MANILA ELECTRIC CO. vs. REMOQUILLO, et als.

GR No. L-8328. May 18, 1956

FACTS:

Efren Magno went to repair a media agua of the house pf his brother-in-law. While making the
repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into contact with the electric wire of
the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet
from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by
the heirs of Magno against Manila Electric Co.

CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the company was at fault and guilty of
negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of
the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON Manila Electric Co., is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

Decision of the CA reversed.

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing
more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made
possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion.
 Bernardo v. Legaspi
GR No. 9308. December 23, 1914

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila dismissing
the complaint on the merits filed in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by
plaintiff's automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in causing a collision between his
automobile and that of plaintiff. The court in its judgment also dismissed a cross-complaint filed
by the defendant, praying for damages against the plaintiff on the ground that the injuries
sustained by the defendant's automobile in the collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's
machine, were caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in handling his automobile.

ISSUE:

WON the parties may recover.

RULING:

NO.

Where two automobiles, going in opposite directions collide on turning a street corner, and it
appears from the evidence and is found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally
negligent and contributed equally to the principal occurrence as determining causes thereof,
neither can recover of the other for the damages suffered.
 Bernal vs House and Tacloban Electric
G.R. No. L-30741. January 30, 1930

DOCTRINES: The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as
a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages
FACTS:

On the evening of April 10, 1925, the procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal came from another municipality to
attend the religious celebration. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter,
passed along a public street named Gran Capitan .The little girl was allowed to get a short
distance in advance of her mother and her friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban
Electric& Ice Plant, Ltd., and automobile appeared from the opposite direction which so
frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At
that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V.
House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward
in the hot water. The girl was taken to the provincial hospital. There she was attended by the
resident physician, Dr. Victoriano A. Benitez. Despite his efforts, the child died that same night
at 11:40o'clock. Dr. Benitez certified that the cause of death was" Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body",
and that the contributory causes were, “Congestion of the Brain and viscera’s of the chest &
abdomen".

RESPONDENT’S DEFENSE: That the hot water was permitted to flow down the side of the street
Gran Captain with the knowledge and consent of the authorities and that the cause of death was
other than the hot water; and that in the death the plaintiffs contributed by their own fault and
negligence.

The trial judge, however, after examination of the evidence presented by the defendants failed
to sustain their theory of the case, however, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of
the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent is absolved from liability because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs

RULING:

NO, the death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of fault and negligence in permitting
hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger the lives of passers-by who were
unfortunately enough to fall into it. We are shown no good reason for the departing from the
conclusion of the trial judge to the effect that the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal
was due principally to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by the extensive burns
from the hot water.

On the contributory negligence, the mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There
was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother.-
No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child
running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and
her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.-The death of the child Purificacion Bernal was the result of
fault and negligence in permitting hot water to flow through the public streets, there to endanger
the lives of passers- by who were unfortunately enough to fall into it.
 PLDT v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989

FACTS:

Sps. Esteban were riding their jeep along the inside lane of Lacson Street where they resided [at
25km/hr as Antonio Esteban claimed; CA said jeep ran fast; if the jeep braked at that speed, the
spouses would not have been thrown against the windshield]. The jeep abruptly swerved from
the inside lane, then it ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation
allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Antonio
failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the darkness and the lack
of any warning light or signs. The spouses were thrown against the windshield. Gloria Esteban
allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek,
while Antonio suffered cut lips. The jeep’s windshield was also shattered.

PLDT denies liability, contending that the injuries sustained by the spouses were due to their own
negligence, and that it should be the independent contractor L.R. Barte and Co. who should be
held liable. PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte, alleging that under the terms of their
agreement, PLDT should not be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the
negligence of Barte or its employees. Barte claimed that it was not aware, nor was it notified of
the accident, and that it complied with its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and
appropriate signs.

RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. CA reversed RTC and dismissed the spouses’ complaint, saying
that the spouses were negligent. Later, it set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE:

WON PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained by Sps. Esteban.

RULING:

NO.

The accident which befell the spouses was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio, and was not
imputable to the negligent omission on the part of PLDT. If the accident did not happen because
the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve
suddenly to the right and had to climb over the accident mound, then Antonio had not exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not
have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see
the accident mound in time. The mound was relatively big and visible, being 2-3 ft high and 1-1/2
ft wide. Also, he knew of the existence and location of the mound, having seen it many previous
times.
The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his and his wife’s injuries but goes to the
very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby
precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to the spouses. By
exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have avoided the injurious
consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the
part of PLDT.

The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would
have prevented the injury. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every
day and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there; hence, the
presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident. Furthermore,
Antonio had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he
imputes to PLDT.

A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence
of such fault or negligence causative thereof, otherwise, his action must fail. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. In this case,
there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. What was presented
was just the self-serving testimony of Antonio and the unverified photograph of a portion of the
scene of the accident. The absence of a police report and the non-submission of a medical report
from the hospital where the spouses were allegedly treated have not even been explained.
 Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals
178 SCRA 422. September 22, 1957

FACTS:

Genobiagon was driving a rig along T. Padilla St. in Cebu City. The petitioner's vehicle was going
so fast not only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to
overtake the rig ahead of him. As an old woman was crossing the street, Genobiagon’s rig
bumped her and caused her to fall in the middle of the road. Vicente Mangyao saw the incident
and shouted at Genobiagon but the latter refused to stop. Genobiagon reasoned out that he did
not bump the old woman and that it was the old woman who bumped him. The old woman was
brought tothe hospital but she died 3 days after. Petitioner was charged and convicted with the
crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence.

CA affirmed the decision but increased the civil liability from 6,000 to 12,000. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the court erred in the affirmation of conviction

(2) Whether or not the court unjustly increased the civil liability

RULING:

(1) No. The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused.
The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through
reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of
his own negligence.

(2) No. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or
murder is 30,000 (at present 50,000, this case was decided in 1989).
 RAKES v ATLANTIC
G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907

FACTS:

The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, was at
work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard near the malecon
in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved
that there were two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven
rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills
secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its
sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a
certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or
upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated
at about the knee.

ISSUE:

Whether the company is liable.

RULING:

YES.

The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the slight
depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence, barring his recovery
under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not only were
they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so,
both the officers of the company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general
prohibition frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the
foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On
this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so, the
disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury
as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.

Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which
there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent
of it, but contributing under review was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to
replace it. This produced the event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track
and the sliding of the iron rails.
 Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 97626. March 14, 1997

FACTS:
Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in
connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted
to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing
the same to RMC’s account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts
in her husband’s account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of
accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on for the span of
more than one year.
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not checking his monthly
statements or the bank’s negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips?
RULING:
The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips
prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not
completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the
proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate.
The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision
of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the
latter’s entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention
to misappropriate the funds, she would not have been able to deposit those funds in her
husband’s current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts
wherein she had deposited them, had it not been for the bank teller’s aforesaid gross and reckless
negligence.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to
avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. It
means that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of damages for
the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter,
who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by exercise of due diligence.
(Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA, supra)