supremacy of the Constitution
elements or fundamental features of the constitution.[5]
2. Rule of law
Although Kesavananda was decided by a narrow mar-
gin of 7-6, the basic structure doctrine has since gained 3. The principle of Separation of Powers

1
2 2 BACKGROUND

4. The objectives specified in the Preamble to the Con- power, with the result that article 13 (2) does not affect
stitution amendments made under article 368. In Sajjan Singh v.
State of Rajasthan (case citation: 1965 AIR 845, 1965
5. Judicial Review SCR (1) 933), by a majority of 3-2, the Supreme Court
6. Articles 32 and 226 held, “When article 368 confers on Parliament the right
to amend the Constitution, the power in question can be
7. Federalism exercised over all the provisions of the Constitution. It
would be unreasonable to hold that the word “Law” in ar-
8. Secularism ticle 13 (2) takes in Constitution Amendment Acts passed
9. The Sovereign, Democratic, Republican structure under article 368.”[7] In both cases, the power to amend
the rights had been upheld on the basis of Article 368.
10. Freedom and dignity of the individual

11. Unity and integrity of the Nation 2.1 Golaknath case

12. The principle of equality, not every feature of equal-
ity, but the quintessence of equal justice;
13. The “essence” of other Fundamental Rights in Part
III
14. The concept of social and economic justice — to
build a Welfare State: Part IV in toto
15. The balance between Fundamental Rights and Di-
rective Principles
16. The Parliamentary system of government
17. The principle of free and fair elections
18. Limitations upon the amending power conferred by
Article 368
19. Independence of the Judiciary
20. Effective access to justice
21. Powers of the Supreme Court under Articles 32,
136, 141, 142
22. Legislation seeking to nullify the awards made in ex-
ercise of the judicial power of the State by Arbitra-
tion Tribunals constituted under an Act[7]
2 Background
The Supreme Court’s initial position on constitutional
amendments was that no part of the Constitution was un-
amendable and that the Parliament might, by passing a
Constitution Amendment Act in compliance with the re-
quirements of article 368, amend any provision of the
Constitution, including the Fundamental Rights and ar-
ticle 368. In Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of
India (AIR. 1951 SC 458), the Supreme Court unani-
mously held, “The terms of article 368 are perfectly gen-
eral and empower Parliament to amend the Constitution
without any exception whatever. In the context of article
13, “law” must be taken to mean rules or regulations made
in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not amend-
ments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent
Main article: I.C. Golak Nath and Ors. vs. State of
Punjab and Anr.
In 1967, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decisions
in Golaknath v. State of Punjab.[7] A bench of eleven
judges (the largest ever at the time) of the Supreme Court
deliberated as to whether any part of the Fundamental
Rights provisions of the constitution could be revoked or
limited by amendment of the constitution. The Supreme
Court delivered its ruling, by a majority of 6-5 on 27
February 1967. The Court held that an amendment of the
Constitution is a legislative process, and that an amend-
ment under article 368 is “law” within the meaning of
article 13 of the Constitution and therefore, if an amend-
ment “takes away or abridges” a Fundamental Right con-
ferred by Part III, it is void. Article 13(2) reads, “The
State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges
the right conferred by this Part and any law made in con-
travention of this clause shall, to the extent of contra-
vention, be void.” The Court also ruled that Fundamental
Rights included in Part III of the Constitution are given a
“transcendental position” under the Constitution and are
kept beyond the reach of Parliament. The Court also held
that the scheme of the Constitution and the nature of the
freedoms it granted incapacitated Parliament from modi-
fying, restricting or impairing Fundamental Freedoms in
Part III. Parliament passed the 24th Amendment in 1971
to abrogate the Supreme Court ruling in the Golaknath
case. It amended the Constitution to provide expressly
that Parliament has the power to amend any part of the
Constitution including the provisions relating to Funda-
mental Rights. This was done by amending articles 13
and 368 to exclude amendments made under article 368,
from article 13’s prohibition of any law abridging or tak-
ing away any of the Fundamental Rights.[7] Chief Justice
Koka Subba Rao writing for the majority held that:
• A law to amend the constitution is a law for the pur-
poses of Article 13.
• Article 13 prevents the passing of laws which “take
away or abridge” the Fundamental Rights provi-
sions.
3.1 Defining the basic structure
• Article 368 does not contain a power to amend the
constitution but only a procedure.
• The power to amend comes from the normal legisla-
tive power of Parliament.
• Therefore, amendments which “take away or
abridge” the Fundamental Rights provisions cannot
be passed.
3 Kesavananda Bharati case (1973)
Main article: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
Six years later in 1973, the largest ever Constitutional
Bench of 13 Judges, heard arguments in Kesavananda
Bharati v. State of Kerala (case citation: AIR 1973 SC
1461). The Supreme Court reviewed the decision in
Golaknath v. State of Punjab, and considered the validity
of the 24th, 25th, 26th and 29th Amendments. The Court
held, by a margin of 7-6, that although no part of the con-
stitution, including fundamental rights, was beyond the
amending power of Parliament (thus overruling the 1967
case), the “basic structure of the Constitution could not
be abrogated even by a constitutional amendment”.[8] The
decision of the Judges is complex, consisting of multiple
opinions taking up one complete volume in the law re-
porter “Supreme Court Cases”. The findings included the
following:
• All of the Judges held that the 24th, 25th and 29th
Amendments Acts are valid.
• Ten judges held that Golak Nath's case was wrongly
decided and that an amendment to the Constitution
was not a “law” for the purposes of Article 13.
Justices Shelat and Grover in their opinion added three
• Seven judges held that the power of amendment is features to the Chief Justice’s list:
plenary and can be used to amend all the articles of
the constitution (including the Fundamental Rights).
• Seven judges held (six judges dissenting on this
point) that “the power to amend does not include the
power to alter the basic structure of the Constitution
so as to change its identity”.
• Seven judges held (two judges dissenting, one leav-
ing this point open) that “there are no inherent or Justices Hegde and Mukherjea, in their opinion, provided
implied limitations on the power of amendment un- a separate and shorter list:
der Article 368”.
Nine judges (including two dissentients) signed a state-
ment of summary for the judgment that reads:
1. Golak Nath’s case is over-ruled.
2. Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the
basic structure or framework of the Constitution.
3
3. The Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act,
1971 is valid.
4. Section 2(a) and 2(b) of the Constitution (Twenty-
fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid.
5. The first part of section 3 of the Constitution
(Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 is valid. The
second part namely “and no law containing a decla-
ration that it is for giving effect to such policy shall
be called in question in any court on the ground that
it does not give effect to such policy” is invalid.
6. The Constitution (Twenty-ninth Amendment) Act,
1971 is valid.[7][9]
The ruling thus established the principle that the basic
structure cannot be amended on the grounds that a power
to amend is not a power to destroy.
3.1 Defining the basic structure
The majority had differing opinions on what the “basic
structure” of the Constitution comprised.
Chief Justice Sarv Mittra Sikri, writing for the majority,
indicated that the basic structure consists of the following:
• The supremacy of the constitution.
• A republican and democratic form of government.
• The secular character of the Constitution.
• Maintenance of the separation of powers.
• The federal character of the Constitution.
• The mandate to build a welfare state contained in the
Directive Principles of State Policy.
• Maintenance of the unity and integrity of India.
• The sovereignty of the country.
• The sovereignty of India.
• The democratic character of the polity.
• The unity of the country.
• Essential features of individual freedoms.
• The mandate to build a welfare state.
4 5
Justice Jaganmohan Reddy preferred to look at the
preamble, stating that the basic features of the constitu-
tion were laid out by that part of the document, and thus
could be represented by:
• A sovereign democratic republic.
• The provision of social, economic and political jus- Constitutional lawyer A. G. Noorani notes
tice.
• Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and wor- to the law faculty in the Banaras Hindu University. The
ship.
• Equality of status and opportunity.[10]
4 The Emergency (1975)
The Court reaffirmed and applied the basic structure doc-
trine in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, popularly
known as Election case. The constitutionality of Article
329A, which had been inserted by the 39th Amendment
in 1975 was challenged in this case.[7] Shortly after the
imposition of the Emergency, a bench of thirteen judges
was hastily assembled to hear the case. Presided over
by Chief Justice Ajit Nath Ray, the court had to deter-
mine the degree to which amendments were restricted by
the basic structure theory. Ray, who was among the dis-
senters in the Kesavananda Bharati case, had been pro-
moted to Chief Justice of India on 26 April 1973, super-
seding three senior Judges, Shelat, Grover and Hegde (all
in the majority in the same case), which was unprece-
dented in Indian legal history. On November 10 and 11,
the team of civil libertarian barristers, led by Nanabhoy
Palkhivala, argued against the Union government’s appli-
cation for reconsideration of the Kesavananda decision.
Some of the judges accepted his argument on the very
first day, the others on the next; by the end of the sec-
ond day, the Chief Justice was reduced to a minority of
one. On the morning of 12 November, Chief Justice Ray
tersely pronounced that the bench was dissolved, and the
judges rose.
The 39th Amendment attempted, among other provi-
sions, to legitimize the election of Indira Gandhi in 1971.
Article 329A put the elections of the Prime Minister and
Lok Sabha Speaker outside the purview of the judiciary
and provided for determination of disputes concerning
their elections by an authority to be set up by a Parlia-
mentary law. The Supreme Court struck down clauses
(4) and (5) of the article 329A, which made the exist-
ing election law inapplicable to the Prime Minister’s and
Speaker’s election, and declared the pending proceedings
in respect of such elections null and void.[7]
DEVELOPMENT
5 Development
[11]
that the
doctrine has “now spread far and wide beyond its fron-
tiers.”, but that the eventual attribution to Dietrich Con-
rad is absent, who propounded the arguments in a lecture
argument, Noorani narrates made way to M K Nambyar
who read the excerpt out in Golaknath.
Implied Limitations of the Amending Power
“Perhaps the position of the Supreme Court is influenced
by the fact that it has not so far been confronted with any
extreme type of constitutional amendments. It is the duty
of the jurist, though, to anticipate extreme cases of con-
flict, and sometimes only extreme tests reveal the true
nature of a legal concept. So, if for the purpose of le-
gal discussion, I may propose some fictive amendment
laws to you, could it still be considered a valid exercise
of the amendment power conferred by Article 368 if a
two-thirds majority changed Article 1 by dividing India
into two States of Tamilnad and Hindustan proper?
“Could a constitutional amendment abolish Article 21, to
the effect that forthwith a person could be deprived of
his life or personal liberty without authorisation by law?
Could the ruling party, if it sees its majority shrinking,
amend Article 368 to the effect that the amending power
rests with the President acting on the advice of the Prime
Minister? Could the amending power be used to abol-
ish the Constitution and reintroduce, let us say, the rule
of a moghul emperor or of the Crown of England? I do
not want, by posing such questions, to provoke easy an-
swers. But I should like to acquaint you with the discus-
sion which took place on such questions among constitu-
tional lawyers in Germany in the Weimar period - discus-
sion, seeming academic at first, but suddenly illustrated
by history in a drastic and terrible manner.”
http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1809/18090950.
htm
The note is that in Kesavananda Bharati the dissenting
judge, Justic Khanna approved as “substantially correct”
the following observations by Prof. Conrad:
Any amending body organised within the statutory
scheme, howsoever verbally unlimited its power, cannot
by its very structure change the fundamental pillars sup-
porting its constitutional authority.
Limitation of Amendment Procedures and the Con-
stituent Power; Indian Year Book of International Affairs,
1966-1967, Madras, pp. 375-430

6 Evolution of the doctrine
The basic structure doctrine was further clarified in
Minerva Mills v. Union of India. The 42nd Amendment
had been enacted by the government of Indira Gandhi in
response to the Kesavananda Bharati judgment in an ef-
fort to reduce the power of the judicial review of constitu-
tional amendments by the Supreme Court. In the Minerva
Mills case, Nanabhoy Palkhivala successfully moved the
Supreme Court to declare sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd
Amendment as unconstitutional.[12] The constitutionality
of sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment were chal-
lenged in this case, when Charan Singh was caretaker
Prime Minister. Section 4 of the 42nd Amendment, had
amended Article 31C of the Constitution to accord prece-
dence to the Directive Principles of State Policy articu-
lated in Part IV of the Constitution over the Fundamen-
tal Rights of individuals articulated in Part III. Section
55 prevented any constitutional amendment from being
“called in question in any Court on any ground”. It also
declared that there would be no limitation whatever on
the constituent power of Parliament to amend by way of
definition, variation or repeal the provisions of the Con-
stitution. On 31 July 1980, when Indira Gandhi was back
in power, the Supreme Court declared sections 4 & 55
of the 42nd amendment as unconstitutional. It further
endorsed and evolved the basic structure doctrine of the
Constitution.[12][13] As had been previously held through
the basic structure doctrine in the Kesavananda case,
the Court ruled that Parliament could not by amending
the constitution convert limited power into an unlimited
power (as it had purported to do by the 42nd amendment).
In the judgement on section 55, Chief Justice Yeshwant
Vishnu Chandrachud wrote, “Since the Constitution had
conferred a limited amending power on the Parliament,
the Parliament cannot under the exercise of that limited
power enlarge that very power into an absolute power.
Indeed, a limited amending power is one of the basic fea-
tures of our Constitution and therefore, the limitations on
that power can not be destroyed. In other words, Parlia-
ment can not, under Article 368, expand its amending
power so as to acquire for itself the right to repeal or ab-
rogate the Constitution or to destroy its basic and essen-
tial features. The donee of a limited power cannot be the
exercise of that power convert the limited power into an
unlimited one.”[14] The ruling was widely welcomed in
India, and Gandhi did not challenge the verdict.[15] In the
judgement on Section 4, Chandrachud wrote:
Three Articles of our Constitution, and
only three, stand between the heaven of free-
dom into which Tagore wanted his country to
awake and the abyss of unrestrained power.
They are Articles 14, 19 and 21. Article 31C
has removed two sides of that golden trian-
gle which affords to the people of this coun-
try an assurance that the promise held forth
by the preamble will be performed by usher-
5
ing an egalitarian era through the discipline
of fundamental rights, that is, without emas-
culation of the rights to liberty and equality
which alone can help preserve the dignity of
the individual.[14]
This latter view of Article 31C was questioned, but not
overturned, in Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co v Bharat
Cooking Coal Ltd. (case citation: AIR 1983 SC 239).
The concept of basic structure has since been developed
by the Supreme Court in subsequent cases, such as Wa-
man Rao v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 271), Bhim
Singhji v. Union of India (AIR 1981 SC 234), S.P. Gupta
v. President of India (AIR 1982 SC 149) (known as
Transfer of Judges case), S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union
of India (AIR 1987 SC 386), P. Sambamurthy v. State
of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1987 SC 663), Kihota Hollo-
hon v. Zachilhu and others (1992 1 SCC 309), L. Chan-
dra Kumar v. Union of India and others (AIR 1997 SC
1125), P. V. Narsimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) (AIR
1998 SC 2120), I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu
and others (2007 2 SCC 1), and Raja Ram Pal v. The
Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and others (JT 2007 (2) SC
1) (known as Cash for Query case).[7]
The Supreme Court’s position on constitutional amend-
ments laid out in its judgements is that Parliament can
amend the Constitution but cannot destroy its “basic
structure”.[13][16]
7 Influence
The influence extends to Commonwealth Countries shar-
ing the judicial system with India. The basic struc-
ture doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court of
Bangladesh in 1989, by expressly relying on the reason-
ing in the Kesavananda case, in its ruling on Anwar Hos-
sain Chowdhary v. Bangladesh (41 DLR 1989 App. Div.
165, 1989 BLD (Spl.) 1).[17]
The High Court of Singapore denied the application of
the basic features doctrine in Singapore in Teo Soh Lung
v. Minister for Home Affairs. Justice Frederick Arthur
Chua held that the doctrine was not applicable to the Sin-
gapore Constitution: “Considering the differences in the
making of the Indian and our Constitution, it cannot be
said that our Parliament’s power to amend our Constitu-
tion is limited in the same way as the Indian Parliament’s
power to amend the Indian Constitution.”[18]
In Malaysia, the basic features doctrine was also found
to be inapplicable by the Federal Court in Phang Chin
Hock v. Public Prosecutor.[19] The Court remarked that
the Indian Constitution was not drafted by “mere mor-
tals”, while the same could not be said for the Malaysian
Constitution.[20] The Indian Constitution was drafted by
a constituent assembly representative of the Indian peo-
ple in territorial, racial and community terms,[21] while
6 9
both the Malaysian and Singapore Constitutions were en- [11] NOORANI, A. G. (Apr 28 – May 11, 2001). “Behind
acted by ordinary legislatures. Reliance on the drawing
of distinctions between the Indian Constitution on the one
hand and the Malaysian and Singapore Constitutions on
the other on the basis of the history of their framing has
[22]
been criticized as weak and inadequate.
8 See also
• Judicial Activism In India
• Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for Home Affairs in
Singapore, the concerned court considered and re-
jected the applicability of the doctrine.
• Phang Chin Hock v. Public Prosecutor in Malaysia.
• Anwar Hossain Chowdhary v. Bangladesh
9 References
[1] “The basic features”. The Hindu. 2004-09-26. Retrieved
2012-07-09.
[2] “Kesavananda Bharati ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on
24 April, 1973”. Indian Kanoon. Retrieved 2012-07-09.
[3] “Revisiting a verdict” 29 (01). Frontline. Jan 14–27,
2012. Retrieved 2012-07-09.
[4] “Kesavananda Bharati ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on
24 April, 1973”. Indian Kanoon. Para. 316. Retrieved
2012-06-24.
[5] “Kesavananda Bharati ... vs State Of Kerala And Anr on
24 April, 1973”. Indian Kanoon. Para. 787. Retrieved
2012-07-09.
[6] http://www.indialawjournal.com/volume3/issue_2/
article_by_rushminsunny.html
[7] “Constitution Amendment: Nature and Scope of the
Amending Process” (PDF). Lok Sabha Secretariat. pp.
14–20. Retrieved 1 December 2013. This article incorpo-
rates text from this source, which is in the public domain.
[8] Austin, Granville (1999). Working a Democratic Constitu-
tion - A History of the Indian Experience. New Delhi: Ox-
ford University Press. pp. 258–277. ISBN 019565610-5.
[9] Satya Prateek (2008). “Today’s Promise, Tomorrow’s
Constitution: 'Basic Structure', Constitutional Transfor-
mations And The Future Of Political Progress In India”
(PDF). NUJS Law Review (West Bengal National Univer-
sity of Juridical Sciences) 1 (3). Retrieved 2012-07-17.
[10] Jasdeep Randhawa. “Understanding Judicialization Of
Mega-Politics : The Basic Structure Doctrine And Mini-
mum Core”. Jus Politicum. Retrieved 2012-07-17.
REFERENCES
the 'basic structure' doctrine : On India’s debt to a Ger-
man jurist, Professor Dietrich Conrad”. Frontline. the
Hindu group. Retrieved 22 March 2014. THERE is,
sadly, little acknowledgment in India of that debt we owe
to a distinguished German jurist and a scholar steeped in
other disciplines beyond the confines of law - Professor
Dietrich Conrad, formerly Head of the Law Department,
South Asia Institute of the University of Heidelberg, Ger-
many....It was no mere coincidence that a German ju-
rist had thought of implied limitations on the amending
power. Article 79(3) of the Basic Law of the Federal Re-
public of Germany, adopted on May 8, 1949, six months
before the drafting of India’s Constitution ended, bars ex-
plicitly amendments to provisions concerning the federal
structure and to “the basic principles laid down in Articles
1 and 20 (on human rights and the “democratic and social”
set-up). The Germans learnt from the bitter experience of
the Nazi era. The framers of the Constitution of India re-
fused to look beyond the Commonwealth countries and
the United States....Prof. Conrad aptly remarked that “in
this free trade of constitutional ideas the Indian Supreme
Court has come to play the role of an exporter. This holds
true with respect to at least two major innovations intro-
duced by the court"; namely, public interest litigation and
“the basic structure doctrine”.
[12] Raghav Sharma (2008-04-16). “Minerva Mills Ltd. &
Ors. v. Union of India & Ors: A Jurisprudential Per-
spective”. Social Science Research Network. Retrieved
2012-07-17.
[13] “Indian Constitution: Sixty years of our faith”. The Indian
Express. 2010-02-02. Retrieved 2013-12-01.
[14] “Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors.”.
Open Archive. Retrieved 2012-07-17.
[15] “When in doubt, amend”. Indian Express. 2009-08-21.
Retrieved 2013-11-23.
[16] “India - The Constitution”. Countrystudies.us. Retrieved
2013-12-01.
[17] http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1809/18090950.htm
[18] Teo Soh Lung (H.C.), p. 479, para. 47.
[19] [1980] 1 M.L.J. [Malayan Law Journal] 70.
[20] Phang Chin Hock, p. 73.
[21] Jaclyn Ling-Chien Neo; Yvonne C.L. Lee (2009), “Pro-
tecting Rights”, in Li-ann Thio; Kevin Y[ew] L[ee] Tan,
eds., Evolution of a Revolution: Forty years of the Singa-
pore Constitution, London; New York, N.Y.: Routledge-
Cavendish, p. 169, ISBN 978-0-415-43862-9.
[22] Ravneet Kaur (1994), “The Basic Features Doctrine and
the Elected President Act”, Singapore Law Review 15:
244–266 at 253–254; see also A[ndrew] J. Harding
(1979), “Death of a Doctrine? Phang Chin Hock v. Public
Prosecutor", Malaya Law Review 21: 365–374 at 371.
• http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/
const/the_basic_structure_of_the_indian_
constitution.pdf
 7

• H M Seervai, 'Constitutional Law of India'

• V.N. Shukla 'Constitution of India' 10th edition

• Anuranjan Sethi (October 25, 2005), 'Basic Struc-
ture Doctrine: Some Reflections”. SSRN 835165
• Conrad, Dietrich, Law and Justice, United Lawyers
Association, New Delhi (Vol. 3, Nos. 1-4; pages
99–114)

• Conrad, Dietrich,Limitation of Amendment Proce-

dures and the Constituent Power; Indian Year Book
of International Affairs, 1966-1967, Madras, pp.
375–430

Indian Constitution Basic Structure

8 10 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

10 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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• Basic structure doctrine Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basic_structure_doctrine?oldid=701971436 Contributors: Iota, Raviki-
ran r, Pmanderson, Rich Farmbrough, VishalB, John Vandenberg, Hydriotaphia, Mindmatrix, Bgwhite, RussBot, WAvegetarian, Horn-
please, JPMcGrath, Closedmouth, SmackBot, Hmains, Bhavnit batra, Legaleagle86, Rory096, Gadiyar, Outriggr (2006-2009), Sanveer,
Camhusmj38, Flyer22 Reborn, Mild Bill Hiccup, Sun Creator, Bloodymurder1992, Awe sreg bbb, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Skcpublic, Mave12,
Diannaa, Alokagrawal8, ClueBot NG, AgniKalpa, Suresh 5, Wbm1058, Metricopolus, BattyBot, BigJolly9, Faizan, Pokedora, Nishantking,
Ufk iitk, Kautilya3, Sudhanshugupta006 and Anonymous: 33

10.2 Images
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main Contributors: Own work Original artist: DTR

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