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Perry Nodelman
Department of English
University of Winnipeg
I began to develop the uncomfortable feeling that the words I was producing seemed
familiar. After some thought, I located the source of the feeling--another review I’d
written of a different book about children’s literature, many years earlier. Startled by
this discovery, I began browsing through other reviews I’ve done over the past two
decades--and began to realize how very often I’ve criticized the same features in
This might mean simply that, when it comes to thinking about children literature,
at least, I’m a obsessive zealot with a narrowly limited range of very fixed ideas--
ideas I so rigidly stick to and harp on that there’s no room for anything else.
Alternately, and as I prefer to believe, it might mean that, for all the advances made
in our field in the last twenty years, children’s literature criticism has changed
surprisingly little. In what follows, I’d like to point out some of the themes I’ve
returned to again and again in my reviews and to consider the implications of their
continuing presence.
1: Exclusion:
Back in 1969, when the volume later reprinted as the first issue of the journal
Children’s Literature appeared, it was called The Great Excluded: Critical Essays on
Children’s Literature. The very first sentence of the editor’s preface to the volume,
maybe the first sentence ever published in the context of serious literary criticism of
texts written for children, explained the title: “Up to now, children’s literature has
been ignored by most humanists and many critics” (7.) By 1984, more than a
criticism and a growing body of research; but I was still able to write, of a critical
book by Richard Kuhn subtitled “The Child in Western Literature,” “. . . it seems that
children’s literature is not part of the ‘Western Literature’ of the subtitle, for the only
perverse attitudes to real children rather than to the children in his books” ( 98).
Even more depressing: it was a memory of this sentence that sparked my interest in
the topic of this paper. I’m currently in the process of reviewing Virginia L. Blum’s
Hide and Seek: The Child Between Psychoanalysis and Fiction, published in 1995,
which purports to talk about “fictions of the child in both literary and psychoanalytic
Kuhn and Blum both exclude children’s literature for the same reason: they are
interested, not in how adults represent childhood for children, but only in what uses
adults make of the idea of childhood for themselves as adults. Both point out how
experienced by young human beings, and their own ignoring (or ignorance?) of
They also don’t interest Jonathan Cott, whose Pipers at the Gates of Dawn
describes how adults can derive great wisdom and healing from the reading of
children’s books. In my 1985 review, I explored the ugly implications of Cott’s view
that children’s literature, in my words, “isn’t really for children’s at all but actually
secret pop-Zen for fuzzy-minded grownups” (206) and expressed my dismay that
represent the only sort of attitude towards children’s literature that gets respect in the
significance for adults than for children” (98)--persuasive; she was showing how
others excluded children, not excluding them herself. But I expressed some concern
that Rose was prepared to reach conclusions about children’s fiction on the basis of
Far too many writers and critics want children’s fiction to represent all that is
true and good in both life and literature, as opposed to the supposed sickness
and decadence and chaos of contemporary life and of all other modern fiction.
The trouble with Rose’s argument is that she actually believes these ridiculous
comments that writers and critics make about children’s books. In doing so,
she misses most of what is interesting about children’s fiction . . . . she accepts
Alan Garner’s comments on his work as the whole truth about it, and ignores
Rose apparently felt she could safely discuss children’s fiction without actually
spending much time reading any of it. Her book about children’s fiction almost
Presumably, one excludes what one excludes on the basis that there is nothing
the very behaviour that all of them write about and most of them condemn--that adults
use constructs of childhood in ways that allow them to indulge themselves and to
commentary, I’ve focused on justifications critics provide for ignoring the qualities that
distinguish texts written for children from other forms of literature. In discussing
books about fantasy by Eric Rabkin and Diana Waggoner in 1980, I say, “They both
deal with the subject of fantasy in general and include discussion of some children's
novels, and they both become unconvincing when they refuse to distinguish between
make my own claim about children's fiction: “Much of it is fantasy, and much of it
isn't; but all of it is clearly different from adult fiction. Neither Rabkin or Waggoner is
interested in that difference, and neither has much of value to say about children's
fiction” (187). In the same review I discuss Roger Sale’s Fairy Tales and After:
. . . he refuses to admit that he has chosen specific books [to discuss] for any
reason other than his admiration of them or that his discussions of different
books have anything to do with each other. And he studiously avoids noticing
novel is a good novel, period. That appears to claim too much for children’s
fiction, but it actually claims too little--like saying a good tragedy is a good
children’s fiction can we come to understand its special power over us.”(189,
190)
Almost a decade later, I make a similar comment on the essays in Moynihan and
. . . Moynihan insists that the best children’s books are the ones that adults can
also admire, presumably on the same grounds that we admire adult books--and
judge children’s books in terms that preserve high standards for literary
children’s and adult literature mars almost all the essays in the book. (149)
This year, almost another whole decade later, in an as yet unpublished review of
She wants to honour children’s literature and justify its study by turning it inside
out and upside down--by celebrating that which is evolved and of age and
get better the more they become like texts written for adults--i.e., the less they
fulfill our usual sense of what makes a text children’s literature--then I wonder
why children’s literature needs to exist at all. Why should it, if the best texts
for children are the ones most like texts written for adults? As an adult who
enjoys reading children’s literature and thinking about it, and who believes that
children ought to enjoy reading it and thinking about it too, I have a great deal
invested in the intuitive conviction, not only that children’s books are different
from adult books, but also, that it’s the differences that make children’s books
The insistence that good children’s books are just like good adult books represents a
of such differences would inevitably mean that children’s books are less worthy of
attention. It is merely another version of the arrogant assumption that childhood and
marginalised.
expertise feel no compunction about writing it. Newcomers to the field often seem to
be working on the assumption that they are pioneers, that they have personally
discovered the idea that children’s literature might be considered from a theoretical
or analytical point of view, that no previous criticism of any standing or value could
possibly exist. In the years in which I edited the Children’s Literature Association
Quarterly, I often found myself reading submissions about Charlotte’s Web or Peter
unconscious of the fact that other serious scholars had come before them. They knew
that the journal existed, and therefore that a field of study existed--so I have to
assume they simply took it for granted that people in the field must be too childishly
about the central questions Zohar Shavit discusses in her Poetics of Children’s
Literature:
These are all good questions. Unfortunately, Shavit believes that nobody
before her has ever bothered to ask them . . . . anyone who reads the
simply not true. In the last decade, many scholars have been examining
exactly the questions that Shavit says have been ignored . . . . Shavit seems to
might have helped her to find a way past some of the glaring deficiencies of
An entire decade later, sadly, I find myself asserting that Karin Lesnik-Oberstein has
made exactly the same complaint about the limitations of existing criticism, and
“it is possible to reject children’s fiction criticism as it stands” (164), she means
all of it, bar none . . . . In order for readers to accept this conclusion, they’d
have to be convinced that the fairly short list of critics Lesnik-Oberstein actually
manages to quote or refer to do indeed represent children’s literature criticism
My review of Lesnik-Oberstein hints that, unlike Shavit, she might have been, not
simply ignorant of the work of other critics, but just ignoring it. She lists Shavit, for
instance, in her bibliography, but never actually discusses Shavit’s work (which might
well challenge her general summation of the characteristics of criticism); and what she
does write often sounds suspiciously like work done earlier, by me personally and by
other critics unnamed in her book. C.S. Lewis once famously suggested that
children’s literature is a kind of writing people do when they want to leave things out;
One of the central idiosyncrasies of this book about theory is Hunt’s assertion
that he has deliberately not named many of the theorists whose work he
make them fit into the invisible jackboots of his own liberal humanist
mythology. (38)
and perceptions of one Peter Hunt. In choosing the excerpts that he has, and
in providing the contexts that he does, Hunt retains perfect control over the
proceedings. It’s very much Hunt’s show, and he’s very much in control. (
192)
I go on in this review to offer a long list of excluded but important names, just as I did
ignorance about work of potential importance to their own pursuits and even of
ignoring work they surely must know that might challenge their own theories. But the
children’s literature to indulge in such activities. It may mean merely that the field is
still too young to have firmly established means of circulating information about new
research--that ignorance of other work is all too possible and even still mildly
respectable. But I suspect there’s something about children’s literature itself that
children theoretically see them. Un-innocent adults who find themselves attracted to it
one knows beyond innocence as wisdom. People with that bias might well tend to
feel it wise, or at least acceptable, to ignore knowledge they actually do have that
might conflict with their satisfyingly totalizing constructs both of children literature and
of its criticism.
At any rate, it’s certainly true that I’ve accused much of the criticism I’ve
reviewed of revealing a kind of subjective bias and blindness that might well be
of perception of the subjectivity of one’s own perceptions. Very early on, in 1979, I
say that “the value of [Diana] Waggoner's bibliography [of fantasy literature] is
limited because it represents, not ‘all of fantasy’ [as she claims], but her own critical
prejudices. The result is not a guide but a canon” (7). Later, I say that “Shavit’s
shallowness merges from her blindness to her own semiological assumptions; her
failure to perceive her own unconscious attitudes” (179-80). I also say, “Her
conviction that people before the seventeenth century had no idea of childhood is
merely a blindness to the possibility of any idea of childhood but her own; she
blandly accepts ‘the increasing awareness of adults of differences between
themselves and children’ [38] without considering that this ‘awareness’--or faith?--may
sufficient individuality of the sort that privileges the values of liberal, humanist,
middle class intellectuals like himself (and, I blush to admit it, like me)--a
that Hunt and I share. Hunt complains that [Terry] Eagleton’s analysis
“suggests that all loving and caring teachers, doing their best to educate their
and to pass on the best and purest of values, are in fact a bunch of jackbooted
fascists” (147); perhaps he needs to take a more careful look down at his own
feet. (38)
acknowledge and celebrate the fact that they’re doing it. Lack of the sophistication of
writers, I describe a series of insistences that serious analysis of literature for children
would be destructive:
In The Openhearted Audience, Pamela Travers says that the qualities of good
writing “can’t be described,” and Ivan Southall says they are “almost
says, “Too much theorizing worries me,” and Susan Cooper asks, “How can
we define what we are doing? How can a fish describe what it is like to
swim?”
I doubt that a fish can. But I am not a fish. As an unrepentant critic and
enough to throw them back rather than laying them out on slabs for filleting.
The point is, I am a reader, not a writer of fiction. My annoyance with all
limiting for readers. We can, and should, think about the qualities of good
While I’m that I haven’t had to confront this kind of celebration of the joys of
thoughtlessness in my more recent reviews, I can’t help noticing that it’s still endemic.
Many of the participants in a recent discussion on the Childlit listserv on the internet
simply took it for granted that when it comes to reading children’s literature, pleasure
and analysis are directly antithetical, and never present at the same time. Analysis is
death, still, for some people, just as it was for Wordsworth; good readers are
assume that children are not, or should not be so. The idea that a reviewer’s
assumptions about the innocence of children is insulting to the many young human
beings who can and do know better recurs in review after review:
. . . Kuhn’s idea that all children are enigmatic is like the idea of some men that
all women are wonderfully sweet and gentle and passive . . . In suggesting
that children are better than adults, he makes them less than human, for he
sees them as ideas rather than as people, and he praises them for what are in
literature with the qualities of childhood itself, and he makes it quite clear that
he thinks children are wonderful exactly because they are limited. Blessed by
a lack of knowledge and experience, he suggests, they can transcend the petty
readers . . . . (206).
[Jack Zipes’s] conviction that these clearly outmoded [fairy] tales are still
harmful not only contradicts his own faith that they represent now outmoded
children have not been indoctrinated by the world around them to find
Perrault’s sexism palatable, then why assume that this peculiarly limited view of
the world should be so attractive to them that they will automatically accept it
of good children’s books to educate their literary tastes causes her to miss the
The worst flaw of [Elliot] Gose’s book is the disdain it frequently expresses for
the intended audience of the books he discusses. He suggests that children are
somehow lower on the ladder of evolution than adults when he says that a
well as to the outlook of primitive man” (21) and comes right out and says it
animals. They are closer to the animal state from which humanity evolved and
can empathize with animals more readily than adults can” [182]. I happily
accept the unfortunate fact that many adults do, consciously or not, believe just
that; but I’ve rarely read so distastefully blatant a statement of it. (155)
elsewhere in his book] and posits, instead, the child as unique self: an
triumphantly escapes all adult attempts at control, who remains at any point in
his childhood as innocent of adult culture as a baby newly emerged from the
womb . . . [This is] a simplistic and limited image of what children are and of
how they fit within the network of the culture they belong to. (38)
The innocence of imaginary child readers is, of course, the key distinguishing quality
of most adult discussions of children’s books, which centre around questions about
whether books might be too sophisticated or too complex for children. But it’s
Of Children’s Literature
A third thread of celebration of innocence involves children’s books
themselves: the insistence that they are indeed simple, one-sided, unambivalently and
joyfully optimistic in their view of life. Occasionally, as with Rose, children’s books
she condemns just about all . . . children’s books because they are simple,
are, of course--but far fewer of them than many adults like to admit. Rose
ignores the ambiguity that underlies the apparent simplicity of most good
terms of the quite limited and often wrongheaded assertions that critics and
But more often, the presumed innocence of books is celebrated as wisdom, as in Cott:
than do many adult ones, at least before their climaxes; they are books which
allow the simplicities of innocence. That’s why Cott insists they are wise, for
he’s one of that breed who believe that complexity is just too damned
confusing to be real; after all, if God had wanted us to think, he would have
The insistence that children’s books are innocently wise leads to yet another
“irony and tragedy [may be] inherently unworkable as modes for children’s books.”
and said, “That effectively ignores the irony even in simple picture books like Pat
White’s Charlotte’s Web and Cormier’s I Am the Cheese” (149). This directly echoes
Rose claims children’s literature is without irony--yet even simple picture books
like Pat Hutchins’s Rosie’s Walk demand a perception of irony before they can
and thus ignores the way in which works like The Stone Book and Where the
And that, in turn is echoed by yet another comment, this one about Shavit’s idea that
Perrault’s fairy tales imply both an innocent child reader and an adult with a sense of
irony:
The serious flaw in this argument is Shavit’s own assumption that children are
always naive and the only adults can appreciate irony . . . .Where the theory
children are incapable of understanding anything but simple formulas, and that
innocuous stories that he constantly misses obvious ironies. In fact, the least
persuasive aspect of his interpretations is his refusal, or perhaps inability, to notice the
books nicely sums up the central paradox this paper is forcing me to recognize: the
fact that critics’ faulty perceptions of the simplicity of children, or of children’s books,
deliberate ingenuousness: “In fact,” I say, “Rose is herself guilty of the unquestioning
innocence that she says, quite rightly, is not in fact a quality of children.” That critics
should so often be innocent--that they should so often replicate the qualities of and
assumptions about childhood they themselves find in the texts they explore, so that
their criticism reproduces the attitudes it examines in very process of analysing and
enduring strength of the most common cultural assumptions that control our thinking
about children and the objects of childhood. Like all manifestations of powerful
would reveal the return of those very ideas about childhood I see it as my purpose to
First, we need to be aware of the tenacity with which innocence returns to work
which has tried to move past it, and to be militant in our efforts to prevent it from
doing so: we won’t produce excellent scholarship unless we force ourselves to move
beyond all forms of innocence about children and about children’s literature, and to
keep ourselves open both to the subtleties and complexities of texts written for
children and to their subtle and complex relationships with an intricate network of
forces work by manipulating those most importantly affected by them into a lack of
awareness of them and of their implications. The tenacity with which innocence
reinserts itself into supposedly un-innocent scholarship therefore suggests that its
continuing existence (and our own lack of awareness of it) must be of great value to
consciously or unconsciously as if children are innocent, and that even very learned
scholars approach texts written for children with an innocent simplicity. Who benefits
from the exclusion of children’s literature from the canon of respectably researchable
texts, of children from consideration as an audience for children’s books? How much
children’s books that might well allow them to go on doing their work of constructing
children in ways that benefit powerful adults and powerful economic forces that might
obligation, therefore, to figure out what these powerful forces are, and to understand
how they operate. They may well not be good for scholarship. They may well not be
Review of Virginia L. Blum, Hide and Seek: The Child between Psychoanalysis and
Fiction (Urbana and Chicago, U of Chicago P, 1996), for The Lion and the Unicorn.
In progress:
and the Fictional Child (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Children’s Literature
“Hunt with a Canon,” review of Peter Hunt, ed., Children’s Literature: the
Development of Criticism (London and New York: Routledge, 1990) and Literature
Fiction (London and New York: Longman, 1992. Children’s Literature 22 (1994):
173-178.
“The Second Kind of Criticism,” a review of Peter Hunt’s Criticism, Theory, &
37-39.
“Take One before Bedtime--and Wake Up on Another Level" a review of Eliot Gose’s
Mere Creatures: A Study of Modern Fantasy Tales for Children, Children’s Literature
Science Fiction: The Mythos of a New Romance. Science Fiction Studies 13,2 (July
1986):216-218.
“Editor’s Comment: Signs of Confusion.” Children’s Literature Association Quarterly
“Cott im Himmel,” review article on Jonathan Cott’s The Pipers at the Gates of Dawn,
Review of two books by Jack Zipes about fairy tales, Children’s Literature Association
about Jack Zipes’ Breaking the Magic Spell. Children’s Literature 11 (1983).
192.
Reviews of books by Roger Sale, Diana Waggoner, Eric S. Rabkin, Max Luthi, and