Acta Astronautica 67 (2010) 1361–1365

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Acta Astronautica
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/actaastro

Terrestrial biological evolution and its implication for SETI

Jean-Pierre Rospars 
INRA, UMR 1272, 78000 Versailles, France

a r t i c l e in fo abstract

Article history: A frequent opinion among biologists upholds that biological evolution is contingent
Received 16 February 2009 and, consequently, that man’s apparition is a random event of very small probability.
Received in revised form We present various arguments against this view, based on chemistry, molecular biology,
1 March 2010
evolutionary convergences, the existence of physical constraints on the structure of
Accepted 3 March 2010
Available online 20 March 2010
living beings, and the evidence of acceleration in the evolution of many features, e.g.
brain size, over geological times. Taken together they suggest that ‘‘laws’’ of evolution
Keywords: exist and may have a universal validity. We extend this view to the evolution of
Evolution ‘‘intelligence’’. We show that it is an essential aspect of biological evolution and that
Convergence
human cultural evolution is just another aspect of it. Finally, we argue that brains more
Brain size
complex than the human brain are conceivable, endowed not merely with quantita-
Allometry
Fermi’s paradox tively better functions but with qualitatively higher cognitive abilities, of the kind found
in the transition from, say, dog to man. This thesis predicts that the usual concept of
advanced civilizations merely separated by huge distances is too restrictive. It favours a
different concept, in which the separation results predominantly from cognitive,
i.e. temporal factors. This idea, far from being discouraging, offers a stimulating solution
to Fermi’s paradox and opens new ways to SETI.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Our existence on this planet proves that the evolution
of intelligent life is possible. However, this fact does not
lead to a consensual view of its probability of occurrence
on other suitable planets. Astronomers have usually given
optimistic estimates. On the contrary, biologists, as a rule,
have been more pessimistic because they have generally
dismissed the idea that biological systems tend to evolve
toward higher levels of complexity. Most leading biolo-
gists, like Simpson, Monod and Gould, have defended the
opinion that complexity and intelligence are of little
evolutionary significance and that terrestrial evolution is
too special to be generalized to other planets.
The first aim of the present paper is to briefly review
well-established facts which contradict this opinion.
A second related aim is to discuss Fermi’s paradox: is
the apparent absence of extraterrestrial visitors on Earth
 Tel.: + 33 130833355; fax: + 33 130833119.
E-mail address: rospars@versailles.inra.fr
due to hazards in evolution that make the emergence of
intelligent species very rare in the Universe, or should we
look for other explanations?
These problems are approached here in three steps.
First, arguments against a purely contingent evolution of
life are presented. Then, contingency in the evolution
of intelligence is discussed. Finally, an extrapolation of
evolution beyond its present level on Earth is attempted.
1. Five arguments against a purely contingent view of
evolution
The main message of this first part is that biological
evolution is submitted to constraints which limit its
possible expressions but at the same time possesses a
dynamic which makes these expressions inevitable [1].
This conclusion is based on the nature of biological
solutions: unique at the molecular level, optimal at the
macromolecular level, and convergent at all levels. It does
not contradict the neodarwinian theory but it opposes the

0094-5765/$ - see front matter & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.actaastro.2010.03.001
1362 J.-P. Rospars / Acta Astronautica 67 (2010) 1361–1365

opinion that this theory implies an absolute contingency
of evolutionary processes.
1.1. Argument of unicity
It is reasonable to believe that any natural life in the
universe is based on carbon in a liquid aqueous environ-
ment [2]. This conjecture is supported by four facts: the
exceptional properties of water, the absence of substitute
to carbon, the fact that carbon dioxide is present every-
where with water and buffers the pH around 7, and the
remarkable coincidence of two temperature scales in
the range 0–1001: that for liquid water and that for the
stability of carbon compounds. According to this view,
the most frequent ecosystems in the universe would have
the same starting point in organic chemistry. (However,
this conclusion does not rule out the possibility of
ecosystems based on other physicochemical processes,
either artificial or even natural.)
1.2. Argument of optimality
The idea that biological solutions are optimal or close
to optimum is recurrent in the work of biochemists and
physiologists. Many examples can illustrate it: the
mechanical properties of silk, the replication of DNA, the
ultimate sensitivity of sensory cells which responds to
single photons in vision or single odorant molecules in
olfaction, etc. One of the best studied examples is that of
the genetic code which is almost universal on Earth.
Freeland and collaborators [3,4] have compared the
natural code to its two billion random variants. They
found very few random variants more efficient than the
natural code at minimizing the impact of errors on
proteins by mutation or mistranslation. They concluded
that random factors and history are not enough to explain
the genetic code and that selection is necessary. But if a
best solution exists and can be reached by natural
selection, then it may well be universal.
marsupials, has been isolated since the beginning of the
tertiary, 50 million years ago. At present there are
marsupials looking like wolves (extinct), cats, squirrels,
rabbits, marmots, anteaters, moles and mice. This extreme
similarity shows that the number of available routes for
forms in evolution is strictly limited [1].
1.4. Argument of physical constraints
The fourth argument is that the structure and
complexity of all organisms are determined by mechan-
ical, energetic and other constraints. It likely explains
optimal properties and convergences. A nice illustration
that biology is constrained by physics is given by the so-
called allometric rules. When a variable y, for example
energy consumption, is plotted as a function of body mass
M (in kg), for different species from mouse to elephant, a
power law is found Y =aMb (Fig. 1). This relationship is
observed also for skeleton mass, tolerance to gravity, lung
volume, heartbeat, respiratory cycle, turnover of glucose,
lifetime in captivity and many other examples [7].
Interestingly, the allometric rule also holds for brains.
On a plot of brain size versus body mass, a constant slope
of 0.67 is found. But the line for mammals and birds is
systematically above that for fish and reptiles [9].
1.5. Argument of macroevolutionary trends
The idea that there could be global trends, such as a
systematic increase in complexity in evolution, or progress,
is emphatically denied by many authors. For example Gould
[10] explains that there is no global progress: first, because
bacteria represent the central trend and only a tiny
percentage of species appears on the right part of the
complexity axis; second because the right wing is an
epiphenomenon, a random walk from the left boundary of
minimal complexity, not a unidirectional impulse towards a
fundamentally advantageous complexity. For him, progress
is not the fundamental dynamics of life history.

1.3. Argument of convergences

The tree of evolution is in reality a bush with a

multitude of independent evolutionary lines displaying
divergences from common ancestors followed by con-
vergences to similar solutions. The most classical example
of evolutionary convergence is the camera eye which is
found for example in worms, octopuses and humans.
It is believed to have appeared independently many times
in the course of evolution [5]. This is consistent with a
theoretical model of eye evolution which shows that if
selection constantly favours an increase in spatial resolu-
tion, the transformation of a light sensitive patch into a
focused lens eye requires only a few hundred thousand
years [6]. The compound eye of arthropods has also been
shown to result from multiple origins [7]. Another
classical example is that of marsupial mammals in
Australia. The separation of marsupial from placental
mammals took place 100 million years ago. Australia, Fig. 1. Example of allometric relationship in log–log plot: metabolic
which was initially populated by monotremes and rates for mammals and birds. The slope of the line is b E0.75. From [8].
 J.-P. Rospars / Acta Astronautica 67 (2010) 1361–1365
Conway Morris [1] provides strong counter-argu-
ments. First, bacteria are indispensable: no right wing
without a left wing. Second, an evolutionary trend is not a
diffusion from a boundary because it may apply indepen-
dently to many species of the same group. Third, progress
is not a mere question of number of species (or number of
organization plans), this is the emergence of new solu-
tions, like larger and more complex brains, new sensory
systems (echolocation, electrical perception), increased
autonomy (warm blood, viviparity), social systems, etc.
—characters which are all convergent, i.e. were redis-
covered many times independently in different groups.
There are also quantitative counter-arguments. For
example, the geologist Cailleux [11] showed that com-
plexity grew approximately exponentially through time.
He plotted a modern version of Huxley’s stages (with five
grades: prokaryotes, eukaryotes, head, lungs and warm
blood) as a function of the time of their first apparition
and full expansion. He concluded that successive equal
levels are crossed in exponentially shorter times. Another
example is given by the size of brains in vertebrates, after
correction of allometric effects, which grew exponentially
as found by Meyer [12].
2. Four arguments against the contingency of
‘‘intelligence’’
The evolution of ‘‘intelligence’’, whatever the name
given to it: cognitive functions, behavioural plasticity,
ability to solve problems, etc. is an essential aspect of
biological evolution. This is again a controversial state-
ment, like that on the existence of evolutionary trends and
for the same reasons. The standard view among evolu-
tionary biologists is that of the non-prevalence of
humanoids as defended by Simpson [13] in his famous
Science paper of 1964. For him, the emergence of man is
just an evolutionary fluke. The same idea is supported by
Monod [14] for whom ‘‘The Universe was not pregnant
with life, neither was biosphere with man. Our number
came out at the casino in Monte-Carlo’’, and of course by
Gould [10] for whom evolution is totally contingent:
‘‘Alter any early event, ever so slightly and without
apparent importance at the time, and evolution cascades
into a radically different channel’’. These statements are
contradicted by several facts:
2.1. Humanoid features are convergent
First, against Simpson, Monod and Gould, it is clear
that all humanoid features (big brain, intelligence, tools,
culture) show examples of convergences (i.e. independent
apparitions) in many lines, in both vertebrates and
invertebrates. Let us take a single example, that of
dolphins. They appeared 30 Ma ago. They were the largest
brains on Earth until 2 Ma ago. In 2001, Reiss and Marino
[15] showed convincingly that a dolphin is capable of self-
recognition in a mirror. They conclude that ‘‘the emer-
gence of self-recognition is not a byproduct of factors
specific to great apes and humans’’ and represents ‘‘a
striking case of cognitive convergence in the face of
1363
profound differences in neuroanatomical characteristics
and evolutionary history.’’ This conclusion is strengthened
by the discovery that not only elephants [16] but also
even magpies [17] can pass the mirror self-recognition
test. Mammals and birds having diverged 300 Ma ago, the
authors conclude that ‘‘the neural capacity for distin-
guishing self and others has evolved independently in the
two vertebrate classes and that a laminated cortex is not a
prerequisite for self-recognition’’ [17].
2.2. Behavioural plasticity is correlated to brain size
A comparative analysis of several hundred instances of
innovation, social learning, and tool use in primates [18]
established that these measures of cognitive ability are
positively correlated with species’ brain volumes, after
correcting the effect of body mass. Similarly, birds with
large brains and greater cognitive complexity were shown
to be better able to cope with novel environments [19].
2.3. Trend in evolution of behaviour
Knowing that brains increase in size during evolution
and that behavioural plasticity depends on brain size, it
would not be surprising to find a trend in behavioural
evolution. However, this is a difficult subject because
there is no universal behavioural test. For example in a
maze a cockroach is as good as a rat which is as good as a
monkey. Moreover there is a non-hierarchical diversity of
behavioural abilities.
To solve this problem, Cailleux (see [12]) asked
specialists of animal behaviour to list and rank behaviour-
al performances. The various scales were found in good
agreement. Cailleux’s scale ranges from simple directed
response (level 1) to the invention of a relation between
mean and end (level 26 at midscale) and the notion of far
future (level 55 at end of scale). Then Cailleux plotted the
various grades of behavioural abilities versus their time of
apparition using the corresponding species or group of
species (Fig. 2). He found again that successive equal
levels were crossed in exponentially shorter times.
2.4. Trend in cultural evolution
We are well aware of scientific and technical progress
in recent times. It can be illustrated by the increase of
available power during the last 6000 years [11] and the
number of scientific journals during the last three
centuries. However, Cailleux [11] showed that technical
progress has very deep roots, extending over 2 Ma of
human industry, and that, here also, equal levels defined
by the stages of prehistoric industries were crossed in
exponentially shorter times. Many other examples might
be given.
3. Arguments for higher cognitive functions
The human brain is the most complex object known to
us. However, analogy and extrapolation suggest that it is
not the most complex object conceivable. For example, it
1364 J.-P. Rospars / Acta Astronautica 67 (2010) 1361–1365
Fig. 2. Cailleux’s scale of behavioural abilities versus time before present
in million years. The logarithmic time scale gives the date of apparition
of the group when a given grade is attained for the first time. The
straight line indicates an exponential growth. Modified from [11].
should be possible to increase the number of neurons and
synapses and to develop or reorganize the fronto-limbic
associative areas. It is conceivable that a more complex
brain may have higher functions, in particular higher
cognitive abilities.
Most examples of higher brain functions concern
trivial superiorities which are merely quantitative im-
provements, for example enhanced or new sensory
abilities, enhanced memory, better mental calculations,
or faster and more exact reasoning. However, non-trivial
superiorities resulting from qualitative extensions, such as
new cognitive abilities, appear as more important. An
example of non-trivial superiority would be the possibi-
lity to see in four dimensions. The human mind can
conceive the notion of hypercube and determines its
properties but, still, is unable to see it as it really is. Other
examples of possible non-trivial superiority are given by
mathematics, in particular the properties of numbers. For
example, is there a law which governs the series of prime
numbers? Let us suppose that this law exists. From
the present point of view, there are then two possibilities:
the law is accessible to the human level in a time shorter
than the lifetime of the species or it is not. In the latter
case, the law is accessible only to higher cognitive
systems.
Three consequences follow: there may be problems
(especially mathematical problems) that human intelligence
can formulate but not solve, or even is not able to formulate.
Nature itself might present aspects (phenomena) exceeding
the possibilities of human intelligence. There might be beings
endowed with super-human intelligence either on Earth in the
future, or elsewhere in the Universe.
The interaction between systems at different levels can be
described by analogy with the interaction between animals
and man. First, the intellectual contact is possible but can
operate only at the lower level (a dog can only ‘‘understand’’
aspects of human nature that are dog-like). Second, the
higher level can be seen but not understood at the lower level
(a cat sees the book but cannot see it as a book). These ideas
have been developed by Michel [20,21] as early as 1958. They
appear as the last of what may be called the Copernician
renunciations. Not only the Earth is not at rest at the centre of
the world, but also Man’s intelligence is not the summit of
intelligence. It merely occupies a modest position at the
threshold of abstract thinking.
4. Conclusions
The views outlined above can be summarized as
follows:
(1) Viable solutions to biological problems are not many
and were all reached several times independently on
Earth. These solutions may have universal validity
which supports a not purely contingent view of the
evolutionary process, i.e. the existence of universal
evolutionary ‘‘laws’’.
(2) The biospheres of exoplanets similar to Earth and
comparable age might be similar to the terrestrial
biosphere.
(3) Emergence of technological civilizations is limited by
the number of favourable biotopes (liquid water for
long times), not by in-principle limitations of ecosys-
tem evolution.
(4) Advanced civilizations may be at different cognitive
levels. Thus, they are not merely separated by large
spatial distances but predominantly by large cognitive
distances. In particular, the aims and motivations of an
alien higher intelligence would be, by definition,
mostly beyond our intellectual ability.
(5) Nonetheless, if interstellar travels have been mastered
by such civilizations, possible extraterrestrial pre-
sence in our environment might be partly accessible to
our limited means of investigation. Although admit-
tedly uncomfortable, this idea, far from being dis-
couraging, offers a stimulating solution to Fermi’s
paradox and opens new ways to SETI.
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